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18 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
20 <title>Free Culture
</title>
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24 <subtitle>Version
2004-
02-
10</subtitle>
28 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
29 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
37 This version of Free Culture is licensed
38 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
39 non-commercial use of this work,
40 so long as attribution is given.
41 For more information about the license,
42 click the icon above, or visit
43 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
48 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
51 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
52 professor of law and a John A.
53 Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar at Stanford Law School, is founder of the
54 Stanford Center for Internet and Society and is chairman of the Creative
56 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random
58 House,
2001) and Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig
59 is a member of the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free Software
61 Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software, twice listed in
63 "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific American's "
50 visionaries." A
64 graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law
65 School, Lessig clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court
76 You can buy a copy of this book
77 by clicking on one of the links below:
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82 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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83 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
89 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
90 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
92 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
104 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
105 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
106 LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
107 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
109 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
117 Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
120 Copyright © Lawrence Lessig,
122 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
123 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright ©
2003 by The New York Times Co.
124 Reprinted with permission.
125 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
126 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
127 Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
128 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
130 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
131 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
134 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
135 1. Intellectual property--United States.
2. Mass media--United States.
136 3. Technological innovations--United States.
4. Art--United States. I. Title.
139 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
140 Printed in the United States of America
142 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
143 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may
144 be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or
145 by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the
146 prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.
147 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other
148 means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please
150 only authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage electronic
151 piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
156 To Eric Eldred--whose work first drew me
157 to this cause, and for whom
161 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
162 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
163 <graphic fileref=
"webcc.gif"></graphic>
169 <title>List of figures
</title>
176 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
177 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
178 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
179 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
184 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
188 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
189 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
190 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
191 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
192 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
193 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
197 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
198 2 Architecture and Law: Force
199 2 Market: Concentration
202 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
203 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
204 2 Constraining Creators
205 2 Constraining Innovators
206 2 Corrupting Citizens
208 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
209 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
213 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
214 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
216 2 1. More Formalities
217 3 Registration and Renewal
220 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
221 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
222 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
231 <chapter id=
"c-preface">
232 <title>PREFACE
</title>
234 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
235 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
236 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
240 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
241 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
242 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
243 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
244 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
249 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book--that
251 or "code," functioned as a kind of law--and his review suggested
252 the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we could always
253 "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a switch and be back
254 home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and any troubles
255 that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
258 Pogue might have been right in
1999--I'm skeptical, but maybe.
259 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
260 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
262 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
263 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
264 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
267 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
268 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
269 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
270 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
273 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
274 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"--not
275 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
277 movement
<footnote><para>
278 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 ( Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
279 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
280 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free culture
281 supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this directly by
282 granting intellectual property rights. But it does so indirectly by
284 the reach of those rights, to guarantee that follow-on creators and
285 innovators remain as free as possible from the control of the past. A free
286 culture is not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a
287 market in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
288 "permission culture"--a culture in which creators get to create only
289 with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the past.
292 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
293 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
294 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
295 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
297 then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the changes I
298 describe affect values that both sides of our political culture deem
302 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
303 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
304 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
305 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
306 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside
307 CodePink Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association,
309 liberal Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he
311 perhaps most simply just what was at stake: the concentration
312 of power. And as he asked,
316 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration
317 of power--political, corporate, media, cultural--should be
319 to conservatives. The diffusion of power through local
321 thereby encouraging individual participation, is the essence
322 of federalism and the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para>
323 William Safire, "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
328 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
329 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
331 in ownership, but more importantly, if because less visibly, on the
332 concentration of power produced by a radical change in the effective
333 scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is altering the way our
334 culture gets made; that change should worry you--whether or not you
335 care about the Internet, and whether you're on Safire's left or on his right.
336 The inspiration for the title and for much of the argument of
337 this book comes from the work of Richard Stallman and the Free
339 Foundation. Indeed, as I reread Stallman's own work, especially
340 the essays in Free Software, Free Society, I realize that all of the
342 insights I develop here are insights Stallman described decades
343 ago. One could thus well argue that this work is "merely" derivative.
346 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
347 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this book
348 than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been its own.
349 Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of values. Like
350 Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And like Stallman,
351 I believe those are values of our past that will need to be defended in
352 our future. A free culture has been our past, but it will only be our
354 if we change the path we are on right now.
356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
357 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
358 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
359 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
360 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
361 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
365 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
367 anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is filled
368 with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract that get
369 enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its
371 becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism
372 in the property rights that define it. That is what I fear about our
374 today. It is against that extremism that this book is written.
378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
381 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
382 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
384 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
385 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
386 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
387 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
388 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
389 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
392 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
393 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
394 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
395 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
396 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
397 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
400 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
401 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
402 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
405 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
406 law--deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
407 by the most important legal thinkers of our past--mattered. If
408 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
409 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
410 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
411 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
414 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
415 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
416 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
417 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
418 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
419 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
420 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
421 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
422 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
425 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
426 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
427 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
428 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
429 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
430 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
431 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
432 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
436 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
437 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
438 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
439 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
440 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
441 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
442 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
443 the public has a just claim.
<footnote><para>
444 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find that
445 there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land effectively
447 the value of the Causbys' land. This example was suggested to me
448 by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty:
449 Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship," Stanford Law
451 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul Goldstein, Real Property
453 N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
1112
13.
458 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
461 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
462 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
463 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
464 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
465 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
466 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
467 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
468 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
469 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
472 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
473 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
474 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
475 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
476 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
477 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
478 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
479 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
480 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
481 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
482 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
483 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
484 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
485 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else--the power of
486 "common sense"--would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
487 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
490 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
491 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
492 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
493 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
494 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
495 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
496 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
497 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
498 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
499 understanding of radio.
500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
503 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
504 for his most significant invention--FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
505 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
506 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
507 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
508 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
509 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
510 much less transmitter power and static.
513 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting
514 of the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in
515 New York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
516 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
518 miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and then with a
519 clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an electrical
521 it produced the sound of an announcer's voice: "This is amateur
522 station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on frequency
524 at two and a half meters."
527 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
531 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
532 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was
533 crumpled and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling
534 forest fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a
536 solo and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was
537 projected with a live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
538 "music box."
<footnote><para>
539 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
540 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
545 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a
546 vastly superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention,
548 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the
549 then dominant AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio
550 stations across the United States, but the stations in large cities were all
551 owned by a handful of networks.
552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
555 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
556 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
557 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
558 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
559 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
563 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
564 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a revolution--
565 start up a whole damn new industry to compete with RCA.
<footnote><para>
566 See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," First
568 Church of America, at www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
570 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
575 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the
577 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have
578 been a superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one
584 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the
585 weight of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices
586 to subdue this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to
587 develop unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio
588 power . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted
589 AM system on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>
595 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
596 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
597 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
598 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
599 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
600 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM--principally by moving FM
601 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
602 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
603 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
604 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
605 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
610 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
611 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
612 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
613 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
619 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
620 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
621 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
622 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
623 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
624 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
625 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
629 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
631 patents. After incorporating FM technology into the emerging
632 standard for television, RCA declared the patents invalid--baselessly,
633 and almost fifteen years after they were issued. It thus refused to pay
634 him royalties. For six years, Armstrong fought an expensive war of
636 to defend the patents. Finally, just as the patents expired, RCA
637 offered a settlement so low that it would not even cover Armstrong's
638 lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and now broke, in
1954 Armstrong
639 wrote a short note to his wife and then stepped out of a
644 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
645 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From the
646 beginning, government and government agencies have been subject
647 to capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
648 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful interest
649 too often exerts its influence within the government to get the
651 to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of course always
652 public spirited; the reality is something different. Ideas that were as
653 solid as rock in one age, but that, left to themselves, would crumble in
654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
655 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
656 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
658 of technological change.
661 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good
662 date upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the
664 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
665 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had
667 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years before.
<footnote><para>
668 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look
669 at Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
670 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
671 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
673 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
677 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
678 changed things. Some of these changes are technical--the Internet has
679 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
680 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
681 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
682 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
683 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
684 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
685 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
688 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
690 itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that the
691 Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
692 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as old as
693 the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change, would reject
694 it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet has introduced.
697 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
698 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
700 of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our culture
701 that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By "noncommercial
702 culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around parks or on
703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
704 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
705 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader,"
706 or Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
709 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
710 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
711 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the peace,
712 then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly concerned
713 with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it left this
715 "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary individuals shared and
716 transformed their culture--telling stories, reenacting scenes from plays
717 or TV, participating in fan clubs, sharing music, making tapes--were
718 left alone by the law.
721 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
722 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
723 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
724 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
725 marketplace.
<footnote><para>
726 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
727 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
728 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
729 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
730 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
731 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
732 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
736 course, an important part of creativity and culture, and it has become
737 an increasingly important part in America. But in no sense was it
739 within our tradition. It was instead just one part, a controlled
740 part, balanced with the free.
743 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
744 been erased.
<footnote><para>
745 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
748 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and,
749 pushed by big media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in
750 our tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
751 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
753 to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
755 that it never reached before. The technology that preserved the
756 balance of our history--between uses of our culture that were free and
757 uses of our culture that were only upon permission--has been undone.
758 The consequence is that we are less and less a free culture, more and
759 more a permission culture.
761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
763 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
765 And indeed, protectionism is precisely its motivation. But the
766 protectionism that justifies the changes that I will describe below is not
767 the limited and balanced sort that has defined the law in the past. This
768 is not a protectionism to protect artists. It is instead a protectionism
769 to protect certain forms of business. Corporations threatened by the
770 potential of the Internet to change the way both commercial and
771 noncommercial culture are made and shared have united to induce
772 lawmakers to use the law to protect them. It is the story of RCA and
773 Armstrong; it is the dream of the Causbys.
776 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
777 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
778 reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
780 for making and cultivating culture generally, and that change
781 in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet is thus to
782 the industries that built and distributed content in the twentieth
784 what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was to the
785 railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of the end,
786 or at least a substantial transformation. Digital technologies, tied to the
787 Internet, could produce a vastly more competitive and vibrant market
788 for building and cultivating culture; that market could include a much
789 wider and more diverse range of creators; those creators could produce
790 and distribute a much more vibrant range of creativity; and depending
791 upon a few important factors, those creators could earn more on average
792 from this system than creators do today--all so long as the RCAs of our
793 day don't use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
796 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
798 in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the early
799 twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are using their
800 power to get the law to protect them against this new, more efficient,
801 more vibrant technology for building culture. They are succeeding in
802 their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet remakes them.
805 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
807 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
808 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions--whether "piracy" will
809 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
810 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet--what
812 Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
813 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
814 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
815 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
816 Times,
17 January
2002.
817 </para></footnote>--has been framed as a battle about the
818 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
819 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
823 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
824 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
826 in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls "creative
828 I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the law, properly tuned,
829 should punish "piracy," whether on or off the Internet.
832 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
833 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
834 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
835 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
838 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
839 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
840 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
841 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
842 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote><para>
843 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
844 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
848 balanced, protected creators against private control. Our tradition
849 was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of patrons. It instead carved out
850 a wide berth within which creators could cultivate and extend our culture.
853 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
854 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the effective
855 regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or critique the
857 around us one must ask, Oliver Twistlike, for permission first.
858 Permission is, of course, often granted--but it is not often granted to
859 the critical or the independent. We have built a kind of cultural
861 those within the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it
862 is nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26 -->
866 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
868 of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods, digital or
869 otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual or group, for
870 neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or otherwise. It is not a
872 tale. Nor is it a call to jihad against an industry.
875 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
877 by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond its
878 code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map peace.
879 There is no good reason for the current struggle around Internet
881 to continue. There will be great harm to our tradition and
882 culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must come to
884 the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
887 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property."
888 The property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
889 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding this
890 "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
892 of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
893 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners of
894 "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys, treat
895 these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object when
896 a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to us as it
897 was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are "trespassing"
898 upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to us as it was to
899 them that the law should intervene to stop this trespass.
902 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
903 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
905 sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky Causbys,
906 common sense is on the side of the property owners in this war. Unlike
907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
908 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
912 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
914 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
915 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
916 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
917 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
918 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
919 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
923 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
924 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
926 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
931 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
932 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
935 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
936 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
937 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
938 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
939 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
942 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
943 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
944 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
946 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
950 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe
951 it was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
952 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt against
953 the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual property."
954 What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a sheriff
956 an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of this silliness will
957 be much more profound.
958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
961 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
962 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
966 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
967 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
969 French theorists--however natural that is for the weird sort we
970 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
971 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
972 can be more fully understood.
975 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
976 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
978 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
979 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
980 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
981 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
983 by the changes to use their power to change the law--and more
984 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
985 who we have always been.
988 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
989 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
991 most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
992 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the
993 story of one more consequence of this form of corruption--a
995 to which most of us remain oblivious.
998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
999 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1000 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1004 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1005 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1006 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1008 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1009 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1013 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1014 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1015 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1017 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1022 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1023 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1025 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1026 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1027 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1029 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1033 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1034 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1035 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1037 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1038 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1041 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1043 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1044 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1046 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1047 piercing--our kids are becoming thieves!
1050 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1051 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1052 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1053 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1056 The idea goes something like this:
1060 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1061 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1062 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1063 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1064 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1069 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1070 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1072 of creative property
<footnote><para>
1074 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1075 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1077 --if there is value, then someone must have a
1078 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1080 ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1081 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1083 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1084 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1085 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1086 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1087 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1090 (the songs) so there must have been a "right"--even against the Girl
1094 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1095 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1097 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1098 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1100 It has never taken hold within our law.
1103 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1104 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1106 to the value of creativity. The current debate has this turned
1107 around. We have become so concerned with protecting the instrument
1108 that we are losing sight of the value.
1111 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1112 takes care to draw--the distinction between republishing someone's
1113 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1114 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1115 copyright law today regulates both.
1118 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't
1120 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1121 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1122 entities could bear the burden of the law--even the burden of the
1123 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1124 more expense of doing business.
1127 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1128 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1129 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1131 would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1133 when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does, the
1134 extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly outweighs
1135 any original benefit--certainly as it affects noncommercial creativity,
1136 and increasingly as it affects commercial creativity as well. Thus, as
1137 we'll see more clearly in the chapters below, the law's role is less and
1138 less to support creativity, and more and more to protect certain
1140 against competition. Just at the time digital technology could
1141 unleash an extraordinary range of commercial and noncommercial
1142 creativity, the law burdens this creativity with insanely complex and
1143 vague rules and with the threat of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1145 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote><para>
1147 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002), Richard
1148 Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a labor of
1150 His work, however, doesn't directly address the legal conditions under
1151 which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about
1152 the importance and significance of this change, but I also believe the
1154 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1156 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1157 this creative class.
1160 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1161 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1162 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1166 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1167 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1169 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1170 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1171 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1172 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1173 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1176 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in
1177 the movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1178 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it
1179 would work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But
1180 when Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were
1182 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1186 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1187 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1188 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1189 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1193 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After
1194 several false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The
1195 mouth organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound
1197 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat.
1198 The synchronization was pretty close.
1201 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1203 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1204 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1205 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1206 wonderful! And it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1208 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1210 (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34
35.
1215 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1216 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1217 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1220 Disney had created something very new, based upon something
1222 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity
1223 that had rarely--except in Disney's hands--been anything more than
1224 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1226 invention that set the standard that others struggled to match.
1227 And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of creativity, was built
1228 upon the work of others.
1231 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1232 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1233 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1234 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1237 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1238 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1239 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1240 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1241 The film was classic Keaton--wildly popular and among the best of its
1245 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1247 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1249 cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1251 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1252 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1253 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1254 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1255 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1256 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1257 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1258 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1260 and both are built upon a
1262 song as a source. It is not just from the invention of synchronized
1263 sound in The Jazz Singer that we get Steamboat Willie. It is also from
1264 Buster Keaton's invention of Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the
1265 song "Steamboat Bill," that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from
1266 Steamboat Willie, Mickey Mouse.
1269 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1270 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1271 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1273 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1274 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1275 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1277 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1278 knockoffs--slight variations on winning themes; retellings of ancient
1279 stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the differences. With
1280 Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its spark. Later, it was the
1281 quality of his work relative to the production-line cartoons with which
1282 he competed. Yet these additions were built upon a base that was
1284 Disney added to the work of others before him, creating
1286 new out of something just barely old.
1289 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1290 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1292 as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy, sweet
1294 appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the Grimm fairy tales
1295 are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps overly ambitious parent
1296 who would dare to read these bloody, moralistic stories to his or her
1297 child, at bedtime or anytime.
1300 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried
1301 them into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1302 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1303 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of
1305 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1306 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon
1307 the work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White
1308 (
1937), Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi
1309 (
1942), Song of the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland
1310 (
1951), Robin Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1312 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1313 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)--not to
1314 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1316 Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1317 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1318 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of his
1319 culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1322 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1324 and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1326 except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize its
1327 importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that would
1328 be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney creativity"--a
1329 form of expression and genius that builds upon the culture around us
1330 and makes it something different.
1333 In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1335 fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1336 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1337 thirty years--for that minority of creative work that was in fact copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1339 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1340 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1342 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1343 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1344 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1346 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1347 Web site associated with this book, available at
1348 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1350 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1351 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1352 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1353 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1356 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public
1358 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1359 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1360 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1361 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for anyone--
1362 whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether approved or
1363 not--to use and build upon.
1366 This is the ways things always were--until quite recently. For most
1367 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1368 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1369 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1372 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1373 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1374 1970s to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1375 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1377 from before the Great Depression.
1380 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney
1382 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently,
1383 and except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1387 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to
1388 many Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
1389 manga, or comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40
1390 percent of publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication
1392 derives from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at
1393 every magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on
1394 Japan's extraordinary system of public transportation.
1397 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1398 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand much
1399 about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to the
1400 stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga cover
1401 every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights." And
1403 it's not as if the New York subways are filled with readers of Joyce
1404 or even Hemingway. People of different cultures distract themselves in
1405 different ways, the Japanese in this interestingly different way.
1408 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1409 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1410 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1413 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1414 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1415 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1416 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1418 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1419 develop it differently--with a different story line. Or the comic can
1420 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1421 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1422 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1423 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1424 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1427 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They
1428 are huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan
1430 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese
1431 come together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the
1433 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1434 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1435 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1436 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi
1438 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1441 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those
1442 trained in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1443 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1445 copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal one. Doujinshi are
1446 plainly "derivative works." There is no general practice by doujinshi
1447 artists of securing the permission of the manga creators. Instead, the
1448 practice is simply to take and modify the creations of others, as Walt
1449 Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under both Japanese and American
1450 law, that "taking" without the permission of the original copyright
1451 owner is illegal. It is an infringement of the original copyright to make
1452 a copy or a derivative work without the original copyright owner's
1456 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1457 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1458 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1459 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1460 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1463 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw--by going into comic
1464 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1465 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1467 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1468 York: Perennial,
2000).
1472 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1473 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1474 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1475 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1476 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1477 which are fifty years old."
1480 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1482 the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that explains
1483 the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra, for
1485 hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these technical
1486 violations because they spur the manga market to be more wealthy and
1487 productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were banned, so
1488 the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1490 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1491 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1492 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1494 that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing legal
1495 actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga artists may be
1496 better off collectively if they set aside their individual self-interest and
1498 not to press their legal rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma
1503 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly
1505 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1506 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1508 are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain why
1510 copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has no
1511 general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases individual
1512 manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not a more
1514 pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi culture?
1517 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1518 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1519 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1520 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1521 to prosecute cases like this."
1524 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1525 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1526 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1527 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1529 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1530 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1531 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1532 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1533 their clients or hurt them?
1534 Let's pause for a moment.
1537 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1538 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1539 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1542 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1544 I believe in the value of property in general, and I also believe
1545 in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1547 property."
<footnote><para>
1549 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1551 Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1553 Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1554 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately describes a set of
1555 "property" rights--copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret--but the
1556 nature of those rights is very different.
1558 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1560 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1561 intellectual property.
1564 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is plenty of
1565 value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't mean "money
1566 can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly part of a process of
1567 production, including commercial as well as noncommercial
1569 If Disney animators had stolen a set of pencils to draw Steamboat
1570 Willie, we'd have no hesitation in condemning that taking as wrong--
1571 even though trivial, even if unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at
1572 least under the law of the day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton
1573 or from the Brothers Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the
1575 from Keaton because Disney's use would have been considered
1576 "fair." There was nothing wrong with the taking from the Grimms
1578 the Grimms' work was in the public domain.
1581 Thus, even though the things that Disney took--or more generally,
1582 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity--are
1583 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1586 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1591 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1592 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1593 work--or even one copy--without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1594 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1595 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1596 form, whether large or small.
1599 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1600 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1602 creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in particular find
1606 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once
1607 you begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1608 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1610 but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity to show
1611 that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1613 adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1615 from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1616 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1617 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1618 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1619 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster films
1623 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1624 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1625 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1626 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1627 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1628 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1629 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking--free
1630 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1634 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1636 are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How free is
1637 this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for
1639 to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members?
1640 To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the
1641 New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1642 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians
1643 generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether
1645 with a studio or not?
1648 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1649 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1650 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1655 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1656 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1659 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1660 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough,
1661 they were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1662 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1663 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1664 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1666 by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1669 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1670 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1672 pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1674 "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to be
1675 kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In the
1676 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1678 of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of glass, and
1679 thus it was still not a process within reach of most amateurs.
1682 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1683 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1685 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1686 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1687 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible, it
1688 could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to a
1690 driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1692 the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1693 population of photographers.
1696 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1697 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1699 on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we do the
1700 rest."
<footnote><para>
1702 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1703 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1707 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work
1708 that any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph,
1709 from the work that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish
1711 man, woman or child, who has sufficient intelligence to
1712 point a box straight and press a button, with an instrument which
1713 altogether removes from the practice of photography the
1715 for exceptional facilities or, in fact, any special knowledge of
1716 the art. It can be employed without preliminary study, without a
1717 darkroom and without chemicals.
<footnote><para>
1719 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1725 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1726 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1727 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1728 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1729 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1730 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1731 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1732 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1733 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1734 percent.
<footnote><para>
1737 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1738 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1740 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1746 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1747 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1748 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur
1750 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1751 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the first
1752 time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1754 record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first time in
1755 history there exists an authentic visual record of the appearance and
1757 of the common man made without [literary] interpretation
1758 or bias."
<footnote><para>
1764 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1766 The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of expression,
1767 of course. But it took years of training before they could be deployed by
1768 amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the Kodak, expression
1769 was possible much sooner and more simply. The barrier to expression
1770 was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality"; professionals would
1771 discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study how best to frame a
1772 picture and you get a sense of the experience of creativity that the
1774 enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary people a way to express
1775 themselves more easily than any tools could have before.
