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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
26 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
27
28 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
29
30 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
31
32 <authorgroup>
33 <author>
34 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
35 <surname>Lessig</surname>
36 </author>
37 </authorgroup>
38
39 <copyright>
40 <year>2004</year>
41 <holder>
42 Lawrence Lessig. This version of Free Culture is licensed under a
43 Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
44 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
45 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
46 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
47 </holder>
48 </copyright>
49
50 <abstract>
51 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
52 <para>
53 LAWRENCE LESSIG
54 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org/">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
55 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
56 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
57 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
58 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
59 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
60 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
61 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
62 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
63 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
64 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
65 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
66 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
67 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
68 Appeals.
69 </para>
70 </abstract>
71 </bookinfo>
72
73 <colophon>
74 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
75
76 <para>
77 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
78 </para>
79 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
80 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
81 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
82 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
83 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
84 </itemizedlist>
85 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
86
87 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
88 <para>
89 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
90 </para>
91 <para>
92 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
93 </para>
94 <para>
95 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
96 </para>
97
98 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
99 <para>
100 THE PENGUIN PRESS
101 </para>
102 <para>
103 NEW YORK
104 </para>
105
106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
107 <para>
108 FREE CULTURE
109 </para>
110
111 <para>
112 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
113 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
114 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
115 </para>
116
117 <para>
118 LAWRENCE LESSIG
119 </para>
120
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
122 <para>
123 THE PENGUIN PRESS
124 </para>
125 <para>
126 a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
127 York, New York
128 </para>
129 <para>
130 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig,
131 </para>
132 <para>
133 All rights reserved
134 </para>
135 <para>
136 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
137 The New York Times, January 16, 2003. Copyright &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co.
138 Reprinted with permission.
139 </para>
140 <para>
141 Cartoon by Paul Conrad on page 159. Copyright Tribune Media Services, Inc.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
145 </para>
146 <para>
147 Diagram on page 164 courtesy of the office of FCC Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
148 </para>
149 <para>
150 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 Lessig, Lawrence.
154 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
155 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
156 </para>
157 <para>
158 p. cm.
159 </para>
160 <para>
161 Includes index.
162 </para>
163 <para>
164 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
165 </para>
166 <para>
167 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
168 </para>
169 <para>
170 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
171 </para>
172 <para>
173 KF2979.L47
174 </para>
175 <para>
176 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
177 </para>
178 <para>
179 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
180 </para>
181 <para>
182 Printed in the United States of America
183 </para>
184 <para>
185 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
186 </para>
187 <para>
188 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
189 </para>
190
191 <para>
192 &translationblock;
193 </para>
194
195 <para>
196 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
197 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
198 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
199 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
200 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
201 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
202 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
203 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
204 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
205 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
206 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
207 </para>
208 </colophon>
209
210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
211 <dedication>
212 <para>
213 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
214 it continues still.
215 </para>
216
217 <para>
218 <figure id="CreativeCommons">
219 <title>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</title>
220 <graphic fileref="images/cc.png"></graphic>
221 </figure>
222 </para>
223 </dedication>
224
225 <toc id="toc"></toc>
226
227 <lot>
228 <title>List of figures</title>
229 </lot>
230
231 <!--
232 c PREFACE xiii
233 c INTRODUCTION
234 c "PIRACY"
235 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
236 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
237 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
238 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
239 2 Film
240 2 Recorded Music
241 2 Radio
242 2 Cable TV
243 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
244 2 Piracy I
245 2 Piracy II
246 c "PROPERTY"
247 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
248 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
249 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
250 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
251 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
252 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
253 2 Beginnings
254 2 Law: Duration
255 2 Law: Scope
256 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
257 2 Architecture and Law: Force
258 2 Market: Concentration
259 2 Together
260 c PUZZLES
261 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
262 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
263 2 Constraining Creators
264 2 Constraining Innovators
265 2 Corrupting Citizens
266 c BALANCES
267 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
268 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
269 c CONCLUSION
270 c AFTERWORD
271 1 Us, Now
272 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
273 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
274 1 Them, Soon
275 2 1. More Formalities
276 3 Registration and Renewal
277 3 Marking
278 2 2. Shorter Terms
279 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
280 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
281 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 c NOTES
283 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
284 c INDEX
285 -->
286
287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
288
289 <preface id="preface">
290 <title>PREFACE</title>
291 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
292 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
293 </indexterm>
294 <para>
295 At the end of his review of my first book, Code: And Other Laws of
296 Cyberspace, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless
297 technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
298 </para>
299 <blockquote>
300 <para>
301 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
302 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
303 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
304 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
305 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," New York Times, 30 January 2000.
306 </para></footnote>
307 </para>
308 </blockquote>
309 <para>
310 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
311 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
312 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
313 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
314 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
315 any troubles that exist in that space wouldn't "affect" us anymore.
316 </para>
317 <para>
318 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
319 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now: Free Culture
320 is about the troubles the Internet causes even after the modem is turned
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
322 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
323 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
324 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
325 </para>
326 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
327 <para>
328 But unlike Code, the argument here is not much about the Internet
329 itself. It is instead about the consequence of the Internet to a part of
330 our tradition that is much more fundamental, and, as hard as this is for
331 a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more important.
332 </para>
333 <para>
334 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
335 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
336 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
337 free software movement<footnote>
338 <para>
339 Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Societies 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
340 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets," "free
341 trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A free
342 culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does this
343 directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
344 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
345 follow-on creators and innovators remain as free as possible from the
346 control of the past. A free culture is not a culture without property,
347 just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free. The
348 opposite of a free culture is a "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in
349 which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful,
350 or of creators from the past.
351 </para>
352 <para>
353 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
354 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
355 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
356 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
357 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
358 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
359 culture deem fundamental.
360 </para>
361 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
362 <para>
363 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
364 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
365 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
366 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
367 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
368 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
369 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
370 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
371 he asked,
372 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
373 </para>
374 <blockquote>
375 <para>
376 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
377 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
378 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
379 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
380 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
381 "The Great Media Gulp," New York Times, 22 May 2003.
382 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
383 </para></footnote>
384 </para>
385 </blockquote>
386 <para>
387 This idea is an element of the argument of Free Culture, though my
388 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
389 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
390 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
391 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
392 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
393 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
394 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
395 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
396 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
397 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in Free Software, Free
398 Society, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
399 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
400 that this work is "merely" derivative.
401 </para>
402 <para>
403 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
404 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
405 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
406 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
407 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
408 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
409 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
410 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
411
412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
413 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
414 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
415 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
416 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
417 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
418 what I advance here.
419 </para>
420 <para>
421 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
422 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
423 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
424 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
425 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
426 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
427 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
428 book is written.
429 </para>
430
431 </preface>
432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
433
434 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
435 <chapter id="c-introduction">
436 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
437 <para>
438 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
439 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
440 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
441 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
442 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
443 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
444 </para>
445 <para>
446 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
447 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
448 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
449 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
450 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
451 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
452 </para></footnote>
453 For many
454 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
455 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
456 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
457 </para>
458 <para>
459 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
460 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
461 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
462 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
463 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
464 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
465 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
466 </para>
467 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
468 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
469 <para>
470 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
471 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
472 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
473 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
474 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
475 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
476 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
477 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
478 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
479 </para>
480 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
481 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
482 <para>
483 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
484 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
485 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
486 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
487 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
488 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
489 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
490 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
491 </para>
492 <blockquote>
493 <para>
494 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
495 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
496 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
497 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
498 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
499 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
500 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
501 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
502 <para>
503 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
504 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
505 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
506 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
507 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
508 Authorship," Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
509 Goldstein, Real Property (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
510 1112&ndash;13.
511 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
512 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
513 </para></footnote>
514 </para>
515 </blockquote>
516 <para>
517 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
518 </para>
519 <para>
520 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
521 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
522 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
524 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
525 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
526 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
527 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
528 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
529 </para>
530 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
532 <para>
533 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
534 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
535 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
536 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
537 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
538 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
539 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
540 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
541 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
542 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
543 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
544 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
545 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
546 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
547 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
548 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
549 </para>
550 <para>
551 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
552 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
553 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
554 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
555 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
556 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
557 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
558 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
559 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
560 understanding of radio.
561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
562 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
563 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
564 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
565 </para>
566 <para>
567 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
568 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
569 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
570 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
571 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
572 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
573 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
574 much less transmitter power and static.
575 </para>
576 <para>
577 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
578 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
579 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
580 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
581 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
582 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
583 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
584 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
585 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
586 </para>
587 <para>
588 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
589 </para>
590 <blockquote>
591 <para>
592 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
593 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
594 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
595 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
596 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
597 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
598 box."<footnote><para>
599 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
600 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
601 </para></footnote>
602 </para>
603 </blockquote>
604 <para>
605 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
606 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
607 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
608 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
609 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
610 a handful of networks.
611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
612 </para>
613 <para>
614 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
615 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
616 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
617 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
618 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
619 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
620 </para>
621 <blockquote>
622 <para>
623 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
624 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
625 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
626 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
627 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
628 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
629
630 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
631 </para></footnote>
632 </para>
633 </blockquote>
634 <para>
635 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
636 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
637 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
638 described,
639 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
640 </para>
641 <blockquote>
642 <para>
643 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
644 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
645 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
646 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
647 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
648 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
649 </para></footnote>
650 </para>
651 </blockquote>
652 <para>
653 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
654 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
655 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
656 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
657 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
658 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
659 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
660 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
661 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
662 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
663 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
664 </para>
665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
666 <blockquote>
667 <para>
668 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
669 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
670 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
671 deviousness.<footnote><para>
672 Lessing, 256.
673 </para></footnote>
674 </para>
675 </blockquote>
676 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
677 <para>
678 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
679 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
680 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
681 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
682 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
683 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
684 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
685 least temporarily.
686 </para>
687 <para>
688 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
689 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
690 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
691 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
692 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
693 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
694 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
695 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
696 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
697 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
698 </para>
699 <para>
700 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
701 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
702 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
703 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
704 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
705 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
706 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
707 course always public spirited; the reality is something
708 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
709 to themselves, would crumble in
710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
711 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
712 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
713 effect of technological change.
714 </para>
715 <para>
716 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
717 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
718 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
719 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
720 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
721 before.<footnote><para>
722 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
723 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
724 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
725 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
726 </para></footnote>
727 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
728 of 2004.
729 </para>
730 <para>
731 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
732 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
733 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
734 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
735 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
736 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
737 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
738 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
739 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
740 </para>
741 <para>
742 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
743 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
744 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
745 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
746 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
747 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
748 has introduced.
749 </para>
750 <para>
751 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
752 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
753 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
754 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
755 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
756 parks or on
757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
758 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
759 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
760 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
761 </para>
762 <para>
763 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
764 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
765 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
766 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
767 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
768 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
769 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
770 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
771 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
772 </para>
773 <para>
774 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
775 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
776 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
777 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
778 marketplace.<footnote>
779 <para>
780 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
781 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
782 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
783 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
784 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
785 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
786 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
787 198&ndash;200.
788 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
789 </para></footnote>
790 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
791 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
792 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
793 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
794 </para>
795 <para>
796 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
797 been erased.<footnote><para>
798 See Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (New York: Prometheus Books,
799 2001), ch. 13.
800 </para></footnote>
801 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
802 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
803 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
804 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
805 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
806 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
807 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
808 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
809 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
810 culture, more and more a permission culture.
811 </para>
812 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
813 <para>
814 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
815 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
816 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
817 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
818 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
819 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
820 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
821 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
822 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
823 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
824 Causbys.
825 </para>
826 <para>
827 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
828 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
829 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
830 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
831 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
832 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
833 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
834 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
835 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
836 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
837 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
838 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
839 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
840 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
841 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
842 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
843 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
844 </para>
845 <para>
846 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
847 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
848 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
849 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
850 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
851 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
852 remakes them.
853 </para>
854 <para>
855 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
857 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
858 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
859 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
860 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
861 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
862 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
863 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
864 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," New York
865 Times, 17 January 2002.
866 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
867 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
868 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
869 against it.
870 </para>
871 <para>
872 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
873 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
874 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
875 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
876 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
877 Internet.
878 </para>
879 <para>
880 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
881 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
882 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
883 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
884 </para>
885 <para>
886 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
887 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
888 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
889 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
890 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
891 <para>
892 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," Yale Law
893 Journal 106 (1996): 283.
894 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
895 </para></footnote>
896 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
897 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
898 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
899 could cultivate and extend our culture.
900 </para>
901 <para>
902 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
903 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
904 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
905 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
906 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
907 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
908 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
909 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
910 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
911 </para>
912 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
913 <para>
914 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
915 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
916 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
917 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
918 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
919 against an industry.
920 </para>
921 <para>
922 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
923 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
924 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
925 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
926 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
927 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
928 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
929 </para>
930 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
931 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
932 <para>
933 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
934 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
935 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
936 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
937 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
938 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
939 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
940 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
941 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
942 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
943 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
944 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
945 trespass.
946 </para>
947 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
948 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
949 <para>
950 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
951 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
952 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
953 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
954 war. Unlike
955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
956 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
957 on its side.
958 </para>
959 <para>
960 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
961 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
962 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
963 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
964 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
965 been a time when the concentration of power to control the uses of
966 culture has been as unquestioningly accepted as it is now.
967 </para>
968 <para>
969 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
970 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
971 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
972 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
973 </para>
974 <para>
975 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
976 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
977 </para>
978 <para>
979 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
980 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
981 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
982 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
983 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
987 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
988 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
989 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
990 view?
991 </para>
992 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
993 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
994 <para>
995 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
996 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
997 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
998 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
999 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1000 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1001 this silliness will be much more profound.
1002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1003 </para>
1004 <para>
1005 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1006 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1007 ideas.
1008 </para>
1009 <para>
1010 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1011 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1012 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1013 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1014 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1015 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1016 </para>
1017 <para>
1018 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1019 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1020 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1021 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1022 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1023 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1024 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1025 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1026 fundamental about who we have always been.
1027 </para>
1028 <para>
1029 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1030 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1031 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1032 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1033 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1034 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1035 </para>
1036 </chapter>
1037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1038 <chapter id="c-piracy">
1039 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1040
1041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1042 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1043 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1044 </indexterm>
1045 <para>
1046 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1047 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1048 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1049 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1050 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1051 </para>
1052 <blockquote>
1053 <para>
1054 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1055 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1056 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1057 <!-- f1 -->
1058 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1059 </para></footnote>
1060 </para>
1061 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1062 </blockquote>
1063 <para>
1064 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1065 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1066 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1067 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1068 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1069 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1070 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1071 </para>
1072 <para>
1073 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1074 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1075 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1076 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1077 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1078 profit."
1079 </para>
1080 <para>
1081 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1082 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1083 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1084 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1085 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming thieves!
1086 </para>
1087 <para>
1088 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1089 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1090 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1091 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1092 </para>
1093 <para>
1094 The idea goes something like this:
1095 </para>
1096 <blockquote>
1097 <para>
1098 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1099 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1100 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1101 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1102 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1103 piracy.
1104 </para>
1105 </blockquote>
1106 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1107 <para>
1108 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1109 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1110 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1111 <!-- f2 -->
1112 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1113 in the Pepsi Generation," Notre Dame Law Review 65 (1990): 397.
1114 </para></footnote>
1115 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1116 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1117 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1118 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1119 <!-- f3 -->
1120 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1121 Up," Wall Street Journal, 21 August 1996, available at
1122 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1123 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1124 Speech, No One Wins," Boston Globe, 24 November 2002.
1125 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1126 </para></footnote>
1127 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1128 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1129 </para>
1130 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1131 <para>
1132 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1133 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1135 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1136 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1137 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1138 </para>
1139 <para>
1140 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1141 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1142 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1143 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1144 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1145 </para>
1146 <para>
1147 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1148 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1149 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1150 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1151 copyright law today regulates both.
1152 </para>
1153 <para>
1154 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1155 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1156 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1157 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1158 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1159 more expense of doing business.
1160 </para>
1161 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1162 <para>
1163 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1164 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1165 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1166 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1167 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1168 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1169 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1170 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1171 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1172 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1173 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1174 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1175 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1176 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1177 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1178 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1179 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1180 <para>
1181 <!-- f4 -->
1182 In The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1183 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1184 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1185 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1186 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1187 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1188 enabled are much more tenuous.
1189 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1190 </para></footnote>
1191 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1192 this creative class.
1193 </para>
1194 <para>
1195 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1196 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1197 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1198 </para>
1199
1200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1201 <sect1 id="creators">
1202 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1203 <para>
1204 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1205 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called Plane Crazy.
1206 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1207 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, Steamboat Willie brought
1208 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1209 </para>
1210 <para>
1211 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1212 movie The Jazz Singer. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1213 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1214 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1215 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1216 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1217 </para>
1218 <blockquote>
1219 <para>
1220 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1221 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1222 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1223 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1225 </para>
1226 <para>
1227 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1228 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1229 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1230 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1231 synchronization was pretty close.
1232 </para>
1233 <para>
1234 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1235 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1236 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1237 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1238 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1239 <!-- f1 -->
1240 Leonard Maltin, Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1241 Cartoons (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1242 </para></footnote>
1243 </para>
1244 </blockquote>
1245 <para>
1246 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1247 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1248 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1249 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1250 </para>
1251 <para>
1252 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1253 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1254 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1255 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1256 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1257 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1258 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1259 </para>
1260 <para>
1261 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also
1262 marks another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed
1263 to cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1264 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was Steamboat Bill, Jr.
1265 </para>
1266 <para>
1267 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of
1268 silent film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to
1269 spark uncontrollable laughter from his audience. Steamboat Bill, Jr. was
1270 a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its incredible stunts.
1271 The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular and among the best of its
1272 genre.
1273 </para>
1274 <para>
1275 Steamboat Bill, Jr. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat Willie.
1276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1277 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1278 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1279 <!-- f2 -->
1280 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1281 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1282 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1283 use the music for five songs in Steamboat Willie: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1284 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1285 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1286 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1287 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1288 </para></footnote>
1289 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1290 the invention of synchronized sound in The Jazz Singer that we get
1291 Steamboat Willie. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1292 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1293 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1294 Mouse.
1295 </para>
1296 <para>
1297 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1298 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1299 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1300 <!-- f3 -->
1301 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1302 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1303 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1304 </para></footnote>
1305 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1306 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1307 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1308 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1309 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1310 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1311 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1312 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1313 old.
1314 </para>
1315 <para>
1316 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1317 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1318 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1319 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1320 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1321 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1322 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1323 </para>
1324 <para>
1325 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1326 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1327 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1328 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1329 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1330 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1331 work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937),
1332 Fantasia (1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of
1333 the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin
1334 Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp
1335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1336 (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961),
1337 The Sword in the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967)&mdash;not to
1338 mention a recent example that we should perhaps quickly forget,
1339 Treasure Planet (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney,
1340 Inc.) ripped creativity from the culture around him, mixed that
1341 creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix
1342 into the soul of his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1343 </para>
1344 <para>
1345 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1346 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1347 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1348 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1349 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1350 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1351 culture around us and makes it something different.
1352 </para>
1353 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1354 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1355 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1356 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1357 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1358 <!-- f4 -->
1359 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1360 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1361 determining
1362 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1363 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1364 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1365 average
1366 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1367 Web site associated with this book, available at
1368 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1369 </para></footnote>
1370 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1371 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1372 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1373 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1374 </para>
1375 <para>
1376 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1377 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1378 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1379 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1380 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1381 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1382 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1383 </para>
1384 <para>
1385 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1386 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1387 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1388 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1389
1390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1391 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1392 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1393 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1394 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1395 content from before the Great Depression.
1396 </para>
1397 <para>
1398 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1399 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1400 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1401 universal.
1402 </para>
1403 <para>
1404 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1405 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: manga, or
1406 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1407 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1408 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1409 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1410 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1411 </para>
1412 <para>
1413 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1414 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1415 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1416 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1417 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1418 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1419 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1420 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1421 interestingly different way.
1422 </para>
1423 <para>
1424 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1425 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1426 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1427 </para>
1428 <para>
1429 This is the phenomenon of doujinshi. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1430 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1431 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is just a copy; the artist must make a
1432 contribution to the art he copies, by transforming it either subtly or
1433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1434 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1435 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1436 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1437 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1438 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1439 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1440 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1441 </para>
1442 <para>
1443 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1444 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1445 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1446 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1447 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1448 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1449 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1450 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1451 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1452 </para>
1453 <para>
1454 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1455 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1456 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1457 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1458 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1459 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1460 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1461 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with Steamboat Bill, Jr. Under
1462 both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without the permission
1463 of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an infringement of
1464 the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative work without the
1465 original copyright owner's permission.
1466 </para>
1467 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1468 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1469 </indexterm>
1470 <para>
1471 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1472 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1473 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1474 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1475 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1477 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1478 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1479 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1480 <!-- f5 -->
1481 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, Reinventing Comics (New
1482 York: Perennial, 2000).
1483 </para></footnote>
1484 </para>
1485 <para>
1486 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1487 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1488 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1489 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1490 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1491 which are fifty years old."
1492 </para>
1493 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1494 <para>
1495 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1496 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1497 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1498 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1499 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1500 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1501 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1502 <!-- f6 -->
1503 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1504 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law
1505 Review 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1506 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1507 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1508 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1509 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1510 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1511 </para></footnote>
1512 </para>
1513 <para>
1514 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1515 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1516 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1517 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1518 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1519 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1520 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1521 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1522 culture?
1523 </para>
1524 <para>
1525 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1526 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1527 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1528 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1529 to prosecute cases like this."
1530 </para>
1531 <para>
1532 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1533 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1534 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1535 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1537 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1538 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1539 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1540 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1541 their clients or hurt them?
1542 Let's pause for a moment.
1543 </para>
1544 <para>
1545 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1546 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1547 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1548 </para>
1549 <para>
1550 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1551 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1552 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1553 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1554 <!-- f7 -->
1555 The term intellectual property is of relatively recent origin. See
1556 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 11 (New York: New York
1557 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas
1558 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1559 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1560 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1561 very different.
1562 </para></footnote>
1563 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1564 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1565 property.
1566 </para>
1567 <para>
1568 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1569 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1570 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1571 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1572 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1573 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1574 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1575 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1576 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1577 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1578 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1579 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1580 the public domain.
1581 </para>
1582 <para>
1583 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1584 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1585 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1586
1587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1588 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1589 freedom is good.
1590 </para>
1591 <para>
1592 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1593 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1594 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1595 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1596 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1597 form, whether large or small.
1598 </para>
1599 <para>
1600 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1601 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1602 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1603 particular find it hard to say why.
1604 </para>
1605 <para>
1606 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1607 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1608 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1609 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1610 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1611 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1612 permission from anyone. (Does anyone believe Shakespeare would be
1613 better spread within our culture if there were a central Shakespeare
1614 rights clearinghouse that all productions of Shakespeare must appeal
1615 to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles with a certain kind of
1616 movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s; two volcano disaster
1617 films in 1997.
1618 </para>
1619 <para>
1620 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1621 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1622 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1623 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1624 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1625 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1626 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1627 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1629 </para>
1630 <para>
1631 The hard question is therefore not whether a culture is free. All
1632 cultures are free to some degree. The hard question instead is "How
1633 free is this culture?" How much, and how broadly, is the culture free
1634 for others to take and build upon? Is that freedom limited to party
1635 members? To members of the royal family? To the top ten corporations
1636 on the New York Stock Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To
1637 artists generally, whether affiliated with the Met or not? To
1638 musicians generally, whether white or not? To filmmakers generally,
1639 whether affiliated with a studio or not?
1640 </para>
1641 <para>
1642 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1643 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1644 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1645 </para>
1646
1647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1648 </sect1>
1649 <sect1 id="mere-copyists">
1650 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1651 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1652 <para>
1653 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1654 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1655 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1656 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1657 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1658 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1659 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1660 </para>
1661 <para>
1662 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1663 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1664 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1665 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1666 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1667 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1668 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1669 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1670 amateurs.
1671 </para>
1672 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1673 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1674 </indexterm>
1675 <para>
1676 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1677 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1679 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1680 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1681 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1682 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1683 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1684 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1685 population of photographers.
1686 </para>
1687 <para>
1688 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1689 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1690 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1691 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1692 <!-- f1 -->
1693 Reese V. Jenkins, Images and Enterprise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1694 </para></footnote> As he described in The Kodak Primer:
1695 </para>
1696 <blockquote>
1697 <para>
1698 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1699 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1700 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1701 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1702 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1703 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1704 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1705 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1706 chemicals.<footnote>
1707 <para>
1708 <!-- f2 -->
1709 Brian Coe, The Birth of Photography (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1710 1977), 53.
1711 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1712 </para></footnote>
1713 </para>
1714 </blockquote>
1715 <para>
1716 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1717 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1718 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1719 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1720 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1721 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1722 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1723 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1724 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
1725 percent.<footnote><para>
1726 <!-- f3 -->
1727 Jenkins, 177.
1728 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1729 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1730 <!-- f4 -->
1731 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1732 </para></footnote>
1733 </para>
1734 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1735 <para>
1736
1737 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1738 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1739 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1740 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1741 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1742 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1743 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1744 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1745 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1746 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1747 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1748 <!-- f5 -->
1749 Coe, 58.
1750 </para></footnote>
1751 </para>
1752 <para>
1753 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1754 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1755 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1756 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1757 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1758 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1759 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1760 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1761 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1762 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1763 have before.
1764 </para>
1765 <para>
1766 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1767 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1768 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1769 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1770 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1771 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1772 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1773 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1774 <!-- f6 -->
1775 For illustrative cases, see, for example, Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
1776 </para></footnote>
1777 </para>
1778 <para>
1779 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1780 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1781 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1782 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1783 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1784 draw
1785 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1786 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1787 that they thought valuable.
1788 </para>
1789 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1790 <para>
1791 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1792 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1793 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1794 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1795 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1796 <para>
1797 <!-- f7 -->
1798 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1799 Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193.
1800 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1801 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1802 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1803 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1804 Steamboat Bill, Jr. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1805 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1806 </para>
1807 <para>
1808 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1809 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1810 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1811 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1812 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1813 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1814 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1815 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1816 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1817 <!-- f8 -->
1818 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," Law and Contemporary
1819 Problems 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," California Law
1820 Review 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; White v. Samsung Electronics America,
1821 Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1822 (1993).
1823 </para></footnote>)
1824 </para>
1825 <para>
1826 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1827 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1828 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1829 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1830 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1831 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1832 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1833 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1834 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1835 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1836 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1837 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1838 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1839 </para>
1840 <para>
1841
1842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1843 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1844 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1845 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1846 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1847 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1848 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1849 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1850 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1851 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1852 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1853 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1854 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1855 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1856 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1857 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1858 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1859 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1860 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1861 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1862 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1863 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1864 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1865 learn.
1866 </para>
1867 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1868 <para>
1869 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1870 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1871 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1872 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1873 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1874 <!-- f9 -->
1875 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1876 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1877 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1878 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1879 </para></footnote>
1880 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1881 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1882 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1883 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1884 </para>
1885 <para>
1886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1887 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1888 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1889 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1890 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1891 the way people access it."
1892 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1893 </para>
1894 <para>
1895 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1896 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1897 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1898 about.
1899 </para>
1900 <para>
1901 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1902 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1903 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1904 <!-- f10 -->
1905 Judith Van Evra, Television and Child Development (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1906 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1907 Study," Denver Post, 25 May 1997, B6.
1908 </para></footnote>
1909 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1910 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1911 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1912 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1913 (at least at first) terrible media.
