1 <html><head><meta http-equiv=
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"Om forfatteren Lawrense Lessig (http://www.lessig.org), professor i juss og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School, er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i Creative Commons (http://creativecommons.org). Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code: And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public Knowledge. Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," og omtalt som en av Scientific American's "50 visjonærer". Etter utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."></head><body bgcolor=
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"black" link=
"#0000FF" vlink=
"#840084" alink=
"#0000FF"><div lang=
"no" class=
"book" title=
"Fri kultur"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"index"></a>Fri kultur
</h1></div><div><h2 class=
"subtitle">Hvordan store medieaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
2 og kontrollere kreativiteten
</h2></div><div><div class=
"authorgroup"><div class=
"author"><h3 class=
"author"><span class=
"firstname">Lawrence
</span> <span class=
"surname">Lessig
</span></h3></div></div></div><div><p class=
"releaseinfo">Versjon
2004-
02-
10</p></div><div><p class=
"copyright">Copyright ©
2004 Lawrence Lessig
</p></div><div><div class=
"legalnotice" title=
"Legal Notice"><a name=
"id2604851"></a><p>
3 <span class=
"inlinemediaobject"><img src=
"images/cc.png" align=
"middle" height=
"37.5" alt=
"Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert"></span>
5 Denne versjonen av
<em class=
"citetitle">Fri Kultur
</em> er lisensiert med en
6 Creative Commons-lisens. Denne lisensen tillater ikke-kommersiell
7 utnyttelse av verket, hvis opphavsinnehaveren er navngitt. For mer
8 informasjon om lisensen, klikk på ikonet over eller besøk
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/" target=
"_top">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</a>
9 </p></div></div><div><p class=
"pubdate">2004-
03-
25</p></div><div><div class=
"abstract" title=
"Om forfatteren"><p class=
"title"><b>Om forfatteren
</b></p><p>
10 Lawrense Lessig (
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://www.lessig.org" target=
"_top">http://www.lessig.org
</a>), professor i juss
11 og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School,
12 er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i
13 Creative Commons (
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://creativecommons.org" target=
"_top">http://creativecommons.org
</a>).
14 Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) og Code:
15 And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), og er medlem av styrene i
16 Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public
17 Knowledge. Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the
18 Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's "e.biz
19 25," og omtalt som en av Scientific American's "
50 visjonærer". Etter
20 utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law
21 School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit
23 </p></div></div></div><hr></div><div class=
"dedication"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"salespoints"></a></h2></div></div></div><p>
24 Du kan kjøpe et eksemplar av denne boken ved å klikke på en av lenkene
26 </p><div class=
"itemizedlist"><ul class=
"itemizedlist" type=
"number" compact
><li class=
"listitem" style=
"list-style-type: number"><p><a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://www.amazon.com/" target=
"_top">Amazon
</a></p></li><li class=
"listitem" style=
"list-style-type: number"><p><a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/" target=
"_top">B
&N
</a></p></li><li class=
"listitem" style=
"list-style-type: number"><p><a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://www.penguin.com/" target=
"_top">Penguin
</a></p></li></ul></div></div><div class=
"dedication"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"alsobylessig"></a></h2></div></div></div><p>
27 Andre bøker av Lawrence Lessig
29 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
31 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
32 </p></div><div class=
"dedication"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"frontpublisher"></a></h2></div></div></div><p>
33 The Penguin Press, New York
34 </p></div><div class=
"dedication"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"frontbookinfo"></a></h2></div></div></div><p>
37 Hvordan store medieaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
38 og kontrollere kreativiteten
41 </p></div><div class=
"dedication"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"id2579566"></a></h2></div></div></div><p>
42 Til Eric Eldred
— hvis arbeid først trakk meg til denne saken, og for
43 hvem saken fortsetter.
44 </p></div><div class=
"toc"><dl><dt><span class=
"preface"><a href=
"#preface">Forord
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">0.
<a href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"part">I.
<a href=
"#c-piracy"><span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Piratvirksomhet
</span>”</span></a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter">1.
<a href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">2.
<a href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Kun etter-apere
</span>”</span></a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">3.
<a href=
"#catalogs">Kapittel tre: Kataloger
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">4.
<a href=
"#pirates">Kapittel fire:
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Pirater
</span>”</span></a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section">4.1.
<a href=
"#film">Film
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">4.2.
<a href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">4.3.
<a href=
"#radio">Radio
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">4.4.
<a href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"chapter">5.
<a href=
"#piracy">Kapittel fem:
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Piratvirksomhet
</span>”</span></a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section">5.1.
<a href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">5.2.
<a href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"part">II.
<a href=
"#c-property"><span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Eiendom
</span>”</span></a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter">6.
<a href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">7.
<a href=
"#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">8.
<a href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">9.
<a href=
"#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">10.
<a href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Eiendom
</span>”</span></a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section">10.1.
<a href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">10.2.
<a href=
"#beginnings">Opphav
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">10.3.
<a href=
"#lawduration">Loven: Varighet
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">10.4.
<a href=
"#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">10.5.
<a href=
"#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">10.6.
<a href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">10.7.
<a href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">10.8.
<a href=
"#together">Sammen
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"part">III.
<a href=
"#c-puzzles">Nøtter
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter">11.
<a href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">12.
<a href=
"#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section">12.1.
<a href=
"#constrain">Constraining Creators
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">12.2.
<a href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">12.3.
<a href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"part">IV.
<a href=
"#c-balances">Maktfordeling
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter">13.
<a href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">14.
<a href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"chapter">15.
<a href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">16.
<a href=
"#c-afterword">Etterord
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section">16.1.
<a href=
"#usnow">Oss, nå
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section">16.1.1.
<a href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">16.1.2.
<a href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"section">16.2.
<a href=
"#themsoon">Dem, snart
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section">16.2.1.
<a href=
"#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section">16.2.1.1.
<a href=
"#registration">Registrering og fornying
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">16.2.1.2.
<a href=
"#marking">Merking
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"section">16.2.2.
<a href=
"#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">16.2.3.
<a href=
"#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">16.2.4.
<a href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section">16.2.5.
<a href=
"#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"chapter">17.
<a href=
"#c-notes">Notater
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter">18.
<a href=
"#c-acknowledgments">Takk til
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"index"><a href=
"#id2662039">Index
</a></span></dt></dl></div><div class=
"colophon" title=
"Colophon"><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"id2580992"></a>Colophon
</h2><p>
45 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street
48 Opphavsrettbeskyttet © Lawrence Lessig. Alle rettigheter reservert.
50 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
51 <em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
52 ©
2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
54 Cartoon in
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#fig-1711" title=
"Figure 10.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.">Figure
10.18,
“VCR/handgun cartoon.
”</a> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
55 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
57 Diagram in
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#fig-1761" title=
"Figure 10.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.">Figure
10.19,
“Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.
”</a> courtesy of the office of FCC
58 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
60 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
62 Lessig, Lawrence. Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law
63 to lock down culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
69 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
71 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United
74 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United
81 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
83 Printed in the United States of America
87 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
89 Oversatt til bokmål av Petter Reinholdtsen og Anders Hagen
90 Jarmund. Kildefilene til oversetterprosjektet er
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"https://github.com/petterreinholdtsen/free-culture-lessig" target=
"_top">tilgjengelig
91 fra github
</a>. Rapporter feil med oversettelsen via github.
93 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this
94 publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
95 system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
96 photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission
97 of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.
99 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or
100 via any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and
101 punishable by law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and
102 do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
103 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
104 </p></div><div class=
"preface" title=
"Forord"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"preface"></a>Forord
</h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxpoguedavid"></a><p>
105 David Pogue, en glimrende skribent og forfatter av utallige tekniske
106 datarelaterte tekster, skrev dette på slutten av hans gjennomgang av min
107 første bok,
<em class=
"citetitle">Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
</em>:
108 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
109 I motsetning til faktiske lover, så har ikke internett-programvare
110 kapasiteten til å straffe. Den påvirker ikke folk som ikke er online (og
111 kun en veldig liten minoritet av verdens befolkning er online). Og hvis du
112 ikke liker systemet på internett, så kan du alltid slå av
113 modemet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"preface01" href=
"#ftn.preface01" class=
"footnote">1</a>]
</sup>
114 </p></blockquote></div><p>
115 Pogue var skeptisk til argumentet som er kjernen av boken
— at
116 programvaren, eller "koden", fungerte som en slags lov
— og foreslo i
117 sin anmeldelse den lykkelig tanken at hvis livet i cyberspace gikk dårlig,
118 så kan vi alltid som med en trylleformel slå over en bryter og komme hjem
119 igjen. Slå av modemet, koble fra datamaskinen, og eventuelle problemer som
120 finnes
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>den
</em></span> virkeligheten ville ikke "påvirke" oss mer.
123 Pogue kan ha hatt rett i
1999 — jeg er skeptisk, men det kan
124 hende. Men selv om han hadde rett da, så er ikke argumentet gyldig
125 nå.
<em class=
"citetitle">Fri Kultur
</em> er om problemene internett forårsaker
126 selv etter at modemet er slått av. Den er et argument om hvordan slagene
127 som nå brer om seg i livet on-line har fundamentalt påvirket "folk som er
128 ikke pålogget." Det finnes ingen bryter som kan isolere oss fra
130 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2580389"></a><p>
131 Men i motsetning til i boken
<em class=
"citetitle">Code
</em>, er argumentet her
132 ikke så mye om internett i seg selv. Istedet er det om konsekvensen av
133 internett for en del av vår tradisjon som er mye mer grunnleggende, og
134 uansett hvor hardt dette er for en geek-wanna-be å innrømme, mye viktigere.
136 Den tradisjonen er måten vår kultur blir laget på. Som jeg vil forklare i
137 sidene som følger, kommer vi fra en tradisjon av "fri kultur"
—ikke
138 "fri" som i "fri bar" (for å låne et uttrykk fra stifteren av fri
139 programvarebevegelsen
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2580370" href=
"#ftn.id2580370" class=
"footnote">2</a>]
</sup>), men "fri" som i
140 "talefrihet", "fritt marked", "frihandel", "fri konkurranse", "fri vilje" og
141 "frie valg". En fri kultur støtter og beskytter skapere og oppfinnere.
142 Dette gjør den direkte ved å tildele immaterielle rettigheter. Men det gjør
143 den indirekte ved å begrense rekkevidden for disse rettighetene, for å
144 garantere at neste generasjon skapere og oppfinnere forblir
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>så fri
145 som mulig
</em></span> fra kontroll fra fortiden. En fri kultur er ikke en
146 kultur uten eierskap, like lite som et fritt marked er et marked der alt er
147 gratis. Det motsatte av fri kultur er "tillatelseskultur"
—en kultur
148 der skapere kun kan skape med tillatelse fra de mektige, eller fra skaperne
151 Hvis vi forsto denne endringen, så tror jeg vi ville stå imot den. Ikke
152 "vi" på venstresiden eller "dere" på høyresiden, men vi som ikke har
153 investert i den spesifikke kulturindustrien som har definert det tjuende
154 århundre. Enten du er på venstre eller høyresiden, hvis du i denne forstand
155 ikke har interesser, vil historien jeg forteller her gi deg problemer. For
156 endringene jeg beskriver påvirker verdier som begge sider av vår politiske
157 kultur anser som grunnleggende.
158 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2580470"></a><p>
159 Vi så et glimt av dette tverrpolitiske raseri på forsommeren i
2003. Da FCC
160 vurderte endringer i reglene for medieeierskap som ville slakke på
161 begrensningene rundt mediekonsentrasjon, sendte en ekstraordinær koalisjon
162 mer enn
700 000 brev til FCC for å motsette seg endringen. Mens William
163 Safire beskrev å marsjere "ubehagelig sammen med CodePink Women for Peace
164 and the National Rifle Association, mellom liberale Olympia Snowe og
165 konservative Ted Stevens", formulerte han kanskje det enkleste uttrykket
166 for hva som var på spill: konsentrasjonen av makt. Så spurte han:
167 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2580489"></a>
168 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
169 Høres dette ikke-konservativt ut? Ikke for meg. Denne konsentrasjonen av
170 makt
—politisk, selskapsmessig, pressemessig, kulturelt
—bør være
171 bannlyst av konservative. Spredningen av makt gjennom lokal kontroll, og
172 derigjennom oppmuntre til individuell deltagelse, er essensen i føderalismen
173 og det største uttrykk for demokrati.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2580512" href=
"#ftn.id2580512" class=
"footnote">3</a>]
</sup>
174 </p></blockquote></div><p>
175 Denne idéen er et element i argumentet til
<em class=
"citetitle">Fri
176 Kultur
</em>, selv om min fokus ikke bare er på konsentrasjonen av
177 makt som følger av konsentrasjonen i eierskap, men mer viktig, og fordi det
178 er mindre synlig, på konsentrasjonen av makt som er resultat av en radikal
179 endring i det effektive virkeområdet til loven. Loven er i endring, og
180 endringen forandrer på hvordan vår kultur blir skapt. Den endringen bør
181 bekymre deg
—Uansett om du bryr deg om internett eller ikke, og uansett
182 om du er til venstre for Safires eller til høyre. Inspirasjonen til tittelen
183 og mye av argumentet i denne boken kommer fra arbeidet til Richard Stallman
184 og Free Software Foundation. Faktisk, da jeg leste Stallmans egne tekster på
185 nytt, spesielt essyene i
<em class=
"citetitle">Free Software, Free Society
</em>,
186 innser jeg at alle de teoretiske innsiktene jeg utvikler her er innsikter
187 som Stallman beskrev for tiår siden. Man kan dermed godt argumentere for at
188 dette verket kun er et avledet verk.
191 Jeg godtar kritikken, hvis det faktisk er kritikk. Arbeidet til en advokat
192 er alltid avledede verker, og jeg mener ikke å gjøre noe mer i denne boken
193 enn å minne en kultur om en tradisjon som alltid har vært deres egen. Som
194 Stallman forsvarer jeg denne tradisjonen på grunnlag av verdier. Som
195 Stallman tror jeg dette er verdiene til frihet. Og som Stallman, tror jeg
196 dette er verdier fra vår fortid som må forsvares i vår fremtid. En fri
197 kultur har vært vår fortid, men vil bare være vår fremtid hvis vi endrer
198 retningen vi følger akkurat nå. På samme måte som Stallmans argumenter for
199 fri programvare, treffer argumenter for en fri kultur på forvirring som er
200 vanskelig å unngå, og enda vanskeligere å forstå. En fri kultur er ikke en
201 kultur uten eierskap. Det er ikke en kultur der kunstnere ikke får
202 betalt. En kultur uten eierskap eller en der skaperne ikke kan få betalt, er
203 anarki, ikke frihet. Anarki er ikke hva jeg fremmer her.
205 I stedet er den frie kulturen som jeg forsvarer i denne boken en balanse
206 mellom anarki og kontroll. En fri kultur, i likhet med et fritt marked, er
207 fylt med eierskap. Den er fylt med regler for eierskap og kontrakter som
208 blir håndhevet av staten. Men på samme måte som det frie markedet blir
209 pervertert hvis dets eierskap blir føydalt, så kan en fri kultur bli ødelagt
210 av ekstremisme i eierskapsrettighetene som definerer den. Det er dette jeg
211 frykter om vår kultur i dag. Det er som motpol til denne ekstremismen at
212 denne boken er skrevet.
213 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.preface01" href=
"#preface01" class=
"para">1</a>]
</sup>
214 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York
215 Times
</em>,
30. januar
2000
216 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2580370" href=
"#id2580370" class=
"para">2</a>]
</sup>
217 Richard M. Stallman,
<em class=
"citetitle">Fri programvare, Frie samfunn
</em> 57
218 (Joshua Gay, red.
2002).
219 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2580512" href=
"#id2580512" class=
"para">3</a>]
</sup> William Safire, "The Great Media Gulp,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York
220 Times
</em>,
22. mai
2003.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2580519"></a>
221 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"0. Introduksjon"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-introduction"></a>0. Introduksjon
</h2></div></div></div><p>
222 17. desember
1903, på en vindfylt strand i Nord-Carolina i såvidt under
223 hundre sekunder, demonstrerte Wright-brødrene at et selvdrevet fartøy tyngre
224 enn luft kunne fly. Øyeblikket var elektrisk, og dens betydning ble alment
225 forstått. Nesten umiddelbart, eksploderte interessen for denne nye
226 teknologien som muliggjorde bemannet luftfart og en hærskare av oppfinnere
227 begynte å bygge videre på den.
229 Da Wright-brødrene fant opp flymaskinen, hevdet loven i USA at en grunneier
230 ble antatt å eie ikke bare overflaten på området sitt, men også alt landet
231 under bakken, helt ned til senterpunktet i jorda, og alt volumet over
232 bakken, "i ubestemt grad, oppover".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2636531" href=
"#ftn.id2636531" class=
"footnote">4</a>]
</sup> I
233 mange år undret lærde over hvordan en best skulle tolke idéen om at
234 eiendomsretten gikk helt til himmelen. Betød dette at du eide stjernene?
235 Kunne en dømme gjess for at de regelmessig og med vilje tok seg inn på annen
238 Så kom flymaskiner, og for første gang hadde dette prinsippet i lovverket i
239 USA
—dypt nede i grunnlaget for vår tradisjon og akseptert av de
240 viktigste juridiske tenkerne i vår fortid
—en betydning. Hvis min
241 eiendom rekker til himmelen, hva skjer når United flyr over mitt område?
242 Har jeg rett til å nekte dem å bruke min eiendom? Har jeg mulighet til å
243 inngå en eksklusiv avtale med Delta Airlines? Kan vi gjennomføre en auksjon
244 for å finne ut hvor mye disse rettighetene er verdt?
245 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636551"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636576"></a><p>
246 I
1945 ble disse spørsmålene en føderal sak. Da bøndene Thomas Lee og Tinie
247 Causby i Nord Carolina begynte å miste kyllinger på grunn av lavtflygende
248 militære fly (vettskremte kyllinger fløy tilsynelatende i låveveggene og
249 døde), saksøkte Causbyene regjeringen for å trenge seg inn på deres
250 eiendom. Flyene rørte selvfølgelig aldri overflaten på Causbys' eiendom. Men
251 hvis det stemte som Blackstone, Kent, og Cola hadde sagt, at deres eiendom
252 strakk seg "i ubestemt grad, oppover," så hadde regjeringen trengt seg inn
253 på deres eiendom, og Causbys ønsket å sette en stopper for dette.
254 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636596"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636602"></a><p>
255 Høyesterett gikk med på å ta opp Causbys sak. Kongressen hadde vedtatt at
256 luftfartsveiene var tilgjengelig for alle, men hvis ens eiendom virkelig
257 rakk til himmelen, da kunne muligens kongressens vedtak ha vært i strid med
258 grunnlovens forbud mot å "ta" eiendom uten kompensasjon. Retten erkjente at
259 "det er gammel doktrine etter sedvane at en eiendom rakk til utkanten av
260 universet.", men dommer Douglas hadde ikke tålmodighet for forhistoriske
261 doktriner. I et enkelt avsnitt, ble hundrevis av år med
262 eiendomslovgivningen strøket. Som han skrev på vegne av retten,
263 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
264 [Denne] doktrinen har ingen plass i den moderne verden. Luften er en
265 offentlig motorvei, slik kongressen har erklært. Hvis det ikke var
266 tilfelle, ville hver eneste transkontinentale flyrute utsette operatørene
267 for utallige søksmål om inntrenging på annen manns eiendom. Idéen er i
268 strid med sunn fornuft. Å anerkjenne slike private krav til luftrommet
269 ville blokkere disse motorveiene, seriøst forstyrre muligheten til kontroll
270 og utvikling av dem i fellesskapets interesse og overføre til privat
271 eierskap det som kun fellesskapet har et rimelig krav til.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2636640" href=
"#ftn.id2636640" class=
"footnote">5</a>]
</sup>
272 </p></blockquote></div><p>
273 "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft."
276 Det er hvordan loven vanligvis fungerer. Ikke ofte like brått eller
277 utålmodig, men til slutt er dette hvordan loven fungerer. Det var ikke
278 stilen til Douglas å utbrodere. Andre dommere ville ha skrevet mange flere
279 sider før de nådde sin konklusjon, men for Douglas holdt det med en enkel
280 linje: "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft.". Men uansett om det tar flere
281 sider eller kun noen få ord, så er det en genial egenskap med et
282 rettspraksis-system, slik som vårt er, at loven tilpasser seg til aktuelle
283 teknologiene. Og mens den tilpasser seg, så endres den. Idéer som var
284 solide som fjell i en tidsalder knuses i en annen.
285 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636705"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636712"></a><p>
286 Eller, det er hvordan ting skjer når det ikke er noen mektige på andre siden
287 av endringen. Causbyene var bare bønder. Og selv om det uten tvil var
288 mange som dem som var lei av den økende trafikken i luften (og en håper ikke
289 for mange kyllinger flakset seg inn i vegger), ville Causbyene i verden
290 finne det svært hardt å samles for å stoppe idéen, og teknologien, som
291 Wright-brødrene hadde ført til verden. Wright-brødrene spyttet flymaskiner
292 inn i den teknologiske meme-dammen. Idéen spredte seg deretter som et virus
293 i en kyllingfarm. Causbyene i verden fant seg selv omringet av "det synes
294 rimelig" gitt teknologien som Wright-brødrene hadde produsert. De kunne stå
295 på sine gårder, med døde kyllinger i hendene, og heve knyttneven mot disse
296 nye teknologiene så mye de ville. De kunne ringe sine representanter eller
297 til og med saksøke. Men når alt kom til alt, ville kraften i det som virket
298 "åpenbart" for alle andre
—makten til "sunn fornuft"
—ville vinne
299 frem. Deres "personlige interesser" ville ikke få lov til å nedkjempe en
300 åpenbar fordel for fellesskapet.
302 Edwin Howard Armstrong er en av USAs glemte oppfinnergenier. Han dukket opp
303 på oppfinnerscenen etter titaner som Thomas Edison og Alexander Graham
304 Bell. Alle hans bidrag på området radioteknologi gjør han til kanskje den
305 viktigste av alle enkeltoppfinnere i de første femti årene av radio. Han
306 var bedre utdannet enn Michael Faraday, som var bokbinderlærling da han
307 oppdaget elektrisk induksjon i
1831. Men han hadde like god intuisjon om
308 hvordan radioverden virket, og ved minst tre anledninger, fant Armstrong opp
309 svært viktig teknologier som brakte vår forståelse av radio et hopp videre.
310 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636774"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636783"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636790"></a>
312 Dagen etter julaften i
1933, ble fire patenter utstedt til Armstrong for
313 hans mest signifikante oppfinnelse
—FM-radio. Inntil da hadde
314 forbrukerradioer vært amplitude-modulert (AM) radio. Tidens teoretikere
315 hadde sagt at frekvens-modulert (FM) radio. De hadde rett når det gjelder
316 et smalt bånd av spektrumet. Men Armstrong oppdaget at frekvens-modulert
317 radio i et vidt bånd i spektrumet leverte en forbløffende gjengivelse av
318 lyd, med mye mindre senderstyrke og støy.
320 Den
5. november
1935 demonstrerte han teknologien på et møte hos institutt
321 for radioingeniører ved Empire State-bygningen i New York City. Han vred
322 radiosøkeren over en rekke AM-stasjoner, inntil radioen låste seg mot en
323 kringkasting som han hadde satt opp
27 kilometer unna. Radioen ble helt
324 stille, som om den var død, og så, med en klarhet ingen andre i rommet noen
325 gang hadde hørt fra et elektrisk apparat, produserte det lyden av en
326 opplesers stemme: "Dette er amatørstasjon W2AG ved Yonkers, New York, som
327 opererer på frekvensmodulering ved to og en halv meter."
329 Publikum hørte noe ingen hadde trodd var mulig:
330 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
331 Et glass vann ble fylt opp foran mikrofonen i Yonkers, og det hørtes ut som
332 et glass som ble fylt opp.
… Et papir ble krøllet og revet opp, og
333 det hørtes ut som papir og ikke som en sprakende skogbrann.
…
334 Sousa-marsjer ble spilt av fra plater og en pianosolo og et gitarnummer ble
335 utført.
… Musikken ble presentert med en livaktighet som sjeldent om
336 noen gang før hadde vært hørt fra en radio-"musikk-boks".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2636842" href=
"#ftn.id2636842" class=
"footnote">6</a>]
</sup>
337 </p></blockquote></div><p>
339 Som vår egen sunn fornuft forteller oss, hadde Armstrong oppdaget en mye
340 bedre radioteknologi. Men på tidspunktet for hans oppfinnelse, jobbet
341 Armstrong for RCA. RCA var den dominerende aktøren i det da dominerende
342 AM-radiomarkedet. I
1935 var det tusen radiostasjoner over hele USA, men
343 stasjonene i de store byene var alle eid av en liten håndfull selskaper.
346 Presidenten i RCA, David Sarnoff, en venn av Armstrong, var ivrig etter å få
347 Armstrong til å oppdage en måte å fjerne støyen fra AM-radio. Så Sarnoff var
348 ganske spent da Armstrong fortalte ham at han hadde en enhet som fjernet
349 støy fra "radio.". Men da Armstrong demonstrerte sin oppfinnelse, var ikke
350 Sarnoff fornøyd.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636898"></a>
351 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
352 Jeg trodde Armstrong ville finne opp et slags filter for å fjerne skurring
353 fra AM-radioen vår. Jeg trodde ikke han skulle starte en revolusjon
—
354 starte en hel forbannet ny industri i konkurranse med RCA.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2636802" href=
"#ftn.id2636802" class=
"footnote">7</a>]
</sup>
355 </p></blockquote></div><p>
356 Armstrongs oppfinnelse truet RCAs AM-herredømme, så selskapet lanserte en
357 kampanje for å knuse FM-radio. Mens FM kan ha vært en overlegen teknologi,
358 var Sarnoff en overlegen taktiker. En forfatter beskrev det slik,
359 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636940"></a>
360 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
361 Kreftene til fordel for FM, i hovedsak ingeniørfaglige, kunne ikke overvinne
362 tyngden til strategien utviklet av avdelingene for salg, patenter og juss
363 for å undertrykke denne trusselen til selskapets posisjon. For FM utgjorde,
364 hvis det fikk utvikle seg uten begrensninger
… en komplett endring i
365 maktforholdene rundt radio
… og muligens fjerningen av det nøye
366 begrensede AM-systemet som var grunnlaget for RCA stigning til
367 makt.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2636966" href=
"#ftn.id2636966" class=
"footnote">8</a>]
</sup>
368 </p></blockquote></div><p>
369 RCA holdt først teknologien innomhus, og insistere på at det var nødvendig
370 med ytterligere tester. Da Armstrong, etter to år med testing, ble
371 utålmodig, begynte RCA å bruke sin makt hos myndighetene til holde tilbake
372 den generelle spredningen av FM-radio. I
1936, ansatte RCA den tidligere
373 lederen av FCC og ga ham oppgaven med å sikre at FCC tilordnet
374 radiospekteret på en måte som ville kastrere FM
—hovedsakelig ved å
375 flytte FM-radio til et annet band i spekteret. I første omgang lyktes ikke
376 disse forsøkene. Men mens Armstrong og nasjonen var distrahert av andre
377 verdenskrig, begynte RCAs arbeid å bære frukter. Like etter at krigen var
378 over, annonserte FCC et sett med avgjørelser som ville ha en klar effekt:
379 FM-radio ville bli forkrøplet.Lawrence lessing beskrevet det slik,
380 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
381 Serien med slag mot kroppen som FM-radio mottok rett etter krigen, i en
382 serie med avgjørelser manipulert gjennom FCC av de store radiointeressene,
383 var nesten utrolige i deres kraft og underfundighet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2636982" href=
"#ftn.id2636982" class=
"footnote">9</a>]
</sup>
384 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637021"></a><p>
385 For å gjøre plass i spektrumet for RCAs nyeste satsingsområde, televisjon,
386 skulle FM-radioens brukere flyttes til et helt nytt band i spektrumet.
387 Sendestyrken til FM-radioene ble også redusert, og gjorde at FM ikke lenger
388 kunne brukes for å sende programmer fra en del av landet til en annen.
389 (Denne endringen ble sterkt støttet av AT
&T, på grunn av at fjerningen
390 av FM-videresendingsstasjoner ville bety at radiostasjonene ville bli nødt
391 til å kjøpe kablede linker fra AT
&T.) Spredningen av FM-radio var
392 dermed kvalt, i hvert fall midlertidig.
394 Armstrong sto imot RCAs innsats. Som svar motsto RCA Armstrongs patenter.
395 Etter å ha bakt FM-teknologi inn i den nye standarden for TV, erklærte RCS
396 patentene ugyldige
—uten grunn og nesten femten år etter at de ble
397 utstedet. De nektet dermed å betale ham for bruken av patentene. I seks år
398 kjempet Armstrong en dyr søksmålskrig for å forsvare patentene sine. Til
399 slutt, samtidig som patentene utløp, tilbød RCA et forlik så lavt at det
400 ikke engang dekket Armstrongs advokatregning. Beseiret, knust og nå blakk,
401 skrev Armstrong i
1954 en kort beskjed til sin kone, før han gikk ut av et
402 vindu i trettende etasje og falt i døden.
405 Dette er slik loven virker noen ganger. Ikke ofte like tragisk, og sjelden
406 med heltemodig drama, men noen ganger er det slik det virker. Fra starten
407 har myndigheter og myndighetsorganer blitt tatt til fange. Det er mer
408 sannsynlig at de blir fanget når en mektig interesse er truet av enten en
409 juridisk eller teknologisk endring. Denne mektige interessen utøver for
410 ofte sin innflytelse hos myndighetene til å få myndighetene til å beskytte
411 den. Retorikken for denne beskyttelsen er naturligvis alltid med fokus på
412 fellesskapets beste. Realiteten er noe annet. Idéer som kan være solide
413 som fjell i en tidsalder, men som overlatt til seg selv, vil falle sammen i
414 en annen, er videreført gjennom denne subtile korrupsjonen i vår politiske
415 prosess. RCA hadde hva Causby-ene ikke hadde: Makten til å undertrykke
416 effekten av en teknologisk endring.
418 Det er ingen enkeltoppfinner av Internet. Ei heller er det en god dato som
419 kan brukes til å markere når det ble født. Likevel har internettet i løpet
420 av svært kort tid blitt en del av vanlige amerikaneres liv. I følge the Pew
421 Internet and American Life-prosjektet, har
58 prosent av amerikanerne hatt
422 tilgang til internettet i
2002, opp fra
49 prosent to år
423 tidligere.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637103" href=
"#ftn.id2637103" class=
"footnote">10</a>]
</sup> Det tallet kan uten
424 problemer passere to tredjedeler av nasjonen ved utgangen av
2004.
426 Etter hvert som internett er blitt integrert inn i det vanlige liv har ting
427 blitt endret. Noen av disse endringene er teknisk
—internettet har
428 gjort kommunikasjon raskere, det har redusert kostnaden med å samle inn
429 data, og så videre. Disse tekniske endringene er ikke fokus for denne
430 boken. De er viktige. De er ikke godt forstått. Men de er den type ting
431 som ganske enkelt ville blir borte hvis vi alle bare slo av internettet. De
432 påvirker ikke folk som ikke bruker internettet, eller i det miste påvirker
433 det ikke dem direkte. De er et godt tema for en bok om internettet. Men
434 dette er ikke en bok om internettet.
436 I stedet er denne boken om effekten av internettet ut over internettet i seg
437 selv. En effekt på hvordan kultur blir skapt. Min påstand er at
438 internettet har ført til en viktig og ukjent endring i denne prosessen.
439 Denne endringen vil forandre en tradisjon som er like gammel som republikken
440 selv. De fleste, hvis de la merke til denne endringen, ville avvise den.
441 Men de fleste legger ikke engang merke til denne endringen som internettet
444 Vi kan få en følelse av denne endringen ved å skille mellom kommersiell og
445 ikke-kommersiell kultur, ved å knytte lovens reguleringer til hver av dem.
446 Med "kommersiell kultur" mener jeg den delen av vår kultur som er produsert
447 og solgt eller produsert for å bli solgt. Med "ikke-kommersiell kultur"
448 mener jeg alt det andre. Da gamle menn satt rundt i parker eller på
449 gatehjørner og fortalte historier som unger og andre lyttet til, så var det
450 ikke-kommersiell kultur. Da Noah Webster publiserte sin "Reader", eller
451 Joel Barlow sin poesi, så var det kommersiell kultur.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637037"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637175"></a>
453 Fra historisk tid, og for omtrent hele vår tradisjon, har ikke-kommersiell
454 kultur i hovedsak ikke vært regulert. Selvfølgelig, hvis din historie var
455 utuktig, eller hvis dine sanger forstyrret freden, kunne loven gripe inn.
456 Men loven var aldri direkte interessert i skapingen eller spredningen av
457 denne form for kultur, og lot denne kulturen være "fri". Den vanlige måten
458 som vanlige individer delte og formet deres kultur
—historiefortelling,
459 formidling av scener fra teater eller TV, delta i fan-klubber, deling av
460 musikk, laging av kassetter
—ble ikke styrt av lovverket.
462 Fokuset på loven var kommersiell kreativitet. I starten forsiktig, etter
463 hvert betraktelig, beskytter loven insentivet til skaperne ved å tildele dem
464 en eksklusiv rett til deres kreative verker, slik at de kan selge disse
465 eksklusive rettighetene på en kommersiell markedsplass.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637208" href=
"#ftn.id2637208" class=
"footnote">11</a>]
</sup> Dette er også, naturligvis, en viktig del av
466 kreativitet og kultur, og det har blitt en viktigere og viktigere del i
467 USA. Men det var på ingen måte dominerende i vår tradisjon. Det var i
468 stedet bare en del, en kontrollert del, balansert mot det frie.
470 Denne grove inndelingen mellom den frie og den kontrollerte har nå blitt
471 fjernet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637245" href=
"#ftn.id2637245" class=
"footnote">12</a>]
</sup> Internettet har satt scenen
472 for denne fjerningen, og pressen frem av store medieaktører har loven nå
473 påvirket det. For første gang i vår tradisjon, har de vanlige måtene som
474 individer skaper og deler kultur havnet innen rekekvidde for reguleringene
475 til loven, som har blitt utvidet til å dra inn i sitt kontrollområde den
476 enorme mengden kultur og kreativitet som den aldri tidligere har nådd over.
477 Teknologien som tok vare på den historiske balansen
—mellom bruken av
478 den delen av kulturen vår som var fri og bruken av vår kultur som krevde
479 tillatelse
—har blitt borte. Konsekvensen er at vi er mindre og mindre
480 en fri kultur, og mer og mer en tillatelseskultur.
482 Denne endringen blir rettferdiggjort som nødvendig for å beskytte
483 kommersiell kreativitet. Og ganske riktig, proteksjonisme er nøyaktig det
484 som motiverer endringen. Men proteksjonismen som rettferdiggjør endringene
485 som jeg skal beskrive lenger ned er ikke den begrensede og balanserte typen
486 som har definert loven tidligere. Dette er ikke en proteksjonisme for å
487 beskytte artister. Det er i stedet en proteksjonisme for å beskytte
488 bestemte forretningsformer. Selskaper som er truet av potensialet til
489 internettet for å endre måten både kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell kultur
490 blir skapt og delt, har samlet seg for å få lovgiverne til å bruke loven for
491 å beskytte selskapene. Dette er historien om RCA og Armstrong, og det er
492 drømmen til Causbyene.
494 For internettet har sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mulighet for mange til å
495 delta i prosessen med å bygge og kultivere en kultur som rekker lagt utenfor
496 lokale grenselinjer. Den makten har endret markedsplassen for å lage og
497 kultivere kultur generelt, og den endringen truer i neste omgang etablerte
498 innholdsindustrier. Internettet er dermed for industriene som bygget og
499 distribuerte innhold i det tjuende århundret hva FM-radio var for AM-radio,
500 eller hva traileren var for jernbaneindustrien i det nittende århundret:
501 begynnelsen på slutten, eller i hvert fall en markant endring. Digitale
502 teknologier, knyttet til internettet, kunne produsere et mye mer
503 konkurransedyktig og levende marked for å bygge og kultivere kultur. Dette
504 markedet kunne inneholde en mye videre og mer variert utvalg av skapere.
505 Disse skaperne kunne produsere og distribuere et mye mer levende utvalg av
506 kreativitet. Og avhengig av noen få viktige faktorer, så kunne disse
507 skaperne tjenere mer i snitt fra dette systemet enn skaperne gjør i
508 dag
—så lenge RCA-ene av i dag ikke bruker loven til å beskytte dem
509 selv mot denne konkurransen.
511 Likevel, som jeg argumenterer for i sidene som følger, er dette nøyaktig det
512 som skjer i vår kultur i dag. Dette som er dagens ekvivalenter til tidlig
513 tjuende århundres radio og nittende århundres jernbaner bruker deres makt
514 til å få loven til å beskytte dem mot dette nye, mer effektive, mer levende
515 teknologi for å bygge kultur. De lykkes i deres plan om å gjøre om
516 internettet før internettet gjør om på dem.
518 Det ser ikke slik ut for mange. Kamphandlingene over opphavsrett og
519 internettet er fjernt for de fleste. For de få som følger dem, virker de i
520 hovedsak å handle om et enklere sett med spørsmål
—hvorvidt
521 "piratvirksomhet" vil bli akseptert, og hvorvidt "eiendomsretten" vil bli
522 beskyttet. "Krigen" som har blitt erklært mot teknologiene til
523 internettet
—det presidenten for Motion Picture Association of America
524 (MPAA) Jack Valenti kaller sin "egen terroristkrig"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637372" href=
"#ftn.id2637372" class=
"footnote">13</a>]
</sup>—har blitt rammet inn som en kamp om å følge
525 loven og respektere eiendomsretten. For å vite hvilken side vi bør ta i
526 denne krigen, de fleste tenker at vi kun trenger å bestemme om hvorvidt vi
527 er for eiendomsrett eller mot den.
529 Hvis dette virkelig var alternativene, så ville jeg være enig med Jack
530 Valenti og innholdsindustrien. Jeg tror også på eiendomsretten, og spesielt
531 på viktigheten av hva Mr. Valenti så pent kaller "kreativ eiendomsrett".
532 Jeg tror at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at loven, riktig innstilt, bør
533 straffe "piratvirksomhet", både på og utenfor internettet.
535 Men disse enkle trosoppfatninger maskerer et mye mer grunnleggende spørsmål
536 og en mye mer dramatisk endring. Min frykt er at med mindre vi begynner å
537 legge merke til denne endringen, så vil krigen for å befri verden fra
538 internettets "pirater" også fjerne verdier fra vår kultur som har vært
539 integrert til vår tradisjon helt fra starten.
541 Disse verdiene bygget en tradisjon som, for i hvert fall de første
180 årene
542 av vår republikk, garanterte skaperne rettigheten til å bygge fritt på deres
543 fortid, og beskyttet skaperne og innovatørene fra både statlig og privat
544 kontroll. Det første grunnlovstillegget beskyttet skaperne fra statlig
545 kontroll. Og som professor Neil Netanel kraftfylt argumenterer,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637439" href=
"#ftn.id2637439" class=
"footnote">14</a>]
</sup> opphavsrettslov, skikkelig balansert, beskyttet
546 skaperne mot privat kontroll. Vår tradisjon var dermed hverken Sovjet eller
547 tradisjonen til velgjørere. I stedet skar det ut en bred manøvreringsrom
548 hvor skapere kunne kultivere og utvide vår kultur.
550 Likevel har lovens respons til internettet, når det knyttes sammen til
551 endringer i teknologien i internettet selv, ført til massiv økting av den
552 effektive reguleringen av kreativitet i USA. For å bygge på eller kritisere
553 kulturen rundt oss må en spørre, som Oliver Twist, om tillatelse først.
554 Tillatelse er, naturligvis, ofte innvilget
—men det er ikke ofte
555 innvilget til den kritiske eller den uavhengige. Vi har bygget en slags
556 kulturell adel. De innen dette adelskapet har et enkelt liv, mens de på
557 utsiden har det ikke. Men det er adelskap i alle former som er fremmed for
560 Historien som følger er om denne krigen. Er det ikke om "betydningen av
561 teknologi" i vanlig liv. Jeg tror ikke på guder, hverken digitale eller
562 andre typer. Det er heller ikke et forsøk på å demonisere noen individer
563 eller gruppe, jeg tro heller ikke i en djevel, selskapsmessig eller på annen
564 måte. Det er ikke en moralsk historie. Ei heller er det et rop om hellig
565 krig mot en industri.
567 Det er i stedet et forsøk på å forstå en håpløst ødeleggende krig som er
568 inspirert av teknologiene til internettet, men som rekker lang utenfor dens
569 kode. Og ved å forstå denne kampen er den en innsats for å finne veien til
570 fred. Det er ingen god grunn for å fortsette dagens batalje rundt
571 internett-teknologiene. Det vil være til stor skade for vår tradisjon og
572 kultur hvis den får lov til å fortsette ukontrollert. Vi må forstå kilden
573 til denne krigen. Vi må finne en løsning snart.
574 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637521"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637527"></a><p>
575 Lik Causbyenes kamp er denne krigen, delvis, om "eiendomsrett". Eiendommen i
576 denne krigen er ikke like håndfast som den til Causbyene, og ingen uskyldige
577 kyllinger har så langt mistet livet. Likevel er idéene rundt denne
578 "eiendomsretten" like åpenbare for de fleste som Causbyenes krav om
579 ukrenkeligheten til deres bondegård var for dem. De fleste av oss tar for
580 gitt de uvanlig mektige krav som eierne av "immaterielle rettigheter" nå
581 hevder. De fleste av oss, som Causbyene, behandler disse kravene som
582 åpenbare. Og dermed protesterer vi, som Causbyene,, når ny teknologi griper
583 inn i denne eiendomsretten. Det er så klart for oss som det var fro dem at
584 de nye teknologiene til internettet "tar seg til rette" mot legitime krav
585 til "eiendomsrett". Det er like klart for oss som det var for dem at loven
586 skulle ta affære for å stoppe denne inntrengingen i annen manns eiendom.
587 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637570"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637576"></a><p>
589 Og dermed, når nerder og teknologer forsvarer sin tids Armstrong og
590 Wright-brødenes teknologi, får de lite sympati fra de fleste av oss. Sunn
591 fornuft gjør ikke opprør. I motsetning til saken til de uheldige Causbyene,
592 er sunn fornuft på samme side som eiendomseierne i denne krigen. I
593 motsetning til hos de heldige Wright-brødrene, har internettet ikke
594 inspirert en revolusjon til fordel for seg.
596 Mitt håp er å skyve denne sunne fornuften videre. Jeg har blitt stadig mer
597 overrasket over kraften til denne idéen om immaterielle rettigheter og, mer
598 viktig, dets evne til å slå av kritisk tanke hos lovmakere og innbyggere.