1778 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1779 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1781 environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1782 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions that
1783 could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1784 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1785 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1786 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1788 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1792 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound
1794 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the
1796 or building whose photograph he shot--pirating something of
1797 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1799 was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to draw
1800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1801 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1802 that they thought valuable.
1805 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1806 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1807 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1808 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1809 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote><para>
1811 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1813 Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1814 </para></footnote>) It may be
1815 that this means that the photographer gets something for nothing. Just
1816 as Disney could take inspiration from Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the
1818 Grimm, the photographer should be free to capture an image
1820 compensating the source.
1823 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1824 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no permission
1825 would be required before an image could be captured and shared with
1826 others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the default.
1827 (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous people:
1829 photographers who snap pictures of famous people for
1831 purposes have more restrictions than the rest of us. But in the
1832 ordinary case, the image can be captured without clearing the rights to
1833 do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1835 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1836 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1838 48 (
1960)
398
407; White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
971 F.
1839 2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951 (
1993).
1843 We can only speculate about how photography would have
1845 had the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been
1846 against the photographer, then the photographer would have had to
1847 demonstrate permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to
1848 demonstrate permission, too, before it developed the film upon which
1849 images were captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then
1850 Eastman Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by
1851 the photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1853 committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1854 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1855 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1856 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine
1857 a system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1862 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would
1863 be very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1864 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1866 it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1868 over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1869 technology as they did--since professionals could have more easily borne
1870 the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of photography
1871 to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like that growth
1872 would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that growth in a
1873 democratic technology of expression would have been realized.
1874 If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might see two
1875 gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and striking
1877 and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a school. But
1878 there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that these busses
1880 These buses are filled with technologies that teach kids to tinker
1881 with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the film of your VCR.
1882 Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think! is a project that
1884 kids to make films, as a way to understand and critique the filmed
1885 culture that they find all around them. Each year, these busses travel to
1886 more than thirty schools and enable three hundred to five hundred
1887 children to learn something about media by doing something with
1889 By doing, they think. By tinkering, they learn.
1892 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1894 so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has fallen
1896 As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good real-time
1897 digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1899 quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1901 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1903 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1904 February
2002, available at
1905 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1907 These buses are filled with technology that
1908 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1909 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1910 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1911 teachers call "media literacy."
1914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1915 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1916 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1918 media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the way
1919 media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and the
1920 way people access it."
1923 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1924 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1925 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1929 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1930 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1932 generally,
<footnote><para>
1934 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1935 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1936 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1938 it is increasingly important to understand the
1939 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1940 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1941 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1943 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1946 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1947 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1948 written understands how difficult writing is--how difficult it is to
1950 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1951 understandable--few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1952 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1953 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1954 emotion or builds suspense.
1957 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1958 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1959 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1960 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1961 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1962 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1965 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just
1966 film, as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of
1968 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1971 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1972 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1973 texture."
<footnote><para>
1975 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1978 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1979 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1980 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary.
1982 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1983 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1984 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1985 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1986 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1988 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1991 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1994 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1998 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2000 "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2001 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2002 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2003 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2006 Yet the push for an expanded literacy--one that goes beyond text to
2007 include audio and visual elements--is not about making better film
2009 The aim is not to improve the profession of filmmaking at all.
2010 Instead, as Daley explained,
2014 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2015 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2016 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2017 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2022 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2023 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2027 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
2028 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2030 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
2031 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
2032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2033 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2035 language for what they need to create or express."
<footnote><para>
2037 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2038 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2039 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2045 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some
2046 than to others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who
2048 in written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2050 for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one
2051 particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high school.
2052 The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all
2053 the traditional measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley
2054 and Barish ran a program that gave kids an opportunity to use film
2055 to express meaning about something the students know something
2056 about--gun violence.
2059 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2060 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2061 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2062 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2063 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2064 what education should be about--learning how to express themselves.
2067 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively
2069 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2070 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2071 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2072 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool and
2073 empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about it,"
2074 Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating expression--far more
2075 successfully and powerfully than could have been created using only
2076 text. "If you had said to these students, `you have to do it in text,' they
2077 would've just thrown their hands up and gone and done something
2078 else," Barish described, in part, no doubt, because expressing
2080 in text is not something these students can do well. Yet neither
2081 is text a form in which these ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2082 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2087 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2088 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2090 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2092 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2093 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part--and
2095 not the most powerful part--of constructing meaning. As Daley
2096 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2100 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2101 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2102 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at
2103 a video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2104 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2105 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school
2106 and you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do
2108 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or
2109 he [can] dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to
2110 dismiss you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things
2111 that you can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that
2112 you think reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect
2113 that, or draw for me something that reflects that." Not by giving
2114 a kid a video camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the
2115 video camera and make a little movie." But instead, really help
2116 you take these elements that you understand, that are your
2118 and construct meaning about the topic. . . .
2121 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2122 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2123 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2124 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2125 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2128 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2129 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2130 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2132 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2133 had a lot of power with this language."
2137 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into
2138 the Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around
2139 the world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2140 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2142 retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was
2143 a retelling, because we had seen the events that were described. The
2145 of this awful act of terrorism was that the delayed second attack was
2146 perfectly timed to assure that the whole world would be watching.
2149 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2150 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across the
2151 screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance," and
2152 seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2154 come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2159 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of
2161 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2162 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2163 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2164 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2165 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2166 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2167 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2169 worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2170 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2172 the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2173 was also the Internet.
2176 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet--though I do think the
2177 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2178 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2180 the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a movie
2182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2183 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2187 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the
2189 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2190 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2192 just that culture can be captured mechanically, and obviously
2193 not just that events are commented upon critically, but that this mix of
2194 captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely spread
2199 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2200 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2201 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2202 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2203 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2204 records private facts in a public way--it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2205 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2208 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2210 There are some who use the space simply to talk about their
2212 life. But there are many who use the space to engage in public
2213 discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing others who
2214 are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about the decisions
2215 they make, offering solutions to problems we all see: blogs create the
2216 sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which we don't all hope to
2217 be there at the same time and in which conversations are not
2219 linked. The best of the blog entries are relatively short; they point
2220 directly to words used by others, criticizing with or adding to them.
2221 They are arguably the most important form of unchoreographed
2223 discourse that we have.
2226 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy
2227 as it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most difficult
2228 for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy has
2230 Of course we have elections, and most of the time the courts
2232 those elections to count. A relatively small number of people vote
2233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2234 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2236 and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2239 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2240 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2241 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2243 This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis de
2244 Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2245 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2246 popular elections that fascinated him--it was the jury, an institution
2247 that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or death for other
2249 And most fascinating for him was that the jury didn't just vote
2250 about the outcome they would impose. They deliberated. Members
2252 about the "right" result; they tried to persuade each other of the
2253 "right" result, and in criminal cases at least, they had to agree upon a
2254 unanimous result for the process to come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2256 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2257 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2261 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2262 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2263 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2265 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2267 Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2269 And in some towns in
2270 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2271 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2276 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2278 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2279 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2281 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2282 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2283 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2285 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2286 65
80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2287 </para></footnote> We say what our
2288 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2291 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2292 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2293 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2295 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2296 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2299 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2303 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2304 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2305 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2306 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2307 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2308 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2311 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2312 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential
2313 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2315 is having an effect.
2318 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2319 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2320 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2322 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2323 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2324 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2325 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2327 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2328 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2329 as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2331 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2332 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2336 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial
2338 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2339 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2340 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
2343 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2344 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2346 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as
2347 the number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks
2348 of stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been
2350 by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
2353 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2355 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2356 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2357 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2358 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2359 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2360 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2361 get it out of the way."
2364 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2365 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide
2366 more from the public than an unconcentrated media can--as CNN
2367 admitted it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the
2369 to its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2371 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2373 It also needs to sustain a more
2375 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
2376 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite
2378 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the
2379 reporter over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She
2380 needed to offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that
2381 wasn't warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2384 Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate--"amateur" not
2385 in the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete,
2386 meaning not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much
2387 broader range of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia
2389 revealed, when hundreds from across the southwest United States
2390 turned to the Internet to retell what they had seen.
<footnote><para>
2392 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2394 Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci D. Kramer,
2395 "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
2397 Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2398 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2401 readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as Winer
2402 puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly with
2403 our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"--with all the
2405 and costs, that might entail.
2408 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
2409 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for
2411 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
2412 "journalism" is happy about this--some journalists have been told to
2413 curtail their blogging.
<footnote><para>
2415 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2416 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2417 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2419 in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war on March
9,
2420 stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year Steve
2422 a Houston Chronicle reporter, was fired for keeping a personal Web log,
2423 published under a pseudonym, that dealt with some of the issues and
2424 people he was covering.")
2426 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2429 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2430 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2431 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2432 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2433 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2436 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2437 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2439 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2440 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2441 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2442 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2443 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2444 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2445 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2446 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2447 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2448 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2453 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2454 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2455 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2458 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2460 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2461 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2462 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2465 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2466 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2468 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2470 enable a different kind of tinkering--with abstract ideas though
2471 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2472 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2474 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2475 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2476 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2477 tinkering of many others.
2480 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2481 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2482 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2483 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2484 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2487 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2489 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2490 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2491 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2492 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2494 a major apprenticeship platform."
2497 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2498 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2500 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2502 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2503 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2504 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2507 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2508 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2509 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2511 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2512 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2513 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2515 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2516 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2517 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2520 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2521 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2524 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2528 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2530 as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2532 highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2533 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that your
2534 child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all around.
2535 The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that
2536 technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2539 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and
2541 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in
2543 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2544 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in general.
<footnote><para>
2546 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological
2548 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2549 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2551 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2552 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2555 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,"
2556 Brown explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up
2558 think and want to learn."
2561 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2562 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2563 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2565 that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that
2566 closes down that part of the brain."
2569 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2570 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2571 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2572 the law to close down that technology.
2575 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2576 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2580 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2581 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2583 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled
2584 as a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2585 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2587 in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2589 technology that was available on the RPI network.
2592 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research
2594 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and
2596 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five
2597 thousand undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high
2598 school class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience
2599 to imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2602 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration
2603 to one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2605 on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network
2606 is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as
2607 more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2610 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2612 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving
2613 the quality of search on the network. Specialty search engines can do
2614 this even better. The idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines
2615 that search within the network of a particular institution, is to provide
2616 users of that institution with better access to material from that
2618 Businesses do this all the time, enabling employees to have
2620 to material that people outside the business can't get. Universities
2624 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2626 for example, has a network file system that makes it very easy
2627 for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2629 about the publicly (within that network) available content.
2630 Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this technology. It
2631 used Microsoft's network file system to build an index of all the files
2632 available within the RPI network.
2635 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2637 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had
2638 built. His single most important improvement over those engines was
2639 to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a
2640 user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed before, if you
2641 tried to access a file through a Windows browser that was on a
2643 that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse modified the
2644 system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that a user could
2645 click to see if the machine holding the file was still on-line.
2648 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2649 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2650 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2651 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2652 be on users' computers.
2655 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2656 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2657 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2659 might have created; university brochures--basically anything that
2660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2661 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2665 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2666 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means,
2667 of course, that three quarters were not, and--so that this point is
2669 clear--Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files in
2670 their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
2671 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a
2673 where he was studying information science, and hence,
2675 was the aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made
2676 no money from this tinkering; he was not connected to any business
2677 that would make any money from this experiment. He was a kid
2679 with technology in an environment where tinkering with
2681 was precisely what he was supposed to do.
2684 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2685 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2686 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2687 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2689 A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from the suit.
2690 As he read these papers and watched the news reports about them, he
2691 was increasingly astonished.
2694 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong. . . .
2695 I don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran
2696 or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way
2697 that promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the
2698 search engine in a way that would make it easier to use"--again, a
2699 search engine, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows
2701 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members
2702 of the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not
2703 himself created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing
2707 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2708 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2711 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2712 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2713 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2714 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2715 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2716 that Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2719 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2720 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2721 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2722 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2723 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2724 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2725 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion--six
2726 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2728 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2729 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2730 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2734 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2735 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2736 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2737 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2738 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2741 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2742 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2744 make it impossible for him to work in many fields of technology
2745 for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him understand that this
2746 process of being sued was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father
2747 recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told
2748 Jesse, "You don't want to pay another visit to a dentist like me.") And
2749 throughout, the RIAA insisted it would not settle the case until it took
2750 every penny Jesse had saved.
2753 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2754 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2755 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2756 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2757 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2758 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2759 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2760 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2763 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at
2765 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2768 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2769 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2770 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2771 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2772 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2773 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2774 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2776 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2777 (
27
2042--Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2778 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2780 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2781 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2783 for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2785 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2786 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2790 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2791 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2792 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2797 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2798 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2799 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2801 what the RIAA has done.
2805 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2806 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2807 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2808 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2809 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2813 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2814 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2817 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2818 their permission--if "if value, then right" is true--then the history of
2819 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2820 "big media" today--film, records, radio, and cable TV--was born of a
2821 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2822 pirates join this generation's country club--until now.
2827 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2829 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2831 See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87
93,
2832 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2835 and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in the early
2836 twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents granted the
2837 inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2839 through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2841 and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property--patents.
2842 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property
2843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2844 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2847 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2851 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2852 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2853 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2854 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2855 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2856 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2857 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2860 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the
2861 number of nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the
2863 movement by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known
2864 as the General Film Company to block the entry of non-licensed
2865 independents. With coercive tactics that have become legendary,
2866 General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment, discontinued
2867 product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
2868 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all
2869 U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent
2870 William Fox who defied the Trust even after his license was
2871 revoked.
<footnote><para>
2873 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2874 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2875 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2876 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2877 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2879 of the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits
2880 imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison
2881 to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the
2883 of Copyright" (September
2002), University of Chicago Law
2884 School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper
2890 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2891 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2893 "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents'
2894 resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life
2895 and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2897 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2899 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2901 That led the independents to flee the
2902 East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2904 there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And the
2905 leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
2908 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2909 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2910 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2913 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2914 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2919 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2920 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2922 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2923 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2926 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2927 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2928 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2929 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2930 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2931 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2932 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2933 right to perform it publicly.
2936 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's
2937 phonograph or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was
2938 clear enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that
2939 I performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2940 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2942 But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a "public
2944 if I recorded the song in my own house (even today, you don't
2945 owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in the shower), or if I
2946 recorded the song from memory (copies in your brain are not--yet--
2947 regulated by copyright law). So if I simply sang the song into a
2949 device in the privacy of my own home, it wasn't clear that I owed the
2950 composer anything. And more importantly, it wasn't clear whether I
2951 owed the composer anything if I then made copies of those recordings.
2952 Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively pirate someone
2953 else's song without paying its composer anything.
2956 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2958 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2963 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2964 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2965 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and
2967 who cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain
2968 of the composer and publisher without any regard for [their] rights.
<footnote><para>
2970 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2971 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2972 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of
2973 South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2974 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2976 N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2981 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2982 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2983 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2985 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2987 of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2989 and the "music publishing industry"
2990 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2992 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2994 of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2997 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2998 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
3000 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3002 of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3006 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So,
3007 too, do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who
3009 the player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3010 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any
3012 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the
3014 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3016 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283
84
3017 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3019 Company of New York).
3020 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
3021 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
3022 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
3023 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
3024 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
3025 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<footnote><para>
3027 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376
3029 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
3031 Graphophone Company Association).
3035 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
3036 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
3037 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
3038 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
3040 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
3041 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
3042 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
3044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3045 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3047 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3048 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3051 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
3052 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
3053 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
3054 Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
3056 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
3060 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3061 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham
3062 gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge
3064 he wants for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is
3065 thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you have no
3066 permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of Grisham.
3069 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3070 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a kind
3071 of piracy--by giving recording artists a weaker right than it otherwise
3072 gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over their creative
3073 work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less control are
3074 the recording industry and the public. The recording industry gets
3075 something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public gets
3076 access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
3077 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
3078 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would
3080 follow-on creativity.
<footnote><para>
3082 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3083 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3084 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3085 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3086 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3090 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3091 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3092 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3097 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3099 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3101 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3103 in the United States and throughout the world; records
3104 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3105 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3107 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3108 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3109 before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3110 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3111 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3112 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3114 quality, and a greater choice.
<footnote><para>
3116 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House
3118 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83,
3119 (
8 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention
3125 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3127 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3131 <title>Radio
</title>
3133 Radio was also born of piracy.
3136 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3137 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3139 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning, record
3140 companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3142 purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a radio station.
3143 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning attached to a
3144 record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See RCA
3146 Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd Cir.
1940). See also Randal C.
3147 Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
3148 Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright," University of Chicago Law
3149 Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3151 As I described above,
3152 the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an exclusive right to
3153 public performances of his work. The radio station thus owes the
3155 money for that performance.
3158 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing
3159 a copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3160 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3162 sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite another to
3163 have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist
3164 is adding to the value of the composition performed on the radio
3166 And if the law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would
3167 have to pay the recording artist for his work, just as it pays the
3169 of the music for his work.
3171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3174 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3176 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3177 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3179 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3180 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3184 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3186 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3187 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3188 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3191 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3192 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3193 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3194 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3195 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3196 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3197 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3200 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3201 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3202 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3204 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3205 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3206 something for nothing.
3209 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3210 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3213 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3216 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with
3217 cable television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the
3219 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable
3221 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3223 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3225 content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever did--
3226 Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to give away.
3229 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3230 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3231 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3233 Copyright Law Revision--CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3235 on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3237 on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966) (statement of
3238 Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
3241 been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV, but as
3243 Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
3245 asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3246 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3248 Copyright Law Revision--CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3249 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3251 As another broadcaster put it,
3255 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3256 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3257 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3259 Copyright Law Revision--CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3260 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3265 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable
3270 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3271 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3272 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3273 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3275 Copyright Law Revision--CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3276 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3277 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3282 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president
3284 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of compensation."
<footnote><para>
3286 Copyright Law Revision--CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3287 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3291 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant
3293 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3297 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have
3298 any copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether
3300 holders who are already compensated, who already have a
3301 monopoly, should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3304 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3305 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3307 Copyright Law Revision--CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3309 acting assistant attorney general).
3314 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the
3315 Supreme Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright
3319 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3320 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3321 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3323 the question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable
3324 companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but
3325 the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright owner.
3326 The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto
3327 power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable companies thus
3328 built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value created by
3333 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy"
3334 means using value from someone else's creative property without
3336 from that creator--as it is increasingly described today
<footnote><para>
3338 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine of Free
3339 Expression: Copyright on the Internet--The Myth of Free Information,
3342 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The threat of piracy--the use of someone else's creative
3343 work without permission or compensation--has grown with the Internet."
3346 then every industry affected by copyright today is the product and
3347 beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio, cable
3348 TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every generation
3349 welcomes the pirates from the last. Every generation--until now.
3351 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3355 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3358 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy
3359 comes in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3360 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3361 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its defense,
3362 this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should
3366 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3367 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3368 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3369 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3370 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3372 copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has
3373 so often done in the past.
3374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3376 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3377 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3379 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3380 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3381 content, copy it, and sell it--all without the permission of a copyright
3382 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3383 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3385 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3386 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available at
3388 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3389 Financial Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3391 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3392 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually
3393 worldwide to piracy.
3396 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3397 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3398 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3399 This piracy is wrong.
3402 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3403 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3404 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3406 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3407 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3409 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3410 existence, treated as right.
3413 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3414 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3415 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3416 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3417 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3418 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3420 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3421 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3422 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3425 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3426 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3428 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3430 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3434 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3435 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3436 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3437 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3439 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns
3440 the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10
13,
209.
3441 The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
3443 obligates member nations to create administrative and enforcement
3444 mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for
3446 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3447 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3449 between burdens imposed upon developing countries and benefits
3451 to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use
3452 patents for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3453 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to gain the
3454 benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a promising strategy for
3455 developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3457 In my view, more developing nations
3458 should take advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then
3459 their laws should be respected. And under the laws of these nations,
3460 this piracy is wrong.
3463 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3464 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3465 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3466 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3467 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3469 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3470 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3471 144
90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3472 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3474 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3475 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3479 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3480 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3481 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3482 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3483 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3484 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3485 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3486 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3487 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3488 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3489 piracy of the tangible.
3492 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3493 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3495 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3496 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3497 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3499 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3500 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3502 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3505 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3506 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3507 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3509 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3510 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3513 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3514 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3515 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3516 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3517 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3519 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3520 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3522 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3523 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3524 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3526 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3529 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3530 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3531 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3532 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3534 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3535 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3538 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3540 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3541 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3543 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3544 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3545 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3546 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3548 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what--at
3549 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3551 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3556 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3557 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3558 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3559 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3560 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3561 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3562 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3566 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this
3567 part suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3568 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the way
3569 it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful and
3571 to produce either new content or new ways of doing business.
3572 Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all "piracy" in
3573 that sense of the term.
3576 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3577 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3578 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3579 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3582 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3583 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3584 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3585 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3588 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3589 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3594 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3595 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3597 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3598 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3600 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3602 This means we must determine whether
3603 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3605 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3606 author of his profit.
3609 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors
3610 of the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3612 Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and,
3614 off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3616 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3617 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3618 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3619 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to come
3620 up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own products.
3621 This job usually falls to outside innovators, who reassemble existing
3623 in inventive ways. For a discussion of Christensen's ideas, see
3624 Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89
92,
139.
3625 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3626 put together components that had been developed independently.
3629 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3630 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3631 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3632 system.
<footnote><para>
3634 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3635 San Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3636 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3637 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3639 Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3641 at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3643 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3644 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3645 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3646 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3647 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3648 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend--
3649 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3652 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3654 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3655 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3656 music--
28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3658 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3659 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3660 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3661 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3664 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
43 million citizens
3665 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3667 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3668 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3671 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3672 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3673 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3675 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3678 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3679 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3681 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3682 complicated than one might think. So consider--a bit more carefully
3683 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do--the kinds of
3684 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3687 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3688 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3689 different kinds into four types.
3691 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3694 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3696 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3697 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3698 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3699 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3700 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3701 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3707 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3708 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3709 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3710 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3712 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3713 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3715 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3716 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3720 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3722 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3723 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3724 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3726 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3727 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3728 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3729 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3730 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3732 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3733 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3734 content anymore, the economic harm is zero--the same harm
3735 that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3741 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3742 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3747 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3750 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3752 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3753 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<footnote><para>
3755 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148
49.
3757 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3759 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3760 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3761 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer--and
3763 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3767 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3768 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3770 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3771 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3772 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3773 that is "devastating" the industry.
3776 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3778 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3780 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3781 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
&
3782 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3783 labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3785 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3787 Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report describes the music
3789 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3790 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3791 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3792 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3793 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent
3794 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3795 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3796 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3797 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145
56.
