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19 <book id=
"index" lang=
"en">
21 <title>Free Culture
</title>
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
25 <subtitle>Version
2004-
02-
10</subtitle>
29 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
30 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
38 This version of Free Culture is licensed
39 under a Creative Commons license. This license permits
40 non-commercial use of this work,
41 so long as attribution is given.
42 For more information about the license,
43 click the icon above, or visit
44 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
49 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
52 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
53 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
54 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
55 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
56 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
57 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
58 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
59 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
60 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
61 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
62 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
63 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
64 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
65 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
76 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 <itemizedlist mark=
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79 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
80 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
88 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
91 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
130 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig,
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January
16,
2003. Copyright
© 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page
159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
147 Diagram on page
164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
164 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
167 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
170 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
176 343.7309'
9—dc22
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
182 Printed in the United States of America
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
211 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
215 <figure id=
"CreativeCommons">
216 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</title>
217 <graphic fileref=
"images/cc.png"></graphic>
223 <title>List of figures
</title>
230 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
231 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
232 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
233 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
238 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
242 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
243 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
244 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
245 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
246 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
247 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
251 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
252 2 Architecture and Law: Force
253 2 Market: Concentration
256 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
257 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
258 2 Constraining Creators
259 2 Constraining Innovators
260 2 Corrupting Citizens
262 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
263 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
267 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
268 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
270 2 1. More Formalities
271 3 Registration and Renewal
274 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
275 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
276 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
285 <chapter id=
"c-preface">
286 <title>PREFACE
</title>
288 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
289 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
290 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
294 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
295 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
296 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
297 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
298 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times,
30 January
2000.
303 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
304 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
305 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
306 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
307 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
308 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
311 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
312 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
313 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
315 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
316 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
317 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
320 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
321 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
322 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
323 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
326 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
327 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
328 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
329 free software movement
<footnote>
331 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies
57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
332 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
333 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
334 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
335 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
336 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
337 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
338 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
339 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
340 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"
—a culture in
341 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
342 or of creators from the past.
345 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
346 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
347 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
348 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
349 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
350 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
351 culture deem fundamental.
353 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
355 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
356 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
357 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
358 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
359 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
360 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
361 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
362 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
367 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
368 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
369 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
370 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
371 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
372 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times,
22 May
2003.
377 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
378 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
379 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
380 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
381 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
382 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
383 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
384 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
385 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
386 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
387 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
388 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
389 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
390 that this work is "merely" derivative.
393 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
394 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
395 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
396 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
397 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
398 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
399 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
400 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
403 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
404 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
405 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
406 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
407 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
411 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
412 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
413 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
414 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
415 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
416 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
417 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
425 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
426 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
428 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
429 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
430 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
431 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
432 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
433 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
436 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
437 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
438 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
439 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
440 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries
3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
441 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
444 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
445 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
446 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
449 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
450 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
451 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
452 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
453 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
454 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
455 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
457 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
458 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
460 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
461 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
462 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
463 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
464 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
465 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
466 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
467 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
468 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
470 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
471 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
473 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
474 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
475 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
476 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
477 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
478 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
479 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
480 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
484 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
485 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
486 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
487 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
488 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
489 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
490 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
491 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
493 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
494 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
495 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
496 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
497 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
498 Authorship," Stanford Law Review
48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
499 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
501 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
502 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
507 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
510 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
511 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
512 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
514 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
515 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
516 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
517 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
518 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
520 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
523 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
524 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
525 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
526 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
527 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
528 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
529 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
530 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
531 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
532 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
533 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
534 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
535 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
536 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
537 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
538 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
541 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
542 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
543 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
544 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
545 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
546 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
547 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
548 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
549 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
550 understanding of radio.
551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
552 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
555 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
556 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
557 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
558 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
559 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
560 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
561 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
562 much less transmitter power and static.
565 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
566 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
567 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
568 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
569 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
570 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
571 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
572 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
573 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
576 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
580 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
581 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
582 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
583 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
584 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
585 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
586 box."
<footnote><para>
587 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
588 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
593 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
594 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
595 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
596 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
597 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
598 a handful of networks.
599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
602 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
603 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
604 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
605 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
606 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
610 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
611 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
612 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
613 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
614 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
615 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
617 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
622 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
623 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
624 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
629 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
630 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
631 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
632 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
633 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
634 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
639 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
640 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
641 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
642 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
643 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
644 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
645 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
646 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
647 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
648 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
649 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
654 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
655 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
656 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
657 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
662 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
664 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
665 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
666 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
667 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
668 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
669 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
670 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
674 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
675 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
676 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
677 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
678 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
679 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
680 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
681 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
682 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
683 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
686 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
687 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
688 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
689 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
690 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
691 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
692 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
693 course always public spirited; the reality is something
694 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
695 to themselves, would crumble in
696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
697 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
698 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
699 effect of technological change.
702 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
703 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
704 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
705 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
706 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
707 before.
<footnote><para>
708 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
709 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
710 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
711 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
713 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
717 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
718 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
719 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
720 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
721 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
722 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
723 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
724 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
725 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
728 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
729 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
730 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
731 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
732 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
733 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
737 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
738 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
739 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
740 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
741 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
743 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
744 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
745 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
746 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
749 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
750 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
751 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
752 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
753 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
754 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
755 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
756 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
757 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
760 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
761 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
762 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
763 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
764 marketplace.
<footnote>
766 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
767 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
768 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
769 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
770 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
771 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
772 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
774 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
776 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
777 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
778 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
779 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
782 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
783 been erased.
<footnote><para>
784 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
787 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
788 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
789 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
790 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
791 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
792 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
793 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
794 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
795 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
796 culture, more and more a permission culture.
798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
800 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
801 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
802 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
803 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
804 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
805 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
806 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
807 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
808 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
809 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
813 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
814 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
815 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
816 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
817 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
818 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
819 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
820 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
821 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
822 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
823 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
824 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
825 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
826 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
827 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
828 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
829 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
832 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
833 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
834 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
835 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
836 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
837 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
841 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
843 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
844 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
845 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
846 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
847 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
848 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
849 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
850 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
851 Times,
17 January
2002.
852 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
853 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
854 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
858 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
859 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
860 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
861 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
862 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
866 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
867 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
868 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
869 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
872 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
873 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
874 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
875 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
876 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
878 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
879 Journal
106 (
1996):
283.
880 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
882 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
883 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
884 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
885 could cultivate and extend our culture.
888 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
889 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
890 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
891 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
892 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
893 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
894 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
895 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
896 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
900 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
901 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
902 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
903 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
904 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
908 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
909 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
910 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
911 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
912 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
913 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
914 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
916 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
917 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
919 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
920 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
921 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
922 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
923 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
924 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
925 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
926 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
927 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
928 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
929 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
930 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
933 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
934 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
936 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
937 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
938 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
939 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
942 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
946 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become
948 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property
949 and, more importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy
950 makers and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when
951 more of our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has
952 never been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses
953 of culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
957 Is it because we have come to understand a truth about the value
958 and importance of absolute property over ideas and culture? Is it
960 we have discovered that our tradition of rejecting such an
965 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
966 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
969 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
970 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
971 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
972 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
973 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
976 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because
977 common sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common
978 sense stand silent in the face of these extremes because, as with
980 versus RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the
983 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
984 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
986 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
987 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
988 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
989 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
990 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
991 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
992 this silliness will be much more profound.
993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
996 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
997 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1001 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1002 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1004 French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird sort we
1005 academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a collection
1006 of stories that set a context within which these apparently simple ideas
1007 can be more fully understood.
1010 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1011 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1013 pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1014 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1015 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1016 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1018 by the changes to use their power to change the law
—and more
1019 importantly, to use their power to change something fundamental about
1020 who we have always been.
1023 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1024 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1025 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1026 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1027 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1028 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1032 <chapter id=
"c-piracy">
1033 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1037 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there
1038 has been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1039 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1041 As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1042 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1046 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1047 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1048 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1050 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1055 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1056 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1058 spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among the
1059 most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables. Using
1060 distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the easy spread of
1062 in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1066 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1067 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1068 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1070 of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the war, as
1071 copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the profit."
1074 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1076 to technology to defend their "property" against this "piracy."
1077 A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being raised to
1079 that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos, never mind body
1080 piercing
—our kids are becoming thieves!
1083 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1084 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1085 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1086 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1089 The idea goes something like this:
1093 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1094 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1095 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1096 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1097 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1101 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1103 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1104 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1105 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1107 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1108 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review
65 (
1990):
397.
1110 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1111 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1112 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1113 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1115 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1116 Up," Wall Street Journal,
21 August
1996, available at
1117 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1118 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1119 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe,
24 November
2002.
1121 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1122 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1124 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1126 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1127 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1129 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right" theory
1130 of creative property has never been America's theory of creative
1132 It has never taken hold within our law.
1135 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1136 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1137 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1138 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1139 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1142 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1143 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1144 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1145 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1146 copyright law today regulates both.
1149 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1150 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1151 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1152 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1153 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1154 more expense of doing business.
1156 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1158 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1159 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1160 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1161 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1162 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1163 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1164 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1165 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1166 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1167 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1168 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1169 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1170 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1171 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1172 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1174 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1177 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1178 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1179 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1180 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1181 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1182 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1183 enabled are much more tenuous.
1184 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1186 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1187 this creative class.
1190 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1191 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1192 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1196 <sect1 id=
"creators">
1197 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1199 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1200 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1201 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1202 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1203 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1206 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1207 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1208 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1209 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1210 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1211 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1215 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1216 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1217 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1218 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1222 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1223 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1224 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1225 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1226 synchronization was pretty close.
1229 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than
1231 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound
1232 and motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in
1233 the audience and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was
1234 wonderful! And it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1236 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1238 (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1243 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1244 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1245 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1246 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1249 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1250 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1251 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1252 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1253 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1254 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1255 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1258 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also
1259 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1260 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1261 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1264 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of
1265 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1266 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1267 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1268 The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular and among the best of its
1272 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1274 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1275 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1277 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1278 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1279 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1280 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1281 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1282 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1283 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1284 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1286 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1287 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1288 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1289 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1290 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1294 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1295 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1296 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1298 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1299 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1300 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1302 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1303 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1304 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1305 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1306 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1307 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1308 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1309 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1313 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1314 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1315 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1316 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1317 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1318 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1319 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1322 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1323 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1324 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1325 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1326 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1327 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1328 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (
1937),
1329 Fantasia (
1940), Pinocchio (
1940), Dumbo (
1941), Bambi (
1942), Song of
1330 the South (
1946), Cinderella (
1950), Alice in Wonderland (
1951), Robin
1331 Hood (
1952), Peter Pan (
1953), Lady and the Tramp
1332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1333 (
1955), Mulan (
1998), Sleeping Beauty (
1959),
101 Dalmatians (
1961),
1334 The Sword in the Stone (
1963), and The Jungle Book (
1967)
—not to
1335 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1336 Treasure Planet (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1337 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1338 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1339 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1342 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1343 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1344 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1345 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1346 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1347 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1348 culture around us and makes it something different.
1350 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1351 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1352 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1353 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1354 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1356 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1357 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1359 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1360 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1361 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1363 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1364 Web site associated with this book, available at
1365 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1367 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1368 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1369 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1370 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1373 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1374 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1375 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1376 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1377 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1378 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1379 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1382 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1383 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1384 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1385 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1388 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1389 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1390 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1391 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1392 content from before the Great Depression.
1395 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1396 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1397 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1401 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1402 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1403 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1404 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1405 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1406 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1407 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1410 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1411 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1412 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1413 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1414 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1415 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1416 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1417 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1418 interestingly different way.
1421 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1422 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1423 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1426 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1427 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1428 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1429 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1431 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1432 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1433 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1434 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1435 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1436 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1437 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1440 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1441 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1442 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1443 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1444 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1445 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1446 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1447 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1448 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1451 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1452 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1453 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1454 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1455 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1456 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1457 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1458 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1459 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1460 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1461 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1462 original copyright owner's permission.
1465 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1466 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1467 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1468 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1469 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1472 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1473 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1474 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1476 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1477 York: Perennial,
2000).
1481 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1482 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1483 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1484 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1485 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1486 which are fifty years old."
1489 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1490 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1491 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1492 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1493 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1494 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1495 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1497 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1498 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1499 Review
55 (
2002):
155,
182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1500 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1501 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1502 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1503 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1504 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1508 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1509 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1510 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1511 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1512 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1513 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1514 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1515 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1519 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1520 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1521 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1522 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1523 to prosecute cases like this."
1526 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1527 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1528 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1529 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1531 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1532 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1533 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1534 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1535 their clients or hurt them?
1536 Let's pause for a moment.
1539 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1540 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1541 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1544 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1545 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1546 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1547 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1549 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See Siva
1551 Copyrights and Copywrongs,
11 (New York: New York
1553 Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas (New York:
1554 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately describes a set of
1555 "property" rights
—copyright, patents, trademark, and trade-secret
—but the
1556 nature of those rights is very different.
1558 A large, diverse society cannot survive without
1560 a large, diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without
1561 intellectual property.
1564 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1565 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1566 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1567 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1568 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1569 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1570 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1571 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1572 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1573 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1574 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1575 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1579 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1580 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1581 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1584 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1588 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1589 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1590 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1591 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1592 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1593 form, whether large or small.
1596 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1597 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1598 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1599 particular find it hard to say why.
1602 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1603 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1604 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1605 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1606 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1607 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1608 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1609 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1610 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1611 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1612 movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s; two volcano disaster
1616 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1617 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1618 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1619 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1620 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1621 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1622 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1623 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1627 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1628 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1629 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1630 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1631 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1632 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1633 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1634 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1635 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1638 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1639 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1640 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1645 <sect1 id=
"mere-copyists">
1646 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1647 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1649 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1650 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1651 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1652 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1653 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1654 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1655 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1658 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1659 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1660 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1661 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1662 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1663 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1664 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1665 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1669 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1670 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1672 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1673 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1674 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1675 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1676 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1677 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1678 population of photographers.
1681 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1682 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1683 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1684 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1686 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1687 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1691 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1692 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1693 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1694 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1695 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1696 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1697 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1698 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1699 chemicals.
<footnote>
1702 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1704 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1709 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1710 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1711 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1712 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1713 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1714 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1715 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1716 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1717 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1718 percent.
<footnote><para>
1721 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1722 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1724 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1727 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1731 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1732 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1733 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1734 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1735 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1736 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1737 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1738 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1739 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1740 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1746 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1747 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1748 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1749 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1750 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1751 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1752 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1753 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1754 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1755 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1759 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1760 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1761 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1762 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1763 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1764 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1765 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1766 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1768 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co.,
50 S.E.
1772 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1773 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1774 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1775 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1776 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1779 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1780 that they thought valuable.
1782 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1784 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1785 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1786 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1787 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1788 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1791 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1792 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193.