599 Det har aldri før i vår historie vært så mye av vår "kultur" som har vært
600 "eid" enn det er nå. Og likevel har aldri før konsentrasjonen av makt til å
601 kontrollere
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>bruken
</em></span> av kulturen vært mer akseptert uten
602 spørsmål enn det er nå.
604 Gåten er, hvorfor det? Er det fordi vi fått en innsikt i sannheten om
605 verdien og betydningen av absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur? Er det
606 fordi vi har oppdaget at vår tradisjon med å avvise slike absolutte krav var
609 Eller er det på grunn av at idéer om absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur
610 gir fordeler til RCA-ene i vår tid, og passer med vår ureflekterte
613 Er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår tradisjon om fri kultur en
614 forekomst av USA som korrigerer en feil fra sin fortid, slik vi gjorde det
615 etter en blodig krig mot slaveri, og slik vi sakte gjør det mot
616 forskjellsbehandling? Eller er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår
617 tradisjon med fri kultur nok et eksempel på at vårt politiske system er
618 fanget av noen få mektige særinteresser?
620 Fører sunn fornuft til det ekstreme i dette spørsmålet på grunn av at sunn
621 fornuft faktisk tror på dette ekstreme? Eller står sunn fornuft i stillhet
622 i møtet med dette ekstreme fordi, som med Armstrong versus RCA, at den mer
623 mektige siden har sikret seg at det har et mye mer mektig synspunkt?
624 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637665"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637671"></a><p>
626 Jeg forsøker ikke å være mystisk. Mine egne synspunkter er klare. Jeg mener
627 det var riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør mot ekstremismen til
628 Causbyene. Jeg mener det ville være riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør
629 mot de ekstreme krav som gjøres i dag på vegne av "immaterielle
630 rettigheter". Det som loven krever i dag er mer å mer like dumt som om
631 lensmannen skulle arrestere en flymaskin for å trenge inn på annen manns
632 eiendom. Men konsekvensene av den nye dumskapen vil bli mye mer
636 Basketaket som pågår akkurat nå senterer seg rundt to idéer:
637 "piratvirksomhet" og "eiendom". Mitt mål med denne bokens neste to deler er
638 å utforske disse to idéene.
640 Metoden min er ikke den vanlige metoden for en akademiker. Jeg ønsker ikke
641 å pløye deg inn i et komplisert argument, steinsatt med referanser til
642 obskure franske teoretikere
—uansett hvor naturlig det har blitt for
643 den rare sorten vi akademikere har blitt. Jeg vil i stedet begynne hver del
644 med en samling historier som etablerer en sammenheng der disse
645 tilsynelatende enkle idéene kan bli fullt ut forstått.
647 De to delene setter opp kjernen i påstanden til denne boken: at mens
648 internettet faktisk har produsert noe fantastisk og nytt, bidrar våre
649 myndigheter, presset av store medieaktører for å møte dette "noe nytt" til å
650 ødelegge noe som er svært gammelt. I stedet for å forstå endringene som
651 internettet kan gjøre mulig, og i stedet for å ta den tiden som trengs for å
652 la "sunn fornuft" finne ut hvordan best svare på utfordringen, så lar vi de
653 som er mest truet av endringene bruke sin makt til å endre loven
—og
654 viktigere, å bruke sin makt til å endre noe fundamentalt om hvordan vi
657 Jeg tror vi tillater dette, ikke fordi det er riktig, og heller ikke fordi
658 de fleste av oss tror på disse endringene. Vi tillater det på grunn av at
659 de interessene som er mest truet er blant de mest mektige aktørene i vår
660 deprimerende kompromitterte prosess for å utforme lover. Denne boken er
661 historien om nok en konsekvens for denne type korrupsjon
—en konsekvens
662 for de fleste av oss forblir ukjent med.
663 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2636531" href=
"#id2636531" class=
"para">4</a>]
</sup>
664 St. George Tucker,
<em class=
"citetitle">Blackstone's Commentaries
</em> 3 (South
665 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
666 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2636640" href=
"#id2636640" class=
"para">5</a>]
</sup>
667 USA mot Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. Domstolen fant at det kunne være
668 å "ta" hvis regjeringens bruk av sitt land reelt sett hadde ødelagt verdien
669 av eiendomen til Causby. Dette eksemplet ble foreslått for meg i Keith
670 Aokis flotte stykke, "(intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward
671 a cultural Geography of Authorship",
<em class=
"citetitle">Stanford Law
672 Review
</em> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. Se også Paul Goldstein,
673 <em class=
"citetitle">Real Property
</em> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press
674 (
1984)),
1112–13.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636674"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636669"></a>
675 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2636842" href=
"#id2636842" class=
"para">6</a>]
</sup>
676 Lawrence Lessing,
<em class=
"citetitle">Man of High Fidelity:: Edwin Howard
677 Armstrong
</em> (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
678 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2636802" href=
"#id2636802" class=
"para">7</a>]
</sup> Se "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," første
679 elektroniske kirke i USA, hos www.webstationone.com/fecha, tilgjengelig fra
680 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
1</a>.
681 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2636966" href=
"#id2636966" class=
"para">8</a>]
</sup>Lessing,
226.
682 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2636982" href=
"#id2636982" class=
"para">9</a>]
</sup>
684 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637103" href=
"#id2637103" class=
"para">10</a>]
</sup>
685 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
686 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American Life
687 Project,
15. april
2003:
6, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
2</a>.
688 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637208" href=
"#id2637208" class=
"para">11</a>]
</sup>
689 Dette er ikke det eneste formålet med opphavsrett, men det er helt klart
690 hovedformålet med opphavsretten slik den er etablert i føderal grunnlov.
691 Opphavsrettslovene i delstatene beskyttet historisk ikke bare kommersielle
692 interesse når det gjaldt publikasjoner, men også personverninteresser. Ved
693 å gi forfattere eneretten til å publisere først, ga delstatenes
694 opphavsrettslovene forfatterne makt til å kontrollere spredningen av fakta
695 om seg selv. Se Samuel D. Warren og Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy",
696 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
198–200.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636857"></a>
697 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637245" href=
"#id2637245" class=
"para">12</a>]
</sup>
698 Se Jessica Litman,
<em class=
"citetitle">Digital Copyright
</em> (New York:
699 Prometheus bøker,
2001), kap.
13.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637253"></a>
700 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637372" href=
"#id2637372" class=
"para">13</a>]
</sup>
701 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates Use New Tools
702 to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York
703 Times
</em>,
17. januar
2002.
704 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637439" href=
"#id2637439" class=
"para">14</a>]
</sup>
705 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Yale
706 Law Journal
</em> 106 (
1996):
283.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637447"></a>
707 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"part" title=
"Part I. “Piratvirksomhet”"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-piracy"></a>Part I.
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Piratvirksomhet
</span>”</span></h1></div></div></div><div class=
"partintro" title=
"“Piratvirksomhet”"><div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxmansfield1"></a><p>
708 Helt siden loven begynte å regulere kreative eierrettigheter, har det vært
709 en krig mot "piratvirksomhet". De presise konturene av dette konseptet,
710 "piratvirksomhet", har vært vanskelig å tegne opp, men bildet av
711 urettferdighet er enkelt å beskrive. Som Lord Mansfield skrev i en sak som
712 utvidet rekkevidden for engelsk opphavsrettslov til å inkludere noteark,
713 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
714 En person kan bruke kopien til å spille den, men han har ingen rett til å
715 robbe forfatteren for profitten, ved å lage flere kopier og distribuere
716 etter eget forgodtbefinnende.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637809" href=
"#ftn.id2637809" class=
"footnote">15</a>]
</sup>
717 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637822"></a></blockquote></div><p>
719 I dag er vi midt inne i en annen "krig" mot "piratvirksomhet". Internettet
720 har fremprovosert denne krigen. Internettet gjør det mulig å effektivt spre
721 innhold. Peer-to-peer (p2p) fildeling er blant det mest effektive av de
722 effektive teknologier internettet muliggjør. Ved å bruke distribuert
723 intelligens, kan p2p-systemer muliggjøre enkel spredning av innhold på en
724 måte som ingen forestilte seg for en generasjon siden.
727 Denne effektiviteten respekterer ikke de tradisjonelle skillene i
728 opphavsretten. Nettverket skiller ikke mellom deling av
729 opphavsrettsbeskyttet og ikke opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold. Dermed har det
730 vært deling av en enorm mengde opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold. Denne
731 delingen har i sin tur ansporet til krigen, på grunn av at eiere av
732 opphavsretter frykter delingen vil "frata forfatteren overskuddet."
734 Krigerne har snudd seg til domstolene, til lovgiverne, og i stadig større
735 grad til teknologi for å forsvare sin "eiendom" mot denne
736 "piratvirksomheten". En generasjon amerikanere, advarer krigerne, blir
737 oppdratt til å tro at "eiendom" skal være "gratis". Glem tatoveringer, ikke
738 tenk på kroppspiercing
—våre barn blir
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>tyver
</em></span>!
740 Det er ingen tvil om at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at pirater bør
741 straffes. Men før vi roper på bødlene, bør vi sette dette
742 "piratvirksomhets"-begrepet i en sammenheng. For mens begrepet blir mer og
743 mer brukt, har det i sin kjerne en ekstraordinær idé som nesten helt sikkert
746 Idéen høres omtrent slik ut:
747 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
748 Kreativt arbeid har verdi. Når jeg bruker, eller tar, eller bygger på det
749 kreative arbeidet til andre, så tar jeg noe fra dem som har verdi. Når jeg
750 tar noe av verdi fra noen andre, bør jeg få tillatelse fra dem. Å ta noe
751 som har verdi fra andre uten tillatelse er galt. Det er en form for
753 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637921"></a><p>
754 Dette synet går dypt i de pågående debattene. Det er hva jussprofessor
755 Rochelle Dreyfuss ved NYU kritiserer som "hvis verdi, så rettighet"-teorien
756 for kreative eierrettigheter
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637936" href=
"#ftn.id2637936" class=
"footnote">16</a>]
</sup>—hvis det finnes verdi, så må noen ha rettigheten til denne
757 verdien. Det er perspektivet som fikk komponistenes rettighetsorganisasjon,
758 ASCAP, til å saksøke jentespeiderne for å ikke betale for sangene som
759 jentene sagt rundt jentespeidernes leirbål.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637956" href=
"#ftn.id2637956" class=
"footnote">17</a>]
</sup> Det fantes "verdi" (sangene), så det måtte ha vært en
760 "rettighet"
—til og med mot jentespeiderne.
761 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637985"></a><p>
763 Denne idéen er helt klart en mulig forståelse om hvordan kreative
764 eierrettigheter bør virke. Det er helt klart et mulig design for et
765 lovsystem som beskytter kreative eierrettigheter. Men teorien om "hvis
766 verdi, så rettighet" for kreative eierrettigheter har aldri vært USAs teori
767 for kreative eierrettigheter. It har aldri stått rot i vårt lovverk.
769 I vår tradisjon har immaterielle rettigheter i stedet vært et instrument.
770 Det bygger fundamentet for et rikt kreativt samfunn, men er fortsatt servilt
771 til verdien av kreativitet. Dagens debatt har snudd dette helt rundt. Vi
772 har blitt så opptatt av å beskytte instrumentet at vi mister verdien av
775 Kilden til denne forvirringen er et skille som loven ikke lenger bryr seg om
776 å markere
—skillet mellom å gjenpublisere noens verk på den ene siden,
777 og bygge på og gjøre om verket på den andre. Da opphavsretten kom var det
778 kun publisering som ble berørt. Opphavsretten i dag regulerer begge.
780 Før teknologiene til internettet dukket opp, betød ikke denne begrepsmessige
781 sammenblandingen mye. Teknologiene for å publisere var kostbare, som betød
782 at det meste av publisering var kommersiell. Kommersielle aktører kunne
783 håndtere byrden pålagt av loven
—til og med byrden som den bysantiske
784 kompleksiteten som opphavsrettsloven har blitt. Det var bare nok en kostnad
785 ved å drive forretning.
786 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638039"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638044"></a><p>
787 Men da internettet dukket opp, forsvant denne naturlige begrensningen til
788 lovens virkeområde. Loven kontrollerer ikke bare kreativiteten til
789 kommersielle skapere, men effektivt sett kreativiteten til alle. Selv om
790 utvidelsen ikke ville bety stort hvis opphavsrettsloven kun regulerte
791 "kopiering", så betyr utvidelsen mye når loven regulerer så bredt og obskurt
792 som den gjør. Byrden denne loven gir oppveier nå langt fordelene den ga da
793 den ble vedtatt
—helt klart slik den påvirker ikke-kommersiell
794 kreativitet, og i stadig større grad slik den påvirker kommersiell
795 kreativitet. Dermed, slik vi ser klarere i kapitlene som følger, er lovens
796 rolle mindre og mindre å støtte kreativitet, og mer og mer å beskytte
797 enkelte industrier mot konkurranse. Akkurat på tidspunktet da digital
798 teknologi kunne sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mengde med kommersiell og
799 ikke-kommersiell kreativitet, tynger loven denne kreativiteten med sinnsykt
800 kompliserte og vage regler og med trusselen om uanstendig harde straffer.
801 Vi ser kanskje, som Richard Florida skriver, "Fremveksten av den kreative
802 klasse"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638048" href=
"#ftn.id2638048" class=
"footnote">18</a>]
</sup> Dessverre ser vi også en
803 ekstraordinær fremvekst av reguleringer av denne kreative klassen.
805 Disse byrdene gir ingen mening i vår tradisjon. Vi bør begynne med å forstå
806 den tradisjonen litt mer, og ved å plassere dagens slag om oppførsel med
807 merkelappen "piratvirksomhet" i sin rette sammenheng.
808 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637809" href=
"#id2637809" class=
"para">15</a>]
</sup>
811 <em class=
"citetitle">Bach
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Longman
</em>,
98
812 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
813 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637936" href=
"#id2637936" class=
"para">16</a>]
</sup>
816 Se Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
817 Pepsi Generation,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Notre Dame Law Review
</em> 65 (
1990):
819 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637956" href=
"#id2637956" class=
"para">17</a>]
</sup>
821 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay Up,"
822 <em class=
"citetitle">Wall Street Journal
</em>,
21. august
1996, tilgjengelig
823 fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
3</a>; Jonathan
824 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
825 Speech, No One Wins,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Boston Globe
</em>,
24. november
826 2002.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637974"></a>
827 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638048" href=
"#id2638048" class=
"para">18</a>]
</sup>
829 I
<em class=
"citetitle">The Rise of the Creative Class
</em> (New York: Basic
830 Books,
2002), dokumenterer Richard Florida en endring i arbeidsstokken mot
831 kreativitetsarbeide. Hans tekst omhandler derimot ikke direkte de juridiske
832 vilkår som kreativiteten blir muliggjort eller hindret under. Jeg er helt
833 klart enig med ham i viktigheten og betydningen av denne endringen, men jeg
834 tror også at vilkårene som disse endringene blir aktivert under er mye
835 vanskeligere.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638077"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638128"></a>
836 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"1. Kapittel en: Skaperne"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"creators"></a>1. Kapittel en: Skaperne
</h2></div></div></div><p>
837 I
1928 ble en tegnefilmfigur født. En tidlig Mikke Mus debuterte i mai
838 dette året, i en stille flopp ved navn
<em class=
"citetitle">Plane Crazy
</em>.
839 I november, i Colony teateret i New York City, ble den første vidt
840 distribuerte tegnefilmen med synkronisert lyd,
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat
841 Willy
</em>, vist frem med figuren som skulle bli til Mikke Mus.
843 Film med synkronisert lyd hadde blitt introdusert et år tidligere i filmen
844 <em class=
"citetitle">The Jazz Singer
</em>. Suksessen fikk Walt Disney til å
845 kopiere teknikken og mikse lyd med tegnefilm. Ingen visste hvorvidt det
846 ville virke eller ikke, og om det fungere, hvorvidt publikum villa ha sans
847 for det. Men da Disney gjorde en test sommeren
1928, var resultatet
848 entydig. Som Disney beskriver dette første eksperimentet,
849 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
851 Et par av guttene mine kunne lese noteark, og en av dem kunne spille
852 munnspill. Vi stappet dem inn i et rom hvor de ikke kunne se skjermen, og
853 gjorde det slik at lyden de spilte ble sendt videre til et rom hvor våre
854 koner og venner var plassert for å se på bildet.
857 Guttene brukte et note- og lydeffekt-ark. Etter noen dårlige oppstarter,
858 kom endelig lyd og handling i gang med et smell. Munnspilleren spilte
859 melodien, og resten av oss i lydavdelingen slamret på tinnkasseroller og
860 blåste på slide-fløyte til rytmen. Synkroniseringen var nesten helt riktig.
862 Effekten på vårt lille publikum var intet mindre enn elektrisk. De reagerte
863 nesten instinktivt til denne union av lyd og bevegelse. Jeg trodde de
864 tullet med meg. Så de puttet meg i publikum og satte igang på nytt. Det
865 var grufullt, men det var fantastisk. Og det var noe nytt!
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638242" href=
"#ftn.id2638242" class=
"footnote">19</a>]
</sup>
866 </p></blockquote></div><p>
867 Disneys daværende partner, og en av animasjonsverdenens mest ekstraordinære
868 talenter, Ub Iwerks, uttalte det sterkere: "Jeg har aldri vært så begeistret
869 i hele mitt liv. Ingenting annet har noen sinne vært like bra."
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638266"></a>
871 Disney hadde laget noe helt nyt, basert på noe relativt nytt. Synkronisert
872 lyd ga liv til en form for kreativitet som sjeldent hadde
—unntatt fra
873 Disneys hender
—vært noe annet en fyllstoff for andre filmer. Gjennom
874 animasjonens tidligere historie var det Disneys oppfinnelse som satte
875 standarden som andre måtte sloss for å oppfylle. Og ganske ofte var Disneys
876 store geni, hans gnist av kreativitet, bygget på arbeidet til andre.
878 Dette er kjent stoff. Det du kanskje ikke vet er at
1928 også markerer en
879 annen viktig overgang. I samme år laget et komedie-geni (i motsetning til
880 tegnefilm-geni) sin siste uavhengig produserte stumfilm. Dette geniet var
881 Buster Keaton. Filmen var
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr
</em>.
883 Keaton ble født inn i en vauderville-familie i
1895. I stumfilm-æraen hadde
884 han mestret bruken av bredpenslet fysisk komedie på en måte som tente
885 ukontrollerbar latter fra hans publikum.
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Bill,
886 Jr
</em>. var en klassiker av denne typen, berømt blant film-elskere
887 for sine utrolige stunts. Filmen var en klassisk Keaton
—fantastisk
888 populær og blant de beste i sin sjanger.
890 <em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr
</em>. kom før Disneys tegnefilm
891 Steamboat Willie. Det er ingen tilfeldighet at titlene er så
892 like. Steamboat Willie er en direkte tegneserieparodi av Steamboat
893 Bill,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638337" href=
"#ftn.id2638337" class=
"footnote">20</a>]
</sup> og begge bygger på en felles sang
894 som kilde. Det er ikke kun fra nyskapningen med synkronisert lyd i
895 <em class=
"citetitle">The Jazz Singer
</em> at vi får
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat
896 Willie
</em>. Det er også fra Buster Keatons nyskapning Steamboat
897 Bill, Jr., som igjen var inspirert av sangen "Steamboat Bill", at vi får
898 Steamboat Willie. Og fra Steamboat Willie får vi så Mikke Mus.
900 Denne "låningen" var ikke unik, hverken for Disney eller for industrien.
901 Disney apet alltid etter full-lengde massemarkedsfilmene rundt
902 ham.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638389" href=
"#ftn.id2638389" class=
"footnote">21</a>]
</sup> Det samme gjorde mange andre.
903 Tidlige tegnefilmer er stappfulle av etterapninger
—små variasjoner
904 over suksessfulle temaer, gamle historier fortalt på nytt. Nøkkelen til
905 suksess var brilliansen i forskjellene. Med Disney var det lyden som ga
906 gnisten til hans animasjoner. Senere var det kvaliteten på hans arbeide
907 relativt til de masseproduserte tegnefilmene som han konkurrerte med.
908 Likevel var disse bidragene bygget på toppen av fundamentet som var lånt.
909 Disney bygget på arbeidet til andre som kom før han, og skapte noe nytt ut
910 av noe som bare var litt gammelt.
912 Noen ganger var låningen begrenset, og noen ganger var den betydelig. Tenkt
913 på eventyrene til brødrene Grimm. Hvis du er like ubevisst som jeg var, så
914 tror du sannsynlighvis at disse fortellingene er glade, søte historier som
915 passer for ethvert barn ved leggetid. Realiteten er at Grimm-eventyrene er,
916 for oss, ganske dystre. Det er noen sjeldne og kanskje spesielt ambisiøse
917 foreldre som ville våge å lese disse blodige moralistiske historiene til
918 sine barn, ved leggetid eller hvilken som helst annet tidspunkt.
921 Disney tok disse historiene og fortalte dem på nytt på en måte som førte dem
922 inn i en ny tidsalder. Han ga historiene liv, med både karakterer og
923 lys. Uten å fjerne bitene av frykt og fare helt, gjorde han morsomt det som
924 var mørkt og satte inn en ekte følelse av medfølelse der det før var
925 frykt. Og ikke bare med verkene av brødrene Grimm. Faktisk er katalogen
926 over Disney-arbeid som baserer seg på arbeidet til andre ganske forbløffende
927 når den blir samlet:
<em class=
"citetitle">Snøhvit
</em> (
1937),
928 <em class=
"citetitle">Fantasia
</em> (
1940),
<em class=
"citetitle">Pinocchio
</em>
929 (
1940),
<em class=
"citetitle">Dumbo
</em> (
1941),
<em class=
"citetitle">Bambi
</em>
930 (
1942),
<em class=
"citetitle">Song of the South
</em> (
1946),
931 <em class=
"citetitle">Askepott
</em> (
1950),
<em class=
"citetitle">Alice in
932 Wonderland
</em> (
1951),
<em class=
"citetitle">Robin Hood
</em> (
1952),
933 <em class=
"citetitle">Peter Pan
</em> (
1953),
<em class=
"citetitle">Lady og
934 landstrykeren
</em> (
1955),
<em class=
"citetitle">Mulan
</em> (
1998),
935 <em class=
"citetitle">Tornerose
</em> (
1959),
<em class=
"citetitle">101
936 dalmatinere
</em> (
1961),
<em class=
"citetitle">Sverdet i steinen
</em>
937 (
1963), og
<em class=
"citetitle">Jungelboken
</em> (
1967)
—for ikke å nevne
938 et nylig eksempel som vi bør kanskje glemme raskt,
<em class=
"citetitle">Treasure
939 Planet
</em> (
2003). I alle disse tilfellene, har Disney (eller
940 Disney, Inc.) hentet kreativitet fra kultur rundt ham, blandet med
941 kreativiteten fra sitt eget ekstraordinære talent, og deretter brent denne
942 blandingen inn i sjelen til sin kultur. Hente, blande og brenne.
944 Dette er en type kreativitet. Det er en kreativitet som vi bør huske på og
945 feire. Det er noen som vil si at det finnes ingen kreativitet bortsett fra
946 denne typen. Vi trenger ikke gå så langt for å anerkjenne dens betydning.
947 Vi kan kalle dette "Disney-kreativitet", selv om det vil være litt
948 misvisende. Det er mer presist "Walt Disney-kreativitet"
—en
949 uttrykksform og genialitet som bygger på kulturen rundt oss og omformer den
951 </p><p> I
1928 var kulturen som Disney fritt kunne trekke veksler på relativt
952 fersk. Allemannseie i
1928 var ikke veldig gammelt og var dermed ganske
953 levende. Gjennomsnittlig vernetid i opphavsretten var bare rundt tredve
954 år
—for den lille delen av kreative verk som faktisk var
955 opphavsrettsbeskyttet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638531" href=
"#ftn.id2638531" class=
"footnote">22</a>]
</sup> Det betyr at i
956 tredve år, i gjennomsnitt, hadde forfattere eller kreative verks
957 opphavsrettighetsinnehaver en "eksklusiv rett" til a kontrollere bestemte
958 typer bruk av verket. For å bruke disse opphavsrettsbeskyttede verkene på
959 de begrensede måtene krevde tillatelse fra opphavsrettsinnehaveren.
961 Når opphavsrettens vernetid er over, faller et verk i det fri og blir
962 allemannseie. Ingen tillatelse trengs da for å bygge på eller bruke dette
963 verket. Ingen tillatelse og dermed, ingen advokater. Allemannseie er en
964 "advokat-fri sone". Det meste av innhold fra det nittende århundre var
965 dermed fritt tilgjengelig for Disney å bruke eller bygge på i
1928. Det var
966 tilgjengelig for enhver
—uansett om de hadde forbindelser eller ikke,
967 om de var rik eller ikke, om de var akseptert eller ikke
—til å bruke
971 Dette er slik det alltid har vært
—inntil ganske nylig. For
972 mesteparten av vår historie, har allemannseiet vært like over horisonten.
973 Fram til
1978 var den gjennomsnittlige opphavsrettslige vernetiden aldri mer
974 enn trettito år, som gjorde at det meste av kultur fra en og en halv
975 generasjon tidligere var tilgjengelig for enhver å bygge på uten tillatelse
976 fra noen. Tilsvarende for i dag ville være at kreative verker fra
1960- og
977 1970-tallet nå ville være fritt tilgjengelig for de neste Walt Disney å
978 bygge på uten tillatelse. Men i dag er allemannseie presumtivt kun for
979 innhold fra før mellomkrigstiden.
981 Walt Disney hadde selvfølgelig ikke monopol på "Walt Disney-kreativitet".
982 Det har heller ikke USA. Normen med fri kultur har, inntil nylig, og
983 unntatt i totalitære nasjoner, vært bredt utnyttet og svært universell.
985 Vurder for eksempel en form for kreativitet som synes underlig for mange
986 amerikanere, men som er overalt i japansk kultur:
987 <em class=
"citetitle">manga
</em>, eller tegneserier. Japanerne er fanatiske når
988 det gjelder tegneserier. Over
40 prosent av publikasjoner er tegneserier,
989 og
30 prosent av publikasjonsomsetningen stammer fra tegneserier. De er
990 over alt i det japanske samfunnet, tilgjengelig fra ethvert
991 tidsskriftsutsalg, og i hendene på en stor andel av pendlere på Japans
992 ekstraordinære system for offentlig transport.
994 Amerikanere har en tendens til å se ned på denne formen for kultur. Det er
995 et lite attraktivt kjennetegn hos oss. Vi misforstår sannsynligvis mye
996 rundt manga, på grunn av at få av oss noen gang har lest noe som ligner på
997 historiene i disse "grafiske historiene" forteller. For en japaner dekker
998 manga ethvert aspekt ved det sosiale liv. For oss er tegneserier "menn i
999 strømpebukser". Og uansett er det ikke slik at T-banen i New York er full
1000 av folk som leser Joyse eller Hemingway for den saks skyld. Folk i ulike
1001 kulturer skiller seg ut på forskjellig måter, og japanerne på dette
1004 Men mitt formål her er ikke å forstå manga. Det er å beskrive en variant av
1005 manga som fra en advokats perspektiv er ganske merkelig, men som fra en
1006 Disneys perspektiv er ganske godt kjent.
1009 Dette er fenomenet
<em class=
"citetitle">doujinshi
</em>. Doujinshi er også
1010 tegneserier, men de er slags etterapings-tegneserier. En rik etikk styrer
1011 de som skaper doujinshi. Det er ikke doujinshi hvis det
1012 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>bare
</em></span> er en kopi. Kunstneren må gjøre et bidrag til
1013 kunsten han kopierer ved å omforme det enten subtilt eller betydelig. En
1014 doujinshi-tegneserie kan dermed ta en massemarkeds-tegneserie og utvikle den
1015 i en annen retning
—med en annen historie-linje. Eller tegneserien kan
1016 beholde figuren som seg selv men endre litt på utseendet. Det er ingen
1017 bestemt formel for hva som gjør en doujinshi tilstrekkelig "forskjellig".
1018 Men de må være forskjellige hvis de skal anses som ekte doujinshi. Det er
1019 faktisk komiteer som går igjennom doujinshi for å bli med på messer, og
1020 avviser etterapninger som bare er en kopi.
1022 Disse etterapings-tegneseriene er ikke en liten del av manga-markedet. Det
1023 er enorme. Mer en
33 000 "sirkler" av skapere over hele Japan som
1024 produserer disse bitene av Walt Disney-kreativitet. Mer en
450 000 japanere
1025 samles to ganger i året, i den største offentlige samlingen i langet, for å
1026 bytte og selge dem. Dette markedet er parallelt med det kommersielle
1027 massemarkeds-manga-markedet. På noen måter konkurrerer det åpenbart med det
1028 markedet, men det er ingen vedvarende innsats fra de som kontrollerer det
1029 kommersielle manga-markedet for å stenge doujinshi-markedet. Det blomstrer,
1030 på tross av konkurransen og til tross for loven.
1032 Den mest gåtefulle egenskapen med doujinshi-markedet, for de som har
1033 juridisk trening i hvert fall, er at det overhodet tillates å eksistere.
1034 Under japansk opphavsrettslov, som i hvert fall på dette området (på
1035 papiret) speiler USAs opphavsrettslov, er doujinshi-markedet ulovlig.
1036 Doujinshi er helt klart "avledede verk". Det er ingen generell praksis hos
1037 doujinshi-kunstnere for å sikre seg tillatelse hos manga-skaperne. I stedet
1038 er praksisen ganske enkelt å ta og endre det andre har laget, slik Walt
1039 Disney gjorde med
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr
</em>. For både
1040 japansk og USAs lov, er å "ta" uten tillatelse fra den opprinnelige
1041 opphavsrettsinnehaver ulovlig. Det er et brudd på opphavsretten til det
1042 opprinnelige verket å lage en kopi eller et avledet verk uten tillatelse fra
1043 den opprinnelige rettighetsinnehaveren.
1044 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxwinickjudd"></a><p>
1045 Likevel eksisterer dette illegale markedet og faktisk blomstrer i Japan, og
1046 etter manges syn er det nettopp fordi det eksisterer at japansk manga
1047 blomstrer. Som USAs tegneserieskaper Judd Winick fortalte meg, "I
1048 amerikansk tegneseriers første dager var det ganske likt det som foregår i
1049 Japan i dag.
… Amerikanske tegneserier kom til verden ved å kopiere
1050 hverandre.
… Det er slik [kunstnerne] lærer å tegne
—ved å se i
1051 tegneseriebøker og ikke følge streken, men ved å se på dem og kopiere dem"
1052 og bygge basert på dem.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638701" href=
"#ftn.id2638701" class=
"footnote">23</a>]
</sup>
1054 Amerikanske tegneserier nå er ganske annerledes, forklarer Winick, delvis på
1055 grunn av de juridiske problemene med å tilpasse tegneserier slik doujinshi
1056 får lov til. Med for eksempel Supermann, fortalte Winick meg, "er det en
1057 rekke regler, og du må følge dem". Det er ting som Supermann "ikke kan"
1058 gjøre. "For en som lager tegneserier er det frustrerende å måtte begrense
1059 seg til noen parameter som er femti år gamle."
1060 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638824"></a><p>
1061 Normen i Japan reduserer denne juridiske utfordringen. Noen sier at det
1062 nettopp er den oppsamlede fordelen i det japanske mangamarkedet som
1063 forklarer denne reduksjonen. Jussprofessor Salil Mehra ved Temple
1064 University hypnotiserer for eksempel med at manga-markedet aksepterer disse
1065 teoretiske bruddene fordi de får mangamarkedet til å bli rikere og mer
1066 produktivt. Alle ville få det verre hvis doujinshi ble bannlyst, så loven
1067 bannlyser ikke doujinshi.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638850" href=
"#ftn.id2638850" class=
"footnote">24</a>]
</sup>
1069 Problemet med denne historien, derimot, og som Mehra helt klart erkjenner,
1070 er at mekanismen som produserer denne "hold hendene borte"-responsen ikke er
1071 forstått. Det kan godt være at markedet som helhet gjør det bedre hvis
1072 doujinshi tillates i stedet for å bannlyse den, men det forklarer likevel
1073 ikke hvorfor individuelle opphavsrettsinnehavere ikke saksøker. Hvis loven
1074 ikke har et generelt unntak for doujinshi, og det finnes faktisk noen
1075 tilfeller der individuelle manga-kunstnere har saksøkt doujinshi-kunstnere,
1076 hvorfor er det ikke et mer generelt mønster for å blokkere denne "frie
1077 takingen" hos doujinshi-kulturen?
1079 Jeg var fire nydelige måneder i Japan, og jeg stilte dette spørsmål så ofte
1080 som jeg kunne. Kanskje det beste svaret til slutt kom fra en venn i et
1081 større japansk advokatfirma. "Vi har ikke nok advokater", fortalte han meg
1082 en ettermiddag. Det er "bare ikke nok ressurser til å tiltale tilfeller som
1086 Dette er et tema vi kommer tilbake til: at lovens regulering både er en
1087 funksjon av ordene i bøkene, og kostnadene med å få disse ordene til å ha
1088 effekt. Akkurat nå er det endel åpenbare spørsmål som presser seg frem:
1089 Ville Japan gjøre det bedre med flere advokater? Ville manga være rikere
1090 hvis doujinshi-kunstnere ble regelmessig rettsforfulgt? Ville Japan vinne
1091 noe viktig hvis de kunne stoppe praksisen med deling uten kompensasjon?
1092 Skader piratvirksomhet ofrene for piratvirksomheten, eller hjelper den dem?
1093 Ville advokaters kamp mot denne piratvirksomheten hjelpe deres klienter,
1094 eller skade dem? La oss ta et øyeblikks pause.
1096 Hvis du er som meg et tiår tilbake, eller som folk flest når de først
1097 begynner å tenke på disse temaene, da bør du omtrent nå være rådvill om noe
1098 du ikke hadde tenkt igjennom før.
1100 Vi lever i en verden som feirer "eiendom". Jeg er en av de som feierer.
1101 Jeg tror på verdien av eiendom generelt, og jeg tror også på verdien av den
1102 sære formen for eiendom som advokater kaller "immateriell
1103 eiendom".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638943" href=
"#ftn.id2638943" class=
"footnote">25</a>]
</sup> Et stort og variert samfunn
1104 kan ikke overleve uten eiendom, og et moderne samfunn kan ikke blomstre uten
1105 immaterielle eierrettigheter.
1107 Men det tar bare noen sekunders refleksjon for å innse at det er masse av
1108 verdi der ute som "eiendom" ikke dekker. Jeg mener ikke "kjærlighet kan
1109 ikke kjøpes med penger" men heller, at en verdi som ganske enkelt er del av
1110 produksjonsprosessen, både for kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell produksjon.
1111 Hvis Disneys animatører hadde stjålet et sett med blyanter for å tegne
1112 Steamboat Willie, vi ville ikke nølt med å dømme det som galt
—selv om
1113 det er trivielt og selv om det ikke blir oppdaget. Men det var intet galt,
1114 i hvert fall slik loven var da, med at Disney tok fra Buster Keaton eller
1115 fra Grimm-brødrene. Det var intet galt med å ta fra Keaton, fordi Disneys
1116 bruk ville blitt ansett som "rimelig". Det var intet galt med å ta fra
1117 brødrene Grimm fordi deres verker var allemannseie.
1120 Dermed, selv om de tingene som Disney tok
—eller mer generelt, tingene
1121 som blir tatt av enhver som utøver Walt Disney-kreativitet
—er
1122 verdifulle, så anser ikke vår tradisjon det som galt å ta disse tingene.
1123 Noen ting forblir frie til å bli tatt i en fri kultur og denne friheten er
1126 Det er det samme med doujinshi-kulturen. Hvis en doujinshi-kunstner brøt
1127 seg inn på kontoret til en forlegger, og stakk av med tusen kopier av hans
1128 siste verk
—eller bare en kopi
—uten å betale, så ville vi uten å
1129 nøle si at kunstneren har gjort noe galt. I tillegg til å ha trengt seg inn
1130 på andres eiendom, ville han ha stjålet noe av verdi. Loven forbyr stjeling
1131 i enhver form, uansett hvor stort eller lite som blir tatt.
1133 Likevel er det en åpenbar motvilje, selv blant japanske advokater, for å si
1134 at etterapende tegneseriekunstnere "stjeler". Denne formen for Walt
1135 Disney-kreativitet anses som rimelig og riktig, selv om spesielt advokater
1136 synes det er vanskelig å forklare hvorfor.
1138 Det er det same med tusen eksempler som dukker opp over alt med en gang en
1139 begynner å se etter dem. Forskerne bygger på arbeidet til andre forskere
1140 uten å spørre eller betale for privilegiet. ("Unnskyld meg, professor
1141 Einstein, men kan jeg få tillatelse til å bruke din relativitetsteori til å
1142 vise at du tok feil om kvantefysikk?") Teatertropper viser frem
1143 bearbeidelser av verkene til Shakespeare uten å sikre seg noen tillatelser.
1144 (Er det
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>noen
</em></span> som tror at Shakespeare ville vært mer
1145 spredt i vår kultur om det var et sentralt rettighetsklareringskontor for
1146 Shakespeare som alle som laget Shakespeare-produksjoner måtte appellere til
1147 først?) Og Hollywood går igjennom sykluser med en bestemt type filmer: fem
1148 astroidefilmer i slutten av
1990-tallet, to vulkankatastrofefilmer i
1997.
1151 Skapere her og overalt har alltid og til alle tider bygd på kreativiteten
1152 som eksisterte før og som omringer dem nå. Denne byggingen er alltid og
1153 overalt i det minste delvis gjort uten tillatelse og uten å kompensere den
1154 opprinnelige skaperen. Intet samfunn, fritt eller kontrollert, har noen
1155 gang krevd at enhver bruk skulle bli betalt for eller at tillatelse for Walt
1156 Disney-kreativitet alltid måtte skaffes. Istedet har ethvert samfunn latt
1157 en bestemt bit av sin kultur være fritt tilgjengelig for alle å
1158 ta
—frie samfunn muligens i større grad enn ufrie, men en viss grad i
1162 Det vanskelige spørsmålet er derfor ikke
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>om
</em></span> en kultur
1163 er fri. Alle kulturer er frie til en viss grad. Det vanskelige spørsmålet
1164 er i stedet "
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>hvor
</em></span> fri er denne kulturen er?" Hvor mye
1165 og hvor bredt, er kulturen fritt tilgjengelig for andre å ta, og bygge på?
1166 Er den friheten begrenset til partimedlemmer? Til medlemmer av
1167 kongefamilien? Til de ti største selskapene på New York-børsen? Eller er
1168 at frihet bredt tilgjengelig? Til kunstnere generelt, uansett om de er
1169 tilknyttet til nasjonalmuseet eller ikke? Til musikere generelt, uansett om
1170 de er hvite eller ikke? Til filmskapere generelt, uansett om de er
1171 tilknyttet et studio eller ikke?
1173 Frie kulturer er kulturer som etterlater mye åpent for andre å bygge på.
1174 Ufrie, eller tillatelse-kulturer etterlater mye mindre. Vår var en fri
1175 kultur. Den er på tur til å bli mindre fri.
1176 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638242" href=
"#id2638242" class=
"para">19</a>]
</sup>
1179 Leonard Maltin,
<em class=
"citetitle">Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1180 Cartoons
</em> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1181 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638337" href=
"#id2638337" class=
"para">20</a>]
</sup>
1184 Jeg er takknemlig overfor David Gerstein og hans nøyaktige historie,
1185 beskrevet på
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
4</a>. I
1186 følge Dave Smith ved the Disney Archives, betalte Disney for å bruke
1187 musikken til fem sanger i
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Willie
</em>:
1188 "Steamboat Bill," "The Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara),
1189 "Joyful Hurry No.
1" (Baron), og "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). En sjette sang, "The
1190 Turkey in the Straw," var allerede allemannseie. Brev fra David Smith til
1191 Harry Surden,
10. juli
2003, tilgjenglig i arkivet til forfatteren.
1192 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638389" href=
"#id2638389" class=
"para">21</a>]
</sup>
1195 Han var også tilhenger av allmannseiet. Se Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse that
1196 Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5. mars
2002, fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
5</a>.
1197 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638531" href=
"#id2638531" class=
"para">22</a>]
</sup>
1200 Inntil
1976 ga opphavsrettsloven en forfatter to mulige verneperioder: en
1201 initiell periode, og en fornyingsperiode. Jeg har beregnet
1202 "gjennomsnittlig" vernetid ved å finne vektet gjennomsnitt av de totale
1203 registreringer for et gitt år, og andelen fornyinger. Hvis
100
1204 opphavsretter ble registrert i år
1, bare
15 av dem ble fornyet, og
1205 fornyingsvernetiden er
28 år, så er gjennomsnittlig vernetid
32,
2
1206 år. Fornyingsdata og andre relevante data ligger på nettsidene tilknyttet
1207 denne boka, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
1209 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638701" href=
"#id2638701" class=
"para">23</a>]
</sup>
1212 For en utmerket historie, se Scott McCloud,
<em class=
"citetitle">Reinventing
1213 Comics
</em> (New York: Perennial,
2000).
1214 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638850" href=
"#id2638850" class=
"para">24</a>]
</sup>
1217 Se Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All
1218 the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?"
<em class=
"citetitle">Rutgers Law
1219 Review
</em> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
"det kan være en kollektiv økonomisk
1220 rasjonalitet som får manga- og anime-kunstnere til ikke å saksøke for
1221 opphavsrettsbrudd. Én hypotese er at alle manga-kunstnere kan være bedre
1222 stilt hvis de setter sin individuelle egeninteresse til side og bestemmer
1223 seg for ikke å forfølge sine juridiske rettigheter. Dette er essensielt en
1224 løsning på fangens dilemma."
1225 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638943" href=
"#id2638943" class=
"para">25</a>]
</sup>
1227 Begrepet
<em class=
"citetitle">immateriell eiendom
</em> er av relativ ny
1228 opprinnelse. Se See Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyrights and
1229 Copywrongs
</em>,
11 (New York: New York University Press,
2001). Se
1230 også Lawrence Lessig,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em> (New York:
1231 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. Begrepet presist beskriver et sett med
1232 "eiendoms"-rettigheter
—opphavsretter, patenter, varemerker og
1233 forretningshemmeligheter
—men egenskapene til disse rettighetene er
1234 svært forskjellige.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638962"></a>
1235 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"2. Kapittel to: “Kun etter-apere”"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"mere-copyists"></a>2. Kapittel to:
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Kun etter-apere
</span>”</span></h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxphotography"></a><p>
1236 I
1839 fant Louis Daguerre opp den første praktiske teknologien for å
1237 produsere det vi ville kalle "fotografier". Rimelig nok ble de kalt
1238 "daguerreotyper". Prosessen var komplisert og kostbar, og feltet var dermed
1239 begrenset til profesjonelle og noen få ivrige og velstående amatører. (Det
1240 var til og med en amerikansk Daguerre-forening som hjalp til med å regulere
1241 industrien, slik alle slike foreninger gjør, ved å holde konkurransen ned
1242 slik at prisene var høye.)