3799 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3800 album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the
3801 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3803 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3806 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3807 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3808 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3809 not the fault of the tapers--who did not [stop after MTV came into
3810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3811 being]--but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3812 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3814 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3818 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3819 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3820 the industry in particular, and society in general--or at least the
3822 that inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record
3823 industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR--the question is
3824 not simply whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also how
3825 harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of
3830 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3831 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3832 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3833 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3834 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3835 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3836 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3839 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3841 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3842 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3845 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3847 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3849 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3851 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3852 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3853 25 June
2003, available at
3854 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3855 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3856 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3857 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3858 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3860 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3861 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3863 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3865 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3866 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3867 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3868 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3869 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3870 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote><para>
3872 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3875 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3878 from other forms of media could also account for some of the decline.
3879 As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film High
3880 Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on
3881 DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3889 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3890 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3891 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3892 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3894 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3895 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3898 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3899 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3900 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3902 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"--but their own
3904 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3905 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3906 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3907 downloads. If every download were a lost sale--if every use of Kazaa
3908 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"--then the industry would have
3909 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3910 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3911 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3913 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3916 These are the harms--alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3918 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3919 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3923 One benefit is type C sharing--making available content that is
3924 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3926 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3927 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3929 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3930 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law--Coming
3931 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3933 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3935 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3936 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3940 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3941 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3942 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3944 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3948 In real space--long before the Internet--the market had a simple
3949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3950 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3952 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3954 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3955 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3956 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3957 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3958 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3960 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3963 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3966 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3967 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3968 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3969 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3970 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3972 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3973 owner for the content they sell.
3976 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3977 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the
3978 content available isn't making money from making the content
3980 It is also different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a
3981 record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone
3982 shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have
3983 it. That difference would matter economically if the owner of the
3984 copyright were selling the record in competition to my sharing. But
3985 we're talking about the class of content that is not currently
3987 available. The Internet is making it available, through
3989 sharing, without competing with the market.
3992 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3993 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3994 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3995 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3996 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
4000 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
4001 type D sharing to occur--the sharing of content that copyright owners
4002 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
4003 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
4004 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
4005 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
4007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
4008 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
4009 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
4010 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
4011 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4012 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4013 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4017 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits
4019 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4020 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4021 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4024 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4026 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How
4027 much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies?
4028 What is the content that otherwise would be unavailable?"
4031 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter,
4032 much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good.
4033 And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of this piracy is
4035 by a new way of spreading content caused by changes in the
4036 technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the tradition that
4037 gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and cable TV, the
4038 question we should be asking about file sharing is how best to preserve
4039 its benefits while minimizing (to the extent possible) the wrongful harm
4040 it causes artists. The question is one of balance. The law should seek
4041 that balance, and that balance will be found only with time.
4044 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4045 just what you call type A sharing?"
4048 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4050 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4051 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4053 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4055 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4057 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4058 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4059 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
4061 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4062 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4064 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
4065 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
4067 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269
82.
4071 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4072 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4073 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4074 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4075 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4076 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4077 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4078 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4079 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4082 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4083 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4084 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
4086 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4088 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
4089 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
4090 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4093 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
4094 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4095 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4097 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
4098 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
4099 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
4100 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
4101 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
4103 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
4106 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4107 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4108 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4109 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4111 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
4115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4116 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4117 pianos, served two important goals--indeed, the two central goals of
4118 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
4119 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
4121 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
4123 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
4124 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
4125 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
4126 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
4128 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
4129 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
4130 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
4132 over the future (cable).
4135 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4137 and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another
4138 technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today,
4139 VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's
4140 claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a device,
4142 and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage in
4144 infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a "record"
4145 button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies and
4146 shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright infringement
4147 of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and Universal claimed, be
4148 partially liable for that infringement.
4151 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4152 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4153 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4154 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4155 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4156 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4157 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4158 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4160 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4162 to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4163 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4164 for the architecture it chose.
4167 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4168 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When
4169 there are
20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be
4171 by millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and
4172 essence of the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4173 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4175 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4176 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4177 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4178 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4180 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing
4181 and creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the
4183 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of
4185 of tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4186 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4187 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4189 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4191 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4192 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4194 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4198 use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By "allowing VCR
4200 to copy freely by the means of an exemption from copyright
4202 without creating a mechanism to compensate copyright
4203 owners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the owners the
4204 very essence of their property: the exclusive right to control who may
4205 use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby profit from its
4206 reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4208 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4213 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4214 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4216 Hollywood in its jurisdiction--leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4217 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"--held
4218 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made
4220 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally
4222 technology--which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler
4223 of the American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston
4224 Strangler of the American film industry)--was an illegal technology.
<footnote><para>
4226 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4231 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4234 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4235 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4240 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4241 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4243 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4245 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4246 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4248 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4250 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4255 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4256 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4258 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4259 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4260 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4264 <title>Table
</title>
4265 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4269 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4270 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4271 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4276 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4277 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4278 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4279 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4282 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4283 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4285 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4288 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4289 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4290 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4291 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4295 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4296 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4297 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4304 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4305 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4307 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4308 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4309 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4310 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4311 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4312 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4313 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4314 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4315 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4316 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293
96.
4318 In each case, throughout our history,
4319 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4323 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4324 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4325 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4326 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4327 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4329 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4330 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4331 the interests at stake.
4332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4335 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4336 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4337 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4338 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4339 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4341 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4342 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4343 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4344 permission to record a song?
4347 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4348 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4349 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4350 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4352 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4355 Instead, the particular uses that the
4356 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4357 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4358 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4360 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4361 the distribution of content.
4364 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4365 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4366 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4367 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4368 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4369 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4370 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4371 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4372 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4373 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4375 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4381 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4383 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4384 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4386 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4388 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4389 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4391 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4392 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4394 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4396 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4397 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4398 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4399 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4400 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4401 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4402 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4405 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4406 just as any other property is protected."
4408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4412 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4413 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4417 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4418 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4419 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4420 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4421 the price she can get.
4424 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4425 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4426 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4427 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4428 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4429 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4430 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard--by, for example,
4432 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4433 thing I am taking then?
4436 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4437 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4439 in the ordinary case--indeed, in practically every case except for a
4441 range of exceptions--ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4442 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress--though I
4443 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4444 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4445 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4446 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4447 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4449 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4450 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4451 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333
34.
4455 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4456 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4457 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4459 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4463 But how, and to what extent, and in what form--the details, in
4464 other words--matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4466 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4468 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4470 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4472 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4473 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4475 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4476 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4478 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4483 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4485 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4487 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4488 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4489 significance of this true statement--"copyright material is property"--
4490 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4491 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4496 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4497 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4499 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4500 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4502 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4503 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4504 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4505 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4506 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4508 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4511 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4512 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4513 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4515 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4516 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4517 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4518 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4519 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4520 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4521 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424
31.
4524 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4526 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4528 University Press,
1968),
151
52.
4531 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4532 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4533 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4535 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4537 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4539 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4542 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4543 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4544 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4545 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4546 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4548 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4550 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4552 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4554 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4556 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4557 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4560 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4562 was--indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4563 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4564 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4566 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4567 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4568 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4570 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4573 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4574 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4575 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4577 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4579 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4580 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4582 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4583 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4585 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4587 of any positive law.
4590 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4591 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4592 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4593 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4596 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4597 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4599 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4602 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4603 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4605 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4606 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4608 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4609 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4612 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4613 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4614 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4617 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4618 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4619 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4620 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4621 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4622 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4623 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4624 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4626 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4629 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4631 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4632 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4636 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4637 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4638 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4639 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4641 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4642 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4644 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4646 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4648 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4649 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4653 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4654 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4655 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4657 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4659 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4660 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4661 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4662 to print--no less, of course, but also no more.
4665 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4666 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4668 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4669 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4670 monopolies--especially
4671 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4672 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4673 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4674 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4676 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4677 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4681 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4683 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4684 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4685 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4686 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4687 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4689 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4692 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4693 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4694 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4695 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4697 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind--tools of the
4698 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4700 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4701 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4702 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4703 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4705 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4706 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4710 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4711 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4713 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4714 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4715 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4719 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4720 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4721 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4722 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4723 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4724 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4726 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4727 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4728 construction and spread of culture.
4731 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4732 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4733 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4734 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4735 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4736 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4737 they said; they needed more time.
4740 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4741 words that echo today,
4745 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4746 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4748 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4750 a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in
4751 the Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a
4753 to Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general
4754 Tax on the Publick; and all this only to increase the private Gain
4755 of the Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4757 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4758 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4759 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4761 of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the
4762 Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4764 (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al.,
8,
4765 Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4770 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in
4771 a series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4772 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4773 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4774 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4775 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4777 "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of Anne,
4778 the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just because the
4779 protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't mean the
4781 of the common law expired: Under the common law they had
4782 the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its Statute of Anne
4783 copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only way to protect
4787 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some
4788 of the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4790 Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it, "The
4791 publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle rancher has
4792 for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4794 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4795 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4796 Vaidhyanathan,
37
48.
4798 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the
4800 His concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4803 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4804 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4805 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4807 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4808 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62
69.
4812 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4813 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4814 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4815 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4817 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4820 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4822 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4823 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4824 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4825 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4831 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's
4832 shop in Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where
4833 he sold inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in
4835 of the supposed common law right of Literary Property."
<footnote><para>
4837 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4841 books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he rested
4842 his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of Anne,
4843 the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4846 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4847 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4848 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4851 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to
4852 James Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the
4854 of the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full
4856 of the statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor
4857 began printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual
4858 common law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4860 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright
4861 Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law
4867 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in
4869 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4870 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4871 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the
4872 common law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4873 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4874 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That
4876 law rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4877 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4880 Considered as a matter of abstract justice--reasoning as if justice
4881 were just a matter of logical deduction from first principles--Mansfield's
4882 conclusion might make some sense. But what it ignored was the larger
4883 issue that Parliament had struggled with in
1710: How best to limit
4884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4885 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4886 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4887 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4888 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4890 Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4891 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4894 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4895 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4898 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4899 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4900 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4904 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4905 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4906 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4907 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4908 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4909 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4912 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4913 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4914 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4915 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4916 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4917 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4918 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4919 statute were no longer protected.
4922 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4923 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4925 of special legal distinction who functioned much like the Justices
4926 in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the House of
4927 Lords generally voted.
4930 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4931 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4933 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one
4935 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4936 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright
4937 was fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by
4939 passed into the public domain.
4942 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4943 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4944 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4945 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4947 history, the legal control over creative works expired, and the
4948 greatest works in English history--including those of Shakespeare,
4949 Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan--were free of legal restraint.
4952 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4953 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4954 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people celebrated
4955 the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser reported, "No
4956 private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the public, and
4957 none has been tried before the House of Lords in the decision of
4958 which so many individuals were interested." "Great rejoicing in
4960 upon victory over literary property: bonfires and
4961 illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4967 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4968 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4973 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what
4974 was honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday
4975 thought property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of
4976 London and Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses
4977 to purchase Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who
4978 after many years industry thought they had acquired a
4980 to provide for their families now find themselves without a
4981 shilling to devise to their successors.
<footnote><para>
4988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4989 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4990 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4991 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4993 would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter free.
4994 Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of course,
4995 for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller had an
4997 right to control the publication of that book. And not in the
4998 sense that books could be stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you
4999 still had to buy the book from someone. But free in the sense that the
5000 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
5001 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free culture
5002 would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English culture
5003 would develop as the many English readers chose to let it develop--
5004 chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the memes they
5005 repeated and endorsed. Chose in a competitive context, not a context
5006 in which the choices about what culture is available to people and
5007 how they get access to it are made by the few despite the wishes of
5011 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
5013 resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a world
5014 where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
5017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
5019 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
5020 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
5022 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
5023 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
5024 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
5025 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
5029 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
5030 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
5034 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
5035 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
5037 are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
5039 a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and in
5040 the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the stage.
5043 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some
5045 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
5046 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers and
5047 the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
5048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5049 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5053 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5054 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
5055 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5056 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5057 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
5060 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get
5062 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a
5063 four-and-a-halfsecond
5064 image on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How
5065 could it hurt? Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told
5066 Else to contact Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5069 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5070 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5071 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5072 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5073 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5076 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we
5078 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation--or at least
5079 that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation." And
5080 second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us to use
5081 this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited Simpsons which
5082 was in the corner of the shot."
5085 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to
5086 someone he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca
5088 He explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . .
5089 We're asking for your educational rate on this." That was the
5091 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5092 confirm what he had been told.
5095 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes,
5096 you have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
5097 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film about
5099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5100 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
5101 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant to
5102 Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want the
5106 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was
5108 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5109 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the very
5110 last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally replaced the
5111 shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on, The Day After
5112 Trinity, from ten years before.
5115 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox,
5116 owns the copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property.
5117 To use that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the
5119 of the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5120 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5121 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5122 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner of
5123 the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law says the
5124 owner gets to control.
5127 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that
5128 the copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5129 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
5130 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the
5132 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5133 whatever she wants--$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set by
5137 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5138 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
5140 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that lawyers don't
5141 permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard A. Posner with William
5142 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred " (draft on
5143 file with author), University of Chicago Law School,
5 August
2003.
5145 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot
5146 of a Simpsons episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons--and fair use
5147 does not require the permission of anyone.
5150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5151 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
5155 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf
5157 what lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and
5158 what is crushingly relevant in practice to those of us actually
5159 trying to make and broadcast documentaries. I never had any
5160 doubt that it was "clearly fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But
5161 I couldn't rely on the concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5163 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5166 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires
5167 that we buy Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers
5169 a detailed "visual cue sheet" listing the source and
5171 status of each shot in the film. They take a dim view of
5172 "fair use," and a claim of "fair use" can grind the application
5177 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the
5178 first place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a
5179 history of tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons
5180 usage, just as George Lucas had a very high profile litigating
5181 Star Wars usage. So I decided to play by the book, thinking
5182 that we would be granted free or cheap license to four seconds
5183 of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working to
5185 on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk legal
5186 trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5191 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford
5192 Law School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also
5193 confirmed that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within
5194 an inch of your life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He
5195 made clear that it would boil down to who had the bigger
5197 department and the deeper pockets, me or them.
5198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5202 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5203 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5209 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory
5211 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
5212 But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5213 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means
5214 that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight. The law
5215 has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5218 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5219 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5221 profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has matured
5222 into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or not.
5224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5226 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5227 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5229 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc.
5231 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder
5232 Paul Allen to develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet
5233 became popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for
5235 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5238 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5239 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology--not to distribute
5240 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult.
5241 In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to build
5243 on the work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was
5244 Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5246 with clips from his films and interviews with figures important
5250 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor
5251 and as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with
5253 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5254 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5258 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5259 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5260 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5261 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5262 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5265 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5266 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5268 films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No
5269 one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No one had
5270 ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an actor's
5274 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5275 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5278 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5279 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5280 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5281 for it."
<footnote><para>
5283 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5285 an artist has to control the commercial exploitation of his
5287 But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as this chapter
5292 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5293 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5294 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5295 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5296 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5299 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5300 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5301 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5305 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips.
5306 We made some artistic decisions about what film clips to
5308 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip
5309 from Dirty Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground
5310 who's wiggling under the gun and you need to get his
5312 And then you have to decide what you are going to pay
5316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5317 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the
5319 rate for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking
5320 about a clip of less than a minute, but to reuse that performance
5321 in the CD-ROM the rate at the time was about $
600.
5322 So we had to identify the people--some of them were hard to
5323 identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
5324 crashing through the glass--is it the actor or is it the stuntman?
5325 And then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some
5326 others, and we just started calling people.
5330 Some actors were glad to help--Donald Sutherland, for example,
5331 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5332 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5333 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5334 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5335 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5336 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5337 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5341 It was one year later--"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5342 were totally in the clear."
5345 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5346 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5347 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5351 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up
5352 their hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many
5354 there's the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director,
5355 there's the actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into
5356 its constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this
5357 many directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it
5358 very systematically and cleared the rights.
5363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5364 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5365 loved it, and it sold very well.
5368 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5369 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
5370 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5372 so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
5373 all."
<footnote><para>
5375 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5376 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5377 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5379 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5383 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5384 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5385 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5386 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5387 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5391 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5392 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5393 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5394 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5395 compensated for that.
5399 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5400 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license that
5401 someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips like this?
5402 Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would have to track
5403 down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit permission
5404 from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of the
5406 process could be made to be more clean?
5410 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5412 you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5413 subject to estranged former spouses--you'd see a lot more of this
5414 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5416 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it
5417 with lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost
5418 as the producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of
5420 X dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a
5421 known cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes
5422 this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have
5423 a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me
5424 X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get
5426 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you
5427 say, "Oh, I want a hundred minutes of something and I have no
5428 idea what it's going to cost me, and a certain number of people are
5429 going to hold me up for money," then it becomes difficult to put
5430 one of these things together.
5434 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some
5435 of the richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and
5436 access that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him
5437 a year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity
5438 is never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5439 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5441 hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5442 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5443 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea
5444 that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing
5446 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5447 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5448 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5449 regulationminimizing
5450 Republican should look at the rights and ask, "Does this
5454 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5455 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5456 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5457 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5460 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5461 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5464 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5465 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5466 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5467 judges loved every minute of it.
5470 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5471 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5472 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5473 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5474 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5475 were just violated in this room?"
5478 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5479 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5480 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law.
5481 Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for
5482 this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle of federal
5484 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point:
5485 A year before anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two
5486 years before another member of our panel, David Boies, would defend
5487 Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was
5489 to get the judges to see that the law would not be friendly to the
5490 capacities that this technology would enable. Technology means you
5491 can now do amazing things easily; but you couldn't easily do them
5495 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5496 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5497 and paste architecture of the Internet created--in a second you can
5498 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5499 planted in your presentation.
5502 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5504 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never
5505 before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on
5506 computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes
5507 images of politicians and blends them with music to create biting
5509 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of
5510 the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is through
5511 the mixing of Flash! and music.
5514 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5515 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5516 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5517 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5518 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5521 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5522 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or
5523 mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5525 requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the
5527 could simply make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate
5528 artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for
5529 example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright owner of an
5531 work for the derivative reuse of his work will be a flat
1 percent
5532 of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the copyright owner." Under
5533 this rule, the copyright owner could benefit from some royalty, but he
5534 would not have the benefit of a full property right (meaning the right
5535 to name his own price) unless he registers the work.
5538 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5539 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5540 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5541 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5544 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an
5546 with Mike Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5548 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and
5550 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under
5551 the agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5552 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and--with the use of
5554 digital technology--insert Myers and other actors into the
5555 film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
5558 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers
5560 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on
5561 existing films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5562 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5563 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5564 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to new
5565 audiences, it is Mike."
5568 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5569 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5570 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5572 under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5574 is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5575 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5576 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5577 privilege reserved for the funny and famous--and presumably rich.
5580 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5581 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5582 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5583 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5584 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5585 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5586 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5587 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5588 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5589 process is a process of paying lawyers--again a privilege, or perhaps a
5590 curse, reserved for the few.
5592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5594 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5595 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5597 In April
1996, millions of "bots"--computer codes designed to
5598 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content--began
5599 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5600 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5601 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5602 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5603 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5606 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5607 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive
5608 that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the
5609 world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5610 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as well
5611 as when those pages changed.
5614 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5616 In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5618 updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved
5619 of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
5622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5623 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5624 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5625 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5628 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5629 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5630 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5631 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5633 updated, without any reliable memory.
5636 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back
5638 and the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the
5639 Internet was. You have the power to see what you remember. More
5640 importantly, perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't
5641 remember and what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5643 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5644 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003, press
5645 release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later
5646 changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended."
5647 E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5651 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we
5653 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the
5655 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965,
5656 or to Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5657 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5658 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5659 are free, using a library, to go back and remember--not just what it is
5660 convenient to remember, but remember something close to the truth.
5663 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5665 it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is whether
5666 we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More directly, the
5667 key is whether an objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do
5668 that, by collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5670 for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5673 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the
5675 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5676 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5678 in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5681 to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to think that
5682 we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns around the
5683 world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet--the one kept by the
5688 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5689 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5691 In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5693 It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
5694 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5696 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie
5697 of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10 billion
5698 pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5701 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge
5702 in human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5703 terabytes of material"--and was "ten times larger than the Library of
5704 Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set
5705 out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been
5707 the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more
5708 ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture
5709 was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of that
5711 is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news are
5713 each evening by Vanderbilt University--thanks to a specific
5714 exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and is available
5715 to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that, [television] is almost
5716 unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were Barbara Walters you could get
5717 access to [the archives], but if you are just a graduate student?" As Kahle
5722 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with
5724 Brown? Remember that back and forth surreal experience of
5725 a politician interacting with a fictional television character? If you
5726 were a graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to
5727 get those original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5730 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5731 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5735 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5736 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5737 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5738 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5740 America will have an easier time than researchers trying to
5742 the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5745 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5746 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5748 These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
5749 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once
5750 the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
5753 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library of
5755 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long
5756 as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5757 borrow back the deposits--for an unlimited time at no cost. In
1915
5758 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed back."
5759 Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any
5760 library. The copy exists--if it exists at all--in the library archive of the
5761 film company.
<footnote><para>
5763 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
5764 Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2
3 (
1980):
5;
5766 Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film Preservation in the United
5767 States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
& Co.,
1992),
36.
5771 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5772 were originally not copyrighted--there was no way to capture the
5773 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5774 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5776 they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5778 But those copies were simply kept by the broadcasters. No
5779 library had any right to them; the government didn't demand them.
5780 The content of this part of American culture is practically invisible to
5781 anyone who would look.
5784 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5786 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5788 from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5790 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations
5791 from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made their
5792 coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5794 could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5798 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger,
5799 whose archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films"
5800 (meaning films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never
5801 copyrighted), Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle
5802 digitize
1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet
5803 to be downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5804 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5805 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock footage
5806 sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the material they
5807 wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made films on
5808 their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to be made.
5809 Either way, the archive enabled access to this important part of our
5811 Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film that instructed
5812 children how to save themselves in the middle of nuclear attack? Go to
5813 archive.org, and you can download the film in a few minutes--for free.
5816 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that
5817 we otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
5818 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law
5819 doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in
5820 an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
5823 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to
5824 this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His
5825 aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part of our
5827 Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but
5829 a second life that all creative property has--a noncommercial life.
5832 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5833 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
5835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5836 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5838 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
5839 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
5840 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial
5842 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5845 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5847 has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers
5848 the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is
5849 used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive
5850 of knowledge about our history. In this second life, the content can
5851 continue to inform even if that information is no longer sold.