1793 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1794 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1795 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1796 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1797 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1798 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1801 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1802 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1803 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1804 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1805 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1806 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1807 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1808 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1809 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1811 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1812 Problems
19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1813 Review
48 (
1960)
398–407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1814 Inc.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1819 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1820 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1821 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1822 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1823 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1824 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1825 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1826 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1827 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1828 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1829 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1830 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1831 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1836 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1837 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1838 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1839 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1840 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1841 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1842 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1843 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1844 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1845 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1846 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1847 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1848 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1849 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1850 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1851 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1852 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1853 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1854 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1855 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1856 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1857 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1861 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1862 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1863 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1864 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1865 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1867 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1869 You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst,
1870 February
2002, available at
1871 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1873 These buses are filled with technology that
1874 would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten years ago. And it is
1875 now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but classrooms across
1876 the country where kids are learning more and more of something
1877 teachers call "media literacy."
1880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1881 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1882 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1883 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1884 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1885 the way people access it."
1888 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1889 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1890 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1894 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1895 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1896 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1898 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1899 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1900 Study," Denver Post,
25 May
1997, B6.
1902 it is increasingly important to understand the
1903 "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the written
1904 word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to write
1905 by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1907 lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1910 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1911 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has
1912 written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult it is to
1914 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1915 understandable
—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1916 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works,
1917 how it holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers
1918 emotion or builds suspense.
1921 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1922 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1923 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1924 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1925 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1926 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1928 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
1930 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1931 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1932 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1935 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1936 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1940 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
1942 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
1943 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
1945 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1946 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1947 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1948 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1949 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1950 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1951 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1952 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
1954 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
1955 November
2000, available at
1956 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
1958 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
1961 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
1963 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1964 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1965 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1966 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1967 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1970 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
1971 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
1972 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1973 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1977 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1978 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1979 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1980 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1985 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1986 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1990 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point:
1991 It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1993 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the
1994 tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy,
1995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
1996 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
1998 language for what they need to create or express."
<footnote>
2001 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2002 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2003 </para></footnote> It is to enable
2004 students "to communicate in the language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2009 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2011 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2012 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2013 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2014 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2015 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2016 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2017 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2018 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2019 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2020 students know something about
—gun violence.
2023 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2024 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2025 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2026 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2027 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2028 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2031 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2032 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2033 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2034 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2035 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2036 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2037 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2038 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2039 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2040 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2041 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2042 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2043 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2044 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2045 to this form of expression.
2049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2050 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2051 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2053 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2055 To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing
2056 is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part
—and
2058 not the most powerful part
—of constructing meaning. As Daley
2059 explained in the most moving part of our interview,
2063 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2064 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2065 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2066 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2067 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2068 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2069 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2070 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2071 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2072 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2073 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2074 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2075 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2076 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2077 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2078 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2079 about the topic. . . .
2082 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2083 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2084 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2085 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2086 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2089 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2090 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2091 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2093 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2094 had a lot of power with this language."
2098 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2099 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2100 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2101 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2102 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2103 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2104 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2105 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2106 world would be watching.
2109 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2110 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2111 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2112 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2113 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2114 entertainment is tragedy.
2116 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2117 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2119 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2120 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2121 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2122 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2123 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2124 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2125 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2126 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2127 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2128 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2129 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2130 was also the Internet.
2133 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2134 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2135 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2136 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2139 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2143 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2144 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2145 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2146 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2147 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2148 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2149 spread practically instantaneously.
2152 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2153 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2154 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2155 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2156 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2157 records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2158 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2161 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2162 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2163 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2164 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2165 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2166 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2167 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2168 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2169 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2170 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2171 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2172 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2175 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2176 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2177 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2178 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2179 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2182 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2183 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2186 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2187 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2188 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2189 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2190 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2191 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2192 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2193 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2194 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2195 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2196 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2197 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2198 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2199 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2201 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk.
1, trans.
2202 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2206 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2207 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2208 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2210 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2212 Philosophy
10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2214 And in some towns in
2215 New England, something close to deliberation remains. But for most
2216 of us for most of the time, there is no time or place for "democratic
2221 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2223 We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2224 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2226 with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics
2227 with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated,
2228 and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2230 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2231 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2232 </para></footnote> We say what our
2233 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
2236 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2237 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when
2238 they want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2240 that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2241 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2244 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2248 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2249 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2250 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2251 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2252 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2253 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2256 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2257 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential
2258 race but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the
2260 is having an effect.
2263 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2264 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2265 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially
2267 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2268 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2269 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The
2270 bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and more
2272 of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story broke
2273 back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to resign
2274 as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2276 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2277 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2281 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2282 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2283 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2284 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2288 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2289 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2290 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2291 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2292 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2293 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2294 peer-generated rankings.
2297 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2299 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2300 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2301 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2302 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2303 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2304 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2305 get it out of the way."
2307 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2309 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2310 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2311 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2312 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2313 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2315 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2317 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2318 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2319 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2320 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2321 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2322 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2323 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2325 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2326 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2327 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2328 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2329 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2330 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2331 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2333 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2334 Information Online," New York Times,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2335 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2336 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2337 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2339 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2340 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2341 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2342 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2345 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2346 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2347 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2348 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2349 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2352 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2353 York Times,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2354 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2355 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2356 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2357 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2358 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2359 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2360 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2362 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2365 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2366 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2367 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2368 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2369 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2372 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
2373 "you don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a
2375 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well.
2376 As more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2377 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It is
2378 easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2379 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare
2380 human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But it
2381 is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2382 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2383 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2384 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2389 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2390 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2391 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2394 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2396 from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
2397 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his
2398 real excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
2401 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew
2402 up," he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines,
2404 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital
2406 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2407 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how
2408 a commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2410 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2411 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or
2412 "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform the
2413 tinkering of many others.
2416 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2417 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2418 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes
2419 a FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit
2420 of FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2423 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning
2425 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2426 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can start
2427 looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can
2428 improve it." Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source
2430 a major apprenticeship platform."
2433 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2434 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2436 and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're
2438 in your garage. You are tinkering with a community platform. . . .
2439 You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the
2440 more you improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
2443 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the
2444 same collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As
2445 Brown puts it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors
2447 forms of intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter
2448 or word processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much
2449 more than text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are
2451 if you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a lot
2452 you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2453 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2455 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2457 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish,
2458 and Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2461 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind
2465 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2466 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2467 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2468 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2469 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2470 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2471 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2474 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2475 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2476 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2477 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2478 general.
<footnote><para>
2480 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2481 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2482 of the Association for Computer Machinery
43 (
2000):
9.
2484 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2485 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2488 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2489 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2493 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2494 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2495 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2496 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2497 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2500 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2501 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2502 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2503 the law to close down that technology.
2506 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2507 chapter
9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2511 <sect1 id=
"catalogs">
2512 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2514 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2515 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2516 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2517 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2518 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2521 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2522 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2523 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2524 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2525 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2526 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2529 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2530 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2531 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2532 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2533 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2536 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2538 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2539 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2540 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2541 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2542 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2543 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2544 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2545 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2548 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2549 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2550 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2551 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2552 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2553 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2554 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2557 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2558 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2559 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2560 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2561 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2562 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2563 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2564 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2565 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2569 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2570 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2571 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2572 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2573 be on users' computers.
2576 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures,
2577 which students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes
2578 or research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that
2580 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2582 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2586 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2587 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2588 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2589 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2590 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2591 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2592 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2593 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2594 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2595 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2596 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2597 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2601 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2602 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2603 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2604 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2605 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2606 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2607 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2610 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2611 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2612 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2613 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2614 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2615 easier to use"
—again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2616 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2617 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2618 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2619 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2622 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2623 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2626 that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2627 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2628 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2629 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2630 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded
2631 that Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2634 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2635 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2636 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2637 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2638 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2639 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2640 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100 billion
—six
2641 times the total profit of the film industry in
2001.
<footnote><para>
2643 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2644 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC
6
2645 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2649 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2650 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2651 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2652 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2653 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2656 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2657 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2658 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2659 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2660 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2661 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2662 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2663 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2664 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2667 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2668 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2669 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2670 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2671 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2673 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2674 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2677 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2678 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2681 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2682 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2683 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2684 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2685 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2686 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2687 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2689 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2690 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2691 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (
2000).
2693 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2694 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2695 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2697 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2698 Wall Street Journal,
10 September
2003, A24.
2702 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2703 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2704 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2709 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2710 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2711 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2712 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2716 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2717 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2718 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2719 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2720 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2724 <sect1 id=
"pirates">
2725 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2727 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2728 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2729 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2730 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2731 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2732 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2737 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2739 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2740 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
87–93,
2741 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2743 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2744 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2745 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2746 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2747 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2748 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2749 this creative property
2750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2751 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2754 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2758 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2759 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2760 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2761 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2762 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2763 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2764 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2767 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2768 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2769 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2770 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2771 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2772 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2773 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2774 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2775 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2776 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2778 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2779 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2780 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2781 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2782 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2783 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2784 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2785 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2786 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2787 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2788 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2789 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2790 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2794 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2795 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2796 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2797 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2798 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2800 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2801 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2803 That led the independents to flee the East
2804 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2805 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2806 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2810 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2811 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2812 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2815 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2816 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2817 Edison's creative property.
2820 <sect2 id=
"recordedmusic">
2821 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2823 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2824 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2827 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2828 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2829 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2830 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2831 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2832 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2833 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2834 right to perform it publicly.
2836 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2838 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2839 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2840 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2841 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2842 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2843 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2844 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2845 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2846 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2847 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2848 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2849 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2850 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2851 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2852 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2853 its composer anything.
2856 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2858 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2863 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2864 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2865 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2866 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2867 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2868 rights.
<footnote><para>
2870 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2871 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2872 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2873 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2874 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2875 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2880 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2881 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2882 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2884 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2885 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2887 and the "music publishing industry"
2888 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2890 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2891 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2894 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2895 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2897 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2898 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2902 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2903 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2904 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2905 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2906 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2907 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2909 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2910 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2912 Company of New York).
2913 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators
2914 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2915 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk
2916 about `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone
2917 Company wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in
2918 ideas musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<footnote><para>
2920 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376
2922 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the
2924 Graphophone Company Association).
2928 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and
2929 the recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that
2930 composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their
2931 music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete
2933 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave
2934 recording artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress,
2935 once the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2938 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2940 a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2941 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2944 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2945 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose
2946 key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright
2947 Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of
2949 so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set
2953 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2954 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2955 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2956 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2957 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2958 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2960 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
2963 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2964 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2965 kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2966 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2967 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2968 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2969 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2970 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2971 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2972 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2973 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2974 creativity.
<footnote><para>
2976 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2977 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
2978 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2979 in Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2980 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2982 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2985 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2986 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2987 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2992 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2994 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2996 is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2998 in the United States and throughout the world; records
2999 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this
3000 creates special problems, since performers need unhampered
3002 to musical material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically,
3003 the record producers pointed out, there were no recording rights
3004 before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license
3005 as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
3006 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of
3007 recorded music, with the public being given lower prices,
3009 quality, and a greater choice.
<footnote><para>
3011 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3012 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3013 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3014 this report.
</para></footnote>
3018 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3020 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3024 <title>Radio
</title>
3026 Radio was also born of piracy.
3029 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3030 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3032 See
17 United States Code, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3033 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3034 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3035 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3036 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3037 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3038 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3039 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3040 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
281.
3041 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3042 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3044 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3045 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3046 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3049 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3050 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3051 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3052 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3053 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3054 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3055 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3056 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3057 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3062 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the
3064 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3065 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3067 for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for
3068 free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege of
3072 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of
3074 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3075 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3076 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3079 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3080 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3081 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3082 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3083 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3084 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3085 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3088 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3089 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3090 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3092 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the
3093 choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take
3094 something for nothing.
3097 <sect2 id=
"cabletv">
3098 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3101 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3104 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3105 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3106 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3107 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3109 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3110 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3111 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3114 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3115 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3117 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3118 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3119 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3121 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3122 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3123 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3124 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3127 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3128 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3129 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3130 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3132 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3133 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3135 As another broadcaster put it,
3139 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3140 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3141 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3143 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3144 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3149 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3153 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3154 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3155 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3156 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3158 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3159 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3160 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3165 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3166 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3167 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3169 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3170 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3174 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3175 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3179 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3180 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3181 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3182 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3185 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3186 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3188 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3189 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3194 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3195 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3198 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3199 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3200 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3201 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3202 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3203 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3204 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3205 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3206 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3207 created by broadcasters' content.
3210 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3211 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3212 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3213 today
<footnote><para>
3215 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3216 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3217 Information, available at
3218 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3219 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3220 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3222 — then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3223 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3224 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3225 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3226 generation
—until now.
3228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3232 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3234 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3235 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3236 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3237 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3238 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3242 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3243 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3244 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3245 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3246 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3247 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3248 has so often done in the past.
3249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3251 <sect2 id=
"piracy-i">
3252 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3254 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3255 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3256 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3257 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3258 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3260 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3261 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003, July
2003, available at
3263 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3264 Financial Times,
14 February
2003,
11.
3266 (that works out to one in three CDs sold
3267 worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually
3268 worldwide to piracy.
3271 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3272 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3273 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3274 This piracy is wrong.
3277 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3278 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3279 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor
3281 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3282 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3284 nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our
3285 existence, treated as right.
3288 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3289 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3290 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3291 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3292 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law
3293 does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3295 that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a
3296 moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal
3297 wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3300 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3301 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3303 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3305 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar
3309 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3310 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3311 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3312 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3314 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3315 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3316 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3317 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3318 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3319 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3320 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3321 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3322 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3323 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3324 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3325 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3326 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3327 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3328 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3329 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3330 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3331 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3335 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3336 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3337 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3338 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3339 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3341 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3342 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3343 144–90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the copyright holder's
3344 ability to appropriate the value of the work will be negligible. One obvious
3346 is the case where the individual engaging in pirating would not have
3347 purchased an original even if pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3351 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3352 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3353 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3354 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3355 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3356 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3357 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3358 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3359 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3360 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3361 piracy of the tangible.
3364 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3365 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like all
3367 rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide the terms
3368 under which content is shared. If the copyright owner doesn't want to
3369 sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important statutory
3371 that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish of the
3372 copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
3374 content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
3376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3377 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3378 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3379 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3381 of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the permission
3382 of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3385 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that
3386 the piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
3387 "steal" Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft.
3388 Microsoft loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains
3389 users who are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the
3391 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software
3392 rather than steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will
3394 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3395 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3396 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3398 Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3401 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a
3402 good one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3403 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3404 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will
3406 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3407 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3410 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3412 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will
3413 make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3415 allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give
3416 their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux,
3417 then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for example, with
3418 Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right means
3420 the property owner the right to say who gets access to what
—at
3421 least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the rights of the
3423 owner with the rights of access, then violating the law is still
3427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3428 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3429 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3430 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3431 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3432 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3433 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3434 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3438 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3439 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3440 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3441 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3442 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3443 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3444 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3447 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3448 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3449 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3450 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3453 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3454 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3455 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3456 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3459 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3460 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3465 <sect2 id=
"piracy-ii">
3466 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3468 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3469 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3471 Bach v. Longman,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3473 This means we must determine whether
3474 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3476 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3477 author of his profit.
3480 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3481 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3482 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3483 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3485 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3486 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3487 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3488 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3489 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3490 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3491 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3492 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future,
89–92,
139.
3493 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3494 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3495 put together components that had been developed independently.
3496 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3499 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3500 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3501 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3502 system.