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639194"></a>
1244 Men til tross for høye priser var etterspørselen etter daguerreotyper
1245 sterk. Dette inspirerte oppfinnere til å finne enklere og billigere måter å
1246 lage "automatiske bilder". William Talbot oppdaget snart en prosess for å
1247 lage "negativer". Men da negativene var av glass, og måtte holdes fuktige,
1248 forble prosessen kostbar og tung. På
1870-tallet ble tørrplater utviklet,
1249 noe som gjorde det enklere å skille det å ta et bilde fra å fremkalle det.
1250 Det var fortsatt plater av glass, og dermed var det fortsatt ikke en prosess
1251 som var innenfor rekkevidden til de fleste amatører.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639214"></a>
1252 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxeastmangeorge"></a><p>
1254 Den teknologiske endringen som gjorde masse-fotografering mulig skjedde ikke
1255 før i
1888, og det var takket være en eneste mann. George Eastman, selv en
1256 amatørfotograf, var frustrert over den plate-baserte fotografi-teknologien.
1257 I et lysglimt av innsikt (for å si det slik), forsto Eastman at hvis filmen
1258 kunne gjøres bøyelig, så kunne den holdes på en enkel rull. Denne rullen
1259 kunne så sendes til en fremkaller, og senke kostnadene til fotografering
1260 vesentlig. Ved å redusere kostnadene, forventet Eastman at han dramatisk
1261 kunne utvide andelen fotografer.
1263 Eastman utviklet bøyelig, emulsjons-belagt papirfilm og plasserte ruller med
1264 dette i små, enkle kameraer: Kodaken. Enheten ble markedsfør med grunnlag
1265 dens enkelhet. "Du trykker på knappen og vi fikser resten."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639261" href=
"#ftn.id2639261" class=
"footnote">26</a>]
</sup> Som han beskrev det i
<em class=
"citetitle">The Kodak
1266 Primer
</em>:
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639275"></a>
1267 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
1268 Prinsippet til Kodak-systemet er skillet mellom arbeidet som enhver kan
1269 utføre når en tar fotografier, fra arbeidet som kun en ekspert kan
1270 gjøre.
… Vi utstyrte alle, menn, kvinner og barn, som hadde
1271 tilstrekkelig intelligens til å peke en boks i riktig retning og trykke på
1272 en knapp, med et instrument som helt fjernet fra praksisen med å fotografere
1273 nødvendigheten av uvanlig utstyr eller for den del, noe som helst spesiell
1274 kunnskap om kunstarten. Det kan tas i bruk uten forutgående studier, uten
1275 et mørkerom og uten kjemikalier.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637038" href=
"#ftn.id2637038" class=
"footnote">27</a>]
</sup>
1276 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1277 For $
25 kunne alle ta bilder. Det var allerede film i kameraet, og når det
1278 var brukt ble kameraet returnert til en Eastman-fabrikk hvor filmen ble
1279 fremkalt. Etter hvert, naturligvis, ble både kostnaden til kameraet og hvor
1280 enkelt et var å bruke forbedret. Film på rull ble dermed grunnlaget for en
1281 eksplosiv vekst i fotografering blant folket. Eastmans kamera ble lagt ut
1282 for salg i
1888, og et år senere trykket Kodak mer enn seks tusen negativer
1283 om dagen. Fra
1888 til
1909, mens produksjonen i industrien vokste med
4,
7
1284 prosent, økte salget av fotografisk utstyr og materiale med
11
1285 prosent.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639340" href=
"#ftn.id2639340" class=
"footnote">28</a>]
</sup> Salget til Eastman Kodak i
1286 samme periode opplevde en årlig vekst på over
17 prosent.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639350" href=
"#ftn.id2639350" class=
"footnote">29</a>]
</sup>
1287 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639359"></a><p>
1290 Den virkelige betydningen av oppfinnelsen til Eastman, var derimot ikke
1291 økonomisk. Den var sosial. Profesjonell fotografering ga individer et
1292 glimt av steder de ellers aldri ville se. Amatørfotografering ga dem
1293 muligheten til å arkivere deres liv på en måte som de aldri hadde vært i
1294 stand til tidligere. Som forfatter Brian Coe skriver, "For første gang
1295 tilbød fotoalbumet mannen i gata et permanent arkiv over hans familie og
1296 dens aktiviteter.
… For første gang i historien fantes det en
1297 autentisk visuell oppføring av utseende og aktivitet til vanlige mennesker
1298 laget uten [skrivefør] tolkning eller forutinntatthet."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639292" href=
"#ftn.id2639292" class=
"footnote">30</a>]
</sup>
1300 På denne måten var Kodak-kameraet og film uttrykksteknologier. Blyanten og
1301 malepenselen var selvfølgelig også en uttrykksteknologi. Men det tok årevis
1302 med trening før de kunne bli brukt nyttig og effektiv av amatører. Med
1303 Kodaken var uttrykk mulig mye raskere og enklere. Barrièren for å uttrykke
1304 seg var senket. Snobber ville fnyse over "kvaliteten", profesjonelle ville
1305 avvise den som irrelevant. Men se et barn studere hvordan best velge
1306 bildemotiv og du får følelsen av hva slags kreativitetserfaring som Kodaken
1307 muliggjorde. Demokratiske verktøy ga vanlige folk en måte å uttrykke dem
1308 selv på enklere enn noe annet verktøy kunne ha gjort før.
1310 Hva krevdes for at denne teknologien skulle blomstre. Eastmans genialitet
1311 var åpenbart en viktig del. Men den juridiske miljøet som Eastmans
1312 oppfinnelse vokste i var også viktig. For tidlig i historien til
1313 fotografering, var det en rekke av rettsavgjørelser som godt kunne ha endret
1314 kursen til fotograferingen betydelig. Domstoler ble spurt om fotografen,
1315 amatør eller profesjonell, måtte ha ha tillatelse før han kunne fange og
1316 trykke hvilket som helst bilde han ønsket. Svaret var nei.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639440" href=
"#ftn.id2639440" class=
"footnote">31</a>]
</sup>
1319 Argumentene til fordel for å kreve tillatelser vil høres overraskende kjent
1320 ut. Fotografen "tok" noe fra personen eller bygningen som ble
1321 fotografert
—røvet til seg noe av verdi. Noen trodde til og med at han
1322 tok målets sjel. På samme måte som Disney ikke var fri til å ta blyantene
1323 som hans animatører brukte til å tegne Mikke, så skulle heller ikke disse
1324 fotografene være fri til å ta bilder som de fant verdi i.
1325 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639473"></a><p>
1326 På den andre siden var et argument som også bør bør være kjent. Joda, det
1327 var kanskje noe av verdi som ble brukt. Men borgerne burde ha rett til å
1328 fange i hvert fall de bildene som var tatt av offentlig område. (Louis
1329 Brandeis, som senere ble høyesterettsjustitiarus, mente regelen skulle være
1330 annerledes for bilder tatt av private områder.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639507" href=
"#ftn.id2639507" class=
"footnote">32</a>]
</sup>) Det kan være at dette betyr at fotografen får noe for ingenting.
1331 På samme måte som Disney kunne hente inspirasjon fra
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat
1332 Bill, Jr
</em>. eller Grimm-brødrene, så burde fotografene stå fritt
1333 til å fange et bilde uten å kompensere kilden.
1335 Heldigvis for Mr. Eastman, og for fotografering generelt, gikk disse
1336 tidligere avgjørelsene i favør av piratene. Generelt ble det ikke nødvendig
1337 å sikre seg tillatelse før et bilde kunne tas og deles med andre. I stedet
1338 var det antatt at tillatelse var gitt. Frihet var utgangspunktet. (Loven
1339 ga etter en stund et unntak for berømte personer: kommersielle fotografer
1340 som tok bilder av berømte personer for kommersielle formål har flere
1341 begrensninger enn resten av oss. Men i det vanlige tilfellet, kan bildet
1342 fanges uten å klarere rettighetene for a fange det.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639559" href=
"#ftn.id2639559" class=
"footnote">33</a>]
</sup>)
1344 Vi kan kun spekulere om hvordan fotografering ville ha utviklet seg om loven
1345 hadde slått ut den andre veien. Hvis den hadde vært mot fotografen, da
1346 ville fotografen måttet dokumentere at tillatelse var på plass. Kanskje
1347 Eastman Kodak også måtte ha dokumentert at tillatelse var gitt, før de
1348 utviklet filmen som bildene ble fanget på. Tross alt, hvis tillatelse ikke
1349 var gitt, da ville Eastman Kodak ha nytt fordeler fra "tyveriet" begått av
1350 fotografer. På samme måte som Napster nøt fordeler fra opphavsrettsbrudd
1351 utført av Napster-brukere, så ville Kodak nytt fordeler fra
1352 "bilde-rettighets"-brudd til deres fotografer. Vi kan forestille oss at
1353 loven da krevede at en form for tillatelse ble vist frem før et selskap
1354 fremkalte bildene. Vi kan forestille oss et system bli utviklet for å legge
1355 frem slike tillatelser.
1360 Men selv om vi kan tenke oss dette godkjenningssystemet, så vil det være
1361 svært vanskelig å se hvordan fotografering skulle ha blomstret slik det
1362 gjorde hvis det var bygd inn krav om godkjenning i reglene som styrte det.
1363 Fotografering ville eksistert. Det ville ha økt sin betydning over tid.
1364 Profesjonelle ville ha fortsatt å bruke teknologien slik de
1365 gjorde
—siden profesjonelle enklere kunne håndtert byrdene pålagt dem
1366 av godkjenningssystemet. Men spredningen av fotografering til vanlige folk
1367 villa aldri ha skjedd. Veksten det skapte kunne aldri ha skjedd. Og det
1368 ville uten tvil aldri vært realisert en slik vekst i demokratisk
1369 uttrykksteknologi. Hvis du kjører gjennom området Presidio i San Francisco,
1370 kan det hende du ser to gusjegule skolebusser overmalt med fargefulle og
1371 iøynefallende bilder, og logoen "Just Think!" i stedet for navnet på en
1372 skole. Men det er lite som er "bare" mentalt i prosjektene som disse bussene
1373 muliggjør. Disse bussene er fylt med teknologi som lærer unger å fikle med
1374 film. Ikke filmen til Eastman. Ikke en gang filmen i din videospiller. I
1375 stedet er det snakk om "filmen" til digitale kamera. Just Think! er et
1376 prosjekt som gjør det mulig for unger å lage filmer, som en måte å forstå og
1377 kritisere den filmede kulturen som de finner over alt rundt seg. Hvert år
1378 besøker disse bussene mer enn tredve skoler og gir mellom tre hundre og fire
1379 hundre barn muligheten til å lære noe om media ved å gjøre noe med media.
1380 Ved å gjøre, så tenker de. Ved å fikle, så lærer de.
1381 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639621"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639632"></a><p>
1382 Disse bussene er ikke billige, men teknologien de har med seg blir billigere
1383 og billigere. Kostnaden til et høykvalitets digitalt videosystem har falt
1384 dramatisk. Som en analytiker omtalte det, "for fem år siden kostet et godt
1385 sanntids redigerinssystem for digital video $
25 000. I dag kan du få
1386 profesjonell kvalitet for $
595."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639718" href=
"#ftn.id2639718" class=
"footnote">34</a>]
</sup> Disse
1387 bussene er fylt med teknologi som ville kostet hundre-tusenvis av dollar for
1388 bare ti år siden. Og det er nå mulig å forestille seg ikke bare slike
1389 busser, men klasserom rundt om i landet hvor unger kan lære mer og mer av
1390 det lærerne kaller "medie-skriveføre" eller "mediekompetanse".
1393 "Media-skriveføre," eller "mediekompetanse" som administrerende direktør
1394 Dave Yanofsky i Just Think!, sier det, "er evnen til
… å forstå,
1395 analysere og dekonstruere mediebilder. Dets mål er å gjøre [unger] i stand
1396 til å forstå hvordan mediene fungerer, hvordan de er konstruert, hvordan de
1397 blir levert, og hvordan folk bruker dem".
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639380"></a>
1399 Dette kan virke som en litt rar måte å tenke på "skrivefør". For de fleste
1400 handler skrivefør å kunne lese og skrive. "Skriveføre folk kjenner ting som
1401 Faulkner, Hemingway og å kjenne igjen delte infinitiver.
1403 Mulig det. Men i en verden hvor barn ser i gjennomsnitt
390 timer med
1404 TV-reklaager i året, eller generelt mellom
20 000 og
45 000
1405 reklameinnslag,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639780" href=
"#ftn.id2639780" class=
"footnote">35</a>]
</sup> så er det mer og mer
1406 viktig å forstå "gramatikken" til media. For på samme måte som det er en
1407 gramatikk for det skrevne ord, så er det også en for media. Og akkurat slik
1408 som unger lærer å skrive ved å skrive masse grusom prosa, så lærer unger å
1409 skrive media ved å konstruere masse (i hvert fall i begynnelsen) grusom
1412 Et voksende felt av akademikere og aktivister ser denne formen for
1413 skriveføre som avgjørende for den neste generasjonen av kultur. For selv om
1414 de som har skrevet forstår hvor vanskelig det er å skrive
—hvor
1415 vanskelig det er å bestemme rekkefølge i historien, å holde på
1416 oppmerksomheten hos leseren, å forme språket slik at det er
1417 forståelig
—så har få av oss en reell følelse av hvor vanskelig medier
1418 er. Eller mer fundamentalt, de færreste av av oss har en følelse for
1419 hvordan media fungerer, hvordan det holder et publikum eller leder leseren
1420 gjennom historien, hvordan det utløser følelser eller bygger opp spenningen.
1422 Det tok filmkusten en generasjon før den kunne gjøre disse tingene bra. Men
1423 selv da, så var kunnskapen i filmingen, ikke i å skrive om filmen.
1424 Ferdigheten kom fra erfaring med å lage en film, ikke fra å lese en bok om
1425 den. En lærer å skrive ved å skrive, og deretter reflektere over det en har
1426 skrevet. En lærer å skrive med bilder ved å lage dem, og deretter
1427 reflektere over det en har laget.
1428 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639813"></a><p>
1429 Denne gramatikken har endret seg etter hvert som media har endret seg. Da
1430 det kun var film, som Elizabeth Daley, administrerende direktør ved
1431 Universitetet i Sør-Califorias Anneberg-senter for kommunkasjon og rektor
1432 ved USC skole for Kino-Televisjon, forklarte for meg, var gramatikken om
1433 "plasseringen av objekter, farger,
… rytme, skritt og
1434 tekstur".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639744" href=
"#ftn.id2639744" class=
"footnote">36</a>]
</sup> Men etter hvert som
1435 datamaskiner åpner opp et interaktivt rom hvor en historie blir "spillt" i
1436 tillegg til opplevd, endrer gramatikken seg. Den enkle kontrollen til
1437 forstellerstemmen er forsvunnet, og dermed er andre teknikker nødvendig.
1438 Forfatter Michael Crichton hadde mestret fortellerstemmen til science
1439 fiction. Men da han forsøkte å lage et dataspill basert på et av sine verk,
1440 så var det et nytt håndverk han måtte lære. Det var ikke åpenbart hvordan
1441 en leder folk gjennom et spill uten at de far følelsen av å ha blitt ledet,
1442 selv for en enormt vellykket forfatter.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639899" href=
"#ftn.id2639899" class=
"footnote">37</a>]
</sup>
1443 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639922"></a><p>
1444 Akkurat denne ferdigheten er håndverket en lærer til de som lager
1445 filmer. Som Daley skriver, "folk er svært overrasket over hvordan de blir
1446 ledet gjennom en film. Den er perfekt konstruert for å hindre deg fra å se
1447 det, så du aner det ikke. Hvis en som lager filmer lykkes så vet du ikke at
1448 du har vært ledet." Hvis du vet at du ble ledet igjennom en film, så har
1451 Likevel er innsatsen for å utvide skriveføren
—til en som går ut over
1452 tekst til å ta med lyd og visuelle elementer
—handler ikke om å lage
1453 bedre filmregisører. Målet er ikke å forbedre filmyrket i det hele tatt. I
1454 stedet, som Daley forklarer,
1455 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
1456 Fra mitt perspektiv er antagelig det viktigste digitale skillet ikke om en
1457 har tilgang til en boks eller ikke. Det er evnen til å ha kontroll over
1458 språket som boksen bruker. I motsatt fall er det bare noen få som kan
1459 skrive i dette språket, og alle oss andre er redusert til å ikke kunne
1461 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1462 "ikke kunne skrive." Passive mottakerne av kultur produsert andre
1463 steder. Sofapoteter. Forbrukere. Dette er medieverden fra det tjuende
1466 Det tjueførste århundret kan bli annerledes. Dette er et kritisk punkt: Det
1467 kan bli både lesing og skriving. Eller i det minste lesing og bedre
1468 forståelse for håndverket å skrive. Eller det beste, lesing og forstå
1469 verktøyene som gir skriving mulighet til å veilede eller villede. Målet med
1470 enhver skriveførhet, og denne skriveførheten spesielt, er å "gi folket
1471 myndighet til å velge det språket som passer for det de trenger å lage eller
1472 uttrykke".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639992" href=
"#ftn.id2639992" class=
"footnote">38</a>]
</sup> Det gir studenter mulighet
1473 "til å kommunisere i språket til det tjueførste århundret".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640011" href=
"#ftn.id2640011" class=
"footnote">39</a>]
</sup>
1474 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640019"></a><p>
1475 Som det alle andre språk, læres dette språket lettere for noen enn for
1476 andre. Det kommer ikke nødvendigvis lettere for de som gjør det godt
1477 skriftlig. Daley og Stephanie Barish, direktør for Institutt for
1478 Multimedia-skriveføre ved Annenberg-senteret, beskriver et spesielt sterkt
1479 eksempel fra et prosjekt de gjennomførte i en videregående skole. Den
1480 videregående skolen var en veldig fattig skole i den indre byen i Los
1481 Angeles. Etter alle tradisjonelle måleenheter for suksess var denne skolen
1482 en fiasko. Men Daley og Barish gjennomførte et program som ga ungene en
1483 mulighet til å bruke film til å uttrykke sine meninger om noe som studentene
1484 visste noe om
—våpen-relatert vold.
1486 Klassen møttes fredag ettermiddag, og skapte et relativt nytt problem for
1487 skolen. Mens utfordringen i de fleste klasser var å få ungene til å dukke
1488 opp, var utfordringen for denne klassen å holde dem unna. "Ungene dukket opp
1489 06:
00, og dro igjen
05:
00 på natta", sa Barish. De jobbet hardere enn i noen
1490 annen klasse for å gjøre det utdanning burde handle om
—å lære hvordan
1491 de skulle uttrykke seg.
1493 Ved å bruke hva som helst av "fritt tilgjengelig web-stoff de kunne finne",
1494 og relativt enkle verktøy som gjorde det mulig for ungene å blande "bilde,
1495 lyd og tekst", sa Barish at denne klassen produserte en serie av prosjekter
1496 som viste noe om våpen-basert vold som få ellers ville forstå. Dette var et
1497 tema veldig nært livene til disse studentene. Prosjektet "ga dem et verktøy
1498 og bemyndiget dem slik at de både ble i stand til å forstå det og snakke om
1499 det", forklarer Barish. Dette verktøyet lyktes med å skape
1500 uttrykk
—mye mer vellykket og kraffylt enn noe som hadde blitt laget
1501 ved å kun bruke tekst. "Hvis du hadde sagt til disse studentene at 'du må
1502 gjøre dette i tekstform', så hadde de bare kastet hendene i været og gått og
1503 gjort noe annet", forklarer Barish. Delvis, uten tvil, fordi å uttrykke seg
1504 selv i tekstform ikke er noe disse studentene gjør godt. Heller ikke er
1505 tekstform en form som kan uttrykke
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>disse
</em></span> idéene godt.
1506 Kraften i denne meldingen avhenger av dens forbindelse med denne for for
1512 "Men handler ikke utdanning om å lære unger å skrive?" spurte jeg. Jo
1513 delvis, naturligvis. Men hvorfor lærer vi unger å skrive? Utdanning,
1514 forklarer Daley, handler om å gi studentene en måte å "konstruere mening".
1515 Å si at det kun betyr skriving er som å si at å lære bort skriving kun
1516 handler om å lære ungene å stave. Tekstforming er bare en del
—og i
1517 større grad ikke den kraftigste delen
—for å konstruere mening. Som
1518 Daley forklarte i den mest rørende delen av vårt intervju,
1519 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
1520 Det du ønsker er å gi disse studentene en måte å konstruere mening. Hvis alt
1521 du gir dem er tekst, så kommer de ikke til å gjøre det. Fordi de kan ikke.
1522 Du vet, du har Johnny som kan se på en video, han kan spille på et TV-spill,
1523 han kan spre grafitti over alle dine vegger, han kan ta fra hverandre bilen
1524 din, og han kan gjøre alle mulige andre ting. Men han kan ikke lese teksten
1525 din. Så Jonny kommer på skolen og du sier "Johnny, du er analfabet.
1526 Ingenting du gjør betyr noe". Vel, da har Johnny to valg: Han kan avvise
1527 deg eller han kan avvise seg selv. Hvis han har et sunt ego så vil han
1528 avvise deg. Men hvis du i stedet sier, "Well, med alle disse tingene som du
1529 kan gjøre, la oss snakke om dette temaet. Spill musikk til meg som du mener
1530 reflekterer over temaet, eller vis meg bilder som du mener reflekterer over
1531 temaet, eller tegn noe til meg som reflektere temaet". Ikke ved å gi en
1532 unge et videokamera og
… si "La oss dra å ha det morsomt med
1533 videokameraet og lage en liten film". Men istedet, virkelig hjelpe deg å ta
1534 disse elementene som du forstår, som er ditt språk, og konstruer mening om
1537 Dette bemyndiger enormt. Og det som skjer til slutt, selvfølgelig, som det
1538 har skjedd i alle disse klassene, er at de stopper opp når de treffer
1539 faktumet "jeg trenger å forklare dette, og da trenger jeg virkelig å skrive
1540 noe". Og som en av lærerne fortalte Stephanie, de vil skrive om avsnittet
1541 5,
6,
7,
8 ganger, helt til det blir riktig.
1544 Fordi de trengte det. Det var en grunn til å gjøre det. De trengte å si
1545 noe, i motsetning til å kun danse etter din pipe. De trengte faktisk å
1546 bruke det språket de ikke håndterte veldig bra. Men de hadde begynt å
1547 forstå at de hadde mye gjennomslagskraft med dette språket."
1548 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1549 Da to fly krasjet inn i World Trade Center, og et annet inn i Pentagon, og
1550 et fjerde inn i et jorde i Pennsylvania, snudde alle medier verden rundt seg
1551 til denne nyheten. Ethvert moment for omtreng hver eneste dag den uka, og
1552 ukene som fulgte gjenfortalte TV spesielt, men media generelt, historien om
1553 disse hendelsene som vi nettopp hadde vært vitne til. Genialiteten i denne
1554 forferdelige terrorhandlingen var at det forsinkede andre-angrepet var
1555 perfekt tidsatt for å sikre at hele verden ville være der for å se på.
1557 Disse gjenfortellingene ga en økende familiær følelse. Det var musikk
1558 spesiallaget for mellom-innslagene, og avansert grafikk som blinket tvers
1559 over skjermen. Det var en formel for intervjuer. Det var "balanse" og
1560 seriøsitet. Dette var nyheter koreaografert slik vi i stadig større grad
1561 forventer det, "nyheter som underholdning", selv om underholdningen er en
1563 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640216"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640222"></a><p>
1564 Men i tillegg til disse produserte nyhetene om "tragedien
11. september",
1565 kunne de av oss som er knyttet til internettet i tillegg se en svært
1566 annerledes produksjon. Internettet er fullt av fortellinger om de samme
1567 hendelsene. Men disse internet-fortellingene hadde en veldig annerledes
1568 smak. Noen folk konstruerte foto-sider som fanget bilder fra hele verden og
1569 presenterte dem som lysbildepresentasjoner med tekst. Noen tilbød åpne
1570 brev. Det var lydopptak. Det var sinne og frustrasjon. Det var forsøk på
1571 å tilby en sammenheng. Det var, kort og godt, en ekstraordinær
1572 verdensomspennende låvebygging, slik Mike Godwin bruker begrepet i hans bok
1573 <em class=
"citetitle">Cyber Rights
</em>, rundt en nyhetshendelse som hadde
1574 fanget oppmerksomheten til hele verden. Det var ABC og CBS, men det var
1578 Det er ikke så enkelt som at jeg ønsker å lovprise internettet
—selv om
1579 jeg mener at folkene som støtter denne formen for tale bør lovprises. Jeg
1580 ønsker i stedet å peke på viktigheten av denne formen for tale. For på
1581 samme måte som en Kodak, gjør internettet folk i stand til å fange bilder.
1582 Og på samme måte som med en film laget av en av studentene på "Just
1583 Think!"-bussen, kan visuelle bilder bli blandet med lyd og tekst.
1585 Men i motsetning til en hvilken som helst teknologi for å enkelt fange
1586 bilder, tillater internettet at en nesten umiddelbart deler disse
1587 kreasjonene med et ekstraordinært antall menesker. Dette er noe nytt i vår
1588 tradisjon
—ikke bare kan kultur fanges inn mekanisk, og åpenbart heller
1589 ikke at hendelser blir kommentert kritisk, men at denne blandingen av
1590 bilder, lyd og kommentar kan spres vidt omkring nesten umiddelbart.
1592 11. september var ikke et avvik. Det var en start. Omtrent på samme tid,
1593 begynte en form for kommunkasjon som hadde vokst dramatisk å komme inn i
1594 offentlig bevissthet: web-loggen, eller blog. Bloggen er en slags offentlig
1595 dagbok, og i noen kulturer, slik som i Japan, fungerer den veldig lik en
1596 dagbok. I disse kulturene registrerer den private fakta på en offentlig
1597 måte
—det er en slags elektronisk
<em class=
"citetitle">Jerry
1598 Springer
</em>, tilgjengelig overalt i verden.
1600 Men i USA har blogger inntatt en svært annerledes karakter. Det er noen som
1601 bruker denne plassen til å snakke om sitt private liv. Men det er mange som
1602 bruker denne plassen til å delta i offentlig debatt. Diskuterer saker med
1603 offentlig interesse, kritiserer andre som har feil synspunkt, kritisere
1604 politigere for avgjørelser de tar, tilbyr løsninger på problemer vi alle
1605 ser. Blogger skaper en følelse av et virtuelt offentlig møte, men et hvor
1606 vi ikke alle håper å være tilstede på samme tid og hvor konversasjonene ikke
1607 nødvendigvis er koblet sammen. De beste av bloggoppføringene er relativt
1608 korte. De peker direkte til ord bruk av andre, kritiserer dem eller bidrar
1609 til dem. Det kan argumenteres for at de er den viktigste form for
1610 ukoreografert offentlig debatt som vi har.
1613 Dette er en sterk uttalelse. Likevel sier den like mye om vårt demokrati
1614 som den sier om blogger. Dette er delen av USA som det er mest vanskelig
1615 for oss som elsker USA å akseptere: vårt demokrati har svunnet hen. Vi har
1616 naturligvis valg, og mesteparten av tiden tillater domstolene at disse
1617 valgene teller. Et relativt lite antall mennesker stemmer i disse valgene.
1618 Syklusen med disse valgene har blitt totalt profesjonalisert og
1619 rutinepreget. De fleste av oss tenker på dette som demokrati.
1621 Men demokrati har aldri kun handlet om valg. Demokrati betyr at folket
1622 styrer, og å styre betyr noe mer enn kun valg. I vår tradisjon betyr det
1623 også kontroll gjennom gjennomtenkt meningsbrytning. Dette var idéen som
1624 fanget fantasien til Alexis de Tocqueville, den franske
1625 nittenhundretalls-advokaten som skrev den viktigste historien om det tidlige
1626 "demokratiet i Amerika". Det var ikke allmenn stemmerett som fascinerte
1627 han
—det var juryen, en institusjon som ga vanlige folk retten til å
1628 velge liv eller død før andre borgere. Og det som fascinerte han mest var
1629 at juryen ikke bare stemte over hvilket resultat de ville legge frem. De
1630 diskuterte. Medlemmene argumenterte om hva som var "riktig" resultat, de
1631 forsøkte å overbevise hverandre om "riktig"resultat, og i hvert fall i
1632 kriminalsaker måtte de bli enige om et enstemming resultat for at prosessen
1633 skulle avsluttes.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640278" href=
"#ftn.id2640278" class=
"footnote">40</a>]
</sup>
1635 Og likevel fremheves denne institusjonen i USA i dag. Og i dets sted er det
1636 ingen systematisk innsats for å muliggjøre borger-diskusjon. Noen gjør en
1637 innsats for å lage en slik institusjon.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640406" href=
"#ftn.id2640406" class=
"footnote">41</a>]
</sup>
1638 Og i noen landsbyer i New England er det noe i nærheten av diskusjon igjen.
1639 Men for de fleste av oss mesteparten av tiden, er det ingen tid og sted for
1640 å gjennomføre "demokratisk diskusjon".
1642 Mer merkelig er at en generelt sett ikke engang har aksept for at det skal
1643 skje. Vi, det mektigste demokratiet i verden, har utviklet en sterk norm
1644 mot å diskutere politikk. Det er greit å diskutere politikk med folk du er
1645 enig med, men det er uhøflig å diskutere politikk med folk du er uenig med.
1646 Politisk debatt blir isolert, og isolert diskusjon blir mer
1647 ekstrem.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640439" href=
"#ftn.id2640439" class=
"footnote">42</a>]
</sup> Vi sier det våre venner vil
1648 høre, og hører veldig lite utenom hva våre venner sier.
1651 Så kommer bloggen. Selve bloggens arkitektur løser en del av dette
1652 problemet. Folk publiserer det de ønsker å publisere, og folk leser det de
1653 ønsker å lese. Det vanskeligste tiden er synkron tid. Teknologier som
1654 muliggjør asynkron kommunasjons, slik som epost, øker muligheten for
1655 kommunikasjon. Blogger gjør det mulig med offentlig debatt uten at folket
1656 noen gang trenger å samle seg på et enkelt offentlig sted.
1658 Men i tillegg til arkitektur, har blogger også løst problemet med normer.
1659 Det er (ennå) ingen norm i blogg-sfæren om å ikke snakke om politikk.
1660 Sfæren er faktisk fylt med politiske innlegg, både på høyre- og
1661 venstresiden. Noen av de mest populære stedene er konservative eller
1662 libertarianske, men det er mange av alle politiske farger. Til og med
1663 blogger som ikke er politiske dekker politiske temaer når anledningen krever
1666 Betydningene av disse bloggene er liten nå, men ikke ubetydelig. Navnet
1667 Howard Dean har i stor grad forsvunnet fra
2004-presidentvalgkampen bortsett
1668 fra hos noen få blogger. Men selv om antallet lesere er lavt, så har det å
1669 lese dem en effekt.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640497"></a>
1671 En direkte effekt er på historier som hadde en annerledes livssyklus i de
1672 store mediene. Trend Lott-affæren er et eksempel. Da Logg "sa feil" på en
1673 fest for senator Storm Thurmond, og essensielt lovpriste
1674 segregeringspolitikken til Thurmond, regnet han ganske riktig med at
1675 historien ville forsvinne fra de store mediene i løpet av førtiåtte timer.
1676 Det skjedde. Men han regnet ikke med dens livssyklus i bloggsfæren.
1677 Bloggerne fortsatte å undersøke historien. Etter hvert dukket flere og
1678 flere tilfeller av tilsvarende "feiluttalelser" opp. Så dukket historien opp
1679 igjen hos de store mediene. Lott ble til slutt tvinget til å trekke seg som
1680 leder for senatets flertall.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640529" href=
"#ftn.id2640529" class=
"footnote">43</a>]
</sup>
1681 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640537"></a>
1683 Denne annerledes syklusen er mulig på grunn av at et tilsvarende kommersielt
1684 press ikke eksisterer hos blogger slik det gjør hos andre kanaler.
1685 Televisjon og aviser er kommersielle aktører. De må arbeide for å holde på
1686 oppmerksomheten. Hvis de mister lesere, så mister de inntekter. Som haier,
1687 må de bevege seg videre.
1689 Men bloggere har ikke tilsvarende begresninger. De kan bli opphengt, de kan
1690 fokusere, de kan bli seriøse. Hvis en bestemt blogger skriver en spesielt
1691 interessant historie, så vil flere og flere folk lenke til den historien.
1692 Og etter hvert som antalet lenker til en bestemt historie øker, så stiger
1693 den i rangeringen for historier. Folk leser det som er populært, og hva som
1694 er populært har blitt valgt gjennom en svært demokratisk prosess av
1695 likemanns-generert rangering.
1696 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxwinerdave"></a><p>
1698 Det er også en annen måte, hvor blogger har en annen syklus enn de store
1699 mediene. Som Dave Winer, en av fedrene til denne bevegelsen og en
1700 programvareutvikler i mange tiår fortalte meg, er en annen forskjell
1701 fraværet av finansiell "interessekonflikt". "Jeg tror du må ta
1702 interessekonflikten" ut av journalismen, fortalte Winer meg. "En
1703 amatørjournalist har ganske enkelt ikke interessekonflikt, eller
1704 interessekonflikten er så enkelt å avsløre at du liksom vet du kan rydde den
1706 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640604"></a><p>
1707 Disse konfliktene blir mer viktig etter hvert som mediene blir mer
1708 konsentert (mer om dette under). Konsenterte medier kan skjule mer fra
1709 offentligheten enn ikke-konsenterte medier kan
—slik CNN innrømte at de
1710 gjorde etter Iraq-krigen fordi de var rett for konsekvensene for sine egne
1711 ansatte.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640369" href=
"#ftn.id2640369" class=
"footnote">44</a>]
</sup> De trenger også å opprettholde
1712 en mer konsistent rapportering. (Midt under Irak-krigen, leste jeg en
1713 melding på Internet fra noen som på det tidspunktet lyttet på
1714 satellitt-forbindelsen til en reporter i Iraq. New York-hovedkvarteret ba
1715 reporteren gang på gang at hennes rapport om krigen var for trist: Hun måtte
1716 tilby en mer optimistisk historie. Når hun fortalte New York at det ikke var
1717 grunnlag for det, fortalte de henne at det var
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>dem
</em></span> som
1719 </p><p> Blogg-sfæren gir amatører en måte å bli med i debatten
—"amatør" ikke i
1720 betydningen uerfaren, men i betydningen til en Olympisk atlet, det vil si
1721 ikke betalt av noen for å komme med deres rapport. Det tillater en mye
1722 bredere rekke av innspill til en historie, slik rapporteringen
1723 Columbia-katastrofen avdekket, når hundrevis fra hele sørvest-USA vendte seg
1724 til internettet for å gjenfortelle hva de hadde sett.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640616" href=
"#ftn.id2640616" class=
"footnote">45</a>]
</sup> Og det får lesere til å lese på tvers av en rekke
1725 fortellinger og "triangulere", som Winer formulerer det, sannheten.
1726 Blogger, sier Winer, "kommunserer direkte med vår velgermasse, og
1727 mellommannen er fjernet"
— med alle de fordeler og ulemper det kan føre
1731 Winer er optimistisk når det gjelder en journalistfremtid infisert av
1732 blogger. "Det kommer til å bli en nødvendig ferdighet", spår Winer, for
1733 offentlige aktører og også i større grad for private aktører. Det er ikke
1734 klart at "journalismen" er glad for dette
—noen journalister har blitt
1735 bedt om å kutte ut sin blogging.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640686" href=
"#ftn.id2640686" class=
"footnote">46</a>]
</sup> Men
1736 det er klart at vi fortsatt er i en overgangsfase. "Mye av det vi gjør nå
1737 er oppvarmingsøvelser", fortalte Winer meg. Det er mye som må modne før
1738 dette området har sin modne effekt. Og etter som inkludering av innhold i
1739 dette området er det området med minst opphavsrettsbrudd på internettet, sa
1740 Wiener at "vi vil være den siste tingen som blir skutt ned".
1742 Slik tale påvirker demokratiet. Winer mener dette skjer fordi "du trenger
1743 ikke jobber for noen som kontrollerer, [for] en portvokter". Det er sant.
1744 Men det påvirker demokratiet også på en annen måte. Etter hvert som flere og
1745 flere borgere uttrykker hva de mener, og forsvarer det skriftlig, så vil det
1746 endre hvordan folk forstår offentlige temaer. Det er enkelt å ha feil og
1747 være på villspor i hodet ditt. Det er vanskeligere når resultatet fra dine
1748 tanker kan bli kritisert av andre. Det er selvfølgelig et sjeldent menneske
1749 som innrømmer at han ble overtalt til å innse at han tok feil. Men det er
1750 mer sjeldent for et menneske å ignorere at noen har bevist at han tok feil.
1751 Å skrive ned idéer, argumenter og kritikk forbedrer demokratiet. I dag er
1752 det antagelig et par millioner blogger der det skrives på denne måten. Når
1753 det er ti milloner, så vil det være noe ekstraordært å rapportere.
1754 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640791"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxbrownjohnseely"></a><p>
1755 John Seely Brown er sjefsforsker ved Xerox Corporation. Hans arbeid, i
1756 følge hans eget nettsted, er "menneskelig læring og
… å skape
1757 kunnskapsøkologier for å skape
… innovasjon".
1759 Brown ser dermed på disse teknologiene for digital kreativitet litt
1760 annerledes enn fra perspektivene jeg har skissert opp så langt. Jeg er
1761 sikker på at han blir begeistret for enhver teknologi som kan forbedre
1762 demokratiet. Men det han virkelig blir begeistret over er hvordan disse
1763 teknologiene påvirker læring.
1766 Brown tror vi lærer med å fikle. Da "mange av oss vokste opp", forklarer
1767 han, ble fiklingen gjort "pa motorsykkelmotorer, gressklippermotorer, biler,
1768 radioer og så videre". Men digitale teknologier muliggjør en annen type
1769 fikling
—med abstrakte idéer i sin konkrete form. Ungene i Just Think!
1770 tenker ikke bare på hvordan et reklameinnslag fremstiller en politiker. Ved
1771 å bruke digital teknologi kan de ta reklameinnslaget fra hverandre og
1772 manipulerer det, fikle med det, og se hvordan det blir gjort. Digitale
1773 teknologier setter igang en slags *bricolage* eller "fritt tilgjengelig
1774 sammenstilling", som Brown kaller det. Mange får mulighet til å legge til
1775 på eller endre på fiklingen til mange andre.
1777 Det beste eksemplet i større skala så langt på denne typen fikling er fri
1778 programvare og åpen kildekode (FS/OSS). FS/OSS er programvare der
1779 kildekoden deles ut. Alle kan laste ned teknologien som får et
1780 FS/OSS-program til å fungere. Og enhver som har lyst til å lære hvordan en
1781 bestemt bit av FS/OSS-teknologi fungerer kan fikle med koden.
1783 Denne muligheten gir en "helt ny type læringsplattform", i følge Brown. "Så
1784 snart du begynner å gjøre dette, så
… slipper du løs en fritt
1785 tilgjengelig sammenstilling til fellesskapet, slik at andre folk kan begynne
1786 å se på koden din, fikle med den, teste den, seom de kan forbedre den". Og
1787 hver innsats er et slags læretid. "Åpen kildekode blir en stor
1790 I denne prossesen, "er de konkrete tingene du fikler med abstrakte. De er
1791 kildekode". Unger "endres til å få evnen til å fikle med det abstrakte, og
1792 denne fiklingen er ikke lenger en isolert aktivitet som du gjør i garasjen
1793 din. Du fikler med en fellesskapsplatform.
… Du fikler med andre
1794 folks greier. Og jo mer du fikler, jo mer forbedrer du." Jo mer du
1795 forbedrer, jo mer lærer du.
1797 Denne sammen tingen skjer også med innhold. Og det skjer på samme
1798 samarbeidende måte når dette innholdet er del av nettet. Som Brown
1799 formulerer det, "nettet er det første medium som virkelig tar hensyn til
1800 flere former for intelligens". Tidligere teknologier, slik som skrivemaskin
1801 eller tekstbehandling, hjelper med å fremme tekst. Men nettet fremmer mye
1802 mer enn tekst. "Nettet
… si hvis du er musikalsk, hvis du er
1803 kunstnerisk, hvis du er visuell, hvis du er interessert i film
…da er
1804 det en masse du kan gå igang med på dette mediet. Det kan fremme og ta
1805 hensyn til alle disse formene for intelligens."
1806 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640894"></a><p>
1808 Brown snakker om hva Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish Og Just Think! lærer
1809 bort: at denne fiklingen med kultur lærer såvel som den skaper. Den utvikler
1810 talenter litt anderledes, og den bygger en annen type gjenkjenning.
1812 Likevel er friheten til å fikle med disse objektene ikke garantert. Faktisk,
1813 som vi vil se i løpet av denne boken, er den friheten i stadig større grad
1814 omstridt. Mens det ikke er noe tvil om at din far hadde rett til å fikle
1815 med bilmotoren, så er det stor tvil om dine barn vil ha retten til å fikle
1816 med bilder som hun finner over alt. Loven, og teknologi i stadig større
1817 grad, forstyrrer friheten som teknolog, nysgjerrigheten, ellers ville sikre.
1819 Disse begresningene har blitt fokusen for forskere og akademikere. Professor
1820 Ed Felten ved Princeton (som vi vil se mer fra i kapittel
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”">10</a>) har utviklet et
1821 kraftfylt argument til fordel for "retten til å fikle" slik det gjøres i
1822 informatikk og til kunnskap generelt.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640978" href=
"#ftn.id2640978" class=
"footnote">47</a>]
</sup>
1823 Men bekymringen til Brown er tidligere, og mer fundamentalt. Det handler om
1824 hva slags læring unger kan få, eller ikke kan få, på grunn av loven.
1826 "Dette er dit utviklingen av utdanning i det tjueførste århundret er på
1827 vei", forklarer Brown. Vi må "forstå hvordan unger som vokser opp digitalt
1828 tenker og ønsker å lære".
1830 "Likevel", fortsatte Brown, og som balansen i denne boken vil føre bevis
1831 for, "bygger vi et juridisk system som fullstendig undertrykker den
1832 naturlige tendensen i dagens digitale unger.
… We bygger en
1833 arkitektur som frigjør
60 prosent av hjernen [og] et juridisk system som
1834 stenger ned den delen av hjernen".
1835 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641008"></a><p>
1836 Vi bygger en teknologi som tar magien til Kodak, mikser inn bevegelige
1837 bilder og lyd, og legger inn plass for kommentarer og en mulighet til å spre
1838 denne kreativiteten over alt. Men vi bygger loven for å stenge ned denne
1841 "Ikke måten å drive en kultur på", sa Brewster Kahle, som vi møtte i
1842 kapittel
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#collectors" title=
"9. Kapittel ni: Samlere">9</a>,
1843 kommenterte til meg i et sjeldent øyeblikk av nedstemthet.