5854 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of
5855 print very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5857 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5858 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5859 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5860 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese, "The
5861 First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston College Law
5863 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5864 </para></footnote>). After it is
5865 out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the copyright
5866 owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many get to read
5867 the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are thus the
5869 life of a book. That second life is extremely important to the
5870 spread and stability of culture.
5873 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5875 property does not hold true with the most important components
5876 of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
5877 these--television, movies, music, radio, the Internet--there is no
5879 of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've replaced
5880 libraries with Barnes
& Noble superstores. With this culture, what's
5881 accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
5883 that, culture disappears.
5886 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5887 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5889 all television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is
5891 high. So even though the law in principle would have
5892 restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5894 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly difficult
5895 to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had little
5900 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution
5901 is that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
5902 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or
5904 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
5905 books published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an
5906 archive of all moving images and sound.
5909 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never
5911 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it;
5912 but we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5917 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of
5919 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases
5920 of movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed]
5921 during the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million
5922 different titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that
5923 would fit in this room and be able to be afforded by a small
5925 So we're at a turning point in our history. Universal access is
5926 the goal. And the opportunity of leading a different life, based on
5927 this, is . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind
5928 would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria,
5929 putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
5934 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5935 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5936 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5937 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5938 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5940 perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand it;
5941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5942 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
5943 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
5944 become unimaginable for much of our past--a future for our past. The
5945 technology of digital arts could make the dream of the Library of
5946 Alexandria real again.
5949 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building
5950 such an archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might
5951 like to call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might
5952 seem, the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5954 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that
5955 Kahle and others would exercise.
5957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5959 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5960 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5962 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture
5964 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C.,
5965 with Lyndon Johnson's administration--literally. The famous picture
5966 of Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5967 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5968 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5969 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5972 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion
5973 Picture Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose
5974 goal was to defend American movies against increasing domestic
5976 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but
5978 and distributors of entertainment for television, video, and
5979 cable. Its board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven
5980 major producers and distributors of motion picture and television
5982 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures
5984 MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal
5985 Studios, and Warner Brothers.
5988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5989 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president
5990 before him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5991 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most
5993 political skill of a Southerner--the ability to appear simple and
5994 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays
5995 the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5996 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5997 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5998 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
6002 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
6004 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
6005 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
6006 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
6007 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
6008 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine
6009 the meaning of "creative property."
6012 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
6017 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges
6018 and the counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting,
6019 reasonable men and women will keep returning to the
6021 issue, the central theme which animates this entire debate:
6023 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protection
6024 resident in all other property owners in the nation. That is the issue.
6025 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
6026 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
6028 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
6029 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
6031 on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
6032 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
97th
6033 Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
6038 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
6039 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
6041 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this:
6042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
6043 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
6045 resident in all other property owners in the nation." There are
6046 no second-class citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should
6047 be no second-class property owners.
6050 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
6051 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
6052 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a
6053 claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this claim of
6054 Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is perhaps
6055 the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and scope
6056 of "creative property." His views have no reasonable connection to our
6057 actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has
6058 slowly redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
6061 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
6063 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
6065 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
6066 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
6067 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
6068 right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
6070 meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private
6071 Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
6073 </para></footnote> it has never been the
6074 case, nor should it be, that "creative property owners" have been
6076 the same rights and protection resident in all other property
6077 owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were given the same rights
6078 as all other property owners, that would effect a radical, and radically
6079 undesirable, change in our tradition.
6082 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat
6083 for our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6084 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6086 in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a
6087 powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6088 culture would develop.
6091 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6092 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to
6093 convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6095 We have always treated rights in creative property differently
6096 from the rights resident in all other property owners. They have never
6097 been the same. And they should never be the same, because, however
6098 counterintuitive this may seem, to make them the same would be to
6100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6101 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6103 depends upon the owners of creativity having less than perfect
6107 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most
6108 powerful of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6110 in assuring that the new can displace them. No organization
6111 does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's
6112 good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A society that
6113 defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the
6115 for new creativity to threaten the old.
6116 To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
6117 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
6118 Constitution itself.
6121 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so
6122 strongly did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6123 important requirement. If the government takes your property--if it
6124 condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm--it is
6125 required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you
6126 "just compensation" for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees
6127 that property is, in a certain sense, sacred. It cannot ever be taken from
6128 the property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6131 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6132 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
6133 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that after
6134 a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has granted and
6135 set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
6137 does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
6138 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not
6139 have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking."
6141 the same Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6143 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
6148 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6149 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be
6150 treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in
6151 our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be
6152 accorded the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is
6154 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
6157 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6158 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6159 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6161 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college
6162 to produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it
6163 did in
1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be
6164 the first to admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected
6165 some of those mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should
6166 reject as well. So my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did
6170 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6171 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
6172 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given the
6173 same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
6175 property there must be a public domain?
6178 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6180 of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6182 Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6183 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that should
6184 be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property should be
6186 but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights the law gives to
6187 creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights ought to
6188 be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether institutions designed
6189 to assure that artists get paid need also control how culture develops.
6193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6194 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk
6195 about how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more
6197 way than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other
6198 Laws of Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6199 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks how
6200 four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
6201 the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6203 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6205 <graphic fileref=
"1331.jpg"></graphic>
6208 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6209 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each
6210 case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right.
6211 For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals
6213 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated--
6214 either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious
6215 constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening
6217 after the fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for
6219 you willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song
6220 from her latest CD and posting it on the Web, you can be punished
6221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6222 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6223 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6226 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6228 for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by
6229 a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law
6230 against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished if you
6231 spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment
6232 might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it could
6233 easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6234 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but the
6235 source of the enforcement.
6238 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6239 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if
6240 you do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6241 norms--it is property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be
6242 taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a
6243 set of norms, and a background of property and contract law, the
6245 imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group
6249 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6251 physical world as one finds it--is a constraint on
6253 A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get across a
6254 river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community to
6255 integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
6257 its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with
6258 the market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous
6259 conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing
6261 or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by "architecture."
6262 If a
500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that
6263 enforces this constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between
6264 you and a flight to New York, it is the market that enforces this
6269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6270 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6272 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced
6273 by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by
6277 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6278 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6280 thing, we have to consider how these four modalities interact.
6281 Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well be; my
6282 claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the most
6283 significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must
6284 consider how these four in particular interact.
6287 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6288 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say
6289 how fast you can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in
6290 part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most
6292 drivers; governors in buses, as another example, set the
6294 rate at which the driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted
6295 by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of
6296 gasoline indirectly constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a
6298 may or may not constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at
50
6299 mph by a school in your own neighborhood and you're likely to be
6300 punished by the neighbors. The same norm wouldn't be as effective in
6301 a different town, or at night.
6304 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6305 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6306 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6308 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6309 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6310 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right self-consciously to
6311 change the other three. The right of the other three is more timidly
6313 See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (New
6314 York: Basic Books,
1999):
90
95; Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago
6315 School," Journal of Legal Studies, June
1998.
6317 The law, in other words, sometimes
6318 operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a particular modality.
6319 Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to
6321 the incentives to drive more slowly. The law might be used to
6322 mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty of driving
6323 rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless
6324 driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be more
6325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6326 strict--a federal requirement that states decrease the speed limit, for
6327 example--so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast driving.
6329 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6331 <graphic fileref=
"1361.jpg"></graphic>
6334 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6335 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of property
6336 at any particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A
6338 imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A
6340 enabled by one modality might be displaced by another.
<footnote><para>
6342 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6344 their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6346 moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6347 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6348 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6349 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss of
6350 freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of
6353 I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which depends
6354 upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue against any
6355 insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of liberty. As I
6356 argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of political thought with a
6357 broader focus than the narrow question of what the government did when.
6358 John Stuart Mill defended freedom of speech, for example, from the
6359 tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of government prosecution;
6360 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19.
6361 John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of labor
6362 from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The Right
6363 to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds., John R.
6364 Commons: Selected Essays (London: Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans
6365 with Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical
6367 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making
6368 access to those places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000).
6369 Each of these interventions to change existing conditions changes the
6370 liberty of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6371 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each of these
6375 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6376 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6379 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6380 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6381 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6382 rallying makes sense.
6385 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6388 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6390 <graphic fileref=
"1371.jpg"></graphic>
6393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6394 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The
6395 law limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties
6396 on those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6397 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture)
6398 and expensive to copy and share content (market). Finally, those
6400 are mitigated by norms we all recognize--kids, for example, taping
6401 other kids' records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be
6403 but the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least)
6404 had no problem with this form of infringement.
6407 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s
6408 and p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes
6410 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6411 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6412 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6414 an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6417 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6419 has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
6420 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of
6422 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq
6423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6424 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6425 looting that results.
6427 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6429 <graphic fileref=
"1381.jpg"></graphic>
6432 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6433 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6435 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6436 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6437 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6439 had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6440 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6442 marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to develop
6443 code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should educate
6444 kids to better protect copyright.
6447 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed--if it was to
6449 the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
6450 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry
6451 to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life
6452 you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if
6454 comes along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a
6456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6457 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6458 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6460 (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government to
6461 bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions
6462 have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when
6463 imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6466 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6467 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6469 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the
6470 changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the
6471 content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown
6473 it, its "architecture of revenue."
6476 But just because a particular interest asks for government support,
6477 it doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6479 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6481 that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6482 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6483 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6484 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6486 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6488 online,
2 August
1999, available at
6489 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more recent
6490 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6491 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6 October
2003,
6494 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6496 Does anyone believe the government should ban
6497 digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have weakened the
6498 freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks
6499 from roads for the purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the
6501 of this book, remote channel changers have weakened the
6503 of television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the
6504 TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this
6505 change has weakened the television advertising market. But does
6507 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial
6509 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to
6510 switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6513 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6514 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6515 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6516 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6517 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6518 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6519 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6520 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6521 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6523 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170
71.
6526 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6527 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6528 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6529 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6530 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6534 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6535 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6537 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6539 that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the
6540 duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they
6541 create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
6542 are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for
6547 In the context of laws regulating speech--which include, obviously,
6548 copyright law--that duty is even stronger. When the industry
6550 about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in
6551 a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be
6553 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government
6554 to get into the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and
6555 dangers of that game are precisely why our framers created the First
6556 Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress shall make no law . . .
6557 abridging the freedom of speech." So when Congress is being asked to
6558 pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom of speech, it should ask--
6559 carefully--whether such regulation is justified.
6562 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6564 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6566 My argument is about their effect. For before we get to the
6568 of justification, a hard question that depends a great deal upon
6569 your values, we should first ask whether we understand the effect of the
6570 changes the content industry wants.
6573 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6576 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6577 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6578 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6579 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6580 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6583 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6584 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6585 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6588 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued
6589 that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6590 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6592 Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6595 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly
6596 did not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of
6598 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse
6599 than the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately,
6600 the problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at
6601 least when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways
6602 to solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6605 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6606 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6607 culture.
<footnote><para>
6609 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6611 for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6613 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of
6614 this chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that
6616 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given
6617 away "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6618 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6620 much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6622 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6623 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6625 copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
6626 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware
6627 of our actions' effects on the environment.
6630 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6631 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6632 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6633 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6634 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6635 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6636 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6637 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6638 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6641 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6642 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6646 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6647 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6649 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and
6651 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
6652 "creative property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the
6654 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6657 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6659 in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I,
6660 section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6663 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6664 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6665 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6668 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does
6669 not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant "creative
6671 rights." It says that Congress has the power to promote progress. The
6672 grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the
6673 purpose of enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of
6678 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we
6679 saw in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6681 that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over culture
6682 by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume
6683 the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike
6684 the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6685 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6688 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6689 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
6690 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built
6691 a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them
6692 short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the
6693 federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6695 power in the federal government, they built structures to reinforce
6696 the power of the states--including the Senate, whose members were
6697 at the time selected by the states, and an electoral college, also selected
6698 by the states, to select the president. In each case, a structure built
6699 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to
6701 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
6704 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
6706 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they
6707 ever considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put
6708 our "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
6709 210 years since they first struck its design.
6712 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6713 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6715 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6718 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6720 <graphic fileref=
"1441.jpg"></graphic>
6725 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6727 <graphic fileref=
"1442.jpg"></graphic>
6731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6734 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6735 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6737 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6738 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6739 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6741 creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6742 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6743 authorship.
<footnote><para>
6745 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the
6746 United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
485
86:
6747 "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme Law of the Land,'
6748 the perpetual rights which authors had, or were supposed by some to have, under
6749 the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6751 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in
6752 the United States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the
6754 law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work
6756 in the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England,
6757 this lingering uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely
6758 upon a public domain to reprint and distribute works.
6761 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6762 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
6763 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections.
6764 Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the
6766 for all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any
6767 state copyrights expired as well.
6770 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6772 copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the
6774 was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to
6775 renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the
6776 copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6779 While there were many works created in the United States in the
6780 first ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were
6782 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work
6784 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
6785 1800,
95 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the
6787 would pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at
6788 most, and more likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6790 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790 to
6791 1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A History of
6792 Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation of an Industry,
6793 1630
1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000 imprints
6794 recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
1790 act;
6795 William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the
6797 Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7
10 (
2002), available at
6798 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
25</ulink>.
6799 Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the
6801 domain. Even those works that were copyrighted fell into the public
6802 domain quickly, because the term of copyright was short. The initial term
6803 of copyright was fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an
6805 fourteen years. Copyright Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
6809 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6810 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6812 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6813 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6815 then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the copyright, either.
6818 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6819 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6821 of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6823 allowed their work to pass into the public domain.
<footnote><para>
6825 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance,
6826 of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were renewed in
6827 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara
6828 A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright," Studies on Copyright,
6829 vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
1963),
618. For a more recent
6830 and comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and Richard A.
6832 "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," University of Chicago Law
6834 70 (
2003):
471,
498
501, and accompanying figures.
6838 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6839 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6840 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6842 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
6844 When that happens, the used books are
6845 traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are no longer
6847 controlled by copyright. The only practical commercial use of the
6848 books at that time is to sell the books as used books; that use--because
6849 it does not involve publication--is effectively free.
6852 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright
6853 was changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum
6854 of
28 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of
6856 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6857 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6858 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6861 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has
6863 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6864 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6865 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6866 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6867 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6868 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
6869 Congress extended the term of existing and future copyrights by
6873 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6874 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6875 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6876 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6879 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6880 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6881 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6884 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6885 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6886 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6887 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6888 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6889 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6890 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6894 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6895 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term--the
6896 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6897 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6898 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6899 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6900 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6901 was ninety-five years.
6904 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic
6905 way to assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the
6906 public domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether
6907 it is even possible to put works into the public domain. The public
6909 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the
6911 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything
6915 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6916 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6917 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6918 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6919 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6920 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6921 years.
<footnote><para>
6923 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6924 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6925 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6926 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6931 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6932 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6934 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6935 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6936 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6937 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6940 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6941 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6942 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6943 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6944 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6945 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6946 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6947 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6948 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6949 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6950 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6953 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of
6955 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6956 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible
6957 form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer
6958 programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative work not only
6959 the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the exclusive right of
6960 control over any "copies" of that work. And most significant for our
6961 purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner control over not
6962 only his or her particular work, but also any "derivative work" that might
6963 grow out of the original work. In this way, the right covers more
6965 work, protects the creative work more broadly, and protects works
6966 that are based in a significant way on the initial creative work.
6969 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded,
6971 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described
6972 the complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6973 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6974 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6976 law, there was a requirement that a work be registered before it
6977 could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also a
6979 that any copyrighted work be marked either with that famous ©
6980 or the word copyright. And for most of the history of American
6982 law, there was a requirement that works be deposited with the
6983 government before a copyright could be secured.
6986 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6988 that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the
6989 first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible for
6991 were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most
6992 works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration narrowed the
6993 regulation of the law to the few that did. The same reasoning justified
6994 the requirement that a work be marked as copyrighted--that way it
6995 was easy to know whether a copyright was being claimed. The
6997 that works be deposited was to assure that after the copyright
6999 there would be a copy of the work somewhere so that it could be
7000 copied by others without locating the original author.
7003 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system
7004 when we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no
7006 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright
7007 now is automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your
7008 work with a ©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually
7009 make a copy available for others to copy.
7012 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
7016 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
7017 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
7018 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
7020 your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so
7021 as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
174
7022 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7024 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
7026 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
7028 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
7029 Copyright Records,
1790
1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
7031 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
7032 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
7033 the United States--publishers.
7036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
7037 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
7038 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
7039 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
7040 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
7041 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
7043 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
7047 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
7048 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
7049 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
7051 to a tangible form--all of this is automatically copyrighted.
7052 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
7053 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
7056 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
7057 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
7058 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
7061 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
7063 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
7064 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
7065 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
7066 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
7067 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
7068 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
7069 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
7071 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
7072 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
7075 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
7076 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
7078 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
7080 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
7081 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
7082 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
7083 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
7087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
7088 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
7089 a free culture--at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
7090 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
7091 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
7092 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
7093 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
7094 all--they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
7096 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
7098 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
7100 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
7102 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
7103 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
7104 the wrong of direct piracy.
7107 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
7108 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
7109 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
7111 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
7113 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
7114 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
7115 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
7116 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
7118 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1
60 (see especially pp.
53
59).
7120 These two different uses of my creative work are
7124 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
7125 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
7126 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
7128 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
7129 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
7133 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
7134 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
7136 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
7137 rights originally granted.
7140 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
7141 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
7143 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7144 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7145 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7146 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
7148 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
7149 regulates more than "copies"--a public performance of a copyrighted
7150 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
7151 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
7153 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
7154 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
7155 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7160 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
7161 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
7162 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
7163 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
7164 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
7165 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
7166 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
7167 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
7168 trigger for copyright law.
7171 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7172 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7173 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7174 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
7176 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
7177 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
7178 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
7180 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
7182 because it is clear that the
7183 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7184 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7187 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7190 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
7192 <graphic fileref=
"1521.jpg"></graphic>
7195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7196 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to
7198 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by copyright
7199 law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a book, that act is not
7200 regulated by copyright law. If you give someone the book, that act is
7201 not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a book, that act is not
7203 (copyright law expressly states that after the first sale of a book,
7204 the copyright owner can impose no further conditions on the
7206 of the book). If you sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or
7207 let your puppy chew it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law,
7208 because those acts do not make a copy.
7210 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
7212 <graphic fileref=
"1531.jpg"></graphic>
7215 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7216 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7217 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7218 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7219 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7220 diagram on next page).
7223 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7224 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
7226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7227 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
7229 <graphic fileref=
"1541.jpg"></graphic>
7232 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
7233 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7235 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
7236 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
7237 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
7238 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
7239 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
7240 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7242 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7244 <graphic fileref=
"1542.jpg"></graphic>
7247 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7249 <graphic fileref=
"1551.jpg"></graphic>
7252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7253 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7254 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7255 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7258 Enter the Internet--a distributed, digital network where every use
7259 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7261 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
7262 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
7263 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
7264 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
7266 And because of this single,
7267 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
7269 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
7271 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
7272 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
7273 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
7274 because each use also makes a copy--category
1 gets sucked into
7276 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
7278 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
7279 burden of this shift.
7282 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7283 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
7284 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
7285 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
7287 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
7288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7289 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use--reading--
7290 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
7295 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
7297 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7298 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
7300 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
7302 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
7303 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
7304 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
7305 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
7306 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
7309 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7310 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7311 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7312 points also become clear:
7315 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7316 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7318 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7320 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
7321 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7322 free culture before the Internet.
7325 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7327 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7328 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7330 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7331 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7333 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7335 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7336 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7338 uses of creative work.
7341 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7344 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7345 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7346 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7347 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7348 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7350 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7351 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7353 before because reading was not regulated.
7356 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7357 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7359 upon fair use--never even addressing the earlier question about
7360 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7361 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7362 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7364 of fair use are not enough.
7367 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7368 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7369 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7370 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7371 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7374 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7376 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7378 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7379 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7380 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7381 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7386 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7388 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7389 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7390 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7392 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter--he had built a
7394 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7395 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7396 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7398 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7399 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7400 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7403 Disney countersued--for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7404 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7406 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7408 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7409 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7410 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7411 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7412 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7415 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7416 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7417 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7418 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7419 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7420 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7421 Disney's permission.
7424 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7425 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7426 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7427 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7429 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7430 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7431 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7432 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7433 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7434 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7435 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7439 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7441 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say
7442 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7443 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
&
7445 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7446 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7448 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7449 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7451 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7452 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7453 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7454 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7457 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7458 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7459 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7460 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7462 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7463 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7466 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7467 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7469 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7470 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7471 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7472 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7475 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7476 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7477 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7478 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7479 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7483 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7484 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7485 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7486 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7487 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7488 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7490 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7492 Problems
44 (
1981):
172
73.
7496 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7497 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7498 you were."
<footnote><para>
7500 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1
3.
7502 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7503 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7504 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7507 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7508 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7509 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7510 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7513 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7514 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7515 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7516 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7518 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7519 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7520 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7521 that is not at all funny.
7524 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7527 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7528 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7529 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7531 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7534 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7538 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7539 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7540 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7541 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7542 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7543 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7544 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7545 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7548 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7549 <title>Acrobat eBook Reader
</title>
7550 <graphic fileref=
"1611.jpg"></graphic>
7553 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7555 that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7557 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7559 <graphic fileref=
"1612.jpg"></graphic>
7562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7563 According to my eBook
7564 Reader, I have the permission
7565 to copy to the clipboard of the
7566 computer ten text selections
7567 every ten days. (So far, I've
7568 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7569 I also have the permission to
7570 print ten pages from the book
7571 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7572 the permission to use the Read
7573 Aloud button to hear
7575 read aloud through the
7579 Here's the e-book for another
7580 work in the public domain
7586 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7588 <graphic fileref=
"1621.jpg"></graphic>
7591 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7592 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7595 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7597 <graphic fileref=
"1622.jpg"></graphic>
7600 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7601 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7604 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7606 <graphic fileref=
"1631.jpg"></graphic>
7609 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7612 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"--
7613 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7614 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7615 the power--up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7617 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7619 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7620 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7621 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7623 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7624 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7625 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7628 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7629 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7630 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7631 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7634 The control comes instead from the code--from the technology
7635 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7636 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7637 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7638 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7639 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7640 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7641 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7642 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7644 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7645 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7646 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud--it's not that the company
7647 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7648 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7652 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7653 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7654 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7657 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7658 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7659 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7660 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7661 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7662 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7665 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7666 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7668 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7669 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7670 protections as well?