<footnote><para>
3504 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3505 Francisco Chronicle,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3506 New Scientist,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3507 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle,
23 May
2003, C1;
3508 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3509 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times,
26 July
2002,
18.
3511 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3512 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3513 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3514 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3515 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3516 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3517 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3520 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of
3522 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3523 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3524 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3526 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3527 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3528 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3529 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3532 group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
43 million citizens
3533 used file-sharing networks to exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3535 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3536 York Times,
6 June
2003, A1.
3539 majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive
3540 quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The ease and
3541 inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired millions to
3543 music in a way that they hadn't before.
3546 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it
3547 does not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3549 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3550 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully
3551 than the polarized voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of
3552 sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
3555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3556 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3557 different kinds into four types.
3559 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3562 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for
3564 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released,
3565 rather than buying the CD, these users simply take it. We might
3566 quibble about whether everyone who takes it would actually
3567 have bought it if sharing didn't make it available for free. Most
3568 probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who would.
3569 The latter are the target of category A: users who download
3575 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3576 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an
3577 artist he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that
3578 artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to
3580 If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from
3581 a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the
3583 will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
3584 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
3588 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to
3590 content that is no longer sold or that they would not
3591 have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too
3592 high. This use of sharing networks is among the most
3594 for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have
3595 long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on
3596 the network. (One friend told me that when she discovered
3597 Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She
3598 was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3600 For content not sold, this is still technically a violation of
3601 copyright, though because the copyright owner is not selling the
3602 content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same harm
3603 that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3609 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3610 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3615 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3618 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3620 of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3621 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<footnote><para>
3623 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,
148–49.
3625 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3627 yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good) and
3628 harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise available). So
3629 how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to answer
—and
3631 much more difficult than the current rhetoric around the issue
3635 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on
3636 how harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about
3638 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists
3639 complained about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV,
3640 the music industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft"
3641 that is "devastating" the industry.
3644 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3646 is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3648 to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette
3649 recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
&
3650 Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular technology, the
3651 labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3653 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, Technology Evolution and the Music
3655 Business Model Crisis (
2003),
3. This report describes the music
3657 effort to stigmatize the budding practice of cassette taping in the
3658 1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull
3659 and the caption "Home taping is killing music."
3660 At the time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical
3661 Assessment conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent
3662 of consumers older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S.
3663 Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying:
3664 Technology Challenges the Law, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3665 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
3667 The labels claimed that every album taped was an
3668 album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the
3669 industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
3671 and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
3674 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3675 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3676 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3677 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3679 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3680 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3682 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying,
4.
3686 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3687 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3688 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3689 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3690 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3691 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3692 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3693 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3696 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3697 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3698 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3699 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3700 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3701 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3702 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3705 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3707 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3708 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3711 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9
3713 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<footnote><para>
3715 See Recording Industry Association of America,
2002 Yearend Statistics,
3717 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3718 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3719 25 June
2003, available at
3720 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3721 of recorded music have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in
3722 to
860 million units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3723 In terms of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in
3724 to $
12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3726 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3727 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3729 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3731 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3732 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3733 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That
3734 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3735 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3736 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3739 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3740 February
2003, available at
3741 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3742 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3745 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3746 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3747 High Fidelity has a list price of $
18.98. You could get the whole movie
3748 [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3756 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3757 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3758 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3759 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3761 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3762 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3765 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3766 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3767 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3769 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own
3771 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3772 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3773 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3774 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of Kazaa
3775 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry would have
3776 suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6
3777 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3778 revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3780 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3783 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3785 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3786 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3790 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
3791 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3793 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3794 tracks that are no longer commercially available.
<footnote><para>
3796 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3797 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3798 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3800 on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared
3802 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3803 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3807 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3808 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3809 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3811 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3815 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3817 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3819 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<footnote><para>
3821 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3822 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3823 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3824 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (
2002), available at
3825 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3827 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3830 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3833 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3834 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3835 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3836 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3837 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3839 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3840 owner for the content they sell.
3842 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3844 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3845 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3846 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3847 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3848 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3849 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3850 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3851 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3852 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3853 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3854 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3857 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3858 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3859 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3860 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3861 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3865 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3866 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3867 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3868 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3869 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3870 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3873 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3874 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3875 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3876 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3877 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3878 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3882 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3883 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3884 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3885 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3888 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3889 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3890 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3891 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3895 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3896 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3897 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4, much of
3898 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3899 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3900 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3901 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3902 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3903 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3904 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3905 found only with time.
3908 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3909 just what you call type A sharing?"
3912 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3914 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3915 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3917 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3919 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3921 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3922 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3923 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3925 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3926 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3928 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3929 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3931 Napster (New York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3935 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3936 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3937 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3938 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3939 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3940 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3941 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3942 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3943 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3946 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3947 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3948 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3950 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3952 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3953 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3954 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3957 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3958 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3959 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3961 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3962 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3963 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3964 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3965 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3967 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3970 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3971 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3972 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3973 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3975 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3980 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3981 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of
3982 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3983 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3985 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3987 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3988 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3989 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3990 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3992 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3993 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3994 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3996 over the future (cable).
3998 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4000 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4001 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4002 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4003 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4004 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4005 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4006 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4007 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4008 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4009 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4010 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4013 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4014 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4015 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4016 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4017 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4018 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4019 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4020 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4022 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4023 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4024 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4025 for the architecture it chose.
4028 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4029 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4030 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4031 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4032 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4033 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4035 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4036 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4037 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4038 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4040 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4041 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4042 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4043 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4044 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4045 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4047 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4049 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4050 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4052 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4055 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4056 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4057 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4058 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4059 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4060 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4061 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4063 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4068 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4069 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4070 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4071 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held
4072 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4073 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4074 technology
—which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4075 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4076 of the American film industry)
—was an illegal
4077 technology.
<footnote><para>
4079 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4084 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4087 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4088 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4093 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4094 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4096 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4098 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4099 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4101 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4103 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4108 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4109 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4111 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4112 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4113 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4117 <title>Table
</title>
4118 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4122 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4123 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4124 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4129 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4130 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4131 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4132 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4135 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4136 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4138 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4141 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4142 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4143 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4144 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4148 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4149 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4150 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4157 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4158 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4160 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4161 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4162 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4163 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4164 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4165 1992 (Title
17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4166 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4167 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4168 Lessig, Future,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4169 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
293–96.
4170 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4172 In each case, throughout our history,
4173 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4177 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4178 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4179 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4180 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4181 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4183 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4184 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4185 the interests at stake.
4186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4189 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4190 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4191 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4192 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4193 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4195 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4196 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4197 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4198 permission to record a song?
4201 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4202 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4203 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4204 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4206 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
4209 Instead, the particular uses that the
4210 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4211 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4212 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4214 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4215 the distribution of content.
4218 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4219 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4220 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4221 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4222 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4223 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4224 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4225 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4226 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4227 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4229 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4235 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4237 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4238 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4240 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4242 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4243 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<footnote><para>
4245 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4246 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times,
22 September
2003, C3.
4248 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4250 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4251 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4252 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4253 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4254 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4255 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4256 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4259 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4260 just as any other property is protected."
4262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4266 <chapter id=
"c-property">
4267 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4271 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4272 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4273 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4274 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4275 the price she can get.
4278 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4279 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4280 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4281 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4282 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4283 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4284 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard
—by, for example,
4286 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4287 thing I am taking then?
4290 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4291 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4293 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4295 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4296 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4297 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4298 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4299 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4300 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4301 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4303 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4304 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4305 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4309 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4310 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4311 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4313 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4317 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in
4318 other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4320 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4322 in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4324 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4326 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4327 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4329 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4330 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4332 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review
45 (
2003):
4337 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4339 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4341 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4342 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4343 significance of this true statement
—"copyright material is property"
—
4344 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4345 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4350 <sect1 id=
"founders">
4351 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4353 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in
1595. The play
4354 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4356 had written. He would continue to write plays through
1613,
4357 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4358 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4359 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4360 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4362 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4365 In
1774, almost
180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4366 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4367 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4369 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4370 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4371 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4372 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4373 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4374 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4375 Bookseller," American Scholar
61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4378 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger
<footnote><para>
4380 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4382 University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4385 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4386 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4387 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4389 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4391 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4393 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4396 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4397 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4398 of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4399 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4400 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4402 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4404 by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.
<footnote><para>
4406 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4408 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
40.
4410 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in
1731. So why
4411 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in
1774?
4414 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4416 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4417 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4418 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4420 in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4421 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4422 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4424 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4427 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4428 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4429 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4431 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4433 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4434 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4436 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4437 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4439 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4441 of any positive law.
4444 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4445 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4446 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4447 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4450 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4451 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4453 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4456 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4457 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4459 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4460 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4462 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4463 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4466 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4467 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4468 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4471 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4472 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4473 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4474 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4475 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4476 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4477 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4478 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4480 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4483 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4485 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4486 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4490 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4491 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4492 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4493 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4495 from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4496 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4498 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4499 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4500 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4502 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4503 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4507 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4508 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4509 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4511 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4513 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4514 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4515 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4516 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4519 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4520 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4522 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4523 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4524 monopolies
—especially
4525 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4526 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4527 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4528 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4530 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4531 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4535 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4537 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4538 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4539 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4540 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4541 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4543 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4546 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4547 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4548 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4549 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4551 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind
—tools of the
4552 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4554 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4555 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4556 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4557 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."
<footnote><para>
4559 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4560 York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4564 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4565 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4567 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4568 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4569 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4573 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4574 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4575 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4576 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4577 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4578 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4580 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4581 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4582 construction and spread of culture.
4585 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4586 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4587 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4588 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4589 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4590 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4591 they said; they needed more time.
4594 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4595 words that echo today,
4599 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4600 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4602 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4603 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4604 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4605 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4606 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4607 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4609 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4610 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4611 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4612 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4613 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4614 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4615 al.,
8, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4620 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4621 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4622 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4623 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4624 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4625 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4626 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4627 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4628 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4629 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4630 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4631 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4632 way to protect authors.
4635 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4636 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4637 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4638 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4639 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4641 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4642 Law Review
40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4643 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4645 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4646 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4649 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4650 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4651 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4653 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4654 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4658 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4659 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4660 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4661 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4663 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4666 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4668 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4669 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4670 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4671 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4675 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4678 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4679 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4680 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4681 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4682 Property."
<footnote><para>
4684 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective,
167 (quoting
4687 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4688 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4689 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4692 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4693 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4694 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4697 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4698 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4699 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4700 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4701 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4702 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4704 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4705 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review
29
4710 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4711 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4712 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4713 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4714 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4715 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4716 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4717 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4718 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4721 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4722 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4723 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4724 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4725 with in
1710: How best to limit
4726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4727 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4728 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4729 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4730 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4731 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4732 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4735 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4736 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4738 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4740 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4741 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4742 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4746 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4747 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4748 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4749 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4750 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4751 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4754 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4755 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4756 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4757 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4758 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4759 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4760 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4761 statute were no longer protected.
4764 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4765 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4766 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4767 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4768 House of Lords generally voted.
4771 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4772 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4774 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4775 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4776 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4777 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4778 passed into the public domain.
4781 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4782 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before
1774, there
4783 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4784 After
1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4785 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4786 and the greatest works in English history
—including those of
4787 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan
—were free of
4789 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4790 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4791 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4792 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4793 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4796 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4797 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4798 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4799 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4800 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4801 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4802 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4803 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4804 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4810 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4811 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4816 By the above decision . . . near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4817 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4818 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4819 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4820 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4821 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4822 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4823 successors.
<footnote><para>
4830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4831 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4832 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4833 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4834 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4835 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4836 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4837 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4838 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4839 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4840 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4841 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4842 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4843 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4844 readers chose to let it develop
— chose in the books they bought
4845 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4846 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4847 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4848 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4851 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4852 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4853 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4858 <sect1 id=
"recorders">
4859 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4861 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4862 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4863 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4864 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4868 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4869 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4873 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4874 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4875 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4876 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4877 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4881 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4882 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4883 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4884 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4886 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4890 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4891 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4892 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4893 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4894 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4897 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4898 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4899 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4900 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4901 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4902 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4905 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4906 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4907 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4908 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4909 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4910 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4913 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4914 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4915 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4916 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4917 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4918 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4921 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4922 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4923 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4924 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4925 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4926 confirm what he had been told.
4929 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4930 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4931 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4935 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4936 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4937 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4941 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4942 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4943 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4944 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4945 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4946 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4949 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4950 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4951 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4952 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4953 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4954 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4955 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4956 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4957 says the owner gets to control.
4960 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4961 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4962 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4963 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4964 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4965 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
4969 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4970 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
4972 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4973 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4974 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4975 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4976 Law School,
5 August
2003.
4978 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4979 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons
—and fair use does
4980 not require the permission of anyone.
4983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4984 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4988 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4989 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4990 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4991 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4992 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4993 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4995 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
4998 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4999 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5000 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5001 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5002 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5006 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5007 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5008 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
5009 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
5010 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5011 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
5012 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5013 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5018 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5019 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5020 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5021 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5022 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5023 pockets, me or them.
5024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5028 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5029 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5035 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5036 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5037 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5038 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5039 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5040 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5043 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5044 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5045 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5046 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5051 <sect1 id=
"transformers">
5052 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5053 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5054 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5056 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5057 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5058 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5059 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5060 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5062 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5064 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5065 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5066 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5067 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5068 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5069 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5070 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5071 important to his career.
5073 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5075 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5076 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5077 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5078 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5082 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5083 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5084 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5085 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5086 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5088 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5090 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5091 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5092 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5093 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5094 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5097 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5099 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5100 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5102 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5104 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5105 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5106 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5110 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5111 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5112 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5113 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5115 <primary>artists
</primary>
5116 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5121 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5122 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5123 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5124 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5125 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5128 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5129 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5130 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5134 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5135 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5136 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5137 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5138 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5139 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5143 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5144 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5145 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5146 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5147 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5148 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5149 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5150 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5151 started calling people.
5154 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5156 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5157 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5158 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5159 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5160 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5161 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5162 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5163 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5167 It was one year later
—"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5168 were totally in the clear."
5170 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5172 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5173 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5174 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5178 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5179 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5180 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5181 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5182 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5183 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5184 systematically and cleared the rights.
5189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5190 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5191 loved it, and it sold very well.
5193 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5194 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5196 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5197 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5198 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5199 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5200 at all."
<footnote><para>
5202 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5203 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5204 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5206 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5210 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5211 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5212 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5213 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5214 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5218 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5219 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when
30 seconds of
5220 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5221 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5222 compensated for that.
5226 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5227 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5228 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5229 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5230 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5231 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5232 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5236 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5237 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5238 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5239 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5241 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5242 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5243 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5244 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5245 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5246 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5247 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5248 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5249 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5250 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5251 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5252 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5255 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5257 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5258 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5259 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5260 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5261 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5262 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5263 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5264 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5265 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5266 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5267 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5268 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5269 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5270 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5271 "Does this still make sense?"
5274 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5275 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5276 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5277 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5280 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5281 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5284 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5285 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
60 Minutes episode.
5286 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5287 judges loved every minute of it.
5289 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5291 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5292 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5293 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5294 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5295 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5296 were just violated in this room?"