1844 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639261" href=
"#id2639261" class=
"para">26</a>]
</sup>
1847 Reese V. Jenkins,
<em class=
"citetitle">Images and Enterprise
</em> (Baltimore:
1848 Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1849 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637038" href=
"#id2637038" class=
"para">27</a>]
</sup>
1851 Brian Coe,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Birth of Photography
</em> (New York:
1852 Taplinger Publishing,
1977),
53.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639314"></a>
1853 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639340" href=
"#id2639340" class=
"para">28</a>]
</sup>
1857 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639350" href=
"#id2639350" class=
"para">29</a>]
</sup>
1860 Basert på et diagram i Jenkins, s.
178.
1861 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639292" href=
"#id2639292" class=
"para">30</a>]
</sup>
1865 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639440" href=
"#id2639440" class=
"para">31</a>]
</sup>
1868 For illustrerende saker, se for eksempel,
<em class=
"citetitle">Pavesich
</em>
1869 mot
<em class=
"citetitle">N.E. Life Ins. Co
</em>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1870 <em class=
"citetitle">Foster-Milburn Co
</em>. mot
<em class=
"citetitle">Chinn
</em>,
1871 123090 S.W.
364,
366 (Ky.
1909);
<em class=
"citetitle">Corliss
</em> mot
1872 <em class=
"citetitle">Walker
</em>,
64 F.
280 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1894).
1873 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639507" href=
"#id2639507" class=
"para">32</a>]
</sup>
1875 Samuel D. Warren og Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1876 <em class=
"citetitle">Harvard Law Review
</em> 4 (
1890):
193.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639516"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639524"></a>
1877 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639559" href=
"#id2639559" class=
"para">33</a>]
</sup>
1880 Se Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Law and
1881 Contemporary Problems
</em> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
1882 "Privacy," <em class=
"citetitle">California Law Review
</em> 48 (
1960)
1883 398–407;
<em class=
"citetitle">White
</em> mot
<em class=
"citetitle">Samsung
1884 Electronics America, Inc
</em>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992),
1885 sert. nektet,
508 U.S.
951 (
1993).
1886 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639718" href=
"#id2639718" class=
"para">34</a>]
</sup>
1889 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and Software You
1890 Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst, februar
2002,
1891 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
7</a>.
1892 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639780" href=
"#id2639780" class=
"para">35</a>]
</sup>
1895 Judith Van Evra,
<em class=
"citetitle">Television and Child Development
</em>
1896 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family
1897 and TV Study,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Denver Post
</em>,
25. mai
1997, B6.
1898 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639744" href=
"#id2639744" class=
"para">36</a>]
</sup>
1900 Intervju med Elizabeth Daley og Stephanie Barish,
13. desember
2002.
1901 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639872"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639880"></a>
1902 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639899" href=
"#id2639899" class=
"para">37</a>]
</sup>
1905 Se Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4. november
1906 2000, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
1907 #
8</a>; "Timeline,"
22. november
2000, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
9</a>.
1908 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639992" href=
"#id2639992" class=
"para">38</a>]
</sup>
1910 Intervju med Daley og Barish.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639999"></a>
1911 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640011" href=
"#id2640011" class=
"para">39</a>]
</sup>
1915 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640278" href=
"#id2640278" class=
"para">40</a>]
</sup>
1918 Se for eksempel Alexis de Tocqueville,
<em class=
"citetitle">Democracy in
1919 America
</em>, bk.
1, overs. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
1921 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640406" href=
"#id2640406" class=
"para">41</a>]
</sup>
1924 Bruce Ackerman og James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Journal of
1925 Political Philosophy
</em> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
1926 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640439" href=
"#id2640439" class=
"para">42</a>]
</sup>
1929 Cass Sunstein,
<em class=
"citetitle">Republic.com
</em> (Princeton: Princeton
1930 University Press,
2001),
65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
1931 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640529" href=
"#id2640529" class=
"para">43</a>]
</sup>
1934 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New York
1935 Times,
16. januar
2003, G5.
1936 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640369" href=
"#id2640369" class=
"para">44</a>]
</sup>
1939 Telefonintervju med David Winer,
16. april
2003.
1940 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640616" href=
"#id2640616" class=
"para">45</a>]
</sup>
1943 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of Information
1944 Online,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
2 februar
2003, A28; Staci
1945 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
1946 Journalism Review,
2. februar
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
10</a>.
1947 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640686" href=
"#id2640686" class=
"para">46</a>]
</sup>
1949 Se Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
<em class=
"citetitle">New
1950 York Times
</em>,
29. september
2003, C4. ("Ikke alle
1951 nyhetsorganisasjoner har hatt like stor aksept for ansatte som
1952 blogger. Kevin Sites, en CNN-korrespondent i Irak som startet en blogg om
1953 sin rapportering av krigen
9. mars, stoppet å publisere
12 dager senere på
1954 forespørsel fra sine sjefer. I fjor fikk Steve Olafson, en
1955 <em class=
"citetitle">Houston Chronicle
</em>-reporter, sparken for å ha hatt en
1956 personlig web-logg, publisert under pseudonym, som handlet om noen av
1957 temaene og folkene som han dekket")
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640734"></a>
1958 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640978" href=
"#id2640978" class=
"para">47</a>]
</sup>
1961 Se for eksempel, Edward Felten og Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
1962 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
1963 <em class=
"citetitle">Communications of the Association for Computer
1964 Machinery
</em> 43 (
2000):
9.
1965 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"3. Kapittel tre: Kataloger"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"catalogs"></a>3. Kapittel tre: Kataloger
</h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641069"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxrensselaer"></a><p>
1966 Høsten
2001, ble Jesse Jordan fra Oceanside, New York, innrullert som
1967 førsteårsstudent ved Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, i Troy, New York.
1968 Hans studieprogram ved RPI var informasjonsteknologi. Selv om han ikke var
1969 en programmerer, bestemte Jesse seg i oktober å begynne å fikle med en
1970 søkemotorteknologi som var tilgjengelig på RPI-nettverket.
1972 RPI er en av Amerikas fremste teknologiske forskningsinstitusjoner. De
1973 tilbyr grader innen områder som går fra arkitektur og ingeniørfag til
1974 informasjonsvitenskap. Mer enn
65 prosent av de fem tusen
1975 laveregradsstudentene fullførte blant de
10 prosent beste i deres klasse på
1976 videregående. Skolen er dermed en perfekt blanding av talent og erfaring
1977 for å se for seg og deretter bygge, en generasjon tilpasset
1980 RPIs data-nettverk kobler studenter, forelesere og administrasjon sammen.
1981 Det kobler også RPI til internettet. Ikke alt som er tilgjengelig på
1982 RPI-nettet er tilgjengelig på internettet. Men nettverket er utformet for å
1983 gi alle studentene mulighet til å bruke internettet, i tillegg til mer
1984 direkte tilgang til andre medlemmer i RPI-fellesskapet.
1987 Søkemotorer er et mål pa hvor nært et nettverk oppleves å være. Google
1988 brakte internettet mye nærmere oss alle ved en utrolig forbedring av
1989 kvaliteten på søk i nettverket. Spesialiserte søkemotorer kan gjøre dette
1990 enda bedre. Ideen med "intranett"-søkemotorer, søkemotorer som kun søker
1991 internt i nettverket til en bestemt institusjon, er å tilby brukerne i denne
1992 institusjonen bedre tilgang til materiale fra denne institusjonen. Bedrifter
1993 gjør dette hele tiden, ved å gi ansatte mulighet til å få tak i materiale
1994 som folk på utsiden av bedriften ikke kan få tak i. Universitetet gjør også
1997 Disse motorene blir muliggjort av netverksteknologien selv. For eksempel
1998 har Microsoft et nettverksfilsystem som gjør det veldig enkelt for
1999 søkemotorer tilpasset det nettverket å spørre systemet etter informasjon om
2000 det offentlig (innen nettverket) tilgjengelige innholdet. Søkemotoren til
2001 Jesse var bygget for å dra nytte av denne teknologien. Den brukte
2002 Microsofts nettverksfilsystem for å bygge en indeks over alle filene
2003 tilgjengelig inne i RPI-nettverket.
2005 Jesse sin var ikke den første søkemotoren bygget for RPI-nettverket. Hans
2006 motor var faktisk en enkel endring av motorer som andre hadde bygget. Hans
2007 viktigste enkeltforbedring i forhold til disse motorene var å fikse en feil
2008 i Microsofts fildelings-system som fikk en brukers datamaskin til å krasje.
2009 Med motorene som hadde eksistert tidligere, hvis du forsøkte å koble deg ved
2010 hjelp av Windows-utforskeren til en fil som var på en datamaskin som ikke
2011 var på nett, så ville din datamaskin krasje. Jesse endret systemet litt for
2012 å fikse det problemet, ved å legge til en knapp som en bruker kunne klikke
2013 på for å se om maskinen som hadde filen fortsatt var på nett.
2015 Motoren til Jesse kom pa nett i slutten av oktober. I løpet av de følgende
2016 seks månedene fortsatte han å justere den for å forbedre dens
2017 funksjonalitet. I mars fungerte systemet ganske bra. Jesse hadde mer enn
2018 en million filer i sin katalog, inkludert alle mulige typer innhold som
2019 fantes på brukernes datamaskiner.
2022 Dermed inneholdt indeksen som hans søkemotor produserte bilder, som
2023 studentene kunne bruke til å legge inn på sine egne nettsider, kopier av
2024 notater og forskning, kopier av informasjonshefter, filmklipp som studentene
2025 kanskje hadde laget, universitetsbrosjyrer
—ganske enkelt alt som
2026 brukerne av RPI-nettverket hadde gjort tilgjengelig i en fellesmappe på sine
2029 Men indeksen inneholdt også musikkfiler. Faktisk var en fjerdedel av filene
2030 som Jesses søkemotor inneholdt musikkfiler. Men det betyr, naturligvis, at
2031 tre fjerdedeler ikke var det, og
—slik at dette poenget er helt
2032 klart
—Jesse gjorde ingenting for å få folk til å plassere musikkfiler
2033 i deres fellesmapper. Han gjorde ingenting for å sikte søkemotoren mot
2034 disse filene. Han var en ungdom som fiklet med Google-lignende teknologi
2035 ved et universitet der han studerte informasjonsvitenskap, og dermed var
2036 fiklingen målet. I motsetning til Google, eller Microsoft for den saks
2037 skyld, tjente han ingen penger på denne fiklingen. Han var ikke knyttet til
2038 noen bedrift som skulle tjene penger fra dette eksperimentet. Han var en
2039 ungdom som fiklet med teknologi i en omgivelse hvor fikling med teknologi
2040 var nøyaktig hva han var ment å gjøre.
2042 Den
3. april
2003 ble Jesse kontaktet av lederen for studentkontoret ved
2043 RPI. Lederen fortalte Jesse at Foreningen for innspillingsindustri i USA,
2044 RIAA, wille levere inn et søksmål mot han og tre andre studenter som han
2045 ikke en gang kjente, to av dem på andre undersiteter. Noen få timer senere
2046 ble Jesse forkynt søksmålet og fikk overlevert dokumentene. Mens han leste
2047 disse dokumentene og så på nyhetsrapportene om den, ble han stadig mer
2050 "Det var absurd", fortalte han meg. "Jeg mener at jeg ikke gjorde noe
2051 galt.
… Jeg mener det ikke er noe galt med søkemotoren som jeg kjørte
2052 eller
… hva jeg hadde gjort med den. Jeg mener, jeg hadde ikke
2053 endret den på noen måte som fremmet eller forbedret arbeidet til pirater.
2054 Jeg endret kun søkemotoren slik at den ble enklere å bruke"
—igjen, en
2055 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>søkemotor
</em></span>, som Jesse ikke hadde bygd selv, som brukte
2056 fildelingssystemet til Windows, som Jesse ikke hadde bygd selv, for å gjøre
2057 det mulig for medlemmer av RPI-fellesskapet å få tilgang til innhold, som
2058 Jesse ikke hadde laget eller gjort tilgjengelig, og der det store flertall
2059 av dette ikke hadde noe å gjøre med musikk.
2062 Men RIAA kalte Jesse en pirat. De hevdet at han opererte et nettverk og
2063 dermed "med vilje" hadde brutt opphavsrettslovene. De krevde at han betalte
2064 dem skadeerstatning for det han hadde gjort galt. I saker med "krenkelser
2065 med vilje", spesifiserer opphavsrettsloven noe som advokater kaller
2066 "lovbestemte skader". Disse skadene tillater en opphavsrettighetseier å
2067 kreve $
150 000 per krenkelse. Etter som RIAA påsto det var mer enn et
2068 hundre spesifikke opphavsrettskrenkelser, krevde de dermed at Jesse betalte
2069 dem minst $
15 000 000.
2071 Lignende søksmål ble gjort mot tre andre studenter: en annen student ved
2072 RPI, en ved Michegan Technical University og en ved Princeton. Deres
2073 situasjoner var lik den til Jesse. Selv om hver sak hadde forskjellige
2074 detaljer, var hovedpoenget nøyaktig det samme: store krav om "erstatning"
2075 som RIAA påsto de hadde rett på. Hvis du summerte opp disse kravene, ba
2076 disse fire søksmålene domstolene i USA å tildele saksøkerne nesten $
100
2077 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>milliarder
</em></span>—seks ganger det
2078 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>totale
</em></span> overskuddet til filmindustrien i
2079 2001.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641338" href=
"#ftn.id2641338" class=
"footnote">48</a>]
</sup>
2080 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641352"></a><p>
2081 Jesse kontaktet sine foreldre. De støttet ham, men var litt skremt. En
2082 onkel var advokat. Han startet forhandlinger med RIAA. De krevde å få vite
2083 hvor mye penger Jesse hadde. Jesse hadde spart opp $
12 000 fra
2084 sommerjobber og annet arbeid. De krevde
12 000 for å trekke saken.
2086 RIAA ville at Jesse skulle innrømme at han hadde gjort noe galt. Han
2087 nektet. De ville ha han til å godta en kjennelse som i praksis ville gjøre
2088 det umulig for han å arbeide i mange områder innen teknologi for resten av
2089 hans liv. Han nektet. De fikk han til å forstå at denne prosessen med å
2090 bli saksøkt ikke kom til å bli hyggelig. (Som faren til Jesse refererte til
2091 meg, fortalte sjefsadvokaten på saken, Matt Oppenheimer, "Du ønsker ikke et
2092 tannlegebesøk hos meg flere ganger") Og gjennom det hele insisterte RIAA at
2093 de ikke ville inngå forlik før de hadde tatt hver eneste øre som Jesse hadde
2097 Familien til Jessie ble opprørt over disse påstandene. De ønsket å kjempe.
2098 Men onkelen til Jessie gjorde en innsats for å lære familien om hvordan det
2099 amerikanske juridiske systemet fungerte. Jesse kunne sloss mot RIAA. Han
2100 kunne til og med vinne. Men kostnaden med å loss mot et søksmål som dette,
2101 ble Jesse fortalt, ville være minst $
250 000. Hvis han vant ville han
2102 ikke få tilbake noen av de pengene. Hvis han vant, så ville han ha en bit
2103 papir som sa at han vant, og en bit papir som sa at han og hans familie var
2106 Så Jesse hadde et mafia-lignende valg: $
250 000 og en sjanse til å
2107 vinne, eller $
12 000 og et forlik.
2109 Innspillingsindustrien insisterer at dette er et spørsmål om lov og moral.
2110 La oss legge loven til side for et øyeblikk og tenke på moralen. Hvor er
2111 moralen i et søksmål som dette? Hva er dyden i å skape offerlam. RIAA er
2112 en spesielt mektig lobby. Presidenten i RIAA tjener i følge rapporter mer
2113 enn $
1 million i året. Artister, på den andre siden, får ikke godt betalt.
2114 Den gjennomsnittelige innspillingsartist tjener $
45 900.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641402" href=
"#ftn.id2641402" class=
"footnote">49</a>]
</sup> Det er utallige måter som RIAA kan bruke for å
2115 påvirke og styre politikken. Så hva er det moralske i å ta penger fra en
2116 student for å drive en søkemotor?
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641447" href=
"#ftn.id2641447" class=
"footnote">50</a>]
</sup>
2118 23. juni overførte Jesse alle sine oppsparte midler til advokaten som jobbet
2119 for RIAA. Saken mot ham ble trukket. Og med dette, ble unggutten som hadde
2120 fiklet med en datamaskin og blitt saksøkt for
15 millioner dollar en
2122 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2123 Jeg var definitivt ikke en aktivist [tidligere]. Jeg mente egentlig aldri å
2124 være en aktivist.
… [men] jeg har blitt skjøvet inn i dette. Jeg
2125 forutså over hodet ikke noe slik som dette, men jeg tror det er bare helt
2126 absurd det RIAA har gjort.
2127 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2128 Foreldrene til Jesse avslører en viss stolthet over deres motvillige
2129 aktivist. Som hans far fortalte meg, Jesse "anser seg selv for å være
2130 konservativ, og det samme gjør jeg.
… Han er ingen
2131 treklemmer.
… Jeg synes det er sært at de ville lage bråk med ham.
2132 Men han ønsker å la folk vite at de sender feil budskap. Og han ønsker å
2133 korrigere rullebladet."
2134 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641338" href=
"#id2641338" class=
"para">48</a>]
</sup>
2138 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks: Suit
2139 Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Professional Media Group
2140 LCC
</em> 6 (
2003):
5, tilgjengelig fra
2003 WL
55179443.
2141 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641402" href=
"#id2641402" class=
"para">49</a>]
</sup>
2144 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2145 (
27–2042—Musikere og Sangere). Se også National Endowment for
2146 the Arts,
<em class=
"citetitle">More Than One in a Blue Moon
</em> (
2000).
2147 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641447" href=
"#id2641447" class=
"para">50</a>]
</sup>
2150 Douglas Lichtman kommer med et relatert poeng i "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2151 <em class=
"citetitle">Wall Street Journal
</em>,
10. september
2003, A24.
2152 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"4. Kapittel fire: “Pirater”"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"pirates"></a>4. Kapittel fire:
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Pirater
</span>”</span></h2></div></div></div><p>
2153 Hvis "piratvirksomhet" betyr å bruke den kreative eiendommen til andre uten
2154 deres tillatelse
—hvis "hvis verdi, så rettighet" er sant
—da er
2155 historien om innholdsindustrien en historie om piratvirksomhet. Hver eneste
2156 viktige sektor av "store medier" i dag
—film, plager, radio og
2157 kabel-TV
—kom fra en slags piratvirksomhet etter den definisjonen. Den
2158 konsekvente fortellingen er at forrige generasjon pirater blir del av denne
2159 generasjonens borgerskap
—inntil nå.
2160 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"4.1. Film"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"film"></a>4.1. Film
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2162 Filmindustrien i Hollywood var bygget av flyktende pirater.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641548" href=
"#ftn.id2641548" class=
"footnote">51</a>]
</sup> Skapere og regisører migrerte fra østkysten til
2163 California tidlig i det tjuende århundret delvis for å slippe unna
2164 kontrollene som patenter ga oppfinneren av det å lage filmer, Thomas
2165 Edison. Disse kontrollene be utøvet gjennom et monopol-"kartell", The
2166 Motion Pictures Patents company, og var basert på Tomhas Edisons kreative
2167 eierrettigheter
—patenter. Edison stiftet MPPC for å utøve rettighetene
2168 som disse kreative eierrettighetene ga ham, og MPPC var seriøst med
2169 kontrollen de krevde.
2171 Som en kommentaror forteller en del av historien,
2172 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2173 En tidsfrist ble satt til januar
1909 for alle selskaper å komme i samsvar
2174 med lisensen. Når februar kom, protesterte de ulisensierte fredløse, som
2175 refererte til seg selv som uavhengige, mot kartellet og fortsatte sin
2176 forretningsvirksomhet uten å bøye seg for Edisons monopol. Sommeren
1909
2177 var bevegelsen med uavhenginge i full sving, med produsenter og kinoeiere
2178 som brukte ulovlig utstyr og importerte filmlager for å opprette sitt eget
2181 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2182 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement by
2183 forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company to block
2184 the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics that have
2185 become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment,
2186 discontinued product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
2187 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all U.S. film
2188 exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent William Fox who
2189 defied the Trust even after his license was revoked.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641622" href=
"#ftn.id2641622" class=
"footnote">52</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641648"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641655"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641661"></a>
2190 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2191 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like Fox. And
2192 no less than today, these independents were vigorously resisted. "Shooting
2193 was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents' resulting in loss of
2194 negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life and limb frequently
2195 occurred."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641677" href=
"#ftn.id2641677" class=
"footnote">53</a>]
</sup> That led the independents to
2196 flee the East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2197 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And
2198 the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
2201 California vokste naturligvis raskt, og effektiv håndhevelse av føderale
2202 lover spredte seg til slutt vestover. Men fordi patenter tildeler
2203 patentinnehaveren et i sannhet "begrenset" monopol (kun sytten år på den
2204 tiden), så patentene var utgått før nok føderale lovmenn dukket opp. En ny
2205 industri var født, delvis fra piratvirksomhet mot Edison's kreative
2207 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"4.2. Innspilt musikk"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"recordedmusic"></a>4.2. Innspilt musikk
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2208 Plateindustrien ble født av en annen type piratvirksomhet, dog for å forstå
2209 hvordan krever at en setter seg inn i detaljer om hvordan loven regulerer
2211 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxfourneauxhenri"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641746"></a><p>
2212 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines for
2213 reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player piano), the
2214 law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of their music and
2215 the exclusive right to control public performances of their music. In other
2216 words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
1899 hit "Happy Mose,"
2217 the law said I would have to pay for the right to get a copy of the musical
2218 score, and I would also have to pay for the right to perform it publicly.
2219 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641764"></a><p>
2220 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph or
2221 Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear enough that I
2222 would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I performed in making
2223 this recording. And it was clear enough that I would have to pay for any
2224 public performance of the work I was recording. But it wasn't totally clear
2225 that I would have to pay for a "public performance" if I recorded the song
2226 in my own house (even today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing
2227 their songs in the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in
2228 your brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2229 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own home,
2230 it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more importantly, it
2231 wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I then made copies of
2232 those recordings. Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively
2233 pirate someone else's song without paying its composer anything.
2234 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641772"></a><p>
2235 Komponistene (og utgiverne) var ikke veldig glade for denne kapasiteten til
2236 å røve. Som Senator Alfred Kittredge fra Sør-Dakota formulerte
2237 det,
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641810"></a>
2238 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2239 Forestill dere denne urettferdigheten. En komponist skriver en sang eller
2240 en opera. En utgiver kjøper til et høy sum rettighetene til denne, og
2241 registrerer opphavsretten til den. Så kommer de fonografiske selskapene og
2242 selskapene som skjærer musikk-ruller og med vitende og vilje stjeler
2243 arbeidet som kommer fra hjernet til komponisten og utgiveren uten å bry seg
2244 om [deres] rettigheter.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641837" href=
"#ftn.id2641837" class=
"footnote">54</a>]
</sup>
2245 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2246 The innovators who developed the technology to record other people's works
2247 were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and genius of American
2248 composers,"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641867" href=
"#ftn.id2641867" class=
"footnote">55</a>]
</sup> and the "music publishing
2249 industry" was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one
2250 pirate."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641878" href=
"#ftn.id2641878" class=
"footnote">56</a>]
</sup> As John Philip Sousa put it,
2251 in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money out of my pieces, I
2252 want a share of it."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641889" href=
"#ftn.id2641889" class=
"footnote">57</a>]
</sup>
2254 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too, do the
2255 arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the player piano
2256 argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the introduction of automatic
2257 music players has not deprived any composer of anything he had before their
2258 introduction." Rather, the machines increased the sales of sheet
2259 music.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641913" href=
"#ftn.id2641913" class=
"footnote">58</a>]
</sup> In any case, the innovators
2260 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2261 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2262 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company wrote, "is
2263 the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas musical, literary
2264 or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641918" href=
"#ftn.id2641918" class=
"footnote">59</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641938"></a>
2267 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2268 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>and
</em></span> the recording artist. Congress amended the law to
2269 make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of
2270 their music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete control
2271 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2272 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once the
2273 composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of copyright law
2274 that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer authorizes a recording of
2275 his song, others are free to record the same song, so long as they pay the
2276 original composer a fee set by the law.
2278 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will refer
2279 to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose key
2280 terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright Act in
2281 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of recordings so long
2282 as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set by the statute.
2284 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham writes a
2285 novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham gives the
2286 publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge whatever he wants
2287 for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is thus set by Grisham,
2288 and copyright law ordinarily says you have no permission to use Grisham's
2289 work except with permission of Grisham.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641985"></a>
2291 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And thus, in
2292 effect, the law
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>subsidizes
</em></span> the recording industry
2293 through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right
2294 than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over
2295 their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less
2296 control are the recording industry and the public. The recording industry
2297 gets something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public
2298 gets access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2299 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2300 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would stifle
2301 follow-on creativity.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641580" href=
"#ftn.id2641580" class=
"footnote">60</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642026"></a>
2303 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2304 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2305 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary relates,
2306 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2307 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory license system
2308 must be retained. They asserted that the record industry is a
2309 half-billion-dollar business of great economic importance in the United
2310 States and throughout the world; records today are the principal means of
2311 disseminating music, and this creates special problems, since performers
2312 need unhampered access to musical material on nondiscriminatory
2313 terms. Historically, the record producers pointed out, there were no
2314 recording rights before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory
2315 license as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2316 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of recorded music,
2317 with the public being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2318 choice.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642058" href=
"#ftn.id2642058" class=
"footnote">61</a>]
</sup>
2319 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2320 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their creative
2321 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2322 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"4.3. Radio"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"radio"></a>4.3. Radio
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2323 Radio kom også fra piratvirksomhet.
2325 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a "public
2326 performance" of the composer's work.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642095" href=
"#ftn.id2642095" class=
"footnote">62</a>]
</sup> As
2327 I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an
2328 exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio station thus
2329 owes the composer money for that performance.
2332 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a copy
2333 of the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>composer's
</em></span> work. The radio station is also
2334 performing a copy of the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>recording artist's
</em></span> work. It's
2335 one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's
2336 choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle
2337 Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the value of the composition
2338 performed on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent,
2339 the radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work, just
2340 as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642161"></a>
2344 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
2345 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station need
2346 only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of something for
2347 nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for free, even if it
2348 must pay the composer something for the privilege of playing the song.
2349 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxmadonna"></a><p>
2350 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music. Imagine
2351 it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize public
2352 performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your song in public,
2353 she has to get your permission.
2355 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She then
2356 decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top hit. Under
2357 our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get some money. But
2358 Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on the sale of her CDs. The
2359 public performance of her recording is not a "protected" right. The radio
2360 station thus gets to
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>pirate
</em></span> the value of Madonna's work
2361 without paying her anything.
2362 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642212"></a><p>
2363 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
2364 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
2365 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law ordinarily
2366 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the choice for
2367 him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take something for
2369 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"4.4. Kabel-TV"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"cabletv"></a>4.4. Kabel-TV
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2371 Kabel-TV kom også fra en form for piratvirksomhet.
2374 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
2375 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content that
2376 they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies started
2377 selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay for what they
2378 sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing broadcasters' content, but more
2379 egregiously than anything Napster ever did
— Napster never charged for
2380 the content it enabled others to give away.
2381 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642247"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642263"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642270"></a><p>
2382 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft. Rosel
2383 Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of "unfair and
2384 potentially destructive competition."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642281" href=
"#ftn.id2642281" class=
"footnote">63</a>]
</sup>
2385 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV,
2386 but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
2387 Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
2388 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642303" href=
"#ftn.id2642303" class=
"footnote">64</a>]
</sup> As another broadcaster put it,
2389 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2390 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the only
2391 business I know of where the product that is being sold is not paid
2392 for.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642321" href=
"#ftn.id2642321" class=
"footnote">65</a>]
</sup>
2393 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2394 Igjen, kravene til opphavsrettsinnehaverne virket rimelige nok:
2395 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2396 Alt vi ber om er en veldig enkel ting, at folk som tar vår eiendom gratis
2397 betaler for den. Vi forsøker å stoppe piratvirksomhet og jeg kan ikke tenke
2398 på et svakere ord for å beskrive det. Jeg tror det er sterkere ord som
2399 ville passe.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642348" href=
"#ftn.id2642348" class=
"footnote">66</a>]
</sup>
2400 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642360"></a><p>
2401 Disse var "gratispassasjerer", sa presidenten Charlton Heston i Screen
2402 Actor's Guild, som "tok lønna fra skuespillerne"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642372" href=
"#ftn.id2642372" class=
"footnote">67</a>]
</sup>
2404 Men igjen, det er en annen side i debatten. Som assisterende justisminister
2405 Edwin Zimmerman sa det,
2406 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2407 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any copyright
2408 protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright holders who are
2409 already compensated, who already have a monopoly, should be permitted to
2410 extend that monopoly.
… The question here is how much compensation
2411 they should have and how far back they should carry their right to
2412 compensation.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641478" href=
"#ftn.id2641478" class=
"footnote">68</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642425"></a>
2413 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2414 Opphavsrettinnehaverne tok kabelselskapene til retten. Høyesterett fant to
2415 ganger at kabelselskaper ikke skyldte opphavsrettinnehaverne noen ting.
2417 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question of
2418 whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated." In the
2419 end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it resolved the
2420 question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable companies would
2421 have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but the price they would
2422 have to pay was not set by the copyright owner. The price was set by law,
2423 so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto power over the emerging
2424 technologies of cable. Cable companies thus built their empire in part upon
2425 a "piracy" of the value created by broadcasters' content.
2427 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means using value
2428 from someone else's creative property without permission from that
2429 creator
—as it is increasingly described today
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642413" href=
"#ftn.id2642413" class=
"footnote">69</a>]
</sup> — then
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>every
</em></span> industry
2430 affected by copyright today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind
2431 of piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
2432 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
2433 last. Every generation
—until now.
2434 </p></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641548" href=
"#id2641548" class=
"para">51</a>]
</sup>
2436 Jeg er takknemlig til Peter DiMauro for å ha pekt meg i retning av denne
2437 ekstraordinære historien. Se også Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyrights
2438 and Copywrongs
</em>,
87–93, som forteller detaljer om Edisons
2439 "eventyr" med opphavsrett og patent.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641433"></a>
2440 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641622" href=
"#id2641622" class=
"para">52</a>]
</sup>
2443 J. A. Aberdeen,
<em class=
"citetitle">Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent
2444 Motion Picture Producers
</em> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and
2445 expanded texts posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture
2446 Patents Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
11</a>. For a discussion of
2447 the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits imposed by
2448 Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
2449 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright"
2450 (September
2002), University of Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in
2451 Law and Economics, Working Paper No.
159.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641677" href=
"#id2641677" class=
"para">53</a>]
</sup>
2454 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios,"
<em class=
"citetitle">The Silents
2455 Majority
</em>, arkivert på
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
12</a>.
2456 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641837" href=
"#id2641837" class=
"para">54</a>]
</sup>
2458 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on S.
6330
2459 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th Cong.
59,
1st
2460 sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of South Dakota,
2461 chairman), reprinted in
<em class=
"citetitle">Legislative History of the Copyright
2462 Act
</em>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2463 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641849"></a>
2464 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641867" href=
"#id2641867" class=
"para">55</a>]
</sup>
2467 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223 (uttalelse fra
2468 Nathan Burkan, advokat for the Music Publishers Association).
2469 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641878" href=
"#id2641878" class=
"para">56</a>]
</sup>
2472 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226 (uttalelse fra
2473 Nathan Burkan, advokat for the Music Publishers Association).
2474 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641889" href=
"#id2641889" class=
"para">57</a>]
</sup>
2477 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23 (uttalelse fra
2478 John Philip Sousa, komponist).
2479 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641913" href=
"#id2641913" class=
"para">58</a>]
</sup>
2483 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2484 (uttalelse fra Albert Walker, representant for the Auto-Music Perforating
2485 Company of New York).
2486 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641918" href=
"#id2641918" class=
"para">59</a>]
</sup>
2489 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
2490 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2491 Graphophone Company Association).
2492 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641580" href=
"#id2641580" class=
"para">60</a>]
</sup>
2496 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2497 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st sess.,
2498 217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted in
2499 <em class=
"citetitle">Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</em>,
2500 E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman
2502 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642058" href=
"#id2642058" class=
"para">61</a>]
</sup>
2505 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee on
2506 the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8 March
2507 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to this report.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642095" href=
"#id2642095" class=
"para">62</a>]
</sup>
2509 See
17 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>, sections
106 and
110. At
2510 the beginning, record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast"
2511 and other messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
2512 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning
2513 attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See
2514 <em class=
"citetitle">RCA Manufacturing
2515 Co
</em>. v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Whiteman
</em>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
2516 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag:
2517 Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright,"
2518 <em class=
"citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review
</em> 70 (
2003):
281.
2519 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642120"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642128"></a>
2520 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642281" href=
"#id2642281" class=
"para">63</a>]
</sup>
2522 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
2523 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
2524 on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966) (statement of Rosel
2525 H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642254"></a>
2526 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642303" href=
"#id2642303" class=
"para">64</a>]
</sup>
2529 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
2530 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
2531 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642321" href=
"#id2642321" class=
"para">65</a>]
</sup>
2534 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
2535 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
2536 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642348" href=
"#id2642348" class=
"para">66</a>]
</sup>
2539 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B. Krim,
2540 president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of United
2541 Artists Television, Inc.).
2542 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642372" href=
"#id2642372" class=
"para">67</a>]
</sup>
2544 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (vitnemål fra Charlton Heston,
2545 president i Screen Actors Guild).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642354"></a>
2546 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641478" href=
"#id2641478" class=
"para">68</a>]
</sup>
2548 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (uttalelse fra Edwin M. Zimmerman,
2549 fungerende assisterende justisministeren).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642376"></a>
2550 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642413" href=
"#id2642413" class=
"para">69</a>]
</sup>
2553 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<em class=
"citetitle">The
2554 Engine of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
2555 Information
</em>, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
13</a>. "The threat of
2556 piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without permission or
2557 compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
2558 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"5. Kapittel fem: “Piratvirksomhet”"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"piracy"></a>5. Kapittel fem:
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Piratvirksomhet
</span>”</span></h2></div></div></div><p>
2559 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in
2560 many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized
2561 taking of other people's content within a commercial context. Despite the
2562 many justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
2563 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
2566 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking" that is
2567 more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems wrong to
2568 many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this taking
2569 "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more. For the harm
2570 of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than outright copying, and
2571 the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has so often done in the
2574 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"5.1. Piracy I"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"piracy-i"></a>5.1. Piracy I
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2575 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there are
2576 businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted content,
2577 copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
2578 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
2579 every year to physical piracy
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642404" href=
"#ftn.id2642404" class=
"footnote">70</a>]
</sup> (that
2580 works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it
2581 loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
2583 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this book, nor
2584 in the argument that most people make when talking about the subject of this
2585 book, should draw into doubt this simple point: This piracy is wrong.
2587 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made for
2588 it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one hundred
2589 years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign copyrights. We
2590 were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might therefore seem
2591 hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other developing nations
2592 treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our existence,
2595 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban the
2596 taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
2597 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works without the
2598 permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule. The copy shops
2599 in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law does protect
2600 foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops violate that law. So
2601 the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a moral wrong, but a
2602 legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal wrong, but a locally
2603 legal wrong as well.
2605 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
2606 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
2608 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a pirate
2609 nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar childhood.
2611 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are its
2612 laws regardless of their source. The international law under which these
2613 nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden of
2614 intellectual property law.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642620" href=
"#ftn.id2642620" class=
"footnote">71</a>]
</sup> In my view,
2615 more developing nations should take advantage of that opportunity, but when
2616 they don't, then their laws should be respected. And under the laws of these
2617 nations, this piracy is wrong.
2619 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in any
2620 case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access to
2621 American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have bought those
2622 American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any less money than they
2623 otherwise would have had.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642671" href=
"#ftn.id2642671" class=
"footnote">72</a>]
</sup>
2625 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many thousands
2626 of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay for the content they
2627 have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree the harm caused by such
2628 taking. Extremists in this debate love to say, "You wouldn't go into Barnes
2629 & Noble and take a book off of the shelf without paying; why should it
2630 be any different with on-line music?" The difference is, of course, that
2631 when you take a book from Barnes
& Noble, it has one less book to
2632 sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3 from a computer network, there is
2633 not one less CD that can be sold. The physics of piracy of the intangible
2634 are different from the physics of piracy of the tangible.
2637 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a property
2638 right of a very special sort, it
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>is
</em></span> a property
2639 right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to
2640 decide the terms under which content is shared. If the copyright owner
2641 doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important
2642 statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish
2643 of the copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
2644 copyrighted content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
2645 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is wrong to
2646 take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have a property
2647 system, and that system is properly balanced to the technology of a time,
2648 then it is wrong to take property without the permission of a property
2649 owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
2651 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
2652 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal" Windows,
2653 that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft loses the value of
2654 the software that was taken. But it gains users who are used to life in the
2655 Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation grows more wealthy, more and more
2656 people will buy software rather than steal it. And hence over time, because
2657 that buying will benefit Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If
2658 instead of pirating Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux
2659 operating system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
2660 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642766"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642773"></a>
2661 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642779"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642791"></a>
2663 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
2664 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law students,
2665 for example, are given free access to the two largest legal databases. The
2666 companies marketing both hope the students will become so used to their
2667 service that they will want to use it and not the other when they become
2668 lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
2670 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the alcoholic
2671 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will make it
2672 more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we ordinarily allow
2673 businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give their product
2674 away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can
2675 give its product away, as it did, for example, with Internet Explorer to
2676 fight Netscape. A property right means giving the property owner the right
2677 to say who gets access to what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law
2678 properly balances the rights of the copyright owner with the rights of
2679 access, then violating the law is still wrong.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642541"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642822"></a>
2680 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642843"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642849"></a>
2684 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy, and I
2685 certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts at
2686 justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy is
2687 rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it steals; it
2688 doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives someone access
2689 to something that the law says he should not have. Nothing has changed to
2690 draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy is flat out wrong.
2692 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
2693 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or at
2694 least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the way it is
2695 increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful and productive,
2696 to produce either new content or new ways of doing business. Neither our
2697 tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all "piracy" in that sense of
2700 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest piracy
2701 concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we need to
2702 understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before we condemn it
2703 to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
2705 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
2706 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
2707 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable TV, no
2708 one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
2710 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They should push
2711 us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this sharing to survive.
2712 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"5.2. Piracy II"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"piracy-ii"></a>5.2. Piracy II
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2714 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s] the
2715 author of [his] profit."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642917" href=
"#ftn.id2642917" class=
"footnote">73</a>]
</sup> This means we
2716 must determine whether and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how
2717 strongly the law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to
2718 assure the author of his profit.
2720 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of the
2721 Napster technology had not made any major technological innovations. Like
2722 every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and, arguably, off the
2723 Internet as well
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642941" href=
"#ftn.id2642941" class=
"footnote">74</a>]
</sup>), Shawn Fanning and
2724 crew had simply put together components that had been developed
2725 independently.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642970"></a>
2727 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999, Napster
2728 amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After eighteen months,
2729 there were close to
80 million registered users of the system.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642983" href=
"#ftn.id2642983" class=
"footnote">75</a>]
</sup> Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other
2730 services emerged to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p
2731 service. It boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are
2732 different architecturally, though not very different in function: Each
2733 enables users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
2734 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
2735 or your
20,
000 best friends.
2737 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans have
2738 tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in September
2002
2739 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded music
—28 percent of
2740 Americans older than
12.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643019" href=
"#ftn.id2643019" class=
"footnote">76</a>]
</sup> A survey by
2741 the NPD group quoted in
<em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em> estimated
2742 that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in
2743 May
2003.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643046" href=
"#ftn.id2643046" class=
"footnote">77</a>]
</sup> The vast majority of these
2744 are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive quantity of content is
2745 being "taken" on these networks. The ease and inexpensiveness of
2746 file-sharing networks have inspired millions to enjoy music in a way that
2749 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
2750 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright infringement,
2751 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more complicated than one
2752 might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully than the polarized
2753 voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of sharing that file
2754 sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
2758 Fildelerne deler ulike typer innhold. Vi kan dele disse ulike typene inn i
2760 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"A"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
2762 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
2763 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying the CD,
2764 these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether everyone who
2765 takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't make it available
2766 for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who
2767 would. The latter are the target of category A: users who download instead
2768 of purchasing.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2643108"></a>
2769 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
2772 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before purchasing
2773 it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist he's not heard
2774 of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This is a kind of
2775 targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the friend recommending
2776 the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation, then one could expect
2777 that the recommendations will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
2778 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
2779 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
2782 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted content
2783 that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased because the
2784 transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of sharing networks is
2785 among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were part of your childhood
2786 but have long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on the
2787 network. (One friend told me that when she discovered Napster, she spent a
2788 solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She was astonished at the range and mix
2789 of content that was available.) For content not sold, this is still
2790 technically a violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is
2791 not selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
2792 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to a
2794 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
2799 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to content
2800 that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner wants to give away.
2801 </p></li></ol></div><p>
2802 Hvordan balanserer disse ulike delingstypene?
2804 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the perspective of
2805 the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the perspective of
2806 economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643176" href=
"#ftn.id2643176" class=
"footnote">78</a>]
</sup> Type B sharing is illegal but plainly
2807 beneficial. Type C sharing is illegal, yet good for society (since more
2808 exposure to music is good) and harmless to the artist (since the work is
2809 not otherwise available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard
2810 question to answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
2811 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
2813 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how harmful
2814 type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood, composers
2815 complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained about radio, and
2816 broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music industry complains that
2817 type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is "devastating" the industry.
2819 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how harmful is harder
2820 to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's practice to blame
2821 technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette recording is a
2822 good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young put it, "Rather
2823 than exploiting this new, popular technology, the labels fought
2824 it."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643220" href=
"#ftn.id2643220" class=
"footnote">79</a>]
</sup> The labels claimed that every
2825 album taped was an album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent
2826 in
1981, the industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
2827 problem, and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
2829 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity to enact
2830 regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record turnaround. "In
2831 the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis'
… was not the fault of
2832 the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into being]
—but had
2833 to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical innovation at the
2834 major labels."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2642681" href=
"#ftn.id2642681" class=
"footnote">80</a>]
</sup>
2836 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is wrong
2837 today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to the industry
2838 in particular, and society in general
—or at least the society that
2839 inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record industry,
2840 the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR
—the question is not simply
2841 whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also
2842 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>how
</em></span> harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the
2843 other types of sharing are.