7673 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7677 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7679 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7680 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7681 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7682 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7684 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7686 <graphic fileref=
"1641.jpg"></graphic>
7689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7690 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7692 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7694 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7697 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7698 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7699 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7700 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7701 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7702 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7705 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was
7707 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7709 the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book read
7710 aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would Adobe
7711 thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack around the
7712 restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company (call it
7713 Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7715 built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say, could use a
7716 computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that such a use of
7717 an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because the answer,
7718 however absurd it might seem, is no.
7721 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7722 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7723 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7725 enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7727 That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is often crazy.
7730 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7731 story of mine that makes the same point.
7734 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7735 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7736 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7739 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7740 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7741 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7743 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7744 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7745 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7748 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7749 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7751 So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about how to
7752 teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com was
7754 information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack their
7756 "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7759 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7760 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7761 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7762 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7763 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7764 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7765 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7766 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7767 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7768 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7771 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7772 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7773 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7774 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7778 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the
7780 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo
7781 to dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a
7782 clever bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7783 than Sony had built.
7786 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7787 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7788 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7790 that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of the
7792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7793 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7795 (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog to
7796 dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to go
7797 on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7799 legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7800 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot dog to
7804 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show--
7805 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7806 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7807 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7808 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7809 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7810 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7811 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7812 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7815 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7817 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7818 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7819 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7820 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7821 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7822 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7823 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7824 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7826 about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7827 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7830 group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted at
7832 The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7834 system being developed by the Secure Digital Music Initiative as
7835 a technique to control the distribution of music.
7838 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7839 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7841 as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7842 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7843 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7845 The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of control
7846 that would get content owners to trust the system of the Internet much
7850 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a
7852 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7853 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7854 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7858 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He
7859 and the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many
7861 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7862 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7865 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7866 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7867 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great idea. A
7868 strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to encourage a wide
7869 range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in turn, to improve the
7871 or people or ideas criticized.
7874 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7875 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7876 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7877 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7878 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7879 constituted, succeed.
7882 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7883 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7884 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7889 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7890 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of
7891 the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
7897 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7898 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7899 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7903 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7905 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities
7907 by the Agreement and could subject you and your research
7908 team to actions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
7913 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7914 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7915 spreading such information an offense.
7918 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7919 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7920 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7921 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies--
7922 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7923 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7924 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7927 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of
7928 this code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could
7929 say, legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7931 to support the legal code of copyright.
7934 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted
7935 works to the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that
7936 is, did not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA
7938 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7939 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7940 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention
7941 would have been a copyright violation.
7944 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack
7946 a copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the
7947 dog to dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of
7949 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the
7950 use did not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt
7951 that aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7952 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7954 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7955 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7958 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7959 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7961 protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7963 Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7964 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7965 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7968 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn
7969 in
1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held
7970 that the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7971 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7972 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7973 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7975 in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape Mr. Rogers'
7980 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7981 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I
7982 think that it's a real service to families to be able to record such
7983 programs and show them at appropriate times. I have always felt
7984 that with the advent of all of this new technology that allows
7985 people to tape the "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm
7987 for the "Neighborhood" because that's what I produce,
7988 that they then become much more active in the programming of
7989 their family's television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people
7990 being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7992 has always been "You are an important person just the way
7993 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on
7994 too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be
7995 more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7996 important.
<footnote><para>
7998 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7999 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
8000 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
8001 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270
71.
8006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
8007 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
8008 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
8009 the VCR responsible.
8012 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
8016 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
8019 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
8020 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used
8021 for different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
8023 of copyrighted material--a bad end. Or they can be used to
8025 the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that would be
8026 considered fair use--a good end.
8029 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
8030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
8031 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
8032 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
8033 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
8036 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
8038 <graphic fileref=
"1711.jpg"></graphic>
8041 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
8042 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
8043 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
8044 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
8045 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
8046 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
8049 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners
8050 are changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code,
8052 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who
8053 would attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose
8054 through code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be
8055 erased; the law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
8058 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
8059 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
8060 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law--increasing its
8061 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
8062 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
8063 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
8064 owners effect--at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
8065 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
8068 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture
8069 and law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
8070 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
8071 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
8072 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
8074 deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
8076 a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
8077 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
8079 down the identity of those who violate the rules.
8083 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
8084 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
8085 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
8086 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another,
8088 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story,
8089 then simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
8091 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
8092 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
8093 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
8097 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
8099 No matter what happened inside your club room, you would never
8100 be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in that space
8101 to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were allowed to
8102 build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
8105 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
8106 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
8108 the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would quickly
8109 find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon the
8111 of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire a lawyer's
8112 threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely costly
8114 The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The penalties are
8116 and the process is quick.
8119 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
8120 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
8121 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
8122 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
8123 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
8124 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
8127 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
8128 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
8130 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically--tripled in the past
8131 thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as well--from
8133 only publishers to now regulating just about everyone. And
8134 copyright's reach has changed, as every action becomes a copy and
8135 hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists find better ways
8136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
8137 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly enforced
8138 through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is easier to
8139 find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative process, which
8140 began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the market for
8142 work, has become the single most important regulator of
8144 there is. It is a massive expansion in the scope of the government's
8145 control over innovation and creativity; it would be totally
8147 to those who gave birth to copyright's control.
8150 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8151 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8152 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8153 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8154 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8157 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8158 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8159 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8161 Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8162 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8163 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the
8164 FCC announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we
8165 will live in a world where just three companies control more than
8166 percent of the media.
8169 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8173 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8174 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8175 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
8177 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8178 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
8180 of Senator John McCain).
8182 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony
8184 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8
8186 of the U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
8188 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8189 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
8191 The "five largest cable companies pipe
8192 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
8194 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
8199 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8200 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8202 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200 stations.
8203 During that period of consolidation, the total number of radio owners
8204 dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two largest
8206 control
74 percent of that market's revenues. Overall, just four
8207 companies control
90 percent of the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8210 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well.
8212 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States
8213 than there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8214 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8215 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
8216 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent of
8217 all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the framers
8218 sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well protected--
8222 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8223 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8224 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8228 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8230 in its integration. They supply content--Fox movies . . .
8231 Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8233 and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8235 newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the cable
8236 channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8237 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's
8238 satellite systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe
8239 and Asia; if Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner,
8240 that system will serve the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
8242 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
8248 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8249 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8250 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8251 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8253 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8255 <graphic fileref=
"1761.jpg"></graphic>
8258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8259 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8260 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8264 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8265 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8266 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8267 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8270 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8274 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8276 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
8277 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8278 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8279 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8280 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8283 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8284 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8285 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8286 control.
<footnote><para>
8288 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8289 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8291 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8292 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8293 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8294 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8300 The network did not control those copyrights because the law
8302 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The
8303 law required a separation between the networks and the content
8305 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
8306 1992, because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8308 percent of it--was "independent" of the networks.
8311 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this
8313 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance.
8314 In
1985, there were twenty-five independent television production
8316 in
2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
8317 1992, only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a
8318 company it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8319 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
8320 16 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control,
8321 last year there was one."
<footnote><para>
8323 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on
8324 Media Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th
8325 Cong.,
1st sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of
8327 Union and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8328 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of
8329 America, West, in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond,
8330 Virginia,
27 February
2003.
8332 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television
8333 was owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
8334 1992 and
2002, the number of prime time television hours per week
8335 produced by network studios increased over
200%, whereas the
8337 of prime time television hours per week produced by independent
8338 studios decreased
63%."
<footnote><para>
8344 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
8345 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8346 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8347 owned by the network.
8350 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the
8352 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller
8353 few. As Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8357 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8358 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8359 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8360 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8362 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent
8364 companies producing television programs. Now you have less
8365 than a handful.
<footnote><para>
8367 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
8368 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8369 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8374 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of
8375 such large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8377 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from
8378 networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the network
8379 wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from the
8381 it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question
8382 without risk of consequence--not necessarily banishment to Siberia,
8383 but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are
8384 quashed. This is not the environment for a democracy.
8387 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8388 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8389 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8390 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8391 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8392 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8394 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
8396 Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business (Cambridge: Harvard
8397 Business School Press,
1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was
8398 first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of
8399 Design Hierarchies and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
8400 Research Policy
14 (
1985):
235
51. For a more recent study, see Richard
8401 Foster and Sarah Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are
8402 Built to Last Underperform the Market--and How to Successfully Transform
8403 Them (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
8407 giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the field is
8408 only open to the giants, there will be far too little sprinting.
8411 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8412 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8413 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8417 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8418 suggest the concern.
8421 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8422 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8423 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8426 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8427 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8428 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8431 wrecked by drugs--though the drugs that wrecked my family were all
8432 quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8434 damage from it is so great as to make waging the war insane.
8435 When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice system, the
8436 desperation of generations of kids whose only real economic
8438 are as drug warriors, the queering of constitutional protections
8440 of the constant surveillance this war requires, and, most profoundly,
8441 the total destruction of the legal systems of many South American
8443 because of the power of the local drug cartels, I find it impossible
8444 to believe that the marginal benefit in reduced drug consumption by
8445 Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
8448 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and
8449 it is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8451 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8455 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
8456 launched a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The
8458 produced scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal
8459 drugs. In one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar,
8460 discussing the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the
8461 collateral damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of
8462 drug legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8463 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes his
8464 mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on
8465 the pro-legalization campaign.
8468 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8469 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8472 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8473 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8474 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the
8475 drug war. Can you do it?
8478 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8480 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8481 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8486 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of
8488 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8489 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
8490 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First
8492 but the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to
8493 choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media
8494 will refuse one side of a crucial debate the opportunity to present its case.
8495 And the courts will defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8497 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads that
8498 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
8499 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
8501 The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
8502 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
8503 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and
8505 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine,
15 October
2003.
8506 These restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for
8508 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with
8509 Rejection from TV Networks," New York Times,
13 March
2003, C4.
8511 of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC or the
8512 courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general overview,
8513 see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
8515 on Television and Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
8516 449
79, and for a more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the
8517 courts, see Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
8518 872 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8519 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
8520 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel buses. Phillip
8521 Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni Rejects
8522 Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8523 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground was
8524 that the criticism was "too controversial."
8528 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well--if we lived in
8529 a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media
8530 throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control
8532 to the media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which
8533 political positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in
8534 an obvious and important way, concentration matters. You might like
8535 the positions the handful of companies selects. But you should not like
8536 a world in which a mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us
8541 <sect2 id=
"together">
8542 <title>Together
</title>
8544 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8546 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In
8547 the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No
8548 sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8551 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed--
8552 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology
8553 and markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8555 our culture is dramatically different--the claim begins to seem
8557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8558 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8560 the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated markets
8561 to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing the
8563 expanded "property" rights granted by copyright fundamentally
8564 changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and build upon our
8565 past, then we have to ask whether this property should be redefined.
8568 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8569 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8570 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8574 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8576 And these massive shifts in the effective power of copyright
8577 regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content industry and
8578 resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly enable control
8579 over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether another
8581 is called for. Not an adjustment that increases copyright's
8582 power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
8584 to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
8585 regulation--a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8588 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8590 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8591 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8592 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8593 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8595 holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8597 suggest that we may well need similar changes in the future. And
8598 these changes have to be reductions in the scope of copyright, in
8600 to the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the
8604 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8605 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8607 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8609 technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8610 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the
8612 of our culture than now.
8615 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8616 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when only
8617 publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much more
8618 diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for even
8619 then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers were
8621 of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a wide
8622 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
8623 remotely as long. This form of regulation--a tiny regulation of a tiny
8624 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding--is now a
8626 regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
8627 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into
8628 the most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8629 known.
<footnote><para>
8631 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8632 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159
60.
8636 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8639 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8640 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8642 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8643 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8644 that copyright law has undergone.
8645 In
1790, the law looked like this:
8650 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8654 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8655 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8660 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8661 <entry>©</entry>
8665 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8674 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8675 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8676 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8679 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8680 noncommercial work was also free.
8683 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8688 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8692 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8693 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8698 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8699 <entry>©</entry>
8700 <entry>©</entry>
8703 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8712 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law--if
8714 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8715 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8716 transformation were still essentially free.
8719 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and
8721 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8722 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8724 Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more
8726 we could say the law began to look like this:
8731 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8736 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8741 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8742 <entry>©</entry>
8743 <entry>©</entry>
8746 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8747 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8755 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through,
8756 say, copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the
8758 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of
8759 digital technologies, especially in the context of a digital network,
8760 means that the law now looks like this:
8765 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8770 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8775 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8776 <entry>©</entry>
8777 <entry>©</entry>
8780 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8781 <entry>©</entry>
8782 <entry>©</entry>
8789 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8791 was not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity--
8792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8793 commercial or not, transformative or not--with the same rules designed
8794 to regulate commercial publishers.
8797 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8798 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8799 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8800 these domains actually does any good.
8803 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8804 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8805 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8807 noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8809 sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8810 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8811 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8812 rights were more sharply restricted.
8815 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8816 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8817 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8819 historically, this property right (as with all property rights
<footnote><para>
8821 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8823 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance
8824 public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of
8825 Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland Pennock and John W.
8826 Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press,
1980).
8828 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8829 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8830 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8832 And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright" did not
8833 control at all the freedom of others to build upon or transform a creative
8834 work. American culture was born free, and for almost
180 years our
8835 country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free culture.
8838 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8839 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8840 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8841 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story
8842 of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar
8844 that is increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair
8845 use right become unavoidably high (the story of chapter
7). Adding
8846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8847 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8849 limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8). And
8851 archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property
8852 notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture
8853 (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But
8854 the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different
8855 from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today.
8858 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8860 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
8861 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing
8862 and distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed
8863 in a way that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property
8864 right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or
8865 was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become
8866 unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and
8867 transform becomes weakened in a world in which creation requires
8868 permission and creativity must check with a lawyer.
8870 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8874 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8875 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8880 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8881 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8884 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8885 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8886 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8887 <!-- f1. --> H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8888 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8889 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8891 The valley is extraordinarily
8892 beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate, slopes of rich
8893 brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent fruit." But the
8894 villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an opportunity. "In the
8895 Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King."
8896 So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a king.
8899 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8900 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8901 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8903 as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the sound
8904 of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to control
8905 him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
8907 he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute, and
8908 which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
8911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8912 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak)
8913 the virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8915 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8916 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8918 of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies,
8919 and she listened to his description of the stars and the mountains and
8920 her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence."
8921 "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could only half
8923 but she was mysteriously delighted."
8926 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously
8928 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8929 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything
8930 right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8933 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8934 is affected," he reports.
8937 "What affects it?" the father asks.
8938 "Those queer things that are called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in
8939 such a way as to affect his brain."
8942 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8943 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple
8944 and easy surgical operation--namely, to remove these irritant bodies
8948 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They
8950 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8951 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8953 in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8954 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8955 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8956 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8957 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8959 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8960 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8962 that she was not the person whose blood was at the scene. . . ."
8965 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8967 A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of
8968 DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two
8969 individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person
8970 can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of
8971 a "person" should reflect this reality.
8974 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright
8975 and culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8976 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8977 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8978 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong.
8979 One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
8980 records--the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
8981 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
8982 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just
8983 send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant
8985 just like what every executive in every recording company no
8986 doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8989 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8990 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music,
8991 then sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8992 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8993 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8994 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8996 to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8999 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
9000 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
9001 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally)
9003 a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free
9004 copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
9008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
9009 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
9010 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take
9011 a CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
9013 to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note
9014 that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that
9015 might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is $
1,
000.
9017 to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song CD, I'm
9019 for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
9022 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that
9023 it is both--both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It
9024 is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side
9026 we need to begin to think about how we should respond to this
9027 chimera. What rules should govern it?
9030 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
9031 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a
9032 felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages
9033 just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get
9034 universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no
9036 is used to commit this crime. These responses might be extreme,
9037 but each of them has either been proposed or actually implemented.
<footnote><para>
9038 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
9039 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
9041 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available
9043 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
9044 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
9045 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
9046 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
9047 Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
9048 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
9049 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
9050 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
9051 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer,
9052 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F.
9053 Supp.
2d
24 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
9054 high as $
90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
9055 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
9056 from $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
9057 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
9059 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
9061 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
9062 August
2003, available at
9063 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
9065 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
9066 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
9067 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003,
9069 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
9074 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids
9075 act as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there
9076 be no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
9078 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip:
9080 if at all, by social norms but not by law.
9083 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
9084 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
9085 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
9086 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter
9087 is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance
9088 extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a reasonable
9090 But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
9091 of the two extremes.
9095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
9096 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
9097 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land
9098 grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give
9100 holders a kind of control over our culture that they have never had
9101 before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
9103 and new creativity will be lost.
9106 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
9107 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
9108 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
9109 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
9111 that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the
9112 passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to distribute
9113 content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the vice president
9114 for global public policy at one of these new innovators, eMusic.com,
9115 put it when criticizing the DMCA's added protection for copyrighted
9120 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
9121 material, and we want to protect those rights.
9124 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
9125 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
9126 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
9128 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
9129 well produce a totally different industry model.
9132 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
9133 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
9134 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
9135 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
9136 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
9137 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
9138 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
9139 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
9140 interests.
<footnote><para>
9141 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
9142 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
9143 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
9145 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
9146 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
9148 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
9154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
9156 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
9157 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
9161 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
9162 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
9163 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
9166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
9169 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
9172 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
9173 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
9174 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
9175 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
9177 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
9180 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
9181 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
9183 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9187 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9188 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9189 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
9193 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still
9194 on the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme
9195 claims of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9196 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
9199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9200 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9201 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9202 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9203 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9204 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9206 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
9207 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
9209 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies.
9210 These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
9211 content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have
9212 done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But
9213 capturing and sharing through digital technology is different. The
9215 and power are different. You could send an e-mail telling
9217 about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you could send the
9218 clip. You could write an essay about the inconsistencies in the
9220 of the politician you most love to hate, or you could make a short
9221 film that puts statement against statement. You could write a poem to
9222 express your love, or you could weave together a string--a mash-up--
9223 of songs from your favorite artists in a collage and make it available on
9227 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
9228 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and
9229 in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it
9231 the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of
9232 digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
9234 creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9236 is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens
9237 to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture
9241 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9242 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9245 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9247 of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9249 extended across the globe.
9252 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9253 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9254 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9255 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9256 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9257 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9258 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9259 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9260 work is presumptively illegal.
9263 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples
9264 of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It
9265 is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed and what's not, and at
9266 the same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh.
9267 The four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of
9268 chapter
3 was just one) were threatened with a $
98 billion lawsuit for
9269 building search engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet
9271 defrauded investors of $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to
9273 in market capitalization of over $
200 billion--received a fine of a
9274 mere $
750 million.
<footnote><para>
9275 <!-- f1. --> See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
9277 N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of the
9279 see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court Approval for
9280 SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
9281 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
9283 And under legislation being pushed in Congress
9284 right now, a doctor who negligently removes the wrong leg in an
9286 would be liable for no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
9287 suffering.
<footnote><para>
9288 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9289 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
9290 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9291 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
9292 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
9293 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
9295 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9298 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9299 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9300 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9303 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9304 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
9305 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
9307 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
9308 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
9309 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
9311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9312 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
9314 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
9315 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
9317 to see a world of underground art--not because the message is
9319 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
9320 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
9322 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
9323 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
9326 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9327 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9329 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9330 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9331 critical or reflective.
9334 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9336 law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an even
9337 bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which infractions
9338 can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems discovered in
2002, it
9339 is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get courts to order Internet
9340 service providers to reveal who has what content. It is as if your cassette
9341 tape player transmitted a list of the songs that you played in the privacy
9342 of your own home that anyone could tune into for whatever reason
9346 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9347 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9348 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9349 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9350 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9351 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9352 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9353 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9354 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9357 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9358 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
9359 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
9360 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
9361 law regulates such a use.
9365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9366 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9367 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9368 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad--in practically
9369 every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too
9370 slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice
9372 the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich.
9373 For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides
9378 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides
9380 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access
9381 the law should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal
9382 system has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9383 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors impose
9384 upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon journalists--
9385 these are the real laws governing creativity. And these rules have little
9386 relationship to the "law" with which judges comfort themselves.
9389 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9391 of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to
9392 even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and which would
9393 never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs
9394 she suffered to defend her right to speak--in that world, the
9396 broad regulations that pass under the name "copyright" silence
9397 speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes a studied blindness for
9398 people to continue to believe they live in a culture that is free.
9401 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said
9406 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative
9407 people are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are
9408 not being expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created,
9409 it still won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're
9410 not going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9412 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9413 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind
9414 of permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9418 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
9419 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9421 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story--creativity
9422 quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn't
9423 get you going. Maybe you think there's enough weird art out there, and
9424 enough expression that is critical of what seems to be just about
9426 And if you think that, you might think there's little in this story
9430 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9432 it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9434 ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special one at
9435 that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect
9436 by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of "free culture."
9437 The point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
9441 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9442 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone,
9443 of course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary--at a
9444 minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9446 both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at
9447 least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9449 vehemently insist that just because some regulation is good, it
9450 doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both perspectives are
9451 constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation simply enables the
9452 powerful industries of today to protect themselves against the
9457 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9459 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
9461 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9462 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9463 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9465 That lesson has been taught through a series of cases that were
9466 designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a lesson. That
9468 former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a "nuclear pall" that
9469 has fallen over the Valley--has been learned.
9472 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9473 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9474 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9477 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com.
9478 MP3.com was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not
9479 just to facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also
9480 to facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9481 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9483 demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9486 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable
9487 way to recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative
9488 was to leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to
9490 new artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9494 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user
9496 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather
9497 this preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9498 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9499 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9501 would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9503 So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9504 wherever you were--at work or at home--you could get access to that
9505 music once you signed into your account. The system was therefore a
9506 kind of music-lockbox.
9509 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9510 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9513 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9514 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9515 the kind of content the users liked.
9518 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
9519 50,
000 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9520 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time, and
9521 would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It therefore
9522 purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process of making
9523 copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content from those
9524 copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they had a copy
9525 of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000 copies, it
9526 was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something they had
9531 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9532 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com
9533 settled with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9534 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9535 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9536 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9537 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9539 MP3.com just about a year later.