5298 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5300 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5301 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5302 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5303 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5304 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5305 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5306 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5307 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5308 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5309 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5310 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5311 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5312 couldn't easily do them legally.
5315 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5316 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5317 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5318 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5319 planted in your presentation.
5322 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5324 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5325 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5326 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5327 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5328 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5329 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5330 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5331 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5334 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5335 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5336 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5337 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5338 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5341 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5342 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5343 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5344 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5345 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5346 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5347 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5348 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5349 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5350 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5351 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5352 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5356 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5357 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5358 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5359 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5362 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5363 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5365 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5366 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5367 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5368 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5369 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5370 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5374 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5375 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5376 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5377 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5378 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5379 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5380 new audiences, it is Mike."
5383 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5384 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5385 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5386 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5387 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5388 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5389 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5390 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5393 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5394 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5395 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5396 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5397 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5398 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5399 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5400 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5401 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5402 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5403 curse, reserved for the few.
5405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5407 <sect1 id=
"collectors">
5408 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5410 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5411 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5412 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5413 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5414 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5415 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5416 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5419 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5420 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5421 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5422 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5423 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5424 well as when those pages changed.
5427 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5428 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
1984, old newspapers were
5429 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5430 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5435 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5436 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5437 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5440 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5441 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5442 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5443 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5444 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5447 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5448 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5449 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5450 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5451 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5453 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5454 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5455 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5456 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5457 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5461 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5462 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5463 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5464 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5465 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5466 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5467 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5468 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5472 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5473 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5474 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5475 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5476 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5477 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5478 presumes this knowedge.
5481 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5482 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5483 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5484 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5485 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5486 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5487 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5488 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5489 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5492 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5493 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5494 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5495 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5496 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5497 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5498 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5499 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5502 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5503 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5504 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5505 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5506 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5507 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5508 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5509 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5510 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5511 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5512 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5513 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5514 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5515 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5516 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5520 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5521 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5522 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5523 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5524 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5527 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5528 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5532 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5533 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5534 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5535 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5536 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5537 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5540 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5541 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5542 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5543 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5544 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5548 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5549 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5550 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5551 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5552 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5553 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5554 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5555 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5557 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5558 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly
13 nos.
2–3
5559 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5560 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5565 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5566 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5567 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5568 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5569 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5570 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5571 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5572 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5573 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5576 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5578 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5579 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5580 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5581 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5582 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5583 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5587 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5588 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5589 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5590 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5591 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5592 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5593 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5594 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5595 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5596 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5597 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5598 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5599 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5600 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5601 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5602 few minutes
—for free.
5605 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5606 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5607 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5608 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5609 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5613 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5614 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5615 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5616 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5617 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5618 has
—a noncommercial life.
5621 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5622 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5626 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5627 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5628 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5629 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5630 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5633 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5634 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5635 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5636 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5637 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5638 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5642 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5643 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5645 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5646 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5647 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5648 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5649 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5650 College Law Review
44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5651 </para></footnote>). After
5652 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5653 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5654 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5655 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5656 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5659 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5660 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5661 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5662 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5663 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5664 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5665 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5666 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5670 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5671 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5672 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5673 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5674 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5677 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5678 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5679 little practical effect.
5682 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5683 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5684 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5685 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5686 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5687 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5690 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5691 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5692 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5697 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5698 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5699 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5700 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5701 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5702 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5703 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5704 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5705 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5706 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5707 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5711 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5712 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5713 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5714 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5715 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5716 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5719 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5720 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5721 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5722 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5723 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5726 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5727 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5728 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5729 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5730 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5731 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5735 <sect1 id=
"property-i">
5736 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5738 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5739 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5740 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5741 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5742 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5743 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5744 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5745 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5748 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5749 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5750 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5751 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5752 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5753 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5754 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5755 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5756 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5760 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5761 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5762 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5763 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5764 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5765 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5766 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5767 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5768 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5769 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5773 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5774 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5775 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5776 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5777 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5778 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5779 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5782 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5787 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5788 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5789 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5790 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5791 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5792 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5793 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5794 debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5796 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5797 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5798 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5799 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5800 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5806 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5807 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5808 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5811 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5812 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5813 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5814 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5817 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5818 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5819 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5820 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5821 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5822 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5823 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5824 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5825 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5829 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5830 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5832 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5833 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5834 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5835 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5836 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5837 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5838 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5839 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5840 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5841 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5842 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5843 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5847 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5848 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5849 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5850 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5851 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5852 culture would develop.
5855 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5856 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5857 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5858 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5859 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5860 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5861 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5862 the same would be to
5864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5865 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5866 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5870 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5871 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5872 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5873 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5874 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5875 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5876 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5877 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5878 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5879 Constitution itself.
5882 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5883 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5884 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5885 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5886 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5887 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5888 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5889 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5890 government pays for the privilege.
5893 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5894 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5895 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5896 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5897 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5898 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5899 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5900 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5901 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5902 compensation for your land
5903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5904 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5905 compensation at all.
5908 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5909 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5910 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5911 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5912 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5913 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5917 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5918 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5919 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5920 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5921 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5922 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5923 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5924 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5925 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5926 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5929 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5930 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5931 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5932 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5933 creative property there must be a public domain?
5936 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5937 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5938 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5939 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5940 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5941 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5942 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5943 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5944 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5945 control how culture develops.
5949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5950 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5951 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5952 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5953 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5954 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5955 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5956 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5958 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
5959 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
5960 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
5963 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5964 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5965 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5966 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5967 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5968 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5969 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5970 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5971 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5972 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5973 Web, you can be punished
5974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5975 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5976 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5979 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5980 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5981 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5982 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5983 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5984 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5985 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5986 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5987 the source of the enforcement.
5990 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5991 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5992 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5993 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5994 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5995 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5996 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5997 individual or group might behave.
6000 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6001 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6002 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6003 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6004 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6005 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6006 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6007 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6008 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6009 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
6010 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6011 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6012 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6016 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6017 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6018 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6019 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6020 undermined by another.
6023 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6024 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6025 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6026 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6027 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6028 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6029 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6031 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6032 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6035 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6036 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6037 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6038 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6039 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6040 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6041 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6042 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6043 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6044 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6045 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6046 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6049 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6050 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6051 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6053 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6054 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6055 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6056 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6057 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6058 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6059 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6062 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6063 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6064 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6065 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6066 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6067 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6068 used to require that other laws be more
6069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6070 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6071 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6074 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6076 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6077 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6078 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6081 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6082 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6083 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6084 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6085 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6089 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6090 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6091 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6092 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6093 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6094 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6095 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6096 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6097 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6098 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6099 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6100 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6101 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6102 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6103 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6104 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6105 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6106 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6107 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6108 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6109 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6110 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6111 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6112 places easier;
42 United States Code, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6113 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6114 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6115 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6116 of these groups might face.
6117 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6120 <sect2 id=
"hollywood">
6121 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6123 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6124 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6125 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6126 rallying makes sense.
6129 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6132 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6133 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6134 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6138 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6139 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6140 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6141 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6142 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6143 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6144 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6145 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6146 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6147 this form of infringement.
6150 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6151 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6152 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6153 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6154 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6155 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6158 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6159 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6160 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6161 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6164 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6165 looting that results.
6167 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6168 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6169 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6172 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6173 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6174 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6175 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6176 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6177 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6178 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6179 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6180 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6181 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6184 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6185 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6186 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6187 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6188 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6189 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6190 life. Homeowners living in a
6192 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6193 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6194 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6195 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6196 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6197 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6198 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6201 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6202 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6203 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6204 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6205 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6206 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6209 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6210 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6211 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6212 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6213 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6214 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6215 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6217 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6218 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6219 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6220 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6221 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6222 October
2003, available at
6223 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6226 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6227 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6228 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6229 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6230 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6231 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6232 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6233 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6234 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6235 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6236 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6239 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6240 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6241 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6243 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6244 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6245 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6246 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6247 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6249 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6252 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6253 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6254 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6255 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6256 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6258 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6261 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6262 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6263 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6264 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6265 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6266 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6267 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6268 opportunities for innovation and change.
6271 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6272 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6273 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6274 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6275 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6276 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6277 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6278 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6279 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6280 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6281 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6282 regulation is justified.
6285 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6287 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6288 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6289 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6290 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6291 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6294 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6297 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6298 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6299 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6300 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6301 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6304 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6305 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6306 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6308 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6310 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6311 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6312 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6313 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6314 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6315 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6318 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6319 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6320 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6321 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6322 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6323 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6324 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6327 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6328 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6329 culture.
<footnote><para>
6331 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6332 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal
47 (
1997):
87.
6334 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6335 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6336 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6337 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6338 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6339 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6341 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6342 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6343 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6344 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6345 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6348 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6349 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6350 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6351 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6352 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6353 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6354 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6355 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6356 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6359 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6360 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6364 <sect2 id=
"beginnings">
6365 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6367 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6368 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6369 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6370 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6373 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6374 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6375 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6378 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6379 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6380 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6383 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6384 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6385 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6386 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6387 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6388 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6391 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6392 in chapter
6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6393 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6394 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6395 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6396 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6397 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6400 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6401 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6402 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6403 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6404 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6405 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6406 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6407 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6408 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6409 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6410 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6411 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6415 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6416 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6417 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6418 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6419 years since they first struck its design.
6422 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6423 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6425 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6428 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6429 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6430 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6435 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6436 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6437 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6444 <sect2 id=
"lawduration">
6445 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6447 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6448 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6449 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6450 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6451 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6452 authorship.
<footnote>
6455 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6456 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6457 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6458 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6459 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6460 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6462 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6463 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6464 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6465 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6466 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6467 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6470 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6471 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6472 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6473 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6474 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6475 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6478 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6479 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6480 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6481 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6482 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6485 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6486 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6487 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6488 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6489 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6490 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6491 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6493 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6494 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6495 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol.
1, The Creation
6496 of an Industry,
1630–1865 (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6497 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6498 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6499 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context,
7–10 (
2002),
6500 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6501 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6502 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6503 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6504 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6505 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6506 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6509 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6510 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6512 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6513 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6514 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6518 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6519 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6520 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6521 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6522 domain.
<footnote><para>
6524 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6525 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6526 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6527 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6528 Studies on Copyright, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6529 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6530 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6531 University of Chicago Law Review
70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6532 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6535 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6536 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6537 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6539 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6540 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6541 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6542 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6543 books; that use
—because it does not involve publication
—is
6547 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6548 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6549 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6550 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6551 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6552 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6555 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6556 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6557 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6558 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6559 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6560 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6561 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6562 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6565 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6566 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6567 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6568 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6571 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6572 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6573 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6576 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6577 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6578 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6579 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6580 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6581 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6582 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6586 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6587 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6588 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6589 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6590 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6591 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6592 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6593 was ninety-five years.
6596 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6597 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6598 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6599 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6600 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6601 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6605 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6606 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6607 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6608 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6609 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6610 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6611 years.
<footnote><para>
6613 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6614 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6615 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6616 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6621 <sect2 id=
"lawscope">
6622 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6624 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6625 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6626 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6627 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6630 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6631 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6632 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6633 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6634 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6635 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6636 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6637 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6638 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6639 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6640 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6643 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6644 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6645 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6646 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6647 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6648 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6649 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6650 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6651 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6652 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6653 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6654 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6655 on the initial creative work.
6658 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6659 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6660 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6662 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6663 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6664 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6665 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6666 famous
© or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6667 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6668 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6671 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6672 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6673 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6674 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6675 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6676 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6677 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6678 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6679 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6680 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6681 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6685 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6686 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6687 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6688 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6689 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6690 copy available for others to copy.
6693 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6697 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6698 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6699 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6700 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6701 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6702 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6704 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6706 of American Literature,"
29 New York University Journal of
6708 Law and Politics
255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6709 Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6711 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6712 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6713 the United States
—publishers.
6716 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6717 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6718 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6719 act was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and
6720 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6721 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6723 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6727 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6728 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6729 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6731 to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6732 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6733 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6736 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6737 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6738 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6741 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6743 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6744 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6745 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6746 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6747 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6748 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6749 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6751 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6752 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6755 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6756 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6758 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6760 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6761 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6762 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6763 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6768 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6769 a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6770 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6771 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6772 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6773 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6774 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6776 derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6778 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6780 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6782 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6783 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6784 the wrong of direct piracy.
6787 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6788 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6789 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6791 use of my book.
<footnote><para>
6793 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6794 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6795 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6796 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6798 Yale Law Journal
112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially pp.
53–59).
6800 These two different uses of my creative work are
6804 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6805 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6806 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6808 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6809 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6813 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6814 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6816 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6817 rights originally granted.
6820 <sect2 id=
"lawreach">
6821 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6823 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6824 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6825 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6826 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6828 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6829 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6830 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6831 make a copy;
17 United States Code, section
106(
4). And it certainly
6833 doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 United States Code, section
112(a). But
6834 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17
6835 United States Code, section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6840 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6841 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6842 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6843 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6844 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6845 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6846 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6847 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6848 trigger for copyright law.
6851 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6852 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6853 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6854 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6856 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6857 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6858 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6860 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6862 because it is clear that the
6863 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6864 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6867 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6870 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6871 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6872 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6876 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6877 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6878 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6879 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6880 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6881 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6882 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6883 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6884 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6885 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6888 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6889 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6890 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6893 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6894 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6895 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6896 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6897 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6898 diagram on next page).
6901 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6902 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6905 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6906 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6907 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6910 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6911 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6913 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6914 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6915 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6916 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6917 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6918 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6920 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6921 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6922 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6925 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6926 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6927 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6931 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6932 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6933 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6936 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6937 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6939 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6940 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6941 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6942 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6944 And because of this single,
6945 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6947 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6949 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6950 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6951 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6952 because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into
6954 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6956 work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
6957 burden of this shift.
6960 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6961 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6962 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6963 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6965 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6967 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use
—reading
—
6968 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6973 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6975 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6976 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6978 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6980 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6981 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6982 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6983 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6984 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6987 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6988 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6989 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6990 points also become clear:
6993 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6994 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6996 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6998 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6999 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
7000 free culture before the Internet.
7003 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7005 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
7006 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
7008 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
7009 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
7011 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
7013 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
7014 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
7016 uses of creative work.
7019 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7022 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7023 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7024 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7025 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7026 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7028 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7029 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7031 before because reading was not regulated.
7034 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7035 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7037 upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question about
7038 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
7039 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
7040 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
7042 of fair use are not enough.
7045 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7046 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7047 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7048 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7049 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7052 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it
7054 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7056 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7057 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7058 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7059 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7064 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7066 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7067 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7068 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7070 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7072 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7073 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7074 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7076 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7077 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7078 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7081 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7082 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7084 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7086 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7087 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7088 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7089 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7090 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7093 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7094 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7095 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7096 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7097 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7098 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7099 Disney's permission.
7102 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7103 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7104 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7105 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7107 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7108 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7109 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7110 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7111 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7112 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7113 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7117 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7119 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say
7120 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7121 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
&
7123 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7124 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7126 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7127 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7129 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7130 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7131 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7132 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7135 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7136 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7137 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7138 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7140 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7141 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7144 <sect2 id=
"lawforce">
7145 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7147 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7148 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7149 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7150 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7153 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7154 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7155 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7156 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7157 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7160 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7162 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7163 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7165 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7166 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7167 if they went forward with their plan.