1914 </para>
1915 <para>
1916 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1917 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1918 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
1919 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1920 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
1921 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1922 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1923 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1924 </para>
1925 <para>
1926 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1927 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1928 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1929 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1930 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1931 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1932 </para>
1933 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1934 <para>
1935 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1936 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1937 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1938
1939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1940 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1941 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1942 texture."<footnote>
1943 <para>
1944 <!-- f11 -->
1945 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1946 2002.
1947 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1948 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1949 </para></footnote>
1950 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1951 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1952 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1953 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1954 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1955 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1956 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1957 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1958 <!-- f12 -->
1959 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1960 November 2000, available at
1961 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1962 available at
1963 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1964 </para></footnote>
1965 </para>
1966 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1967 <para>
1968 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1969 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1970 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1971 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1972 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1973 </para>
1974 <para>
1975 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1976 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
1977 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
1978 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
1979 </para>
1980 <blockquote>
1981 <para>
1982 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
1983 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
1984 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
1985 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
1986 being read-only.
1987 </para>
1988 </blockquote>
1989 <para>
1990 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
1991 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
1992 twentieth century.
1993 </para>
1994 <para>
1995 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
1996 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
1997 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
1998 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
1999 literacy,
2000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2001 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2002 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2003 express."<footnote>
2004 <para>
2005 <!-- f13 -->
2006 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2007 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2008 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2009 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2010 <!-- f14 -->
2011 Ibid.
2012 </para></footnote>
2013 </para>
2014 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2015 <para>
2016 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2017 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2018 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2019 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2020 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2021 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2022 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2023 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2024 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2025 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2026 </para>
2027 <para>
2028 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2029 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2030 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2031 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2032 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2033 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2034 </para>
2035 <para>
2036 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2037 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2038 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2039 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2040 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2041 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2042 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2043 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2044 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2045 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2046 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2047 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2048 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which these ideas can be
2049 expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its connection
2050 to this form of expression.
2051 </para>
2052 <para>
2053
2054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2055 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2056 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2057 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2058 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2059 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2060 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2061 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2062 our interview,
2063 </para>
2064 <blockquote>
2065 <para>
2066 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2067 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2068 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2069 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2070 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2071 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2072 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2073 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2074 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2075 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2076 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2077 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2078 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2079 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2080 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2081 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2082 about the topic. . . .
2083 </para>
2084 <para>
2085 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2086 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2087 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2088 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2089 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2090 </para>
2091 <para>
2092 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2093 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2094 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2096 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2097 had a lot of power with this language."
2098 </para>
2099 </blockquote>
2100 <para>
2101 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2102 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2103 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2104 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2105 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2106 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2107 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2108 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2109 world would be watching.
2110 </para>
2111 <para>
2112 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2113 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2114 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2115 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2116 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2117 entertainment is tragedy.
2118 </para>
2119 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2120 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2121 <para>
2122 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2123 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2124 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2125 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2126 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2127 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2128 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2129 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2130 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2131 the term in his book Cyber Rights, around a news event that had
2132 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2133 was also the Internet.
2134 </para>
2135 <para>
2136 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2137 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2138 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2139 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2140 movie
2141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2142 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2143 with sound or text.
2144 </para>
2145 <para>
2146 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2147 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2148 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2149 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2150 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2151 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2152 spread practically instantaneously.
2153 </para>
2154 <para>
2155 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around
2156 the same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically
2157 was just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2158 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures, such
2159 as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those cultures, it
2160 records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind of electronic Jerry
2161 Springer, available anywhere in the world.
2162 </para>
2163 <para>
2164 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2165 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2166 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2167 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2168 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2169 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2170 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2171 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2172 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2173 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2174 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2175 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2176 </para>
2177 <para>
2178 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2179 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2180 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2181 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2182 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2183 people vote
2184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2185 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2186 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2187 </para>
2188 <para>
2189 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2190 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2191 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2192 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2193 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2194 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2195 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2196 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2197 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2198 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2199 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2200 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2201 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2202 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2203 <!-- f15 -->
2204 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, bk. 1, trans.
2205 Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2206 </para></footnote>
2207 </para>
2208 <para>
2209 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2210 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2211 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2212 <!-- f16 -->
2213 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," Journal of
2214 Political Philosophy 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2215 </para></footnote>
2216 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2217 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2218 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2219 </para>
2220 <para>
2221 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2222 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2223 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2224 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2225 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2226 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2227 <!-- f17 -->
2228 Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2229 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2230 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2231 little beyond what our friends say.
2232 </para>
2233 <para>
2234 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2235 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2236 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2237 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2238 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2239
2240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2241 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2242 place.
2243 </para>
2244 <para>
2245 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2246 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2247 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2248 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2249 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2250 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2251 </para>
2252 <para>
2253 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2254 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2255 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2256 is having an effect.
2257 </para>
2258 <para>
2259 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2260 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2261 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2262 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2263 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2264 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2265 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2266 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2267 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2268 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2269 <!-- f18 -->
2270 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2271 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2272 </para></footnote>
2273 </para>
2274 <para>
2275 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2276 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2277 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2278 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2279 on.
2280 </para>
2281 <para>
2282 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2283 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2284 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2285 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2286 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2287 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2288 peer-generated rankings.
2289 </para>
2290 <para>
2291 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2293 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2294 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2295 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2296 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2297 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2298 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2299 get it out of the way."
2300 </para>
2301 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2302 <para>
2303 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2304 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2305 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2306 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2307 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2308 <!-- f19 -->
2309 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2310 </para></footnote>
2311 It also needs to sustain a more coherent
2312 account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet
2313 from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink with
2314 a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
2315 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to
2316 offer a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't
2317 warranted, they told her that they were writing "the story.")
2318 </para>
2319 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2320 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2321 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2322 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2323 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2324 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2325 had seen.<footnote><para>
2326 <!-- f20 -->
2327 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2328 Information Online," New York Times, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2329 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2330 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2331 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2332 </para></footnote>
2333 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2334 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2335 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2336 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2337 </para>
2338 <para>
2339 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2340 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2341 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2342 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2343 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2344 <para>
2345 <!-- f21 -->
2346 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" New
2347 York Times, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2348 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2349 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2350 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2351 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a Houston Chronicle reporter, was
2352 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2353 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2354 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2355 </para></footnote>
2356 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2357
2358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2359 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2360 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2361 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2362 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2363 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2364 </para>
2365 <para>
2366 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2367 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2368 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2369 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2370 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2371 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2372 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2373 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2374 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2375 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2376 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2377 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2378 extraordinary to report.
2379 </para>
2380 <para>
2381 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2382 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2383 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2384 </para>
2385 <para>
2386 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2387 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2388 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2389 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2390 affect learning.
2391 </para>
2392 <para>
2393 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2394 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2395 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2396 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2397 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2398 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2400 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2401 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2402 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2403 the tinkering of many others.
2404 </para>
2405 <para>
2406 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2407 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2408 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2409 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2410 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2411 </para>
2412 <para>
2413 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2414 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2415 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2416 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2417 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2418 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2419 </para>
2420 <para>
2421 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2422 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2423 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2424 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2425 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2426 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2427 learn.
2428 </para>
2429 <para>
2430 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2431 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2432 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2433 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2434 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2435 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2436 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2437 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2438 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2439 </para>
2440 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2441 <para>
2442 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2443 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2444
2445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2446 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2447 kind of recognition.
2448 </para>
2449 <para>
2450 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2451 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2452 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2453 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2454 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2455 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2456 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2457 </para>
2458 <para>
2459 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2460 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2461 10) has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2462 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2463 general.<footnote><para>
2464 <!-- f22 -->
2465 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2466 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," Communications
2467 of the Association for Computer Machinery 43 (2000): 9.
2468 </para></footnote>
2469 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2470 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2471 </para>
2472 <para>
2473 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2474 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2475 and want to learn."
2476 </para>
2477 <para>
2478 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2479 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2480 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2481 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2482 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2483 </para>
2484 <para>
2485 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2486 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2487 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2488 the law to close down that technology.
2489 </para>
2490 <para>
2491 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2492 chapter 9, quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2493 </para>
2494 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2495 </sect1>
2496 <sect1 id="catalogs">
2497 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2498 <para>
2499 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2500 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2501 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2502 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2503 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2504 </para>
2505 <para>
2506 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2507 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2508 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2509 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2510 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2511 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2512 </para>
2513 <para>
2514 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2515 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2516 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2517 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2518 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2519 </para>
2520 <para>
2521 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2523 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2524 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2525 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2526 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2527 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2528 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2529 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2530 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2531 </para>
2532 <para>
2533 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2534 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2535 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2536 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2537 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2538 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2539 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2540 </para>
2541 <para>
2542 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2543 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2544 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2545 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2546 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2547 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2548 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2549 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2550 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2551 on-line.
2552 </para>
2553 <para>
2554 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2555 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2556 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2557 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2558 be on users' computers.
2559 </para>
2560 <para>
2561 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2562 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2563 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2564 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2566 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2567 computer.
2568 </para>
2569 <para>
2570 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2571 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2572 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2573 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2574 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2575 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2576 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2577 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2578 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2579 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2580 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2581 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2582 supposed to do.
2583 </para>
2584 <para>
2585 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2586 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2587 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2588 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2589 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2590 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2591 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2592 </para>
2593 <para>
2594 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2595 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2596 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2597 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2598 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2599 easier to use"&mdash;again, a search engine, which Jesse had not
2600 himself built, using the Windows filesharing system, which Jesse had
2601 not himself built, to enable members of the RPI community to get
2602 access to content, which Jesse had not himself created or posted, and
2603 the vast majority of which had nothing to do with music.
2604 </para>
2605 <para>
2606 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2607 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2608 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2609 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2610 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2611 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2612 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2613 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2614 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2615 </para>
2616 <para>
2617 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one
2618 other student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2619 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2620 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2621 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2622 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2623 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100 billion&mdash;six
2624 times the total profit of the film industry in 2001.<footnote><para>
2625 <!-- f1 -->
2626 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2627 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," Professional Media Group LCC 6
2628 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2629 </para></footnote>
2630 </para>
2631 <para>
2632 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2633 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2634 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2635 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2636 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2637 </para>
2638 <para>
2639 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2640 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2641 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2642 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2643 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2644 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2645 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2646 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2647 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2648 </para>
2649 <para>
2650 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2651 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2652 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2653 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2654 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2656 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2657 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2658 </para>
2659 <para>
2660 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2661 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2662 </para>
2663 <para>
2664 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2665 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2666 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2667 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2668 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2669 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2670 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2671 <!-- f2 -->
2672 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2673 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2674 the Arts, More Than One in a Blue Moon (2000).
2675 </para></footnote>
2676 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2677 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2678 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2679 <!-- f3 -->
2680 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2681 Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2003, A24.
2682 </para></footnote>
2683 </para>
2684 <para>
2685 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2686 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2687 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2688 activist:
2689 </para>
2690 <blockquote>
2691 <para>
2692 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2693 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2694 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2695 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2696 </para>
2697 </blockquote>
2698 <para>
2699 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2700 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2701 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2702 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2703 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2704 </para>
2705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2706 </sect1>
2707 <sect1 id="pirates">
2708 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2709 <para>
2710 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2711 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2712 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2713 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2714 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2715 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2716 </para>
2717 <sect2 id="film">
2718 <title>Film</title>
2719 <para>
2720 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2721 <!-- f1 -->
2722 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2723 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 87&ndash;93,
2724 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2725 </para></footnote>
2726 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2727 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2728 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2729 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2730 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2731 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2732 this creative property
2733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2734 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2735 </para>
2736 <para>
2737 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2738 </para>
2739 <blockquote>
2740 <para>
2741 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2742 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2743 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2744 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2745 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2746 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2747 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2748 </para>
2749 <para>
2750 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2751 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2752 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2753 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2754 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2755 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2756 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2757 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2758 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2759 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2760 <!-- f2 -->
2761 J. A. Aberdeen, Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2762 Picture Producers (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2763 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2764 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2765 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2766 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2767 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2768 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2769 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2770 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2771 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2772 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2773 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2774 </para>
2775 </blockquote>
2776 <para>
2777 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2778 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2779 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2780 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2781 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2782 <!-- f3 -->
2783 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," The Silents Majority, archived at
2784 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2785 </para></footnote>
2786 That led the independents to flee the East
2787 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2788 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2789 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2790 did just that.
2791 </para>
2792 <para>
2793 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2794 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2795 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2796
2797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2798 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2799 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2800 Edison's creative property.
2801 </para>
2802 </sect2>
2803 <sect2 id="recordedmusic">
2804 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2805 <para>
2806 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2807 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2808 </para>
2809 <para>
2810 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2811 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2812 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2813 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2814 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2815 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2816 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2817 right to perform it publicly.
2818 </para>
2819 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2820 <para>
2821 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2822 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2823 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2824 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2825 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2826 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2827 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2828 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2829 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2830 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2831 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2832 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2833 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2834 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2835 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2836 its composer anything.
2837 </para>
2838 <para>
2839 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2841 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2842 put it,
2843 </para>
2844 <blockquote>
2845 <para>
2846 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2847 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2848 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2849 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2850 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2851 rights.<footnote><para>
2852 <!-- f4 -->
2853 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2854 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2855 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2856 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in Legislative History of the
2857 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2858 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2859 </para></footnote>
2860 </para>
2861 </blockquote>
2862 <para>
2863 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2864 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2865 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2866 <!-- f5 -->
2867 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2868 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2869 </para></footnote>
2870 and the "music publishing industry"
2871 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2872 <!-- f6 -->
2873 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2874 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2875 </para></footnote>
2876 As John Philip
2877 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2878 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2879 <!-- f7 -->
2880 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2881 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2882 </para></footnote>
2883 </para>
2884 <para>
2885 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2886 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2887 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2888 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2889 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2890 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2891 <!-- f8 -->
2892
2893 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2894 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2895 Perforating Company of New York).
2896 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2897 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2898 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2899 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2900 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2901 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2902 statute."<footnote><para>
2903 <!-- f9 -->
2904 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2905 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2906 Graphophone Company Association).
2907 </para></footnote>
2908 </para>
2909 <para>
2910 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer and the
2911 recording artist. Congress amended the law to make sure that composers
2912 would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of their music. But
2913 rather than simply granting the composer complete control over the
2914 right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2915 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once
2916 the composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of
2917
2918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2919 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2920 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2921 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2922 </para>
2923 <para>
2924 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2925 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2926 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2927 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2928 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2929 the fee set by the statute.
2930 </para>
2931 <para>
2932 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2933 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2934 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2935 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2936 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2937 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2938 Grisham.
2939 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2940 </para>
2941 <para>
2942 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2943 thus, in effect, the law subsidizes the recording industry through a
2944 kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a weaker right than
2945 it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control
2946 over their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of
2947 this less control are the recording industry and the public. The
2948 recording industry gets something of value for less than it otherwise
2949 would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range of musical
2950 creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its reasons for
2951 granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of rights
2952 holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2953 creativity.<footnote><para>
2954 <!-- f10 -->
2955 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2956 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2957 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
2958 in Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, E. Fulton Brylawski and
2959 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2960 </para></footnote>
2961 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2962 </para>
2963 <para>
2964 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2965 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2966 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
2967 relates,
2968 </para>
2969 <blockquote>
2970 <para>
2971 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
2972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
2973 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
2974 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
2975 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
2976 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
2977 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
2978 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
2979 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
2980 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
2981 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
2982 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
2983 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2984 choice.<footnote><para>
2985 <!-- f11 -->
2986 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
2987 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
2988 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
2989 this report.</para></footnote>
2990 </para>
2991 </blockquote>
2992 <para>
2993 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
2994 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2995 </para>
2996 </sect2>
2997 <sect2 id="radio">
2998 <title>Radio</title>
2999 <para>
3000 Radio was also born of piracy.
3001 </para>
3002 <para>
3003 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3004 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3005 <!-- f12 -->
3006 See 17 United States Code, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3007 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3008 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3009 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3010 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3011 station. See RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3012 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3013 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3014 Copyright," University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 281.
3015 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3016 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3017 </para></footnote>
3018 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3019 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3020 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3021 </para>
3022 <para>
3023 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3024 copy of the composer's work. The radio station is also performing a
3025 copy of the recording artist's work. It's one thing to have "Happy
3026 Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's choir; it's quite
3027 another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The
3028 recording artist is adding to the value of the composition performed
3029 on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent, the
3030 radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work,
3031 just as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
3032
3033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3034 </para>
3035 <para>
3036 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3037 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3038 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3039 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3040 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3041 of playing the song.
3042 </para>
3043 <para>
3044 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3045 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3046 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3047 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3048 </para>
3049 <para>
3050 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3051 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3052 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get
3053 some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3054 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3055 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to pirate the value of
3056 Madonna's work without paying her anything.
3057 </para>
3058 <para>
3059 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3060 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3061 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3062 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3063 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3064 to take something for nothing.
3065 </para>
3066 </sect2>
3067 <sect2 id="cabletv">
3068 <title>Cable TV</title>
3069 <para>
3070
3071 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3072 </para>
3073 <para>
3074 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3075 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3076 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3077 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3079 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3080 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3081 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3082 give away.
3083 </para>
3084 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3085 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3086 <para>
3087 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3088 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3089 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3090 <!-- f13 -->
3091 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3092 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3093 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3094 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3095 Commission).
3096 </para></footnote>
3097 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3098 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3099 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3100 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3101 <!-- f14 -->
3102 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3103 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3104 </para></footnote>
3105 As another broadcaster put it,
3106 </para>
3107 <blockquote>
3108 <para>
3109 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3110 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3111 paid for.<footnote><para>
3112 <!-- f15 -->
3113 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3114 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3115 </para></footnote>
3116 </para>
3117 </blockquote>
3118 <para>
3119 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3120 </para>
3121 <blockquote>
3122 <para>
3123 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3124 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3125 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3126 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3127 <!-- f16 -->
3128 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3129 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3130 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3131 </para></footnote>
3132 </para>
3133 </blockquote>
3134 <para>
3135 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3136 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3137 compensation."<footnote><para>
3138 <!-- f17 -->
3139 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3140 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3141 </para></footnote>
3142 </para>
3143 <para>
3144 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3145 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3146 </para>
3147 <blockquote>
3148 <para>
3149 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3150 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3151 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3152 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3153
3154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3155 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3156 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3157 <!-- f18 -->
3158 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3159 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3160 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3161 </para></footnote>
3162 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3163 </para>
3164 </blockquote>
3165 <para>
3166 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3167 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3168 </para>
3169 <para>
3170 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3171 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3172 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3173 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3174 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3175 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3176 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3177 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3178 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3179 created by broadcasters' content.
3180 </para>
3181 <para>
3182 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3183 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3184 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3185 today<footnote><para>
3186 <!-- f19 -->
3187 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, The Engine
3188 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3189 Information, available at
3190 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3191 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3192 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3193 </para></footnote>
3194 &mdash; then every industry affected by copyright today is the product
3195 and beneficiary of a certain kind of piracy. Film, records, radio,
3196 cable TV. . . . The list is long and could well be expanded. Every
3197 generation welcomes the pirates from the last. Every
3198 generation&mdash;until now.
3199 </para>
3200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3201 </sect2>
3202 </sect1>
3203 <sect1 id="piracy">
3204 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3205 <para>
3206 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3207 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3208 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3209 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3210 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3211 should stop it.
3212 </para>
3213 <para>
3214 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3215 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3216 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3217 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3218 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3219 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3220 has so often done in the past.
3221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3222 </para>
3223 <sect2 id="piracy-i">
3224 <title>Piracy I</title>
3225 <para>
3226 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3227 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3228 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3229 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3230 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3231 <!-- f1 -->
3232 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), The
3233 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003, July 2003, available
3234 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3235 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," Financial
3236 Times, 14 February 2003, 11.
3237 </para></footnote>
3238 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3239 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3240 </para>
3241 <para>
3242 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3243 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3244 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3245 This piracy is wrong.
3246 </para>
3247 <para>
3248 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3249 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3250 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3251 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3252 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3253 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3254 of our existence, treated as right.
3255 </para>
3256 <para>
3257 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3258 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3259 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3260 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3261 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3262 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3263 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3264 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3265 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3266 </para>
3267 <para>
3268 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3269 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3271 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3272 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3273 similar childhood.
3274 </para>
3275 <para>
3276 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3277 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3278 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3279 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3280 <!-- f2 -->
3281 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
3282 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3283 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3284 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3285 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3286 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3287 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3288 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3289 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3290 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3291 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3292 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3293 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3294 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3295 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3296 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3297 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3298 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3299 is wrong.
3300 </para>
3301 <para>
3302 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3303 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3304 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3305 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3306 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3307 <!-- f3 -->
3308 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3309 Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3310 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the
3311 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3312 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3313 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3314 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3315 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3316 </para></footnote>
3317 </para>
3318 <para>
3319 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3320 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3321 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3322 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3323 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3324 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3325 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3326 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3327 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3328 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3329 piracy of the tangible.
3330 </para>
3331 <para>
3332 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3333 property right of a very special sort, it is a property right. Like
3334 all property rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to decide
3335 the terms under which content is shared. If the copyright owner
3336 doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions:
3337 important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted content
3338 regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses give
3339 people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3340 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3341
3342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3343 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3344 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3345 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3346 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3347 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3348 </para>
3349 <para>
3350 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3351 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3352 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3353 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3354 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3355 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3356 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3357 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3358 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3359 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3360 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3361 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3362 </para>
3363 <para>
3364 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3365 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3366 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3367 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3368 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3369 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3370 </para>
3371 <para>
3372 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3373 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3374 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3375 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3376 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3377 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3378 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3379 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3380 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3381 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3382 violating the law is still wrong.
3383 </para>
3384 <para>
3385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3386 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3387 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3388 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3389 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3390 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3391 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3392 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3393 is flat out wrong.
3394 </para>
3395 <para>
3396 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3397 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3398 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3399 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3400 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3401 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3402 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3403 </para>
3404 <para>
3405 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3406 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3407 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3408 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3409 </para>
3410 <para>
3411 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3412 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3413 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3414 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3415 </para>
3416 <para>
3417 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3418 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3419 sharing to survive.
3420 </para>
3421 </sect2>
3422 <sect2 id="piracy-ii">
3423 <title>Piracy II</title>
3424 <para>
3425 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3426 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3427 <!-- f4 -->
3428 Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3429 </para></footnote>
3430 This means we must determine whether
3431 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3433 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3434 author of his profit.
3435 </para>
3436 <para>
3437 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3438 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3439 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3440 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3441 <!-- f5 -->
3442 See Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3443 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business (New York:
3444 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3445 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3446 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3447 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3448 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3449 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, Future, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3450 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3451 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3452 put together components that had been developed independently.
3453 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3454 </para>
3455 <para>
3456 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3457 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3458 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3459 system.<footnote><para>
3460 <!-- f6 -->
3461 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," San
3462 Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3463 New Scientist, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3464 Secures New Financing," San Francisco Chronicle, 23 May 2003, C1;
3465 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," Economist, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3466 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) Times, 26 July 2002, 18.
3467 </para></footnote>
3468 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3469 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3470 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3471 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3472 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3473 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3474 or your 20,000 best friends.
3475 </para>
3476 <para>
3477 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3478 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3479 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3480 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3481
3482 <!-- f7 -->
3483 See Ipsos-Insight, TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
3484 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3485 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3486 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3487 </para></footnote>
3488 A survey by the NPD group quoted in The New York Times estimated that
3489 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in
3490 May 2003.<footnote><para>
3491 <!-- f8 -->
3492 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," New
3493 York Times, 6 June 2003, A1.
3494 </para></footnote>
3495 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3496 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3497 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3498 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3499 </para>
3500 <para>
3501 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3502 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3503 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3504 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3505 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3506 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3507 of harm it entails.
3508 </para>
3509 <para>
3510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3511 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3512 different kinds into four types.
3513 </para>
3514 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3515 <listitem><para>
3516 <!-- A. -->
3517 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3518 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3519 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3520 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3521 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3522 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3523 users who download instead of purchasing.
3524 </para></listitem>
3525 <listitem><para>
3526 <!-- B. -->
3527 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3528 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3529 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3530 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3531 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3532 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3533 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3534 music purchased.
3535 </para></listitem>
3536 <listitem><para>
3537 <!-- C. -->
3538 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3539 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3540 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3541 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3542 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3543 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3544 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3545 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3546 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3547 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3548 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3549 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3550 a local collector.
3551 </para></listitem>
3552 <listitem><para>
3553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3554 <!-- D. -->
3555 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3556 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3557 wants to give away.
3558 </para></listitem>
3559 </orderedlist>
3560 <para>
3561 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3562 </para>
3563 <para>
3564 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3565 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3566 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3567 harmful.<footnote><para>
3568 <!-- f9 -->
3569 See Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy,148&ndash;49.
3570 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3571 </para></footnote>
3572 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3573 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3574 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3575 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3576 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3577 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3578 </para>
3579 <para>
3580 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3581 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3582 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3583 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3584 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3585 "devastating" the industry.
3586 </para>
3587 <para>
3588 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3589 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3590 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3591 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3592 &amp; Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3593 technology, the labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3594 <!-- f10 -->
3595 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, Technology Evolution and the
3596 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis (2003), 3. This report
3597 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3598 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3599 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3600 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3601 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3602 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3603 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3604 Assessment, Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law,
3605 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3606 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3607 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3608 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3609 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3610 regulating technology was the answer.
3611 </para>
3612 <para>
3613 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3614 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3615 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3616 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3618 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3619 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3620 <!-- f11 -->
3621 U.S. Congress, Copyright and Home Copying, 4.
3622 </para></footnote>
3623 </para>
3624 <para>
3625 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3626 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3627 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3628 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3629 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3630 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3631 harmful. The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how
3632 beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3633 </para>
3634 <para>
3635 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from
3636 the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3637 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3638 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3639 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3640 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They
3641 would therefore have little static reason to resist them.
3642 </para>
3643 <para>
3644 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining
3645 because
3646 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD
3647 sales actually suggest it might be close.
3648 </para>
3649 <para>
3650 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9
3651 percent,
3652 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7 percent.<footnote><para>
3653 <!-- f12 -->
3654 See Recording Industry Association of America, 2002 Yearend Statistics,
3655 available at
3656 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later report indicates even greater losses. See
3657 Recording Industry Association of America, Some Facts About Music Piracy,
3658 25 June 2003, available at
3659 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments
3660 of recorded music have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in
3661 to 860 million units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped).
3662 In terms of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in
3663 to $12.6 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The
3664 music
3665 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3666 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3667 </para></footnote>
3668 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3669 Internet
3670 piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3671 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3672 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That
3673 no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3674 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3675 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3676 <!-- f13 -->
3677 <para>
3678 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3679 February 2003, available at
3680 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3681 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3682 </para>
3683 </footnote>
3684 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of the
3685 decline. As Jane Black of BusinessWeek notes, "The soundtrack to the film
3686 High Fidelity has a list price of $18.98. You could get the whole movie
3687 [on DVD] for $19.99."<footnote><para>
3688 <!-- f14 -->
3689 Ibid.
3690 </para></footnote>
3691 </para>
3692 <para>
3693
3694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3695 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD
3696 sales is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3697 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3698 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3699 although
3700 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3701 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3702 </para>
3703 <para>
3704 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3705 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3706 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference
3707 between
3708 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own
3709 numbers
3710 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3711 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3712 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3713 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of Kazaa
3714 "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry would have
3715 suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7 percent drop. If 2.6
3716 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, and yet sales
3717 revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is a huge difference
3718 between
3719 "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3720 </para>
3721 <para>
3722 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3723 assume,
3724 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the
3725 recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these
3726 costs?
3727 </para>
3728 <para>
3729 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that is
3730 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3731 available.