9542 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9545 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and
9546 filed a malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that
9547 they had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would
9548 be considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9549 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9551 therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared
9552 to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
9555 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9557 amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in the press)
9558 was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising clients in this
9559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9560 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9562 directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of you who
9564 the law should be less restrictive should realize that such a view of
9565 the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9568 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9569 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9570 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9571 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9572 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9573 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9574 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9576 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9578 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9579 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9580 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9583 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9584 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9586 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9587 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9588 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9589 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9590 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9591 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9592 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9593 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9594 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9598 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9599 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9600 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9601 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9602 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9604 for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9605 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote><para>
9606 <!-- f5. --> Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9608 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli
9614 This is the world of the mafia--filled with "your money or your
9615 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the
9616 law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system that will
9618 and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard enough to start
9619 a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is constantly
9625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9626 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9627 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9628 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9629 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9630 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9632 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9634 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9635 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9636 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9637 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9638 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9641 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9642 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9643 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9645 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9647 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9648 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9650 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9652 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9653 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9654 overregulatedregulated
9658 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9659 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9661 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture--a
9663 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9664 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9665 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9666 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9667 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9668 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9669 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9670 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9672 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9673 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9675 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9676 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9677 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9678 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9680 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9683 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9684 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9686 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9688 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9689 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9690 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9691 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9692 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9695 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9696 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9697 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9698 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9699 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9700 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9701 (
2003),
33
35, available at
9702 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9706 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9708 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9709 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9710 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9711 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9712 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9714 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9715 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26
27.
9720 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9721 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9723 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9724 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9727 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9731 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9732 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9733 impose.
<footnote><para>
9734 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9735 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9737 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9738 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9742 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9744 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9748 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9749 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9750 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9751 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9754 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9755 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9756 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9757 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9760 overall this history of copyright
9761 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9762 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9763 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9764 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9767 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9768 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9769 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9770 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9771 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9774 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9775 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9776 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9777 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9778 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9780 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9782 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9783 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9784 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9786 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9787 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9788 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9789 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9792 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9793 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9794 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9795 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9796 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9797 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9799 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9800 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9801 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9802 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9803 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9804 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9805 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9806 World,"
27 June
2003,
33
34, available at
9807 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9810 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9817 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9818 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9819 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9820 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"--to memorialize her famous
9821 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden--
9822 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9824 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9825 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9828 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9829 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9830 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9831 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9832 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9834 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9835 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9837 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9840 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9842 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9843 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9844 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9845 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9847 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9850 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9851 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9852 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9853 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9855 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9856 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9857 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9858 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9859 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9860 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9861 in to this new form of radio.
9865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9866 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9868 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9870 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9871 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9873 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9874 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9878 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9879 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9881 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9882 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9884 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9885 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9886 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9887 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9889 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9890 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9892 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9893 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9894 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
<footnote><para>
9895 <!-- f12. --> Lessing,
239.
9900 This potential for FM radio was never realized--not because
9902 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9903 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<footnote><para>
9904 <!-- f13. --> Ibid.,
229.
9908 the growth of this competing technology.
9911 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9912 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9913 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9914 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9915 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9919 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9920 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9923 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9925 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9926 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9927 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9929 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9930 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9931 neutral toward Internet radio--the law actually burdens Internet radio
9932 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9935 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9936 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed
9938 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9939 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9940 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote><para>
9941 <!-- f14. --> This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9943 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example
9944 offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw
9945 (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain
9946 submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected.
9947 See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
9948 and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP DTRA
1 and
2,
9950 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9951 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker,
9952 "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution," Antitrust
9953 Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was not confusion, these are just
9954 old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected from
9956 entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the
9957 name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of
9959 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9961 A regular radio station broadcasting the same
9962 content would pay no equivalent fee.
9965 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9966 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9967 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9970 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9972 name of the service;
9975 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9978 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9981 date of transmission;
9984 time of transmission;
9987 time zone of origination of transmission;
9990 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9993 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9996 sound recording title;
9999 ISRC code of the recording;
10002 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
10005 featured recording artist;
10008 retail album title;
10014 UPC code of the retail album;
10020 copyright owner information;
10023 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
10026 name of the service or entity;
10029 channel or program;
10032 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
10035 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
10038 time zone where the signal was received (user);
10041 Unique User identifier;
10044 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
10049 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
10050 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
10051 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
10052 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
10053 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
10057 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
10058 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
10059 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
10062 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed
10064 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
10065 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
10069 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
10070 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
10071 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
10072 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
10073 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
10074 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
10076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
10077 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
10079 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
10080 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
10081 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
10082 of business. . . ."
10085 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
10086 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
10087 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
10088 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
10092 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
10093 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
10094 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
10095 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
10096 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
10097 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
10098 effective to prevent it.
10101 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
10102 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
10104 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
10106 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
10107 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
10110 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
10111 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
10112 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
10115 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
10116 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
10117 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
10118 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
10119 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
10120 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
10121 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
10122 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
10123 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
10125 According to the RIAA,
10126 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
10127 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
10129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
10130 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
10131 the world, but against students building search engines, and
10133 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
10134 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
10135 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
10137 response by the other.
10140 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
10141 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
10142 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
10143 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
10144 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
10145 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
10146 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
10147 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
10148 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
10149 sued
261 individuals--including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
10150 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
10151 was.
<footnote><para>
10152 <!-- f16. --> Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
10153 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
10155 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to
10157 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
10158 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
10159 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
10160 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
10161 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
10165 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
10166 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
10168 with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
10170 of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war against
10171 drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent of its
10172 preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition, consumption was
10173 up to
70 percent of the preprohibition level. Americans were drinking
10174 just about as much, but now, a vast number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
10175 <!-- f17. --> Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
10177 American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
10181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
10182 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of
10184 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
10185 <!-- f18. --> National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
10186 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
10187 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
10190 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of the
10191 population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
10193 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
10194 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.
<footnote><para>
10195 <!-- f19. --> See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
10197 Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of compliance
10201 pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of ordinary
10202 behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a huge
10204 of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10207 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10208 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
10209 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told
10210 a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students
10211 who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and
10212 sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven
10213 cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the
10214 norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to teach them how
10215 to behave ethically--how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds
10217 or honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that
10218 your case is over. Generations of Americans--more significantly in
10219 some parts of America than in others, but still, everywhere in America
10220 today--can't live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally"
10221 entails a certain degree of illegality.
10224 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10225 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how
10226 to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10228 in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10230 and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and
10231 collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be changed.
10232 Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much greater than
10233 the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason to consider the
10238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10239 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10240 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10241 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10242 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10243 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10246 My point is instead one that democracies understood for
10248 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law
10249 depends upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more
10251 we as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect
10252 the law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10253 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law or
10254 not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether
10255 my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law sow
10257 disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they impose.
10258 Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10260 this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to call these
10261 twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
10264 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from
10265 the Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10266 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10268 is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be
10269 whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve
10270 the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to
10271 assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three million
10272 Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other ways to
10273 assure that artists get paid without transforming America into a nation
10277 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10280 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These
10281 pieces of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought.
10282 The law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10284 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used
10286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10287 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
10288 recordings is free.
10291 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10292 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10293 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
10294 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10295 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a right:
10296 In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
10298 of digital technologies.
10301 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10302 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10303 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10305 called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music:
10306 Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others--the
10307 potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists,
10308 these technologies help build a creativity with play lists that is itself
10310 valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and
10312 in their own right.
10315 This use is enabled by unprotected media--either CDs or records.
10316 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10317 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair
10318 return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10320 with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10322 for example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or
10323 they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content on people's
10327 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10328 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in
10329 hacker circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that
10331 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10332 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10333 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10336 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10337 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10338 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
10343 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10344 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10346 with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what
10347 if there were another way to assure that artists are paid, without
10349 down any content? What if, in other words, a different system
10350 could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom
10351 to move content easily?
10354 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I
10356 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10357 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system
10358 achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright
10360 achieved, but left consumers and creators much more free, then
10361 we'd have a very good reason to pursue this alternative--namely,
10363 The choice, in other words, would not be between property and
10364 piracy; the choice would be between different property systems and the
10365 freedoms each allowed.
10368 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10370 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature
10371 of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for
10372 producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today
10373 control the vast majority of the distribution of content in the world,
10374 would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go
10375 the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10378 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already
10379 saddled Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against
10380 this new form of competition. For them the choice is between
10382 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10385 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10387 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10390 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10392 as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10393 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10395 to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10397 As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann
10398 describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises whenever you turn
10399 a very large percentage of the population into criminals." This is the
10400 collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10403 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10408 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10410 to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright infringer,
10411 how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright
10412 infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of your
10413 computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10414 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh,
10415 well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this
10416 campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
10418 of the American Internet-using population into
10423 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10424 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10425 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10428 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the
10429 RIAA launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn
10430 over the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating
10431 copyright law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple
10433 to a judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the
10434 identity of an Internet user is revealed.
10438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10439 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general
10440 strategy to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10441 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10442 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10444 computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the
10445 family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop the
10446 RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10447 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10448 <!-- f20. --> See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10449 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10451 Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
10452 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
10453 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being
10454 Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson Graham,
10455 "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
2003,
4D;
10456 John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either,"
10457 New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a
10458 Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
10463 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10464 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10465 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10466 <!-- f21. --> See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry
10468 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10469 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10471 Using a sophisticated
10472 hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a fingerprint of
10473 every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those MP3s will
10474 have the same "fingerprint."
10477 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10478 friend gives a CD to your daughter--a collection of songs just like the
10479 cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does
10480 your daughter, where these songs came from. But she copies these
10481 songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to college and
10482 connects it to a college network, and if the college network is
10484 with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't properly protected
10485 her content from the network (do you know how to do that yourself ?),
10486 then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as a "criminal."
10487 And under the rules that universities are beginning to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10488 <!-- f22. --> See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent," Boston
10489 Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four Students Sued
10490 over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at Colleges,"
10492 Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix,
10493 Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science Monitor,
2 September
2003,
10494 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to
10496 Two Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible," Chicago
10497 Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy Guns on
10498 Universities," Internet News,
30 January
2003, available at
10499 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
48</ulink>; Benny
10500 Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman Orientation This Fall to
10501 Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing," San Francisco
10502 Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters Are Weapons at
10504 USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10507 daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer network.
10508 She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10511 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10512 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead
10513 that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that
10514 they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes
10515 her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat this
10517 as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students
10519 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10520 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10521 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10526 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10527 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10528 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10529 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog
10530 where you could randomly choose any person off the street and be
10531 confident that they were committing an unlawful act that could
10532 put them on the hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of
10533 millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but
10534 speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit
10535 civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
10537 analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has
10538 eroded all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many
10540 as criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing
10541 is an order of magnitude larger number of Americans than drug
10542 use. . . . If forty to sixty million Americans have become
10544 then we're really on a slippery slope to lose a lot of civil
10545 liberties for all forty to sixty million of them.
10549 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals"
10550 under the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective--
10551 securing rights to authors--without these millions being considered
10552 "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is
10554 a constant war on our own people or a concerted effort through
10555 our democracy to change our law?
10558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10562 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10563 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10567 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10568 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10569 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10570 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10573 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10574 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to stop--or
10576 she understands just why she should stop--the bucket is in the air.
10577 The gasoline is about to hit the blazing car. And the fire that gasoline
10578 will ignite is about to ignite everything around.
10581 A war about copyright rages all around--and we're all focusing on the
10582 wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10584 No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies change.
10585 The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use technology
10586 to protect themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This
10587 is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10591 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10592 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to eliminate
10593 the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is not the real
10594 threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small fire in the
10596 there is a massive change in the way culture is made that is
10601 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more
10603 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to
10604 avoid pouring gasoline onto this fire.
10607 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a
10609 binary view. However much many people push to frame this
10611 more broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We
10612 rubberneck to look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on
10616 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10617 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small brace
10618 of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this debate. We must
10619 understand these failures if we're to understand what success will
10623 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10624 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10625 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10628 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
10629 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least
10630 one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10632 living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10633 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10634 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10638 It didn't work--at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10640 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave
10641 birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a
10642 library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10643 them available for free.
10646 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10647 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10648 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10649 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10650 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10652 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne,
10653 and many others, into a form more accessible--technically
10657 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the
10658 same source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10659 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10661 of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10662 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10663 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10664 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10665 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10666 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10668 publications of public domain works.
10671 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications
10672 of public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are
10674 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world
10675 have discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share
10676 works that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we
10677 might call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10678 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10680 causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10682 and groups dedicated to spreading culture generally.
<footnote><para>
10683 <!-- f1. --> There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
10684 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world
10685 of noncommercial pornographers--people who were distributing porn
10686 but were not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution.
10687 Such a class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the
10688 costs of distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors
10689 got special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down
10690 the Communications Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the
10691 burden on noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed
10692 Congress's power. The same point could have been made about
10694 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10695 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at
10696 least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect
10703 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10704 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10705 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public library.
10706 But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10, in
1998, for
10707 the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of
10709 copyrights--this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to
10710 add any works more recent than
1923 to his collection until
2019.
10712 no copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until
10713 that year (and not even then, if Congress extends the term again). By
10714 contrast, in the same period, more than
1 million patents will pass into
10719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10720 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10721 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10722 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10724 should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10725 <!-- f2. --> The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
10726 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
10727 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
10729 laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is also Jack
10730 Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the
10732 may look at that next Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2
10738 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10739 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10740 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10741 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10742 of publishing would make Eldred a felon--whether or not anyone
10743 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10747 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10749 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10751 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10752 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10754 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10758 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10759 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10760 their . . . Writings. . . .
10764 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10765 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10766 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10767 something--for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10768 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10770 "promote . . . Progress"--through means that are also specific--
10771 by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
10774 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10776 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10777 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10778 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10780 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10782 has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve what
10783 the Constitution plainly forbids--perpetual terms "on the installment
10784 plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10787 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10788 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10790 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10791 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10792 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the
10793 practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10794 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10795 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to
10796 keep this gravy train going.
10799 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10800 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
10801 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10803 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce
10804 it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can
10805 do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must do--and those
10806 things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10809 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10810 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10811 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10812 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10814 to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10816 greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher would
10817 pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be published
10818 by anyone for free.
10821 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10822 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10823 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10824 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10828 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10831 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10832 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10836 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10837 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10838 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10839 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10842 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10846 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10847 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10848 they support the bill."
10851 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10852 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10853 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10857 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10858 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10859 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10860 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10863 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10864 correct conclusion:
10867 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10868 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10870 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10873 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10875 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10876 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10879 You quickly get the point--you as the member of the board and, I
10880 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10881 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10882 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10884 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10886 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10887 the copyright term extended.
10890 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10892 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10893 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10896 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10898 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10899 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10900 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10901 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10902 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10903 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10904 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10905 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10907 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10908 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10909 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10910 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10912 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10914 Disney is estimated to have
10915 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10916 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10917 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10919 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10920 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10925 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10926 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10928 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10929 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10930 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10931 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10932 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10934 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10938 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10939 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10940 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10941 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10942 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10944 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10946 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10947 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10951 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10952 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10953 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10955 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10956 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10961 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10962 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10964 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10965 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10967 to impose no limit.
10970 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10971 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10972 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10973 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10974 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10975 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10976 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10977 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10978 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10980 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10983 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10985 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10986 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10988 If anything Congress says is interstate
10989 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10990 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10991 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10992 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10997 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10998 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10999 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
11000 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
11002 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
11003 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
11004 commerce--the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
11005 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
11006 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
11007 to regulate copyrights--the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
11009 And if it is applied to the
11010 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
11012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
11013 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
11015 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
11016 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
11017 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
11019 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
11020 existing copyrights.
11023 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
11024 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics--a conservative
11025 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
11026 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
11028 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
11029 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
11030 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
11031 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
11033 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
11034 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
11037 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
11038 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
11040 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
11041 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy--piracy of
11042 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
11043 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
11044 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
11046 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
11047 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
11048 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
11049 work. But now these entities were using their power--expressed
11050 through the power of lobbyists' money--to get another twenty-year
11051 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
11052 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
11055 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
11057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
11058 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
11059 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
11060 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
11061 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
11062 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
11065 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
11066 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
11067 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
11070 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
11072 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
11074 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
11075 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
11076 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
11077 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
11078 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
11079 bought to extend them again.
11082 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
11084 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
11085 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
11087 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
11089 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
11090 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
11091 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
11092 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
11094 and no longer available as a result.
11097 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
11098 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
11099 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
11100 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
11101 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
11102 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
11103 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
11105 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
11106 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
11107 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
11112 Think practically about the consequence of this
11113 extension--practically,
11114 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
11116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
11117 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
11118 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
11119 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
11121 9,
873. What would you have to do?
11124 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
11125 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
11126 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
11127 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
11128 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
11129 list of books still under copyright.
11132 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
11133 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
11136 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
11138 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
11139 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
11140 being at least a list?
11143 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
11144 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
11146 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
11148 of such records--especially since the person who registered is
11149 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
11152 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
11154 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
11158 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
11159 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
11160 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
11162 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
11163 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
11164 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
11167 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
11168 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
11169 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
11171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
11172 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
11173 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
11175 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
11176 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
11177 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
11178 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
11179 know quite well who owns what property.
11182 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
11183 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
11185 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
11186 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
11187 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
11188 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
11189 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
11190 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
11191 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
11194 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
11195 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
11197 for other creative works is much more dire.
11200 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach
11202 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee
11203 is a direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films
11204 were made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky
11205 Dog, is currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
11206 1923 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee
11207 controls the exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great
11208 deal of money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
11209 60,
000 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent films."
<footnote><para>
11210 <!-- f11. --> See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright
11211 Law," Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic
11212 Movies, Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today
11213 on Striking Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9
11220 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare
11221 virtue in this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the
11222 Supreme Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
11223 will, if left standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
11226 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
11228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
11229 any continuing commercial value. The rest--to the extent it survives at
11230 all--sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work not
11231 now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the
11233 of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit
11234 from the work must exceed the costs of making the work available for
11238 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11239 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11240 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11241 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11242 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
11243 mm film.
<footnote><para>
11244 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11246 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
11247 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
11248 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
11249 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
11254 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11256 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11257 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11258 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11259 locate the copyright owner.
11262 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
11263 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
11264 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
11265 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
11266 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
11271 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11272 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
11273 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11274 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11275 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11276 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11277 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11278 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11279 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11282 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11285 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11287 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11288 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11289 the copyright expires.
11292 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11293 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11294 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11296 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11300 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
11301 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
11302 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
11303 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
11305 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
11309 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11310 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11312 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11313 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11314 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11316 the commercial life ends.
11319 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11320 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
11321 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11323 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11325 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11326 of culture is important and valuable--for entertainment but also, and
11327 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11328 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11329 have, we need to have access to this history.
11332 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11335 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11336 this context do no good.
11339 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11340 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11341 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
11342 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
11343 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used book
11344 store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the copyright
11345 owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its commercial
11346 life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
11349 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11350 a film--the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs--were so high, it
11351 was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains of
11352 a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
11353 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the
11354 end of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
11357 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11358 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11359 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11360 would not have interfered with anything.
11363 But this situation has now changed.
11366 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11367 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11368 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11369 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11370 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once
11371 a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it and make it
11373 to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give new life to
11375 material after it passes out of its commercial life. It is now
11376 possible to preserve and assure universal access to this knowledge and
11377 culture, whereas before it was not.
11380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11381 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of
11383 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
11384 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11386 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other
11387 aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these
11388 things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want
11389 to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
11394 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms:
11395 Now that technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria,
11396 the law gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11397 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
11399 market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about culture
11400 after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright is
11402 no purpose at all related to the spread of knowledge. In this
11404 copyright is not an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11407 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11408 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11409 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11413 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest
11414 that publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11415 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11417 the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a
11419 is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you think the
11420 role of a library is bigger than this--if you think its role is to archive
11421 culture, whether there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture
11422 or not--then we can't count on the commercial market to do our
11427 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11428 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11429 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11430 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11433 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11435 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11436 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11437 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure to
11438 provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11439 <!-- f13. --> Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
11442 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11447 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in
11449 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11450 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11451 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
11453 the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
11455 terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11458 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11460 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11462 our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11463 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11464 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11467 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11468 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11469 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11470 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11471 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11472 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to
11473 interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11475 Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11476 power to extend existing terms.
11479 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11480 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11481 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11482 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11485 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11486 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11489 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11490 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11495 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11496 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11497 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11498 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11499 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11502 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11503 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11504 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11505 briefs and preparing for argument.
11508 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
11509 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we
11510 lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just the
11512 you probably think there was no way this case could have been
11513 won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by
11514 well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11515 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11517 to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11520 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11521 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11522 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11526 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the
11527 very end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11529 lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had moved
11530 to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11532 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11534 this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11535 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11538 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11539 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11540 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11541 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11542 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11543 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11544 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11545 most powerful media companies in the world."
11548 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11549 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11550 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11551 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11552 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11553 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11554 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11555 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11557 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11558 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11560 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11561 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11562 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11564 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11565 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11566 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11569 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11570 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11571 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11572 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11573 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11574 why it was unconstitutional.
11577 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11579 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11580 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11581 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11582 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11583 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11584 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11586 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11587 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11588 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11589 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11590 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11591 gather the widest range of credible critics--credible not because they
11592 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11593 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11596 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11597 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11599 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11600 November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11602 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11603 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11604 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11605 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11606 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11607 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11608 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11609 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11612 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11614 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11615 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11616 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11617 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11618 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11621 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse
11622 as it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11625 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/
11626 Linux possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11628 by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11630 scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11631 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11633 of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief by
11634 Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11637 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11638 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11639 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11640 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11643 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11645 I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that
11646 unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film would
11647 disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely clear.
11650 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11651 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11652 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The
11654 as the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11655 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11656 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do anything
11657 to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were nothing more
11658 than "rent-seeking"--the fancy term economists use to describe
11659 special-interest legislation gone wild.
11662 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we
11664 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been
11665 with us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court,
11666 we added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court:
11667 Alan Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group
11668 that had made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories
11669 in the Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and
11670 dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11673 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11675 former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11678 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11679 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11680 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11681 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand
11682 up for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief
11683 lawyer in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11684 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11685 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11687 disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of confidence in
11691 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11692 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11693 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11694 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11698 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to
11699 gain from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either--they
11700 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11702 such power induced. And of course it was not surprising that the
11703 copyright holders would defend the idea that they should continue to
11704 have the right to control who did what with content they wanted to
11708 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was better for
11709 the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to Dr. Seuss's work--
11710 better than allowing it to fall into the public domain--because if this
11711 creativity were in the public domain, then people could use it to
11713 drugs or to create pornography."
<footnote><para>
11714 <!-- f14. --> Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
11715 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11717 That was also the motive of
11718 the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection" of the work of
11719 George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license Porgy and Bess
11720 to anyone who refuses to use African Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11721 <!-- f15. --> Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11722 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11727 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11728 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11731 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11733 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11735 Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will favor.