<footnote><para>
7169 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7171 Problems
44 (
1981):
172–73.
7175 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7176 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7177 you were."
<footnote><para>
7179 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs,
1–3.
7181 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7182 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7183 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7186 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7187 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7188 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7189 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7192 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7193 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7194 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7195 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7197 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7198 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7199 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7200 that is not at all funny.
7203 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7206 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7207 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7208 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7210 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7213 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7217 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7218 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7219 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7220 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7221 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7222 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7224 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7227 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7228 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7229 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7232 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7233 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7235 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7236 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7237 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7241 According to my eBook
7242 Reader, I have the permission
7243 to copy to the clipboard of the
7244 computer ten text selections
7245 every ten days. (So far, I've
7246 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7247 I also have the permission to
7248 print ten pages from the book
7249 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7250 the permission to use the Read
7251 Aloud button to hear
7253 read aloud through the
7257 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7258 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7260 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7261 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7262 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7265 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7266 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7269 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7270 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7271 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7274 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7275 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7278 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7279 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7280 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7283 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7286 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
—
7287 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7288 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7289 the power
—up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7291 copyright, there is no such copyright power.
<footnote><para>
7293 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7294 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7295 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7297 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7298 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7299 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7302 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7303 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7304 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7305 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7308 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7309 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7310 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7311 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7312 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but
7313 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7314 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7315 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7316 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7318 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7319 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7320 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud
—it's not that the company
7321 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7322 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7326 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7327 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7328 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7331 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7332 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7333 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7334 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7335 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7336 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7339 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7340 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7342 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7343 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7344 protections as well?
7347 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7351 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7353 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7354 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7355 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7356 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7358 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7359 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7360 Wonderland
".
</title>
7361 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7365 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7367 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7369 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7372 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7373 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7374 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7375 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7376 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7377 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7380 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7381 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7382 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7383 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7384 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7385 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7386 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7387 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7388 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7389 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7390 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7393 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7394 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7395 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7396 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7397 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7401 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7402 story of mine that makes the same point.
7404 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7406 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7407 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7408 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7411 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7412 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7413 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7415 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7416 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7417 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7420 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7421 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7422 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7423 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7424 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7425 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7428 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7429 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7430 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7431 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7432 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7433 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7434 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7435 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7436 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7437 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7440 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7441 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7442 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7443 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7446 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7448 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7449 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7450 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7451 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7452 than Sony had built.
7455 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7456 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7457 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7458 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7462 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7463 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7464 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7465 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7466 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7467 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7471 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7472 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7473 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7474 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7475 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7476 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7477 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7478 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7479 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7482 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7484 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7485 Science
293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7486 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7487 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7488 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter,
11 December
2001; Bill
7489 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7490 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7491 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7492 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7493 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7494 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7496 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7497 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7498 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7499 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7502 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7503 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7504 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7505 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7506 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7507 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7508 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7512 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7513 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7514 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7515 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7519 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7520 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7521 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7522 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7525 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7526 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7527 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7528 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7529 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7530 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7533 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7534 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7535 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7536 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7537 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7538 constituted, succeed.
7541 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7542 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7543 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7548 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7549 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7550 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7554 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7555 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7556 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7560 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7562 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7563 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7564 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7568 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7569 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7570 spreading such information an offense.
7573 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7574 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7575 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7576 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies
—
7577 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7578 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7579 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7582 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7583 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7584 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7585 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7588 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7589 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7590 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7591 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7592 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7593 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7594 have been a copyright violation.
7597 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7598 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7599 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7600 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7601 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7602 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7603 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7605 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7606 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7609 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7610 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7611 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7612 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7613 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7614 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7617 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7618 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7619 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7620 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7621 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7622 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7623 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7624 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7628 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7629 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7630 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7631 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7632 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7633 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7634 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7635 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7636 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7637 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7638 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7639 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7640 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7641 important.
<footnote><para>
7643 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S.
417,
7644 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7645 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7646 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7652 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7653 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7654 the VCR responsible.
7657 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7661 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7664 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7665 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7666 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7667 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7668 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7669 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7672 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7674 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7675 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7676 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7679 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7680 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7681 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7684 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7685 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7686 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7687 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7688 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7689 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7692 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7693 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7694 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7695 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7696 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7697 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7700 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7701 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7702 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law
—increasing its
7703 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7704 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7705 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7706 owners effect
—at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7707 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7710 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7711 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7712 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7713 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7714 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7715 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7716 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7717 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7718 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7723 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7724 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7725 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7726 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7727 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7729 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7730 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7731 Entertainment Law Journal
17 (
1997):
651.
7735 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7736 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7737 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7738 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7739 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7742 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7743 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7744 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7745 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7746 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7747 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7748 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7749 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7752 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7753 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7754 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7755 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7756 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7757 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7760 <sect2 id=
"marketconcentration">
7761 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7763 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7764 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7765 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7766 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7767 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7770 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7771 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7772 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7773 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7774 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7775 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7776 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7777 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7781 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7782 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7783 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7784 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7785 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7788 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7789 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7790 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7791 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7792 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7793 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7794 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7795 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7799 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7802 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7804 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7805 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7806 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7808 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7809 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7810 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7811 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7812 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7813 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7815 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7816 Slide," New York Times,
23 December
2002.
7818 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7819 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7821 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7826 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7827 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7829 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than
1,
200
7830 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7831 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7832 largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's
7833 revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of the
7834 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7837 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7838 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7839 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7840 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7841 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7842 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7843 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7844 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7845 protected
— by the market.
7848 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7849 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7850 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7851 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7855 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7856 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7857 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7858 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7859 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7860 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7861 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7862 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7863 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7864 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7866 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7868 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7873 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7874 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7875 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7876 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7878 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7879 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7880 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7884 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7885 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7889 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7890 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7891 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7892 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7895 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7896 integration may matter.
7898 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7899 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7900 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7902 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7903 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7904 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7905 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7906 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7909 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7910 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7911 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7912 control.
<footnote><para>
7914 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7915 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7917 3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7918 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7919 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7920 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7926 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7927 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7928 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7929 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7930 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7931 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7935 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7936 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
7937 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7938 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
7939 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7940 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7941 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
7942 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7943 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
7945 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7946 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
7947 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7948 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7949 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7950 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7951 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
7954 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7955 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
7956 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7957 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7958 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7959 63%."
<footnote><para>
7964 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7966 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7967 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7968 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7969 owned by the network.
7972 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7973 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7974 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7978 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7979 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7980 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7981 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7983 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7984 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7985 handful.
<footnote><para>
7987 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7988 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
7989 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
7994 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7995 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7996 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7997 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7998 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7999 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8000 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8001 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8002 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8005 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8007 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8008 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8009 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8010 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8011 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8012 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8014 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8015 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
8016 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8017 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8018 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8019 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy
14 (
1985):
8020 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8021 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8022 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
8023 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8025 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8026 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8028 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8031 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8032 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8033 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8037 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8038 suggest the concern.
8041 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8042 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8043 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8046 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8047 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8048 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8050 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8051 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8052 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8053 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8054 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8055 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8056 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8057 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8058 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8059 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8060 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8061 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8062 outweigh these costs.
8065 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8066 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8067 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8071 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8072 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8073 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8074 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8075 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8076 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8077 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8078 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8079 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8080 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8083 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8084 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8087 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8088 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8089 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8093 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8095 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8096 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8097 message will be heard then?
8100 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8101 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8102 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8103 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8104 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8105 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8106 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8107 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8108 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8110 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8111 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8112 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8113 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8114 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8115 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8116 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8117 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8118 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8119 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8120 York Times,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8121 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8122 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8123 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8124 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review
6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8125 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8126 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC,
184 F.
3d
872
8127 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8128 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8129 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8130 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8131 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8132 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8133 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8137 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8138 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8139 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8140 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8141 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8142 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8143 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8144 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8145 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8148 <sect2 id=
"together">
8149 <title>Together
</title>
8151 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8152 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8153 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8154 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8157 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8158 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8159 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8160 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8164 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8165 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8166 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8167 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8168 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8169 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8173 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8174 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8175 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8179 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8180 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8181 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8182 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8183 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8184 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8185 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8186 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8187 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8188 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8191 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8192 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8193 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8194 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8195 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8196 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8197 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8198 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8199 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8200 technology and the market enable.
8203 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8204 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8206 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8207 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8208 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8209 the development of our culture than now.
8211 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8212 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8213 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8214 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8215 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8216 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8217 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8218 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny
8219 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8220 founding
—is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8221 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8222 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8223 culture that our free society has known.
<footnote><para>
8225 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8226 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8230 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8233 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8234 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8235 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8236 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8237 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8242 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8246 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8247 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8252 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8253 <entry>©</entry>
8257 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8266 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8267 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8268 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8271 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8272 noncommercial work was also free.
8275 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8280 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8284 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8285 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8290 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8291 <entry>©</entry>
8292 <entry>©</entry>
8295 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8304 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8305 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8306 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8307 transformation were still essentially free.
8310 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8311 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8312 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8313 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8314 we could say the law began to look like this:
8319 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8324 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8329 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8330 <entry>©</entry>
8331 <entry>©</entry>
8334 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8335 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8343 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8344 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8345 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8346 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8347 that the law now looks like this:
8352 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8357 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8362 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8363 <entry>©</entry>
8364 <entry>©</entry>
8367 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8368 <entry>©</entry>
8369 <entry>©</entry>
8376 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8377 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8380 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8381 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8384 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8385 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8386 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8387 these domains actually does any good.
8390 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8391 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8392 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8393 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8394 reasons sketched especially in chapters
7 and
8, one might well wonder
8395 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8396 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8397 rights were more sharply restricted.
8400 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8401 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8402 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8403 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8404 property rights
<footnote><para>
8406 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8407 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8408 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8409 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8410 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8413 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8414 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8415 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8416 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8417 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8418 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8419 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8423 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8424 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8425 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8426 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8427 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8428 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8429 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8432 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8433 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8434 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8435 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8436 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8437 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8438 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8439 dominates the debate today.
8442 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8443 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8444 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8445 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8446 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8447 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8448 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8449 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8450 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8451 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8458 <chapter id=
"c-puzzles">
8459 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8462 <sect1 id=
"chimera">
8463 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8464 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8465 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8467 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8468 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8470 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8471 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8475 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8476 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8477 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8479 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8480 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8481 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8483 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8484 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8485 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8486 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8487 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8488 villagers to explore life as a king.
8491 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8492 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8493 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8494 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8495 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8496 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8497 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8498 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8503 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8504 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8505 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8506 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8507 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8508 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8509 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8510 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8511 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8514 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8515 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8516 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8517 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8520 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8521 is affected," he reports.
8524 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8525 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8529 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8530 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8531 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8532 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8535 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8536 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8537 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8538 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8539 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8540 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8541 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8542 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8544 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8545 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8546 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8549 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8550 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8552 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8553 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8554 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8555 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8556 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8557 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8560 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8561 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8562 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8563 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8564 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8565 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8566 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8567 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8568 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8569 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8570 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8571 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8574 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8575 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8576 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8577 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8578 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8579 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8580 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8583 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8584 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8585 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8586 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8587 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8593 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8594 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8595 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8596 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8597 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8598 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8599 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8600 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8603 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8604 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8605 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8606 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8607 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8610 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8611 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8612 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8613 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8614 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8615 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8616 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8617 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8618 <!-- f2. --> For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8619 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8621 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available
8623 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8624 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized on-line
8625 copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high as five years
8626 imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
8627 Los Angeles Times,
17 July
2003, available at
8628 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil penalties are
8629 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
8630 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
8631 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer,
8632 see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In re. Verizon Internet Services),
240 F.
8633 Supp.
2d
24 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as
8634 high as $
90 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a
8635 powerful arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging
8636 from $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8637 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8639 the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8641 Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8642 August
2003, available at
8643 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an example of the RIAA's
8645 of student file sharing, and of the subpoenas issued to universities to
8646 reveal student file-sharer identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up
8647 Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students," Boston Globe,
8 August
2003,
8649 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8653 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8655 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8656 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8657 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8658 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8659 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8662 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8663 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8664 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8665 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8666 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8667 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8668 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8669 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8674 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8675 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8676 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8677 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8678 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8679 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8682 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8683 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8684 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8685 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8686 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8687 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8688 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8689 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8690 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8691 protection for copyrighted material,
8695 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8696 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8699 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8700 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8701 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8703 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8704 well produce a totally different industry model.
8707 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8708 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8709 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8710 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8711 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8712 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8713 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8714 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8715 interests.
<footnote><para>
8716 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8717 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8718 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8720 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement
8721 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8723 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8731 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8732 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8736 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8737 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8738 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8744 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8747 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8748 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8749 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8750 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8752 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8755 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8756 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8758 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8762 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8763 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8764 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8767 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8768 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8770 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8771 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8772 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8773 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8777 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8778 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8779 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8780 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8781 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8783 <sect2 id=
"constrain">
8784 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8786 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8787 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8788 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8789 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8790 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8791 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8792 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8793 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8794 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8795 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8796 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8797 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8798 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8801 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8802 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8803 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8804 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8805 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8806 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8807 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8808 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8809 the culture all around.
8812 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8813 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8817 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8818 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8819 storytelling extended across the globe.
8822 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8823 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8824 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8825 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8826 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8827 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8828 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8829 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8830 work is presumptively illegal.
8833 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8834 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8835 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8836 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8837 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8838 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8839 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8840 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8841 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8842 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8843 million.
<footnote><para>
8845 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8846 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8847 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8848 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8849 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8851 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8852 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8853 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8854 suffering.
<footnote>
8856 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8857 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8858 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8859 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8860 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8861 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8863 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8865 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8867 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8868 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8869 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8872 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8873 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8874 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8876 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8877 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8878 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8881 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8883 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8884 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8886 to see a world of underground art
—not because the message is
8888 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8889 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8891 art" tour the United States.
<footnote><para>
8892 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired,
7 July
2003,
8895 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8896 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8898 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8899 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8900 critical or reflective.
8903 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8904 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
10. But an
8905 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8906 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8907 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8908 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8909 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8910 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8911 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8914 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8915 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8916 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8917 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8918 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8919 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8920 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8921 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8922 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8925 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8926 described in chapter
7, in response to the story about documentary
8927 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8928 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8929 law regulates such a use.
8933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8934 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8935 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8936 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
8937 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8938 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8939 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8940 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8941 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8944 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8945 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8946 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8947 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8948 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8949 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8950 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8951 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8955 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
8956 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8957 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8958 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8959 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
8960 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8961 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8962 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8963 culture that is free.
8966 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8970 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8971 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8972 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8973 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8974 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8976 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8977 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8978 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8982 <sect2 id=
"innovators">
8983 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
8985 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8986 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8987 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8988 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8989 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8990 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8993 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8994 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8995 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8996 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8997 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8998 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8999 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9002 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9003 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9004 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9005 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9006 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9007 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9008 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9009 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9010 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9011 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9012 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9014 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9016 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9018 strategy that I described in chapter
10. The consequence of this
9019 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
9020 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
9021 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
9022 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
9023 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9024 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9025 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9028 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9029 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
9030 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9033 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9034 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9035 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9036 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9037 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9038 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9041 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9042 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9043 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9044 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9048 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9049 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9050 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9051 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9052 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9053 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9054 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9055 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9056 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9057 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9060 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9061 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9064 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9065 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9066 the kind of content the users liked.