2845 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
2846 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause. The
2847 "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type A sharing
2848 exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records through sampling
2849 than they lost through substitution, then sharing networks would actually
2850 benefit music companies on balance. They would therefore have little
2851 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>static
</em></span> reason to resist them.
2854 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because of file
2855 sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales actually suggest
2858 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent, from
882
2859 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643324" href=
"#ftn.id2643324" class=
"footnote">81</a>]
</sup> This confirms a trend over the past few years. The
2860 RIAA blames Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other
2861 causes that could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a
2862 more than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
2863 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
2864 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average price
2865 of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643367" href=
"#ftn.id2643367" class=
"footnote">82</a>]
</sup> Competition from other forms of media could also
2866 account for some of the decline. As Jane Black of
2867 <em class=
"citetitle">BusinessWeek
</em> notes, "The soundtrack to the film
2868 <em class=
"citetitle">High Fidelity
</em> has a list price of $
18.98. You could
2869 get the whole movie [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643400" href=
"#ftn.id2643400" class=
"footnote">83</a>]
</sup>
2874 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales is
2875 because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period that the
2876 RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA estimates that
2.1
2877 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus, although
2.6 times the total
2878 number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7
2881 There are too many different things happening at the same time to explain
2882 these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable: The recording
2883 industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between downloading a song
2884 and stealing a CD?"
—but their own numbers reveal the difference. If I
2885 steal a CD, then there is one less CD to sell. Every taking is a lost
2886 sale. But on the basis of the numbers the RIAA provides, it is absolutely
2887 clear that the same is not true of downloads. If every download were a lost
2888 sale
—if every use of Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his]
2889 profit"
—then the industry would have suffered a
100 percent drop in
2890 sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold
2891 were downloaded for free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent,
2892 then there is a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a
2895 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's assume,
2896 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the recording
2897 industry. What value does it produce in addition to these costs?
2899 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
2900 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially available.
2901 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of tracks that
2902 are no longer commercially available.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643424" href=
"#ftn.id2643424" class=
"footnote">84</a>]
</sup>
2903 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
2904 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
2905 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
2906 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic sense
2907 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>to the company
</em></span> to make it available.
2909 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
2910 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are thousands
2911 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643481" href=
"#ftn.id2643481" class=
"footnote">85</a>]
</sup> These stores buy content from owners, then sell the
2912 content they buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell
2913 this content,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>even if the content is still under
2914 copyright
</em></span>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used book and
2915 record stores are commercial entities; their owners make money from the
2916 content they sell; but as with cable companies before statutory licensing,
2917 they don't have to pay the copyright owner for the content they sell.
2918 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2643528"></a><p>
2919 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used record
2920 stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the content
2921 available isn't making money from making the content available. It is also
2922 different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a record, I don't
2923 have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone shares my
1949 recording
2924 of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have it. That difference would
2925 matter economically if the owner of the copyright were selling the record in
2926 competition to my sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that
2927 is not currently commercially available. The Internet is making it
2928 available, through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
2930 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
2931 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may well
2932 be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
2933 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
2934 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be shut as
2938 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable type D
2939 sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners want to
2940 have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This sharing
2941 clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author Cory Doctorow,
2942 for example, released his first novel,
<em class=
"citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
2943 Kingdom
</em>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
2944 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
2945 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read part
2946 on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If they liked
2947 it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is type D
2948 content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then both he and
2949 society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a great book!)
2951 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society with
2952 no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem of type A
2953 sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we lose something
2954 important in order to protect type A content.
2956 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry understandably
2957 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How much has society
2958 gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies? What is the content that
2959 otherwise would be unavailable?"
2961 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter, much
2962 of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good. And
2963 like the piracy I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#pirates" title=
"4. Kapittel fire: “Pirater”">4</a>, much of this piracy is motivated by a new way of
2964 spreading content caused by changes in the technology of distribution. Thus,
2965 consistent with the tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording
2966 industry, and cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing
2967 is how best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
2968 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
2969 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be found
2972 Men er ikke krigen bare en krig mot ulovlig deling? Er ikke angrepsmålet
2973 bare det du kaller type A-deling?
2975 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The effect of
2976 the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far beyond that
2977 one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the Napster case
2978 itself. When Napster told the district court that it had developed a
2979 technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified infringing
2980 material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4 percent was not
2981 good enough. Napster had to push the infringements "down to
2982 zero."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643637" href=
"#ftn.id2643637" class=
"footnote">86</a>]
</sup>
2984 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
2985 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to assure
2986 that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance with the
2987 law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of VCRs or
100
2988 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns are used in compliance
2989 with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p. The court's ruling means that
2990 we as a society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally legal
2991 and beneficial uses they serve, simply to assure that there are zero
2992 copyright infringements caused by p2p.
2994 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the content
2995 industry that we know today. The history of American law has been a process
2996 of balance. As new technologies changed the way content was distributed, the
2997 law adjusted, after some time, to the new technology. In this adjustment,
2998 the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting
2999 innovation. Sometimes this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes
3002 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the interests
3003 of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers against the
3004 interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to composers, but
3005 also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but at a price set
3006 by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the recordings made by
3007 these recording artists, and they complained to Congress that their
3008 "creative property" was not being respected (since the radio station did not
3009 have to pay them for the creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their
3010 claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
3012 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts rejected the
3013 claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content they rebroadcast,
3014 Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to compensation, but at a
3015 level set by the law. It likewise gave cable companies the right to the
3016 content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
3021 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player pianos,
3022 served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of any
3023 copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators would have
3024 the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content. Second, the law assured
3025 that copyright holders would be paid for the content that was
3026 distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply required cable TV to pay
3027 copyright holders whatever they demanded for their content, then copyright
3028 holders associated with broadcasters would use their power to stifle this
3029 new technology, cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use
3030 broadcasters' content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized
3031 cable. Thus Congress chose a path that would assure
3032 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>compensation
</em></span> without giving the past (broadcasters)
3033 control over the future (cable).
3034 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2643734"></a><p>
3035 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major producers and
3036 distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another technology, the
3037 video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today, VCRs) that Sony had
3038 produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's claim against Sony was
3039 relatively simple: Sony produced a device, Disney and Universal claimed,
3040 that enabled consumers to engage in copyright infringement. Because the
3041 device that Sony built had a "record" button, the device could be used to
3042 record copyrighted movies and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the
3043 copyright infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3044 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3047 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did decide to
3048 design its machine to make it very simple to record television shows. It
3049 could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct copying from a
3050 television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the machine to copy
3051 only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the line. It was clear that
3052 there were many television shows that did not grant anyone permission to
3053 copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no doubt the majority of shows would not
3054 have authorized copying. And in the face of this obvious preference, Sony
3055 could have designed its system to minimize the opportunity for copyright
3056 infringement. It did not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold
3057 it responsible for the architecture it chose.
3059 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal champion. Valenti
3060 called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
20,
30,
40 million of
3061 these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by millions of `tapeworms,'
3062 eating away at the very heart and essence of the most precious asset the
3063 copyright owner has, his copyright."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643782" href=
"#ftn.id2643782" class=
"footnote">87</a>]
</sup>
3064 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and creative
3065 judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation on the
3066 after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of tapings that
3067 will adversely impact on the future of the creative community in this
3068 country. It is simply a question of basic economics and plain common
3069 sense."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643799" href=
"#ftn.id2643799" class=
"footnote">88</a>]
</sup> Indeed, as surveys would later
3070 show, percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or
3071 more
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643808" href=
"#ftn.id2643808" class=
"footnote">89</a>]
</sup> — a use the Court would
3072 later hold was not "fair." By "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the
3073 means of an exemption from copyright infringementwithout creating a
3074 mechanism to compensate copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would
3075 "take from the owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive
3076 right to control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and
3077 thereby profit from its reproduction."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643716" href=
"#ftn.id2643716" class=
"footnote">90</a>]
</sup>
3079 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme Court. In
3080 the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Hollywood in
3081 its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski, who sits on that court,
3082 refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held that Sony would be liable
3083 for the copyright infringement made possible by its machines. Under the
3084 Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack
3085 Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry"
3086 (worse yet, it was a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Japanese
</em></span> Boston Strangler of the
3087 American film industry)
—was an illegal technology.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643842" href=
"#ftn.id2643842" class=
"footnote">91</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2643868"></a>
3090 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. And in
3091 its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of when and
3092 whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the Court wrote,
3093 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
3094 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
3095 Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
3096 copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the
3097 institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
3098 competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
3099 technology.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643894" href=
"#ftn.id2643894" class=
"footnote">92</a>]
</sup>
3100 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3101 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as with
3102 the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress ignored the
3103 request. Congress was convinced that American film got enough, this "taking"
3104 notwithstanding. If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
3105 </p><div class=
"informaltable"><a name=
"t1"></a><table border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char">Tilfelle
</th><th align=
"char">Hvems verdi ble "røvet"
</th><th align=
"char">Responsen til domstolene
</th><th align=
"char">Responsen til Kongressen
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Innspillinger
</td><td align=
"char">Komponister
</td><td align=
"char">Ingen beskyttelse
</td><td align=
"char">Statutory license
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Radio
</td><td align=
"char">Innspillingsartister
</td><td align=
"char">N/A
</td><td align=
"char">Ingenting
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Kabel-TV
</td><td align=
"char">Kringkastere
</td><td align=
"char">Ingen beskyttelse
</td><td align=
"char">Statutory license
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">VCR
</td><td align=
"char">Filmskapere
</td><td align=
"char">Ingen beskyttelse
</td><td align=
"char">Ingenting
</td></tr></tbody></table></div><p>
3106 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the way
3107 content was distributed.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644021" href=
"#ftn.id2644021" class=
"footnote">93</a>]
</sup> In each case,
3108 throughout our history, that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on
3109 someone else's work.
3112 In
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>none
</em></span> of these cases did either the courts or
3113 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>none
</em></span> of these
3114 cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should assure that the
3115 copyright holder get all the value that his copyright created. In every
3116 case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy." In every case, Congress
3117 acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in the behavior of the "pirates."
3118 In each case, Congress allowed some new technology to benefit from content
3119 made before. It balanced the interests at stake.
3122 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that make up
3123 the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes sense. Was Walt
3124 Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators had to ask
3125 permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and spread images as
3126 a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better regulated? Is it
3127 really right that building a search engine should expose you to $
15 million
3128 in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had controlled film? Should
3129 every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get permission to record a song?
3131 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition has
3132 answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated, copyright
3133 "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible
3134 uses of his work."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644108" href=
"#ftn.id2644108" class=
"footnote">94</a>]
</sup> Instead, the
3135 particular uses that the law regulates have been defined by balancing the
3136 good that comes from granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an
3137 exclusive right creates. And this balancing has historically been done
3138 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>after
</em></span> a technology has matured, or settled into the mix
3139 of technologies that facilitate the distribution of content.
3141 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the Internet is
3142 changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet (wires
3143 vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network should not
3144 become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should the law become
3145 a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists (or more accurately,
3146 distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail in the last chapter of
3147 this book, we should be securing income to artists while we allow the market
3148 to secure the most efficient way to promote and distribute content. This
3149 will require changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes
3150 should be designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
3151 public interest that innovation continue.
3155 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly superior mode
3156 of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies can be ideally
3157 efficient in moving content across a widely diverse network. Left to
3158 develop, they could make the network vastly more efficient. Yet these
3159 "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
<em class=
"citetitle">The New
3160 York Times
</em>, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644160" href=
"#ftn.id2644160" class=
"footnote">95</a>]
</sup> Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the
3161 copyright warriors raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about
3162 balance and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our
3163 content," the warriors insist, "is our
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>property
</em></span>. Why
3164 should we wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have
3165 to wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
3166 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask
3167 whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
3169 "Det er
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>vår eiendom
</em></span>," insisterer krigerne. "og den bør
3170 være beskyttet på samme måte som all annen eiendom er beskyttet."
3171 </p></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642404" href=
"#id2642404" class=
"para">70</a>]
</sup>
3174 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
3175 <em class=
"citetitle">The Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</em>,
3176 July
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
3177 #
14</a>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3178 <em class=
"citetitle">Financial Times
</em>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3179 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642620" href=
"#id2642620" class=
"para">71</a>]
</sup>
3181 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3182 <em class=
"citetitle">Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</em> (New York: The New
3183 Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
3184 Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create
3185 administrative and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights,
3186 a costly proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights
3187 may lead to higher prices for staple industries such as agriculture. Critics
3188 of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens imposed upon developing
3189 countries and benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does
3190 permit governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3191 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may be
3192 able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3193 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS
3194 framework.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641920"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642651"></a>
3195 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642671" href=
"#id2642671" class=
"para">72</a>]
</sup>
3197 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3198 Liebowitz,
<em class=
"citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy
</em> (New York:
3199 Amacom,
2002),
144–90. "In some instances
… the impact of
3200 piracy on the copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the
3201 work will be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the
3202 individual engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3203 pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642629"></a>
3204 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642917" href=
"#id2642917" class=
"para">73</a>]
</sup>
3207 <em class=
"citetitle">Bach
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Longman
</em>,
98
3208 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3209 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642941" href=
"#id2642941" class=
"para">74</a>]
</sup>
3211 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
3212 Revolutionary National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do
3213 Business
</em> (New York: HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen
3214 examines why companies that give rise to and dominate a product area are
3215 frequently unable to come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses
3216 for their own products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3217 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3218 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<em class=
"citetitle">Future
</em>,
3219 89–92,
139.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642680"></a>
3220 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642983" href=
"#id2642983" class=
"para">75</a>]
</sup>
3223 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3224 <em class=
"citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle
</em>,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock
3225 'n' Roll Suicide,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New Scientist
</em>,
6 July
2002,
42;
3226 Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO, Secures New Financing,"
3227 <em class=
"citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle
</em>,
23 May
2003, C1; "Napster's
3228 Wake-Up Call,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Economist
</em>,
24 June
2000,
23; John
3229 Naughton, "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
3230 <em class=
"citetitle">Times
</em>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3231 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643019" href=
"#id2643019" class=
"para">76</a>]
</sup>
3235 See Ipsos-Insight,
<em class=
"citetitle">TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music
3236 Distribution
</em> (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of
3237 Americans aged twelve and older have downloaded music off of the Internet
3238 and
30 percent have listened to digital music files stored on their
3240 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643046" href=
"#id2643046" class=
"para">77</a>]
</sup>
3243 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New
3244 York Times
</em>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3245 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643176" href=
"#id2643176" class=
"para">78</a>]
</sup>
3247 Se Liebowitz,
<em class=
"citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy
</em>,
3248 148–49.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2642959"></a>
3249 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643220" href=
"#id2643220" class=
"para">79</a>]
</sup>
3252 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<em class=
"citetitle">Technology Evolution and the
3253 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</em> (
2003),
3. This report
3254 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding practice of
3255 cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a
3256 cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping is killing music." At the
3257 time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical Assessment
3258 conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers
3259 older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office
3260 of Technology Assessment,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying: Technology
3261 Challenges the Law
</em>, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3262 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2642681" href=
"#id2642681" class=
"para">80</a>]
</sup>
3265 U.S. Congress,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying
</em>,
4.
3266 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643324" href=
"#id2643324" class=
"para">81</a>]
</sup>
3269 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<em class=
"citetitle">2002 Yearend
3270 Statistics
</em>, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
15</a>. A later report
3271 indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry Association of
3272 America,
<em class=
"citetitle">Some Facts About Music Piracy
</em>,
25 June
2003,
3273 available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
16</a>:
3274 "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music have fallen by
26
3275 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million units in
2002 in the
3276 United States (based on units shipped). In terms of sales, revenues are
3277 down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6 billion last year (based on
3278 U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music industry worldwide has gone from
3279 a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based
3280 on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3281 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643367" href=
"#id2643367" class=
"para">82</a>]
</sup>
3282 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13. februar
3283 2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
3284 #
17</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2643381"></a>
3285 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643400" href=
"#id2643400" class=
"para">83</a>]
</sup>
3289 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643424" href=
"#id2643424" class=
"para">84</a>]
</sup>
3292 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3293 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3294 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
3295 the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared statement of
3296 the Future of Music Coalition), available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
18</a>.
3297 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643481" href=
"#id2643481" class=
"para">85</a>]
</sup>
3300 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3301 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3302 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<em class=
"citetitle">The
3303 Quiet Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</em> (
2002),
3304 available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
3305 #
19</a>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3306 National Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3307 Results," available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
3309 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643637" href=
"#id2643637" class=
"para">86</a>]
</sup>
3312 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
35
3313 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183 MHP, available at
3314 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
21</a>. For an account
3315 of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
<em class=
"citetitle">All
3316 the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</em> (New
3317 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3318 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643782" href=
"#id2643782" class=
"para">87</a>]
</sup>
3321 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on S.
1758
3322 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st and
2nd sess.,
3323 459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion Picture Association
3325 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643799" href=
"#id2643799" class=
"para">88</a>]
</sup>
3328 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
3329 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643808" href=
"#id2643808" class=
"para">89</a>]
</sup>
3332 <em class=
"citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc
</em>. v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Sony
3333 Corp. of America
</em>,
480 F. Supp.
429, (C.D. Cal.,
1979).
3334 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643716" href=
"#id2643716" class=
"para">90</a>]
</sup>
3337 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony of Jack
3339 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643842" href=
"#id2643842" class=
"para">91</a>]
</sup>
3342 <em class=
"citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc
</em>. mot
<em class=
"citetitle">Sony
3343 Corp. of America
</em>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
1981).
3344 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643894" href=
"#id2643894" class=
"para">92</a>]
</sup>
3347 <em class=
"citetitle">Sony Corp. of America
</em> mot
<em class=
"citetitle">Universal City
3348 Studios, Inc
</em>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
3349 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644021" href=
"#id2644021" class=
"para">93</a>]
</sup>
3351 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
3352 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example, was
3353 regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy Congress
3354 imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and controlling the
3355 technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
1992 (Title
17 of the
3356 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
3357 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
3358 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
3359 Lessig,
<em class=
"citetitle">Future
</em>,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to
3360 the Broadcast Flag,"
<em class=
"citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review
</em>
3361 70 (
2003):
293–96.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2643659"></a>
3362 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644108" href=
"#id2644108" class=
"para">94</a>]
</sup>
3365 <em class=
"citetitle">Sony Corp. of America
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Universal City
3366 Studios, Inc
</em>.,
464 U.S.
417, (
1984).
3367 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644160" href=
"#id2644160" class=
"para">95</a>]
</sup>
3370 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software Echoes Past
3371 Efforts,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
22 September
2003, C3.
3372 </p></div></div></div></div><div class=
"part" title=
"Part II. “Eiendom”"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-property"></a>Part II.
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Eiendom
</span>”</span></h1></div></div></div><div class=
"partintro" title=
"“Eiendom”"><div></div><p>
3376 Opphavsretts-krigerne har rett: Opphavsretten er en type eiendom. Den kan
3377 eies og selges, og loven beskytter mot at den blir stjålet. Vanligvis, kan
3378 opphavsrettseieren be om hvilken som helst pris som han ønsker. Markeder
3379 bestemmer tilbud og etterspørsel som i hvert tilfelle bestemmer prisen hun
3382 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a bit
3383 misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
3384 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
3385 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you put in
3386 your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I take it,
3387 you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
3388 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>idea
</em></span> you had to put a picnic table in the
3389 backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a table, and putting
3390 it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking then?
3392 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus ideas,
3393 though that's an important difference. The point instead is that in the
3394 ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a narrow
3395 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't take
3396 anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I might seem
3397 weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
3398 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true when I
3399 copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea from me,
3400 receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
3401 taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644242" href=
"#ftn.id2644242" class=
"footnote">96</a>]
</sup>
3403 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the reach of the
3404 law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that I won't discuss
3405 here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or expression without my
3406 permission: The law turns the intangible into property.
3408 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in other
3409 words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of turning the
3410 intangible into property emerged, we need to place this "property" in its
3411 proper context.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644288" href=
"#ftn.id2644288" class=
"footnote">97</a>]
</sup>
3413 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the preceding
3414 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright material is
3415 property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are its limits? How
3416 does it function in practice? After these stories, the significance of this
3417 true statement
—"copyright material is property"
— will be a bit
3418 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different from
3419 the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
3420 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644242" href=
"#id2644242" class=
"para">96</a>]
</sup>
3423 Brev fra Thomas Jefferson til Isaac McPherson (
13. august
1813) i
3424 <em class=
"citetitle">The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</em>, vol.
6 (Andrew
3425 A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
3426 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644288" href=
"#id2644288" class=
"para">97</a>]
</sup>
3429 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
3430 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
3431 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach
3432 to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to
3433 which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What
3434 Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Arizona Law
3435 Review
</em> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
3436 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"6. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"founders"></a>6. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2644335"></a><p>
3437 William Shakespeare skrev
<em class=
"citetitle">Romeo og Julie
</em> i
3438 1595. Skuespillet ble først utgitt i
1597. Det var det ellevte store
3439 skuespillet Shakespeare hadde skrevet. Han fortsatte å skrive skuespill helt
3440 til
1613, og stykkene han skrevhar fortsatt å definere angloamerikansk
3441 kultur siden. Så dypt har verkene av en
1500-talls forfatter sunket inn i
3442 vår kultur at vi ofte ikke engang kjenner kilden. Jeg overhørte en gang noen
3443 som kommentere Kenneth Branaghs utgave av Henry V: "Jeg likte det, men
3444 Shakespeare er så full av klisjeer."
3447 I
1774, nesten
180 år etter at
<em class=
"citetitle">Romeo og Julie
</em> ble
3448 skrevet, mente mange at "opphavsretten" kun tilhørte én eneste utgiver i
3449 London, John Tonson.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644371" href=
"#ftn.id2644371" class=
"footnote">98</a>]
</sup> Tonson var den
3450 mest fremstående av en liten gruppe utgivere kalt "the Conger"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644401" href=
"#ftn.id2644401" class=
"footnote">99</a>]
</sup>, som kontrollerte boksalget i England gjennom hele
3451 1700-tallet. The Conger hevdet at de hadde en evigvarende rett over "kopier"
3452 av bøker de hadde fått av forfatterne. Denne evigvarende retten innebar at
3453 ingen andre kunne publisere kopier av disse bøkene. Slik ble prisen på
3454 klassiske bøker holdt oppe; alle konkurrenter som lagde bedre eller
3455 billigere utgaver, ble fjernet.
3457 Men altså, det er noe spennende med året
1774 for alle som vet litt om
3458 opphavsretts-lovgivning. Det mest kjente året for opphavsrett er
1710, da
3459 det britiske parlamentet vedtok den første loven. Denne loven er kjent som
3460 "Statute of Anne" og sa at alle publiserte verk skulle være beskyttet i
3461 fjorten år, en periode som kunne fornyes én gang dersom forfatteren ennå
3462 levde, og at alle verk publisert i eller før
1710 skulle ha en ekstraperiode
3463 på
22 tillegsår.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644439" href=
"#ftn.id2644439" class=
"footnote">100</a>]
</sup> På grunn av denne
3464 loven, så skulle
<em class=
"citetitle">Rome og Julie
</em> ha falt i det fri i
3465 1731. Hvordan kunne da Tonson fortsatt ha kontroll over verket i
1774?
3467 Årsaken var ganske enkelt at engelskmennene ennå ikke hadde bestemt hva
3468 opphavsrett innebar -- faktisk hadde ingen i verden det. På den tiden da
3469 engelskmennene vedtok "Statute of Anne", var det ingen annen lovgivning om
3470 opphavsrett. Den siste loven som regulerte utgivere var lisensieringsloven
3471 av
1662, utløpt i
1695. At loven ga utgiverne monopol over publiseringen,
3472 noe som gjorde det enklere for kronen å kontrollere hva ble publisert. Men
3473 etter at det har utløpt, var det ingen positiv lov som sa at utgiverne hadde
3474 en eksklusiv rett til å trykke bøker.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2644479"></a>
3476 At det ikke fantes noen
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>positiv
</em></span> lov, betydde ikke at
3477 det ikke fantes noen lov. Den anglo-amerikanske juridiske tradisjon ser både
3478 til lover skapt av politikere (det lovgivende statsorgen)og til lover
3479 (prejudikater) skapt av domstolene for å bestemme hvordan folket skal
3480 leve. Vi kaller politikernes lover for positiv lov og vi kaller lovene fra
3481 dommerne sedvanerett."Common law" angir bakgrunnen for de lovgivendes
3482 lovgivning; retten til lovgiving, vanligvis kan trumfe at bakgrunnen bare
3483 hvis det går gjennom en lov til å forskyve den. Og så var det virkelige
3484 spørsmålet etter lisensiering lover hadde utløpt om felles lov beskyttet
3485 opphavsretten, uavhengig av lovverket positiv.
3488 Dette spørsmålet var viktig for utgiverne eller "bokselgere," som de ble
3489 kalt, fordi det var økende konkurranse fra utenlandske utgivere, Særlig fra
3490 Skottland hvor publiseringen og eksporten av bøker til England hadde økt
3491 veldig. Denne konkurransen reduserte fortjenesten til "The Conger", som
3492 derfor krevde at parlamentet igjen skulle vedta en lov for å gi dem
3493 eksklusiv kontroll over publisering. Dette kravet resulterte i "Statute of
3496 "Statute of Anne" ga forfatteren eller "eieren" av en bok en eksklusiv rett
3497 til å publisere denne boken. Men det var, til bokhandernes forferdelse en
3498 viktig begrensning, nemlig hvor lenge denne retten skulle vare. Etter dette
3499 gikk trykkeretten bort og verket falt i det fri og kunne trykkes av hvem som
3500 helst. Det var ihvertfall det lovgiverne hadde tenkt.
3502 Men nå det mest interessante med dette: Hvorfor ville parlamentet begrense
3503 trykkeretten? Sprøsmålet er ikke hvorfor de bestemte seg for denne perioden,
3504 men hvorfor ville de begrense retten
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>i det hele tatt?
</em></span>
3506 Bokhandlerne, og forfatterne som de representerte, hadde et veldig sterkt
3507 krav. Ta
<em class=
"citetitle">romeo og Julie
</em> som et eksempel: Skuespillet
3508 ble skrevet av Shakespeare. Det var hans kreativitet som brakte det til
3509 verden. Han krenket ikke noens rett da han skrev dette verket (det er en
3510 kontroversiell påstanden, men det er urelevant), og med sin egen rett skapte
3511 han verket, han gjorde det ikke noe vanskeligere for andre til å lage
3512 skuespill. Så hvorfor skulle loven tillate at noen annen kunne komme og ta
3513 Shakespeares verkuten hans, eller hans arvingers, tillatelse? Hvilke grunner
3514 finnes for å tillate at noen "stjeler" Shakespeares verk?
3516 Svaret er todel. Først må vi se på noe spesielt med oppfatningen av
3517 opphavsrett som fantes på tidspunktet da "Statute of Anne" ble
3518 vedtatt. Deretter må vi se på noe spesielt med bokhandlerne.
3521 Først om opphavsretten. I de siste tre hundre år har vi kommet til å bruke
3522 begrepet "copyright" i stadig videre forstand. Men i
1710 var det ikke så
3523 mye et konsept som det var en bestemt rett. Opphavsretten ble født som et
3524 svært spesifikt sett med begrensninger: den forbød andre å reprodusere en
3525 bok. I
1710 var "kopi-rett" en rett til å bruke en bestemt maskin til å
3526 replikere en bestemt arbeid. Den gikk ikke utover dette svært smale
3527 formålet. Den kontrollerte ikke mer generelt hvordan et verk kunne
3528 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>brukes
</em></span>. Idag inkluderer retten en stor samling av
3529 restriksjoner på andres frihet: den gir forfatteren eksklusiv rett til å
3530 kopiere, eksklusiv rett til å distribuere, eksklusiv rett til å fremføre, og
3533 Så selv om f. eks. opphavsretten til Shakespeares verker var evigvarende,
3534 betydde det under den opprinnelige betydningen av begrepet at ingen kunne
3535 trykke Shakespeares arbeid uten tillatelse fra Shakespeares arvinger. Den
3536 ville ikke ha kontrollert noe mer, for eksempel om hvordan verket kunne
3537 fremføres, om verket kunne oversettes eller om Kenneth Branagh ville hatt
3538 lov til å lage filmer. "Kopi-retten" var bare en eksklusiv rett til å
3539 trykke--ikke noe mindre, selvfølgelig, men heller ikke mer.
3540 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2644624"></a><p>
3541 Selv dnne begrensede retten ble møtt med skepsis av britene. De hadde hatt
3542 en lang og stygg erfaring med "eksklusive rettigheter," spesielt "enerett"
3543 gitt av kronen. Engelskmennene hadde utkjempet en borgerkrig delvis mot
3544 kronens praksis med å dele ut monopoler--spesielt monopoler for verk som
3545 allerede eksisterte. Kong Henrik VIII hadde gitt patent til å trykke Bibelen
3546 og monopol til Darcy for å lage spillkort. Det engelske parlamentet begynte
3547 å kjempe tilbake mot denne makten hos kronen. I
1656 ble "Statute of
3548 Monopolis" vedtatt for å begrense monopolene på patenter for nye
3549 oppfinnelser. Og i
1710 var parlamentet ivrig etter å håndtere det voksende
3550 monopolet på publisering.
3552 Dermed ble "kopi-retten", når den sees på som en monopolrett, en rettighet
3553 som bør være begrenset. (Uansett hvor overbevisende påstanden om at "det er
3554 min eiendom, og jeg skal ha for alltid," prøv hvor overbevisende det er når
3555 men sier "det er mitt monopol, og jeg skal ha det for alltid.") Staten ville
3556 beskytte eneretten, men bare så lenge det gavnet samfunnet. Britene så
3557 skadene særinteresserte kunne skape; de vedtok en lov for å stoppe dem.
3559 Dernest, om bokhandlerne. Det var ikke bare at kopiretten var et
3560 monopol. Det var også et monopol holdt av bokhandlerne. En bokhandler høres
3561 greie og ufarlige ut for oss, men slik var det ikke i syttenhundretallets
3562 England. Medlemmene i "the Conger" ble av en voksende mengde sett på som
3563 monopolister av verste sort - et verktøy for kronens undertrykkelse, de
3564 solgte Englands frihet mot å være garantert en monopolskinntekt. Men
3565 monopolistene ble kvast kritisert: Milton beskrev dem som "gamle
3566 patentholdere og monopolister i bokhandlerkunsten"; de var "menn som derfor
3567 ikke hadde et ærlig arbeide hvor utdanning er nødvendig."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644688" href=
"#ftn.id2644688" class=
"footnote">101</a>]
</sup>
3569 Mange trodde at den makten bokhandlerne utøvde over spredning av kunnskap,
3570 var til skade for selve spredningen, men på dette tidspunktet viste
3571 Opplysningen viktigheten av utdannelse og kunnskap for alle. idéen om at
3572 kunnskap burde være gratis er et kjennetegn for tiden, og disse kraftige
3573 kommersielle interesser forstyrret denne idéen.
3575 For å balansere denne makten, besluttet Parlamentet å øke konkurransen blant
3576 bokhandlerne, og den enkleste måten å gjøre det på, var å spre mengden av
3577 verdifulle bøker. Parlamentet begrenset derfor begrepet om opphavsrett, og
3578 garantert slik at verdifulle bøker ville bli frie for alle utgiver å
3579 publisere etter en begrenset periode. Slik ble det å gi eksisterende verk en
3580 periode på tjueen år et kompromiss for å bekjempe bokhandlernes
3581 makt. Begrensninger med dato var en indirekte måte å skape konkurranse
3582 mellom utgivere, og slik en skapelse og spredning av kultur.
3584 Når
1731 (
1710+
21) kom, ble bokhandlerne engstelige. De så konsekvensene av
3585 mer konkurranse, og som alle konkurrenter, likte de det ikke. Først
3586 ignorerte bokhandlere ganske enkelt "Statute of Anne", og fortsatte å kreve
3587 en evigvarende rett til å kontrollere publiseringen. Men i
1735 og
1737 de
3588 prøvde å tvinge Parlamentet til å utvide periodene. Tjueen år var ikke nok,
3589 sa de; de trengte mer tid.
3591 Parlamentet avslo kravene, Som en pamflett sa, i en vending som levere ennå
3593 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
3594 Jeg ser ingen grunn til å gi en utvidet perioden nå som ikke ville kunne gi
3595 utvidelser om igjen og om igjen, så fort de gamle utgår; så dersom dette
3596 lovforslaget blir vedtatt, vil effekten være: at et evig monopol blir skapt,
3597 et stort nederlag for handelen, et angrep mot kunnskapen, ingen fordel for
3598 forfatterne, men en stor avgift for folket; og alt dette kun for å øke
3599 bokhandlernes personlige rikdom.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644766" href=
"#ftn.id2644766" class=
"footnote">102</a>]
</sup>
3600 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3601 Etter å ha mislyktes i Parlamentet gikk utgiverne til rettssalen i en rekke
3602 saker. Deres argument var enkelt og direkte: "Statute of Anne" ga
3603 forfatterne en viss beskyttelse gjennom positiv loven, men denne
3604 beskyttelsenvar ikke ment som en erstatning for felles lov. Istedet var de
3605 ment å supplere felles lov. Ifølge sedvanerett var det galt å ta en annen
3606 persons kreative eiendom og bruke den uten hans tillatelse. "Statute of
3607 Anne", hevdet bokhandlere, endret ikke dette faktum. Derfor betydde ikke det
3608 at beskyttelsen gitt av "Statute of Anne" utløp, at beskyttelsen fra
3609 sedvaneretten utløp: Ifølge sedvaneretten hadde de rett til å fordømme
3610 publiseringen av en bok, selv følgelig om "Statute of Anne" sa at de var
3611 falt i det fri. Dette, mente de, var den eneste måten å beskytte
3614 Dette var et godt argument, og hadde støtte fra flere av den tidens ledende
3615 jurister. Det viste også en ekstraordinær chutzpah. Inntail da, som
3616 jusprofessor Raymond Pattetson har sagt, "var utgiverne
… like
3617 bekymret for forfatterne som en gjeter for sine lam."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2643266" href=
"#ftn.id2643266" class=
"footnote">103</a>]
</sup> Bokselgerne brydde seg ikke det spor om
3618 forfatternes rettigheter. Deres bekymring var den monopolske inntekten
3619 forfatterens verk ga.
3621 Men bokhandlernes argument ble ikke godtatt uten kamp. Helten fra denne
3622 kampen var den skotske bokselgeren Alexander Donaldson.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644855" href=
"#ftn.id2644855" class=
"footnote">104</a>]
</sup>
3624 Donaldson var en fremmed for Londons "the Conger". Han startet in karriere i
3625 Edinburgh i
1750. Hans forretningsidé var billige kopier av standardverk
3626 falt i det fri, ihvertfall fri ifølge "Statute of Anne".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644877" href=
"#ftn.id2644877" class=
"footnote">105</a>]
</sup> Donaldsons forlag vokste og ble "et sentrum for
3627 litterære skotter." "Blant dem," skriver professor Mark Rose, var "den unge
3628 James Boswell som, sammen med sin venn Andrew Erskine, publiserte en hel
3629 antologi av skotsk samtidspoesi sammen med Donaldson."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644903" href=
"#ftn.id2644903" class=
"footnote">106</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2644911"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2644917"></a>
3631 Da Londons bokselgere prøvde å få stengt Donaldsons butikk i Skottland, så
3632 flyttet han butikken til London. Her solgte han billige utgaver av "de mest
3633 populære, engelske bøker, i kamp mot sedvanerettens rett til litterær
3634 eiendom."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644935" href=
"#ftn.id2644935" class=
"footnote">107</a>]
</sup> Bøkene hans var mellom
30%
3635 og
50% billigere enn "the Conger"s, og han baserte sin rett til denne
3636 konkurransen på at bøkene, takket være "Statute of Anne", var falt i det
3639 Londons bokselgere begynte straks å slå ned mot "pirater" som
3640 Donaldson. Flere tiltak var vellykkede, den viktigste var den tidlig seieren
3641 i kampen mellom
<em class=
"citetitle">Millar
</em> og
3642 <em class=
"citetitle">Taylor
</em>.
3644 Millar var en bokhandler som i
1729 hadde kjøpt opp rettighetene til James
3645 Thomsons dikt "The Seasons". Millar hadde da full beskyttelse gjennom
3646 "Statute of Anne", men etter at denne beskyttelsen var uløpt, begynte Robert
3647 Taylor å trykke et konkurrerende bind. Millar gikk til sak, og hevdet han
3648 hadde en evig rett gjennom sedvaneretten, uansett hva "Statute of Anne"
3649 sa.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644981" href=
"#ftn.id2644981" class=
"footnote">108</a>]
</sup>
3650 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxmansfield2"></a><p>
3651 Til moderne juristers forbløffelse, var en av, ikke bare datidens, men en av
3652 de største dommere i engelsk historie, Lord Mansfield, enig med
3653 bokhandlerne. Uansett hvilken beskyttelse "Statute of Anne" gav
3654 bokhandlerne, så sa han at den ikke fortrengte noe fra
3655 sedvaneretten. Spørsmålet var hvorvidt sedvaneretten beskyttet forfatterne
3656 mot pirater. Mansfield svar var ja: Sedvaneretten nektet Taylor å
3657 reprodusere Thomsons dikt uten Millars tillatelse. Slik gav sedvaneretten
3658 bokselgerne en evig publiseringsrett til bøker solgt til dem.
3661 Ser man på det som et spørsmål innen abstrakt jus - dersom man resonnere som
3662 om rettferdighet bare var logisk deduksjon fra de første bud - kunne
3663 Mansfields konklusjon gitt mening. Men den overså det Parlamentet hadde
3664 kjempet for i
1710: Hvordan man på best mulig vis kunne innskrenke
3665 utgivernes monopolmakt. Parlamentets strategi hadde vært å kjøpe fred
3666 gjennom å tilby en beskyttelsesperiode også for eksisterende verk, men
3667 perioden måtte være så kort at kulturen ble utsatt for konkurranse innen
3668 rimelig tid. Storbritannia skulle vokse fra den kontrollerte kulturen under
3669 kronen, inn i en fri og åpen kultur.
3670 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645048"></a><p>
3671 Kampen for å forsvare "Statute of Anne"s begrensninger sluttet uansett ikke
3672 der, for nå kommer Donaldson.
3673 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645063"></a><p>
3674 Millar døde kort tid etter sin seier. Boet hans solgte rettighetene over
3675 Thomsons dikt til et syndikat av utgivere, deriblant Thomas
3676 Beckett.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2645076" href=
"#ftn.id2645076" class=
"footnote">109</a>]
</sup> Da ga Donaldson ut en
3677 uautorisert utgave av Thomsons verk. Etter avgjørelsen i
3678 <em class=
"citetitle">Millar
</em>-saken, gikk Beckett til sak mot
3679 Donaldson. Donaldson tok saken inn for Overhuset, som da fungerte som en
3680 slags høyesterett. I februar
1774 hadde dette organet muligheten til å tolke
3681 Parlamentets mening med utøpsdatoen fra seksti år før.
3683 Rettssaken
<em class=
"citetitle">Donaldson
</em> mot
3684 <em class=
"citetitle">Beckett
</em> fikk en enorm oppmerksomhet i hele
3685 Storbritannia. Donaldsons advokater mente at selv om det før fantes en del
3686 rettigheter i sedvaneretten, så var disse fortrengt av "Statute of
3687 Anne". Etter at "Statute of Anne" var blitt vedtatt, skulle den eneste
3688 lovlige beskyttelse for trykkerett kom derfra. Og derfor, mente de, i tråd
3689 med vilkårene i "Statute of Anne", falle i det fri så fort
3690 beskyttelsesperioden var over.
3692 Overhuset var en merkelig institusjon. Juridiske spørsmål ble presentert for
3693 huset, og ble først stemt over av "juslorder", medlemmer av enspesiell
3694 rettslig gruppe som fungerte nesten slik som justiariusene i vår
3695 Høyesterett. Deretter, etter at "juslordene" hadde stemt, stemte resten av
3699 Rapportene om juslordene stemmer er uenige. På enkelte punkter ser det ut
3700 som om evigvarende beskyttelse fikk flertall. Men det er ingen tvil om
3701 hvordan resten av Overhuset stemte. Med en majoritet på to mot en (
22 mot
3702 11) stemte de ned forslaget om en evig beskyttelse. Uansett hvordan man
3703 hadde tolket sedvaneretten, var nå kopiretten begrenset til en periode, og
3704 etter denne ville verket falle i det fri.
3706 "Å falle i det fri". Før rettssaken
<em class=
"citetitle">Donaldson
</em> mot
3707 <em class=
"citetitle">Beckett
</em> var det ingen klar oppfatning om hva å falle
3708 i det fri innebar. Før
1774 var det jo en allmenn oppfatning om at
3709 kopiretten var evigvarende. Men etter
1774 ble Public Domain født.For første
3710 gang i angloamerikansk historie var den lovlige beskyttelsen av et verk
3711 utgått, og de største verk i engelsk historie - inkludert Shakespeare,
3712 Bacon, Milton, Johnson og Bunyan - var frie.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645173"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645179"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645185"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645191"></a>
3713 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645198"></a>
3715 Vi kan knapt forestille oss det, men denne avgjørelsen fra Overhuset fyrte
3716 opp under en svært populær og politisk reaksjon. I Skottland, hvor de fleste
3717 piratugiverne hadde holdt til, ble avgjørelsen feiret i gatene. Som
3718 <em class=
"citetitle">Edinburgh Advertiser
</em> skrev "Ingen privatsak har noen
3719 gang fått slik oppmerksomhet fra folket, og ingen sak som har blitt prøvet i
3720 Overhuset har interessert så mange enkeltmennesker." "Stor glede i Edinburgh
3721 etter seieren over litterær eiendom: bål og *illuminations*.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2645226" href=
"#ftn.id2645226" class=
"footnote">110</a>]
</sup>
3723 I London, ihvertfall blant utgiverne, var reaksjonen like sterk, men i
3724 motsatt retning.