11736 Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate
11737 and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to
11739 the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do better
11740 with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward the
11741 popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11743 gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way, that's just
11744 what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11747 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the
11748 CTEA mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11749 copyrights--extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
11750 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11752 through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11753 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond
11754 preparing for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11757 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11758 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11759 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11760 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11761 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11762 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11763 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11767 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11768 Congress's power. These four--Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
11769 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer--had repeatedly argued that the
11771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11772 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to
11774 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the
11775 Court's role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11776 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11777 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11780 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11781 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11782 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11784 of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11786 and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11787 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11788 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11790 to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
11793 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also
11794 viewed as unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter
11795 strongly favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both
11796 were also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11798 there was a very important free speech argument against these
11799 retrospective extensions.
11802 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11803 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11804 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11805 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11806 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11807 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11810 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11811 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11812 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11814 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11815 most important jurisprudential innovation--the argument that Judge
11816 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11817 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11820 This then was the core of our strategy--a strategy for which I am
11821 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11824 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11825 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11826 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11827 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11828 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11829 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11830 copyright be limited.
11833 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11835 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11837 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11838 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11839 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11842 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11843 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11844 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11846 terms regularly--eleven times in forty years.
11849 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11851 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11852 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11853 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11855 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11857 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11858 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11860 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11861 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11862 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11864 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11865 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11868 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11869 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11872 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11873 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11874 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11875 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11877 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11878 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11882 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11883 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with
11885 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the
11886 Supreme Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern
11890 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11891 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11893 practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the
11894 harm--passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don't see
11895 that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11898 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11899 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11900 right thing--not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11901 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11902 does the right thing--not because of politics but because it is right. As
11903 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11904 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11905 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11906 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11907 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11908 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11911 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11912 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11915 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11916 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11917 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11918 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11920 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11921 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11922 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11923 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11924 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11925 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11926 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11927 family of the Justices.
11930 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11931 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11932 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11933 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11936 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11937 The history was bothering her.
11941 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11942 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11943 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11944 practice that began with the very first act.
11948 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11949 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11950 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11954 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11955 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11957 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11962 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11963 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11964 Kennedy, who observed,
11968 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11969 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11970 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11971 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11972 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11976 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11982 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11983 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11984 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11985 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11987 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11991 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11992 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11993 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11994 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11995 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11998 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11999 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
12000 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
12003 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
12005 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
12007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
12011 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
12012 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
12015 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
12016 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
12018 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
12019 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
12020 into the Copyright Clause.
12024 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
12025 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
12026 asked Solicitor General Olson,
12030 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
12032 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
12033 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
12034 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
12039 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
12040 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
12041 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
12042 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
12043 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
12044 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
12045 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause--
12046 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
12048 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
12049 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
12052 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
12053 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
12055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
12056 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
12060 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
12061 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
12062 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
12063 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
12065 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
12067 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
12068 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
12069 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
12070 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
12072 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
12074 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court--in
12075 particular, the Conservatives--would feel itself constrained by the rule
12076 of law that it had established elsewhere.
12079 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
12080 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
12081 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
12082 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
12083 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
12086 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
12087 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
12088 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
12091 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
12092 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
12093 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
12096 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
12098 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
12100 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
12101 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
12102 in the Court's opinion.
12106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
12107 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
12108 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
12110 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
12113 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable--for her, and for Justice
12114 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
12115 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
12116 they had worked so hard to defeat.
12119 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
12120 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
12121 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
12122 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
12123 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
12124 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
12125 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
12126 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
12130 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers'
12132 they would respect? By what right did they--the silent five--get to
12133 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the
12135 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that
12136 I said I hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue
12137 here was important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I
12138 might hate a system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional
12139 values that it will respect, that is the system we have.
12142 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
12143 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
12144 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension
12145 of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had
12147 in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court
12148 discounted the parallel--without explaining how the very same words
12149 in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally different things
12151 upon whether the words were about patents or copyrights.
12152 The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
12156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
12157 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
12159 was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
12161 has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said
12162 that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8 percent of
12163 the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the
12165 number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the
12166 point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and
12167 the existing term was so long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was
12171 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
12172 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
12173 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
12174 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
12175 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
12178 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
12179 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
12180 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
12183 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
12184 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
12185 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
12187 I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having tried
12188 to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of integrity.
12189 These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the proper mode
12190 of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"--to first understand
12191 the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light of the structure
12192 of the Constitution. That method had produced Lopez and many other
12193 "originalist" rulings. Where was their "originalism" now?
12196 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
12197 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
12198 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
12199 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
12201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
12202 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
12203 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
12204 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
12206 to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
12207 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that they
12208 liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their own
12212 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
12214 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
12218 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
12220 about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
12221 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that
12222 this case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices
12223 that the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
12224 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted on
12225 arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of principles.
12226 I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need to waste my
12227 time showing it should also follow in popularity.
12230 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
12231 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
12233 in different directions, where the truth about the harm that
12234 this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to this
12235 Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically,
12236 corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown
12237 the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the
12239 to make the logical point. I had shown them how they could strike
12240 this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a hundred places
12241 where I could have helped them want to, yet my stubbornness, my
12243 to give in, stopped me. I have stood before hundreds of audiences
12244 trying to persuade; I have used passion in that effort to persuade; but I
12245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
12246 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
12248 I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court should
12252 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
12253 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12257 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12258 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12259 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12260 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12263 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12264 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12265 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12266 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12270 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12271 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12273 property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case was
12274 a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
12275 not be raised until it is.
12278 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12279 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12280 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12281 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12282 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12283 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12284 this case--a decision I had made four years before--was wrong.
12285 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
12286 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
12287 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
12288 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
12290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12291 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12293 of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good thing,
12294 even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was attacked,
12295 it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful law. The New
12296 York Times wrote in its editorial,
12300 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12301 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12302 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand
12304 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw
12305 freely on the entire creative output of humanity is one of the
12307 we live in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12311 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12313 images--of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view
12314 of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page. The
12315 "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch in the face felt
12319 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12320 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
12321 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
12322 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in
12323 our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12325 the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12326 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12330 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
12331 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
12333 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
12334 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
12336 the case was really finally over--fate would have it that
12337 I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.) This was a
12338 particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city
12339 from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my
12341 and wrote an op-ed piece.
12344 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12345 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12346 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12347 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12348 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12349 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12350 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12351 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12354 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12355 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12357 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12358 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12359 the work passed into the public domain.
12362 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12363 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12364 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12367 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12368 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
12369 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12370 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12371 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12372 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
12373 everything else, let the content go.
12376 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes
12378 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12379 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people
12380 can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican
12381 might say, here government regulation is simply getting in the way of
12382 innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the
12383 government is blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no
12384 good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference between Democrats
12385 and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm
12386 of the present system.
12389 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12391 For one of the hardest things about the current system for
12392 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to
12393 look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not
12395 since marking content is not required, since no formality at all
12396 is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask
12397 permission to use or license their work. This system would lower these
12398 costs, by establishing at least one registry where copyright owners
12399 could be identified.
12402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12403 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
12405 in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by
12407 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12408 <!-- f1. --> Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12409 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12411 such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
12413 claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act, every text
12414 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
12415 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any
12417 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article
12418 5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue
12419 to impose some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as
12420 a condition of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of
12421 copies of works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12422 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12423 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12424 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12426 or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International Intellectual
12427 Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation Press,
2001),
12432 are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
12433 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12435 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were
12436 to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the
12437 dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not
12438 upon the special favor of the government.
12441 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12443 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a
12444 world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12445 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12446 know what's protected and what's not.
12449 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin
12450 in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12452 in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as
12453 the abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated
12455 the stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was
12456 as if a Charles Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the
12458 to dot an i or cross a t resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12461 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12462 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
12463 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
12464 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities
12466 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more
12468 system of registration.
12471 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12472 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12473 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12474 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12476 imposed upon creators.
12479 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12480 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12483 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table,
12484 his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the
12486 He has a property right over the table "naturally," and he can
12487 assert that right against anyone who would steal the table, whether or
12488 not he has informed the government of his ownership of the table.
12491 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For
12492 the argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12493 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12495 turns upon the special problems that creative property
12497 The law of formalities responds to the special physics of creative
12498 property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
12501 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12502 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is
12503 to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just
12504 because you must register the car with the state and tag it with a
12506 In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important
12507 reason to secure registration--both because it makes the markets more
12508 efficient and because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without
12509 a registration system for land, landowners would perpetually have to
12510 guard their property. With registration, they can simply point the
12512 to a deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would
12513 be much easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden
12514 to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but
12515 those burdens produce a much better system of protection for property
12519 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12520 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12521 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12522 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12523 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12524 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12525 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12526 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12529 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
12533 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12534 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12535 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12536 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12537 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12538 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12539 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12540 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12543 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12545 to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a
12546 huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12548 can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12549 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the copyright
12550 system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been seen before
12551 because there are no formalities.
12554 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12555 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12556 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12557 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12558 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12561 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12562 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12563 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12564 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12565 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12568 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12570 the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the hassle
12571 worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with registration?
12574 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12575 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12576 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12579 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12581 the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12583 of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That solution
12584 essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it was
12585 Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12587 The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12589 fifty years after a work was published. Based upon historical data,
12590 that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial work,
12592 work that no longer had a commercial life, into the public
12594 within fifty years. What do you think?
12597 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began
12598 to pay attention. Many people contacted me pointing to
12600 who might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few
12601 who directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12604 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12605 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international law. It
12606 imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners possible. In
12607 May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be introduced. On May
16, I
12608 posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are close." There was a general
12610 in the blog community that something good might happen here.
12613 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12614 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to
12615 give the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me,
12616 Valenti informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose
12617 the Eldred Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly,
12618 their thinness shows something clear about what this debate is
12623 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the
12625 concept in the proposed bill"--that copyrights be renewed. That
12626 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12628 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12630 they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12632 those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third, they
12634 that Congress had determined that extending a copyright term
12635 would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12637 of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12638 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut off
12639 the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12640 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a registration
12641 system is not free. True enough, but those costs are certainly less than
12642 the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright whose owner is not
12643 known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the copyright to a story
12644 underlying a film were to pass into the public domain. But what risk is
12645 that? If it is in the public domain, then the film is a valid derivative use.
12648 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright
12649 owners to do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12650 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12652 to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright or
12653 not--a controversial claim in any case--unless they know about a
12654 copyright, they're not likely to.
12657 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12659 to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12660 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the
12661 two stories was the power of the opposition--the power of the side that
12662 fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12664 old interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the
12665 power to protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
12668 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12669 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12670 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12671 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12677 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the copyright
12678 owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and harmful,
12679 and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is p2p
12681 it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners still: Much
12682 of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When the issue is
12683 copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is possible still
12684 to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people don't
12686 the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus still possible
12687 to see good faith within the resistance.
12690 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the
12692 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12694 driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary range of
12695 content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with any
12697 owner's desire to exercise continued control over his content. It
12698 would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark Content" that
12699 fills archives around the world. So when the warriors oppose a change
12700 like this, we should ask one simple question:
12703 What does this industry really want?
12706 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12707 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12708 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12709 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12710 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12711 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12712 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12716 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other
12717 side is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has
12718 as its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12720 Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their aim is to
12722 that all there is is what is theirs.
12725 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12726 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12729 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12730 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12731 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12732 and to share its own creation.
12735 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12736 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12737 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12738 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12739 block the progress of others.
12742 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of
12743 the "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and
12744 so long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12745 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12747 The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the owner and
12748 gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be controlled
12749 by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12754 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12755 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12757 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12758 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12759 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12760 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12761 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12764 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12766 These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental, but they have
12767 already had a dramatic effect. In the United States, AIDS patients who
12768 regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase their life expectancy
12769 by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make the disease almost
12773 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12774 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12775 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12776 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12778 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12779 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12780 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12781 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12783 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12785 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12786 the developing world receive them--and half of them are in Brazil.
12790 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12791 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12792 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12793 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12795 at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use that
12796 monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12797 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12800 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12801 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12803 by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case where
12804 patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some assurance
12805 that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a disease, it will
12806 be able to earn back its investment and more. This is socially an
12808 valuable incentive. I am the last person who would argue that
12809 the law should abolish it, at least without other changes.
12812 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12814 thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as African
12815 leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was bringing,
12816 they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at costs
12818 below the market price.
12821 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12822 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12823 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12825 if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into Africa
12826 from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is generally
12828 under international trade law and is specifically permitted
12829 within the European Union.
<footnote><para>
12830 <!-- f2. --> See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12831 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12835 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12836 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12838 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12839 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12840 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12841 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12843 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12844 2000),
14, available at
12845 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12846 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12847 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12848 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150
57
12849 (statement of James Love).
12852 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12853 asked South Africa to change the law--and to add pressure to that
12855 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12857 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12859 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12861 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12862 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12864 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12866 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent--
12867 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12868 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12869 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12870 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12871 <!-- f4. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12872 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12874 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12879 We should place the intervention by the United States in context.
12880 No doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans
12881 don't have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12882 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12883 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on their
12884 demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12886 there was an effect from our government's intervention to stop
12887 the flow of medications into Africa.
12890 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12891 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12892 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12893 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12894 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12895 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12898 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12899 profits of United States drug companies--at least, not substantially. It
12900 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12901 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12902 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12903 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12907 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12909 which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an argument
12910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12911 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12912 <!-- f5. --> See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12913 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12914 May
1999, A1, available at
12915 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink> ("compulsory licenses and gray
12917 pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property protection");
12918 Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
12920 to Essential Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999),
12922 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink> (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS,
12923 Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
12924 Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a
12926 Widener Law Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12929 It was because "intellectual property"
12930 would be violated that these drugs should not flow into Africa. It was
12931 a principle about the importance of "intellectual property" that led
12932 these government actors to intervene against the South African
12937 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12938 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12939 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12941 cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans, and
12942 whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an idea?
12943 What possible justification could there ever be for a policy that results
12944 in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that would allow so
12945 many to die for such an abstraction?
12948 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12949 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12950 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12951 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12952 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system--
12953 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12956 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12957 drug companies would love--they say, and I believe them--to sell their
12958 drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere.
12959 There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn't get
12960 back into the United States, but those are mere problems of
12962 They could be overcome.
12965 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12966 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12967 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12968 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12969 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12970 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12971 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12972 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12973 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12974 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12975 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12976 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal--the sanctity of an
12977 idea called "intellectual property."
12980 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12981 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12982 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12983 What is the argument?
12986 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the
12987 patent system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly
12988 the same way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and
12989 strongly support a copyright system without having to regulate the
12990 spread of culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could
12991 endorse and strongly support a patent system without having to block
12992 the spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market
12993 prices in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12994 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies were
12995 balanced in just this sense.
12998 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12999 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
13001 A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to our
13002 tradition, now reigns in this culture--bizarrely, and with consequences
13003 more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other
13004 single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
13005 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much
13006 happens that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically
13007 do we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice
13008 how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
13009 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture that
13010 we don't even question when the control of that property removes our
13011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
13012 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
13014 our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
13015 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make this
13016 common sense open its eyes.
13019 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
13020 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
13021 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
13022 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
13023 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
13024 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
13025 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
13026 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
13027 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
13028 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
13029 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
13030 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
13033 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
13034 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
13035 meeting.
<footnote><para>
13036 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
13037 August
2003, E1, available at
13038 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
13039 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
13040 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
13041 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
13042 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
13043 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
13044 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
13046 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had
13048 to hold a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to
13049 create public goods." These are projects that have been successful in
13050 producing public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary
13051 use of intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the
13052 World Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of
13054 in the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support
13055 open academic journals, including the Public Library of Science
13057 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
13058 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
13059 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
13061 a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
13062 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
13063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
13064 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
13066 IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It included
13067 the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free in the
13068 early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
13071 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
13072 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
13073 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
13074 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
13075 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
13078 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
13079 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
13082 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
13084 work. They primarily involved science, but from many
13086 And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
13087 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
13091 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
13092 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
13093 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information
13095 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked
13096 what I would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
13097 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
13098 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
13100 to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
13101 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
13102 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
13103 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
13105 minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made intellectual
13106 property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to talk about an
13107 "Information Society" unless one also talked about the range of
13109 and culture that would be free. My talk did not make my
13111 moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct that the
13112 scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the stuff of
13113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
13114 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
13115 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
13116 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
13119 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual
13121 I had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and
13122 should. And thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to
13123 create public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO
13127 But there is one project within that list that is highly controversial,
13128 at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source and free
13130 Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of the subject. From
13131 its perspective, a conference to discuss open source and free software
13132 would be like a conference to discuss Apple's operating system. Both
13133 open source and free software compete with Microsoft's software. And
13134 internationally, many governments have begun to explore requirements
13135 that they use open source or free software, rather than "proprietary
13136 software," for their own internal uses.
13139 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
13140 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
13142 software. There are many important companies that depend
13144 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
13145 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
13146 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"--and IBM is
13147 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
13148 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
13149 support a mode of software development that is different from
13150 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
13151 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
13153 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
13154 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
13156 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
13158 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
13159 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
13161 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
13162 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
13163 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
13165 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
13167 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
13168 Stern School of Business (
3 May
2001), available at
13169 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
13173 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
13174 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free
13176 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
13177 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
13178 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected by
13179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
13180 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license are
13181 no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software license.
13182 Free software licensed under the General Public License (GPL), for
13183 example, requires that the source code for the software be made
13185 by anyone who modifies and redistributes the software. But that
13186 requirement is effective only if copyright governs software. If copyright
13187 did not govern software, then free software could not impose the same
13188 kind of requirements on its adopters. It thus depends upon copyright
13189 law just as Microsoft does.
13192 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
13194 Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
13196 that it would use its lobbyists to get the United States government
13197 to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what was reported to have
13198 happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the Washington Post,
13200 lobbyists succeeded in getting the United States government
13201 to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
13202 <!-- f9. --> Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
13203 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
13205 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was
13209 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
13211 consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is plainly
13212 consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about its
13214 here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most powerful
13216 producer in the United States having succeeded in its lobbying
13220 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
13221 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
13222 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
13223 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
13225 of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights." She
13226 is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose to
13228 or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the goals of
13232 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
13234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
13236 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
13237 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property right
13238 called "copyright." Without it, restrictions imposed by those licenses
13239 wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission of
13241 intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap in
13243 sort of mistake that is excusable in a first-year law
13244 student, but an embarrassment from a high government official
13246 with intellectual property issues.
13249 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
13250 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
13252 conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best to
13253 protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
13255 property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the hard
13257 in intellectual property law is to find that balance. But that there
13258 should be limits is, I had thought, uncontested. One wants to ask Ms.
13259 Boland, are generic drugs (drugs based on drugs whose patent has
13260 expired) contrary to the WIPO mission? Does the public domain
13261 weaken intellectual property? Would it have been better if the
13263 of the Internet had been patented?
13266 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to
13268 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
13269 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
13270 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If they
13271 want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition,
13272 totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion
13273 to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of
13274 the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property
13276 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
13277 to do with their property.
13280 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a
13282 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
13283 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
13284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
13285 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
13286 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
13288 an intellectual property right. That the interest of WIPO is
13289 not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but that they also
13290 should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive way possible.
13293 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
13294 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
13296 not only was property held by a relatively small number of
13298 and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with that
13299 property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a strong
13300 interest in assuring that property holders within that system not
13301 weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their control
13302 to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control and
13303 concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with that
13307 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13308 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
13309 <!-- f10. --> See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210
20.
13312 an information society. That much is certain. Our only choice now is
13313 whether that information society will be free or feudal. The trend is
13318 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13319 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13320 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one
13322 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster
13327 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the
13328 world as it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any
13329 government, should be to promote the right balance of
13330 intellectualproperty
13331 rights, not simply to promote intellectual property
13332 rights"), not as it is. If we were talking about the world as it is,
13333 then of course Boland didn't say anything wrong. But in the world
13334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13335 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay
13337 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13341 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13342 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13343 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13344 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13345 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13346 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13347 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13348 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13351 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea.
13353 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13354 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
13356 property. That was obviously silly to him. And it obviously
13357 betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for an
13359 the poster might well have continued.
13362 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism
13363 is silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly unrealistic
13364 ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in our own
13369 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13371 should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly, for
13372 that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should be
13373 obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13374 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13375 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13376 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13377 not lies is just naïve, then who have we, the most powerful democracy
13378 in the world, become?
13381 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13382 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13383 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13385 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13386 been part of our tradition for most of our history--free culture.
13389 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13390 There are moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that
13391 surprise. When the FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules,
13392 which would thereby further increase the concentration in media
13394 an extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this
13395 change. For perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the
13396 NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and
13397 CodePink Women for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC
13398 policy. An astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC,
13400 more hearings and a different result.
13403 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad
13405 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile
13407 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement
13408 had become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision,
13409 and there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13414 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13415 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13416 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13418 The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not mean
13419 that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13422 The danger in media concentration comes not from the
13424 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13425 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13427 companies that control an ever expanding slice of the media. It
13428 is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated range of
13429 rights--property rights of a historically extreme form--that makes
13432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13434 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13436 and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood as being
13437 about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We Americans have a
13438 long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That we could be
13440 to fight "big" again is not something new.
13443 It would be something new, and something very important, if an
13444 equal number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built
13445 within the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien
13446 to our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13448 the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything called
13449 "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13452 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13456 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13457 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
13458 <!-- f11. --> John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com,
13459 September
2003, available at
13460 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music
13462 Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
2003, available at
13463 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a
13464 Song, N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily
13465 News,
9 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet
13467 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13468 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13469 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
13472 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
13476 has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's music.
<footnote><para>
13477 <!-- f12. --> Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
13478 17 September
2003, available at
13479 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
13482 story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
13484 making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
13485 <!-- f13. --> Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13487 Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
13488 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
13489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13491 An insider from Hollywood--who insists
13492 he must remain anonymous--reports "an amazing conversation with
13493 these studio guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd
13494 love to use but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've
13495 got scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but
13496 it would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
13498 about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers thought
13499 to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for kids who
13500 use a computer to share content.
13503 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13504 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13505 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13506 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13507 24 August
2003, available at
13508 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13511 culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero of Brazilian music,
13512 has joined with Creative Commons to release content and free licenses
13513 in that Latin American country.
<footnote><para>
13514 <!-- f15. --> "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
13516 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13519 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13520 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13521 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13522 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13523 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13524 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13525 day into the Causbys.
13528 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13529 potential is ever to be realized.
13531 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13535 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
13536 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13540 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that
13542 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of
13543 this book maps what might be done.
13546 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13547 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13548 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13549 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13552 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must
13554 a significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13556 musicians, filmmakers, scientists--all to tell this story in their
13557 own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
13560 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13561 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13562 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13563 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13564 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13569 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13571 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so
13572 far has been framed at the extremes--as a grand either/or: either
13574 or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that
13576 is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13579 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13581 in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There
13582 are those who believe in maximal copyright--"All Rights Reserved"--
13583 and those who reject copyright--"No Rights Reserved." The "All
13584 Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask permission before
13585 you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved"
13586 sorts believe you should be able to do with content as you wish,
13588 of whether you have permission or not.