9069 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9070 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9071 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9072 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9073 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9074 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9075 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9076 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9077 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9078 they had already bought.
9081 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9082 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9083 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9084 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9085 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9086 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9087 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9088 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9091 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9094 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9095 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9096 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9097 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9098 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9099 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9100 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9104 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9105 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9106 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9109 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9110 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9111 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9112 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9114 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9115 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9117 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9118 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9119 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9120 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9121 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9122 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9123 Times,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9125 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9127 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available at
9128 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9129 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9132 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9133 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9135 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9136 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9137 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9138 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9139 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9140 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9141 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9142 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9143 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9146 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9148 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9149 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9150 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9151 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9152 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9153 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9154 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . .
<footnote>
9157 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business
2.0,
16 June
9159 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9160 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9161 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9166 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9167 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9168 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9169 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9170 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9171 constantly threatened by litigation.
9175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9176 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9177 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9178 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9179 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9180 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9182 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9184 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9185 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9186 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9187 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9188 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9191 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9192 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
9193 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
9195 stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
9197 and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
9198 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9200 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of
9202 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect
9203 of too much control in the market is to produce an
9204 overregulatedregulated
9208 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9209 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9211 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture
—a
9213 in which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again,
9214 I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I
9215 am certainly not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its
9216 limits. And leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the
9217 high costs that our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of
9218 the law is an embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our
9219 profession should therefore do everything it can to make the law more
9220 efficient, it should at least do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9222 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9223 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9225 Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that result.
9226 The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There is
9227 a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by many
9228 in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9230 of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9233 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables
9234 the efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9236 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this
9238 is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content
9239 distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution of content.
9240 One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet
9241 less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says,
9242 we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9245 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9246 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9247 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9248 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9249 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9250 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9251 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9252 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9256 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9258 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9259 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9260 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9261 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9262 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9264 and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9265 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2,
26–27.
9270 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9271 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9273 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9274 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9277 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9281 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9282 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9283 impose.
<footnote><para>
9284 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9285 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9287 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9288 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9292 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9293 innovation
—again,
9294 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9298 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9299 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9300 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9301 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9304 As I described in chapter
10, despite this feature of copyright as
9305 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9306 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,
<footnote><para>
9307 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9310 overall this history of copyright
9311 is not bad. As chapter
10 details, when new technologies have come
9312 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9313 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9314 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9317 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9318 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9319 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9320 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9321 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9324 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9325 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9326 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th
9327 Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9328 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9330 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9332 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9333 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9334 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9336 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
1029 (C.D.
9337 Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9338 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9339 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9342 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9343 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.
<footnote><para>
9344 <!-- f11. --> For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9345 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9346 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9347 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9349 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
9350 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
9351 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
9352 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
9353 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
9354 Act, which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
9355 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
9356 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
9357 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9360 example that captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the
9366 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9367 As I described in chapter
4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9368 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he
9369 or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9370 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9371 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9372 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9374 owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9375 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9378 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9379 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9380 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio
9381 station was making it more likely that her records would be purchased.
9382 Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only indirectly.
9384 this reasoning had less to do with the result than with the power
9385 of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good at stopping any
9387 to get Congress to require compensation to the recording artists.
9390 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9392 to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast
9393 travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum.
9394 Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting
9395 in San Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a
9397 radio station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
9400 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9401 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could
9402 tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture
9403 for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of
9405 and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore
9406 be more competitive than regular radio; it could provide a wider range
9407 of selections. And because the potential audience for Internet radio is
9408 the whole world, niche stations could easily develop and market their
9409 content to a relatively large number of users worldwide. According to
9410 some estimates, more than eighty million users worldwide have tuned
9411 in to this new form of radio.
9415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9416 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9418 potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9420 over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too, is the
9421 competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the fight to
9423 FM radio and the fight to protect Internet radio. As one author
9424 describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable FM radio,
9428 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9429 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on
9431 in the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the
9432 number of stations would be limited only by economics and
9434 rather than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong
9435 likened the situation that had grown up in radio to that following
9436 the invention of the printing press, when governments and ruling
9437 interests attempted to control this new instrument of mass
9439 by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny
9440 was broken only when it became possible for men freely to
9442 printing presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense
9443 was as great an invention as the printing presses, for it gave radio
9444 the opportunity to strike off its shackles.
<footnote><para>
9445 <!-- f12. --> Lessing,
239.
9450 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because
9452 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated
9453 the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<footnote><para>
9454 <!-- f13. --> Ibid.,
229.
9458 the growth of this competing technology.
9461 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9462 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9463 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9464 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9465 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9469 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9470 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9473 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9475 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9476 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9477 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9479 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9480 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9481 neutral toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio
9482 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9485 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9486 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9487 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9488 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9489 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9492 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9493 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9494 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9495 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9496 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9497 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9498 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9499 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9500 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9501 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9502 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9503 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9504 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9505 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9506 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9507 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9508 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9509 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9510 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9512 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9516 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9517 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9518 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9521 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9523 name of the service;
9526 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9529 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9532 date of transmission;
9535 time of transmission;
9538 time zone of origination of transmission;
9541 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9544 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9547 sound recording title;
9550 ISRC code of the recording;
9553 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9556 featured recording artist;
9565 UPC code of the retail album;
9571 copyright owner information;
9574 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9577 name of the service or entity;
9583 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9586 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9589 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9592 Unique User identifier;
9595 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9600 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9601 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9602 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9603 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9604 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9608 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9609 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9610 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9612 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9614 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9615 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9616 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9620 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9621 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9622 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9623 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9624 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9625 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9628 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9630 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9631 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9632 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9636 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9637 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9638 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9639 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9643 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9644 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9645 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9646 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9647 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9648 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9649 effective to prevent it.
9652 <sect2 id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9653 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9655 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9657 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9658 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9661 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9662 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9663 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9666 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9667 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9668 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times,
43 million
9669 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9670 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9671 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9672 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9673 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9674 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9676 According to the RIAA,
9677 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9678 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9681 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9682 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9684 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9685 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9686 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9688 response by the other.
9691 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9692 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9693 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9694 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9695 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9696 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9697 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9698 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9699 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9700 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9701 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9702 was.
<footnote><para>
9704 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9705 Angeles Times,
10 September
2003, Business.
9707 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9708 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9709 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9710 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9711 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9712 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9716 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9717 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9718 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9719 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9720 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9721 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9722 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9723 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9724 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9726 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9727 Prohibition," American Economic Review
81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9731 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9732 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9734 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9735 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9736 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9738 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9739 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9740 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9741 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9742 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9744 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9745 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature
36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9746 compliance literature).
9748 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9749 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9750 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9753 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9754 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9755 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9756 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9757 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9758 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9759 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9760 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9761 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9762 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9763 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9764 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9765 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9766 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9767 degree of illegality.
9770 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9771 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9772 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9773 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9774 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9775 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9776 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9777 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9778 to consider the alternative.
9782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9783 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9784 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9785 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9786 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9787 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9790 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9791 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9792 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9793 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9794 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9795 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9796 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9797 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9798 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9799 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9800 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9801 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9804 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9805 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9806 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9807 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9808 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9809 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9810 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9811 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9812 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9816 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9819 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9820 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9821 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9822 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9826 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9830 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9831 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9832 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9833 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9834 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9835 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9836 capacities of digital technologies.
9838 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9840 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9841 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9842 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9843 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9844 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9845 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9846 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9847 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9848 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9851 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9852 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9853 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9854 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9855 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9856 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9857 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9858 on people's machines.
9861 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9862 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9863 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9864 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9865 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9866 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9868 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9869 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9870 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9871 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9875 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9876 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9877 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9878 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9879 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9880 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9881 freedom to move content easily?
9884 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9885 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9886 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9887 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9888 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9889 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9890 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9891 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9892 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9895 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9896 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9897 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9898 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9899 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9900 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9901 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9904 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9905 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9906 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9907 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9910 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9911 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9915 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9916 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9917 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9918 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9919 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9920 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9921 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9922 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9924 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9927 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9932 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9933 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9934 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9935 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9936 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9937 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9938 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9939 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9940 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9944 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9945 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9946 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9949 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
9950 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9951 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9952 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9953 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9954 an Internet user is revealed.
9957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9958 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9959 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9960 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9961 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9962 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9963 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9964 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9965 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
9967 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9968 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9969 Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9970 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9971 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9972 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
9973 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today,
15 September
9974 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9975 Fan, Either," New York Times,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9976 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star,
18 September
2003, P7.
9981 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9982 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9983 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
9985 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9986 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9987 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
9989 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9990 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9991 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9994 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9995 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
9996 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9997 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9998 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9999 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10000 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10001 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10002 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10003 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10004 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10006 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10007 Boston Globe,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10008 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10009 Colleges," Washington Post,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10010 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
10011 Monitor,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10012 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10013 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10014 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News,
30 January
10015 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10016 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10017 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10018 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10019 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10021 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10022 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10025 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10026 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10027 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10028 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10029 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10030 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10034 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10035 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10040 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10041 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10042 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10043 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10044 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10045 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10046 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10047 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10048 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10049 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10050 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10051 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10052 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10053 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10054 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10055 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10060 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10061 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10062 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10063 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10064 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10065 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10072 <chapter id=
"c-balances">
10073 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10077 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10078 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10079 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10080 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10083 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10084 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10085 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10086 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10087 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10091 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10092 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10093 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10094 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10095 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10096 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10100 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10101 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10102 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10103 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10104 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10105 made that is happening all around.
10108 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10109 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10110 gasoline onto this fire.
10113 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10114 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10115 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10116 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10119 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10120 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10121 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10122 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10123 success will require.
10126 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10127 <sect1 id=
"eldred">
10128 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10130 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10131 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10132 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10133 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10134 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10135 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10139 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10140 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10141 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10142 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10143 them available for free.
10146 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10147 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10148 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10149 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10150 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10152 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10153 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10154 accessible
—today.
10157 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10158 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10159 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10160 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10161 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10162 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10163 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10164 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10165 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10166 commercial publications of public domain works.
10169 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10170 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10171 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10172 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10173 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10174 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10175 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10176 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10177 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10178 generally.
<footnote><para>
10180 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10181 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10182 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10183 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10184 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10185 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10186 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10187 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10188 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10189 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10190 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10191 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10192 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10193 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10194 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10197 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10198 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10199 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10200 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
10,
10201 in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10202 terms of existing copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred
10203 would not be free to add any works more recent than
1923 to his
10204 collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10205 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10206 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than
1
10207 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10212 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10213 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10214 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10215 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10217 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10218 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10219 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10220 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10221 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10222 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10223 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10228 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10229 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10230 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10231 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10232 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10233 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10237 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10239 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10241 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10242 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10244 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10248 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10249 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10250 their . . . Writings. . . .
10254 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10255 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10256 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10257 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10258 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10259 specific
—to "promote . . . Progress"
—through means that
10260 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10261 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10264 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10265 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10266 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10267 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10269 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10270 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10271 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10272 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10273 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10276 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10277 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10278 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10279 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10280 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10281 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10282 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10283 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10284 this gravy train going.
10287 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10288 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10289 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10290 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10291 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10292 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10293 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10296 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10297 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10298 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10299 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10300 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10301 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10302 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10303 published by anyone for free.
10306 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10307 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10308 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10309 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10313 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10316 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10317 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10321 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10322 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10323 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10324 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10327 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10331 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10332 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10333 they support the bill."
10336 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10337 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10338 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10342 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10343 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10344 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10345 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10348 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10349 correct conclusion:
10352 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10353 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10355 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10358 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10360 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10361 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10364 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10365 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10366 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10367 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10369 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10371 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10372 the copyright term extended.
10375 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10377 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10378 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10381 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10383 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10384 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10385 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10386 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10387 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10388 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10389 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10390 Chicago Tribune,
17 October
1998,
22.
10392 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10393 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10394 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10395 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10397 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10399 Disney is estimated to have
10400 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10401 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10402 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10404 Quarterly This Week,
8 August
1990, available at
10405 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10410 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10411 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10413 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10414 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10415 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10416 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10417 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10419 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10423 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10424 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10425 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10426 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10427 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10429 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10432 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10436 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10437 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10438 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10440 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10441 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10446 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10447 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10449 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10450 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10452 to impose no limit.
10455 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10456 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10457 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10458 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10459 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10460 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10461 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10462 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10463 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10465 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10468 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10470 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10471 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10473 If anything Congress says is interstate
10474 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10475 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10476 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.
<footnote><para>
10477 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10482 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10483 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10484 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10485 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10487 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10488 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10489 commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10490 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10491 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10492 to regulate copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10494 And if it is applied to the
10495 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10498 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10500 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10501 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10502 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10504 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10505 existing copyrights.
10508 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10509 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics
—a conservative
10510 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10511 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10513 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10514 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10515 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10516 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10518 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10519 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10522 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10523 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10525 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10526 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy
—piracy of
10527 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10528 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10529 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10531 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10532 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10533 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10534 work. But now these entities were using their power
—expressed
10535 through the power of lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year
10536 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10537 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10540 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10542 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10543 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10544 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10545 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
10546 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
10547 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10550 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10551 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10552 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10555 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10557 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10559 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10560 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10561 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10562 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10563 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10564 bought to extend them again.
10567 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10569 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10570 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10572 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10574 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10575 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10576 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10577 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10579 and no longer available as a result.
10582 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10583 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10584 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10585 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10586 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10587 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10588 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10590 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10591 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
7, available at
10592 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10597 Think practically about the consequence of this
10598 extension
—practically,
10599 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10602 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10603 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10604 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10606 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10609 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10610 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10611 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10612 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10613 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10614 list of books still under copyright.
10617 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10618 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10621 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10623 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10624 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10625 being at least a list?
10628 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10629 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10631 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10633 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10634 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10637 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10639 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10643 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10644 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10645 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10647 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10648 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10649 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10652 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10653 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10654 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10657 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10658 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10660 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10661 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10662 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10663 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10664 know quite well who owns what property.
10667 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10668 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10670 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10671 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10672 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10673 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10674 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10675 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10676 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10679 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10680 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10682 for other creative works is much more dire.
10684 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10686 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10687 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10688 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10689 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10690 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10691 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10692 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10693 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10694 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10695 films."
<footnote><para>
10697 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10698 Los Angeles Times,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10699 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10700 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune,
9 October
2002.
10705 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10706 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10707 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10708 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10711 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10714 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10715 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10716 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10717 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10718 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10719 work available for distribution.
10722 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10723 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10724 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10725 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10726 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10727 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10728 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10730 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
10731 618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10732 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10733 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10738 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10740 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10741 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10742 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10743 locate the copyright owner.
10746 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10747 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10748 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10749 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10750 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10755 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10756 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10757 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10758 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10759 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10760 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10761 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10762 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10763 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10766 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10768 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10769 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10771 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10772 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10773 the copyright expires.
10776 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10777 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10778 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10780 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10784 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10785 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10786 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10787 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10789 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10793 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10794 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10796 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10797 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10798 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10800 the commercial life ends.