<em class=
"citetitle">Morning Chronicle
</em> skrev:
3725 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
3726 Gjennom denne avgjørelsen
… er verdier til nesten
200 000 pund, som
3727 er blitt ærlig kjøpt gjennom allment salg, og som i går var eiendom, er nå
3728 redusert til ingenting. Bokselgerne i London og Westminster, mange av dem
3729 har solgt hus og eiendom for å kjøpe kopirettigheter, er med ett ruinerte,
3730 og mange som gjennom mange år har opparbeidet kompetanse for å brødfø
3731 familien, sitter nå uten en shilling til sine.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2644830" href=
"#ftn.id2644830" class=
"footnote">111</a>]
</sup>
3732 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3735 Ruinert er en overdrivelse. Men det er ingen overdrivelse å si at endringen
3736 var stor. Vedtaket fra Overhuset betydde at bokhandlerne ikke lenger kunnen
3737 kontrollere hvordan kulturen i England ville vokse og utvikle seg. Kulturen
3738 i England var etter dette
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>fri
</em></span>. Ikke i den betydning at
3739 kopiretten ble ignorert, for utgiverne hadde i en begrenset periode rett
3740 over trykkingen. Og heller ikke i den betydningen at bøker kunne stjeles,
3741 for selv etter at boken var falt i det fri, så måtte den kjøpes. Men
3742 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>fri
</em></span> i betydningen at kulturen og dens vekst ikke lenger
3743 var kontrollert av en liten gruppe utgivere. Som alle frie markeder, ville
3744 dette markedet vokse og utvikle seg etter tilbud og etterspørsel. Den
3745 engelske kulturen ble nå formet slik flertallet Englands lesere ville at det
3746 skulle formes - gjennom valget av hva de kjøpte og skrev, gjennom valget av
3747 *memes* de gjentok og beundret. Valg i en
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>konkurrerende
3748 sammenheng
</em></span>, ikke der hvor valgene var om hvilken kultur som
3749 skulle være tilgjengelig for folket og hvor deres tilgang til den ble styrt
3750 av noen få, på tros av flertallets ønsker.
3752 Til sist, dette var en verden hvor Parlamentet var antimonopolistisk, og
3753 holdt stand mot utgivernes krav. I en verden hvor parlamentet er lett å
3754 påvirke, vil den frie kultur være mindre beskyttet.
3755 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644371" href=
"#id2644371" class=
"para">98</a>]
</sup>
3758 Jacob Tonson er vanligvis husket for sin omgang med
1700-tallets litterære
3759 storheter, spesielt John Dryden, og for hans kjekke"ferdige versjoner" av
3760 klassiske verk. I tillegg til
<em class=
"citetitle">Romeo og Julie
</em>, utga
3761 han en utrolig rekke liste av verk som ennå er hjertet av den engelske
3762 kanon, inkludert de samlede verk av Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, John Milton, og
3763 John Dryden. Se Keith Walker: "Jacob Tonson, Bookseller,"
3764 <em class=
"citetitle">American Scholar
</em> 61:
3 (
1992):
424-
31.
3765 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644401" href=
"#id2644401" class=
"para">99</a>]
</sup>
3768 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright in Historical
3769 Perspective
</em> (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
3771 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644439" href=
"#id2644439" class=
"para">100</a>]
</sup>
3773 Som Siva Vaidhyanathan så pent argumenterer, er det feilaktige å kalle dette
3774 en "opphavsrettslov." Se Vaidhyanathan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyrights and
3775 Copywrongs
</em>,
40.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2644449"></a>
3776 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644688" href=
"#id2644688" class=
"para">101</a>]
</sup>
3780 Philip Wittenberg,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Protection and Marketing of Literary
3781 Property
</em> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
3782 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644766" href=
"#id2644766" class=
"para">102</a>]
</sup>
3785 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending in the
3786 House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the Eighth Year of the
3787 Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
3788 Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
3789 Copies, during the Times therein mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici
3790 Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al.,
8,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
3791 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
3792 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2643266" href=
"#id2643266" class=
"para">103</a>]
</sup>
3794 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
3795 <em class=
"citetitle">Vanderbilt Law Review
</em> 40 (
1987):
28. For en
3796 fantastisk overbevisende fortelling, se Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
3797 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2644411"></a>
3798 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644855" href=
"#id2644855" class=
"para">104</a>]
</sup>
3801 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<em class=
"citetitle">Authorship and
3802 Copyright
</em> (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
3803 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644877" href=
"#id2644877" class=
"para">105</a>]
</sup>
3805 Mark Rose,
<em class=
"citetitle">Authors and Owners
</em> (Cambridge: Harvard
3806 University Press,
1993),
92.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2644885"></a>
3807 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644903" href=
"#id2644903" class=
"para">106</a>]
</sup>
3811 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644935" href=
"#id2644935" class=
"para">107</a>]
</sup>
3814 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright in Historical
3815 Perspective
</em>,
167 (quoting Borwell).
3816 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644981" href=
"#id2644981" class=
"para">108</a>]
</sup>
3819 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
3820 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Wayne Law
3821 Review
</em> 29 (
1983):
1152.
3822 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2645076" href=
"#id2645076" class=
"para">109</a>]
</sup>
3826 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2645226" href=
"#id2645226" class=
"para">110</a>]
</sup>
3830 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2644830" href=
"#id2644830" class=
"para">111</a>]
</sup>
3834 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"7. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"recorders"></a>7. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</h2></div></div></div><p>
3835 Jon Else er en filmskaper. Han er mest kjent for sine dokumentarer og har på
3836 ypperlig vis klart å spre sin kunst. Han er også en lærer, som meg selv, og
3837 jeg misunner den lojaliteten og beundringen hans studenter har for ham. (Ved
3838 et uhell møtte jeg to av hans studenter i et middagsselskap og han var deres
3841 Else arbeidet med en dokumentarfilm hvor også jeg var involvert. I en pause
3842 så fortalte han meg om hvordan det kunne være å skape film i dagens Amerika.
3844 I
1990 arbeidet Else med en dokumentar om Wagners Ring Cycle. Fokuset var på
3845 *stagehands* på San Francisco Opera. Stagehands er spesielt morsomt og
3846 fargerikt innslag i en opera. I løpet av forestillingen oppholder de seg
3847 blant publikum og på lysloftet. De er en perfekt kontrast til kunsten på
3848 scenen.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645378"></a>
3851 Under en forestilling, filmet Else noen stagehands som spilte *checkers*. I
3852 et hjørne av rommet stod det et fjernsynsapparat. På fjernsynet, mens
3853 forestillingen pågikk og operakompaniet spilte Wagner, gikk
<em class=
"citetitle">The
3854 Simpsons
</em>. Slik Else så det, så hjalp dette tegnefilm-innslaget
3855 med å fange det spesielle med scenen.
3857 Så noen år senere, da han endelig hadde fått ordnet den siste
3858 finansieringen, ville Else skaffe rettigheter til å bruke disse få sekundene
3859 med
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpson
</em>. For disse få sekundene var selvsagt
3860 beskyttet av opphavsretten, og for å bruke beskyttet materiale må man ha
3861 tillatelse fra eieren, dersom det ikke er "rimelig bruk" eller det
3862 foreligger spesielle avtaler.
3864 Else kontaktet
<em class=
"citetitle">Simpson
</em>-skaper Matt Groenings kontor
3865 for å få tillatelse. Og Groening gav ham det. Det var tross alt kun snakk om
3866 fire og et halvt sekund på et lite fjernsyn, bakerst i et hjørne av
3867 rommet. Hvordan kunne det skade? Groening var glad for å få ha det med i
3868 filmen, men han ba Else om å kontakte Gracie Films, firmaet som produserer
3869 programmet.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645439"></a>
3871 Gracie Films sa også at det var greit, men de, slik som Groening, ønsket å
3872 være forsiktige, og ba Else om å kontakte Fox, konsernet som eide Gracie. Og
3873 Else kontaktet Fox og forklarte situasjonen; at det var snakk om et klipp i
3874 hjørnet i bakgrunnen i ett rom i filmen. Matt Groening hadde allerede gitt
3875 sin tillatelse, sa Else. Han ville bare få det avklart med Fox.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645460"></a>
3877 Deretter, fortalte Else: "skjedde to ting. Først oppdaget vi
… at
3878 Matt Groening ikke eide sitt eget verk
— ihvertfall at noen [hos Fox]
3879 trodde at han ikke eide sitt eget verk." Som det andre krevde Fox "ti tusen
3880 dollar i lisensavgift for disse fire og et halvt sekundene med
…
3881 fullstendig tilfeldig
<em class=
"citetitle">Simpson
</em> som var i et hjørne i
3884 Ellers var sikker på at det var en feil. Han fikk tak i noen som han trodde
3885 var nestleder for lisensiering, Rebecca Herrera. Han forklarte for henne at
3886 "det må være en feil her
… Vi ber deg om en utdanningssats på dette."
3887 Og de hadde fått utdanningssats, fortalte Herrera. Kort tid etter ringte
3888 Else igjen for å få dette bekreftet.
3891 "Jeg måtte være sikker på at jeg hadde riktige opplysninger foran meg," sa
3892 han. "Ja, du har riktige opplysninger," sa hun. Det ville koste $
10 000 å
3893 bruke dette lille klippet av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpson
</em>, plassert
3894 bakerst i et hjørne i en scene i en dokumentar om Wagners Ring Cycle. Som om
3895 det ikke var nok, forbløffet Herrera Else med å si "Og om du siterer meg,
3896 vil du høre fra våre advokater." En av Herreras assistenter fortalte Else at
3897 "De bryr seg ikke i det heletatt. Alt de vil ha er pengene."
3899 Men Else hadde ikke penger til å kjøpe lisens for klippet. Så å gjenskape
3900 denne delen av virkeligheten, lå langt utenfor hans budsjett. Like før
3901 dokumentaren skulle slippes, redigerte Else inn et annet klipp på
3902 fjernsynet, et klipp fra en av hans andre filmer
<em class=
"citetitle">The Day After
3903 Trinity
</em> fra ti år tidligere.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645536"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645542"></a>
3905 Det er ingen tvil om at noen, enten det er er Matt Groening eller Fox, eier
3906 rettighetene til
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em>. Rettighetene er deres
3907 eiendom. For å bruke beskyttet mteriale, kreves det ofte at men får
3908 tillatelse fra eieren eller eierne. Dersom Else ønsket å bruke
3909 <em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em> til noe hvor loven gir verket
3910 beskyttelse, så må han innhente tillatelse fra eieren før han kan bruke
3911 det. Og i et fritt markes er det eieren som bestemmer hvor mye han/hun vil
3912 ta for hvilken som helst bruk (hvor loven krever tillatelse fra eier).
3914 For eksempel "offentlig fremvisning"* av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpson
</em>
3915 er en form for bruk hvor loven gir eieren kontroll. Dersom du velger ut dine
3916 favorittepisoder, leier en kinosal og selger billetter til "Mine
3917 <em class=
"citetitle">Simpson
</em>-favoritter", så må du ha tillatelse fra
3918 rettighetsinnhaveren (eieren). Og eieren kan (med rette, slik jeg ser det)
3919 kreve hvor mye han vil; $
10ellr $
1 000 000. Det er hans rett ifølge loven.
3921 Men når jurister hører denne historien om Jon Else og Fox, så er deres
3922 første tanke "rimelig bruk".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2645600" href=
"#ftn.id2645600" class=
"footnote">112</a>]
</sup> Elses bruk
3923 av
4,
5 sekunder med et indirekte klipp av en
3924 <em class=
"citetitle">Simpsons
</em>-episode er et klart eksempel på "rimelig
3925 bruk" av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em>— og "rimelig bruk" krever
3926 ingen tillatelse fra noen.
3930 Så jeg spurte Else om hvorfor han ikke bare stolte på "fair use". Og her er
3932 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
3933 <em class=
"citetitle">Simpsons
</em>-fiaskoen lærte meg om hvor stor avstand det
3934 var mellom det jurister finner urelevant på en abstrakt måte, og hva som er
3935 knusende relevant på en konkret måte for oss som prøver å lage og kringkaste
3936 dokumentarer. Jeg tvilte aldri på at dette helt klart var "rimelig bruk",
3937 men jeg kunne ikke stole på konseptet på noen konkret måte. Og dette er
3939 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"1"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
3942 Før våre filmer kan kringkastes, krever nettverket at vi kjøper en "Errors
3943 and Omissions"-forsikring. Den krever en detailjert "visual cue sheet" med
3944 alle kilder og lisens-status på alle scener i filmen. De har et smalt syn på
3945 "fair use", og å påstå at noe er nettopp det kan forsinke, og i verste fall
3947 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
3949 Jeg skulle nok aldri ha bedt om Matt Groenings tillatelse. Men jeg visste
3950 (ihvertfall fra rykter) at Fox tidligere hadde brukt å jakte på og stoppe
3951 ulisensiert bruk av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em>, på samme måte som
3952 George Lucas var veldig ivrig på å forfølge bruken av
<em class=
"citetitle">Star
3953 Wars
</em>. Så jeg bestemte meg for å følge boka, og trodde at vi
3954 kulle få til en gratis, i alle fall rimelig, avtale for fire sekunders bruk
3955 av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em>. Som en dokumentarskaper, arbeidende
3956 på randen av utryddelse, var det siste jeg ønsket en juridisk strid, selv
3957 for å forsvare et prinsipp.
3958 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
3962 Jeg snakket faktisk med en av dine kolleger på Stanford Law School
…
3963 som bekreftet at dette var rimelig bruk. Han bekreftet også at Fox ville
3964 "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your life", uavhengig av
3965 sannheten i mine krav. Han gjorde det klart at alt ville koke ned til hvem
3966 som hadde flest jurister og dypest lommer, jeg eller dem.
3968 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
3971 Spørsmålet om "fair use" dukker om regel opp helt mot slutten av prosjektet,
3972 når vi nærmer oss siste frist og er tomme for penger.
3973 </p></li></ol></div></blockquote></div><p>
3974 I teorien betyr "fair use" at du ikke trenger tillatelse. Teorien støtter
3975 derfor den frie kultur og arbeider mot tillatelseskulturen. Men i praksis
3976 fungerer "fair use" helt annerledes. Men de uklare linjene i lovverket, samt
3977 de fryktelige konsekvensene dersom man tar feil, gjør at mange kunstnere
3978 ikke stoler på "fair use". Loven har en svært god hensikt, men praksisen har
3981 Dette eksempelet viser hvor langt denne loven har kommet fra sine
3982 syttenhundretalls røtter. Loven som skulle beskytte utgiverne mot
3983 urettferdig piratkonkurranse, hadde utviklet seg til et sverd som slo ned på
3984 _all_ bruk, transformativ* eller ikke.
3985 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2645600" href=
"#id2645600" class=
"para">112</a>]
</sup>
3988 Ønsker du å lese en flott redegjørelse om hvordan dette er "fair use", og
3989 hvordan advokatene ikke anerkjenner det, så les Richard A. Posner og William
3990 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
3991 <em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> " (utkast arkivert hos forfatteren),
3992 University of Chicago Law School, 5. august 2003.
3993 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter
" title="8. Kapittel åtte: Omformere
"><div class="titlepage
"><div><div><h2 class="title
"><a name="transformers
"></a>8. Kapittel åtte: Omformere</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm
" name="id2645789
"></a><a class="indexterm
" name="id2645796
"></a><p>
3994 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave was an
3995 innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop
3996 digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave
3997 began investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
3998 anticipation of the power of networks.
3999 </p><a class="indexterm
" name="id2645811
"></a><p>
4000 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by the
4001 emerging market for CD-ROM technology—not to distribute film, but to
4002 do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult. In 1993, he
4003 launched an initiative to develop a product to build retrospectives on the
4004 work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was Clint Eastwood. The
4005 idea was to showcase all of the work of Eastwood, with clips from his films
4006 and interviews with figures important to his career.
4007 </p><a class="indexterm
" name="id2645819
"></a><p>
4008 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and as a
4009 director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood, asking him
4010 about his career. Because Starwave produced those interviews, it was free to
4011 include them on the CD.
4015 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so Starwave
4016 wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career: posters,
4017 scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood made. Most of his
4018 career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was relatively easy to get
4019 permission for that content.
4020 </p><a class="indexterm
" name="id2645853
"></a><p>
4021 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our goal was
4022 that we were going to have a clip from every one of Eastwood's films," Alben
4023 told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No one had ever really done
4024 this before," Alben explained. "No one had ever tried to do this in the
4025 context of an artistic look at an actor's career."
4026 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645869"></a><p>
4027 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave. Slade asked,
4028 "Well, what will it take?"
4029 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645880"></a><p>
4030 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from everyone who
4031 appears in these films, and the music and everything else that we want to
4032 use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go for it."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2645892" href=
"#ftn.id2645892" class=
"footnote">113</a>]
</sup>
4034 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what clearing
4035 those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films could have a claim
4036 to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD- ROMs had not been specified
4037 in the contracts for the actors, so there was no clear way to know just what
4040 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious pride in his
4041 resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his tale, Alben
4042 recounted just what they did:
4043 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4044 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made some
4045 artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of course we were
4046 going to use the "Make my day" clip from
<em class=
"citetitle">Dirty
4047 Harry
</em>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's
4048 wiggling under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you
4049 have to decide what you are going to pay him.
4053 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate for
4054 the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of less than
4055 a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the rate at the time
4056 was about $
600. So we had to identify the people
—some of them were
4057 hard to identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
4058 crashing through the glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And
4059 then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we
4060 just started calling people.
4061 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645952"></a><p>
4062 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example, followed
4063 up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared. Others were
4064 dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask, "Hey, can I pay you $
600
4065 or maybe if you were in two films, you know, $
1,
200?" And they would say,
4066 "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a
4067 bit difficult (estranged ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and
4068 his team had cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint
4071 It was one
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>year
</em></span> later
—"and even then we weren't
4072 sure whether we were totally in the clear."
4073 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645990"></a><p>
4074 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and the
4075 only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive project for
4076 the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
4077 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4078 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their hands
4079 and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's the music,
4080 there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the actors." But we
4081 just broke it down. We just put it into its constituent parts and said,
4082 "Okay, there's this many actors, this many directors,
… this many
4083 musicians," and we just went at it very systematically and cleared the
4085 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4089 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood loved it,
4090 and it sold very well.
4091 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646025"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646031"></a><p>
4092 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to take a
4093 year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
4094 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is nothing so
4095 useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
4096 all."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2646044" href=
"#ftn.id2646044" class=
"footnote">114</a>]
</sup> Did it make sense, I asked Alben,
4097 that this is the way a new work has to be made?
4099 For, as he acknowledged, "very few
… have the time and resources, and
4100 the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be made. Does
4101 it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what anybody really
4102 thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that you would have to
4103 go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
4104 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4105 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie, he or she
4106 gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of that performance
4107 is used in a new product that is a retrospective of somebody's career, I
4108 don't think that that person
… should be compensated for that.
4109 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4110 Or at least, is this
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>how
</em></span> the artist should be
4111 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of
4112 statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use
4113 of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
4114 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit
4115 permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of
4116 the creative process could be made to be more clean?
4117 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4119 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
4120 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
4121 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this work,
4122 because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a retrospective of
4123 someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with lots of media from that
4124 person's career. You'd build in a cost as the producer of one of these
4125 things. You'd build in a cost of paying X dollars to the talent that
4126 performed. But it would be a known cost. That's the thing that trips
4127 everybody up and makes this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If
4128 you knew I have a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to
4129 cost me X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get investments
4130 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I want
4131 a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going to cost
4132 me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for money," then
4133 it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
4134 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646126"></a><p>
4135 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
4136 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access that
4137 the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a year, how long
4138 would it take someone else? And how much creativity is never made just
4139 because the costs of clearing the rights are so high? These costs are the
4140 burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a Republican hat for a moment, and
4141 get angry for a bit. The government defines the scope of these rights, and
4142 the scope defined determines how much it's going to cost to negotiate
4143 them. (Remember the idea that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the
4144 pilot purchasing flythrough rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles
4145 to San Francisco.) These rights might well have once made sense; but as
4146 circumstances change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a
4147 well-trained, regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and
4148 ask, "Does this still make sense?"
4151 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only a
4152 few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
4153 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I was
4154 asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer from an
4155 L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a friend, Robert
4156 Fairbank, had produced.
4158 Videoen var en glimrende sammenstilling av filmer fra hver periode i det
4159 tjuende århundret, rammet inn rundt idéen om en episode i TV-serien
4160 <em class=
"citetitle">60 Minutes
</em>. Utførelsen var perfekt, ned til seksti
4161 minutter stoppeklokken. Dommerne elsket enhver minutt av den.
4162 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646179"></a><p>
4163 Da lysene kom på, kikket jeg over til min medpaneldeltager, David Nimmer,
4164 kanskje den ledende opphavsrettakademiker og utøver i nasjonen. Han hadde en
4165 forbauset uttrykk i ansiktet sitt, mens han tittet ut over rommet med over
4166 250 godt underholdte dommere. Med en en illevarslende tone, begynte han sin
4167 tale med et spørsmål: "Vet dere hvor mange føderale lover som nettopp brutt
4169 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646199"></a><p>
4170 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this film
4171 hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the rights to
4172 these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law. Of course,
4173 it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for this
4174 violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle of federal marshals
4175 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point: A year before
4176 anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two years before another
4177 member of our panel, David Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth
4178 Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that
4179 the law would not be friendly to the capacities that this technology would
4180 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
4181 couldn't easily do them legally.
4183 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone building
4184 a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut and paste
4185 architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can find just
4186 about any image you want; in another second, you can have it planted in your
4189 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and its
4190 archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never before
4191 imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on computers
4192 around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes images of
4193 politicians and blends them with music to create biting political
4194 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of the most biting
4195 criticism of the record industry that there is through the mixing of Flash!
4196 and music.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646227"></a>
4198 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators wanted
4199 to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
4200 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is never
4201 made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the clearance
4202 rules, it doesn't get released.
4204 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of rights so
4205 that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or mix as they
4206 see fit. We could even make this change without necessarily requiring that
4207 the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the system could simply
4208 make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate artists without requiring
4209 an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for example, that says "the
4210 royalty owed the copyright owner of an unregistered work for the derivative
4211 reuse of his work will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in
4212 escrow for the copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could
4213 benefit from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
4214 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he registers
4217 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be for
4218 objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made; which if
4219 made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists. What reason
4220 would anyone have to oppose it?
4223 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers,
4224 the comic genius of
<em class=
"citetitle">Saturday Night Live
</em> and Austin
4225 Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works would work
4226 together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the agreement, DreamWorks
4227 "will acquire the rights to existing motion picture hits and classics, write
4228 new storylines and
—with the use of stateof-the-art digital
4229 technology
—insert Myers and other actors into the film, thereby
4230 creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
4232 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained, "Film
4233 Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing films and
4234 allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap artists have been
4235 doing this for years with music and now we are able to take that same
4236 concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is quoted as saying, "If
4237 anyone can create a way to bring old films to new audiences, it is Mike."
4239 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if you
4240 don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point about this
4241 announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage remains under
4242 copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks announcement is just this: It
4243 is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is free to sample. Any general freedom
4244 to build upon the film archive of our culture, a freedom in other contexts
4245 presumed for us all, is now a privilege reserved for the funny and
4246 famous
—and presumably rich.
4248 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
4249 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use." Much
4250 of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would rely upon so
4251 weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason that the
4252 privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the legal rights
4253 for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high. These costs
4254 mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to defend your fair
4255 use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions so you don't have to
4256 rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative process is a process of
4257 paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a curse, reserved for the
4259 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2645892" href=
"#id2645892" class=
"para">113</a>]
</sup>
4261 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
4262 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial exploitation
4263 of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as
4264 this chapter evinces.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2645821"></a>
4265 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2646044" href=
"#id2646044" class=
"para">114</a>]
</sup>
4268 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
4269 <em class=
"citetitle">Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services
4270 Acquisition
</em>, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
22</a>.
4271 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"9. Kapittel ni: Samlere"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"collectors"></a>9. Kapittel ni: Samlere
</h2></div></div></div><p>
4272 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to "spider,"
4273 or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began running
4274 across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based information
4275 onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San Francisco's
4276 Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet, they started
4277 again. Over and over again, once every two months, these bits of code took
4278 copies of the Internet and stored them.
4280 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of copies. And
4281 at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive that these
4282 copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the world. Using a
4283 technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could enter a Web page, and
4284 see all of its copies going back to
1996, as well as when those pages
4287 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have appreciated. In
4288 the dystopia described in
<em class=
"citetitle">1984</em>, old newspapers were
4289 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved of
4290 by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
4294 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was no way
4295 ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the story that was
4296 printed on the date published on the paper.
4298 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today, there's no
4299 way for you to know whether the content you are reading is the same as the
4300 content you read before. The page may seem the same, but the content could
4301 easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's library
—constantly
4302 updated, without any reliable memory.
4304 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and the
4305 Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet was. You have
4306 the power to see what you remember. More importantly, perhaps, you also have
4307 the power to find what you don't remember and what others might prefer you
4308 forget.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2646407" href=
"#ftn.id2646407" class=
"footnote">115</a>]
</sup>
4310 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
4311 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction of your
4312 hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to Bull Connor's
4313 water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public library and look at the
4314 newspapers. Those papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they
4315 exist in paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back
4316 and remember
—not just what it is convenient to remember, but remember
4317 something close to the truth.
4319 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to repeat
4320 it. That's not quite correct. We
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>all
</em></span> forget
4321 history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we
4322 forget. More directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
4323 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it, for
4324 schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this
4328 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
4329 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the quintessentially
4330 transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more important in forming and
4331 reforming society, it becomes more and more important to maintain in some
4332 historical form. It's just bizarre to think that we have scads of archives
4333 of newspapers from tiny towns around the world, yet there is but one copy of
4334 the Internet
—the one kept by the Internet Archive.
4336 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
4337 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
4338 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
4339 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
4340 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The Internet
4341 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie of the
4342 Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10 billion pages, and it
4343 was growing at about a billion pages a month.
4345 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in human
4346 history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty terabytes of
4347 material"
—and was "ten times larger than the Library of Congress." And
4348 this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set out to build. In
4349 addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been constructing the Television
4350 Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more ephemeral than the
4351 Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture was constructed through
4352 television, only a tiny proportion of that culture is available for anyone
4353 to see today. Three hours of news are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt
4354 University
—thanks to a specific exemption in the copyright law. That
4355 content is indexed, and is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But
4356 other than that, [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you
4357 were Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
4358 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
4359 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646514"></a><p>
4361 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown? Remember
4362 that back and forth surreal experience of a politician interacting with a
4363 fictional television character? If you were a graduate student wanting to
4364 study that, and you wanted to get those original back and forth exchanges
4365 between the two, the
<em class=
"citetitle">60 Minutes
</em> episode that came out
4366 after it
… it would be almost impossible.
… Those materials
4367 are almost unfindable.
…
4368 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4369 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded in
4370 newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is recorded
4371 on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world where researchers
4372 trying to understand the effect of media on nineteenthcentury America will
4373 have an easier time than researchers trying to understand the effect of
4374 media on twentieth-century America?
4376 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
4377 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
4378 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
4379 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once the
4380 copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
4382 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library of Congress
4383 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long as such
4384 deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to borrow back the
4385 deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
1915 alone, there were
4386 more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed back." Thus, when the
4387 copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any library. The copy
4388 exists
—if it exists at all
—in the library archive of the film
4389 company.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2646477" href=
"#ftn.id2646477" class=
"footnote">116</a>]
</sup>
4391 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts were
4392 originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the broadcasts,
4393 so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled capturing,
4394 broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law required they make a
4395 copy of each broadcast for the work to be "copyrighted." But those copies
4396 were simply kept by the broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the
4397 government didn't demand them. The content of this part of American culture
4398 is practically invisible to anyone who would look.
4401 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and his
4402 allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty stations from
4403 around the world and hit the Record button. After September
11, Kahle,
4404 working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations from around the
4405 world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made their coverage during the week
4406 of September
11 available free on-line. Anyone could see how news reports
4407 from around the world covered the events of that day.
4409 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
4410 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning films
4411 other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted), Kahle
4412 established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
1,
300 films in
4413 this archive and post those films on the Internet to be downloaded for
4414 free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells copies of these films as
4415 stock footage. What he has discovered is that after he made a significant
4416 chunk available for free, his stock footage sales went up
4417 dramatically. People could easily find the material they wanted to use. Some
4418 downloaded that material and made films on their own. Others purchased
4419 copies to enable other films to be made. Either way, the archive enabled
4420 access to this important part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
4421 "Duck and Cover" film that instructed children how to save themselves in the
4422 middle of nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film
4423 in a few minutes
—for free.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646590"></a>
4425 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
4426 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
4427 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law doesn't
4428 require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in an archive
4429 by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
4431 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to this
4432 content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His aim is
4433 to ensure competition in access to this important part of our culture. Not
4434 during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but during a
4435 second life that all creative property has
—a noncommercial life.
4438 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit of
4439 creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
4440 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial market
4441 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
4442 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
4443 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial market,
4444 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
4446 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our tradition has
4447 always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers the news every
4448 day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is used to wrap fish
4449 or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive of knowledge
4450 about our history. In this second life, the content can continue to inform
4451 even if that information is no longer sold.
4453 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print very
4454 quickly (the average today is after about a year
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2646695" href=
"#ftn.id2646695" class=
"footnote">117</a>]
</sup>). After it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores
4455 without the copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where
4456 many get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are
4457 thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely important to
4458 the spread and stability of culture.
4460 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for creative
4461 property does not hold true with the most important components of popular
4462 culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
4463 these
—television, movies, music, radio, the Internet
—there is no
4464 guarantee of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've
4465 replaced libraries with Barnes
& Noble superstores. With this culture,
4466 what's accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
4467 Beyond that, culture disappears.
4470 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this so. It
4471 would have been insanely expensive to collect and make accessible all
4472 television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily
4473 high. So even though the law in principle would have restricted the ability
4474 of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the real restriction was
4475 economics. The market made it impossibly difficult to do anything about this
4476 ephemeral culture; the law had little practical effect.
4478 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is that
4479 for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
4480 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or distributed
4481 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all books
4482 published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
4483 moving images and sound.
4485 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
4486 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but we are
4487 for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As Kahle
4489 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4490 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
4491 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of movies,
4492 … and about one to two million movies [distributed] during the
4493 twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different titles of
4494 books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in this room and
4495 be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at a turning point in
4496 our history. Universal access is the goal. And the opportunity of leading a
4497 different life, based on this, is
… thrilling. It could be one of the
4498 things humankind would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of
4499 Alexandria, putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
4501 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4503 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
4504 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
4505 libraries or archives could be.
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>When
</em></span> the commercial
4506 life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it
4507 does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and
4508 culture, remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
4509 it; some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
4510 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
4511 become unimaginable for much of our past
—a future
4512 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>for
</em></span> our past. The technology of digital arts could make
4513 the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
4515 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
4516 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to call
4517 these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem, the
4518 "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also someone's
4519 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that Kahle and
4520 others would exercise.
4521 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2646407" href=
"#id2646407" class=
"para">115</a>]
</sup>
4524 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White House
4525 changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003, press release
4526 stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later changed,
4527 without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." E-mail from
4528 Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
4529 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2646477" href=
"#id2646477" class=
"para">116</a>]
</sup>
4532 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
4533 Library of Congress,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Film Library Quarterly
</em> 13
4534 nos.
2–3 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<em class=
"citetitle">Nitrate Won't Wait: A
4535 History of Film Preservation in the United States
</em> ( Jefferson,
4536 N.C.: McFarland
& Co.,
1992),
36.
4537 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2646695" href=
"#id2646695" class=
"para">117</a>]
</sup>
4540 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord, Bar
4541 Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Chicago
4542 Tribune
</em>,
5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published
4543 between
1927 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony
4544 Reese, "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
4545 <em class=
"citetitle">Boston College Law Review
</em> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
4546 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"property-i"></a>10. Kapittel ti:
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Eiendom
</span>”</span></h2></div></div></div><p>
4547 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association of
4548 America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
4549 administration
—literally. The famous picture of Johnson's swearing-in
4550 on Air Force One after the assassination of President Kennedy has Valenti in
4551 the background. In his almost forty years of running the MPAA, Valenti has
4552 established himself as perhaps the most prominent and effective lobbyist in
4553 Washington.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646804"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646852"></a>
4555 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
4556 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal was to
4557 defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism. The
4558 organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
4559 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its board is
4560 made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major producers and
4561 distributors of motion picture and television programs in the United States:
4562 Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth
4563 Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646871"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646878"></a>
4564 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646884"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646890"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646896"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646903"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646909"></a>
4568 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before him has
4569 had as much influence over that organization, or over Washington. As a
4570 Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important political skill of a
4571 Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and slow while hiding a
4572 lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays the simple, humble
4573 man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four books, who finished high
4574 school at the age of fifteen and flew more than fifty combat missions in
4575 World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When Valenti went to Washington, he mastered
4576 the city in a quintessentially Washingtonian way.
4578 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our culture
4579 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting the MPAA rating
4580 system, it has probably avoided a great deal of speech-regulating harm. But
4581 there is an aspect to the organization's mission that is both the most
4582 radical and the most important. This is the organization's effort,
4583 epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine the meaning of "creative
4586 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy perfectly:
4587 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4588 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
4589 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men and
4590 women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central theme which
4591 animates this entire debate:
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Creative property owners must be
4592 accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other property
4593 owners in the nation
</em></span>. That is the issue. That is the
4594 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
4595 debates to follow must rest.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2646965" href=
"#ftn.id2646965" class=
"footnote">118</a>]
</sup>
4596 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4598 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
4599 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The "central
4600 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this: "Creative
4601 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protections resident in
4602 all other property owners in the nation." There are no second-class
4603 citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should be no second-class
4606 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated with
4607 such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we use
4608 elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a claim
4609 made by
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>anyone
</em></span> who is serious in this debate than this
4610 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is
4611 perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and
4612 scope of "creative property." His views have
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>no
</em></span>
4613 reasonable connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull
4614 of his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
4617 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and precise
4618 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2647017" href=
"#ftn.id2647017" class=
"footnote">119</a>]
</sup> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that "creative
4619 property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and protection resident
4620 in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were
4621 given the same rights as all other property owners, that would effect a
4622 radical, and radically undesirable, change in our tradition.
4624 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for our
4625 tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry that is
4626 instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British overturned in
4627 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a powerful few would
4628 exercise powerful control over how our creative culture would develop.
4631 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you that,
4632 historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to convince
4633 you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our history. We have
4634 always treated rights in creative property differently from the rights
4635 resident in all other property owners. They have never been the same. And
4636 they should never be the same, because, however counterintuitive this may
4637 seem, to make them the same would be to fundamentally weaken the opportunity
4638 for new creators to create. Creativity depends upon the owners of
4639 creativity having less than perfect control.
4641 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful of
4642 the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric notwithstanding, in
4643 assuring that the new can displace them. No organization does. No person
4644 does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's good for the MPAA is
4645 not necessarily good for America. A society that defends the ideals of free
4646 culture must preserve precisely the opportunity for new creativity to
4647 threaten the old. To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally
4648 wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
4649 Constitution itself.
4651 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly did
4652 they love property that they built into the Constitution an important
4653 requirement. If the government takes your property
—if it condemns your
4654 house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm
—it is required,
4655 under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you "just compensation"
4656 for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a
4657 certain sense, sacred. It cannot
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>ever
</em></span> be taken from the
4658 property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
4661 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what Valenti
4662 calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the power to
4663 create "creative property," the Constitution
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>requires
</em></span>
4664 that after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
4665 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
4666 Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
4667 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not have any
4668 obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
4669 Constitution that requires compensation for your land requires that you lose
4670 your "creative property" right without any compensation at all.
4672 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of property
4673 are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be treated
4674 differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in our
4675 tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be accorded
4676 the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is effectively
4677 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
4679 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong. There
4680 was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong. The
4681 Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be appointed
4682 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college to
4683 produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it did in
4684 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be the first to
4685 admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected some of those
4686 mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should reject as well. So
4687 my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
4689 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at least
4690 try to understand
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>why
</em></span>. Why did the framers, fanatical
4691 property types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be
4692 given the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
4693 creative property there must be a public domain?
4695 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the history of
4696 these "creative property" rights, and the control that they enabled. Once
4697 we see clearly how differently these rights have been defined, we will be in
4698 a better position to ask the question that should be at the core of this
4699 war: Not
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>whether
</em></span> creative property should be protected,
4700 but how. Not
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>whether
</em></span> we will enforce the rights the law
4701 gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
4702 ought to be. Not
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>whether
</em></span> artists should be paid, but
4703 whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
4704 control how culture develops.
4709 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about how
4710 property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way than the
4711 narrow language of the law allows. In
<em class=
"citetitle">Code and Other Laws of
4712 Cyberspace
</em>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
4713 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks how
4714 four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the
4715 right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
4716 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1331"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.1. How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
4717 the right or regulation.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1331.png" alt=
"How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
4718 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or group
4719 that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each case
4720 throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right. For
4721 simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals represent
4722 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated
— either
4723 constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious constraint
4724 (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening punishments after the
4725 fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for example, you
4726 willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song from her latest CD
4727 and posting it on the Web, you can be punished with a $
150,
000 fine. The
4728 fine is an ex post punishment for violating an ex ante rule. It is imposed
4729 by the state.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2646925"></a>
4731 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an individual
4732 for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by a
4733 community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law against
4734 spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished if you spit on the
4735 ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment might not be harsh,
4736 though depending upon the community, it could easily be more harsh than many
4737 of the punishments imposed by the state. The mark of the difference is not
4738 the severity of the rule, but the source of the enforcement.
4740 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected through
4741 conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you do N. These
4742 constraints are obviously not independent of law or norms
—it is
4743 property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be taken legally;
4744 it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a set of norms,
4745 and a background of property and contract law, the market imposes a
4746 simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group might behave.
4748 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
4749 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
4750 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get
4751 across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community
4752 to integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
4753 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with the
4754 market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous
4755 conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing contracts,
4756 or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
4757 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces
4758 this constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
4759 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
4764 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is obvious:
4765 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by
4766 another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.
4768 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the effective
4769 freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any particular thing, we
4770 have to consider how these four modalities interact. Whether or not there
4771 are other constraints (there may well be; my claim is not about
4772 comprehensiveness), these four are among the most significant, and any
4773 regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must consider how these four in
4774 particular interact.
4775 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxdrivespeed"></a><p>
4776 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high speed. That
4777 freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say how fast you
4778 can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in part restricted
4779 by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most rational drivers;
4780 governors in buses, as another example, set the maximum rate at which the
4781 driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel
4782 efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly
4783 constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not
4784 constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
4785 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The same
4786 norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
4789 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear: While
4790 these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role
4791 in affecting the three.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2647346" href=
"#ftn.id2647346" class=
"footnote">120</a>]
</sup> The law, in
4792 other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a
4793 particular modality. Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on
4794 gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to drive more slowly. The law
4795 might be used to mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty
4796 of driving rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize
4797 reckless driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be
4798 more strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
4799 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
4801 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647376"></a><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1361"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.2. Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1361.png" alt=
"Law has a special role in affecting the three."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
4802 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To understand
4803 the effective protection of liberty or protection of property at any
4804 particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A restriction
4805 imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A freedom enabled by one
4806 modality might be displaced by another.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2647410" href=
"#ftn.id2647410" class=
"footnote">121</a>]
</sup>
4807 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"10.1. Hvorfor Hollywood har rett"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"hollywood"></a>10.1. Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</h2></div></div></div><p>
4808 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just how,
4809 Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress and the
4810 courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that rallying makes
4813 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the Internet:
4814 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1371"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.3. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1331.png" alt=
"Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
4817 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
4818 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on those
4819 who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by technologies
4820 that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture) and expensive to
4821 copy and share content (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by
4822 norms we all recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids'
4823 records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but
4824 the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
4825 this form of infringement.
4827 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and p2p
4828 sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically, as does
4829 the constraint of the market. And as both the market and architecture relax
4830 the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The happy balance (for the
4831 warriors, at least) of life before the Internet becomes an effective state
4832 of anarchy after the Internet.
4835 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
4836 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
4837 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of protection
4838 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq after the fall
4839 of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the looting that
4841 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1381"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.4. effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1381.png" alt=
"effective state of anarchy after the Internet."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
4842 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
4843 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce Department
4844 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995, this mix of
4845 regulatory modalities had already been identified and the strategy to
4846 respond already mapped. In response to the changes the Internet had
4847 effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should strengthen intellectual
4848 property law, (
2) businesses should adopt innovative marketing techniques,
4849 (
3) technologists should push to develop code to protect copyrighted
4850 material, and (
4) educators should educate kids to better protect copyright.
4853 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
4854 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
4855 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry to
4856 push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life you have
4857 as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if something comes
4858 along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a flood plain have no
4859 hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild (and rebuild again) when a
4860 flood (architecture) wipes away their property (law). Farmers have no
4861 hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when a virus
4862 (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to
4863 the government to bail them out when imports (market) wipe out the
4864 U.S. steel industry.
4866 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's campaign
4867 to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a technological
4868 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the changing
4869 technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the content
4870 industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown describes it, its
4871 "architecture of revenue."
4872 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647605"></a><p>
4873 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
4874 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because technology
4875 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't follow that the
4876 government should intervene to support that old way of doing
4877 business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20 percent of
4878 their traditional film market to the emerging technologies of digital
4879 cameras.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2647620" href=
"#ftn.id2647620" class=
"footnote">122</a>]
</sup> Does anyone believe the
4880 government should ban digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have
4881 weakened the freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban
4882 trucks from roads
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>for the purpose of
</em></span> protecting the
4883 railroads? Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
4884 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring commercial
4885 comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that
4886 this change has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
4887 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
4888 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch to only
4889 ten channels within an hour?)
4891 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no. In a free
4892 society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and free trade,
4893 the government's role is not to support one way of doing business against
4894 others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect them against loss. If
4895 the government did this generally, then we would never have any progress. As
4896 Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
1991, in a memo criticizing software
4897 patents, "established companies have an interest in excluding future
4898 competitors."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2647670" href=
"#ftn.id2647670" class=
"footnote">123</a>]
</sup> And relative to a
4899 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and FM
4900 radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight not only the
4901 market but also the government is a world in which competitors with new
4902 ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and increasingly
4903 concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.
4904 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647689"></a>
4906 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
4907 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the government
4908 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to guarantee that
4909 that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the duty of policy
4910 makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they create, in response
4911 to the request of those hurt by changing technology, are changes that
4912 preserve the incentives and opportunities for innovation and change.
4914 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include, obviously,
4915 copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the industry
4916 complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in a
4917 way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be especially
4918 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government to get into
4919 the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and dangers of that
4920 game are precisely why our framers created the First Amendment to our
4921 Constitution: "Congress shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of
4922 speech." So when Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge"
4923 the freedom of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
4924 regulation is justified.