3732 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of
3733 tracks that are no longer commercially available.<footnote><para>
3734 <!-- f15 -->
3735 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3736 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law&mdash;Coming
3737 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate
3738 Committee
3739 on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April 2001) (prepared
3740 statement
3741 of the Future of Music Coalition), available at
3742 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3743 </para></footnote>
3744 And while it's
3745 conceivable
3746 that some of this content is not available because the artist
3747 producing the content doesn't want it to be made available, the vast
3748 majority of it is unavailable solely because the publisher or the
3749 distributor
3750 has decided it no longer makes economic sense to the company to
3751 make it available.
3752 </para>
3753 <para>
3754 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3756 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3757 thousands
3758 of used book and used record stores in America today.<footnote><para>
3759 <!-- f16 -->
3760 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3761 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3762 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, The Quiet
3763 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market (2002), available at
3764 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3765 National
3766 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3767 Results,"
3768 available at
3769 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3770 </para></footnote>
3771 These
3772 stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they buy. And
3773 under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this content,
3774 even if the content is still under copyright, the copyright owner doesn't get
3775 a dime. Used book and record stores are commercial entities; their
3776 owners make money from the content they sell; but as with cable
3777 companies
3778 before statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright
3779 owner for the content they sell.
3780 </para>
3781 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3782 <para>
3783 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3784 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3785 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3786 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3787 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3788 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3789 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3790 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3791 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3792 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3793 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3794 </para>
3795 <para>
3796 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3797 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3798 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3799 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3800 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3801 shut as well?
3802 </para>
3803 <para>
3804 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3805 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3806 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3807 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3808 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in
3809 the Magic Kingdom, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3810
3811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3812 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3813 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3814 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3815 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3816 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3817 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3818 great book!)
3819 </para>
3820 <para>
3821 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3822 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3823 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3824 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3825 </para>
3826 <para>
3827 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3828 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3829 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3830 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3831 unavailable?"
3832 </para>
3833 <para>
3834 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3835 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3836 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of
3837 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3838 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3839 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3840 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3841 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3842 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3843 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3844 found only with time.
3845 </para>
3846 <para>
3847 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3848 just what you call type A sharing?"
3849 </para>
3850 <para>
3851 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3852 effect
3853 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3854 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3855 Napster
3856 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3857 developed
3858 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3860 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3861 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3862 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3863 <!-- f17 -->
3864 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3865 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3866 MHP, available at
3867 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an account of the litigation and its toll on
3868 Napster, see Joseph Menn, All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn
3869 Fanning's
3870 Napster (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3871 </para></footnote>
3872 </para>
3873 <para>
3874 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3875 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3876 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3877 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3878 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3879 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3880 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3881 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3882 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3883 </para>
3884 <para>
3885 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3886 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3887 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way
3888 content
3889 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3890 technology.
3891 In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights
3892 of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant
3893 more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3894 </para>
3895 <para>
3896 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3897 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3898 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3899 composers,
3900 but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but
3901 at a price set by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the
3902 recordings made by these recording artists, and they complained to
3903 Congress that their "creative property" was not being respected (since
3904 the radio station did not have to pay them for the creativity it
3905 broadcast),
3906 Congress rejected their claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3907 </para>
3908 <para>
3909 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3910 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3911 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3912 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3913 companies
3914 the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3915 </para>
3916 <para>
3917
3918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3919 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3920 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals of
3921 any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators
3922 would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content.
3923 Second,
3924 the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the
3925 content
3926 that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply
3927 required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded
3928 for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters
3929 would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. But if
3930 Congress
3931 had permitted cable to use broadcasters' content for free, then it
3932 would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus Congress chose a path that
3933 would assure compensation without giving the past (broadcasters)
3934 control
3935 over the future (cable).
3936 </para>
3937 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3938 <para>
3939 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3940 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3941 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3942 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3943 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3944 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3945 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3946 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3947 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3948 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3949 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3950 </para>
3951 <para>
3952 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3953 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
3954 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
3955 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
3956 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
3957 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
3958 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
3959 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
3960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
3961 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
3962 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
3963 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
3964 for the architecture it chose.
3965 </para>
3966 <para>
3967 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
3968 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
3969 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
3970 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
3971 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
3972 copyright."<footnote><para>
3973 <!-- f18 -->
3974 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
3975 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
3976 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
3977 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
3978 </para></footnote>
3979 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
3980 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
3981 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
3982 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
3983 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
3984 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
3985 <!-- f19 -->
3986 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
3987 </para></footnote>
3988 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
3989 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
3990 <!-- f20 -->
3991 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429,
3992 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
3993 </para></footnote>
3994 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
3995 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
3996 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
3997 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
3998 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
3999 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4000 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4001 <!-- f21 -->
4002 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4003 of Jack Valenti).
4004 </para></footnote>
4005 </para>
4006 <para>
4007 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4008 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4009 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex Kozinski,
4010 who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"&mdash;held
4011 that Sony would be liable for the copyright infringement made possible
4012 by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar
4013 technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the
4014 American film industry" (worse yet, it was a Japanese Boston Strangler
4015 of the American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4016 technology.<footnote><para>
4017 <!-- f22 -->
4018 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4019 1981).
4020 </para></footnote>
4021 </para>
4022 <para>
4023 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4024
4025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4026 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4027 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4028 Court wrote,
4029 </para>
4030 <blockquote>
4031 <para>
4032 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4033 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4034 market
4035 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4036 authority
4037 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4038 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4039 implicated
4040 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4041 <!-- f23 -->
4042 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4043 </para></footnote>
4044 </para>
4045 </blockquote>
4046 <para>
4047 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision.
4048 But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts,
4049 Congress
4050 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film
4051 got enough, this "taking" notwithstanding.
4052 If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
4053 </para>
4054
4055 <table id="t1">
4056 <title>Table</title>
4057 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4058 <thead>
4059 <row>
4060 <entry>CASE</entry>
4061 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4062 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4063 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4064 </row>
4065 </thead>
4066 <tbody>
4067 <row>
4068 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4069 <entry>Composers</entry>
4070 <entry>No protection</entry>
4071 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4072 </row>
4073 <row>
4074 <entry>Radio</entry>
4075 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4076 <entry>N/A</entry>
4077 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4078 </row>
4079 <row>
4080 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4081 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4082 <entry>No protection</entry>
4083 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4084 </row>
4085 <row>
4086 <entry>VCR</entry>
4087 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4088 <entry>No protection</entry>
4089 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4090 </row>
4091 </tbody>
4092 </tgroup>
4093 </table>
4094
4095 <para>
4096 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4097 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4098 <!-- f24 -->
4099 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4100 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4101 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4102 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4103 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4104 1992 (Title 17 of the United States Code), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4105 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4106 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4107 Lessig, Future, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4108 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4109 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4110 </para></footnote>
4111 In each case, throughout our history,
4112 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4113 work.
4114 </para>
4115 <para>
4116 In none of these cases did either the courts or Congress eliminate all
4117 free riding. In none of these cases did the courts or Congress insist that
4118 the law should assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his
4119 copyright created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
4120 "piracy." In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the
4121 legitimacy
4122 in the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed
4123 some new technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced
4124 the interests at stake.
4125 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4126 </para>
4127 <para>
4128 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4129 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4130 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4131 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4132 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4133 regulated?
4134 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4135 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4136 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4137 permission to record a song?
4138 </para>
4139 <para>
4140 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4141 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4142 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4143 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4144 <!-- f25 -->
4145 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
4146 (1984).
4147 </para></footnote>
4148 Instead, the particular uses that the
4149 law regulates have been defined by balancing the good that comes from
4150 granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an exclusive right
4151 creates. And this balancing has historically been done after a
4152 technology
4153 has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that facilitate
4154 the distribution of content.
4155 </para>
4156 <para>
4157 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4158 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4159 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4160 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should
4161 the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists
4162 (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail
4163 in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing income to artists
4164 while we allow the market to secure the most efficient way to promote
4165 and distribute content. This will require changes in the law, at least
4166 in the interim. These changes should be designed to balance the
4167 protection
4168 of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
4169 continue.
4170 </para>
4171 <para>
4172
4173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4174 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4175 superior
4176 mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4177 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4178 network.
4179 Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4180 efficient.
4181 Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
4182 The New York Times, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."<footnote><para>
4183 <!-- f26 -->
4184 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4185 Echoes Past Efforts," New York Times, 22 September 2003, C3.
4186 </para></footnote>
4187 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright
4188 warriors
4189 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance
4190 and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content,"
4191 the warriors insist, "is our property. Why should we wait for Congress
4192 to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4193 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4194 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether the
4195 car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
4196 </para>
4197 <para>
4198 "It is our property," the warriors insist. "And it should be protected
4199 just as any other property is protected."
4200 </para>
4201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4202 </sect2>
4203 </sect1>
4204 </chapter>
4205 <chapter id="c-property">
4206 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4207 <para>
4208
4209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4210 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4211 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4212 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4213 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4214 the price she can get.
4215 </para>
4216 <para>
4217 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4218 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
4219 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
4220 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you
4221 put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I
4222 take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
4223 idea you had to put a picnic table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example,
4224 going
4225 to Sears, buying a table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the
4226 thing I am taking then?
4227 </para>
4228 <para>
4229 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4230 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4231 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4232 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4233 narrow
4234 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4235 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4236 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4237 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4238 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4239 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4240 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4241 <!-- f1 -->
4242 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4243 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4244 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4245 </para></footnote>
4246 </para>
4247 <para>
4248 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4249 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4250 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4251 expression
4252 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4253 property.
4254 </para>
4255 <para>
4256 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details, in
4257 other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of
4258 turning
4259 the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4260 "property"
4261 in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4262 <!-- f2 -->
4263 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4264 intangible.
4265 A property right is simply a right that an individual has against the
4266 world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach to a
4267 physical
4268 object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to which it is
4269 (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What Is
4270 Property?
4271 Putting the Pieces Back Together," Arizona Law Review 45 (2003):
4272 373, 429 n. 241.
4273 </para></footnote>
4274 </para>
4275 <para>
4276 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4277 preceding
4278 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright
4279 material
4280 is property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are
4281 its limits? How does it function in practice? After these stories, the
4282 significance of this true statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash;
4283 will be a bit more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite
4284 different from the implications that the copyright warriors would have
4285 us draw.
4286 </para>
4287
4288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4289 <sect1 id="founders">
4290 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4291 <para>
4292 William Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet in 1595. The play
4293 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4294 Shakespeare
4295 had written. He would continue to write plays through 1613,
4296 and the plays that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American
4297 culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer
4298 seeped into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source.
4299 I once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's
4300 adaptation
4301 of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of clichés."
4302 </para>
4303 <para>
4304 In 1774, almost 180 years after Romeo and Juliet was written, the
4305 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4306 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4307 <!-- f1 -->
4308 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4309 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4310 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to Romeo and
4311 Juliet, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4312 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4313 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4314 Bookseller," American Scholar 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4315 </para></footnote>
4316 Tonson was the
4317 most prominent of a small group of publishers called the Conger<footnote><para>
4318 <!-- f2 -->
4319 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville:
4320 Vanderbilt
4321 University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4322 </para></footnote>
4323 who
4324 controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth century. The
4325 Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of books that
4326 they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant that no
4327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4328 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4329 copyright.
4330 Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4331 produce
4332 better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4333 </para>
4334 <para>
4335 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4336 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the history
4337 of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament adopted the
4338 first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the act stated that
4339 all published works would get a copyright term of fourteen years,
4340 renewable
4341 once if the author was alive, and that all works already
4342 published
4343 by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one additional years.<footnote><para>
4344 <!-- f3 -->
4345 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4346 "copyright
4347 law." See Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 40.
4348 </para></footnote>
4349 Under this law, Romeo and Juliet should have been free in 1731. So why
4350 was there any issue about it still being under Tonson's control in 1774?
4351 </para>
4352 <para>
4353 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
4354 "copyright"
4355 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4356 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4357 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4358 expired
4359 in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing, as
4360 a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was published.
4361 But after it expired, there was no positive law that said that the
4362 publishers,
4363 or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print books.
4364 </para>
4365 <para>
4366 There was no positive law, but that didn't mean that there was no
4367 law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to both the words of
4368 legislatures and the words of judges to know the rules that are to
4369 govern
4370 how people are to behave. We call the words from legislatures
4371 "positive
4372 law." We call the words from judges "common law." The common
4373 law sets the background against which legislatures legislate; the
4374 legislature,
4375 ordinarily, can trump that background only if it passes a law to
4376 displace it. And so the real question after the licensing statutes had
4377 expired
4378 was whether the common law protected a copyright,
4379 independent
4380 of any positive law.
4381 </para>
4382 <para>
4383 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4384 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4385 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4386 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4387
4388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4389 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4390 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4391 ultimately
4392 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4393 </para>
4394 <para>
4395 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book
4396 an exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4397 however,
4398 and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the bookseller
4399 that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the copyright
4400 "expired,"
4401 and the work would then be free and could be published by
4402 anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have believed.
4403 </para>
4404 <para>
4405 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4406 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to the
4407 particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right at all?
4408 </para>
4409 <para>
4410 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a
4411 very strong claim. Take Romeo and Juliet as an example: That play was
4412 written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4413 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4414 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating this
4415 play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So why is it
4416 that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and take
4417 Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4418 reason
4419 is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4420 </para>
4421 <para>
4422 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something
4423 special
4424 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4425 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4426 "booksellers."
4427 </para>
4428 <para>
4429 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have
4430 come to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
4431 1710, it wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4432 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4433 others
4434 from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right to use
4435 a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not go
4436 beyond
4437 that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how
4438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4439 a work could be used. Today the right includes a large collection of
4440 restrictions
4441 on the freedom of others: It grants the author the exclusive
4442 right to copy, the exclusive right to distribute, the exclusive right to
4443 perform, and so on.
4444 </para>
4445 <para>
4446 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4447 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4448 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4449 permission
4450 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4451 anything,
4452 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4453 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4454 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4455 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4456 </para>
4457 <para>
4458 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4459 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4460 especially
4461 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4462 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4463 monopolies&mdash;especially
4464 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4465 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4466 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4467 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4468 Monopolies,
4469 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4470 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4471 publishing.
4472 </para>
4473 <para>
4474 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4475 naturally
4476 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4477 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4478 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4479 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4480 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4481 specialinterest
4482 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4483 </para>
4484 <para>
4485 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4486 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4487 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4488 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4490 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst kind&mdash;tools of the
4491 Crown's repression, selling the liberty of England to guarantee
4492 themselves
4493 a monopoly profit. The attacks against these monopolists were
4494 harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees and monopolizers in
4495 the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do not therefore labour
4496 in an honest profession to which learning is indetted."<footnote><para>
4497 <!-- f4 -->
4498 Philip Wittenberg, The Protection and Marketing of Literary Property (New
4499 York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4500 </para></footnote>
4501 </para>
4502 <para>
4503 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread
4504 of knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the
4505 Enlightenment
4506 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4507 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of the
4508 time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering with
4509 that idea.
4510 </para>
4511 <para>
4512 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4513 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4514 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4515 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4516 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4517 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4518 compromise
4519 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4520 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4521 construction and spread of culture.
4522 </para>
4523 <para>
4524 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4525 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4526 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4527 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4528 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4529 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4530 they said; they needed more time.
4531 </para>
4532 <para>
4533 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4534 words that echo today,
4535 </para>
4536 <blockquote>
4537 <para>
4538 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4539 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4541 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4542 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4543 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4544 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4545 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4546 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4547 <!-- f5 -->
4548 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4549 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4550 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4551 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4552 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4553 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4554 al., 8, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4555 </para></footnote>
4556 </para>
4557 </blockquote>
4558 <para>
4559 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4560 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4561 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4562 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4563 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4564 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4565 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4566 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4567 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4568 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4569 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4570 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4571 way to protect authors.
4572 </para>
4573 <para>
4574 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4575 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4576 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4577 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4578 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4579 <!-- f6 -->
4580 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," Vanderbilt
4581 Law Review 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4582 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4583 </para></footnote>
4584 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4585 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4586 </para>
4587 <para>
4588 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4589 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4590 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4591 <!-- f7 -->
4592 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright
4593 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4594 </para></footnote>
4595 </para>
4596 <para>
4597 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4598 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4599 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4600 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4601 <!-- f8 -->
4602 Mark Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4603 1993), 92.
4604 </para></footnote>
4605 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4607 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4608 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4609 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4610 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4611 <!-- f9 -->
4612 Ibid., 93.
4613 </para></footnote>
4614 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4615 </para>
4616 <para>
4617 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4618 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4619 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4620 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4621 Property."<footnote><para>
4622 <!-- f10 -->
4623 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 167 (quoting
4624 Borwell).
4625 </para></footnote>
4626 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4627 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4628 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4629 </para>
4630 <para>
4631 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4632 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4633 the most important early victory being Millar v. Taylor.
4634 </para>
4635 <para>
4636 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4637 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4638 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4639 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4640 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4641 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4642 <!-- f11 -->
4643 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4644 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," Wayne Law Review 29
4645 (1983): 1152.
4646 </para></footnote>
4647 </para>
4648 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4649 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4650 </indexterm>
4651 <para>
4652 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4653 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4654 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4655 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4656 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4657 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4658 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4659 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4660 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4661 </para>
4662 <para>
4663 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4664 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4665 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4666 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4667 with in 1710: How best to limit
4668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4669 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4670 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4671 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4672 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4673 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4674 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4675 </para>
4676 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4677 <para>
4678 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4679 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4680 </para>
4681 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4682 <para>
4683 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4684 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4685 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4686 <!-- f12 -->
4687 Ibid., 1156.
4688 </para></footnote>
4689 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4690 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in Millar,
4691 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4692 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4693 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4694 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4695 </para>
4696 <para>
4697 As few legal cases ever do, Donaldson v. Beckett drew an enormous
4698 amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers argued
4699 that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the Statute
4700 of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute of Anne,
4701 the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control publication
4702 came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term specified in
4703 the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been protected by the
4704 statute were no longer protected.
4705 </para>
4706 <para>
4707 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4708 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4709 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4710 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4711 House of Lords generally voted.
4712 </para>
4713 <para>
4714 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4715 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4716 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4717 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4718 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4719 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4720 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4721 passed into the public domain.
4722 </para>
4723 <para>
4724 "The public domain." Before the case of Donaldson v. Beckett, there
4725 was no clear idea of a public domain in England. Before 1774, there
4726 was a strong argument that common law copyrights were perpetual.
4727 After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first time in
4728 Anglo-American history, the legal control over creative works expired,
4729 and the greatest works in English history&mdash;including those of
4730 Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson, and Bunyan&mdash;were free of
4731 legal restraint.
4732 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4733 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4734 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4735 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4736 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4737 </para>
4738 <para>
4739 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4740 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4741 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4742 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the Edinburgh Advertiser
4743 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4744 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4745 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4746 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4747 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4748 <!-- f13 -->
4749 Rose, 97.
4750 </para></footnote>
4751 </para>
4752 <para>
4753 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4754 equally strong in the opposite direction. The Morning Chronicle
4755 reported:
4756 </para>
4757 <blockquote>
4758 <para>
4759 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4760 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4761 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4762 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4763 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4764 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4765 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4766 successors.<footnote><para>
4767 <!-- f14 -->
4768 Ibid.
4769 </para></footnote>
4770 </para>
4771 </blockquote>
4772 <para>
4773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4774 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4775 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4776 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4777 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4778 free. Not in the sense that copyrights would not be respected, for of
4779 course, for a limited time after a work was published, the bookseller
4780 had an exclusive right to control the publication of that book. And
4781 not in the sense that books could be stolen, for even after a
4782 copyright expired, you still had to buy the book from someone. But
4783 free in the sense that the culture and its growth would no longer be
4784 controlled by a small group of publishers. As every free market does,
4785 this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and
4786 producers chose. English culture would develop as the many English
4787 readers chose to let it develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought
4788 and wrote; chose in the memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
4789 competitive context, not a context in which the choices about what
4790 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4791 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4792 </para>
4793 <para>
4794 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4795 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4796 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4797 protected.
4798 </para>
4799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4800 </sect1>
4801 <sect1 id="recorders">
4802 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4803 <para>
4804 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4805 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4806 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4807 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4808 He was their god.)
4809 </para>
4810 <para>
4811 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4812 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4813 today.
4814 </para>
4815 <para>
4816 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4817 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4818 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4819 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4820 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4821 stage.
4822 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4823 </para>
4824 <para>
4825 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4826 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4827 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4828 and the opera company played Wagner, was The Simpsons. As Else judged
4829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4830 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4831 about the scene.
4832 </para>
4833 <para>
4834 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4835 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of The Simpsons.
4836 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4837 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4838 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4839 </para>
4840 <para>
4841 Else called Simpsons creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4842 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4843 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4844 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4845 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4846 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4847 </para>
4848 <para>
4849 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4850 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4851 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4852 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4853 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4854 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4855 </para>
4856 <para>
4857 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4858 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4859 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4860 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4861 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4862 Simpsons which was in the corner of the shot."
4863 </para>
4864 <para>
4865 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4866 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4867 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4868 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4869 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4870 confirm what he had been told.
4871 </para>
4872 <para>
4873 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4874 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4875 clip of The Simpsons in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4876 about
4877
4878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4879 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4880 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4881 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4882 the money."
4883 </para>
4884 <para>
4885 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4886 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4887 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4888 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4889 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4890 The Day After Trinity, from ten years before.
4891 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4892 </para>
4893 <para>
4894 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4895 copyright to The Simpsons. That copyright is their property. To use
4896 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4897 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4898 Simpsons copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4899 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4900 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4901 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4902 says the owner gets to control.
4903 </para>
4904 <para>
4905 For example, "public performance" is a use of The Simpsons that the
4906 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4907 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4908 Favorite Simpsons," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4909 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4910 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4911 by the law.
4912 </para>
4913 <para>
4914 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4915 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4916 <!-- f1 -->
4917 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4918 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4919 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4920 Wake of Eldred " (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4921 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4922 </para></footnote>
4923 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a Simpsons
4924 episode is clearly a fair use of The Simpsons&mdash;and fair use does
4925 not require the permission of anyone.
4926 </para>
4927 <para>
4928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4929 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4930 </para>
4931 <blockquote>
4932 <para>
4933 The Simpsons fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4934 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4935 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4936 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4937 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4938 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4939 </para>
4940 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4941 <listitem><para>
4942 <!-- 1. -->
4943 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4944 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4945 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4946 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4947 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4948 </para></listitem>
4949 <listitem><para>
4950 <!-- 2. -->
4951 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4952 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4953 tracking down and stopping unlicensed Simpsons usage, just as George
4954 Lucas had a very high profile litigating Star Wars usage. So I decided
4955 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4956 license to four seconds of Simpsons. As a documentary producer working
4957 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4958 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4959 principle.
4960 </para></listitem>
4961 <listitem><para>
4962 <!-- 3. -->
4963 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4964 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4965 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4966 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4967 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4968 pockets, me or them.
4969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4970 </para></listitem>
4971 <listitem><para>
4972 <!-- 4. -->
4973 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
4974 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
4975 money.
4976 </para></listitem>
4977 </orderedlist>
4978 </blockquote>
4979 <para>
4980 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
4981 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
4982 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
4983 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
4984 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
4985 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
4986 </para>
4987 <para>
4988 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
4989 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
4990 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
4991 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
4992 not.
4993 </para>
4994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
4995 </sect1>
4996 <sect1 id="transformers">
4997 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
4998 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
4999 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5000 <para>
5001 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5002 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5003 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5004 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5005 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5006 </para>
5007 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5008 <para>
5009 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5010 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5011 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5012 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5013 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5014 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5015 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5016 important to his career.
5017 </para>
5018 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5019 <para>
5020 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5021 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5022 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5023 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5024 </para>
5025 <para>
5026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5027 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5028 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5029 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5030 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5031 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5032 </para>
5033 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5034 <para>
5035 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5036 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5037 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5038 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5039 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5040 actor's career."
5041 </para>
5042 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5043 <para>
5044 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5045 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5046 </para>
5047 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5048 <para>
5049 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5050 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5051 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5052 for it."<footnote>
5053 <para>
5054 <!-- f1 -->
5055 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5056 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5057 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5058 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5059 <indexterm>
5060 <primary>artists</primary>
5061 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5062 </indexterm>
5063 </para></footnote>
5064 </para>
5065 <para>
5066 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5067 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5068 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5069 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5070 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5071 </para>
5072 <para>
5073 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5074 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5075 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5076 </para>
5077 <blockquote>
5078 <para>
5079 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5080 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5081 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from Dirty
5082 Harry. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5083 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5084 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5085 </para>
5086 <para>
5087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5088 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5089 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5090 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5091 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5092 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5093 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5094 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5095 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5096 started calling people.
5097 </para>
5098 </blockquote>
5099 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5100 <para>
5101 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5102 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5103 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5104 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5105 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5106 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5107 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5108 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5109 career.
5110 </para>
5111 <para>
5112 It was one year later&mdash;"and even then we weren't sure whether we
5113 were totally in the clear."
5114 </para>
5115 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5116 <para>
5117 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5118 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5119 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5120 </para>
5121 <blockquote>
5122 <para>
5123 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5124 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5125 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5126 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5127 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5128 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5129 systematically and cleared the rights.
5130 </para>
5131 </blockquote>
5132 <para>
5133
5134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5135 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5136 loved it, and it sold very well.
5137 </para>
5138 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5139 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5140 <para>
5141 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5142 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5143 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5144 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5145 at all."<footnote><para>
5146 <!-- f2 -->
5147 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, Seven
5148 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition, available at
5149 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5150 </para></footnote>
5151 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5152 has to be made?
5153 </para>
5154 <para>
5155 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5156 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5157 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5158 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5159 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5160 </para>
5161 <blockquote>
5162 <para>
5163 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5164 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5165 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5166 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5167 compensated for that.
5168 </para>
5169 </blockquote>
5170 <para>
5171 Or at least, is this how the artist should be compensated? Would it
5172 make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of statutory license
5173 that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use of clips
5174 like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
5175 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get
5176 explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the
5177 legal part of the creative process could be made to be more clean?
5178 </para>
5179 <blockquote>
5180 <para>
5181 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5182 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5183 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5184 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5186 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5187 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5188 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5189 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5190 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5191 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5192 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5193 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5194 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5195 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5196 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5197 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5198 </para>
5199 </blockquote>
5200 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5201 <para>
5202 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5203 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5204 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5205 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5206 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5207 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5208 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5209 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5210 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5211 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5212 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5213 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5214 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5215 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5216 "Does this still make sense?"
5217 </para>
5218 <para>
5219 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5220 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5221 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5222 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5223
5224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5225 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5226 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5227 </para>
5228 <para>
5229 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5230 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a 60 Minutes episode.
5231 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5232 judges loved every minute of it.
5233 </para>
5234 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5235 <para>
5236 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5237 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5238 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5239 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5240 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5241 were just violated in this room?"
5242 </para>
5243 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5244 <para>
5245 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5246 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5247 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5248 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5249 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5250 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5251 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5252 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5253 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5254 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5255 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5256 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5257 couldn't easily do them legally.
5258 </para>
5259 <para>
5260 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5261 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5262 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5263 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5264 planted in your presentation.
5265 </para>
5266 <para>
5267 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5269 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5270 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5271 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5272 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5273 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5274 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5275 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5276 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5277 </para>
5278 <para>
5279 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5280 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5281 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5282 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5283 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5284 </para>
5285 <para>
5286 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5287 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5288 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5289 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5290 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5291 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5292 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5293 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5294 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5295 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5296 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5297 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5298 registers the work.
5299 </para>
5300 <para>
5301 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5302 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5303 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5304 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5305 </para>
5306 <para>
5307 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5308 Myers, the comic genius of Saturday Night Live and
5309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5310 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5311 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5312 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5313 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5314 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5315 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5316 entertainment."