10803 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10804 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10805 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10807 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10809 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10810 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10811 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10812 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10813 have, we need to have access to this history.
10816 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10819 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10820 this context do no good.
10823 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10824 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10825 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10826 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10827 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10828 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10829 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10830 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10833 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10834 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10835 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10836 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10837 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10838 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10839 market didn't have more to offer.
10842 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10843 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10844 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10845 would not have interfered with anything.
10848 But this situation has now changed.
10851 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10852 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10853 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10854 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10855 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10856 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10857 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10858 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10859 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10860 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10864 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10865 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10866 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10867 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10868 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10869 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10870 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10871 written for a radically different context.
10874 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10875 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10876 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10877 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10878 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10879 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10880 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10881 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10882 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10885 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10886 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10887 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10891 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10892 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10893 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10894 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10895 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10896 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10897 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10898 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10899 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10902 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10903 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10904 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10905 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10908 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10909 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10910 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10911 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10912 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10914 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10915 December
2002, available at
10916 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10921 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10922 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10923 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10924 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10925 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10926 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10929 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10930 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10931 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10932 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10933 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10936 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10937 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10938 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10939 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10940 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10941 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10942 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10943 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10944 power to extend existing terms.
10947 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10948 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10949 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10950 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10953 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10954 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10957 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10958 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10959 overstepped its bounds.
10962 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10963 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10964 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10965 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10966 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10969 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10970 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10971 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
10972 briefs and preparing for argument.
10975 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10976 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10977 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10978 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10979 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10980 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10981 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10982 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10985 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10986 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10987 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10990 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
10992 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10993 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10994 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10995 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10998 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10999 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11000 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11002 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11003 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11004 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11006 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11007 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11008 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11009 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11010 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11011 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11012 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11013 most powerful media companies in the world."
11016 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11017 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11018 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11019 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11020 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11021 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11022 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11023 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11025 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11026 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11028 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11029 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11030 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11032 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11033 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11034 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11037 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11038 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11039 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11040 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11041 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11042 why it was unconstitutional.
11045 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11048 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11049 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11050 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11051 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
11052 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
11054 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
11055 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
11056 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
11057 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
11058 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
11059 gather the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11060 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11061 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11064 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
11065 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very
11067 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In
11068 November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the
11070 Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you
11071 sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to narrow
11072 special interests slide easily through the intricate legislative process,
11073 while bills that benefit the general public seem to get bogged down?"
11074 The answer, as the editorial documented, was the power of money.
11075 Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key players on the
11076 committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty
11077 more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11080 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11082 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11083 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11084 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms.
11085 That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative
11086 judge, Judge Sentelle.
11089 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11090 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11093 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11094 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11095 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11096 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11097 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11098 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11099 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11102 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11103 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11104 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11105 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11108 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11109 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11110 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11111 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11114 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11115 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11116 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11117 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11118 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11120 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11121 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11122 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11123 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11124 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11125 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11126 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11127 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11128 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11131 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11132 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11133 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11134 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11135 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11136 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11137 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11138 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11141 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11142 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11143 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11146 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11147 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11148 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11149 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11150 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11151 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11152 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11153 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11154 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11155 confidence in our argument.
11156 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11159 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11160 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11161 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11162 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11166 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11167 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11168 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11169 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11170 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11171 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11175 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11176 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11177 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11178 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11179 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11180 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11182 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537
11183 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11185 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11186 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11187 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11188 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11190 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11191 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times,
28 March
1998, B7.
11194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11195 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11196 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11197 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11200 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11201 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11202 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11203 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11204 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11205 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11206 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11207 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11208 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11209 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11212 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11213 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11214 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11215 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11216 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11217 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11218 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11221 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11222 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11223 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11224 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11225 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11226 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11227 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11230 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11232 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11233 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11234 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11237 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11238 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11239 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11240 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11241 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11244 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11245 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11246 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11247 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11248 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11249 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11250 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11251 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11254 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11256 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11257 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11258 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11259 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11260 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11261 these retrospective extensions.
11264 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11265 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11266 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11267 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11268 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11269 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11272 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11273 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11274 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11276 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11277 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11278 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11279 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11282 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11283 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11286 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11287 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11288 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11289 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11290 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11291 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11292 copyright be limited.
11295 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11297 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11299 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11300 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11301 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11304 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11305 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11306 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11308 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11311 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11313 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11314 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11315 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11317 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11319 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11320 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11322 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11323 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11324 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11326 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11327 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11330 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11331 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11334 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11335 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11336 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11337 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11339 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11340 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11343 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11345 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11346 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11347 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11348 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11349 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11352 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11353 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11354 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11355 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11356 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11358 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11360 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11361 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11362 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11363 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11364 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11365 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11366 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11367 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11368 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11369 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11370 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11373 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11374 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11377 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11378 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11379 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11380 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11382 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11383 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11384 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11385 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11386 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11387 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11388 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11389 family of the Justices.
11392 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11393 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11394 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11395 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11398 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11399 The history was bothering her.
11403 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11404 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11405 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11406 practice that began with the very first act.
11410 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11411 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11412 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11416 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11417 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11419 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11424 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11425 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11426 Kennedy, who observed,
11430 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11431 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11432 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11433 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11434 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11438 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11444 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11445 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11446 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11447 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11449 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11452 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11454 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11455 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11456 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11457 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11458 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11461 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11462 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11463 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11466 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11468 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11474 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11475 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11478 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11479 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11481 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11482 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11483 into the Copyright Clause.
11487 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11488 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11489 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11493 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an
11495 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's
11496 precisely the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that
11497 a limited time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of
11502 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11503 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11504 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11505 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright
11506 and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I
11507 closed by pointing out the long history of the Court imposing limits on
11508 Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause
—
11509 indeed, the very first case striking a law of Congress as exceeding a
11511 enumerated power was based upon the Copyright and Patent
11512 Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the Court to my side.
11515 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11516 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11519 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11523 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the
11524 limit? Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This
11525 was precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11526 imagine how the Court could understand that the government
11528 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the
11530 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor
11531 general had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried,
11532 I could not understand how the Court could find that Congress's
11533 power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
11535 Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself
11537 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
11538 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule
11539 of law that it had established elsewhere.
11542 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11543 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11544 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11545 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11546 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11549 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11550 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11551 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11554 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the
11555 world against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor,
11556 scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
11559 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11561 the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez. The
11563 was nowhere to be found. The case was not even cited. The
11564 argument that was the core argument of our case did not even appear
11565 in the Court's opinion.
11569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11570 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11571 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11573 she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11576 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11577 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11578 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11579 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11582 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11583 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11584 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with
11585 the Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11586 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11587 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11588 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11589 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context it
11593 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11594 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11595 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11596 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11597 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11598 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11599 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11600 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11601 the system we have.
11603 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11605 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11606 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11607 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11608 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11609 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11610 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11611 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11612 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11613 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11615 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11618 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11619 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11620 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11621 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11622 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11623 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11624 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11625 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11626 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11629 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11630 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11631 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11632 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11633 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11636 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11637 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11638 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11641 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11642 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11643 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11644 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11645 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11646 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11647 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11648 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11649 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11650 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11654 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11655 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11656 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11657 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11659 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11660 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11661 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11662 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11663 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11664 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11665 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11669 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11671 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11674 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11676 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11677 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11678 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11679 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11680 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11681 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11682 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11683 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11684 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11687 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11688 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11689 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11690 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11691 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11692 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11693 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11694 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11695 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11696 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11697 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11698 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11699 effort to persuade; but I
11700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11701 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11702 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11703 should decide the issue.
11705 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11707 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11708 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11710 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11713 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11714 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11715 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11716 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11719 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11720 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11721 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11722 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11726 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11727 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11728 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11729 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11730 issue should not be raised until it is.
11731 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11734 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11735 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11736 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11737 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11738 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11739 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11740 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11741 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11742 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11743 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11744 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11747 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11748 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11749 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11750 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11751 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11755 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11756 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11757 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11758 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11759 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11760 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11764 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11765 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11766 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11767 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11768 in the face felt exactly like that.
11771 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11772 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11773 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11774 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11775 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11776 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11777 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11781 <sect1 id=
"eldred-ii">
11782 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11784 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11785 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11786 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11787 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11788 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11789 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11790 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11792 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11794 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11795 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11796 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11797 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11798 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11799 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11800 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11801 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11804 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11805 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11807 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11808 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11809 the work passed into the public domain.
11812 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11813 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11814 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11817 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11818 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11819 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11820 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11821 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11822 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11823 everything else, let the content go.
11825 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11827 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11828 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11829 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11830 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11831 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11832 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11833 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11834 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11835 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11836 the stupid harm of the present system.
11839 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11840 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11841 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11842 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11843 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11844 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11845 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11846 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11847 where copyright owners could be identified.
11849 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11850 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11853 As I described in chapter
10, formalities in copyright law were
11854 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11855 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11857 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11858 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11859 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11860 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11861 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11862 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11863 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11864 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11865 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11866 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11867 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11868 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11869 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11870 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11871 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11872 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11873 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11874 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11875 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11876 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11877 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11878 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11879 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11880 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11883 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11884 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11885 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11886 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11887 know what's protected and what's not.
11889 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11891 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11892 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11893 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11894 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11895 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11896 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11897 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11898 in the loss of widows' only income.
11901 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11902 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11903 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11904 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11905 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11906 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11909 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11910 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11911 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11912 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11914 imposed upon creators.
11917 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11918 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11921 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11922 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11923 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11924 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11925 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11929 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11930 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11931 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11932 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11933 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11934 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11938 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11939 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11940 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11941 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11942 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11943 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
11944 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11945 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11946 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11947 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11948 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11949 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11950 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11951 system of protection for property generally.
11954 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11955 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11956 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11957 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11958 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11959 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11960 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11961 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11964 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11968 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11969 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11970 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11971 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11972 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11973 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11974 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11975 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11978 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11979 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11980 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11981 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11982 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11983 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11984 seen before because there are no formalities.
11987 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11988 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11989 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11990 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11991 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11994 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11995 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11996 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11997 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11998 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12001 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12002 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12003 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12007 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12008 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12009 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12012 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12013 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
12014 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
12015 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
12016 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
12017 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
12018 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
12019 historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of commercial
12020 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
12021 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12023 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12025 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12026 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12027 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12028 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12031 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12032 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12033 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12034 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12035 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12036 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12037 something good might happen here.
12040 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12041 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12042 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12043 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12044 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12045 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12048 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12049 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12050 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12052 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12053 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12054 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12055 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12056 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12057 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12058 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12059 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12060 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12061 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12062 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12063 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12064 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12065 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12066 film is a valid derivative use.
12069 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12070 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12071 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12072 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12073 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12074 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12077 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12078 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12079 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12080 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12081 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12082 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12083 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12087 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12088 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12089 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12090 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12096 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12097 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12098 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12099 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12100 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12101 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12102 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12103 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12104 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12107 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12108 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12109 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12110 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12111 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12112 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12113 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12114 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12117 What does this industry really want?
12120 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12121 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12122 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12123 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12124 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12125 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12126 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12130 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12131 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12132 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12133 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12134 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12137 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12138 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12141 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12142 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12143 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12144 and to share its own creation.
12146 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12147 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12149 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12150 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12151 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12152 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12153 block the progress of others.
12156 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12157 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12158 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12159 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12160 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12161 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12162 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12167 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12168 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12170 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12171 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12172 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12173 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12174 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12177 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12178 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12179 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12180 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12181 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12182 the disease almost invisible.
12185 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12186 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12187 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12188 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12190 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12191 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12192 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12193 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12195 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12197 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12198 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12203 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12204 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12205 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12206 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12207 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12208 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12211 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12212 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12213 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12214 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12215 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12216 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12217 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12218 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12222 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12223 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12224 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12225 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12226 costs significantly below the market price.
12229 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12230 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12231 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12232 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12233 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12234 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12235 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12238 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12239 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12240 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12241 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12245 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12246 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12248 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12249 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."
<footnote><para>
12250 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12251 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12253 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12254 2000),
14, available at
12255 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12256 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12257 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12258 Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57
12259 (statement of James Love).
12262 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12263 asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add pressure to that
12265 in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12267 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12269 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12271 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12272 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12274 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12276 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent
—
12277 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12278 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12279 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12280 of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12282 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12283 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12284 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12285 Organization (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12288 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12289 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12290 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12291 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12292 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12293 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12294 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12295 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12298 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12299 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12300 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12301 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12302 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12303 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12306 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12307 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12308 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12309 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12310 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12311 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12315 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12316 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12319 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12321 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12322 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle,
24
12323 May
1999, A1, available at
12324 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12325 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12326 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12327 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12328 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus
4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12329 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12330 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12331 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12332 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12333 Symposium Journal (Spring
2001):
175.
12334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12336 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12337 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12338 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12339 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12342 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12343 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12344 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12345 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12346 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12347 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12348 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12349 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12352 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12353 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12354 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12355 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12356 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12357 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12360 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12361 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12362 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12363 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12364 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12365 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12368 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12369 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12370 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12371 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12372 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12373 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12374 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12375 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12377 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12378 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12379 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12380 idea called "intellectual property."
12383 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12384 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12385 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12386 What is the argument?
12389 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12390 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12391 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12392 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12393 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12394 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12395 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12396 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12397 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12398 were balanced in just this sense.
12401 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12402 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12403 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12404 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12405 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12406 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12407 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12408 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12409 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12410 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12411 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12412 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12415 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12416 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12417 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12418 this common sense open its eyes.
12421 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12422 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12423 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12424 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12425 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12426 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12427 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12428 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12429 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12430 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12431 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12432 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12435 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12436 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12437 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12438 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12439 August
2003, E1, available at
12440 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12441 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12442 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12443 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12444 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12445 Daily,
19 August
2003, available at
12446 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12448 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12449 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12450 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12451 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12452 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12453 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12454 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12455 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12456 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12457 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12458 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12459 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12460 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12462 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12463 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12464 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12465 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12468 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12469 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12470 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12471 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12472 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12475 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12476 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12479 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12480 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12481 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12482 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12486 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12487 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12488 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12489 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12490 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12491 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12492 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12493 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12494 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12495 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12496 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12497 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12498 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12499 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12500 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12501 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12502 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12505 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12506 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12507 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12510 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12511 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12512 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12513 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12516 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12517 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12518 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12519 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12520 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12521 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12522 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12523 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12524 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12527 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to make
12528 clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12530 software. There are many important companies that depend
12532 upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12533 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12534 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM is
12535 emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12536 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead, to
12537 support a mode of software development that is different from
12538 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12539 <!-- f8. --> Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12541 As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with "open source"
12542 software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's principal
12544 is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft" license, meaning a
12546 that requires the licensee to adopt the same terms on any derivative
12547 work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future of Software: Enabling the
12549 to Decide," Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
12550 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
12551 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
12553 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice
12555 The Commercial Software Model, discussion at New York University
12556 Stern School of Business (
3 May
2001), available at
12557 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12561 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12562 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12563 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12564 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12565 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12568 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12569 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12570 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12571 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12572 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12573 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12574 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12575 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12576 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12579 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12580 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12581 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12582 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12583 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12584 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12585 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12587 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12588 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12590 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12593 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12594 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12595 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12596 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12597 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12598 its lobbying efforts.