4927 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether the changes
4928 that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are "justified." My argument
4929 is about their effect. For before we get to the question of justification, a
4930 hard question that depends a great deal upon your values, we should first
4931 ask whether we understand the effect of the changes the content industry
4934 Her kommer metaforen som vil forklare argumentet.
4935 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxddt"></a><p>
4936 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss chemist Paul
4937 Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work demonstrating the
4938 insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the insecticide was widely
4939 used around the world to kill disease-carrying pests. It was also used to
4940 increase farm production.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647766"></a>
4942 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
4943 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
4944 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
4945 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647784"></a><p>
4946 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<em class=
"citetitle">Silent Spring
</em>,
4947 which argued that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having
4948 unintended environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
4949 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647800"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647806"></a>
4951 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did not aim
4952 to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems produced
4953 another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than the problems that
4954 were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the problems DDT caused were
4955 worse than the problems it solved, at least when considering the other, more
4956 environmentally friendly ways to solve the problems that DDT was meant to
4960 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James Boyle
4961 appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
4962 culture.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2647835" href=
"#ftn.id2647835" class=
"footnote">124</a>]
</sup> His point, and the point I
4963 want to develop in the balance of this chapter, is not that the aims of
4964 copyright are flawed. Or that authors should not be paid for their work. Or
4965 that music should be given away "for free." The point is that some of the
4966 ways in which we might protect authors will have unintended consequences for
4967 the cultural environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And
4968 just as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
4969 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
4970 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
4971 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware of
4972 our actions' effects on the environment.
4974 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly this
4975 effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic effect on
4976 the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But there should
4977 also be little doubt that when you add together the changes in copyright law
4978 over time, plus the change in technology that the Internet is undergoing
4979 just now, the net effect of these changes will not be only that copyrighted
4980 work is effectively protected. Also, and generally missed, the net effect of
4981 this massive increase in protection will be devastating to the environment
4984 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences for free
4985 culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will be lost.
4986 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647879"></a></div><div class=
"section" title=
"10.2. Opphav"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"beginnings"></a>10.2. Opphav
</h2></div></div></div><p>
4987 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
4988 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
4989 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English aim to
4990 avoid overly powerful publishers.
4992 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to Congress in
4993 a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I, section
4994 8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
4997 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
4998 by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
4999 to their respective Writings and Discoveries. We can call this the
5000 "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does not say. It does not say
5001 Congress has the power to grant "creative property rights." It says that
5002 Congress has the power
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>to promote progress
</em></span>. The grant
5003 of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of
5004 enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
5006 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw in
5007 chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#founders" title=
"6. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne">6</a>, the
5008 English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few would not
5009 exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
5010 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers followed
5011 the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the English, the framers
5012 reinforced that objective, by requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors"
5015 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
5016 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
5017 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built a
5018 structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them short. To
5019 prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the federal
5020 government from establishing a church. To prevent concentrating power in the
5021 federal government, they built structures to reinforce the power of the
5022 states
—including the Senate, whose members were at the time selected
5023 by the states, and an electoral college, also selected by the states, to
5024 select the president. In each case, a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>structure
</em></span> built
5025 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to prevent
5026 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
5028 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
5029 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
5030 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
5031 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210 years
5032 since they first struck its design.
5035 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes in
5036 technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a particular
5037 concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we started here:
5038 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1441"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.5. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1331.png" alt=
"Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5039 Vi kommer til å ende opp her:
5040 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1442"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.6. "Opphavsrett" i dag.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1442.png" alt='
"Opphavsrett" i dag.'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5042 La meg forklare hvordan.
5044 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"10.3. Loven: Varighet"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"lawduration"></a>10.3. Loven: Varighet
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5045 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it faced
5046 the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that the English
5047 had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws protecting creative
5048 property, and some believed that these laws simply supplemented common law
5049 rights that already protected creative authorship.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648038" href=
"#ftn.id2648038" class=
"footnote">125</a>]
</sup> This meant that there was no guaranteed public
5050 domain in the United States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the
5051 common law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work published in
5052 the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
5053 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public domain
5054 to reprint and distribute works.
5056 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
5057 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
5058 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections. Just
5059 as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the copyrights for
5060 all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any state copyrights
5063 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a federal
5064 copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the author was
5065 alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to renew the
5066 copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the copyright, his
5067 work passed into the public domain.
5069 Selv om det ble skapt mange verker i USA i de første
10 årene til
5070 republikken, så ble kun
5 prosent av verkene registrert under det føderale
5071 opphavsrettsregimet. Av alle verker skapt i USA både før
1790 og fra
1790
5072 fram til
1800, så ble
95 prosent øyeblikkelig allemannseie (public
5073 domain). Resten ble allemannseie etter maksimalt
20 år, og som oftest etter
5074 14 år.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648110" href=
"#ftn.id2648110" class=
"footnote">126</a>]
</sup>
5077 Dette fornyelsessystemet var en avgjørende del av det amerikanske systemet
5078 for opphavsrett. Det sikret at maksimal vernetid i opphavsretten bare ble
5079 gitt til verker der det var ønsket. Etter den første perioden på fjorten år,
5080 hvis forfatteren ikke så verdien av å fornye sin opphavsrett, var det heller
5081 ikke verdt det for samfunnet å håndheve opphavsretten.
5083 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
5084 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small minority of
5085 them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the balance allowed their
5086 work to pass into the public domain.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648176" href=
"#ftn.id2648176" class=
"footnote">127</a>]
</sup>
5088 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work has an
5089 actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall out of
5090 print after one year.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648205" href=
"#ftn.id2648205" class=
"footnote">128</a>]
</sup> When that
5091 happens, the used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the
5092 books are no longer
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>effectively
</em></span> controlled by
5093 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time is to
5094 sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not involve
5095 publication
—is effectively free.
5097 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
5098 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28 years to
5099 a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright from
14 years to
5100 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic, the term increased once
5101 again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal term of
14 years to
28 years,
5102 setting a maximum term of
56 years.
5104 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
5105 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress has
5106 extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty years,
5107 Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the extensions
5108 of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years. In
1976,
5109 Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years. And in
1998,
5110 in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress extended the term
5111 of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
5114 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing of
5115 works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the public
5116 domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five years, or
70
5117 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years after the Sonny
5118 Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the public domain, zero
5119 copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue of the expiration of a
5122 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
5123 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the framers
5124 established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright owner to
5125 renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of renewal meant
5126 that works that no longer needed copyright protection would pass more
5127 quickly into the public domain. The works remaining under protection would
5128 be those that had some continuing commercial value.
5130 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For all works
5131 created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the maximum
5132 term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty years. For
5133 corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992, Congress
5134 abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created before
1978. All
5135 works still under copyright would be accorded the maximum term then
5136 available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term was ninety-five years.
5138 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to assure
5139 that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public domain. And
5140 indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is even possible to
5141 put works into the public domain. The public domain is orphaned by these
5142 changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement that terms be "limited,"
5143 we have no evidence that anything will limit them.
5145 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
5146 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to renew
5147 their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright in
1973 was
5148 just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal requirement, the
5149 average term of copyright is now the maximum term. In thirty years, then,
5150 the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95 years.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648300" href=
"#ftn.id2648300" class=
"footnote">129</a>]
</sup>
5151 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"10.4. Loven: Virkeområde"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"lawscope"></a>10.4. Loven: Virkeområde
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5152 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law. The
5153 scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those changes are not
5154 necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent of the changes if we're
5155 to keep this debate in context.
5157 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps, charts,
5158 and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
5159 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave the
5160 author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That means
5161 someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the work without
5162 the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted by a copyright
5163 was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right did not extend to
5164 what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not, therefore, interfere
5165 with the right of someone other than the author to translate a copyrighted
5166 book, or to adapt the story to a different form (such as a drama based on a
5169 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright today
5170 are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the right covers
5171 practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible form. It covers
5172 music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer programs. It gives
5173 the copyright owner of that creative work not only the exclusive right to
5174 "publish" the work, but also the exclusive right of control over any
5175 "copies" of that work. And most significant for our purposes here, the right
5176 gives the copyright owner control over not only his or her particular work,
5177 but also any "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In
5178 this way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
5179 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way on the
5180 initial creative work.
5183 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
5184 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
5185 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition to the
5186 renewal requirement, for most of the history of American copyright law,
5187 there was a requirement that a work be registered before it could receive
5188 the protection of a copyright. There was also a requirement that any
5189 copyrighted work be marked either with that famous © or the word
5190 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright
</em></span>. And for most of the history of American
5191 copyright law, there was a requirement that works be deposited with the
5192 government before a copyright could be secured.
5194 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible understanding
5195 that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the first ten
5196 years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible for copyright were never
5197 copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most works apparently didn't
5198 need copyright, so registration narrowed the regulation of the law to the
5199 few that did. The same reasoning justified the requirement that a work be
5200 marked as copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright
5201 was being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
5202 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
5203 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the original
5206 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when we
5207 decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement that you
5208 register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is automatic; the
5209 copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with a ©; and the
5210 copyright exists whether or not you actually make a copy available for
5213 Vurder et praktisk eksempel for å forstå omfanget av disse forskjellene.
5215 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who actually
5216 copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you against another
5217 publisher's taking your book and republishing it without your
5218 permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so as to prevent
5219 that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
174 publishers in the
5220 United States.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648424" href=
"#ftn.id2648424" class=
"footnote">130</a>]
</sup> The Copyright Act was
5221 thus a tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative
5222 market in the United States
—publishers.
5226 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem by
5227 hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act was totally
5228 unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made a play based upon
5229 it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of those activities were
5230 regulated by the original copyright act. These creative activities remained
5231 free, while the activities of publishers were restrained.
5233 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
5234 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail, every
5235 note to your spouse, every doodle,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>every
</em></span> creative act
5236 that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically
5237 copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection
5238 follows the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
5240 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of fair use
5241 exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they copy it to
5242 republish it or to share an excerpt.
5244 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would control
5245 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of today
5246 that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative rights."
5247 If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your book without
5248 permission. No one can translate it without permission. CliffsNotes can't
5249 make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All of these derivative
5250 uses of your original work are controlled by the copyright holder. The
5251 copyright, in other words, is now not just an exclusive right to your
5252 writings, but an exclusive right to your writings and a large proportion of
5253 the writings inspired by them.
5255 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our framers,
5256 though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this expansion was
5257 created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower copyright. If I write a
5258 book, can you change one word and then claim a copyright in a new and
5259 different book? Obviously that would make a joke of the copyright, so the
5260 law was properly expanded to include those slight modifications as well as
5261 the verbatim original work.
5264 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within a free
5265 culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the law
5266 applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
5267 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone else's
5268 work. But whatever
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>that
</em></span> wrong is, transforming someone
5269 else's work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
5270 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
5271 protect derivative rights at all.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648505" href=
"#ftn.id2648505" class=
"footnote">131</a>]
</sup>
5272 Whether or not you go that far, it seems plain that whatever wrong is
5273 involved is fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy.
5275 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I can
5276 go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I can go to
5277 court and get an injunction against your transformative use of my
5278 book.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648552" href=
"#ftn.id2648552" class=
"footnote">132</a>]
</sup> These two different uses of my
5279 creative work are treated the same.
5281 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should you be
5282 able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from it without
5283 paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature called "Mickey
5284 Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to
5285 trade on the value that Disney originally created?
5287 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
5288 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower: simply to
5289 make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the rights
5291 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"10.5. Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"lawreach"></a>10.5. Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5292 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
5293 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users, and
5294 authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making copies,
5295 and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648608" href=
"#ftn.id2648608" class=
"footnote">133</a>]
</sup>
5299 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
5300 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>copy
</em></span>right law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's
5301 argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative property" deserves the
5302 "same rights" as all other property, it is the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>obvious
</em></span>
5303 that we need to be most careful about. For while it may be obvious that in
5304 the world before the Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright
5305 law, upon reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the
5306 Internet, copies should
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>not
</em></span> be the trigger for
5307 copyright law. More precisely, they should not
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>always
</em></span>
5308 be the trigger for copyright law.
5310 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this very
5311 slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the Internet
5312 should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which the law of
5313 copyright automatically applies,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648670" href=
"#ftn.id2648670" class=
"footnote">134</a>]
</sup>
5314 because it is clear that the current reach of copyright was never
5315 contemplated, much less chosen, by the legislators who enacted copyright
5318 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely empty
5320 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1521"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.7. Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1521.png" alt=
"Alle potensielle bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5323 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent all
5324 its potential
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>uses
</em></span>. Most of these uses are unregulated
5325 by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a book,
5326 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone the book,
5327 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a book, that act
5328 is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that after the first sale
5329 of a book, the copyright owner can impose no further conditions on the
5330 disposition of the book). If you sleep on the book or use it to hold up a
5331 lamp or let your puppy chew it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright
5332 law, because those acts do not make a copy.
5333 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1531"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.8. Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1531.png" alt=
"Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5334 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated by
5335 copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It is
5336 therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands at
5337 the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
5338 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
5339 diagram on next page).
5341 Til slutt er det en tynn skive av ellers regulert kopierings-bruk som
5342 forblir uregluert på grunn av at loven anser dette som "rimelig bruk".
5343 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1541"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.9. Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
5344 copyrighted work.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1541.png" alt=
"Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5345 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats as
5346 unregulated because public policy demands that they remain unregulated. You
5347 are free to quote from this book, even in a review that is quite negative,
5348 without my permission, even though that quoting makes a copy. That copy
5349 would ordinarily give the copyright owner the exclusive right to say whether
5350 the copy is allowed or not, but the law denies the owner any exclusive right
5351 over such "fair uses" for public policy (and possibly First Amendment)
5353 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1542"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.10. Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1542.png" alt='Uregulert kopiering anses som
"rimelig bruk".'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p> </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1551"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.11. Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
5354 regulated.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1551.png" alt=
"Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5357 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
5358 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
5359 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
5361 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use of a
5362 copyrighted work produces a copy.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2648616" href=
"#ftn.id2648616" class=
"footnote">135</a>]
</sup> And
5363 because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a digital
5364 network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were
5365 presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated. No longer is
5366 there a set of presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom
5367 associated with a copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the
5368 copyright, because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked
5369 into category
2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
5370 copyrighted work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
5371 burden of this shift.
5374 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
5375 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be no
5376 plausible
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright
</em></span>-related argument that the copyright
5377 owner could make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
5378 nothing to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
5379 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
5380 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because none of
5381 those uses produced a copy.
5383 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different set of
5384 rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book only once or
5385 only once a month, then
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright law
</em></span> would aid the
5386 copyright owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
5387 accidental feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
5388 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says you
5389 may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or any portion
5390 of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to
5391 the copyright owner's wish.
5393 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim just now is
5394 not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim is only to make
5395 clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other points also become
5398 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker ever
5399 intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the presumptively
5400 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no evidence at all that
5401 policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed our policy here to
5402 shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of free culture before the
5405 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of transformative
5406 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong in
5407 commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
5408 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>any
</em></span> transformation you make of creative work using a
5409 machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with
5410 a story and releasing it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a
5411 requirement of justification. However troubling the expansion with respect
5412 to copying a particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect
5413 to transformative uses of creative work.
5416 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary burden
5417 on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear. If a
5418 copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read a book
5419 on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a violation of
5420 my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation about whether I
5421 have a fair use right to read, because before the Internet, reading did not
5422 trigger the application of copyright law and hence the need for a fair use
5423 defense. The right to read was effectively protected before because reading
5426 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for free
5427 culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights depend upon fair
5428 use
—never even addressing the earlier question about the expansion in
5429 effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in fair use makes sense
5430 when the vast majority of uses are
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>unregulated
</em></span>. But
5431 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the protections of
5432 fair use are not enough.
5434 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was in the
5435 business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available to video
5436 stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
5437 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put the
5438 trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
5440 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began to
5441 think about the Internet as another way to distribute these previews. The
5442 idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by giving on-line
5443 stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can
5444 read a few pages of a book before you buy the book, so, too, you would be
5445 able to sample a bit from the movie on-line before you bought it.
5448 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors that it
5449 intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet (rather than
5450 sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two years later, Disney
5451 told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video Pipeline asked Disney to
5452 talk about the matter
—he had built a business on distributing this
5453 content as a way to help sell Disney films; he had customers who depended
5454 upon his delivering this content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video
5455 Pipeline stopped the distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it
5456 was within their "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So
5457 they filed a lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in
5460 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages were
5461 predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully infringed" on
5462 Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of willful infringement, it
5463 can award damages not on the basis of the actual harm to the copyright
5464 owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the statute. Because Video
5465 Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of Disney movies to enable
5466 video stores to sell copies of those movies, Disney was now suing Video
5467 Pipeline for $
100 million.
5469 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
5470 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
5471 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim in
5472 court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
5473 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
5474 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
5475 Disney's permission.
5477 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
5478 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
5479 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control how
5480 people got access to their content. Once a video was in the marketplace, the
5481 "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he wished,
5482 including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the entire
5483 movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to
5484 centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
5485 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
5486 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
5487 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
5491 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for control
5492 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say you
5493 can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right. But
5494 the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
& Noble
5495 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores. Competition
5496 protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does
5497 not even question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger
5498 when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
5499 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you read
5500 a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But in a
5501 competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this happening
5504 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
5505 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
5506 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
5507 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private owners
5508 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
5509 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
5510 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"10.6. Arkitektur og lov: Makt"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"lawforce"></a>10.6. Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5511 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a second
5512 important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
5513 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
5514 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
5516 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
5517 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law. The law,
5518 meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human, trained in the
5519 tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that tradition embraced,
5520 who said whether and how the law would restrict your freedom.
5521 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649124"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxmarxbrothers"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxwarnerbrothers"></a><p>
5522 Det er en berømt historie om en kamp mellom Marx-brødrene (the Marx
5523 Brothers) og Warner Brothers. Marx-brødrene planla å lage en parodi av
5524 <em class=
"citetitle">Casablanca
</em>. Warner Brothers protesterte. De skrev et
5525 ufint brev til Marx-brødrene og advarte dem om at det ville få seriøse
5526 juridiske konsekvenser hvis de gikk videre med sin plan.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2649171" href=
"#ftn.id2649171" class=
"footnote">136</a>]
</sup>
5528 Dette fikk Marx-brødrene til å svare tilbake med samme mynt. De advarte
5529 Warner Brothers om at Marx-brødrene "var brødre lenge før dere var
5530 det".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2649192" href=
"#ftn.id2649192" class=
"footnote">137</a>]
</sup> Marx-brødrene eide derfor ordet
5531 <em class=
"citetitle">Brothers
</em>, og hvis Warner Brothers insisterte på å
5532 forsøke å kontrollere
<em class=
"citetitle">Casablanca
</em>, så ville
5533 Marx-brødrene insistere på kontroll over
<em class=
"citetitle">Brothers
</em>.
5535 Det var en absurd og hul trussel, selvfølgelig, fordi Warner Brothers, på
5536 samme måte som Marx-brødrene, visste at ingen domstol noensinne ville
5537 håndheve et slikt dumt krav. Denne ekstremismen var irrelevant for de ekte
5538 friheter som alle (inkludert Warner Brothers) nøt godt av.
5540 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on the
5541 Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a machine:
5542 Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by the copyright
5543 owner, get built into the technology that delivers copyrighted content. It
5544 is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem with code regulations
5545 is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code would not get the humor of the
5546 Marx Brothers. The consequence of that is not at all funny.
5547 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649250"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649258"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxadobeebookreader"></a><p>
5548 La oss se på livet til min Adobe eBook Reader.
5550 En ebok er en bok levert i elektronisk form. En Adobe eBook er ikke en bok
5551 som Adobe har publisert. Adobe produserer kun programvaren som utgivere
5552 bruker å levere e-bøker. Den bidrar med teknologien, og utgiveren leverer
5553 innholdet ved hjelp av teknologien.
5555 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook Reader.
5558 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this e-book
5559 library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the public domain:
5560 <em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em>, for example, is in the public domain.
5561 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My own book
5562 <em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em> is not yet within the public
5563 domain. Consider
<em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em> first. If you click on
5564 my e-book copy of
<em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em>, you'll see a fancy
5565 cover, and then a button at the bottom called Permissions.
5566 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1611"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.12. Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1611.png" alt=
"Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5567 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the permissions
5568 that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
5569 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1612"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.13. List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1612.png" alt=
"List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5572 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the clipboard
5573 of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far, I've copied no
5574 text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to print ten pages from
5575 the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the permission to use the Read Aloud
5576 button to hear
<em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em> read aloud through the
5579 Her er e-boken for et annet allemannseid verk (inkludert oversettelsen):
5580 Aristoteles
<em class=
"citetitle">Politikk
</em> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649383"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649389"></a>
5581 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1621"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.14. E-bok av Aristoteles
<span class=
"quote">“<span class=
"quote">Politikk
</span>”</span></b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1621.png" alt=
"E-bok av Aristoteles Politikk"></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5582 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted at
5583 all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear the book.
5584 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1622"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.15. Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1622.png" alt='Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles
"Politikk".'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5585 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the original
5586 e-book version of my last book,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em>:
5587 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1631"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.16. List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1631.png" alt='List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas".'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5588 Ingen kopiering, ingen utskrift, og våg ikke å prøve å lytte til denne
5591 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
— as if
5592 the publisher has the power to control how you use these works. For works
5593 under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have the power
—up
5594 to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not under copyright, there
5595 is no such copyright power.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2649469" href=
"#ftn.id2649469" class=
"footnote">138</a>]
</sup> When my
5596 e-book of
<em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em> says I have the permission to
5597 copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten days, what that
5598 really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control
5599 how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would
5602 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology within
5603 which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are permissions,
5604 they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal with. When a
5605 teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she knows (unless
5606 she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but will suffer a
5607 punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the
5608 permission to make ten copies of the text into the computer's memory, that
5609 means that after I've made ten copies, the computer will not make any
5610 more. The same with the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook
5611 Reader will not print any more pages. It's the same with the silly
5612 restriction that says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my
5613 book aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
5614 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply won't
5618 These are
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>controls
</em></span>, not permissions. Imagine a world
5619 where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried
5620 to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
5621 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649525"></a>
5623 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
5624 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>law
</em></span> as copyright
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>code
</em></span>. The
5625 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified by
5626 courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that are coded
5627 by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into the law are
5628 always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are built into the
5629 technology have no similar built-in check.
5631 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the controls
5632 built into the technology? Software used to be sold with technologies that
5633 limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those were trivial
5634 protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these protections
5637 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe eBook
5640 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
5641 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free on the
5642 Adobe site was a copy of
<em class=
"citetitle">Alice's Adventures in
5643 Wonderland
</em>. This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet
5644 when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
5645 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649576"></a>
5646 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1641"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.17. List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1641.png" alt=
"List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland"."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5647 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to copy,
5648 not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the "permissions"
5649 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
5651 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission. For the
5652 text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read Aloud button;
5653 it said you did not have the permission to read the book aloud. That led
5654 some people to think that Adobe was restricting the right of parents, for
5655 example, to read the book to their children, which seemed, to say the least,
5658 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying to
5659 restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only restricting
5660 the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book read aloud. But
5661 the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would Adobe thus agree that a
5662 consumer was free to use software to hack around the restrictions built into
5663 the eBook Reader? If some company (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to
5664 disable the technological protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a
5665 blind person, say, could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe
5666 agree that such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer
5667 because the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
5669 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most innovative
5670 companies developing strategies to balance open access to content with
5671 incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's technology enables
5672 control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this control. That incentive
5673 is understandable, yet what it creates is often crazy.
5674 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649657"></a><p>
5675 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite story
5676 of mine that makes the same point.
5677 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxaibo1"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxroboticdog1"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxsonyaibo1"></a><p>
5678 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo learns tricks,
5679 cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity and that doesn't
5680 leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
5682 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world have set up
5683 clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web site to enable
5684 information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
5686 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site), and
5687 on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo to do tricks
5688 in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
5690 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers. You
5691 teach a computer how to do something by programming it differently. So to
5692 say that aibopet.com was giving information about how to teach the dog to do
5693 new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com was giving information to users
5694 of the Aibo pet about how to hack their computer "dog" to make it do new
5695 tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
5697 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
5698 <em class=
"citetitle">hack
</em> has a particularly unfriendly
5699 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror
5700 movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them,
5701 <em class=
"citetitle">hack
</em> is a much more positive
5702 term.
<em class=
"citetitle">Hack
</em> just means code that enables the program
5703 to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy a
5704 new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer doesn't
5705 run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be happy
5706 to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a driver to enable
5707 the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
5709 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a community like
5710 to challenge themselves and others with increasingly difficult
5711 tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
5712 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
5715 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program and
5716 offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to dance
5717 jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever bit of
5718 tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature than Sony had
5720 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649783"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649791"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649799"></a><p>
5722 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the United
5723 States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience, is it
5724 permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We forget that
5725 stories about the backcountry still flow across much of the world. So let's
5726 just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime anywhere (anymore) to
5727 dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog to dance jazz. Nor should it
5728 be a crime (though we don't have a lot to go on here) to teach your robot
5729 dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a completely legal activity. One imagines
5730 that the owner of aibopet.com thought,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>What possible problem could
5731 there be with teaching a robot dog to dance?
</em></span>
5733 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
— not
5734 literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic named Ed
5735 Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic is well known and
5736 respected. He was hired by the government in the Microsoft case to test
5737 Microsoft's claims about what could and could not be done with its own
5738 code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his brilliance and his
5739 coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft lawyers, Ed Felten stood his
5740 ground. He was not about to be bullied into being silent about something he
5743 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2649855" href=
"#ftn.id2649855" class=
"footnote">139</a>]
</sup> He and a group of colleagues were working on a
5744 paper to be submitted at conference. The paper was intended to describe the
5745 weakness in an encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
5746 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
5748 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content owners to
5749 exercise much better control over their content than the Internet, as it
5750 originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI hoped to develop a
5751 standard that would allow the content owner to say "this music cannot be
5752 copied," and have a computer respect that command. The technology was to be
5753 part of a "trusted system" of control that would get content owners to trust
5754 the system of the Internet much more.
5756 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition. In
5757 exchange for providing contestants with the code to an SDMI-encrypted bit of
5758 content, contestants were to try to crack it and, if they did, report the
5759 problems to the consortium.
5763 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and the
5764 team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption systems
5765 would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team thought it
5766 worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
5768 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
5769 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not just
5770 because it is the law, but also because it is a really great idea. A
5771 strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to encourage a wide
5772 range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in turn, to improve the
5773 systems or people or ideas criticized.
5775 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper describing
5776 the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free music, or
5777 building and deploying this technology. The paper was an academic essay,
5778 unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the weakness in the
5779 SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently constituted, succeed.
5780 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxaibo2"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxroboticdog2"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxsonyaibo2"></a><p>
5781 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they then
5782 received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the aibopet.com
5783 hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony wrote:
5784 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
5785 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent AIBO-ware's
5786 copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the anti-circumvention
5787 provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
5788 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650020"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650028"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650036"></a><p>
5789 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system of
5790 encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter from an
5791 RIAA lawyer that read:
5792 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
5794 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the Public
5795 Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by the
5796 Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions under the
5797 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
5798 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5799 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the spread
5800 of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made spreading such
5801 information an offense.
5803 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear about
5804 cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively dead; the
5805 response was to find technologies that might compensate. These new
5806 technologies would be copyright protection technologies
— technologies
5807 to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted material. They
5808 were designed as
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>code
</em></span> to modify the original
5809 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>code
</em></span> of the Internet, to reestablish some protection
5810 for copyright owners.
5812 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this code
5813 designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
5814 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>legal code
</em></span> intended to buttress
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>software
5815 code
</em></span> which itself was intended to support the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>legal
5816 code of copyright
</em></span>.
5818 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to the
5819 extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did not end at
5820 the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated devices that were
5821 designed to circumvent copyright protection measures. It was designed to ban
5822 those devices, whether or not the use of the copyrighted material made
5823 possible by that circumvention would have been a copyright violation.
5824 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650114"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650120"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650127"></a><p>
5826 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
5827 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to dance
5828 jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted material. But
5829 as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did not enable
5830 subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that aibopet.com's hack
5831 was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet fair use is not a defense
5832 to the DMCA. The question is not whether the use of the copyrighted material
5833 was a copyright violation. The question is whether a copyright protection
5834 system was circumvented.
5836 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the same line
5837 of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a copyright protection
5838 system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer suggested, Felten himself was
5839 distributing a circumvention technology. Thus, even though he was not
5840 himself infringing anyone's copyright, his academic paper was enabling
5841 others to infringe others' copyright.
5842 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650164"></a><p>
5843 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
1981 by
5844 Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that the VCR could
5845 be banned because it was a copyright-infringing technology: It enabled
5846 consumers to copy films without the permission of the copyright owner. No
5847 doubt there were uses of the technology that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
5848 "
<em class=
"citetitle">Mr. Rogers
</em>," for example, had testified in that case
5849 that he wanted people to feel free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
5850 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650184"></a>
5851 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
5852 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
5853 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that it's
5854 a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show them
5855 at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all of this
5856 new technology that allows people to tape the "Neighborhood" off-the-air,
5857 and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood" because that's what I produce, that
5858 they then become much more active in the programming of their family's
5859 television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by
5860 others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always been "You are an
5861 important person just the way you are. You can make healthy decisions."
5862 Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a
5863 person to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy
5864 way, is important.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650211" href=
"#ftn.id2650211" class=
"footnote">140</a>]
</sup>
5865 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5868 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were some uses
5869 that were illegal, the court held the companies producing the VCR
5872 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to the DMCA.
5873 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650252"></a>
5875 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
5877 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright circumvention
5878 technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for different
5879 ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive pirating of
5880 copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used to enable the use
5881 of particular copyrighted materials in ways that would be considered fair
5882 use
—a good end.
5885 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most would agree
5886 such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target practice or to
5887 protect against an intruder. At least some would say that such a use would
5888 be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good and bad uses.
5889 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1711"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1711.png" alt=
"VCR/handgun cartoon."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5890 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world where guns
5891 are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and circumvention
5892 technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>No one ever died from copyright
5893 circumvention
</em></span>. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
5894 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but permits
5895 guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650310"></a>
5896 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650318"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650324"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650330"></a><p>
5897 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are changing the
5898 balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright owners restrict
5899 fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would attempt to evade the
5900 restrictions on fair use that they impose through code. Technology becomes a
5901 means by which fair use can be erased; the law of the DMCA backs up that
5904 This is how
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>code
</em></span> becomes
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>law
</em></span>. The
5905 controls built into the technology of copy and access protection become
5906 rules the violation of which is also a violation of the law. In this way,
5907 the code extends the law
—increasing its regulation, even if the
5908 subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute
5909 fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the
5910 law; code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
5911 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the nasty
5912 letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
5914 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and law
5915 that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is the ease
5916 with which infringements of the law can be detected. For contrary to the
5917 rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the Internet, no one
5918 knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing technologies deployed on
5919 the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who committed a legal wrong. The
5920 technologies of the Internet are open to snoops as well as sharers, and the
5921 snoops are increasingly good at tracking down the identity of those who
5926 For example, imagine you were part of a
<em class=
"citetitle">Star Trek
</em> fan
5927 club. You gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of
5928 fan fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
5929 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then simply
5930 continue it.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650394" href=
"#ftn.id2650394" class=
"footnote">141</a>]
</sup>
5932 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated activity.
5933 No matter what happened inside your club room, you would never be interfered
5934 with by the copyright police. You were free in that space to do as you
5935 wished with this part of our culture. You were allowed to build on it as you
5936 wished without fear of legal control.
5938 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
5939 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
5940 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would quickly find
5941 your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon the ownership of the
5942 series that you're depicting, could well inspire a lawyer's threat. And
5943 ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely costly indeed. The law of
5944 copyright is extremely efficient. The penalties are severe, and the process
5947 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change in the
5948 ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts the law's
5949 balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at which you
5950 traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just one step before
5951 the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you transmitted. That
5952 is, in effect, what is happening here.
5953 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"10.7. Marked: Konsentrasjon"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"marketconcentration"></a>10.7. Marked: Konsentrasjon
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5955 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in the past
5956 thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as well
—from
5957 regulating only publishers to now regulating just about everyone. And
5958 copyright's reach has changed, as every action becomes a copy and hence
5959 presumptively regulated. And as technologists find better ways to control
5960 the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly enforced through
5961 technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is easier to find and
5962 easier to control. This regulation of the creative process, which began as a
5963 tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the market for creative work, has
5964 become the single most important regulator of creativity there is. It is a
5965 massive expansion in the scope of the government's control over innovation
5966 and creativity; it would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth
5967 to copyright's control.
5969 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it weren't
5970 for one more change that we must also consider. This is a change that is in
5971 some sense the most familiar, though its significance and scope are not well
5972 understood. It is the one that creates precisely the reason to be concerned
5973 about all the other changes I have described.
5975 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media. In
5976 the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone a radical
5977 alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the media. Before
5978 this change happened, the different forms of media were owned by separate
5979 media companies. Now, the media is increasingly owned by only a few
5980 companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC announced in June
2003,
5981 most expect that within a few years, we will live in a world where just
5982 three companies control more than percent of the media.
5984 Det er her to sorter endringer: omfanget av konsentrasjon, og dens natur.
5986 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John McCain
5987 summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media ownership, "five
5988 companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650503" href=
"#ftn.id2650503" class=
"footnote">142</a>]
</sup> The five recording labels of Universal Music Group,
5989 BMG, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8
5990 percent of the U.S. music market.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650515" href=
"#ftn.id2650515" class=
"footnote">143</a>]
</sup> The
5991 "five largest cable companies pipe programming to
74 percent of the cable
5992 subscribers nationwide."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650528" href=
"#ftn.id2650528" class=
"footnote">144</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650538"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650544"></a>
5993 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650550"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650556"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650562"></a>
5996 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation, the
5997 nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
5998 seventy-five stations. Today
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>one
</em></span> company owns more than
5999 1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
6000 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two largest
6001 broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's revenues. Overall, just
6002 four companies control
90 percent of the nation's radio advertising
6005 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today, there are
6006 six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than there were
6007 eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the nation's
6008 circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in the United
6009 States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all film revenue. The
6010 ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent of all cable
6011 revenue. This is a market far from the free press the framers sought to
6012 protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well protected
— by the
6015 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious change is in
6016 the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows put it in a recent
6017 article about Rupert Murdoch,
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650594"></a>
6018 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
6019 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system unmatched in its
6020 integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
… Fox TV shows
6021 … Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus newspapers and books. They
6022 sell the content to the public and to advertisers
—in newspapers, on
6023 the broadcast network, on the cable channels. And they operate the physical
6024 distribution system through which the content reaches the
6025 customers. Murdoch's satellite systems now distribute News Corp. content in
6026 Europe and Asia; if Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that
6027 system will serve the same function in the United States.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650619" href=
"#ftn.id2650619" class=
"footnote">145</a>]
</sup>
6028 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6029 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not just large
6030 companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies owning as many
6031 outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this pattern better than a
6032 thousand words could do:
6033 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1761"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
10.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1761.png" alt=
"Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
6036 Betyr denne konsentrasjonen noe? Påvirker det hva som blir laget, eller hva
6037 som blir distribuert? Eller er det bare en mer effektiv måte å produsere og
6038 distribuere innhold?
6040 Mitt syn var at konsentrasjonen ikke betød noe. Jeg tenkte det ikke var noe
6041 mer enn en mer effektiv finansiell struktur. Men nå, etter å ha lest og
6042 hørt på en haug av skapere prøve å overbevise meg om det motsatte, har jeg
6043 begynt å endre mening.
6045 Her er en representativ historie som kan foreslå hvorfor denne integreringen
6047 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650698"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650704"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650710"></a><p>
6048 I
1969 laget Norman Lear en polit for
<em class=
"citetitle">All in the
6049 Family
</em>. Han tok piloten til ABC, og nettverket likte det ikke.
6050 Da sa til Lear at det var for på kanten. Gjør det om igjen. Lear lagde
6051 piloten på nytt, mer på kanten enn den første. ABC ble fra seg. Du får
6052 ikke med deg poenget, fortalte de Lear. Vi vil ha det mindre på kanten,
6055 I stedet for å føye seg, to Lear ganske enkelt serien sin til noen andre.
6056 CBS var glad for å ha seriene, og ABC kunne ikke stoppe Lear fra å gå til
6057 andre. Opphavsretten som Lear hadde sikret uavhengighet fra
6058 nettverk-kontroll.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650744" href=
"#ftn.id2650744" class=
"footnote">146</a>]
</sup>
6063 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade the
6064 networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law required a
6065 separation between the networks and the content producers; that separation
6066 would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992, because of these rules,
6067 the vast majority of prime time television
—75 percent of it
—was
6068 "independent" of the networks.
6070 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence. After
6071 that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985, there were
6072 twenty-five independent television production studios; in
2002, only five
6073 independent television studios remained. "In
1992, only
15 percent of new
6074 series were produced for a network by a company it controlled. Last year,
6075 the percentage of shows produced by controlled companies more than
6076 quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16 new series were produced
6077 independently of conglomerate control, last year there was one."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650774" href=
"#ftn.id2650774" class=
"footnote">147</a>]
</sup> In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was
6078 owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
6079 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week produced by network
6080 studios increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television
6081 hours per week produced by independent studios decreased
63%."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650817" href=
"#ftn.id2650817" class=
"footnote">148</a>]
</sup>
6082 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650825"></a><p>
6083 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<em class=
"citetitle">All in the
6084 Family
</em> would find that he had the choice either to make the show
6085 less edgy or to be fired: The content of any show developed for a network is
6086 increasingly owned by the network.
6088 Mens antall kanaler har økt dramatisk, har eierskapet til disse kanalene
6089 snevret inn fra få til stadig færre. Som Barry Diller sa til Bill Moyers,
6090 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650849"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650855"></a>
6091 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
6092 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on their
6093 channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes through their
6094 controlled distribution system, then what you get is fewer and fewer actual
6095 voices participating in the process. [We u]sed to have dozens and dozens of
6096 thriving independent production companies producing television programs. Now
6097 you have less than a handful.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650873" href=
"#ftn.id2650873" class=
"footnote">149</a>]
</sup>
6098 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6099 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such large
6100 and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous. Increasingly
6101 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from networks like
6102 this is increasingly tailored to the message the network wants to
6103 convey. This is not the communist party, though from the inside, it must
6104 feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question without risk of
6105 consequence
—not necessarily banishment to Siberia, but punishment
6106 nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are quashed. This is not
6107 the environment for a democracy.
6108 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650897"></a><p>
6109 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
6110 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
6111 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
6112 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business. The
6113 same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media companies
6114 would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2650925" href=
"#ftn.id2650925" class=
"footnote">150</a>]
</sup> Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not,
6115 sprint. Yet if the field is only open to the giants, there will be far too
6116 little sprinting.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650954"></a>
6118 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media market to say
6119 with certainty what concentration and integration will do. The efficiencies
6120 are important, and the effect on culture is hard to measure.
6122 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly suggest
6125 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
6126 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
6127 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
6130 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to any
6131 position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound mistake. I
6132 am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once wrecked by
6133 drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were all quite legal. I
6134 believe this war is a profound mistake because the collateral damage from it
6135 is so great as to make waging the war insane. When you add together the
6136 burdens on the criminal justice system, the desperation of generations of
6137 kids whose only real economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the
6138 queering of constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance
6139 this war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
6140 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the local
6141 drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal benefit in
6142 reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
6144 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it is
6145 through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we depend
6146 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about these issues.
6148 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched a
6149 media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced scores
6150 of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In one series
6151 (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing the idea of
6152 legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral damage from the
6153 war. One advances an argument in favor of drug legalization. The other
6154 responds in a powerful and effective way against the argument of the
6155 first. In the end, the first guy changes his mind (hey, it's
6156 television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on the pro-legalization
6159 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
6160 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
6162 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
6163 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
6164 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
6168 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
6169 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in the
6170 world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your message will be
6173 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
6174 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
6175 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
6176 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First Amendment, but
6177 the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to choose what they
6178 run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media will refuse one side of a
6179 crucial debate the opportunity to present its case. And the courts will
6180 defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2651056" href=
"#ftn.id2651056" class=
"footnote">151</a>]
</sup>
6182 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived in a
6183 media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media throws
6184 that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control access to the
6185 media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which political
6186 positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in an obvious
6187 and important way, concentration matters. You might like the positions the
6188 handful of companies selects. But you should not like a world in which a
6189 mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
6190 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"10.8. Sammen"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"together"></a>10.8. Sammen
</h2></div></div></div><p>
6191 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the copyright
6192 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In the abstract,
6193 it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No sane sort who is
6194 not an anarchist could disagree.
6197 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
— when we
6198 recognize how it might now interact with both technology and markets to mean
6199 that the effective constraint on the liberty to cultivate our culture is
6200 dramatically different
—the claim begins to seem less innocent and
6201 obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to supplement the law's control,
6202 and (
2) the power of concentrated markets to weaken the opportunity for
6203 dissent, if strictly enforcing the massively expanded "property" rights
6204 granted by copyright fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture
6205 to cultivate and build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this
6206 property should be redefined.
6208 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish copyright
6209 or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total mistake,
6210 disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within our culture
6213 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
6214 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
6215 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
6216 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
6217 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether
6218 another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that increases
6219 copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
6220 adjustment to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
6221 regulation
—a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
6223 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of constant
6224 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and geeks now
6225 flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a short period of
6226 time, as the technologies of distribution and creation have changed and as
6227 lobbyists have pushed for more control by copyright holders. Changes in the
6228 past in response to changes in technology suggest that we may well need
6229 similar changes in the future. And these changes have to be
6230 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>reductions
</em></span> in the scope of copyright, in response to
6231 the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the market enable.
6234 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that we
6235 see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add together
6236 the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and changing technology,
6237 together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Never in our
6238 history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the development of
6239 our culture than now
</em></span>.
6241 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were perpetual, they
6242 affected only that precise creative work. Not when only publishers had the
6243 tools to publish, for the market then was much more diverse. Not when there
6244 were only three television networks, for even then, newspapers, film
6245 studios, radio stations, and publishers were independent of the
6246 networks.
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Never
</em></span> has copyright protected such a wide
6247 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
6248 remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny
6249 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a
6250 massive regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
6251 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the
6252 most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
6253 known.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2651260" href=
"#ftn.id2651260" class=
"footnote">152</a>]
</sup>
6255 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
6257 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
6258 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have distinguished
6259 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now combine these two
6260 distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes that copyright law has
6261 undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
6262 </p><div class=
"informaltable"><a name=
"t2"></a><table border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char"> </th><th align=
"char">Publisere
</th><th align=
"char">Omforme
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Ikke-kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td></tr></tbody></table></div><p>
6264 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by copyright
6265 law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as copyright attached
6266 only with registration, and only those who intended to benefit commercially
6267 would register, copying through publishing of noncommercial work was also
6270 På slutten av det nittende århundre hadde loven blitt endret til dette:
6271 </p><div class=
"informaltable"><a name=
"t3"></a><table border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char"> </th><th align=
"char">Publisere
</th><th align=
"char">Omforme
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Ikke-kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td></tr></tbody></table></div><p>
6272 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if published,
6273 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time, means if offered
6274 commercially. But noncommercial publishing and transformation were still
6277 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after this
6278 change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the technology of
6279 copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law expanded. Thus by
1975,
6280 as photocopying machines became more common, we could say the law began to
6282 </p><div class=
"informaltable"><a name=
"t4"></a><table border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char"> </th><th align=
"char">Kopiere
</th><th align=
"char">Omforme
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Ikke-kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©/Fri
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td></tr></tbody></table></div><p>
6283 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say, copy
6284 machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial market
6285 remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital technologies,
6286 especially in the context of a digital network, means that the law now looks
6288 </p><div class=
"informaltable"><a name=
"t5"></a><table border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char"> </th><th align=
"char">Kopiere
</th><th align=
"char">Omforme
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Ikke-kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td></tr></tbody></table></div><p>
6290 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most creativity was
6291 not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity
— commercial or
6292 not, transformative or not
—with the same rules designed to regulate
6293 commercial publishers.