5317 </para>
5318 <para>
5319 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5320 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5321 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5322 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5323 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5324 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5325 new audiences, it is Mike."
5326 </para>
5327 <para>
5328 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5329 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5330 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5331 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5332 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5333 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5334 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5335 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5336 </para>
5337 <para>
5338 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5339 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5340 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5341 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5342 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5343 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5344 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5345 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5346 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5347 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5348 curse, reserved for the few.
5349 </para>
5350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5351 </sect1>
5352 <sect1 id="collectors">
5353 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5354 <para>
5355 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5356 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5357 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5358 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5359 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5360 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5361 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5362 </para>
5363 <para>
5364 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5365 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5366 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5367 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5368 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5369 well as when those pages changed.
5370 </para>
5371 <para>
5372 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5373 appreciated. In the dystopia described in 1984, old newspapers were
5374 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5375 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5376 reports.
5377 </para>
5378 <para>
5379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5380 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5381 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5382 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5383 </para>
5384 <para>
5385 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5386 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5387 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5388 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5389 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5390 </para>
5391 <para>
5392 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5393 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5394 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5395 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5396 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5397 <!-- f1 -->
5398 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5399 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5400 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5401 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5402 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5403 </para></footnote>
5404 </para>
5405 <para>
5406 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5407 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5408 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5409 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5410 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5411 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5412 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5413 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5414 truth.
5415 </para>
5416 <para>
5417 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5418 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We all forget history. The key is
5419 whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we forget. More
5420 directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
5421 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it,
5422 for schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society
5423 presumes this knowedge.
5424 </para>
5425 <para>
5426 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5427 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5428 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5429 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5431 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5432 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5433 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5434 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5435 </para>
5436 <para>
5437 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5438 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5439 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5440 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5441 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5442 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5443 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5444 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5445 </para>
5446 <para>
5447 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5448 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5449 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5450 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5451 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5452 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5453 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5454 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5455 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5456 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5457 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5458 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5459 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5460 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5461 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5462 </para>
5463 <blockquote>
5464 <para>
5465 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5466 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5467 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5468 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5469 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5470
5471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5472 60 Minutes episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5473 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5474 </para>
5475 </blockquote>
5476 <para>
5477 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5478 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5479 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5480 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5481 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5482 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5483 </para>
5484 <para>
5485 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5486 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5487 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5488 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5489 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5490 work.
5491 </para>
5492 <para>
5493 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5494 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5495 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5496 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5497 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5498 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5499 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5500 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5501 <!-- f2 -->
5502 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5503 the Library of Congress," Film Library Quarterly 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5504 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5505 Preservation in the United States ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5506 Co., 1992), 36.
5507 </para></footnote>
5508 </para>
5509 <para>
5510 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5511 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5512 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5513 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5514 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5515 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5516 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5517 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5518 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5519 </para>
5520 <para>
5521 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5523 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5524 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5525 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5526 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5527 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5528 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5529 events of that day.
5530 </para>
5531 <para>
5532 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5533 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5534 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5535 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5536 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5537 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5538 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5539 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5540 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5541 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5542 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5543 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5544 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5545 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5546 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5547 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5548 </para>
5549 <para>
5550 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5551 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5552 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5553 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5554 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5555 to find them.
5556 </para>
5557 <para>
5558 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5559 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5560 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5561 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5562 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5563 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5564 </para>
5565 <para>
5566 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5567 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5568 life, if the
5569
5570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5571 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5572 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5573 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5574 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5575 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5576 </para>
5577 <para>
5578 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5579 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5580 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5581 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5582 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5583 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5584 longer sold.
5585 </para>
5586 <para>
5587 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5588 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5589 <!-- f3 -->
5590 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5591 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," Chicago Tribune,
5592 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5593 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5594 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," Boston
5595 College Law Review 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5596 </para></footnote>). After
5597 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5598 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5599 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5600 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5601 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5602 </para>
5603 <para>
5604 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5605 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5606 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5607 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5608 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5609 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5610 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5611 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5612 disappears.
5613 </para>
5614 <para>
5615 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5616 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5617 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5618 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5619 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5620 generally, the
5621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5622 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5623 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5624 little practical effect.
5625 </para>
5626 <para>
5627 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5628 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5629 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5630 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5631 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5632 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5633 </para>
5634 <para>
5635 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5636 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5637 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5638 Kahle describes,
5639 </para>
5640 <blockquote>
5641 <para>
5642 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5643 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5644 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5645 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5646 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5647 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5648 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5649 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5650 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5651 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5652 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5653 </para>
5654 </blockquote>
5655 <para>
5656 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5657 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5658 libraries or archives could be. When the commercial life of creative
5659 property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it does, Kahle
5660 and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and culture,
5661 remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
5662 it;
5663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5664 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5665 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5666 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5667 future for our past. The technology of digital arts could make the
5668 dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5669 </para>
5670 <para>
5671 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5672 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5673 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5674 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5675 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5676 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5677 </para>
5678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5679 </sect1>
5680 <sect1 id="property-i">
5681 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5682 <para>
5683 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5684 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5685 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5686 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5687 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5688 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5689 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5690 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5691 </para>
5692 <para>
5693 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5694 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5695 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5696 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5697 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5698 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5699 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5700 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5701 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5702 Warner Brothers.
5703 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5704 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5705 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5706 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5707 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5708 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5709 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5710 </para>
5711 <para>
5712 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5713 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5714 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5715 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5716 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5717 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5718 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5719 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5720 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5721 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5722 Washingtonian way.
5723 </para>
5724 <para>
5725 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5726 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5727 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5728 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5729 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5730 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5731 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5732 </para>
5733 <para>
5734 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5735 perfectly:
5736 </para>
5737 <blockquote>
5738 <para>
5739 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5740 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5741 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5742 theme which animates this entire debate: Creative property owners must
5743 be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other
5744 property owners in the nation. That is the issue. That is the
5745 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
5746 debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5747 <!-- f1 -->
5748 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5749 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5750 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5751 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5752 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5753 Valenti).
5754 </para></footnote>
5755 </para>
5756 </blockquote>
5757 <para>
5758 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5759 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5760 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5761 this:
5762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5763 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5764 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5765 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5766 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5767 </para>
5768 <para>
5769 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5770 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5771 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5772 extreme a claim made by anyone who is serious in this debate than this
5773 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant,
5774 is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature
5775 and scope of "creative property." His views have no reasonable
5776 connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull of
5777 his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
5778 Washington.
5779 </para>
5780 <para>
5781 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5782 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5783 <!-- f2 -->
5784 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5785 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5786 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5787 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5788 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5789 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the
5790 Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5791 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5792 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5793 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5794 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5795 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5796 in our tradition.
5797 </para>
5798 <para>
5799 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5800 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5801 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5802 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5803 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5804 culture would develop.
5805 </para>
5806 <para>
5807 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5808 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5809 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5810 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5811 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5812 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5813 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5814 the same would be to
5815
5816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5817 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5818 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5819 perfect control.
5820 </para>
5821 <para>
5822 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5823 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5824 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5825 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5826 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5827 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5828 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5829 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5830 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5831 Constitution itself.
5832 </para>
5833 <para>
5834 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5835 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5836 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5837 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5838 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5839 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5840 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5841 sacred. It cannot ever be taken from the property owner unless the
5842 government pays for the privilege.
5843 </para>
5844 <para>
5845 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5846 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5847 power to create "creative property," the Constitution requires that
5848 after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
5849 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet
5850 when Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term
5851 "takes" your copyright and turns it over to the public domain,
5852 Congress does not have any obligation to pay "just compensation" for
5853 this "taking." Instead, the same Constitution that requires
5854 compensation for your land
5855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5856 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5857 compensation at all.
5858 </para>
5859 <para>
5860 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5861 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5862 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5863 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5864 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5865 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5866 itself.
5867 </para>
5868 <para>
5869 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5870 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5871 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5872 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5873 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5874 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5875 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5876 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5877 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5878 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5879 </para>
5880 <para>
5881 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5882 least try to understand why. Why did the framers, fanatical property
5883 types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be given
5884 the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
5885 creative property there must be a public domain?
5886 </para>
5887 <para>
5888 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5889 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5890 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5891 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5892 should be at the core of this war: Not whether creative property
5893 should be protected, but how. Not whether we will enforce the rights
5894 the law gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix
5895 of rights ought to be. Not whether artists should be paid, but whether
5896 institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
5897 control how culture develops.
5898 </para>
5899 <para>
5900
5901 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5902 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5903 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5904 than the narrow language of the law allows. In Code and Other Laws of
5905 Cyberspace, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5906 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5907 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5908 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5909 </para>
5910 <figure id="fig-1331">
5911 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5912 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5913 </figure>
5914 <para>
5915 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5916 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5917 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5918 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5919 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5920 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5921 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5922 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5923 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5924 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5925 Web, you can be punished
5926 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5927 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5928 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5929 </para>
5930 <para>
5931 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5932 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5933 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5934 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5935 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5936 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5937 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5938 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5939 the source of the enforcement.
5940 </para>
5941 <para>
5942 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5943 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5944 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5945 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5946 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5947 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5948 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5949 individual or group might behave.
5950 </para>
5951 <para>
5952 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5953 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5954 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5955 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5956 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5957 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5958 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5959 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5960 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5961 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
5962 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5963 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5964 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5965 </para>
5966 <para>
5967
5968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
5969 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
5970 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
5971 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
5972 undermined by another.
5973 </para>
5974 <para>
5975 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
5976 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
5977 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
5978 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
5979 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
5980 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
5981 must consider how these four in particular interact.
5982 </para>
5983 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
5984 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
5985 </indexterm>
5986 <para>
5987 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
5988 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
5989 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
5990 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
5991 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
5992 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
5993 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
5994 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
5995 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
5996 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
5997 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
5998 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
5999 </para>
6000 <para>
6001 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6002 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6003 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6004 <!-- f3 -->
6005 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6006 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6007 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6008 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6009 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, Code: And
6010 Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6011 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies,
6012 June 1998.
6013 </para></footnote>
6014 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6015 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6016 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6017 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6018 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6019 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6020 used to require that other laws be more
6021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6022 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6023 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6024 driving.
6025 </para>
6026 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6027
6028 <figure id="fig-1361">
6029 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6030 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6031 </figure>
6032 <para>
6033 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6034 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6035 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6036 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6037 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6038 another.<footnote>
6039 <para>
6040 <!-- f4 -->
6041 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6042 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6043 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6044 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6045 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6046 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6047 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6048 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6049 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6050 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6051 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6052 of liberty. As I argued in Code, we come from a long tradition of
6053 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6054 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6055 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6056 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indiana:
6057 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6058 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6059 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6060 J. Samuels, eds., John R. Commons: Selected Essays (London:
6061 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6062 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6063 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6064 places easier; 42 United States Code, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6065 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6066 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6067 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6068 of these groups might face.
6069 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6070 </para></footnote>
6071 </para>
6072 <sect2 id="hollywood">
6073 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6074 <para>
6075 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6076 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6077 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6078 rallying makes sense.
6079 </para>
6080 <para>
6081 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6082 Internet:
6083 </para>
6084 <figure id="fig-1371">
6085 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6086 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6087 </figure>
6088 <para>
6089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6090 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6091 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6092 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6093 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6094 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6095 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6096 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6097 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6098 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6099 this form of infringement.
6100 </para>
6101 <para>
6102 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6103 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6104 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6105 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6106 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6107 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6108 </para>
6109 <para>
6110 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6111 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6112 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6113 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6114 Iraq
6115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6116 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6117 looting that results.
6118 </para>
6119 <figure id="fig-1381">
6120 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6121 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6122 </figure>
6123 <para>
6124 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6125 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6126 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6127 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6128 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6129 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6130 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6131 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6132 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6133 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6134 </para>
6135 <para>
6136 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6137 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6138 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6139 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6140 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6141 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6142 life. Homeowners living in a
6143
6144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6145 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6146 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6147 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6148 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6149 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6150 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6151 </para>
6152 <para>
6153 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6154 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6155 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6156 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6157 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6158 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6159 </para>
6160 <para>
6161 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6162 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6163 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6164 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6165 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6166 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6167 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6168 <!-- f5 -->
6169 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6170 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6171 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6172 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6173 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6174 October 2003, available at
6175 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6176 </para></footnote>
6177
6178 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6179 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6180 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads for the
6181 purpose of protecting the railroads? Closer to the subject of this
6182 book, remote channel changers have weakened the "stickiness" of
6183 television advertising (if a boring commercial comes on the TV, the
6184 remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that this change
6185 has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
6186 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
6187 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch
6188 to only ten channels within an hour?)
6189 </para>
6190 <para>
6191 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6192 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6193 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6195 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6196 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6197 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6198 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6199 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6200 <!-- f6 -->
6201 Fred Warshofsky, The Patent Wars (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6202 </para></footnote>
6203 And relative to a
6204 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6205 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6206 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6207 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6208 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6209 Brezhnev.
6210 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6211 </para>
6212 <para>
6213 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6214 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6215 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6216 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6217 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6218 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6219 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6220 opportunities for innovation and change.
6221 </para>
6222 <para>
6223 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6224 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6225 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6226 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6227 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6228 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6229 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6230 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6231 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6232 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6233 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6234 regulation is justified.
6235 </para>
6236 <para>
6237 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6239 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6240 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6241 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6242 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6243 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6244 </para>
6245 <para>
6246 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6247 </para>
6248 <para>
6249 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6250 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6251 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6252 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6253 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6254 </para>
6255 <para>
6256 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6257 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6258 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6259 </para>
6260 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6261 <para>
6262 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, which argued that
6263 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6264 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6265 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6266 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6267 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6268 </para>
6269 <para>
6270 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6271 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6272 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6273 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6274 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6275 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6276 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6277 </para>
6278 <para>
6279 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6280 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6281 culture.<footnote><para>
6282 <!-- f7 -->
6283 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6284 Environmentalism for the Net?" Duke Law Journal 47 (1997): 87.
6285 </para></footnote>
6286 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6287 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6288 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6289 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6290 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6291 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6293 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6294 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6295 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6296 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6297 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6298 </para>
6299 <para>
6300 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6301 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6302 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6303 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6304 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6305 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6306 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6307 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6308 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6309 </para>
6310 <para>
6311 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6312 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6313 be lost.
6314 </para>
6315 </sect2>
6316 <sect2 id="beginnings">
6317 <title>Beginnings</title>
6318 <para>
6319 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6320 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6321 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6322 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6323 </para>
6324 <para>
6325 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6326 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6327 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6328 </para>
6329 <para>
6330 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6331 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6332 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6333
6334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6335 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6336 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6337 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power to
6338 promote progress. The grant of power is its purpose, and its purpose
6339 is a public one, not the purpose of enriching publishers, nor even
6340 primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6341 </para>
6342 <para>
6343 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6344 in chapter 6, the English limited the term of copyright so as to
6345 assure that a few would not exercise disproportionate control over
6346 culture by exercising disproportionate control over publishing. We can
6347 assume the framers followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed,
6348 unlike the English, the framers reinforced that objective, by
6349 requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6350 </para>
6351 <para>
6352 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6353 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6354 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6355 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6356 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6357 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6358 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6359 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6360 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6361 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6362 case, a structure built checks and balances into the constitutional
6363 frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable concentrations of
6364 power.
6365 </para>
6366 <para>
6367 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6368 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6369 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6370 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6371 years since they first struck its design.
6372 </para>
6373 <para>
6374 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6375 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6377 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6378 started here:
6379 </para>
6380 <figure id="fig-1441">
6381 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6382 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6383 </figure>
6384 <para>
6385 We will end here:
6386 </para>
6387 <figure id="fig-1442">
6388 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6389 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6390 </figure>
6391 <para>
6392 Let me explain how.
6393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6394 </para>
6395 </sect2>
6396 <sect2 id="lawduration">
6397 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6398 <para>
6399 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6400 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6401 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6402 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6403 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6404 authorship.<footnote>
6405 <para>
6406 <!-- f8 -->
6407 William W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6408 the United States (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6409 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6410 Law of the Land,' the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6411 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law" (emphasis added).
6412 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6413 </para></footnote>
6414 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6415 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6416 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6417 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6418 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6419 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6420 </para>
6421 <para>
6422 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6423 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6424 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6425 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6426 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6427 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6428 </para>
6429 <para>
6430 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6431 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6432 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6433 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6434 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6435 </para>
6436 <para>
6437 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6438 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6439 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6440 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6441 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6442 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6443 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6444 <!-- f9 -->
6445 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6446 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, A
6447 History of Book Publishing in the United States, vol. 1, The Creation
6448 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865 (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6449 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6450 1790 act; William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6451 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6452 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6453 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6454 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6455 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6456 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6457 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6458 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6459 </para>
6460 <para>
6461 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6462 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6463 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6464 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6465 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6466 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6467 copyright, either.
6468 </para>
6469 <para>
6470 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6471 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6472 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6473 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6474 domain.<footnote><para>
6475 <!-- f10 -->
6476 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6477 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6478 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6479 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6480 Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6481 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6482 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6483 University of Chicago Law Review 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6484 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6485 </para>
6486 <para>
6487 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6488 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6489 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6490 <!-- f11 -->
6491 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6492 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6493 no longer effectively controlled by copyright. The only practical
6494 commercial use of the books at that time is to sell the books as used
6495 books; that use&mdash;because it does not involve publication&mdash;is
6496 effectively free.
6497 </para>
6498 <para>
6499 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6500 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6501 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6502 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6503 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6504 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6505 </para>
6506 <para>
6507 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6508 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6509 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6510 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6511 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6512 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6513 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6514 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6515 </para>
6516 <para>
6517 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6518 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6519 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6520 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6521
6522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6523 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6524 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6525 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6526 </para>
6527 <para>
6528 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6529 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6530 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6531 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6532 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6533 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6534 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6535 value.
6536 </para>
6537 <para>
6538 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6539 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6540 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6541 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6542 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6543 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6544 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6545 was ninety-five years.
6546 </para>
6547 <para>
6548 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6549 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6550 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6551 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6552 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6553 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6554 them.
6555 </para>
6556 <para>
6557 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6558 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6559 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6560 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6561 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6562 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6563 years.<footnote><para>
6564 <!-- f12 -->
6565 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6566 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6567 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6568 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6569 </para></footnote>
6570 </para>
6571 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6572 </sect2>
6573 <sect2 id="lawscope">
6574 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6575 <para>
6576 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6577 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6578 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6579 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6580 </para>
6581 <para>
6582 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6583 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6584 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6585 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6586 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6587 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6588 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6589 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6590 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6591 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6592 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6593 </para>
6594 <para>
6595 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6596 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6597 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6598 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6599 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6600 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6601 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6602 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6603 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6604 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6605 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6606 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6607 on the initial creative work.
6608 </para>
6609 <para>
6610 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6611 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6612 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6614 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6615 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6616 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6617 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6618 famous &copy; or the word copyright. And for most of the history of
6619 American copyright law, there was a requirement that works be
6620 deposited with the government before a copyright could be secured.
6621 </para>
6622 <para>
6623 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6624 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6625 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6626 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6627 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6628 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6629 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6630 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6631 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6632 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6633 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6634 original author.
6635 </para>
6636 <para>
6637 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6638 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6639 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6640 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6641 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6642 copy available for others to copy.
6643 </para>
6644 <para>
6645 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6646 differences.
6647 </para>
6648 <para>
6649 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6650 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6651 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6652 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6653 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6654 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6655 <!-- f13 -->
6656 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6657 Creation
6658 of American Literature," 29 New York University Journal of
6659 International
6660 Law and Politics 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed., Federal
6661 Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6662 </para></footnote>
6663 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6664 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6665 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6666 </para>
6667 <para>
6668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6669 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your
6670 poem by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my
6671 act was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and
6672 made a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6673 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6674 creative
6675 activities remained free, while the activities of publishers were
6676 restrained.
6677 </para>
6678 <para>
6679 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6680 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6681 every note to your spouse, every doodle, every creative act that's
6682 reduced
6683 to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is automatically copyrighted.
6684 There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection follows
6685 the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
6686 </para>
6687 <para>
6688 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6689 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6690 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6691 </para>
6692 <para>
6693 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6694 control
6695 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6696 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6697 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6698 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6699 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6700 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6701 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6702 exclusive
6703 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6704 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6705 </para>
6706 <para>
6707 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6708 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6709 expansion
6710 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6711 copyright.
6712 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6713 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6714 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6715 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6716 </para>
6717 <para>
6718
6719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6720 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within
6721 a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the
6722 law applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
6723 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone
6724 else's work. But whatever that wrong is, transforming someone else's
6725 work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6726 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
6727 protect
6728 derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6729 <!-- f14 -->
6730 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," Legal Affairs, July/August
6731 2003, available at
6732 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6733 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6734 </para></footnote>
6735 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6736 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6737 the wrong of direct piracy.
6738 </para>
6739 <para>
6740 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same
6741 way. I can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my
6742 book. I can go to court and get an injunction against your
6743 transformative
6744 use of my book.<footnote><para>
6745 <!-- f15 -->
6746 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6747 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective
6748 of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See
6749 Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's
6750 Constitutionality,"
6751 Yale Law Journal 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6752 </para></footnote>
6753 These two different uses of my creative work are
6754 treated the same.
6755 </para>
6756 <para>
6757 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6758 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6759 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6760 creates
6761 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6762 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6763 originally created?
6764 </para>
6765 <para>
6766 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6767 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6768 simply
6769 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6770 rights originally granted.
6771 </para>
6772 </sect2>
6773 <sect2 id="lawreach">
6774 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6775 <para>
6776 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6777 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6778 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6779 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6780 <!-- f16 -->
6781 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6782 regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a copyrighted
6783 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't
6784 make a copy; 17 United States Code, section 106(4). And it certainly
6785 sometimes
6786 doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17 United States Code, section 112(a). But
6787 the presumption under the existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17
6788 United States Code, section 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6789 </para></footnote>
6790 </para>
6791 <para>
6792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6793 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for copyright
6794 law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's argument at the start of this
6795 chapter, that "creative property" deserves the "same rights" as all other
6796 property, it is the obvious that we need to be most careful about. For
6797 while it may be obvious that in the world before the Internet, copies
6798 were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon reflection, it should be
6799 obvious that in the world with the Internet, copies should not be the
6800 trigger for copyright law. More precisely, they should not always be the
6801 trigger for copyright law.
6802 </para>
6803 <para>
6804 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6805 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6806 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6807 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6808 <!-- f17 -->
6809 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6810 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6811 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6812 basis
6813 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6814 </para></footnote>
6815 because it is clear that the
6816 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6817 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6818 </para>
6819 <para>
6820 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6821 empty circle.
6822 </para>
6823 <figure id="fig-1521">
6824 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6825 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6826 </figure>
6827 <para>
6828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6829 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6830 all its potential uses. Most of these uses are unregulated by
6831 copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a
6832 book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone
6833 the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a
6834 book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that
6835 after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can impose no
6836 further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you sleep on
6837 the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew it up,
6838 those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those acts do
6839 not make a copy.
6840 </para>
6841 <figure id="fig-1531">
6842 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6843 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6844 </figure>
6845 <para>
6846 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6847 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6848 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6849 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6850 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6851 diagram on next page).
6852 </para>
6853 <para>
6854 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6855 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6856 </para>
6857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6858 <figure id="fig-1541">
6859 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6860 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6861 </figure>
6862 <para>
6863 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6864 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6865 unregulated.
6866 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6867 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6868 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6869 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6870 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6871 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6872 </para>
6873 <figure id="fig-1542">
6874 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6875 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6876 </figure>
6877 <para> </para>
6878 <figure id="fig-1551">
6879 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6880 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6881 </figure>
6882 <para>
6883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6884 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6885 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6886 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6887 </para>
6888 <para>
6889 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6890 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6891 <!-- f18 -->
6892 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6893 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6894 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6895 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6896 </para></footnote>
6897 And because of this single,
6898 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6899 category
6900 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6901 unregulated
6902 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6903 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6904 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6905 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6906 category
6907 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6908 copyrighted
6909 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6910 burden of this shift.
6911 </para>
6912 <para>
6913 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6914 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be
6915 no plausible copyright-related argument that the copyright owner could
6916 make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
6917 nothing
6918 to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
6919 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6920 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6921 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6922 produced
6923 a copy.
6924 </para>
6925 <para>
6926 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a
6927 different
6928 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6929 only once or only once a month, then copyright law would aid the
6930 copyright
6931 owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
6932 accidental
6933 feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
6934 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says
6935 you may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or
6936 any portion of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the
6937 book contrary to the copyright owner's wish.
6938 </para>
6939 <para>
6940 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6941 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6942 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6943 points also become clear:
6944 </para>
6945 <para>
6946 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6947 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6948 presumptively
6949 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6950 evidence
6951 at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed
6952 our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of
6953 free culture before the Internet.
6954 </para>
6955 <para>
6956 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6957 transformative
6958 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong
6959 in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate any
6960 transformation
6961 you make of creative work using a machine. "Copy and paste"
6962 and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with a story and
6963 releasing
6964 it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a requirement of
6965 justification.
6966 However troubling the expansion with respect to copying a
6967 particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect to
6968 transformative
6969 uses of creative work.
6970 </para>
6971 <para>
6972 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
6973
6974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
6975 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
6976 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
6977 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
6978 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
6979 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
6980 Internet,
6981 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
6982 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
6983 protected
6984 before because reading was not regulated.
6985 </para>
6986 <para>
6987 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
6988 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
6989 depend
6990 upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question about
6991 the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in
6992 fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are unregulated. But
6993 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the
6994 protections
6995 of fair use are not enough.
6996 </para>
6997 <para>
6998 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
6999 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7000 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7001 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7002 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7003 </para>
7004 <para>
7005 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7006 began
7007 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7008 previews.
7009 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7010 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7011 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7012 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7013 before
7014 you bought it.
7015 </para>
7016 <para>
7017 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7018 distributors
7019 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7020 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7021 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7023 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7024 business
7025 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7026 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7027 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7028 immediately.
7029 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7030 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7031 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7032 </para>
7033 <para>
7034 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7035 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7036 infringed"
7037 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7038 willful
7039 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7040 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7041 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7042 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7043 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7044 </para>
7045 <para>
7046 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7047 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7048 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7049 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7050 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7051 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7052 Disney's permission.
7053 </para>
7054 <para>
7055 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
7056 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
7057 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control
7058 how people got access to their content. Once a video was in the
7059 marketplace,
7060 the "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he
7061 wished, including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the
7062 entire movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney
7063 to centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
7064 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
7065 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
7066 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7067 </para>
7068 <para>
7069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7070 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7071 control
7072 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the right to say
7073 you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right.
7074 But the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes &amp;
7075 Noble
7076 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores.
7077 Competition protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my
7078 argument
7079 so far does not even question this) that competition would prevent
7080 any similar danger when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers
7081 exercising
7082 the rights that authors have assigned to them might try to regulate
7083 how many times you read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book
7084 with anyone. But in a competitive market such as the book market, the
7085 dangers of this happening are quite slight.
7086 </para>
7087 <para>
7088 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7089 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7090 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7091 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7092 owners
7093 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
7094 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7095 </para>
7096 </sect2>
7097 <sect2 id="lawforce">
7098 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7099 <para>
7100 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7101 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7102 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7103 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7104 </para>
7105 <para>
7106 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7107 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7108 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7109 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7110 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7111 your freedom.