13591 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13592 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13593 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13595 of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
13597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13598 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13599 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13603 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13604 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13605 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13606 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13608 of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13610 made the effective default "no rights reserved," the future
13611 architecture will make the effective default "all rights reserved." The
13613 and law that surround the Internet's design will increasingly
13614 produce an environment where all use of content requires permission.
13615 The "cut and paste" world that defines the Internet today will become
13616 a "get permission to cut and paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
13619 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle--neither "all
13620 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"--
13621 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content
13622 as they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of
13624 that we could just take for granted before.
13627 <sect2 id=
"examples">
13628 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13630 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13632 this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before
13633 the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about
13634 our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore
13635 and browsed through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need
13636 to worry about explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or
13637 boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was assured.
13640 What made it assured?
13642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13644 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13645 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13646 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13647 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13649 working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be assured.
13650 But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable enough to
13651 spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of us (again,
13652 we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient architecture of
13653 real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount of privacy. That
13654 privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law (there is no law
13656 "privacy" in public places), and in many places, not by norms
13657 (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs that
13659 imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13662 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in
13664 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13665 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13666 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13668 viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and
13669 the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than
13670 not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy" protected by
13671 the friction disappears, too.
13674 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to
13675 worry about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13676 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13678 knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13679 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13680 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic
13681 spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.
13684 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13685 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13686 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13688 did.
<footnote><para>
13689 <!-- f1. --> See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13691 of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology Law
13692 Review
1 (
2001): par.
6
18, available at
13693 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink> (describing examples in
13694 which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked
13695 Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age (New York:
13697 House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs between technology and privacy).
13699 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the
13701 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13704 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13706 now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively act
13707 where, before, privacy was given by default.
13710 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13711 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13712 commercially, the software--both the source code and the binaries--
13713 was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data General
13715 on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
13716 about controlling their software.
13719 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he
13720 was a researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that
13722 when one was free to explore and tinker with the software that
13723 ran on machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented
13725 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify
13726 other people's work.
13729 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In
13730 a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that
13731 someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a
13733 you could take what someone else did and change it. In a classics
13734 department, if you believed a colleague's translation of a recently
13736 text was flawed, you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman,
13737 it seemed obvious that you should be free to tinker with and improve
13738 the code that ran a machine. This, too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't
13739 it be open for criticism like anything else?
13742 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13743 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs
13744 from one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least
13745 in the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13747 started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just
13748 take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make it easier for
13749 me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13752 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13753 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13754 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13755 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13757 of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about it,
13758 then the freedom to change and share software would be
13763 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free
13765 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13766 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13767 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13770 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13771 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13773 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the
13774 source code for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone
13775 building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free
13776 as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code
13777 would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13779 goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a byproduct.
13782 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13783 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13784 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13785 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13786 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13787 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13790 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13791 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13792 scientific journals are produced.
13795 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many
13796 that printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending
13797 them to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13798 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13799 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
13800 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
13801 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
13802 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
13804 Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and
13806 is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free
13807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13808 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13809 Court opinion through their respective services.
13812 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability
13813 to charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13814 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13815 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been
13817 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13818 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13819 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13822 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13823 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13824 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13827 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13828 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
13829 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to
13830 the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts
13832 the library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand
13833 the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks by reading all
13834 available articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a
13835 function of the institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of
13836 paper journals (architecture)--namely, that it was very hard to control
13837 access to a paper journal.
13840 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are
13842 that libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This
13843 means that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries
13844 begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing
13845 technology and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
13848 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13849 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13850 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13851 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13853 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13854 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is then
13855 deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13857 for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but the
13859 for the print journal does not inhibit the right of anyone to
13860 redistribute the work for free.
13863 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13864 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and
13866 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the
13868 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13869 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13871 a good--especially when it helps spread knowledge and science.
13875 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13876 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13878 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13880 control effected through law and technology.
13883 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a
13885 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13886 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable copyright
13887 on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for
13888 people to build upon other people's work, by making it simple for
13890 to express the freedom for others to take and build upon their
13891 work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to
13893 licenses, make this possible.
13896 Simple--which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer.
13897 By developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13898 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that
13899 can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13900 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13902 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three
13904 together--a legal license, a human-readable description, and
13905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13906 machine-readable tags--constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13907 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone
13908 who accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the
13909 ideal that the person associated with the license believes in something
13910 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13911 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13913 freedoms are given.
13916 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13917 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13919 can choose a license that permits any use, so long as attribution is
13920 given. She can choose a license that permits only noncommercial use.
13921 She can choose a license that permits any use so long as the same
13923 are given to other uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so
13924 long as no derivative use is made. Or any use at all within developing
13925 nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full copies are not made. Or
13926 lastly, any educational use.
13929 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default
13930 of copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13931 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13932 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13933 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13935 by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13936 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13938 available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a
13943 This is just one project among many within the Creative
13945 And of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization
13946 pursuing such freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative
13947 Commons from many is that we are not interested only in talking
13948 about a public domain or in getting legislators to help build a public
13949 domain. Our aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13951 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13952 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13953 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13956 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is
13957 to complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a
13959 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws
13960 written centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could
13961 have imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a
13963 of technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense
13964 against the background of digital technologies. New rules--with
13966 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can
13967 use them--are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way
13969 to begin to build those rules.
13972 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13973 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example,
13974 is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in the Magic
13975 Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13977 license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13980 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13981 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1) those
13982 who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (
2)
13983 those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for
13984 free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download Cory's book
13986 of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2) will download
13987 Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (
2)-goods.
13988 If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the strategy of releasing
13989 Cory's book free on-line will probably increase sales of Cory's book.
13992 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13994 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13995 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was
13999 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree
14001 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
14002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
14003 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
14004 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
14005 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
14006 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
14007 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
14011 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
14013 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
14014 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
14015 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
14017 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others
14018 are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content
14019 from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
14020 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
14021 art--they, too, sample from others. Because the legal costs of sampling
14022 are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy,
14023 which was born sampling the music of others, has stated that he does
14024 not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs
14025 are so high
<footnote><para>
14026 <!-- f2. --> Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real Culture Wars
14027 (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg Hittelman, a Fiat
14029 production, available at
14030 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
14031 </para></footnote>),
14032 these artists release into the creative environment content
14033 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
14036 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative
14037 Commons license just because they want to express to others the
14039 of balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system
14040 as it is, you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
14041 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
14043 that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate
14044 description of how most creators view the rights associated with their
14045 content. The Creative Commons license expresses this notion of "Some
14046 Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to say it to others.
14049 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
14050 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
14051 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
14052 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
14054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
14055 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
14056 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
14059 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
14060 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
14061 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
14062 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
14063 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
14064 steps are possible.
14067 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
14069 and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the
14070 creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
14072 it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it
14073 easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and
14074 cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread
14078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
14081 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
14082 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
14084 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
14085 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
14086 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
14087 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
14088 changes that we need.
14091 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
14092 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
14093 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
14097 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
14098 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
14100 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
14101 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
14102 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
14103 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
14106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
14107 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
14109 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
14112 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
14113 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
14114 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
14115 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
14121 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
14122 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
14123 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
14124 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
14125 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
14127 were getting in the way.
14130 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
14131 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
14133 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what,
14134 or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
14136 work of others. There are no records, there is no system to trace--
14137 there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the
14138 massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is
14139 a necessary step for any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
14140 lack of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could
14144 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
14145 <!-- f1. --> The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
14146 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
14147 by other countries as well.
14148 </para></footnote>--but it should
14149 not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We should
14151 formalities, but we should establish a system that will create the
14152 incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
14155 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
14157 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally,
14158 the first of these three was something the copyright owner did; the
14160 two were something the government did. But a revised system of
14161 formalities would banish the government from the process, except for
14162 the sole purpose of approving standards developed by others.
14165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
14167 <sect3 id=
"registration">
14168 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
14170 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with
14171 the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
14172 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
14173 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the
14174 burden of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee.
14175 And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of government
14177 the office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus,
14178 when people who know something about the process hear this idea
14179 about formalities, their first reaction is panic--nothing could be worse
14180 than forcing people to deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
14183 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a
14185 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
14186 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
14187 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't
14188 follow that the government must actually administer the role. Instead,
14189 we should be creating incentives for private parties to serve the public,
14190 subject to standards that the government sets.
14193 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
14194 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
14195 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
14196 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
14197 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
14199 by many competing registrars. That competition drives the cost
14200 of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease with which
14201 registration occurs up.
14204 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
14205 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry,
14206 but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should
14208 a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
14209 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete
14210 with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for
14212 and renewing copyrights. That competition would
14214 lower the burden of this formality--while producing a database
14215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
14216 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
14220 <sect3 id=
"marking">
14221 <title>MARKING
</title>
14223 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
14224 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
14226 for failing to comply with a regulatory rule--akin to imposing
14227 the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights.
14228 Here again, there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be
14229 enforced in this way. And more importantly, there is no reason a
14231 requirement needs to be enforced uniformly across all media.
14234 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
14236 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also
14237 makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use
14241 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
14242 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
14243 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
14244 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
14245 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
14246 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
14247 signal from the failure to mark--not the loss of the copyright, but the
14248 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
14251 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
14252 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
14253 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
14254 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
14256 owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
14257 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
14258 <!-- f2. --> There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
14259 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
14260 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
14262 The meaning of an unmarked work would
14263 therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
14265 then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
14266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
14267 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
14268 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
14272 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
14273 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
14274 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
14275 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
14276 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
14279 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method
14280 for marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
14281 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
14282 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
14283 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
14285 of which method could best be integrated into the registration
14286 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to
14288 but we would count on the government to keep the product of
14290 in line with its other important functions.
14293 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
14295 If photographs were marked by author and year, there
14296 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
14298 all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick step. The
14299 aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the system itself
14300 should be kept as simple as possible.
14303 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
14304 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
14305 make things unclear.
14308 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
14309 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
14310 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
14311 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
14312 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
14313 that assertion at the appropriate time.
14316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
14319 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
14320 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
14322 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
14323 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
14327 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
14328 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five years.
14329 That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost Eldred v.
14330 Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The Economist
14332 a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright term.
<footnote><para>
14333 <!-- f3. --> "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15, available
14335 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
14338 proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14341 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14343 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four
14344 principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
14346 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14349 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to
14350 give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very
14351 strong protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim
14352 rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14354 works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14355 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an
14360 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and
14361 protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14363 of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
14365 That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14366 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus
14368 The value of short terms is that there is little need to
14369 build exceptions into copyright when the term itself is kept
14370 short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
14372 of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
14374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14378 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed.
14380 if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14381 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the
14382 protection continued. This need not be an onerous burden,
14383 but there is no reason this monopoly protection has to be
14384 granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
14386 to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
14387 <!-- f4. --> Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14388 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
14390 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
14392 If we make veterans suffer that
14393 burden, I don't see why we couldn't require authors to spend
14394 ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
14398 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should
14399 be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term
14400 once given should not be extended. It might have been a
14402 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year
14403 term. I don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then
14404 the consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
14405 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct that
14406 mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do
14407 today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
14408 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who
14409 write now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden
14410 that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
14412 their reward will not increase their creativity in
1923.
14413 What's not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do
14418 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
14419 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
14420 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
14423 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
14424 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
14425 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
14426 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14432 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
14433 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
14435 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14436 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14437 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14438 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional challenge.
14439 It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given the
14441 of that new technology.
14444 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
14446 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
14447 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that
14448 are sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
14449 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the
14450 right to release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
14453 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
14455 the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control
14456 translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
14457 <!-- f5. --> Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
14458 University Press,
1967),
32.
14460 The courts have expanded
14461 it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This expansion has
14462 been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
14468 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14469 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14470 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14471 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
14472 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
14477 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14478 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14479 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14480 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14481 Consider each limitation in turn.
14484 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
14485 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
14487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14488 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14489 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14490 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14491 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14492 after the creative work is done.
14495 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
14496 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
14497 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
14498 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
14499 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
14501 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer
14502 makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the
14504 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine
14506 molasses into the machines. That's what this general requirement
14507 of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
14510 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of
14511 the Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation
14512 for foreseeable derivative rights--turning a book into a movie, or a
14513 poem into a musical score--it doesn't make sense to require
14515 for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much
14519 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14521 and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14523 This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul
14524 Goldstein.
<footnote><para>
14525 <!-- f7. --> Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14527 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187
216.
14529 His view is that the law should be written so that expanded
14530 protections follow expanded uses.
14533 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the
14535 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14536 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14538 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a
14539 strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14542 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14544 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14546 statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great
14547 deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights
14548 regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14552 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
14553 <title>4. Liberate the Music--Again
</title>
14555 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't
14556 be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most
14557 people, most pressing--music. There is no other policy issue that
14559 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing
14563 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14565 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14567 than any other single application. It was the Internet's killer
14568 app--possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was the
14570 that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the application
14571 that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill innovation on
14575 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music
14576 in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14578 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14579 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14580 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14583 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
14584 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
14585 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
14586 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
14588 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14591 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14592 for purchasing CDs.
14596 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14597 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14602 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14604 to content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright
14605 or that would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14609 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get
14611 to content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the
14612 copyright owner plainly endorses.
14616 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14617 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14618 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14619 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14620 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14621 significantly weakened.
14624 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14626 For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is
14627 real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is significantly
14628 greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
14631 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14632 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14636 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
14637 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
14639 It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of content
14640 in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and slow--we
14641 in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and
14642 very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and down. Although
14643 wireless access is growing, most of us still get access across wires. Most
14644 only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The idea of the
14646 on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
14649 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14650 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14651 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14653 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14655 should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this world?
14656 The question should be, what law will we require when the network
14657 becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is one in
14658 which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net; where
14659 everywhere you are--except maybe the desert or the Rockies--you can
14660 instantaneously be connected to the Internet. Imagine the Internet as
14661 ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service, where with the flip of a
14666 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14667 give you access to content on the fly--such as Internet radio, content
14668 that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the
14669 critical point: When it is extremely easy to connect to services that give
14670 access to content, it will be easier to connect to services that give you
14671 access to content than it will be to download and store content on the
14672 many devices you will have for playing content. It will be easier, in other
14673 words, to subscribe than it will be to be a database manager, as
14675 in the download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies
14677 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if
14678 the services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14679 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell
14680 phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14682 for this content even though "free" content is available in the form
14683 of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14684 <!-- f8. --> See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
14685 3 April
2002, available at
14686 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14691 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14692 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14694 the extent there is a real problem--is a problem that will
14696 disappear as it becomes easier to connect to the Internet.
14697 And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today to be
14698 "solving" this problem in light of a technology that will be gone
14700 The question should not be how to regulate the Internet to
14701 eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that problem away). The
14702 question instead should be how to assure that artists get paid, during
14704 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14705 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14706 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14709 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different
14711 here to solve. Let's start with type D content--uncopyrighted
14712 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14714 with this content is to make sure that the technology that would
14715 enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can think of it
14716 this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands, no doubt.
14717 But there are many who need to use pay phones who have nothing to
14718 do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in order to
14719 eliminate kidnapping.
14722 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14723 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be unavailable
14724 because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the record label he
14725 signed with to carry his work. Or it may be unavailable because the work
14726 is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the law should be to facilitate the
14728 to this content, ideally in a way that returns something to the artist.
14731 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out
14732 of print, it may still be available in libraries and used book stores. But
14733 libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright owner when
14734 someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes total sense, of
14735 course, since any other system would be so burdensome as to eliminate
14736 the possibility of used book stores' existing. But from the author's
14738 this "sharing" of his content without his being compensated is
14742 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply
14743 deem out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make
14744 copies of the music available for sale, then commercial and
14746 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14747 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would
14748 be incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing
14749 has ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14754 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14756 that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14758 if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial sharing of
14759 content that was not offered for sale by a commercial publisher, and if
14760 that rate were automatically transferred to a trust for the benefit of the
14761 artist, then businesses could develop around the idea of trading this
14762 content, and artists would benefit from this trade.
14765 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14766 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14767 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14768 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14769 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14771 the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it alive,
14772 then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than the
14773 amount owed a commercial publisher.
14776 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14777 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14778 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14780 should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that we are
14781 in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14783 and accessing content.
14786 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14787 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14790 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14791 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14792 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14793 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14794 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14795 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14796 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14797 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14801 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14803 But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the law.
14804 And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy the
14806 or the p2p technologies that are currently harming content
14807 providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple way to
14808 compensate those who are harmed.
14811 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14812 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote><para>
14813 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14814 10 October
2000), available at
14815 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14816 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14817 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14818 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14820 has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14822 from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation to
14823 artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14825 Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14826 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14827 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14828 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14829 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14831 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14832 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14833 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14834 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14836 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14837 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14838 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14840 "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14842 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14843 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14844 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14845 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14846 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14848 by about a decade. See
14849 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14852 very clever way around the current impasse of the Internet. Under his
14853 plan, all content capable of digital transmission would (
1) be marked
14854 with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to evade
14855 these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once the
14856 content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (
2) systems to
14857 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the
14859 of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be compensated. The
14861 would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate tax.
14864 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14865 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14866 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14868 Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14870 I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of the
14871 proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
14872 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14874 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal
14875 after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free
14877 of content, supported through a taxation system, then it can be
14878 continued. If this form of protection is no longer necessary, then the
14879 system could lapse into the old system of controlling access.
14882 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His
14883 aim is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the
14884 system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But
14885 the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes
14886 I described were accomplished--in particular, the limits on derivative
14888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14889 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14890 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14892 to do with the content itself.
14895 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14896 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14897 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14898 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere
14899 with innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts
14901 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by
14903 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14904 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents, the
14905 cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels have
14906 none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by Real
14907 Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt there
14908 will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music on-line.
14911 This competition has already occurred against the background of
14912 "free" music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have
14913 known for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more
14914 than that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with
14915 free." Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to
14917 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive
14918 market was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant,
14919 movie theaters are often luxurious--with "first class" seats, and meals
14920 served while you watch a movie--as they struggle and succeed in
14922 ways to compete with "free."
14925 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14926 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the delivery of
14927 content. That competition would continue to shrink type A sharing. It
14928 would inspire an extraordinary range of new innovators--ones who
14929 would have a right to the content, and would no longer fear the
14931 and barbarically severe punishments of the law.
14934 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14939 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14941 in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize the
14942 harm to interests affected by this technological change, while enabling,
14943 and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can create.
14946 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to
14950 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14953 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14957 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14958 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14963 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14964 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14968 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a
14970 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14971 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14975 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14976 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But
14977 the real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract.
14978 The real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14980 that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x, or
14981 (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14983 of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14984 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14986 sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14988 without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then it
14989 may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty pirates.
14992 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14993 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not be
14994 on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14997 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting the
14998 space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
15002 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
15003 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
15005 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
15006 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
15007 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
15008 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
15011 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
15012 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it is
15013 my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. And
15014 in a world where the rich clients have one strong view, the
15016 of the profession to question or counter that one strong view queers
15020 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
15022 by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
15024 are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate and
15025 significant figures in the history of this branch of the law. Many, for
15027 thought crazy the challenge that we brought to the Copyright
15028 Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the dominant scholar
15029 and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville Nimmer, thought it
15030 obvious.
<footnote><para>
15031 <!-- f10. --> Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
15032 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069
70.
15037 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
15038 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
15039 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
15042 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and
15044 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the
15045 legal system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction
15046 costs of the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
15047 <!-- f11. --> A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is to
15048 be commended for his careful review of data about infringement, leading
15049 him to question his own publicly stated position--twice. He initially
15051 that downloading would substantially harm the industry. He then
15052 revised his view in light of the data, and he has since revised his view again.
15053 Compare Stan J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True
15054 Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002),
15055 (reviewing his original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J.
15056 Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper,
15057 June
2003, available at
15058 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
15059 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
15061 of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he underestimates the
15062 costs of the legal system. See, for example, Rethinking,
174
76.
15064 They see a system that has been
15065 around for hundreds of years, and they assume it works the way their
15066 elementary school civics class taught them it works.
15069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
15070 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't
15071 work for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
15072 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal level, at
15073 least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of our legal
15075 are so astonishingly high that justice can practically never be done.
15078 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
15079 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
15080 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
15082 strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality: very
15084 The law depended upon the careful articulation and development
15085 of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development of legal
15087 depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work costs too much,
15088 except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
15091 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
15092 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
15093 their duty to change the way the law works--or better, to change the
15094 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
15095 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
15096 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
15099 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the
15100 law away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is
15102 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left
15106 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with
15107 digital technology--the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or
15108 think about the amazing things your community could facilitate with
15109 digital technology--a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change
15111 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold
15112 molasses poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that
15114 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's
15118 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture--but it should
15119 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
15121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
15122 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this simple
15123 pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about the
15125 reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
15128 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
15129 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
15130 keep your lawyers away.
15132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
15136 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
15137 <title>NOTES
</title>
15139 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide Web. As
15140 anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be highly unstable. I
15141 have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting readers to the original source
15142 through the Web site associated with this book. For each link below, you can go to
15143 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by clicking on the
15144 number after the # sign. If the original link remains alive, you will be redirected to
15145 that link. If the original link has disappeared, you will be redirected to an
15147 reference for the material.
15149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
15152 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
15153 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
15155 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
15156 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
15157 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
15158 to him that this book is dedicated.
15161 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
15162 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard
15163 Posner, Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction
15164 and guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School
15165 and Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden,
15166 James P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert
15168 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum,
15169 Alina Ng, and Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine
15170 Crump and Harry Surden, who helped direct their research, and to
15171 Laura Lynch, who brilliantly managed the army that they assembled,
15172 and provided her own critical eye on much of this.
15175 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
15176 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
15177 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
15178 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
15179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
15180 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
15181 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
15182 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
15183 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
15186 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly
15187 draw upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible
15188 to receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
15189 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice
15190 to requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli,
15191 David Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who
15192 had specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
15193 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
15194 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy
15195 Hunsinger, Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James
15197 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey
15198 McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D.
15199 Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack,
15200 Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina,
15201 Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger
15202 Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have
15203 missed anyone; with computers come glitches, and a crash of my
15204 e-mail system meant I lost a bunch of great replies.)
15207 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book
15208 in draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
15209 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
15211 of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an embarrassingly large
15212 number of errors. While my work is in part inspired by Stallman's, he
15213 does not agree with me in important places throughout this book.
15216 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
15218 that there would be unending happiness away from these battles,
15219 and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever, grateful for
15220 her perpetual patience and love.
15222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->