12601 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12602 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12603 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12604 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12605 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12606 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12607 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12611 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12615 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12616 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12617 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12618 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12619 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12620 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12621 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12622 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12625 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12626 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12627 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12628 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12629 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12630 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12631 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12632 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12633 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12634 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12635 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12638 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12639 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12640 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12641 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12642 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12643 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12644 $
20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12645 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12646 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12647 right to decide what to do with their property.
12648 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12651 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12652 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12653 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12655 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12656 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12657 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12658 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12659 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12663 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12664 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12665 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12666 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12667 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12668 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12669 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12670 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12671 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12674 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12675 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12677 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12678 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12680 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
210–20.
12681 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12683 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12684 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12685 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12688 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12689 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12690 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12691 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12695 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12696 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12697 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12698 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12699 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12700 say anything wrong. But in the world
12701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12702 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12703 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12707 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12708 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12709 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12710 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12711 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12712 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12713 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12714 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12717 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12718 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12719 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12720 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12721 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12722 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12725 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12726 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12727 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12728 our own country's history).
12731 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12732 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12733 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12734 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12735 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12736 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12737 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12738 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12739 democracy in the world, become?
12742 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12743 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12744 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12746 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12747 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12749 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12751 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12752 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12753 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12754 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12755 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12756 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12757 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12758 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12759 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12760 hearings and a different result.
12763 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12764 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12765 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12766 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12767 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12768 concentration in the media.
12771 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12772 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12773 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12774 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12775 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12778 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12779 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12780 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12781 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12782 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12783 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12784 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12788 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12789 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12790 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12791 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12792 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12795 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12796 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12797 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12798 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12799 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12800 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12803 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12806 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12808 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12809 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12811 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12813 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12814 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12816 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12817 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12818 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News,
9
12819 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12820 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12821 Defendants," Washington Post,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12822 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News,
10 September
2003,
12824 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12826 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12827 music.
<footnote><para>
12829 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12830 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12831 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12833 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12834 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12836 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12837 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12838 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12841 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12842 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12843 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12844 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12845 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12846 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12847 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12848 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12849 kids who use a computer to share content.
12851 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12852 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12853 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12854 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12856 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12857 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12858 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12859 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12860 24 August
2003, available at
12861 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12863 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12864 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12865 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12866 country.
<footnote><para>
12868 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12870 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12873 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12874 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12875 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12876 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12877 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12878 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12879 day into the Causbys.
12882 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12883 potential is ever to be realized.
12885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12889 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12890 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12894 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12895 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12896 maps what might be done.
12899 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12900 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12901 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12902 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12905 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12906 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12907 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12908 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12912 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12913 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12914 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12915 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12916 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12921 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12923 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12924 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12925 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12926 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12929 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12930 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12931 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12932 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
12933 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12934 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12935 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12936 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12939 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12940 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12941 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12942 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12946 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12947 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12951 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12952 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12953 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12954 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12955 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12956 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12957 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12958 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12959 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12960 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12961 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12962 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12965 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
12966 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12967 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12968 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12969 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12973 <sect2 id=
"examples">
12974 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
12976 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12977 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12978 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12979 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12980 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12981 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12982 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12986 What made it assured?
12988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12990 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12991 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12992 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12993 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12994 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12995 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12996 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12997 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12998 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12999 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13000 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13001 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13002 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13004 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13006 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13007 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13008 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13009 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13010 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13011 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13012 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13013 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13016 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13017 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13018 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13019 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13020 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13021 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13022 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13026 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13027 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13028 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13029 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13032 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13033 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
13034 Law Review
1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13036 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13037 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13038 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13039 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13040 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13041 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13042 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13045 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13046 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13047 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13050 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13051 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13052 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13053 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13054 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13055 care much about controlling their software.
13057 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13059 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13060 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13061 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13062 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13063 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13067 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13068 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13069 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13070 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13071 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13072 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13073 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13074 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13075 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13079 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13080 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13081 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13082 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13083 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13084 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13085 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13088 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13089 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13091 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13092 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13093 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13094 fundamentally weakened.
13097 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13098 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13099 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13100 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13103 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13104 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13105 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13106 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13107 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13108 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13109 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13110 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13114 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13115 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13116 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13117 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13118 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13119 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13122 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13123 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13124 scientific journals are produced.
13127 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13128 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13129 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13130 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13131 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13132 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13133 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13134 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13135 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13136 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13137 and Westlaw are also free
13138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13139 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13140 Court opinion through their respective services.
13143 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13144 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13145 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13146 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13147 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13148 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13149 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13152 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13153 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13154 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13157 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13158 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13159 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13160 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13161 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13162 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13163 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13164 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13165 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13166 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13169 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13170 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13171 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13172 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13173 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13177 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13178 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13179 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13180 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13182 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13183 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13184 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13185 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13186 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13187 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13190 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13191 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13192 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13193 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13194 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13195 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13200 <sect2 id=
"oneidea">
13201 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13202 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13203 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13206 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13207 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13210 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13211 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13212 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13213 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13214 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13215 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13216 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13217 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13220 Simple
—which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13221 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13222 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13223 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13224 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13225 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13226 three expressions together
—a legal license, a human-readable
13228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13229 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13230 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13231 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13232 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13233 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13234 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13235 certain freedoms are given.
13238 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13239 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13240 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13241 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13242 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13243 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13244 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13245 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13246 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13249 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13250 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13251 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13252 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13253 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13254 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13255 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13256 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13260 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13261 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13262 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13263 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13264 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13265 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13267 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13268 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13269 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13270 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13273 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13274 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13275 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13276 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13277 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13278 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13279 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13280 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13281 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13282 to begin to build those rules.
13285 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13286 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13287 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13288 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13289 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13292 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13293 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13294 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13295 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13296 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13297 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13298 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13299 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13300 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13301 sales of Cory's book.
13304 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13305 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13306 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13307 was a total success.
13310 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13311 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13313 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13314 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13315 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13316 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13317 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13321 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13322 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13323 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13324 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13325 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13326 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13327 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13328 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13329 with their own art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13330 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13331 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13332 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13333 because the legal costs are so high
<footnote><para>
13336 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13337 Culture Wars (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13338 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13339 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13340 </para></footnote>),
13341 these artists release into the creative environment content
13342 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13345 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13346 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13347 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13348 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13349 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13350 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13351 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13352 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13353 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13357 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13358 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13359 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13360 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13363 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13364 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13367 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13368 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13369 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13370 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13371 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13372 steps are possible.
13375 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13376 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13377 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13378 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13379 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13380 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13381 creativity to spread more easily.
13383 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13388 <sect1 id=
"themsoon">
13389 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13391 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13392 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13393 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13394 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13395 changes that we need.
13398 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13399 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13400 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13404 <sect2 id=
"formalities">
13405 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13407 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13408 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13409 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13410 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13414 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13415 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13419 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13420 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13421 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13422 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13428 As I suggested in chapter
10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13429 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13430 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13431 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13432 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13433 formalities were getting in the way.
13436 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13437 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13438 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13439 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13440 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13441 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13442 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13443 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13444 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13445 they otherwise could speak.
13448 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13450 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13451 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13452 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13453 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13454 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13455 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13458 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13459 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13460 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13461 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13462 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13463 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13464 developed by others.
13467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13469 <sect3 id=
"registration">
13470 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13472 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13473 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13474 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13475 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13476 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13477 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13478 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13479 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13480 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13481 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13482 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13485 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13486 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13487 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13488 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13489 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13490 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13491 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13494 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13495 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13496 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13497 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13498 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13499 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13500 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13501 with which registration occurs up.
13504 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13505 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13506 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13507 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13508 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13509 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13510 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13511 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13512 formality
—while producing a database
13513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13514 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13518 <sect3 id=
"marking">
13519 <title>MARKING
</title>
13521 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13522 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13523 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13524 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13525 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13526 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13527 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13528 uniformly across all media.
13531 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13532 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13533 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13537 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13538 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13539 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13540 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13541 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13542 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13543 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13544 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13547 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13548 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13549 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13550 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13551 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13552 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13554 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13555 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13556 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13558 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13559 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13560 stop using the work in any new
13561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13562 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13563 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13567 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13568 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13569 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13570 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13571 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13574 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13575 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13576 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13577 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13578 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13579 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13580 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13581 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13582 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13585 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13586 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13587 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13588 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13589 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13590 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13593 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13594 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13595 make things unclear.
13598 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13599 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13600 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13601 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13602 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13603 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13609 <sect2 id=
"shortterms">
13610 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13612 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13613 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13617 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13618 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13619 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13620 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13621 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13622 term.
<footnote><para>
13624 "A Radical Rethink," Economist,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13626 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13628 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13631 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13632 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13633 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13636 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13639 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13640 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13641 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13642 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13643 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13644 regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
</para></listitem>
13647 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13648 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13649 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13650 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13651 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13652 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13653 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13654 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13660 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13661 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13662 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13663 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13664 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13665 veteran to apply for a pension.
<footnote><para>
13667 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13668 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13670 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13672 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13673 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13678 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13679 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13680 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the law to
13681 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13682 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13683 fewer authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13684 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13685 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13686 in
1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13687 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13688 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13689 not increase their creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done,
13690 and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13693 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13694 that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976, the average
13695 term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13698 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13699 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13700 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13701 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13704 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13707 <sect2 id=
"freefairuse">
13708 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13710 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13711 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13712 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13713 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13714 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13715 the emergence of that new technology.
13718 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13719 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13720 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13721 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13722 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13723 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13724 though that movie is not "my writing."
13727 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13728 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13729 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13731 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13732 University Press,
1967),
32.
13734 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13735 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13736 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13740 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13741 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13742 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13743 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13744 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13749 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13750 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13751 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13752 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13753 Consider each limitation in turn.
13756 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13757 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13760 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13761 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13762 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13763 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13764 after the creative work is done.
13765 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13768 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13769 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13770 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13771 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13772 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13773 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13774 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13775 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13776 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13777 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13780 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13781 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13782 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13783 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13784 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13788 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13789 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13790 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13791 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13794 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13795 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13796 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13798 His view is that the law should be written so that
13799 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13802 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13803 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13804 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13805 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13806 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13809 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13811 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13812 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13813 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13814 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13818 <sect2 id=
"liberatemusic">
13819 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13821 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13822 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13823 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13824 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13825 battles around the sharing of music.
13828 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13829 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13830 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13831 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13832 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13833 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13834 innovation on the network.
13837 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13838 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13839 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13840 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13841 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13844 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13845 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13846 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13847 chapter
5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13849 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13852 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13853 for purchasing CDs.
13857 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13858 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13863 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13864 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13865 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13869 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13870 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13871 owner plainly endorses.
13875 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13876 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13877 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13878 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13879 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13880 significantly weakened.
13883 As I said in chapter
5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13884 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13885 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13886 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13890 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13891 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13895 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13896 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13897 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13898 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13899 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13900 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13901 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13902 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13903 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13904 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13907 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13908 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13909 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13911 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13912 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13913 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13914 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13915 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13916 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
13917 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
13918 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13919 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13922 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13923 that give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet
13924 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13925 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13926 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13927 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13928 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13929 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13930 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13931 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13932 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13933 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13934 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13935 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13936 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13937 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
13939 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
13940 April
2002, available at
13941 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
13946 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13947 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13948 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
13949 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13950 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13951 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13952 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13953 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13954 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13955 artists get paid, during
13957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13958 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13959 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13962 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13963 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
13964 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13965 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13966 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13967 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13968 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13969 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13970 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13973 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13974 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13975 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13976 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13977 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13978 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13979 way that returns something to the artist.
13982 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13983 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13984 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13985 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13986 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13987 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13988 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13989 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13992 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13993 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13994 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13995 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13996 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13997 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13998 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14003 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14004 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14005 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14006 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14007 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14008 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14009 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14013 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14014 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14015 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14016 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14017 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14018 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14019 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14020 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14023 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14024 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14025 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14026 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14027 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14028 delivering and accessing content.
14031 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14032 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14035 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14036 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14037 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14038 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14039 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14040 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14041 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14042 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14046 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14047 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14048 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14049 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14050 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14051 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14054 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14055 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14057 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
14058 10 October
2000), available at
14059 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
14060 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
14061 Stanford University Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
14062 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14063 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14064 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14065 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14066 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14067 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14068 Broadband?" Washington Post,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14069 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14070 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14072 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14073 Use Fee (IPUF),
3 March
2002, available at
14074 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14075 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today,
13 May
14077 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14078 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14079 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14080 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14082 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14083 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14084 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14085 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14086 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14087 debate by about a decade. See
14088 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14089 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14090 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14092 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14093 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14094 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14095 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14096 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14097 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14098 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14099 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14103 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14104 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14105 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14106 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14107 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14108 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14109 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14110 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14111 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14112 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14113 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14114 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14115 controlling access.
14118 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14119 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14120 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14121 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14122 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14123 limits on derivative
14125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14126 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14127 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14128 allowed to do with the content itself.
14131 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14132 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14133 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14134 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14135 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14136 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14137 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14138 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14139 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14140 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14141 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14142 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14146 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14147 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14148 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14149 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14150 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14151 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14152 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14153 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14154 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14155 finding ways to compete with "free."
14158 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14159 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14160 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14161 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14162 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14163 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14167 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14172 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14173 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14174 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14175 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14179 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14182 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14185 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14189 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14190 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14195 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14196 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14200 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14201 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14202 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14206 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14207 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14208 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14209 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14210 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14211 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14212 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14213 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14214 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14215 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14216 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14220 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14221 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14222 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14225 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14226 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14230 <sect2 id=
"firelawyers">
14231 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14233 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14234 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14235 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14236 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14239 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14240 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14241 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14242 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14243 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14244 strong view queers the law.
14247 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14248 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14249 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14250 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14251 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14252 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14253 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14254 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14256 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14257 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review
48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14262 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14263 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14264 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14267 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14268 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14269 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14270 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14272 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14273 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14274 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14275 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14276 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14277 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14278 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14279 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14280 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14281 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14283 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14284 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14285 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14286 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14287 Rethinking,
174–76.
14289 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14290 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14295 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14296 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14297 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14298 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14299 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14300 practically never be done.
14303 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14304 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14305 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14306 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14307 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14308 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14309 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14310 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14313 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14314 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14315 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14316 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14317 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14318 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14321 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14322 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14323 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14327 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14328 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14329 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14330 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14331 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14332 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14333 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14336 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14337 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14340 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14341 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14342 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14345 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14346 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14347 keep your lawyers away.
14349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14353 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14354 <title>NOTES
</title>
14356 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14357 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14358 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14359 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14360 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14361 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14362 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14363 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14364 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14370 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14371 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14373 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14374 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14375 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14376 to him that this book is dedicated.
14379 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14380 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14381 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14382 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14383 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14384 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14385 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14386 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14387 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14388 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14389 critical eye on much of this.
14392 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14393 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14394 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14395 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14397 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14398 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14399 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14400 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14403 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14404 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14405 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14406 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14407 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14408 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14409 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14410 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14411 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14412 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14413 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14414 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14415 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14416 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14417 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14418 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14419 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14420 a bunch of great replies.)
14423 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14424 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14425 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14426 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14427 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14428 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14429 throughout this book.
14432 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14433 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14434 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14435 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
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