7112 </para>
7113 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7114 <para>
7115 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7116 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7117 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7118 Casablanca. Warner Brothers objected. They wrote a nasty letter to the
7119 Marxes, warning them that there would be serious legal consequences
7120 if they went forward with their plan.<footnote><para>
7121 <!-- f19 -->
7122 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," Law and
7123 Contemporary
7124 Problems 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7125 </para></footnote>
7126 </para>
7127 <para>
7128 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7129 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7130 you were."<footnote><para>
7131 <!-- f20 -->
7132 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs, 1&ndash;3.
7133 </para></footnote>
7134 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word brothers,
7135 and if Warner Brothers insisted on trying to control Casablanca, then
7136 the Marx Brothers would insist on control over brothers.
7137 </para>
7138 <para>
7139 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7140 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7141 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7142 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7143 </para>
7144 <para>
7145 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because
7146 on the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by
7147 a machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7148 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7149 copyrighted
7150 content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem
7151 with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code
7152 would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The consequence of
7153 that is not at all funny.
7154 </para>
7155 <para>
7156 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7157 </para>
7158 <para>
7159 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook
7160 is not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7161 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7162 technology,
7163 and the publisher delivers the content by using the technology.
7164 </para>
7165 <para>
7166 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7167 Reader.
7168 </para>
7169 <para>
7170 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7171 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7172 public domain: Middlemarch, for example, is in the public domain.
7173 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My
7174 own book The Future of Ideas is not yet within the public domain.
7175 Consider Middlemarch first. If you click on my e-book copy of
7176 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7177 Middlemarch, you'll see a fancy cover, and then a button at the bottom
7178 called Permissions.
7179 </para>
7180 <figure id="fig-1611">
7181 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7182 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7183 </figure>
7184 <para>
7185 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7186 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7187 </para>
7188 <figure id="fig-1612">
7189 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7190 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7191 </figure>
7192 <para>
7193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7194 According to my eBook
7195 Reader, I have the permission
7196 to copy to the clipboard of the
7197 computer ten text selections
7198 every ten days. (So far, I've
7199 copied no text to the clipboard.)
7200 I also have the permission to
7201 print ten pages from the book
7202 every ten days. Lastly, I have
7203 the permission to use the Read
7204 Aloud button to hear
7205 Middlemarch
7206 read aloud through the
7207 computer.
7208 </para>
7209 <para>
7210 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7211 translation): Aristotle's Politics.
7212 </para>
7213 <figure id="fig-1621">
7214 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7215 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7216 </figure>
7217 <para>
7218 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7219 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7220 the book.
7221 </para>
7222 <figure id="fig-1622">
7223 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7224 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7225 </figure>
7226 <para>
7227 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7228 original e-book version of my last book, The Future of Ideas:
7229 </para>
7230 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7231 <figure id="fig-1631">
7232 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7233 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7234 </figure>
7235 <para>
7236 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7237 </para>
7238 <para>
7239 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"&mdash;
7240 as if the publisher has the power to control how you use these works.
7241 For works under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have
7242 the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not
7243 under
7244 copyright, there is no such copyright power.<footnote><para>
7245 <!-- f21 -->
7246 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
7247 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
7248 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
7249 obligation
7250 (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
7251 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would
7252 not necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
7253 </para></footnote>
7254 When my e-book of
7255 Middlemarch says I have the permission to copy only ten text selections
7256 into the memory every ten days, what that really means is that the
7257 eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control how I use the book
7258 on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would enable.
7259 </para>
7260 <para>
7261 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7262 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7263 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal
7264 with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she
7265 knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till 2 A.M., but
7266 will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook
7267 Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies of the text into
7268 the computer's memory, that means that after I've made ten copies, the
7269 computer will not make any more. The same with the printing
7270 restrictions:
7271 After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not print any more pages.
7272 It's the same with the silly restriction that says that you can't use the
7273 Read Aloud button to read my book aloud&mdash;it's not that the company
7274 will sue you if you do; instead, if you push the Read Aloud button with
7275 my book, the machine simply won't read aloud.
7276 </para>
7277 <para>
7278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7279 These are controls, not permissions. Imagine a world where the
7280 Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried to
7281 type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
7282 </para>
7283 <para>
7284 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright law as
7285 copyright code. The controls over access to content will not be controls
7286 that are ratified by courts; the controls over access to content will be
7287 controls that are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that
7288 are built into the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls
7289 that are built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7290 </para>
7291 <para>
7292 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7293 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7294 technologies
7295 that limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those
7296 were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these
7297 protections as well?
7298 </para>
7299 <para>
7300 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7301 eBook Reader.
7302 </para>
7303 <para>
7304 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a
7305 public
7306 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for
7307 free on the Adobe site was a copy of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
7308 This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet when you clicked on
7309 Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
7310 </para>
7311 <figure id="fig-1641">
7312 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7313 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7314 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7315 </figure>
7316 <para>
7317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7318 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not
7319 allowed
7320 to copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7321 "permissions"
7322 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7323 </para>
7324 <para>
7325 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7326 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7327 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7328 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7329 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7330 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7331 </para>
7332 <para>
7333 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7334 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7335 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7336 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7337 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7338 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7339 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7340 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7341 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7342 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7343 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7344 </para>
7345 <para>
7346 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7347 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7348 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7349 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7350 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7351 often crazy.
7352 </para>
7353 <para>
7354 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7355 story of mine that makes the same point.
7356 </para>
7357 <indexterm id="idxaibo" class='startofrange'>
7358 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7359 </indexterm>
7360 <para>
7361 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7362 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7363 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7364 </para>
7365 <para>
7366 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7367 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7368 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7370 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7371 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7372 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7373 </para>
7374 <para>
7375 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7376 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7377 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7378 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7379 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7380 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7381 </para>
7382 <para>
7383 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7384 word hack has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7385 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7386 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, hack is a much
7387 more positive term. Hack just means code that enables the program to
7388 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7389 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7390 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7391 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7392 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7393 </para>
7394 <para>
7395 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7396 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7397 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7398 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7399 ethically.
7400 </para>
7401 <para>
7402 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7403 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7404 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7405 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7406 than Sony had built.
7407 </para>
7408 <indexterm startref="idxaibo" class='endofrange'/>
7409 <para>
7410 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7411 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7412 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7413 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7414 the
7415
7416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7417 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7418 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7419 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7420 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7421 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7422 thought, What possible problem could there be with teaching a robot
7423 dog to dance?
7424 </para>
7425 <para>
7426 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7427 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7428 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7429 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7430 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7431 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7432 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7433 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7434 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7435 </para>
7436 <para>
7437 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7438 <!-- f22 -->
7439 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7440 Science 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7441 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," American Prospect,
7442 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7443 DMCA," Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter, 11 December 2001; Bill
7444 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," Billboard,
7445 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7446 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7447 Questions about Felten and USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case," available at
7448 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7449 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7450 </para></footnote>
7451 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7452 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7453 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7454 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7455 </para>
7456 <para>
7457 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7458 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7459 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7460 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7461 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7462 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7463 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7464 Internet much more.
7465 </para>
7466 <para>
7467 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7468 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7469 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7470 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7471 </para>
7472 <para>
7473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7474 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7475 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7476 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7477 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7478 </para>
7479 <para>
7480 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7481 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7482 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7483 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7484 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7485 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7486 </para>
7487 <para>
7488 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7489 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7490 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7491 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7492 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7493 constituted, succeed.
7494 </para>
7495 <para>
7496 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7497 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7498 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7499 wrote:
7500 </para>
7501 <blockquote>
7502 <para>
7503 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7504 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7505 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7506 </para>
7507 </blockquote>
7508 <para>
7509 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7510 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7511 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7512 </para>
7513 <blockquote>
7514 <para>
7515 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7516 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7517 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7518 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7519 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7520 </para>
7521 </blockquote>
7522 <para>
7523 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7524 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7525 spreading such information an offense.
7526 </para>
7527 <para>
7528 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7529 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7530 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7531 These new technologies would be copyright protection technologies&mdash;
7532 technologies to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted
7533 material. They were designed as code to modify the original code of the
7534 Internet, to reestablish some protection for copyright owners.
7535 </para>
7536 <para>
7537 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7538 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7539 legal code intended to buttress software code which itself was
7540 intended to support the legal code of copyright.
7541 </para>
7542 <para>
7543 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7544 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7545 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7546 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7547 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7548 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7549 have been a copyright violation.
7550 </para>
7551 <para>
7552 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7553 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7554 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7555 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7556 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7557 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7558 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7560 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7561 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7562 </para>
7563 <para>
7564 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7565 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7566 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7567 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7568 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7569 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7570 </para>
7571 <para>
7572 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7573 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7574 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7575 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7576 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7577 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "Mr. Rogers," for example, had
7578 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7579 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7580 </para>
7581 <blockquote>
7582 <para>
7583 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7584 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7585 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7586 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7587 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7588 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7589 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7590 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7591 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7592 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7593 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7594 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7595 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7596 important.<footnote><para>
7597 <!-- f23 -->
7598 Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
7599 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7600 James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7601 the VCR (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7602 </para></footnote>
7603 </para>
7604 </blockquote>
7605 <para>
7606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7607 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7608 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7609 the VCR responsible.
7610 </para>
7611 <para>
7612 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7613 the DMCA.
7614 </para>
7615 <para>
7616 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7617 </para>
7618 <para>
7619 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7620 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7621 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7622 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7623 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7624 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7625 </para>
7626 <para>
7627 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7629 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7630 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7631 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7632 and bad uses.
7633 </para>
7634 <figure id="fig-1711">
7635 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7636 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7637 </figure>
7638 <para>
7639 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7640 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7641 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: No one ever died from
7642 copyright circumvention. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
7643 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but
7644 permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7645 </para>
7646 <para>
7647 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7648 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7649 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7650 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7651 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7652 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7653 </para>
7654 <para>
7655 This is how code becomes law. The controls built into the technology
7656 of copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7657 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the law&mdash;increasing its
7658 regulation, even if the subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise
7659 plainly constitute fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes
7660 law; code extends the law; code thus extends the control that copyright
7661 owners effect&mdash;at least for those copyright holders with the lawyers
7662 who can write the nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7663 </para>
7664 <para>
7665 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7666 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7667 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7668 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7669 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7670 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7671 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7672 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7673 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7674 </para>
7675 <para>
7676
7677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7678 For example, imagine you were part of a Star Trek fan club. You
7679 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7680 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7681 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7682 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7683 <!-- f24 -->
7684 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7685 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," Loyola of Los Angeles
7686 Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1997): 651.
7687 </para></footnote>
7688 </para>
7689 <para>
7690 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7691 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7692 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7693 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7694 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7695 </para>
7696 <para>
7697 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7698 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7699 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7700 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7701 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7702 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7703 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7704 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7705 </para>
7706 <para>
7707 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7708 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7709 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7710 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7711 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7712 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7713 </para>
7714 </sect2>
7715 <sect2 id="marketconcentration">
7716 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7717 <para>
7718 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7719 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7720 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7721 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7722 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7723 find better ways
7724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7725 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7726 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7727 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7728 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7729 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7730 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7731 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7732 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7733 control.
7734 </para>
7735 <para>
7736 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7737 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7738 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7739 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7740 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7741 </para>
7742 <para>
7743 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7744 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7745 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7746 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7747 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7748 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7749 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7750 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7751 of the media.
7752 </para>
7753 <para>
7754 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7755 nature.
7756 </para>
7757 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7758 <para>
7759 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7760 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7761 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7762 <!-- f25 -->
7763 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7764 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7765 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7766 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7767 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7768 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7769 <!-- f26 -->
7770 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7771 Slide," New York Times, 23 December 2002.
7772 </para></footnote>
7773 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7774 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7775 <!-- f27 -->
7776 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," Charleston Gazette,
7777 31 May 2003.
7778 </para></footnote>
7779 </para>
7780 <para>
7781 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7782 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7784 seventy-five stations. Today one company owns more than 1,200
7785 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
7786 radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two
7787 largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that market's
7788 revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of the
7789 nation's radio advertising revenues.
7790 </para>
7791 <para>
7792 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7793 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7794 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7795 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7796 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7797 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7798 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7799 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7800 protected&mdash; by the market.
7801 </para>
7802 <para>
7803 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7804 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7805 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7806 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7807 </para>
7808 <blockquote>
7809 <para>
7810 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7811 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7812 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7813 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7814 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7815 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7816 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7817 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7818 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7819 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7820 <!-- f28 -->
7821 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," Atlantic Monthly (September
7822 2003): 89.
7823 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7824 </para></footnote>
7825 </para>
7826 </blockquote>
7827 <para>
7828 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7829 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7830 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7831 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7832 </para>
7833 <figure id="fig-1761">
7834 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7835 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7836 </figure>
7837 <para>
7838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7839 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7840 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7841 distribute content?
7842 </para>
7843 <para>
7844 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7845 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7846 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7847 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7848 </para>
7849 <para>
7850 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7851 integration may matter.
7852 </para>
7853 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7854 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7855 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7856 <para>
7857 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for All in the Family. He took
7858 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7859 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7860 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7861 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7862 </para>
7863 <para>
7864 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7865 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7866 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7867 control.<footnote><para>
7868 <!-- f29 -->
7869 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7870 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7871 Missouri,
7872 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7873 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7874 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7875 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7876 </para></footnote>
7877 </para>
7878 <para>
7879
7880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7881 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7882 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7883 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7884 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7885 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7886 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7887 networks.
7888 </para>
7889 <para>
7890 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7891 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7892 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7893 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7894 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7895 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7896 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7897 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7898 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7899 <!-- f30 -->
7900 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7901 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7902 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7903 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7904 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7905 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7906 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7907 2003.
7908 </para></footnote>
7909 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7910 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7911 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7912 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7913 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7914 63%."<footnote><para>
7915 <!-- f31 -->
7916 Ibid.
7917 </para></footnote>
7918 </para>
7919 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7920 <para>
7921 Today, another Norman Lear with another All in the Family would
7922 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7923 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7924 owned by the network.
7925 </para>
7926 <para>
7927 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7928 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7929 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7930 </para>
7931 <blockquote>
7932 <para>
7933 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7934 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7935 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7936 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7938 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7939 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7940 handful.<footnote><para>
7941 <!-- f32 -->
7942 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," Now with Bill Moyers, Bill
7943 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7944 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7945 </para></footnote>
7946 </para>
7947 </blockquote>
7948 <para>
7949 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7950 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7951 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7952 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7953 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
7954 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
7955 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
7956 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
7957 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
7958 democracy.
7959 </para>
7960 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
7961 <para>
7962 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
7963 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
7964 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
7965 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
7966 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
7967 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
7968 <!-- f33 -->
7969 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The
7970 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
7971 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
7972 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
7973 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
7974 Concepts in Technological Evolution," Research Policy 14 (1985):
7975 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
7976 Kaplan, Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
7977 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them
7978 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
7979
7980 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
7981 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
7982 sprinting.
7983 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
7984 </para>
7985 <para>
7986 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
7987 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
7988 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
7989 measure.
7990 </para>
7991 <para>
7992 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
7993 suggest the concern.
7994 </para>
7995 <para>
7996 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
7997 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
7998 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
7999 </para>
8000 <para>
8001 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8002 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8003 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8004
8005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8006 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8007 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8008 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8009 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8010 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8011 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8012 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8013 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8014 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8015 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8016 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8017 outweigh these costs.
8018 </para>
8019 <para>
8020 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8021 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8022 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8023 these issues.
8024 </para>
8025 <para>
8026 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8027 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8028 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8029 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8030 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8031 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8032 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8033 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8034 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8035 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8036 </para>
8037 <para>
8038 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8039 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8040 </para>
8041 <para>
8042 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8043 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8044 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8045 war. Can you do it?
8046 </para>
8047 <para>
8048 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8050 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8051 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8052 message will be heard then?
8053 </para>
8054 <para>
8055 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8056 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8057 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8058 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8059 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8060 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8061 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8062 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8063 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8064 <!-- f34 -->
8065 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8066 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8067 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8068 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8069 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8070 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8071 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8072 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8073 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8074 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," New
8075 York Times, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8076 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8077 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8078 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8079 Radio," Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8080 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8081 Radio-Television News Directors Association v. FCC, 184 F. 3d 872
8082 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8083 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8084 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8085 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8086 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8087 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8088 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8089 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8090 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8091 </para></footnote>
8092 </para>
8093 <para>
8094 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8095 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8096 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8097 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8098 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8099 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8100 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8101 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8102 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8103 </para>
8104 </sect2>
8105 <sect2 id="together">
8106 <title>Together</title>
8107 <para>
8108 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8109 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8110 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8111 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8112 </para>
8113 <para>
8114 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8115 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8116 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8117 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8118 to seem
8119
8120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8121 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8122 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8123 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8124 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8125 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8126 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8127 be redefined.
8128 </para>
8129 <para>
8130 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8131 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8132 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8133 our culture today.
8134 </para>
8135 <para>
8136 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8137 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8138 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8139 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8140 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8141 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8142 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8143 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8144 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8145 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8146 </para>
8147 <para>
8148 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8149 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8150 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8151 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8152 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8153 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8154 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8155 future. And these changes have to be reductions in the scope of
8156 copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase in control that
8157 technology and the market enable.
8158 </para>
8159 <para>
8160 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8161 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8163 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8164 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8165 Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control more of
8166 the development of our culture than now.
8167 </para>
8168 <para> Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8169 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8170 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8171 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8172 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8173 were independent of the networks. Never has copyright protected such a
8174 wide range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term
8175 that was remotely as long. This form of regulation&mdash;a tiny
8176 regulation of a tiny part of the creative energy of a nation at the
8177 founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation of the overall creative
8178 process. Law plus technology plus the market now interact to turn this
8179 historically benign regulation into the most significant regulation of
8180 culture that our free society has known.<footnote><para>
8181 <!-- f35 -->
8182 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8183 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8184 </para></footnote>
8185 </para>
8186 <para>
8187 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8188 </para>
8189 <para>
8190 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8191 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8192 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8193 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8194 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8195 </para>
8196
8197 <table id="t2">
8198 <title></title>
8199 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8200 <thead>
8201 <row>
8202 <entry></entry>
8203 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8204 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8205 </row>
8206 </thead>
8207 <tbody>
8208 <row>
8209 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8210 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8211 <entry>Free</entry>
8212 </row>
8213 <row>
8214 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8215 <entry>Free</entry>
8216 <entry>Free</entry>
8217 </row>
8218 </tbody>
8219 </tgroup>
8220 </table>
8221
8222 <para>
8223 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8224 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8225 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8226
8227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8228 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8229 noncommercial work was also free.
8230 </para>
8231 <para>
8232 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8233 </para>
8234
8235 <table id="t3">
8236 <title></title>
8237 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8238 <thead>
8239 <row>
8240 <entry></entry>
8241 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8242 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8243 </row>
8244 </thead>
8245 <tbody>
8246 <row>
8247 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8248 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8249 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8250 </row>
8251 <row>
8252 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8253 <entry>Free</entry>
8254 <entry>Free</entry>
8255 </row>
8256 </tbody>
8257 </tgroup>
8258 </table>
8259
8260 <para>
8261 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8262 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8263 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8264 transformation were still essentially free.
8265 </para>
8266 <para>
8267 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8268 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8269 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8270 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8271 we could say the law began to look like this:
8272 </para>
8273
8274 <table id="t4">
8275 <title></title>
8276 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8277 <thead>
8278 <row>
8279 <entry></entry>
8280 <entry>COPY</entry>
8281 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8282 </row>
8283 </thead>
8284 <tbody>
8285 <row>
8286 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8287 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8288 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8289 </row>
8290 <row>
8291 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8292 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8293 <entry>Free</entry>
8294 </row>
8295 </tbody>
8296 </tgroup>
8297 </table>
8298
8299 <para>
8300 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8301 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8302 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8303 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8304 that the law now looks like this:
8305 </para>
8306
8307 <table id="t5">
8308 <title></title>
8309 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8310 <thead>
8311 <row>
8312 <entry></entry>
8313 <entry>COPY</entry>
8314 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8315 </row>
8316 </thead>
8317 <tbody>
8318 <row>
8319 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8320 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8321 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8322 </row>
8323 <row>
8324 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8325 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8326 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8327 </row>
8328 </tbody>
8329 </tgroup>
8330 </table>
8331
8332 <para>
8333 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8334 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8335 creativity&mdash;
8336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8337 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8338 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8339 </para>
8340 <para>
8341 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8342 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8343 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8344 these domains actually does any good.
8345 </para>
8346 <para>
8347 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8348 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8349 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8350 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8351 reasons sketched especially in chapters 7 and 8, one might well wonder
8352 whether it does more harm than good for commercial transformation.
8353 More commercial transformative work would be created if derivative
8354 rights were more sharply restricted.
8355 </para>
8356 <para>
8357 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8358 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8359 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8360 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8361 property rights<footnote><para>
8362 <!-- f36 -->
8363 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8364 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8365 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8366 Disintegration of Property," in Nomos XXII: Property, J. Roland
8367 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8368 Press, 1980).
8369 </para></footnote>)
8370 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8371 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8372 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8373 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8374 did not control at all the freedom of others to build upon or
8375 transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
8376 almost 180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich
8377 free culture.
8378 </para>
8379 <para>
8380 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8381 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8382 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8383 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8384 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8385 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8386 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8387 chapter 7). Adding
8388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8389 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8390 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8391 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8392 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8393 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8394 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8395 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8396 dominates the debate today.
8397 </para>
8398 <para>
8399 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8400 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8401 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8402 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8403 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8404 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8405 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8406 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8407 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8408 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8409 lawyer.
8410 </para>
8411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8412 </sect2>
8413 </sect1>
8414 </chapter>
8415 <chapter id="c-puzzles">
8416 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8417 <para></para>
8418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8419 <sect1 id="chimera">
8420 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8421 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8422 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8423 </indexterm>
8424 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8425 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8426 </indexterm>
8427 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8428 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8429 </indexterm>
8430
8431 <para>
8432 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8433 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8434 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8435 <!-- f1. -->
8436 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8437 The Country of the Blind and Other Stories, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8438 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8439 </para></footnote>
8440 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8441 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8442 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8443 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8444 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8445 villagers to explore life as a king.
8446 </para>
8447 <para>
8448 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8449 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8450 "blind." They don't have the word blind. They think he's just thick.
8451 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8452 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8453 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8454 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8455 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8456 alone!'"
8457 </para>
8458 <para>
8459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8460 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8461 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8462 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8463 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8464 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8465 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8466 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8467 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8468 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8469 </para>
8470 <para>
8471 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8472 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8473 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8474 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8475 </para>
8476 <para>
8477 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8478 is affected," he reports.
8479 </para>
8480 <para>
8481 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8482 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8483 his brain."
8484 </para>
8485 <para>
8486 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8487 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8488 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8489 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8490 </para>
8491 <para>
8492 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8493 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8494 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8495 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8496 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8497 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8498 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8499 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8500
8501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8502 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8503 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8504 scene. . . ."
8505 </para>
8506 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8507 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8508 <para>
8509 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8510 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8511 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8512 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8513 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8514 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8515 </para>
8516 <para>
8517 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8518 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8519 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8520 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8521 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8522 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8523 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8524 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8525 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8526 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8527 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8528 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8529 </para>
8530 <para>
8531 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8532 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8533 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8534 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8535 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8536 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8537 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8538 </para>
8539 <para>
8540 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8541 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8542 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8543 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8544 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8545 from Tower.
8546 </para>
8547 <para>
8548
8549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8550 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8551 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8552 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8553 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8554 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8555 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8556 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8557 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8558 </para>
8559 <para>
8560 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8561 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8562 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8563 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8564 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8565 </para>
8566 <para>
8567 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8568 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8569 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8570 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8571 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8572 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8573 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8574 implemented.<footnote><para>
8575 <!-- f2. -->
8576 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8577 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8578 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003,
8579 available at
8580 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8581 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8582 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8583 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8584 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8585 Stakes on Piracy," Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2003, available at
8586 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8587 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8588 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8589 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8590 through a family computer, see RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services (In
8591 re. Verizon Internet Services), 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8592 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8593 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8594 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8595 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8596 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8597 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8598 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8599 August 2003, available at
8600 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8601 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8602 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8603 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8604 Name Students," Boston Globe, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8605 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8606 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8607 </para></footnote>
8608
8609 </para>
8610 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8611 <para>
8612 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8613 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8614 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8615 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8616 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8617 </para>
8618 <para>
8619 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8620 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8621 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8622 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8623 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8624 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe either extreme would be worse than a
8625 reasonable alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution
8626 would be the worse of the two extremes.
8627 </para>
8628 <para>
8629
8630 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8631 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8632 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8633 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8634 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8635 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8636 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8637 </para>
8638 <para>
8639 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8640 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8641 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8642 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8643 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8644 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8645 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8646 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8647 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8648 protection for copyrighted material,
8649 </para>
8650 <blockquote>
8651 <para>
8652 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8653 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8654 </para>
8655 <para>
8656 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8657 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8658 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8659 answer
8660 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8661 well produce a totally different industry model.
8662 </para>
8663 <para>
8664 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8665 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8666 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8667 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8668 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8669 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8670 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8671 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8672 interests.<footnote><para>
8673 <!-- f3. --> WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to
8674 Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before
8675 the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
8676 Protection,
8677 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement
8678 of Peter Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8679 EMusic.com),
8680 available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8681 Congressional
8682 Testimony File.
8683 </para></footnote>
8684 </para>
8685 </blockquote>
8686 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8687 <para>
8688 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8689 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8690 changed.
8691 </para>
8692 <para>
8693 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8694 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will
8695 kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8696 </para>
8697
8698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8699 </sect1>
8700 <sect1 id="harms">
8701 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8702 <para>
8703
8704 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8705 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8706 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8707 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8708 prohibition,
8709 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8710 </para>
8711 <para>
8712 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8713 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8714 extend
8715 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8716 justified?
8717 </para>
8718 <para>
8719 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8720 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8721 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8722 our history.
8723 </para>
8724 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8725 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8726 <para>
8727 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8728 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8729 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8730 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8731 </para>
8732 <para>
8733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8734 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8735 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8736 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8737 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8738 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8739 </para>
8740 <sect2 id="constrain">
8741 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8742 <para>
8743 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8744 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8745 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8746 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8747 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8748 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8749 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8750 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8751 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8752 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8753 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8754 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8755 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8756 </para>
8757 <para>
8758 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8759 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8760 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8761 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8762 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8763 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8764 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8765 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8766 the culture all around.
8767 </para>
8768 <para>
8769 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8770 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8771
8772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8773
8774 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8775 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8776 storytelling extended across the globe.
8777 </para>
8778 <para>
8779 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8780 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8781 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8782 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8783 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8784 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8785 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8786 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8787 work is presumptively illegal.
8788 </para>
8789 <para>
8790 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8791 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8792 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8793 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8794 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8795 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8796 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8797 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8798 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8799 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8800 million.<footnote><para>
8801 <!-- f1. -->
8802 See Lynne W. Jeter, Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
8803 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8804 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8805 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8806 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8807 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8808 </para></footnote>
8809 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8810 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8811 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8812 suffering.<footnote>
8813 <para>
8814 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8815 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8816 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8817 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8818 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8819 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8820 available at
8821 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8822 recent months.
8823 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8824 </para></footnote>
8825 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8826 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8827 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8828 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8829 </para>
8830 <para>
8831 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8832 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either
8833 never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this
8834 creative
8835 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys
8836 "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public
8837 domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are designed to
8838
8839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8840 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right to
8841 create,
8842 and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As was the
8843 case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons, we will
8844 begin
8845 to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the message is
8846 necessarily
8847 political, or because the subject is controversial, but because the
8848 very act of creating the art is legally fraught. Already, exhibits of
8849 "illegal
8850 art" tour the United States.<footnote><para>
8851 <!-- f3. --> See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," Wired, 7 July 2003,
8852 available
8853 at
8854 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8855 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8856 </para></footnote>
8857 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8858 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8859 critical or reflective.
8860 </para>
8861 <para>
8862 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8863 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter 10. But an
8864 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8865 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8866 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8867 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8868 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8869 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8870 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8871 </para>
8872 <para>
8873 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8874 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8875 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8876 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8877 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8878 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8879 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8880 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8881 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8882 </para>
8883 <para>
8884 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8885 described in chapter 7, in response to the story about documentary
8886 filmmaker Jon Else, I have been lectured again and again by lawyers
8887 who insist Else's use was fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the
8888 law regulates such a use.
8889 </para>
8890 <para>
8891
8892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8893 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8894 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8895 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8896 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8897 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8898 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8899 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8900 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8901 </para>
8902 <para>
8903 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8904 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8905 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8906 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8907 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8908 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8909 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8910 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8911 comfort themselves.
8912 </para>
8913 <para>
8914 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8915 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8916 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8917 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8918 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8919 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8920 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8921 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8922 culture that is free.
8923 </para>
8924 <para>
8925 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8926 </para>
8927 <blockquote>
8928 <para>
8929 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8930 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8931 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8932 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8933 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8935 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8936 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8937 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8938 </para>
8939 </blockquote>
8940 </sect2>
8941 <sect2 id="innovators">
8942 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8943 <para>
8944 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
8945 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
8946 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
8947 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
8948 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
8949 think there's little in this story to worry you.
8950 </para>
8951 <para>
8952 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
8953 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
8954 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
8955 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
8956 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
8957 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
8958 affecting culture are more fundamental.
8959 </para>
8960 <para>
8961 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
8962 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
8963 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
8964 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
8965 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
8966 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
8967 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
8968 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
8969 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
8970 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
8971 against the competitors of tomorrow.
8972 </para>
8973 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
8974 <para>
8975 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
8976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
8977 strategy that I described in chapter 10. The consequence of this
8978 massive threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright
8979 law is that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely
8980 innovate only if they have the sign-off from last generation's
8981 dominant industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of
8982 cases that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
8983 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
8984 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
8985 </para>
8986 <para>
8987 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
8988 I told in The Future of Ideas and which has progressed in a way that
8989 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
8990 </para>
8991 <para>
8992 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
8993 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
8994 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
8995 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
8996 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
8997 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
8998 </para>
8999 <para>
9000 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9001 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9002 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9003 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9004 Raitt. And so on.
9005 </para>
9006 <para>
9007 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9008 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9009 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9010 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9011 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9012 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9013 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9014 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9015 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9016 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9017 </para>
9018 <para>
9019 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9020 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9021
9022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9023 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9024 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9025 the kind of content the users liked.
9026 </para>
9027 <para>
9028 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9029 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9030 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9031 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9032 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9033 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9034 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9035 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9036 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9037 they had already bought.
9038 </para>
9039 <para>
9040 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9041 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9042 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9043 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9044 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9045 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9046 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9047 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9048 </para>
9049 <para>
9050 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9051 </para>
9052 <para>
9053 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9054 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9055 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9056 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9057 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9058 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9059 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9060 demanded.
9061 </para>
9062 <para>
9063 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9064 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9065 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9066 clients in this
9067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9068 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9069 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9070 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9071 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9072 </para>
9073 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9074 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9075 <para>
9076 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9077 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9078 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9079 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9080 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9081 <!-- f4. --> See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," Los Angeles
9082 Times, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9083 innovation
9084 in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9085 Revolution
9086 Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available at
9087 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9088 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," Los Angeles
9089 Times, 28 May 2001.
9090 </para></footnote>
9091 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have
9092 recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
9093 industry
9094 should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
9095 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again,
9096 the aim of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if
9097 you fund a company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs,
9098 you are at risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well.
9099 Your investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9100 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers
9101 are afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in Business
9102 2.0, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9103 </para>
9104 <blockquote>
9105 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9106 <para>
9107 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9108 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9109 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9110 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9111 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9112 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9113 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9114 <para>
9115 <!-- f5. -->
9116 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," Business 2.0, 16 June
9117 2003, available at
9118 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9119 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9120 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9121 </para></footnote>
9122 </para>
9123 </blockquote>
9124 <para>
9125 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9126 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9127 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9128 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9129 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9130 constantly threatened by litigation.
9131 </para>
9132 <para>
9133
9134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9135 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9136 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9137 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9138 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9139 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9140 imposes,
9141 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9142 conservative
9143 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9144 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9145 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9146 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9147 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9148 </para>
9149 <para>
9150 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9151 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9152 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9153 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9154 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9155 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9156 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9157 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9158 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9159 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9160 </para>
9161 <para>
9162 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9163 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9164 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9165 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9166 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9167 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9168 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9169 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9170 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9171 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9172 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9173 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9175 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9176 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9177 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9178 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9179 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9180 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9181 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9182 </para>
9183 <para>
9184 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9185 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9186 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9187 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9188 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9189 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9190 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9191 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9192 </para>
9193 <para>
9194 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9195 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9196 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9197 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9198 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9199 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9200 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9201 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9202 </para></footnote>
9203
9204 Congress
9205 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9206 "broadcast
9207 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9208 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9209 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9210 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9211 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9212 violators
9213 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9214 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9215 </para></footnote>
9216
9217 </para>
9218 <para>
9219 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9220 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9221 regulation
9222 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9223 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9224
9225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9226 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9227 those requirements.
9228 </para>
9229 <para>
9230 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9231 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9232 impose.<footnote><para>
9233 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9234 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9235 </para></footnote>
9236 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9237 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9238 harm than good.
9239 </para>
9240 <para>
9241 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9242 innovation&mdash;again,
9243 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9244 crowd.
9245 </para>
9246 <para>
9247 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9248 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9249 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9250 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9251 </para>
9252 <para>
9253 As I described in chapter 10, despite this feature of copyright as
9254 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica
9255 Litman in her book Digital Copyright,<footnote><para>
9256 <!-- f9. --> Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
9257 2001).
9258 </para></footnote>
9259 overall this history of copyright
9260 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9261 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9262 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9263 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9264 </para>
9265 <para>
9266 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9267 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9268 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9269 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9270 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9271 </para>
9272 <para>
9273 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9274 <!-- f10. --> The only circuit court exception is found in Recording Industry Association
9275 of America (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 180 F. 3d 1072 (9th
9276 Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
9277 makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for contributory
9278 copyright
9279 infringement for a device that is unable to record or redistribute
9280 music
9281 (a device whose only copying function is to render portable a music file
9282 already stored on a user's hard drive).
9283 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9284 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
9285 Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
9286 Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the distributor and
9287 any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the distributor liable for
9288 contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
9289 </para></footnote>
9290 It has been
9291 mirrored in the responses threatened and actually implemented by
9292 Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses here.<footnote><para>
9293 <!-- f11. -->
9294 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9295 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9296 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9297 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9298 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9299 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9300 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9301 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9302 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9303 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9304 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9305 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9306 available at
9307 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9308 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9309 </para></footnote>
9310 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9311 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9312 </para>
9313 <para>
9314
9315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9316 As I described in chapter 4, when a radio station plays a song, the
9317 recording artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless
9318 he or she is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had
9319 recorded a version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9320 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9321 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9322 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9323 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9324 </para>
9325 <para>
9326 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9327 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9328 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9329 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9330 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9331 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9332 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9333 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9334 recording artists.
9335 </para>
9336 <para>
9337 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9338 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9339 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9340 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9341 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9342 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9343 metropolitan area.
9344 </para>
9345 <para>
9346 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9347 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9348 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9349 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9350 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9351 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9352 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9353 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9354 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9355 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9356 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9357 </para>
9358 <para>
9359
9360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9361 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9362 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9363 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9364 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9365 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9366 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9367 FM radio,
9368 </para>
9369 <blockquote>
9370 <para>
9371 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9372 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9373 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9374 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9375 than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation
9376 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9377 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9378 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9379 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9380 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9381 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9382 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9383 shackles.<footnote><para>
9384 <!-- f12. -->
9385 Lessing, 239.
9386 </para></footnote>
9387 </para>
9388 </blockquote>
9389 <para>
9390 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9391 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9392 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9393 legislation"<footnote><para>
9394 <!-- f13. -->
9395 Ibid., 229.
9396 </para></footnote>
9397 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9398 </para>
9399 <para>
9400 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9401 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9402 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9403 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9404 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9405 radio?
9406 </para>
9407 <para>
9408 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9409 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9410
9411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9412 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the
9413 phenomenon
9414 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress
9415 to adopt a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9416 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9417 hypothetical
9418 Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording of
9419 "Happy Birthday" on the air, Internet radio does. Not only is the law not
9420 neutral toward Internet radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio
9421 more than it burdens terrestrial radio.
9422 </para>
9423 <para>
9424 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9425 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9426 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9427 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9428 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9429 <para>
9430 <!-- f14. -->
9431 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9432 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9433 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9434 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9435 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9436 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9437 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9438 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9439 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9440 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9441 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9442 Distribution," Antitrust Bulletin (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9443 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9444 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9445 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9446 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9447 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9448 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9449 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9450 </para></footnote>
9451 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9452 equivalent fee.
9453 </para>
9454 <para>
9455 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9456 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
9457 would have to collect the following data from every listening transaction:
9458 </para>
9459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9460 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9461 <listitem><para>
9462 name of the service;
9463 </para></listitem>
9464 <listitem><para>
9465 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9466 </para></listitem>
9467 <listitem><para>
9468 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9469 </para></listitem>
9470 <listitem><para>
9471 date of transmission;
9472 </para></listitem>
9473 <listitem><para>
9474 time of transmission;
9475 </para></listitem>
9476 <listitem><para>
9477 time zone of origination of transmission;
9478 </para></listitem>
9479 <listitem><para>
9480 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9481 </para></listitem>
9482 <listitem><para>
9483 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9484 </para></listitem>
9485 <listitem><para>
9486 sound recording title;
9487 </para></listitem>
9488 <listitem><para>
9489 ISRC code of the recording;
9490 </para></listitem>
9491 <listitem><para>
9492 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9493 </para></listitem>
9494 <listitem><para>
9495 featured recording artist;
9496 </para></listitem>
9497 <listitem><para>
9498 retail album title;
9499 </para></listitem>
9500 <listitem><para>
9501 recording label;
9502 </para></listitem>
9503 <listitem><para>
9504 UPC code of the retail album;
9505 </para></listitem>
9506 <listitem><para>
9507 catalog number;
9508 </para></listitem>
9509 <listitem><para>
9510 copyright owner information;
9511 </para></listitem>
9512 <listitem><para>
9513 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9514 </para></listitem>
9515 <listitem><para>
9516 name of the service or entity;
9517 </para></listitem>
9518 <listitem><para>
9519 channel or program;
9520 </para></listitem>
9521 <listitem><para>
9522 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9523 </para></listitem>
9524 <listitem><para>
9525 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9526 </para></listitem>
9527 <listitem><para>
9528 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9529 </para></listitem>
9530 <listitem><para>
9531 Unique User identifier;
9532 </para></listitem>
9533 <listitem><para>
9534 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9535 </para></listitem>
9536 </orderedlist>
9537
9538 <para>
9539 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9540 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9541 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9542 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9543 Internet radio has to pay a type of copyright fee that terrestrial radio
9544 does not.
9545 </para>
9546 <para>
9547 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9548 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9549 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9550 </para>
9551 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9552 <para>
9553 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9554 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9555 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9556 </para>
9557 <blockquote>
9558 <para>
9559 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9560 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9561 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9562 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9563 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9564 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9565
9566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9567 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9568 Because
9569 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9570 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9571 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9572 of business. . . ."
9573 </para>
9574 <para>
9575 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this
9576 as an industry with thousands of webcasters, we think it should be
9577 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9578 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market." (Emphasis added.)
9579 </para>
9580 </blockquote>
9581 <para>
9582 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9583 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9584 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9585 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9586 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9587 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9588 effective to prevent it.
9589 </para>
9590 </sect2>
9591 <sect2 id="corruptingcitizens">
9592 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9593 <para>
9594 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9595 dinosaurs
9596 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9597 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9598 </para>
9599 <para>
9600 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9601 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9602 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9603 </para>
9604 <para>
9605 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9606 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9607 large number of citizens. According to The New York Times, 43 million
9608 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9609 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9610 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9611 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9612 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9613 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9614 </para></footnote>
9615 According to the RIAA,
9616 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9617 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9618
9619 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9620 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9621 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9622 increasingly
9623 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9624 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9625 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9626 extreme
9627 response by the other.
9628 </para>
9629 <para>
9630 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9631 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9632 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9633 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9634 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9635 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9636 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9637 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9638 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9639 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9640 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9641 was.<footnote><para>
9642 <!-- f16. -->
9643 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," Los
9644 Angeles Times, 10 September 2003, Business.
9645 </para></footnote>
9646 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9647 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9648 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9649 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9650 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9651 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9652 they oppose.
9653 </para>
9654 <para>
9655 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9656 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9657 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9658 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9659 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9660 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9661 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9662 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9663 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9664 <!-- f17. -->
9665 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9666 Prohibition," American Economic Review 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9667 </para></footnote>
9668 We have
9669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9670 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9671 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9672 <!-- f18. -->
9673 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9674 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9675 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9676 </para></footnote>
9677 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9678 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9679 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9680 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9681 cheat.<footnote><para>
9682 <!-- f19. -->
9683 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9684 Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9685 compliance literature).
9686 </para></footnote>
9687 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9688 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9689 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9690 </para>
9691 <para>
9692 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9693 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9694 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9695 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9696 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9697 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9698 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9699 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9700 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9701 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9702 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9703 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9704 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9705 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9706 degree of illegality.
9707 </para>
9708 <para>
9709 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9710 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9711 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9712 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9713 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9714 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9715 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9716 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9717 to consider the alternative.
9718 </para>
9719 <para>
9720
9721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9722 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9723 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9724 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9725 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9726 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9727 </para>
9728 <para>
9729 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9730 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9731 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9732 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9733 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9734 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9735 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9736 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9737 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9738 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9739 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9740 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9741 </para>
9742 <para>
9743 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9744 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9745 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9746 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9747 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9748 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9749 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9750 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9751 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9752 a nation of felons?
9753 </para>
9754 <para>
9755 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9756 </para>
9757 <para>
9758 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9759 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9760 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9761 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9762 used
9763
9764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9765 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9766 recordings is free.
9767 </para>
9768 <para>
9769 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9770 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9771 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9772 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9773 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9774 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9775 capacities of digital technologies.
9776 </para>
9777 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9778 <para>
9779 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9780 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9781 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9782 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9783 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9784 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9785 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9786 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9787 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9788 </para>
9789 <para>
9790 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9791 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9792 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9793 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9794 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9795 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9796 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9797 on people's machines.
9798 </para>
9799 <para>
9800 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9801 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9802 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9803 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9804 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9805 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9806
9807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9808 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9809 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9810 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9811 management" system.
9812 </para>
9813 <para>
9814 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9815 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9816 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9817 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9818 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9819 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9820 freedom to move content easily?
9821 </para>
9822 <para>
9823 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9824 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9825 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9826 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9827 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9828 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9829 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9830 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9831 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9832 </para>
9833 <para>
9834 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9835 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9836 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9837 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9838 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9839 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9840 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9841 </para>
9842 <para>
9843 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9844 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9845 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9846 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9847 </para>
9848 <para>
9849 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9850 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9851
9852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9853
9854 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9855 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9856 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9857 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9858 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9859 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9860 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9861 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9862 generally.
9863 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9864 </para>
9865 <para>
9866 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9867 explains,
9868 </para>
9869 <blockquote>
9870 <para>
9871 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9872 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9873 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9874 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9875 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9876 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9877 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9878 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9879 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9880 </para>
9881 </blockquote>
9882 <para>
9883 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9884 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9885 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9886 </para>
9887 <para>
9888 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9889 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9890 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9891 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9892 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9893 an Internet user is revealed.
9894 </para>
9895 <para>
9896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9897 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9898 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9899 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9900 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9901 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9902 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9903 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9904 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9905 <!-- f20. -->
9906 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9907 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9908 Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9909 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9910 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9911 Being Sued," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9912 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," USA Today, 15 September
9913 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9914 Fan, Either," New York Times, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9915 Brianna a Criminal?" Toronto Star, 18 September 2003, P7.
9916 </para></footnote>
9917
9918 </para>
9919 <para>
9920 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9921 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9922 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9923 <!-- f21. -->
9924 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9925 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9926 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9927 </para></footnote>
9928 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9929 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9930 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9931 </para>
9932 <para>
9933 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
9934 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
9935 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
9936 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
9937 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
9938 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
9939 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
9940 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
9941 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
9942 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
9943 to deploy,<footnote><para>
9944 <!-- f22. -->
9945 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
9946 Boston Globe, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
9947 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
9948 Colleges," Washington Post, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
9949 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," Christian Science
9950 Monitor, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
9951 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
9952 Lawsuit Possible," Chicago Tribune, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
9953 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," Internet News, 30 January
9954 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9955 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
9956 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
9957 Sharing," San Francisco Chronicle, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
9958 Are Weapons at Universities," USA Today, 26 September 2000, 3D.
9959 </para></footnote>
9960 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
9961 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
9962 </para>
9963 <para>
9964 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
9965 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
9966 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
9967 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
9968 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
9969 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
9970 college students
9971
9972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
9973 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
9974 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
9975 Says von Lohmann,
9976 </para>
9977 <blockquote>
9978 <para>
9979 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
9980 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
9981 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
9982 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
9983 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
9984 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
9985 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
9986 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
9987 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
9988 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
9989 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
9990 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
9991 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
9992 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
9993 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
9994 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
9995 million of them.
9996 </para>
9997 </blockquote>
9998 <para>
9999 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10000 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10001 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10002 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10003 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10004 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10005 </para>
10006
10007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10008 </sect2>
10009 </sect1>
10010 </chapter>
10011 <chapter id="c-balances">
10012 <title>BALANCES</title>
10013
10014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10015 <para>
10016 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10017 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10018 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10019 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10020 </para>
10021 <para>
10022 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10023 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10024 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10025 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10026 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10027 everything around.
10028 </para>
10029 <para>
10030 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10031 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10032 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10033 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10034 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10035 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10036 </para>
10037 <para>
10038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10039 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10040 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10041 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10042 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10043 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10044 made that is happening all around.
10045 </para>
10046 <para>
10047 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10048 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10049 gasoline onto this fire.
10050 </para>
10051 <para>
10052 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10053 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10054 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10055 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10056 </para>
10057 <para>
10058 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10059 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10060 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10061 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10062 success will require.
10063 </para>
10064
10065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10066 <sect1 id="eldred">
10067 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10068 <para>
10069 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10070 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10071 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10072 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10073 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10074 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10075 come alive.
10076 </para>
10077 <para>
10078 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10079 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10080 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10081 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10082 them available for free.
10083 </para>
10084 <para>
10085 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10086 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10087 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10088 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10089 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10091 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10092 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10093 accessible&mdash;today.
10094 </para>
10095 <para>
10096 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10097 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter had passed into the
10098 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10099 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10100 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10101 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10102 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10103 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (Cinderella), sometimes not
10104 (The Hunchback of Notre Dame, Treasure Planet). These are all
10105 commercial publications of public domain works.
10106 </para>
10107 <para>
10108 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10109 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10110 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10111 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10112 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10113 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10114 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10115 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10116 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10117 generally.<footnote><para>
10118 <!-- f1. -->
10119 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10120 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10121 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10122 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10123 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10124 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10125 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10126 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10127 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10128 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10129 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10130 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10131 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10132 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10133 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10134 </para>
10135 <para>
10136 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10137 collection of poems New Hampshire was slated to pass into the public
10138 domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
10139 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter 10,
10140 in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the
10141 terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by twenty years. Eldred
10142 would not be free to add any works more recent than 1923 to his
10143 collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work would pass into
10144 the public domain until that year (and not even then, if Congress
10145 extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period, more than 1
10146 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10147 </para>
10148 <para>
10149
10150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10151 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10152 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10153 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10154 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10155 <!-- f2. -->
10156 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10157 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10158 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10159 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10160 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10161 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10162 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10163 </para></footnote>
10164
10165 </para>
10166 <para>
10167 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10168 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10169 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10170 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10171 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10172 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10173 to undertake.
10174 </para>
10175 <para>
10176 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10177 constitutional
10178 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10179 interpretation.
10180 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10181 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10182 importantly
10183 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10184 </para>
10185 <blockquote>
10186 <para>
10187 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10188 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10189 their . . . Writings. . . .
10190 </para>
10191 </blockquote>
10192 <para>
10193 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10194 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10195 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10196 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10197 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10198 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10199 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10200 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10201 </para>
10202 <para>
10203 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10204 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10205 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10206 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10208 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10209 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10210 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10211 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10212 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10213 </para>
10214 <para>
10215 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10216 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10217 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10218 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10219 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10220 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10221 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10222 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10223 this gravy train going.
10224 </para>
10225 <para>
10226 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10227 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10228 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10229 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10230 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10231 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10232 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10233 </para>
10234 <para>
10235 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10236 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10237 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10238 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10239 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10240 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10241 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10242 published by anyone for free.
10243 </para>
10244 <para>
10245 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10246 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10247 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10248 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10249 report:
10250 </para>
10251 <para>
10252 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10253
10254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10255 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10256 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10257 those works.
10258 </para>
10259 <para>
10260 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10261 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10262 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10263 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10264 </para>
10265 <para>
10266 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10267 about it?"
10268 </para>
10269 <para>
10270 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10271 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10272 they support the bill."
10273 </para>
10274 <para>
10275 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10276 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10277 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10278 much is it worth?"
10279 </para>
10280 <para>
10281 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10282 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10283 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10284 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10285 </para>
10286 <para>
10287 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10288 correct conclusion:
10289 </para>
10290 <para>
10291 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10292 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10293 contributions
10294 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10295 </para>
10296 <para>
10297 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10298 contribute
10299 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10300 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10301 </para>
10302 <para>
10303 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10304 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10305 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10306 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10307 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10308 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10309 copyrights
10310 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10311 the copyright term extended.
10312 </para>
10313 <para>
10314 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as
10315 legislation
10316 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10317 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10318 </para>
10319 <para>
10320 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10321 Copyright
10322 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10323 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10324 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10325 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10326 contributions.<footnote><para>
10327 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10328 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10329 Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1998, 22.
10330 </para></footnote>
10331 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10332 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10333 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10334 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10335 Age," available at
10336 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10337 </para></footnote>
10338 Disney is estimated to have
10339 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10340 cycle.<footnote><para>
10341 <!-- f5. --> Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10342 Congressional
10343 Quarterly This Week, 8 August 1990, available at
10344 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10345 </para></footnote>
10346
10347 </para>
10348 <para>
10349 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10350 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10351 reality
10352 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10353 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10354 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10355 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10356 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10357 "limited."
10358 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10359 and again.
10360 </para>
10361 <para>
10362 It was also my judgment that this Supreme Court would not allow
10363 Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
10364 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power
10365 of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the
10366 power granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional
10367 scholars,
10368 the most famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's
10369
10370 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10371 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10372 guns near schools.
10373 </para>
10374 <para>
10375 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10376 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10377 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10378 "interstate
10379 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10380 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10381 interstate
10382 commerce.
10383 </para>
10384 <para>
10385 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there
10386 was no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10387 activity,
10388 when considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce.
10389 A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was instead
10390 interpreted
10391 to impose no limit.
10392 </para>
10393 <para>
10394 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command,
10395 changed that in United States v. Lopez. The government had argued
10396 that possessing guns near schools affected interstate commerce. Guns
10397 near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values, and so on. In
10398 the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government whether
10399 there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce under
10400 the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there
10401 was not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then
10402 that activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the
10403 government
10404 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
10405 </para>
10406 <para>
10407 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's
10408 arguments,"
10409 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10410 <!-- f6. --> United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10411 </para></footnote>
10412 If anything Congress says is interstate
10413 commerce must therefore be considered interstate commerce, then
10414 there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in Lopez was
10415 reaffirmed five years later in United States v. Morrison.<footnote><para>
10416 <!-- f7. --> United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10417 </para></footnote>
10418
10419 </para>
10420 <para>
10421 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10422 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10423 <!-- f8. --> If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
10424 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the
10425 context
10426 of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the
10427 government would allow the government unending power to regulate
10428 commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The
10429 same point is true in the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the
10430 government's interpretation would allow the government unending power
10431 to regulate copyrights&mdash;the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10432 </para></footnote>
10433 And if it is applied to the
10434 Progress Clause, the principle should yield the conclusion that
10435 Congress
10436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10437 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an
10438 existing
10439 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power
10440 over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such
10441 a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10442 copyrights
10443 should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the term of
10444 existing copyrights.
10445 </para>
10446 <para>
10447 If, that is, the principle announced in Lopez stood for a principle.
10448 Many believed the decision in Lopez stood for politics&mdash;a conservative
10449 Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its power over
10450 Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
10451 rejected
10452 that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
10453 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
10454 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court
10455 decides cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily
10456 boring.
10457 I was not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if
10458 these nine Justices were going to be petty politicians.
10459 </para>
10460 <para>
10461 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what
10462 the argument in Eldred was not about. By insisting on the
10463 Constitution's
10464 limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing piracy.
10465 Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of piracy&mdash;piracy of
10466 the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work and when Walt
10467 Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was just
10468 fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
10469 already
10470 enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had
10471 gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In
10472 exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new
10473 work. But now these entities were using their power&mdash;expressed
10474 through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to get another twenty-year
10475 dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop would be taken from the
10476 public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a piracy that affects us all.
10477 </para>
10478 <para>
10479 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10480
10481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10482 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10483 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10484 <!-- f9. --> Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
10485 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available at
10486 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10487 </para></footnote>
10488 But
10489 it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional system,
10490 our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's requirements,
10491 but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's charter.
10492 </para>
10493 <para>
10494 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10495 copyright
10496 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10497 influence
10498 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10499 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10500 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10501 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10502 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10503 bought to extend them again.
10504 </para>
10505 <para>
10506 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10507 extended.
10508 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10509 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10510 society
10511 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10512 Disney's.
10513 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10514 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10515 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10516 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10517 exploited,
10518 and no longer available as a result.
10519 </para>
10520 <para>
10521 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10522 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10523 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10524 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10525 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10526 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10527 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10528 Congressional
10529 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10530 of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 7, available at
10531 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10532 </para></footnote>
10533
10534 </para>
10535 <para>
10536 Think practically about the consequence of this
10537 extension&mdash;practically,
10538 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10539
10540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10541 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10542 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10543 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10544 remaining
10545 9,873. What would you have to do?
10546 </para>
10547 <para>
10548 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10549 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10550 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10551 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10552 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10553 list of books still under copyright.
10554 </para>
10555 <para>
10556 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10557 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10558 </para>
10559 <para>
10560 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10561 owners
10562 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10563 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10564 being at least a list?
10565 </para>
10566 <para>
10567 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10568 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10569 practically
10570 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10571 thousands
10572 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10573 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10574 </para>
10575 <para>
10576 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10577 apologists
10578 for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright
10579 owners?"
10580 </para>
10581 <para>
10582 Well, actually, if you think about it, there are plenty of lists of who
10583 owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles to cars.
10584 And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty good at
10585 suggesting
10586 who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in your
10587 backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a pretty
10588 good way to know who owns what tangible property.
10589 </para>
10590 <para>
10591 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10592 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10593 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10594
10595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10596 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10597 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10598 happen
10599 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10600 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10601 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10602 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10603 know quite well who owns what property.
10604 </para>
10605 <para>
10606 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10607 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10608 already
10609 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10610 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10611 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10612 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10613 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10614 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10615 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10616 </para>
10617 <para>
10618 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10619 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10620 consequence
10621 for other creative works is much more dire.
10622 </para>
10623 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10624 <para>
10625 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10626 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10627 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10628 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, The Lucky Dog, is
10629 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10630 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10631 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10632 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10633 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10634 films."<footnote><para>
10635 <!-- f11. -->
10636 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10637 Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10638 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10639 Down Copyright Extension," Orlando Sentinel Tribune, 9 October 2002.
10640 </para></footnote>
10641
10642 </para>
10643 <para>
10644 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10645 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10646 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10647 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10648 </para>
10649 <para>
10650 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10651
10652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10653 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10654 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10655 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10656 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10657 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10658 work available for distribution.
10659 </para>
10660 <para>
10661 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10662 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10663 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10664 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10665 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10666 mm film.<footnote><para>
10667 <!-- f12. --> Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10668 Supporting
10669 the Petitoners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
10670 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by
10671 the Internet Archive, Eldred v. Ashcroft, available at
10672 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10673 </para></footnote>
10674
10675 </para>
10676 <para>
10677 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10678 important.
10679 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10680 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10681 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10682 locate the copyright owner.
10683 </para>
10684 <para>
10685 Or more accurately, owners. As we've seen, there isn't only a single
10686 copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't a single
10687 person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
10688 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
10689 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
10690 exceptionally
10691 high.
10692 </para>
10693 <para>
10694 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10695 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10696 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10697 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10698 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10699 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10700 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10701 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10702 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10703 </para>
10704 <para>
10705 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10706
10707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10708 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10709 benefit
10710 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10711 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10712 the copyright expires.
10713 </para>
10714 <para>
10715 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10716 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10717 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10718 canisters
10719 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10720 than dust.
10721 </para>
10722 <para>
10723 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10724 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10725 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10726 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10727 creative
10728 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10729 free expression."
10730 </para>
10731 <para>
10732 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10733 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10734 indicated,
10735 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10736 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10737 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10738 distributors,
10739 the commercial life ends.
10740 </para>
10741 <para>
10742 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10743 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10744 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10745 between
10746 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10747 Friday
10748 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10749 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10750 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10751 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10752 have, we need to have access to this history.
10753 </para>
10754 <para>
10755 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10756
10757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10758 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10759 this context do no good.
10760 </para>
10761 <para>
10762 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10763 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10764 copyright-related use that would be inhibited by an exclusive right.
10765 When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a publisher.
10766 But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a used
10767 book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
10768 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
10769 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
10770 </para>
10771 <para>
10772 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10773 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10774 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10775 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10776 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10777 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10778 market didn't have more to offer.
10779 </para>
10780 <para>
10781 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10782 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10783 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10784 would not have interfered with anything.
10785 </para>
10786 <para>
10787 But this situation has now changed.
10788 </para>
10789 <para>
10790 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10791 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10792 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10793 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10794 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10795 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10796 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10797 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10798 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10799 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10800 </para>
10801 <para>
10802 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10803 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10804 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10805 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10806 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10807 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10808 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10809 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10810 written for a radically different context.
10811 </para>
10812 <para>
10813 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10814 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10815 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10816 copyright purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to enable the
10817 commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
10818 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context,
10819 copyright is serving no purpose at all related to the spread of
10820 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
10821 expression. Copyright is a brake.
10822 </para>
10823 <para>
10824 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10825 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10826 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10827 culture widely?"
10828 </para>
10829 <para>
10830 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10831 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10832 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10833 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10834 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10835 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10836 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10837 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10838 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10839 </para>
10840 <para>
10841 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10842 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10843 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10844 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10845
10846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10847 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10848 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10849 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10850 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10851 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10852 <!-- f13. -->
10853 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10854 December 2002, available at
10855 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10856 </para></footnote>
10857
10858 </para>
10859 <para>
10860 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10861 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10862 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10863 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10864 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10865 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10866 </para>
10867 <para>
10868 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10869 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10870 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10871 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10872 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10873 </para>
10874 <para>
10875 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10876 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10877 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10878 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10879 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10880 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10881 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10882 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10883 power to extend existing terms.
10884 </para>
10885 <para>
10886 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10887 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10888 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10889 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10890 </para>
10891 <para>
10892 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10893 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10894
10895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10896 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10897 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10898 overstepped its bounds.
10899 </para>
10900 <para>
10901 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10902 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10903 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10904 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10905 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10906 </para>
10907 <para>
10908 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10909 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10910 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10911 briefs and preparing for argument.
10912 </para>
10913 <para>
10914 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10915 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10916 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10917 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10918 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10919 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10920 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10921 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10922 </para>
10923 <para>
10924 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10925 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10926 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10927 mistake lost it.
10928 </para>
10929 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10930 <para>
10931 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10932 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10933 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10934 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
10935 heat
10936 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
10937 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
10938 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
10939 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
10940 </para>
10941 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
10942 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
10943 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10944 <para>
10945 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
10946 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
10947 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
10948 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
10949 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
10950 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
10951 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
10952 most powerful media companies in the world."
10953 </para>
10954 <para>
10955 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
10956 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
10957 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
10958 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
10959 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
10960 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
10961 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
10962 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
10963 interpretation
10964 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
10965 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
10966 unconstitutional,
10967 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
10968 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
10969 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
10970 Constitution,
10971 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
10972 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
10973 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
10974 </para>
10975 <para>
10976 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
10977 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
10978 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
10979 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
10980 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
10981 why it was unconstitutional.
10982 </para>
10983 <para>
10984 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
10985
10986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
10987 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
10988 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
10989 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
10990 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed that
10991 this field of review was simply the preference of a small political
10992 minority.
10993 Although my focus in the case was not to demonstrate how bad the
10994 Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it was unconstitutional,
10995 my hope was to make this argument against a background of briefs that
10996 covered the full range of political views. To show that this claim against
10997 the CTEA was grounded in law and not politics, then, we tried to
10998 gather the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
10999 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11000 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11001 </para>
11002 <para>
11003 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11004 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11005 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11006 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11007 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11008 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11009 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11010 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11011 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11012 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11013 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11014 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11015 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11016 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11017 </para>
11018 <para>
11019 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11020 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11021 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11022 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11023 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11024 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11025 </para>
11026 <para>
11027 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11028 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11029
11030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11031 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11032 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11033 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11034 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11035 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11036 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11037 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11038 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11039 </para>
11040 <para>
11041 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11042 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11043 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11044 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11045 </para>
11046 <para>
11047 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11048 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11049 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11050 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11051 clear.
11052 </para>
11053 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11054 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11055 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11056 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11057 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11058 <para>
11059 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11060 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11061 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11062 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11063 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11064 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11065 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11066 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11067 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11068 </para>
11069 <para>
11070 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11071 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11072 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11073 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11074 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11075 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11076 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11077 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11078
11079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11080 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11081 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11082 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11083 </para>
11084 <para>
11085 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11086 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11087 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11088 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11089 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11090 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11091 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11092 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11093 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11094 confidence in our argument.
11095 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11096 </para>
11097 <para>
11098 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11099 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11100 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11101 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11102 copyright holders.
11103 </para>
11104 <para>
11105 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11106 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11107 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11108 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11109 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11110 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11111 wanted to control.
11112 </para>
11113 <para>
11114 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11115 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11116 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11117 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11118 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11119 pornography."<footnote><para>
11120 <!-- f14. -->
11121 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
11122 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11123 </para></footnote>
11124 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11125 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11126 to license Porgy and Bess to anyone who refuses to use African
11127 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11128 <!-- f15. -->
11129 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11130 Mouse Joins the Fray," New York Times, 28 March 1998, B7.
11131 </para></footnote>
11132 That's
11133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11134 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11135 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11136 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11137 </para>
11138 <para>
11139 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11140 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11141 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11142 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11143 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11144 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11145 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11146 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11147 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11148 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11149 </para>
11150 <para>
11151 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11152 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11153 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11154 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11155 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11156 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11157 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11158 </para>
11159 <para>
11160 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11161 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11162 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11163 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11164 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11165 five who had supported the Lopez/Morrison line of cases that said that
11166 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11167 powers had limits.
11168 </para>
11169 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11170 <para>
11171 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11172 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11173 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11174 the Constitution
11175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11176 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11177 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11178 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11179 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11180 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11181 </para>
11182 <para>
11183 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11184 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11185 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11186 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11187 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11188 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11189 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11190 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11191 sense.
11192 </para>
11193 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11194 <para>
11195 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11196 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11197 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11198 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11199 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11200 these retrospective extensions.
11201 </para>
11202 <para>
11203 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11204 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11205 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11206 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11207 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11208 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11209 </para>
11210 <para>
11211 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11212 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11213 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11214 overriding
11215 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11216 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11217 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11218 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11219 </para>
11220 <para>
11221 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11222 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the Lopez
11223
11224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11225 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always
11226 have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain
11227 about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this
11228 power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
11229 Court to reconcile Eldred with Lopez: If Congress's power to regulate
11230 commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate
11231 copyright be limited.
11232 </para>
11233 <para>
11234 The argument on the government's side came down to this:
11235 Congress
11236 has done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The
11237 government
11238 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been
11239 extending the term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued,
11240 the Court should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11241 </para>
11242 <para>
11243 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11244 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11245 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11246 existing
11247 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11248 </para>
11249 <para>
11250 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11251 extended
11252 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11253 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11254 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11255 existing
11256 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11257 restraint
11258 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11259 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11260 hesitated
11261 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11262 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11263 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11264 arrived
11265 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11266 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11267
11268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11269 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11270 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11271 </para>
11272 <para>
11273 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11274 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11275 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11276 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11277 Congress
11278 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11279 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11280 this central idea.
11281 </para>
11282 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11283 <para>
11284 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11285 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11286 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11287 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11288 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11289 </para>
11290 <para>
11291 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11292 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11293 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11294 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11295 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11296 </para>
11297 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11298 <para>
11299 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11300 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11301 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11302 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11303 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11304 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11305 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11306 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11307 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11308 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11309 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11310
11311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11312 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11313 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11314 </para>
11315 <para>
11316 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11317 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11318 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11319 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11320 congressmen
11321 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11322 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11323 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11324 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11325 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11326 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11327 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11328 family of the Justices.
11329 </para>
11330 <para>
11331 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11332 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11333 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11334 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11335 </para>
11336 <para>
11337 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11338 The history was bothering her.
11339 </para>
11340 <blockquote>
11341 <para>
11342 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11343 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11344 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11345 practice that began with the very first act.
11346 </para>
11347 </blockquote>
11348 <para>
11349 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11350 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11351 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11352 </para>
11353 <blockquote>
11354 <para>
11355 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11356 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11358 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11359 is yes.
11360 </para>
11361 </blockquote>
11362 <para>
11363 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11364 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11365 Kennedy, who observed,
11366 </para>
11367 <blockquote>
11368 <para>
11369 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11370 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11371 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11372 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11373 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11374 </para>
11375 </blockquote>
11376 <para>
11377 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11378 student,
11379 I answered,
11380 </para>
11381 <blockquote>
11382 <para>
11383 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11384 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11385 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11386 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an
11387 effectively
11388 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11389 </para>
11390 </blockquote>
11391 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11392 <para>
11393 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11394 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11395 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11396 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11397 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11398 </para>
11399 <para>
11400 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had
11401 been crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the Lopez ruling, and we
11402 hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11403 </para>
11404 <para>
11405 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11406 sympathetic.
11407 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11408
11409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11410 </para>
11411 <blockquote>
11412 <para>
11413 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11414 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11415 </para>
11416 <para>
11417 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11418 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11419 domain
11420 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11421 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11422 into the Copyright Clause.
11423 </para>
11424 </blockquote>
11425 <para>
11426 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11427 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11428 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11429 </para>
11430 <blockquote>
11431 <para>
11432 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11433 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11434 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11435 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11436 time.
11437 </para>
11438 </blockquote>
11439 <para>
11440 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11441 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11442 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11443 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11444 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11445 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11446 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11447 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11448 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11449 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11450 Court to my side.
11451 </para>
11452 <para>
11453 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11454 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11455
11456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11457 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11458 optimistic.
11459 </para>
11460 <para>
11461 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11462 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11463 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11464 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11465 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11466 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11467 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11468 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11469 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11470 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11471 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11472 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11473 law that it had established elsewhere.
11474 </para>
11475 <para>
11476 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11477 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11478 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11479 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11480 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11481 </para>
11482 <para>
11483 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11484 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11485 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11486 </para>
11487 <para>
11488 My reasoning. Here was a case that pitted all the money in the world
11489 against reasoning. And here was the last naïve law professor, scouring
11490 the pages, looking for reasoning.
11491 </para>
11492 <para>
11493 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11494 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11495 Lopez. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11496 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11497 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11498 </para>
11499 <para>
11500
11501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11502 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11503 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11504 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11505 </para>
11506 <para>
11507 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11508 Souter. Neither believes in Lopez. It would be too much to expect them
11509 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11510 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11511 </para>
11512 <para>
11513 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11514 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11515 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11516 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11517 reconcile the two simply by not addressing the argument. There was no
11518 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together.
11519 There was therefore no principle that followed from the Lopez case: In
11520 that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this context
11521 it would not.
11522 </para>
11523 <para>
11524 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11525 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11526 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11527 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11528 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11529 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11530 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11531 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11532 the system we have.
11533 </para>
11534 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11535 <para>
11536 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11537 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11538 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11539 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11540 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11541 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11542 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11543 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11544 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11545 </para>
11546 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11547 <para>
11548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11549 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11550 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11551 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11552 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11553 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11554 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11555 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11556 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11557 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11558 </para>
11559 <para>
11560 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11561 because neither believed in the Lopez case, neither was willing to push
11562 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11563 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11564 Sentelle. It was Hamlet without the Prince.
11565 </para>
11566 <para>
11567 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11568 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11569 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11570 </para>
11571 <para>
11572 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11573 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez didn't
11574 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11575 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11576 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11577 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11578 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11579 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11580 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11581 Lopez and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11582 "originalism" now?
11583 </para>
11584 <para>
11585 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11586 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11587 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11588 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11589
11590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11591 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11592 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11593 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11594 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11595 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11596 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11597 own principles.
11598 </para>
11599 <para>
11600 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11601 myself.
11602 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11603 the law as it is.
11604 </para>
11605 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11606 <para>
11607 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11608 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11609 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11610 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11611 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11612 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11613 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11614 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11615 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11616 </para>
11617 <para>
11618 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11619 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11620 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11621 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11622 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11623 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11624 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11625 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11626 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11627 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11628 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11629 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11630 effort to persuade; but I
11631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11632 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11633 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11634 should decide the issue.
11635 </para>
11636 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11637 <para>
11638 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11639 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11640 Kathleen Sullivan?
11641 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11642 </para>
11643 <para>
11644 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11645 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11646 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11647 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11648 </para>
11649 <para>
11650 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11651 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11652 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11653 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11654 have persuaded.
11655 </para>
11656 <para>
11657 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11658 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11659 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11660 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11661 issue should not be raised until it is.
11662 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11663 </para>
11664 <para>
11665 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11666 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11667 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11668 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11669 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11670 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11671 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11672 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11673 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11674 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11675 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11676
11677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11678 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11679 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11680 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11681 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11682 harmful law. The New York Times wrote in its editorial,
11683 </para>
11684 <blockquote>
11685 <para>
11686 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11687 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11688 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11689 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11690 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11691 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11692 </para>
11693 </blockquote>
11694 <para>
11695 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11696 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11697 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11698 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11699 in the face felt exactly like that.
11700 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11701 </para>
11702 <para>
11703 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11704 quote from The New York Times. That "grand experiment" we call the
11705 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11706 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11707 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11708 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11709 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11710 </para>
11711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11712 </sect1>
11713 <sect1 id="eldred-ii">
11714 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11715 <para>
11716 The day Eldred was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11717 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in Eldred was
11718 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11719 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11720 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11721 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11722 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11723 </para>
11724 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11725 <para>
11726 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11727 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11728 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11729 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11730 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11731 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11732 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11733 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11734 </para>
11735 <para>
11736 The New York Times published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11737 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11739 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11740 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11741 the work passed into the public domain.
11742 </para>
11743 <para>
11744 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11745 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11746 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11747 </para>
11748 <para>
11749 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11750 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11751 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11752 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11753 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11754 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11755 everything else, let the content go.
11756 </para>
11757 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11758 <para>
11759 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11760 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11761 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11762 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11763 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11764 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11765 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11766 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11767 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11768 the stupid harm of the present system.
11769 </para>
11770 <para>
11771 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11772 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11773 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11774 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11775 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11776 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11777 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11778 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11779 where copyright owners could be identified.
11780 </para>
11781 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11782 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11783 <para>
11784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11785 As I described in chapter 10, formalities in copyright law were
11786 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11787 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11788 <!-- f1. -->
11789 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11790 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11791 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11792 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11793 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11794 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11795 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11796 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11797 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11798 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11799 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11800 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11801 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11802 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11803 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11804 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, International
11805 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials (New York: Foundation
11806 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11807 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11808 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11809 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11810 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11811 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11812 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11813 </para>
11814 <para>
11815 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11816 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11817 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11818 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11819 know what's protected and what's not.
11820 </para>
11821 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11822 <para>
11823 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11824 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11825 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11826 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11827 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11828 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11829 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an i or cross a t resulted
11830 in the loss of widows' only income.
11831 </para>
11832 <para>
11833 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11834 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11835 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11836 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11837 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11838 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11839 </para>
11840 <para>
11841 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11842 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11843 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11844 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11845 burden
11846 imposed upon creators.
11847 </para>
11848 <para>
11849 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11850 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11851
11852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11853 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11854 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11855 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11856 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11857 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11858 table.
11859 </para>
11860 <para>
11861 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11862 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11863 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11864 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11865 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11866 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11867 spread.
11868 </para>
11869 <para>
11870 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11871 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11872 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11873 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11874 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11875 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11876 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11877 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11878 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11879 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11880 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11881 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11882 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11883 system of protection for property generally.
11884 </para>
11885 <para>
11886 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11887 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11888 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11889 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11890 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11891 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11892 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11893 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11894
11895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11896 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive, lawyer transactions
11897 take their place.
11898 </para>
11899 <para>
11900 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11901 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11902 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11903 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11904 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11905 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11906 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11907 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11908 </para>
11909 <para>
11910 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11911 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11912 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11913 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11914 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11915 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11916 seen before because there are no formalities.
11917 </para>
11918 <para>
11919 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11920 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11921 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11922 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11923 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11924 </para>
11925 <para>
11926 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11927 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11928 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11929 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11930 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
11931 </para>
11932 <para>
11933 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
11934 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
11935 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
11936 registration?
11937 </para>
11938 <para>
11939 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
11940 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
11941 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
11942
11943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
11944 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
11945 address the real problem of governments standing at the core of any
11946 system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
11947 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it
11948 was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
11949 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click
11950 registration fifty years after a work was published. Based upon
11951 historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of commercial
11952 work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life, into the
11953 public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
11954 </para>
11955 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11956 <para>
11957 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
11958 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
11959 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
11960 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
11961 </para>
11962 <para>
11963 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
11964 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
11965 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
11966 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
11967 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
11968 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
11969 something good might happen here.
11970 </para>
11971 <para>
11972 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
11973 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
11974 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
11975 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
11976 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
11977 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
11978 </para>
11979 <para>
11980 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
11981 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
11982 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
11983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
11984 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
11985 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
11986 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
11987 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
11988 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
11989 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
11990 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
11991 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
11992 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
11993 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
11994 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
11995 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
11996 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
11997 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
11998 film is a valid derivative use.
11999 </para>
12000 <para>
12001 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12002 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12003 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12004 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12005 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12006 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12007 </para>
12008 <para>
12009 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12010 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12011 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12012 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12013 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12014 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12015 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12016 threat.
12017 </para>
12018 <para>
12019 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12020 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12021 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12022 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12023 sense?
12024 </para>
12025 <para>
12026
12027 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12028 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12029 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12030 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12031 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12032 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12033 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12034 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12035 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12036 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12037 </para>
12038 <para>
12039 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12040 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12041 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12042 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12043 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12044 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12045 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12046 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12047 </para>
12048 <para>
12049 What does this industry really want?
12050 </para>
12051 <para>
12052 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12053 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12054 protecting their content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an effort
12055 to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is another
12056 step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
12057 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
12058 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require their
12059 permission first.
12060 </para>
12061 <para>
12062 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12063 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12064 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12065 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is theirs. Their
12066 aim is to assure that all there is is what is theirs.
12067 </para>
12068 <para>
12069 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12070 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12071
12072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12073 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12074 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12075 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12076 and to share its own creation.
12077 </para>
12078 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12079 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12080 <para>
12081 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12082 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12083 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12084 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12085 block the progress of others.
12086 </para>
12087 <para>
12088 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12089 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12090 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12091 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12092 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12093 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12094 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12095 </para>
12096 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12097 </sect1>
12098 </chapter>
12099 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12100 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12101 <para>
12102 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12103 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12104 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12105 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12106 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12107 </para>
12108 <para>
12109 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12110 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12111 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12112 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12113 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12114 the disease almost invisible.
12115 </para>
12116 <para>
12117 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12118 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12119 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12120 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12121 population:
12122 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12123 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12124 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12125 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12126 available at
12127 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12128 release
12129 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12130 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12131 </para></footnote>
12132 </para>
12133 <para>
12134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12135 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12136 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12137 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12138 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12139 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12140 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12141 </para>
12142 <para>
12143 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12144 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12145 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12146 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12147 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12148 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12149 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12150 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12151 changes.
12152 </para>
12153 <para>
12154 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12155 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12156 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12157 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12158 costs significantly below the market price.
12159 </para>
12160 <para>
12161 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12162 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12163 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12164 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12165 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12166 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12167 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12168 <para>
12169 <!-- f2. -->
12170 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who
12171 Owns the Knowledge Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12172 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12173 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12174 </para></footnote>
12175 </para>
12176 <para>
12177 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed,
12178 more than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property
12179 Association
12180 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12181 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel imports."<footnote><para>
12182 <!-- f3. --> International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent Protection and
12183 Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a Report
12184 Prepared
12185 for the World Intellectual Property Organization (Washington, D.C.,
12186 2000), 14, available at
12187 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a firsthand account of the struggle over
12188 South Africa, see Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
12189 Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee on Government
12190 Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess., Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57
12191 (statement of James Love).
12192 </para></footnote>
12193 Through the
12194 Office of the United States Trade Representative, the government
12195 asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add pressure to that
12196 request,
12197 in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for possible trade sanctions.
12198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12199 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies
12200 began
12201 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the
12202 government's
12203 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments
12204 from the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical
12205 companies,
12206 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12207 international
12208 law by discriminating against a particular kind of patent&mdash;
12209 pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments, with the
12210 United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect these patents
12211 as it respects any other patent, regardless of any effect on the treatment
12212 of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12213 <!-- f4. -->
12214 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), Patent
12215 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12216 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12217 Organization (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12218 </para>
12219 <para>
12220 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12221 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12222 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12223 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12224 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12225 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12226 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12227 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12228 </para>
12229 <para>
12230 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12231 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12232 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12233 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12234 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12235 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12236 </para>
12237 <para>
12238 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12239 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12240 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12241 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12242 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12243 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12244 by U.S. companies.
12245 </para>
12246 <para>
12247 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12248 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12249 argument
12250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12251 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12252 <!-- f5. -->
12253 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12254 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," San Francisco Chronicle, 24
12255 May 1999, A1, available at
12256 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12257 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12258 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12259 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12260 Medicines," Foreign Policy in Focus 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12261 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12262 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12263 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12264 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," Widener Law
12265 Symposium Journal (Spring 2001): 175.
12266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12267 </para></footnote>
12268 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12269 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12270 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12271 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12272 </para>
12273 <para>
12274 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12275 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12276 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12277 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12278 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12279 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12280 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12281 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12282 </para>
12283 <para>
12284 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12285 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12286 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12287 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12288 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12289 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12290 </para>
12291 <para>
12292 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12293 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12294 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12295 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12296 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12297 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12298 </para>
12299 <para>
12300 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12301 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12302 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12303 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12304 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12305 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12306 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12307 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12309 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12310 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12311 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12312 idea called "intellectual property."
12313 </para>
12314 <para>
12315 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12316 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12317 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12318 What is the argument?
12319 </para>
12320 <para>
12321 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12322 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12323 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12324 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12325 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12326 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12327 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12328 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12329 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12330 were balanced in just this sense.
12331 </para>
12332 <para>
12333 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12334 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12335 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12336 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12337 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12338 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12339 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12340 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12341 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12342 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12343 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12344 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12345 our
12346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12347 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12348 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12349 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12350 this common sense open its eyes.
12351 </para>
12352 <para>
12353 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12354 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12355 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12356 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12357 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12358 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12359 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12360 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12361 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12362 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12363 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12364 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12365 </para>
12366 <para>
12367 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12368 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12369 meeting.<footnote><para>
12370 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," Washington Post,
12371 August 2003, E1, available at
12372 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12373 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," National Journal's Technology
12374 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12375 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12376 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," National Journal's Technology
12377 Daily, 19 August 2003, available at
12378 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12379 </para></footnote>
12380 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12381 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12382 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12383 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12384 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12385 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12386 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12387 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12388 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12389 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12390 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12391 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12392 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12394 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12395 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12396 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12397 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12398 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12399 </para>
12400 <para>
12401 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12402 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12403 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12404 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12405 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12406 </para>
12407 <para>
12408 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12409 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12410 meeting.
12411 </para></footnote>
12412 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12413 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12414 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12415 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12416 property issues.
12417 </para>
12418 <para>
12419 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12420 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12421 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12422 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12423 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12424 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12425 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12426 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12427 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12428 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12429 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12430 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12431 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12432 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12433 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12434 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12435 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12436 stuff of
12437 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12438 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12439 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12440 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12441 </para>
12442 <para>
12443 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12444 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12445 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12446 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12447 </para>
12448 <para>
12449 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12450 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12451 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12452 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12453 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12454 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12455 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12456 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12457 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12458 </para>
12459 <para>
12460 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12461 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12462 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12463 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12464 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12465 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12466 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12467 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12468 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12469 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12470 <!-- f8. -->
12471 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12472 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12473 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12474 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12475 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12476 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12477 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," Government Policy
12478 Toward Open Source Software (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12479 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12480 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12481 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12482 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, The Commercial Software
12483 Model, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12484 May 2001), available at
12485 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12486 </para></footnote>
12487 </para>
12488 <para>
12489 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12490 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12491 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12492 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12493 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12494 by
12495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12496 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12497 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12498 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12499 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12500 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12501 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12502 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12503 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12504 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12505 </para>
12506 <para>
12507 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12508 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12509 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12510 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12511 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12512 Washington Post, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12513 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12514 <!-- f9. -->
12515 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12516 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12517 </para></footnote>
12518 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12519 </para>
12520 <para>
12521 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12522 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12523 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12524 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12525 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12526 its lobbying efforts.
12527 </para>
12528 <para>
12529 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12530 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12531 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12532 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12533 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12534 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12535 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12536 goals of WIPO."
12537 </para>
12538 <para>
12539 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12540 </para>
12541 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12542 <para>
12543 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12544 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12545 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12546 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12547 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12548 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12549 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12550 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12551 </para>
12552 <para>
12553 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12554 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12555 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12556 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12557 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12558 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12559 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12560 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12561 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12562 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12563 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12564 </para>
12565 <para>
12566 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12567 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12568 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12569 what to do with those rights because, again, they are their rights. If
12570 they want to "waive" or "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our
12571 tradition, totally appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than
12572 $20 billion to do good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the
12573 objectives of the property system. That is, on the contrary, just what
12574 a property system is supposed to be about: giving individuals the
12575 right to decide what to do with their property.
12576 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12577 </para>
12578 <para>
12579 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12580 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12581 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12583 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12584 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12585 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12586 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12587 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12588 way possible.
12589 </para>
12590 <para>
12591 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12592 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12593 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12594 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12595 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12596 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12597 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12598 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12599 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12600 that control.
12601 </para>
12602 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12603 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12604 <para>
12605 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12606 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12607 <!-- f10. -->
12608 See Drahos with Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 210&ndash;20.
12609 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12610 </para></footnote>
12611 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12612 choice now is whether that information society will be free or
12613 feudal. The trend is toward the feudal.
12614 </para>
12615 <para>
12616 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12617 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12618 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12619 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12620 </para>
12621 <blockquote>
12622 <para>
12623 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12624 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12625 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12626 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12627 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12628 say anything wrong. But in the world
12629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12630 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12631 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12632 </para>
12633 </blockquote>
12634 <para>
12635 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12636 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12637 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12638 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12639 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12640 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12641 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12642 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12643 </para>
12644 <para>
12645 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12646 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12647 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12648 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12649 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12650 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12651 </para>
12652 <para>
12653 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12654 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12655 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12656 our own country's history).
12657 </para>
12658 <para>
12659 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12660 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12661 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12662 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12663 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12664 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12665 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12666 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12667 democracy in the world, become?
12668 </para>
12669 <para>
12670 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12671 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12672 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12674 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12675 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12676 </para>
12677 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12678 <para>
12679 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12680 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12681 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12682 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12683 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12684 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12685 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12686 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12687 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12688 hearings and a different result.
12689 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12690 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12691 </para>
12692 <para>
12693 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12694 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12695 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12696 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12697 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12698 concentration in the media.
12699 </para>
12700 <para>
12701 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12702 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12703 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12704 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12705 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12706 </para>
12707 <para>
12708 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12709 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12710 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12711 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12712 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12713 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12714 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12715 </para>
12716 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12717 <para>
12718 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12719 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12720 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12721 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12722 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12723 </para>
12724 <para>
12725 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12726 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12727 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12728 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12729 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12730 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12731 </para>
12732 <para>
12733 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12734 of our tragedy.
12735 </para>
12736 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12737 <para>
12738 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12739 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12740 <!-- f11. -->
12741 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12742 2003, available at
12743 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12744 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12745 2003, available at
12746 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12747 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12748 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," New York Daily News, 9
12749 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12750 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12751 Defendants," Washington Post, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12752 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," Wired News, 10 September 2003,
12753 available at
12754 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12755 </para></footnote>
12756 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12757 music.<footnote><para>
12758 <!-- f12. -->
12759 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12760 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12761 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12762 </para></footnote>
12763 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12764 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12765 <!-- f13. -->
12766 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12767 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12768 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12770 </para></footnote>
12771 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12772 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12773 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12774 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12775 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12776 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12777 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12778 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12779 kids who use a computer to share content.
12780 </para>
12781 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12782 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12783 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12784 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12785 <para>
12786 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12787 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12788 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12789 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12790 24 August 2003, available at
12791 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12792 </para></footnote>
12793 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12794 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12795 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12796 country.<footnote><para>
12797 <!-- f15. -->
12798 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12799 available at
12800 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12801 </para></footnote>
12802 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12803 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12804 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12805 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12806 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12807 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12808 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12809 day into the Causbys.
12810 </para>
12811 <para>
12812 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12813 potential is ever to be realized.
12814
12815 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12816
12817 </para>
12818 </chapter>
12819 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12820 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12821 <para>
12822
12823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12824 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12825 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12826 maps what might be done.
12827 </para>
12828 <para>
12829 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12830 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12831 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12832 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12833 </para>
12834 <para>
12835 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12836 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12837 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12838 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12839 is so important.
12840 </para>
12841 <para>
12842 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12843 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12844 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12845 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12846 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12847 </para>
12848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12849
12850 <sect1 id="usnow">
12851 <title>US, NOW</title>
12852 <para>
12853 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12854 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12855 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12856 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12857 </para>
12858 <para>
12859 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12860 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12861 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12862 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12863 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12864 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12865 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12866 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12867 </para>
12868 <para>
12869 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12870 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12871 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12872 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12873 the
12874
12875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12876 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12877 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12878 unprotected.
12879 </para>
12880 <para>
12881 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12882 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12883 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12884 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12885 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12886 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12887 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12888 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12889 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12890 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12891 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12892 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12893 </para>
12894 <para>
12895 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12896 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12897 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12898 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12899 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12900 before.
12901 </para>
12902
12903 <sect2 id="examples">
12904 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12905 <para>
12906 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12907 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12908 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12909 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12910 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12911 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12912 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12913 assured.
12914 </para>
12915 <para>
12916 What made it assured?
12917 </para>
12918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12919 <para>
12920 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12921 10, your privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture
12922 for gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12923 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12924 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12925 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
12926 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
12927 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
12928 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
12929 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
12930 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
12931 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
12932 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
12933 </para>
12934 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
12935 <para>
12936 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
12937 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
12938 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
12939 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
12940 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
12941 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
12942 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
12943 protected by the friction disappears, too.
12944 </para>
12945 <para>
12946 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
12947 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
12948 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
12949 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
12950 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
12951 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
12952 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
12953 disappears.
12954 </para>
12955 <para>
12956 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
12957 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
12958 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
12959 friction did.<footnote><para>
12960 <!-- f1. -->
12961
12962 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
12963 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," Stanford Technology
12964 Law Review 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
12965
12966 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
12967 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
12968 also Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
12969 in an Anxious Age (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
12970 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
12971 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
12972 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
12973
12974 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
12975 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
12976 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
12977 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
12978 </para>
12979 <para>
12980 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
12981 movement. When computers with software were first made available
12982 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
12983 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
12984 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
12985 care much about controlling their software.
12986 </para>
12987 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
12988 <para>
12989 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
12990 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
12991 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
12992 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
12993 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
12994 people's work.
12995 </para>
12996 <para>
12997 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
12998 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
12999 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13000 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13001 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13002 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13003 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13004 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13005 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13006 anything else?
13007 </para>
13008 <para>
13009 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13010 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13011 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13012 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13013 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13014 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13015 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13016 </para>
13017 <para>
13018 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13019 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13020 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13021 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13022 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13023 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13024 fundamentally weakened.
13025 </para>
13026 <para>
13027 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13028 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13029 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13030 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13031 </para>
13032 <para>
13033 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13034 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13035 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13036 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13037 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13038 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13039 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13040 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13041 byproduct.
13042 </para>
13043 <para>
13044 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13045 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13046 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13047 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13048 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13049 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13050 </para>
13051 <para>
13052 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13053 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13054 scientific journals are produced.
13055 </para>
13056 <para>
13057 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13058 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13059 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13060 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13061 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13062 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13063 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13064 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13065 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13066 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13067 and Westlaw are also free
13068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13069 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13070 Court opinion through their respective services.
13071 </para>
13072 <para>
13073 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13074 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13075 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13076 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13077 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13078 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13079 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13080 </para>
13081 <para>
13082 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13083 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13084 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13085 </para>
13086 <para>
13087 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13088 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13089 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13090 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13091 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13092 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13093 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13094 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13095 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13096 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13097 </para>
13098 <para>
13099 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13100 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13101 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13102 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13103 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13104 granted before.
13105 </para>
13106 <para>
13107 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13108 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13109 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13110 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13111 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13112 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13113 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13114 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13115 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13116 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13117 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13118 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13119 </para>
13120 <para>
13121 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13122 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13123 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13124 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13125 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13126 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13127 and science.
13128 </para>
13129
13130 </sect2>
13131 <sect2 id="oneidea">
13132 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13133 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13134 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13135 </indexterm>
13136 <para>
13137 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13138 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13139 </para>
13140 <para>
13141 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13142 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13143 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of reasonable
13144 copyright on top of the extremes that now reign. It does this by
13145 making it easy for people to build upon other people's work, by making
13146 it simple for creators to express the freedom for others to take and
13147 build upon their work. Simple tags, tied to human-readable
13148 descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this possible.
13149 </para>
13150 <para>
13151 Simple&mdash;which means without a middleman, or without a lawyer. By
13152 developing a free set of licenses that people can attach to their
13153 content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content that can
13154 easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
13155 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers
13156 automatically to identify content that can easily be shared. These
13157 three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a human-readable
13158 description, and
13159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13160 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13161 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13162 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13163 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13164 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13165 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13166 certain freedoms are given.
13167 </para>
13168 <para>
13169 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13170 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13171 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13172 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13173 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13174 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13175 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13176 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13177 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13178 </para>
13179 <para>
13180 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13181 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13182 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13183 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13184 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13185 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13186 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13187 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13188 a public domain.
13189 </para>
13190 <para>
13191 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13192 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13193 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13194 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13195 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13196 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13198 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13199 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13200 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13201 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13202 </para>
13203 <para>
13204 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13205 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13206 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13207 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13208 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13209 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13210 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13211 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13212 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13213 to begin to build those rules.
13214 </para>
13215 <para>
13216 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13217 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13218 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, Down and Out in
13219 the Magic Kingdom, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13220 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13221 </para>
13222 <para>
13223 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13224 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13225 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13226 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13227 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13228 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13229 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13230 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13231 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably increase
13232 sales of Cory's book.
13233 </para>
13234 <para>
13235 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13236 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13237 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13238 was a total success.
13239 </para>
13240 <para>
13241 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13242 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13244 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled Free for All,
13245 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13246 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13247 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13248 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13249 well.
13250 </para>
13251 <para>
13252 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread
13253 proprietary content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of
13254 the Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for
13255 other reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because
13256 anything else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that
13257 others are free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample
13258 content from the licensed work; they are just not free to make full
13259 copies of the licensed work available to others. This is consistent
13260 with their own art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13261 legal costs of sampling are so high (Walter Leaphart, manager of the
13262 rap group Public Enemy, which was born sampling the music of others,
13263 has stated that he does not "allow" Public Enemy to sample anymore,
13264 because the legal costs are so high<footnote><para>
13265 <!-- f2. -->
13266
13267 Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13268 Culture Wars (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13269 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13270 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13271 </para></footnote>),
13272 these artists release into the creative environment content
13273 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13274 </para>
13275 <para>
13276 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13277 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13278 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13279 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13280 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13281 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13282 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13283 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13284 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13285 say it to others.
13286 </para>
13287 <para>
13288 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13289 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13290 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13291 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13292
13293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13294 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13295 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13296 </para>
13297 <para>
13298 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13299 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13300 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13301 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13302 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13303 steps are possible.
13304 </para>
13305 <para>
13306 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13307 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13308 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13309 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13310 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13311 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13312 creativity to spread more easily.
13313 </para>
13314 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13315
13316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13317 </sect2>
13318 </sect1>
13319 <sect1 id="themsoon">
13320 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13321 <para>
13322 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13323 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13324 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13325 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13326 changes that we need.
13327 </para>
13328 <para>
13329 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13330 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13331 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13332 to our end.
13333 </para>
13334
13335 <sect2 id="formalities">
13336 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13337 <para>
13338 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13339 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13340 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13341 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13342 </para>
13343 <para>
13344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13345 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13346 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13347 protected.
13348 </para>
13349 <para>
13350 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13351 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13352 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13353 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13354 </para>
13355 <para>
13356 Why?
13357 </para>
13358 <para>
13359 As I suggested in chapter 10, the motivation to abolish formalities
13360 was a good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13361 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13362 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13363 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13364 formalities were getting in the way.
13365 </para>
13366 <para>
13367 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13368 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13369 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13370 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13371 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13372 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13373 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13374 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13375 past. And thus, the lack of formalities forces many into silence where
13376 they otherwise could speak.
13377 </para>
13378 <para>
13379 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13380 <!-- f1. -->
13381 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13382 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13383 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13384 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13385 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13386 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13387 </para>
13388 <para>
13389 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13390 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13391 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13392 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13393 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13394 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13395 developed by others.
13396 </para>
13397
13398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13399
13400 <sect3 id="registration">
13401 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13402 <para>
13403 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13404 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13405 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13406 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13407 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13408 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13409 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13410 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13411 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13412 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13413 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13414 </para>
13415 <para>
13416 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13417 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13418 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13419 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13420 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13421 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13422 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13423 </para>
13424 <para>
13425 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13426 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13427 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13428 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13429 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13430 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13431 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13432 with which registration occurs up.
13433 </para>
13434 <para>
13435 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13436 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13437 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13438 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13439 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13440 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13441 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13442 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13443 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13445 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13446 </para>
13447
13448 </sect3>
13449 <sect3 id="marking">
13450 <title>MARKING</title>
13451 <para>
13452 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13453 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13454 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13455 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13456 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13457 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13458 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13459 uniformly across all media.
13460 </para>
13461 <para>
13462 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13463 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13464 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13465 use the work.
13466 </para>
13467 <para>
13468 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13469 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13470 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13471 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13472 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13473 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13474 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13475 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13476 </para>
13477 <para>
13478 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13479 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13480 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13481 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13482 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13483 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13484 <!-- f2. -->
13485 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13486 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13487 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13488 </para></footnote>
13489 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13490 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13491 stop using the work in any new
13492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13493 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13494 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13495 their work.
13496 </para>
13497 <para>
13498 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13499 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13500 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13501 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13502 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13503 </para>
13504 <para>
13505 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13506 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13507 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13508 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13509 judged preferable, and it would base that choice solely upon the
13510 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the
13511 registration and renewal system. We would not count on the government
13512 to innovate; but we would count on the government to keep the product
13513 of innovation in line with its other important functions.
13514 </para>
13515 <para>
13516 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13517 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13518 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13519 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13520 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13521 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13522 </para>
13523 <para>
13524 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13525 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13526 make things unclear.
13527 </para>
13528 <para>
13529 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13530 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13531 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13532 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13533 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13534 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13535 </para>
13536
13537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13538 </sect3>
13539 </sect2>
13540 <sect2 id="shortterms">
13541 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13542 <para>
13543 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13544 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13545 natural authors.
13546 </para>
13547 <para>
13548 In The Future of Ideas, I proposed a seventy-five-year term, granted
13549 in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every five
13550 years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13551 Eldred v. Ashcroft, the proposals became even more radical. The
13552 Economist endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year copyright
13553 term.<footnote><para>
13554 <!-- f3. -->
13555 "A Radical Rethink," Economist, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13556 available at
13557 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13558 </para></footnote>
13559 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13560 </para>
13561 <para>
13562 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13563 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13564 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13565 terms.
13566 </para>
13567 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13568 <listitem><para>
13569 <!-- (1) -->
13570 Keep it short: The term should be as long as necessary to give
13571 incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
13572 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
13573 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
13574 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal
13575 regulations when it no longer benefits an author. </para></listitem>
13576 <listitem><para>
13577 <!-- (2) -->
13578 Keep it simple: The line between the public domain and protected
13579 content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the fuzziness of "fair use,"
13580 and the distinction between "ideas" and "expression." That kind of
13581 law gives them lots of work. But our framers had a simpler idea in
13582 mind: protected versus unprotected. The value of short terms is that
13583 there is little need to build exceptions into copyright when the term
13584 itself is kept short. A clear and active "lawyer-free zone" makes the
13585 complexities of "fair use" and "idea/expression" less necessary to
13586 navigate.
13587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13588 </para></listitem>
13589 <listitem><para>
13590 <!-- (3) -->
13591 Keep it alive: Copyright should have to be renewed. Especially if the
13592 maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be required to signal
13593 periodically that he wants the protection continued. This need not be
13594 an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly protection has
13595 to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes for a
13596 veteran to apply for a pension.<footnote><para>
13597 <!-- f4. -->
13598 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13599 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13600 available at
13601 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13602 </para></footnote>
13603 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13604 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13605 single form.
13606 </para></listitem>
13607 <listitem><para>
13608 <!-- (4) -->
13609 Keep it prospective: Whatever the term of copyright should be, the
13610 clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once given should
13611 not be extended. It might have been a mistake in 1923 for the law to
13612 offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
13613 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got
13614 fewer authors to create in 1923 than we otherwise would have. But we
13615 can't correct that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter
13616 what we do today, we will not increase the number of authors who wrote
13617 in 1923. Of course, we can increase the reward that those who write
13618 now get (or alternatively, increase the copyright burden that smothers
13619 many works that are today invisible). But increasing their reward will
13620 not increase their creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done,
13621 and there's nothing we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13622 </orderedlist>
13623 <para>
13624 These changes together should produce an average copyright term
13625 that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976, the average
13626 term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the same.
13627 </para>
13628 <para>
13629 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13630 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13631 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13632 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13633 </para>
13634
13635 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13636
13637 </sect2>
13638 <sect2 id="freefairuse">
13639 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13640 <para>
13641 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13642 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13643 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13644 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13645 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13646 the emergence of that new technology.
13647 </para>
13648 <para>
13649 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13650 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13651 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13652 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13653 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13654 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13655 though that movie is not "my writing."
13656 </para>
13657 <para>
13658 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13659 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13660 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13661 <!-- f5. -->
13662 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright (New York: Columbia
13663 University Press, 1967), 32.
13664 </para></footnote>
13665 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13666 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13667 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13668 </para>
13669 <blockquote>
13670 <para>
13671 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13672 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13673 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13674 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13675 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13676 </para></footnote>
13677 </para>
13678 </blockquote>
13679 <para>
13680 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13681 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13682 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13683 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13684 Consider each limitation in turn.
13685 </para>
13686 <para>
13687 Term: If Congress wants to grant a derivative right, then that right
13688 should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect John
13689
13690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13691 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13692 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13693 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13694 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13695 after the creative work is done.
13696 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13697 </para>
13698 <para>
13699 Scope: Likewise should the scope of derivative rights be narrowed.
13700 Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are important.
13701 Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines around
13702 regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
13703 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses,
13704 perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no
13705 longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all
13706 the creative possibilities that digital technologies enable; now
13707 imagine pouring molasses into the machines. That's what this general
13708 requirement of permission does to the creative process. Smothers it.
13709 </para>
13710 <para>
13711 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13712 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13713 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13714 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13715 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13716 much more sense.
13717 </para>
13718 <para>
13719 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13720 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13721 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13722 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13723 <para>
13724 <!-- f7. -->
13725 Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13726 Jukebox (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13727 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13728 </para></footnote>
13729 His view is that the law should be written so that
13730 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13731 </para>
13732 <para>
13733 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13734 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13735 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13736 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13737 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13738 </para>
13739 <para>
13740 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13742 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13743 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13744 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13745 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13746 </para>
13747 </sect2>
13748
13749 <sect2 id="liberatemusic">
13750 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13751 <para>
13752 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13753 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13754 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13755 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13756 battles around the sharing of music.
13757 </para>
13758 <para>
13759 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13760 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13761 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13762 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13763 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13764 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13765 innovation on the network.
13766 </para>
13767 <para>
13768 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13769 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13770 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13771 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13772 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13773 </para>
13774 <para>
13775 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the
13776 spread of content for which the performer has not been paid. But of
13777 course, that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in
13778 chapter 5, they enable four different kinds of sharing:
13779 </para>
13780 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13781 <listitem><para>
13782 <!-- A. -->
13783 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13784 for purchasing CDs.
13785 </para></listitem>
13786 <listitem><para>
13787 <!-- B. -->
13788 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13789 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13790 </para></listitem>
13791 <listitem><para>
13792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13793 <!-- C. -->
13794 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13795 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13796 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13797 </para></listitem>
13798 <listitem><para>
13799 <!-- D. -->
13800 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13801 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13802 owner plainly endorses.
13803 </para></listitem>
13804 </orderedlist>
13805 <para>
13806 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13807 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13808 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13809 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13810 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13811 significantly weakened.
13812 </para>
13813 <para>
13814 As I said in chapter 5, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13815 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13816 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13817 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13818 networks.
13819 </para>
13820 <para>
13821 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13822 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13823 should respond.
13824 </para>
13825 <para>
13826 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13827 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13828 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13829 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13830 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13831 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13832 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13833 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13834 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13835 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13836 </para>
13837 <para>
13838 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13839 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13840 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13842 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13843 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13844 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13845 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13846 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13847 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13848 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13849 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13850 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13851 </para>
13852 <para>
13853 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services
13854 that give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet
13855 radio, content that is streamed to the user when the user
13856 demands. Here, then, is the critical point: When it is extremely easy
13857 to connect to services that give access to content, it will be easier
13858 to connect to services that give you access to content than it will be
13859 to download and store content on the many devices you will have for
13860 playing content. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe than
13861 it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13862 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13863 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13864 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13865 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13866 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13867 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13868 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13869 <!-- f8. -->
13870 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13871 April 2002, available at
13872 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13873 </para></footnote>
13874
13875 </para>
13876 <para>
13877 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13878 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13879 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13880 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13881 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13882 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13883 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13884 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13885 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13886 artists get paid, during
13887
13888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13889 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13890 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13891 </para>
13892 <para>
13893 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13894 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13895 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13896 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13897 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13898 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13899 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13900 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13901 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13902 </para>
13903 <para>
13904 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
13905 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
13906 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
13907 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
13908 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
13909 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
13910 way that returns something to the artist.
13911 </para>
13912 <para>
13913 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
13914 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
13915 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
13916 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
13917 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
13918 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
13919 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
13920 his being compensated is less than ideal.
13921 </para>
13922 <para>
13923 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
13924 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
13925 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
13926 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
13927 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
13928 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
13929 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
13930 </para>
13931 <para>
13932
13933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
13934 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
13935 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
13936 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
13937 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
13938 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
13939 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
13940 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
13941 trade.
13942 </para>
13943 <para>
13944 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
13945 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
13946 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
13947 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
13948 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
13949 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
13950 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
13951 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
13952 </para>
13953 <para>
13954 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
13955 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
13956 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
13957 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
13958 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
13959 delivering and accessing content.
13960 </para>
13961 <para>
13962 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
13963 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
13964 </para>
13965 <para>
13966 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
13967 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
13968 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
13969 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
13970 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
13971 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
13972 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
13973 harmed the interests of the content industry.
13974 </para>
13975 <para>
13976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
13977 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
13978 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
13979 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
13980 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
13981 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
13982 way to compensate those who are harmed.
13983 </para>
13984 <para>
13985 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
13986 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
13987 <para>
13988 <!-- f9. --> William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities (last revised:
13989 10 October 2000), available at
13990 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William Fisher, Promises to Keep:
13991 Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment (forthcoming) (Stanford:
13992 Stanford University Press, 2004), ch. 6, available at
13993 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
13994 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
13995 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
13996 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
13997 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
13998 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
13999 Broadband?" Washington Post, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14000 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14001 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14002 available at
14003 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14004 Use Fee (IPUF), 3 March 2002, available at
14005 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14006 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," USA Today, 13 May
14007 2002, available at
14008 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14009 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14010 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14011 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14012 2002, available at
14013 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14014 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14015 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14016 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14017 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14018 debate by about a decade. See
14019 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14020 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14021 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14022 </para></footnote>
14023 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14024 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14025 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14026 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14027 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14028 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14029 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14030 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14031 tax.
14032 </para>
14033 <para>
14034 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14035 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14036 Promises to Keep. The modification that I would make is relatively
14037 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14038 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14039 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14040 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14041 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14042 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14043 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14044 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14045 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14046 controlling access.
14047 </para>
14048 <para>
14049 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14050 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14051 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14052 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14053 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14054 limits on derivative
14055
14056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14057 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14058 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14059 allowed to do with the content itself.
14060 </para>
14061 <para>
14062 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14063 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14064 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14065 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14066 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14067 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14068 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14069 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14070 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14071 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14072 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14073 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14074 on-line.
14075 </para>
14076 <para>
14077 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14078 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14079 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14080 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14081 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14082 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14083 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14084 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14085 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14086 finding ways to compete with "free."
14087 </para>
14088 <para>
14089 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14090 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14091 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14092 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14093 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14094 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14095 the law.
14096 </para>
14097 <para>
14098 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14099 </para>
14100 <para>
14101
14102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14103 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14104 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14105 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14106 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14107 create.
14108 </para>
14109 <para>
14110 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14111 by
14112 </para>
14113 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14114 <listitem><para>
14115 <!-- 1. -->
14116 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14117 </para></listitem>
14118 <listitem><para>
14119 <!-- 2. -->
14120 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14121 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14122 statute;
14123 </para></listitem>
14124 <listitem><para>
14125 <!-- 3. -->
14126 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14127 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14128 </para></listitem>
14129 </orderedlist>
14130 <para>
14131 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14132 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14133 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14134 something then?
14135 </para>
14136 <para>
14137 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14138 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14139 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14140 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14141 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size x,
14142 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14143 market of five times x? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14144 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14145 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14146 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14147 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14148 pirates.
14149 </para>
14150 <para>
14151 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14152 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14153 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14154
14155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14156 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14157 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14158 </para>
14159 </sect2>
14160
14161 <sect2 id="firelawyers">
14162 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14163 <para>
14164 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14165 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14166 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14167 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14168 </para>
14169 <para>
14170 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14171 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14172 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14173 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14174 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14175 strong view queers the law.
14176 </para>
14177 <para>
14178 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14179 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14180 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14181 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14182 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14183 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14184 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14185 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14186 <!-- f10. -->
14187 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14188 Memorial Lecture), UCLA Law Review 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14189 </para></footnote>
14190
14191 </para>
14192 <para>
14193 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14194 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14195 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14196 </para>
14197 <para>
14198 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14199 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14200 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14201 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14202 <!-- f11. -->
14203 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14204 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14205 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14206 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14207 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14208 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14209 J. Liebowitz, Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14210 Drive the Digital Marketplace (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14211 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14212 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14213 available at
14214 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14215 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14216 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14217 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14218 Rethinking, 174&ndash;76.
14219 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14220 </para></footnote>
14221 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14222 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14223 them it works.
14224 </para>
14225 <para>
14226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14227 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14228 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14229 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14230 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14231 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14232 practically never be done.
14233 </para>
14234 <para>
14235 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14236 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14237 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14238 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14239 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14240 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14241 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14242 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14243 </para>
14244 <para>
14245 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14246 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14247 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14248 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14249 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14250 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14251 </para>
14252 <para>
14253 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14254 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14255 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14256 its review.
14257 </para>
14258 <para>
14259 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14260 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14261 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14262 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14263 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14264 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14265 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14266 </para>
14267 <para>
14268 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14269 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14270
14271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14272 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14273 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14274 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14275 </para>
14276 <para>
14277 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14278 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14279 keep your lawyers away.
14280 </para>
14281 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14282 </sect2>
14283 </sect1>
14284 </chapter>
14285 <chapter id="c-notes">
14286 <title>NOTES</title>
14287 <para>
14288 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14289 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14290 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14291 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14292 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14293 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14294 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14295 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14296 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14297 the material.
14298 </para>
14299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14300
14301 </chapter>
14302 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14303 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14304 <para>
14305 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14306 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14307 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14308 to him that this book is dedicated.
14309 </para>
14310 <para>
14311 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14312 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14313 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14314 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14315 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14316 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14317 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14318 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14319 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14320 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14321 critical eye on much of this.
14322 </para>
14323 <para>
14324 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14325 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14326 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14327 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14329 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14330 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14331 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14332 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14333 </para>
14334 <para>
14335 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14336 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14337 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14338 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14339 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14340 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14341 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14342 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14343 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14344 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14345 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14346 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14347 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14348 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14349 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14350 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14351 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14352 a bunch of great replies.)
14353 </para>
14354 <para>
14355 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14356 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14357 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14358 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14359 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14360 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14361 throughout this book.
14362 </para>
14363 <para>
14364 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14365 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14366 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14367 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14368 </para>
14369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14370
14371 </chapter>
14372 </book>