6295 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation that does
6296 no good. So the question that we should be asking just now is whether
6297 extending the regulations of copyright law into each of these domains
6298 actually does any good.
6300 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying. But I
6301 also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when regulating (as it
6302 regulates just now) noncommercial copying and, especially, noncommercial
6303 transformation. And increasingly, for the reasons sketched especially in
6304 chapters
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#recorders" title=
"7. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne">7</a> and
6305 <a class=
"xref" href=
"#transformers" title=
"8. Kapittel åtte: Omformere">8</a>, one might
6306 well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
6307 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created if
6308 derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
6310 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of course
6311 copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any property, the
6312 state ought to protect it. But first impressions notwithstanding,
6313 historically, this property right (as with all property rights
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2651610" href=
"#ftn.id2651610" class=
"footnote">153</a>]
</sup>) has been crafted to balance the important need to
6314 give authors and artists incentives with the equally important need to
6315 assure access to creative work. This balance has always been struck in light
6316 of new technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
6317 did not control
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>at all
</em></span> the freedom of others to build
6318 upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
6319 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free
6323 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important limits on
6324 the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very birth of
6325 "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by granting
6326 copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story of chapter
6327 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar concern that is
6328 increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair use right
6329 become unavoidably high (the story of chapter
7). Adding statutory rights
6330 where markets might stifle innovation is another familiar limit on the
6331 property right that copyright is (chapter
8). And granting archives and
6332 libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property notwithstanding, is
6333 a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free
6334 cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But the nature of the
6335 property that builds a free culture is very different from the extremist
6336 vision that dominates the debate today.
6338 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In response
6339 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
6340 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing and
6341 distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed in a way
6342 that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property right that
6343 is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or was intended to
6344 be. The property right that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted
6345 toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened
6346 in a world in which creation requires permission and creativity must check
6348 </p></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2646965" href=
"#id2646965" class=
"para">118</a>]
</sup>
6351 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
4794,
6352 H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the Subcommittee on
6353 Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee
6354 on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd
6355 sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
6356 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2647017" href=
"#id2647017" class=
"para">119</a>]
</sup>
6359 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
6360 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
6361 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
6362 right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
6363 ordinary meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
6364 <em class=
"citetitle">Private Property and the Constitution
</em> (New Haven:
6365 Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
6366 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2647346" href=
"#id2647346" class=
"para">120</a>]
</sup>
6369 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6370 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6371 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right
6372 self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the other three is
6373 more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<em class=
"citetitle">Code: And Other
6374 Laws of Cyberspace
</em> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6375 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Journal of Legal
6376 Studies
</em>, June
1998.
6377 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2647410" href=
"#id2647410" class=
"para">121</a>]
</sup>
6379 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6380 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6381 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6382 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6383 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6384 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss
6385 of freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries
6386 of ordinary life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view,
6387 which depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6388 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of
6389 liberty. As I argued in
<em class=
"citetitle">Code
</em>, we come from a long
6390 tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question
6391 of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6392 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of
6393 government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
<em class=
"citetitle">On Liberty
</em>
6394 (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously
6395 defended the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the
6396 market; John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and
6397 Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
<em class=
"citetitle">John R. Commons: Selected
6398 Essays
</em> (London: Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with
6399 Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical disabilities
6400 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making access
6401 to those places easier;
42 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>,
6402 section
12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6403 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of those
6404 interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the effective
6405 liberty that each of these groups might face.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647458"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2647467"></a>
6406 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2647620" href=
"#id2647620" class=
"para">122</a>]
</sup>
6409 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6410 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
23</a>. For a more recent
6411 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6412 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6 October
2003, available at
6413 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
24</a>.
6414 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2647670" href=
"#id2647670" class=
"para">123</a>]
</sup>
6417 Fred Warshofsky,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Patent Wars
</em> (New York: Wiley,
6418 1994),
170–71.
6419 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2647835" href=
"#id2647835" class=
"para">124</a>]
</sup>
6422 Se for eksempel James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6423 Environmentalism for the Net?"
<em class=
"citetitle">Duke Law Journal
</em> 47
6425 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648038" href=
"#id2648038" class=
"para">125</a>]
</sup>
6427 William W. Crosskey,
<em class=
"citetitle">Politics and the Constitution in the History
6428 of the United States
</em> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953),
6429 vol.
1,
485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6430 Law of the Land,'
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6431 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</em></span>" (emphasis
6432 added). <a class="indexterm
" name="id2648054
"></a>
6433 </p></div><div class="footnote
"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2648110
" href="#id2648110
" class="para
">126</a>] </sup>
6436 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790 to
6437 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <em class="citetitle
">A
6438 History of Book Publishing in the United States</em>, vol. 1,
6439 <em class="citetitle
">The Creation of an Industry, 1630–1865</em> (New
6440 York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000 imprints recorded before 1790, only
6441 twelve were copyrighted under the 1790 act; William J. Maher,
6442 <em class="citetitle
">Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the Copyright Law of
6443 1790 in Historical Context</em>, 7–10 (2002), available at
6444 <a class="ulink
" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/
" target="_top
">link #25</a>. Thus, the
6445 overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the public domain. Even
6446 those works that were copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly,
6447 because the term of copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was
6448 fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen
6449 years. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </p></div><div class="footnote
"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2648176
" href="#id2648176
" class="para
">127</a>] </sup>
6452 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance, of
6453 the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were renewed in 1910. For
6454 a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
6455 "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Studies on
6456 Copyright
</em>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
1963),
6457 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and
6458 Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6459 <em class=
"citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review
</em> 70 (
2003):
471,
6460 498–501, and accompanying figures.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648205" href=
"#id2648205" class=
"para">128</a>]
</sup>
6463 Se Ringer, kap.
9, n.
2.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648300" href=
"#id2648300" class=
"para">129</a>]
</sup>
6466 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the first
6467 year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never more than
6468 thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and Posner,
6469 "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6470 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648424" href=
"#id2648424" class=
"para">130</a>]
</sup>
6473 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of
6474 American Literature,"
29 <em class=
"citetitle">New York University Journal of
6475 International Law and Politics
</em> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth,
6476 ed., Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6478 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648505" href=
"#id2648505" class=
"para">131</a>]
</sup>
6480 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Legal
6481 Affairs
</em>, julu/august
2003,tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
26</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2648533"></a>
6482 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648552" href=
"#id2648552" class=
"para">132</a>]
</sup>
6484 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument about
6485 the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective of the
6486 First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See Jed
6487 Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,"
6488 <em class=
"citetitle">Yale Law Journal
</em> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see
6489 especially pp.
53–59).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2648563"></a>
6490 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648608" href=
"#id2648608" class=
"para">133</a>]
</sup>
6493 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6494 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6495 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't make
6496 a copy;
17 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>, section
106(
4). And it
6497 certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
6498 Code
</em>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the existing law
6499 (which regulates "copies;"
17 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>,
6500 section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6501 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648670" href=
"#id2648670" class=
"para">134</a>]
</sup>
6504 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends, we
6505 should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for its
6506 extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the basis of
6507 arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6508 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2648616" href=
"#id2648616" class=
"para">135</a>]
</sup>
6511 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather
6512 that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not
6513 make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be
6514 designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies
6516 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2649171" href=
"#id2649171" class=
"para">136</a>]
</sup>
6519 Se David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Law and
6520 Contemporary Problems
</em> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
6521 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2649192" href=
"#id2649192" class=
"para">137</a>]
</sup>
6523 Ibid. Se også Vaidhyanathan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyrights and
6524 Copywrongs
</em>,
1–3.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649183"></a>
6525 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2649469" href=
"#id2649469" class=
"para">138</a>]
</sup>
6528 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
6529 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
6530 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
6531 obligation (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
6532 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would not
6533 necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
6534 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2649855" href=
"#id2649855" class=
"para">139</a>]
</sup>
6536 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
6537 <em class=
"citetitle">Science
</em> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
"Play
6538 Dead: Sony Muzzles the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,"
6539 <em class=
"citetitle">American Prospect
</em>, January
2002; "Court Dismisses
6540 Computer Scientists' Challenge to DMCA,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Intellectual Property
6541 Litigation Reporter
</em>,
11 December
2001; Bill Holland, "Copyright
6542 Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Billboard
</em>, May
6543 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com, April
2001;
6544 Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked Questions about
6545 <em class=
"citetitle">Felten and USENIX
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">RIAA
</em>
6546 Legal Case," available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
6547 #
27</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649892"></a>
6548 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650211" href=
"#id2650211" class=
"para">140</a>]
</sup>
6550 <em class=
"citetitle">Sony Corporation of America
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Universal
6551 City Studios, Inc
</em>.,
464 U.S.
417,
455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers
6552 never changed his view about the VCR. See James Lardner,
<em class=
"citetitle">Fast
6553 Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR
</em>
6554 (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2649200"></a>
6555 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650394" href=
"#id2650394" class=
"para">141</a>]
</sup>
6558 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
6559 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Loyola of Los
6560 Angeles Entertainment Law Journal
</em> 17 (
1997):
651.
6561 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650503" href=
"#id2650503" class=
"para">142</a>]
</sup>
6564 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
6565 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003) (statement
6566 of Senator John McCain).
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650515" href=
"#id2650515" class=
"para">143</a>]
</sup>
6569 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to Slide,"
6570 <em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
23 December
2002.
6571 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650528" href=
"#id2650528" class=
"para">144</a>]
</sup>
6574 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Charleston
6575 Gazette
</em>,
31 May
2003.
6576 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650619" href=
"#id2650619" class=
"para">145</a>]
</sup>
6578 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Atlantic Monthly
</em>
6579 (September
2003):
89.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2650634"></a>
6580 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650744" href=
"#id2650744" class=
"para">146</a>]
</sup>
6583 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center Forum,
6584 "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis, Missouri,
3 April
6585 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
28</a>; for the Lear story,
6586 not included in the prepared remarks, see
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
29</a>).
6587 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650774" href=
"#id2650774" class=
"para">147</a>]
</sup>
6590 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
6591 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
6592 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union and
6593 the Consumer Federation of America), available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
30</a>. Kimmelman quotes
6594 Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West, in her Remarks
6595 at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
2003.
6596 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650817" href=
"#id2650817" class=
"para">148</a>]
</sup>
6600 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650873" href=
"#id2650873" class=
"para">149</a>]
</sup>
6603 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Now with Bill
6604 Moyers
</em>, Bill Moyers,
25 April
2003, redigert avskrift
6605 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
6607 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2650925" href=
"#id2650925" class=
"para">150</a>]
</sup>
6610 Clayton M. Christensen,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
6611 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do
6612 Business
</em> (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
6613 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean
6614 Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and
6615 Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Research
6616 Policy
</em> 14 (
1985):
235–51. For a more recent study, see
6617 Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Creative Destruction: Why
6618 Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market
—and How to
6619 Successfully Transform Them
</em> (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
6620 2001).
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2651056" href=
"#id2651056" class=
"para">151</a>]
</sup>
6622 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads that
6623 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
6624 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
6625 policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
6626 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
6627 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and returned
6628 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These
6629 restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for example,
6630 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection
6631 from TV Networks,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
13 March
2003,
6632 C4. Outside of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC
6633 or the courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general
6634 overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
6635 Advertising on Television and Radio,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Yale Law and Policy
6636 Review
</em> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a more recent summary of
6637 the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
<em class=
"citetitle">Radio-Television News
6638 Directors Association
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">FCC
</em>,
184 F.
3d
6639 872 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
6640 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
6641 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel
6642 buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni
6643 Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
32</a>. The ground was that
6644 the criticism was "too controversial."
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651104"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651113"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651119"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651125"></a>
6645 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651131"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651138"></a>
6646 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2651260" href=
"#id2651260" class=
"para">152</a>]
</sup>
6648 Siva Vaidhyanathan fanger et lignende poeng i hans "fire kapitulasjoner" for
6649 opphavsrettsloven i den digitale tidsalder. Se Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
6650 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651082"></a>
6651 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2651610" href=
"#id2651610" class=
"para">153</a>]
</sup>
6653 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist movement
6654 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance public
6655 and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of Property,"
6656 in
<em class=
"citetitle">Nomos XXII: Property
</em>, J. Roland Pennock and John
6657 W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press,
1980).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651622"></a>
6658 </p></div></div></div></div><div class=
"part" title=
"Part III. Nøtter"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-puzzles"></a>Part III. Nøtter
</h1></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"11. Kapittel elleve: Chimera"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"chimera"></a>11. Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxchimera"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxwells"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxtcotb"></a><p>
6659 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez
6660 trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in
6661 the Peruvian Andes.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2651749" href=
"#ftn.id2651749" class=
"footnote">154</a>]
</sup> The valley is
6662 extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate,
6663 slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent
6664 fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an
6665 opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed
6666 Man is King." So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a
6669 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of sight
6670 to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are "blind."
6671 They don't have the word
<em class=
"citetitle">blind
</em>. They think he's just
6672 thick. Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
6673 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to
6674 control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
6675 understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute,
6676 and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
6680 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
6681 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his affection,
6682 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in the whole of
6683 creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's description of what he
6684 sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies, and she listened to his
6685 description of the stars and the mountains and her own sweet white-lit
6686 beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells
6687 tells us, and "she could only half understand, but she was mysteriously
6690 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted" love,
6691 the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her father instructs,
6692 "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything right." They take
6693 Nunez to the village doctor.
6695 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain is
6696 affected," he reports.
6698 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are called the
6699 eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect his brain."
6701 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty that in
6702 order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple and easy
6703 surgical operation
—namely, to remove these irritant bodies [the
6707 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform Nunez
6708 of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride. (You'll have
6709 to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I believe in free
6710 culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.) It sometimes happens
6711 that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
6712 "chimera." A chimera is a single creature with two sets of DNA. The DNA in
6713 the blood, for example, might be different from the DNA of the skin. This
6714 possibility is an underused plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows
6715 with
100 percent certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at
6717 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651844"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651852"></a><p>
6718 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were impossible. A
6719 single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of DNA is that it is
6720 the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two individuals have
6721 the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person can have two different
6722 sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of a "person" should reflect this
6725 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
6726 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not unfairly
6727 enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing with a
6728 chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is p2p file
6729 sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong. One side
6730 says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
6731 records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
6732 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
6733 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just send
6734 the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant respects,
6735 just like what every executive in every recording company no doubt did as a
6738 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is on a
6739 p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then sure, my
6740 friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of "friends" beyond
6741 recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can get access. Whether or
6742 not sharing my music with my best friend is what "we have always been
6743 allowed to do," we have not always been allowed to share music with "our ten
6744 thousand best friends."
6746 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking into
6747 a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out with it,"
6748 that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally) releases a
6749 new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free copy to
6750 take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2651878"></a>
6755 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD from
6756 Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a CD from
6757 Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and something to show on
6758 my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note that when I take a
6759 CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that might be imposed on me, under
6760 California law, at least, is $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if
6761 I download a ten-song CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
6763 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that it
6764 is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It is
6765 a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side asserts, we
6766 need to begin to think about how we should respond to this chimera. What
6767 rules should govern it?
6769 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We could,
6770 with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a felony. We
6771 could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages just because
6772 file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get universities to
6773 monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no computer is used to commit
6774 this crime. These responses might be extreme, but each of them has either
6775 been proposed or actually implemented.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2651948" href=
"#ftn.id2651948" class=
"footnote">155</a>]
</sup>
6777 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652031"></a><p>
6778 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act as
6779 though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be no
6780 copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making copyrighted
6781 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip: regulated, if
6782 at all, by social norms but not by law.
6784 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake. Rather than
6785 embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace something that
6786 recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book with a sketch of a
6787 system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter is to show just how
6788 awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
6789 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>either
</em></span> extreme would be worse than a reasonable
6790 alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
6791 of the two extremes.
6796 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the middle of
6797 the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land grab is
6798 occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give content holders
6799 a kind of control over our culture that they have never had before. And in
6800 this extremism, many an opportunity for new innovation and new creativity
6803 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My focus
6804 instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war will also
6805 kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so broadly among our
6806 citizens, and we have just begun to see the innovation that this power will
6807 unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the passing of one cycle of
6808 innovation around technologies to distribute content. The law is responsible
6809 for this passing. As the vice president for global public policy at one of
6810 these new innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
6811 protection for copyrighted material,
6812 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
6813 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted material,
6814 and we want to protect those rights.
6816 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the major
6817 labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright interests, nor is it
6818 necessarily the best. It is simply too early to answer that question. Market
6819 forces operating naturally may very well produce a totally different
6822 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make with
6823 respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the market for
6824 digital media and the manner in which digital media are distributed. This in
6825 turn will directly influence the options that are available to consumers,
6826 both in terms of the ease with which they will be able to access digital
6827 media and the equipment that they will require to do so. Poor choices made
6828 this early in the game will retard the growth of this market, hurting
6829 everyone's interests.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2652125" href=
"#ftn.id2652125" class=
"footnote">156</a>]
</sup>
6830 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6831 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal, one of "the
6832 major labels." Its position on these matters has now changed.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652148"></a>
6834 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash piracy. It
6835 will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will kill
6836 opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
6837 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2651749" href=
"#id2651749" class=
"para">154</a>]
</sup>
6840 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). Se H. G. Wells,
6841 <em class=
"citetitle">The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</em>, Michael
6842 Sherborne, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
6843 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2651948" href=
"#id2651948" class=
"para">155</a>]
</sup>
6845 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
6846 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, "Copyright
6847 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available at
6848 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
33</a>. Reps. John
6849 Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill
6850 that would treat unauthorized on-line copying as a felony offense with
6851 punishments ranging as high as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
6852 "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Los Angeles
6853 Times
</em>,
17 July
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
34</a>. Civil penalties are
6854 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
6855 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
6856 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer, see
6857 <em class=
"citetitle">RIAA
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Verizon Internet Services (In
6858 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</em>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
6859 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
6860 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful arsenal
6861 in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from $
12,
000 to
6862 $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on university
6863 networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98 billion the RIAA
6864 could seek should the matter proceed to court. See Elizabeth Young,
6865 "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com, August
2003, available
6866 at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
35</a>. For an
6867 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
6868 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer identities,
6869 see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students,"
6870 <em class=
"citetitle">Boston Globe
</em>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
36</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652015"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652023"></a>
6871 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2652125" href=
"#id2652125" class=
"para">156</a>]
</sup>
6874 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
6875 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
6876 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, House
6877 Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter Harter,
6878 vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards, EMusic.com), available
6879 in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony File.
</p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"12. Kapittel tolv: Skader"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"harms"></a>12. Kapittel tolv: Skader
</h2></div></div></div><p>
6880 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has launched
6881 a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
6882 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both direct
6883 and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these damages will be
6884 suffered most by our own people.
6886 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
6887 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to extend
6888 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war justified?
6890 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the first
6891 time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the power of
6892 the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in our
6894 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652198"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652204"></a><p>
6895 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on the
6896 side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims of control
6897 in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical rejection of "piracy"
6902 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to describe
6903 just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite confident
6904 the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The first two
6905 protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in the wings to fight
6906 today's monopolists of culture.
6907 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"12.1. Constraining Creators"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"constrain"></a>12.1. Constraining Creators
</h2></div></div></div><p>
6908 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies.
6909 These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
6910 content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have done
6911 since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But capturing and
6912 sharing through digital technology is different. The fidelity and power are
6913 different. You could send an e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on
6914 Comedy Central, or you could send the clip. You could write an essay about
6915 the inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
6916 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
6917 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could weave
6918 together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your favorite artists
6919 in a collage and make it available on the Net.
6921 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
6922 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and in
6923 part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it explodes
6924 the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of digital
6925 "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily diverse
6926 creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that creativity is
6927 applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens to use
6928 technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture all
6932 Teknologien har dermed gitt oss en mulighet til å gjøre noe med kultur som
6933 bare har vært mulig for enkeltpersoner i små grupper, isolert fra andre
6934 grupper. Forestill deg en gammel mann som forteller en historie til en
6935 samling med naboer i en liten landsby. Forestill deg så den samme
6936 historiefortellingen utvidet til å nå over hele verden.
6938 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In the
6939 current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for a
6940 moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web sites that
6941 offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites that catalog
6942 cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound to criticize
6943 politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles on remote
6944 topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative work spread
6945 across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this work is
6946 presumptively illegal.
6948 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples of
6949 extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It is
6950 impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed and what's not, and at the
6951 same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh. The
6952 four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3
6953 was just one) were threatened with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search
6954 engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which
6955 defrauded investors of $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in
6956 market capitalization of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere
6957 $
750 million.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2652320" href=
"#ftn.id2652320" class=
"footnote">157</a>]
</sup> And under legislation
6958 being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who negligently removes the
6959 wrong leg in an operation would be liable for no more than $
250,
000 in
6960 damages for pain and suffering.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2652356" href=
"#ftn.id2652356" class=
"footnote">158</a>]
</sup> Can
6961 common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where the maximum fine for
6962 downloading two songs off the Internet is more than the fine for a doctor's
6963 negligently butchering a patient?
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652392"></a>
6965 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely high
6966 penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either never
6967 be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this creative
6968 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys "pirates." We
6969 make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public domain, because the
6970 boundaries of the public domain are designed to be unclear. It never pays to
6971 do anything except pay for the right to create, and hence only those who can
6972 pay are allowed to create. As was the case in the Soviet Union, though for
6973 very different reasons, we will begin to see a world of underground
6974 art
—not because the message is necessarily political, or because the
6975 subject is controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is
6976 legally fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
6977 States.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2651931" href=
"#ftn.id2651931" class=
"footnote">159</a>]
</sup> In what does their "illegality"
6978 consist? In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that
6979 is critical or reflective.
6981 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the changing
6982 law. I described that change in detail in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”">10</a>. But an even bigger part has to do with
6983 the increasing ease with which infractions can be tracked. As users of
6984 file-sharing systems discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for
6985 copyright owners to get courts to order Internet service providers to reveal
6986 who has what content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a
6987 list of the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that
6988 anyone could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
6990 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether his painting
6991 infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day painter, using the
6992 tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web, must worry all the
6993 time. Images are all around, but the only safe images to use in the act of
6994 creation are those purchased from Corbis or another image farm. And in
6995 purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free market in pencils; we needn't
6996 worry about its effect on creativity. But there is a highly regulated,
6997 monopolized market in cultural icons; the right to cultivate and transform
6998 them is not similarly free.
7000 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I described
7001 in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#recorders" title=
"7. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne">7</a>, in
7002 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have been
7003 lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was fair use, and
7004 hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a use.
7009 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend
7010 your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system for
7011 defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in practically
7012 every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too
7013 slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice
7014 underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich.
7015 For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides itself
7018 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
7019 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law should
7020 allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system has become
7021 that anyone actually believes this. The rules that publishers impose upon
7022 writers, the rules that film distributors impose upon filmmakers, the rules
7023 that newspapers impose upon journalists
— these are the real laws
7024 governing creativity. And these rules have little relationship to the "law"
7025 with which judges comfort themselves.
7027 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful infringement of
7028 a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to even defend
7029 against a copyright infringement claim, and which would never return to the
7030 wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs she suffered to defend
7031 her right to speak
—in that world, the astonishingly broad regulations
7032 that pass under the name "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in
7033 that world, it takes a studied blindness for people to continue to believe
7034 they live in a culture that is free.
7036 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
7037 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7039 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people are
7040 being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
7041 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still won't
7042 get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not going to
7043 get it distributed in the mainstream media unless you've got a little note
7044 from a lawyer saying, "This has been cleared." You're not even going to get
7045 it on PBS without that kind of permission. That's the point at which they
7047 </p></blockquote></div></div><div class=
"section" title=
"12.2. Constraining Innovators"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"innovators"></a>12.2. Constraining Innovators
</h2></div></div></div><p>
7048 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story
—creativity
7049 quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn't get you
7050 going. Maybe you think there's enough weird art out there, and enough
7051 expression that is critical of what seems to be just about everything. And
7052 if you think that, you might think there's little in this story to worry
7055 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense. Indeed,
7056 it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme promarket
7057 ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special one at that,
188
7058 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect by
7059 substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of "free culture." The
7060 point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
7063 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the same
7064 charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of course,
7065 concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at a minimum, we
7066 need rules of property and contract, and courts to enforce both. Likewise,
7067 in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at least some framework of
7068 copyright is also required. But both perspectives vehemently insist that
7069 just because some regulation is good, it doesn't follow that more regulation
7070 is better. And both perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which
7071 regulation simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect
7072 themselves against the competitors of tomorrow.
7073 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652588"></a><p>
7075 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory strategy
7076 that I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”">10</a>. The consequence of this massive threat of liability
7077 tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is that innovators who want to
7078 innovate in this space can safely innovate only if they have the sign-off
7079 from last generation's dominant industries. That lesson has been taught
7080 through a series of cases that were designed and executed to teach venture
7081 capitalists a lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry
7082 calls a "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been
7085 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning I told in
7086 <em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em> and which has progressed in a way
7087 that even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
7088 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652640"></a><p>
7089 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com was
7090 keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to facilitate new
7091 ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to facilitate new ways to
7092 create content. Unlike the major labels, MP3.com offered creators a venue to
7093 distribute their creativity, without demanding an exclusive engagement from
7096 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
7097 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
7098 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
7099 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie Raitt. And
7100 so on.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652670"></a>
7102 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
7103 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this preference
7104 data. In January
2000, the company launched a service called
7105 my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would sign into an
7106 account and then insert into her computer a CD. The software would identify
7107 the CD, and then give the user access to that content. So, for example, if
7108 you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then wherever you were
—at work or at
7109 home
—you could get access to that music once you signed into your
7110 account. The system was therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
7113 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But that
7114 opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the my.mp3.com
7115 service was to give users access to their own content, and as a by-product,
7116 by seeing the content they already owned, to discover the kind of content
7119 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000 CDs to
7120 a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who uploaded the music,
7121 but that would have taken a great deal of time, and would have produced a
7122 product of questionable quality.) It therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a
7123 store, and started the process of making copies of those CDs. Again, it
7124 would not serve the content from those copies to anyone except those who
7125 authenticated that they had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while
7126 this was
50,
000 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers
7127 something they had already bought.
7128 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxvivendiuniversal"></a><p>
7129 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels, headed
7130 by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled with four of
7131 the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found MP3.com to have been
7132 guilty of willful infringement with respect to the fifth. Applying the law
7133 as it is, the judge imposed a fine against MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com
7134 then settled with the remaining plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over
7135 $
54 million. Vivendi purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
7137 Den delen av historien har jeg fortalt før. Nå kommer konklusjonen.
7139 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
7140 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they had a
7141 good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be considered
7142 legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it should have been
7143 obvious that the courts would find this behavior illegal; therefore, this
7144 lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared to suggest that the law
7145 was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
7148 Den åpenbare hensikten med dette søksmålet (som ble avsluttet med et forlik
7149 for et uspesifisert beløp like etter at saken ikke lenger fikk
7150 pressedekning), var å sende en melding som ikke kan misforstås til advokater
7151 som gir råd til klienter på dette området: Det er ikke bare dine klienter
7152 som får lide hvis innholdsindustrien retter sine våpen mot dem. Det får
7153 også du. Så de av dere som tror loven burde være mindre restriktiv bør
7154 innse at et slikt syn på loven vil koste deg og ditt firma dyrt.
7155 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652774"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652782"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652788"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652794"></a><p>
7156 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003, Universal
7157 and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the venture capital firm
7158 (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of its development, its
7159 cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner (Hank Barry).
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2652808" href=
"#ftn.id2652808" class=
"footnote">160</a>]
</sup> The claim here, as well, was that the VC should
7160 have recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
7161 industry should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
7162 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim
7163 of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
7164 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at risk
7165 not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your investment
7166 buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit. So extreme has the
7167 environment become that even car manufacturers are afraid of technologies
7168 that touch content. In an article in
<em class=
"citetitle">Business
2.0</em>,
7169 Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652847"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652853"></a>
7170 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652863"></a><p>
7171 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in the car,
7172 there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW engineers in Germany
7173 had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via the car's built-in sound system,
7174 but that the company's marketing and legal departments weren't comfortable
7175 with pushing this forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are
7176 sold in the United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <sup>[
<a name=
"id2652551" href=
"#ftn.id2652551" class=
"footnote">161</a>]
</sup>
7177 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7178 Dette er verden til mafiaen
—fylt med "penger eller livet"-trusler, som
7179 ikke er regulert av domstolene men av trusler som loven gir
7180 rettighetsinnehaver mulighet til å komme med. Det er et system som åpenbart
7181 og nødvendigvis vil kvele ny innovasjon. Det er vanskelig nok å starte et
7182 selskap. Det blir helt umulig hvis selskapet er stadig truet av søksmål.
7187 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
7188 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
7189 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
7190 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and by
7191 embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law imposes, that
7192 uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more conservative than is
7193 right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking tickets, we'd not
7194 only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much less driving. The same
7195 principle applies to innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this
7196 uncertain and unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation
7197 and much less creativity.
7199 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
7200 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
7201 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
7202 systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
7203 industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
7204 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant competition.
7205 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of competition.
7206 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect of too
7207 much control in the market is to produce an overregulatedregulated market.
7210 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is the
7211 first important way in which the changes I have described will burden
7212 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture
—a culture in
7213 which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again, I am not
7214 antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I am certainly
7215 not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its limits. And
7216 leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the high costs that
7217 our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an
7218 embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our profession should
7219 therefore do everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at
7220 least do everything it can to limit the reach of the law where the law is
7221 not doing any good. The transaction costs buried within a permission culture
7222 are enough to bury a wide range of creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of
7223 justifying to justify that result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden
7224 on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more directly. This is
7225 the effort by many in the content industry to use the law to directly
7226 regulate the technology of the Internet so that it better protects their
7229 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
7230 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the Internet's
7231 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this feature is a
7232 "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content distributors have
7233 a harder time controlling the distribution of content. One obvious response
7234 to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet less efficient. If the
7235 Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says, we should break the
7236 kneecaps of the Internet.
7238 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of the
7239 content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that would
7240 require computers to determine whether the content they access is protected
7241 or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653002" href=
"#ftn.id2653002" class=
"footnote">162</a>]
</sup> Congress has already launched proceedings to
7242 explore a mandatory "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device
7243 capable of transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would
7244 disable the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast
7245 flag. Other members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers
7246 from liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
7247 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653024" href=
"#ftn.id2653024" class=
"footnote">163</a>]
</sup>
7250 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the code, why
7251 not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any regulation of technical
7252 infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular technology of the
7253 day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on the technology, but
7254 will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly those requirements.
7256 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by Intel,
7257 tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
7258 impose.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653048" href=
"#ftn.id2653048" class=
"footnote">164</a>]
</sup> Their argument was obviously
7259 not that copyright should not be protected. Instead, they argued, any
7260 protection should not do more harm than good.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653059"></a>
7262 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
7263 innovation
—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the free
7266 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form of
7267 regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others. When
7268 done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done wrong, it is
7269 regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
7271 As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”">10</a>, despite this feature of copyright as regulation, and
7272 subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica Litman in her book
7273 <em class=
"citetitle">Digital Copyright
</em>,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653094" href=
"#ftn.id2653094" class=
"footnote">165</a>]
</sup> overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10
7274 details, when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a
7275 balance to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
7276 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as in the
7277 case of the VCR) has been another.
7279 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed with the
7280 rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between the claims of a
7281 new technology and the legitimate rights of content creators, both the
7282 courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions that will have the
7283 effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
7285 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653129" href=
"#ftn.id2653129" class=
"footnote">166</a>]
</sup> It has been mirrored in the responses threatened
7286 and actually implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
7287 here.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653164" href=
"#ftn.id2653164" class=
"footnote">167</a>]
</sup> But there is one example that
7288 captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the demise of Internet
7293 As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#pirates" title=
"4. Kapittel fire: “Pirater”">4</a>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording artist
7294 doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she is also the
7295 composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a version of "Happy
7296 Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous performance before President
7297 Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
— then whenever that recording was
7298 played on the radio, the current copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would
7299 get some money, whereas Marilyn Monroe would not.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653220"></a>
7301 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some sense. The
7302 justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The recording artist
7303 thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio station was making it
7304 more likely that her records would be purchased. Thus, the recording artist
7305 got something, even if only indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to
7306 do with the result than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists
7307 were quite good at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require
7308 compensation to the recording artists.
7310 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a technology to
7311 stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast travels
7312 across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum. Thus, I can
7313 "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting in San
7314 Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a regular radio
7315 station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
7317 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there are
7318 potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could tune in
7319 to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture for broadcast
7320 radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of broadcasters and clear
7321 broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore be more competitive
7322 than regular radio; it could provide a wider range of selections. And
7323 because the potential audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche
7324 stations could easily develop and market their content to a relatively large
7325 number of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
7326 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
7331 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an improvement
7332 potentially vastly more significant than the FM improvement over AM, since
7333 not only is the technology better, so, too, is the competition. Indeed,
7334 there is a direct parallel between the fight to establish FM radio and the
7335 fight to protect Internet radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's
7336 struggle to enable FM radio,
7337 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7338 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the shortwaves,
7339 thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in the crowded
7340 longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of stations would be
7341 limited only by economics and competition rather than by technical
7342 restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation that had grown up in
7343 radio to that following the invention of the printing press, when
7344 governments and ruling interests attempted to control this new instrument of
7345 mass communications by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was
7346 broken only when it became possible for men freely to acquire printing
7347 presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention
7348 as the printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
7349 shackles.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2652878" href=
"#ftn.id2652878" class=
"footnote">168</a>]
</sup>
7350 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7351 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because Armstrong
7352 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated the power of
7353 "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653070" href=
"#ftn.id2653070" class=
"footnote">169</a>]
</sup> to retard the growth of this competing technology.
7355 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For again, there
7356 is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of Internet radio
7357 stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are those imposed by the
7358 law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first question we should ask is,
7359 what copyright rules would govern Internet radio?
7362 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a new
7363 industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very powerful
7364 lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon of Internet
7365 radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt a different rule
7366 for Internet radio than the rule that applies to terrestrial radio. While
7367 terrestrial radio does not have to pay our hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when
7368 it plays her hypothetical recording of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
7369 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Internet radio does
</em></span>. Not only is the law not neutral
7370 toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more
7371 than it burdens terrestrial radio.
7373 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor William Fisher
7374 estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree popular music to
7375 (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four hours a day, the total
7376 artist fees that radio station would owe would be over $
1 million a
7377 year.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653377" href=
"#ftn.id2653377" class=
"footnote">170</a>]
</sup> A regular radio station
7378 broadcasting the same content would pay no equivalent fee.
7380 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
7381 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
7382 would have to collect the following data from
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>every listening
7383 transaction
</em></span>:
7384 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"1"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7386 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7387 kanalen til programmet (AM/FM-stasjoner bruker stasjons-ID);
7388 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7389 type program (fra arkivet/i løkke/direkte);
7390 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7392 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7393 tidspunkt for sending;
7394 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7395 tidssone til opprinnelsen for sending;
7396 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7397 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
7398 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7399 varigheten av sending (til nærmeste sekund):
7400 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7401 lydinnspilling-tittel;
7402 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7403 ISRC-kode for opptaket;
7404 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7405 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of
7406 compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of
7408 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7409 spillende plateartist;
7410 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7411 tittel på album i butikker;
7412 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7414 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7415 UPC-koden for albumet i butikker;
7416 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7418 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7419 informasjon om opphavsrettsinnehaver;
7420 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7421 musikksjanger for kanal eller programmet (stasjonsformat);
7422 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7423 navn på tjenesten eller selskap;
7424 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7425 kanal eller program;
7426 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7427 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
7428 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7429 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
7430 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7431 time zone where the signal was received (user);
7432 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7433 unik bruker-identifikator;
7434 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7435 landet til brukeren som mottok sendingene.
7436 </p></li></ol></div><p>
7437 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting requirements,
7438 pending further study. And he also changed the original rates set by the
7439 arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the basic difference
7440 between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains: Internet radio has to
7441 pay a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>type of copyright fee
</em></span> that terrestrial radio does
7444 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the economic
7445 consequences from Internet radio that would justify these differences? Was
7446 the motive to protect artists against piracy?
7447 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653593"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653599"></a><p>
7448 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious to
7449 everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public Policy at
7450 Real Networks, told me,
7451 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7453 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented some testimony
7454 about what they thought a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, and
7455 it was much higher. It was ten times higher than what radio stations pay to
7456 perform the same songs for the same period of time. And so the attorneys
7457 representing the webcasters asked the RIAA,
… "How do you come up
7458 with a rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
7459 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and that
7460 should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so high, you're
7461 going to drive the small webcasters out of business.
…"
7463 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an industry
7464 with thousands of webcasters,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>we think it should be an industry
7465 with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a high rate and it's a
7466 stable, predictable market
</em></span>." (Emphasis added.)
7467 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7468 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so that
7469 this platform of potentially immense competition, which would cause the
7470 diversity and range of content available to explode, would not cause pain to
7471 the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right or the left, who
7472 should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is practically no one, on
7473 either the right or the left, who is doing anything effective to prevent it.
7474 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"12.3. Corrupting Citizens"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"corruptingcitizens"></a>12.3. Corrupting Citizens
</h2></div></div></div><p>
7475 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
7476 dinosaurs a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
7477 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
7479 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was important
7480 to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation corrupts
7481 citizens and weakens the rule of law.
7484 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with every war
7485 of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very large number
7486 of citizens. According to
<em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em>,
43
7487 million Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653687" href=
"#ftn.id2653687" class=
"footnote">171</a>]
</sup> According to the RIAA, the behavior of those
43 million Americans
7488 is a felony. We thus have a set of rules that transform
20 percent of
7489 America into criminals. As the RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the
7490 Napsters and Kazaas of the world, but against students building search
7491 engines, and increasingly against ordinary users downloading content, the
7492 technologies for sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal
7493 use. It is an arms race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side
7494 inviting a more extreme response by the other.
7496 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American legal
7497 system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it knew that in
7498 Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The threat of having to
7499 pay either all the money in the world in damages ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all
7500 the money in the world to defend against paying all the money in the world
7501 in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees) led Jordan to choose to pay all the
7502 money he had in the world ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same
7503 strategy animates the RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
7504 2003, the RIAA sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl
7505 living in public housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what
7506 file sharing was.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653367" href=
"#ftn.id2653367" class=
"footnote">172</a>]
</sup> As these scapegoats
7507 discovered, it will always cost more to defend against these suits than it
7508 would cost to simply settle. (The twelve year old, for example, like Jesse
7509 Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000 to settle the case.) Our law is an
7510 awful system for defending rights. It is an embarrassment to our
7511 tradition. And the consequence of our law as it is, is that those with the
7512 power can use the law to quash any rights they oppose.
7514 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just something
7515 more extreme than anything we've seen before. We experimented with alcohol
7516 prohibition, at a time when the per capita consumption of alcohol was
1.5
7517 gallons per capita per year. The war against drinking initially reduced that
7518 consumption to just
30 percent of its preprohibition levels, but by the end
7519 of prohibition, consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
7520 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast number
7521 were criminals.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653761" href=
"#ftn.id2653761" class=
"footnote">173</a>]
</sup> We have launched a war
7522 on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated narcotics that
7
7523 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653774" href=
"#ftn.id2653774" class=
"footnote">174</a>]
</sup> That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
7524 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast majority
7525 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex tax system
7526 that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653791" href=
"#ftn.id2653791" class=
"footnote">175</a>]
</sup> We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an
7527 endless array of ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a
7528 result, a huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
7529 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653807"></a>
7531 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
7532 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
7533 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told a
7534 class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students who
7535 have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and sometimes
7536 drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven cars. These
7537 are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the norm. And then we,
7538 as law professors, are supposed to teach them how to behave
7539 ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or
7540 honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that your case is
7541 over. Generations of Americans
—more significantly in some parts of
7542 America than in others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't
7543 live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a
7544 certain degree of illegality.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653726"></a>
7546 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law more
7547 severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how to make
7548 that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense depends, in part, at
7549 least, upon whether the costs of the law, both intended and collateral,
7550 outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and collateral, do outweigh
7551 the benefits, then the law ought to be changed. Alternatively, if the costs
7552 of the existing system are much greater than the costs of an alternative,
7553 then we have a good reason to consider the alternative.
7558 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
7559 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
7560 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But that
7561 wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the week. A
7562 society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
7564 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations, but
7565 that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends upon people
7566 obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we as citizens
7567 experience violating the law, the less we respect the law. Obviously, in
7568 most cases, the important issue is the law, not respect for the law. I don't
7569 care whether the rapist respects the law or not; I want to catch and
7570 incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether my students respect the
7571 law. And I do care if the rules of law sow increasing disrespect because of
7572 the extreme of regulation they impose. Twenty million Americans have come
7573 of age since the Internet introduced this different idea of "sharing." We
7574 need to be able to call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not
7577 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
7578 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
7579 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be asking is
7580 not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be whether this
7581 particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve the proper
7582 ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to assure that artists
7583 get paid without transforming forty-three million Americans into felons?
7584 Does it make sense if there are other ways to assure that artists get paid
7585 without transforming America into a nation of felons?
7587 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
7590 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces of
7591 plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The law
7592 protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a copyright
7593 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used record store
7594 and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the recordings is free.
7596 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of phonograph
7597 records that is effectively free. Because these recordings were made without
7598 copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy, or "rip," music from my
7599 records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed, Apple Corporation went so far as
7600 to suggest that "freedom" was a right: In a series of commercials, Apple
7601 endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn" capacities of digital technologies.
7602 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653922"></a><p>
7603 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large process
7604 at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing them in one
7605 archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful program called
7606 Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music: Bach, Baroque,
7607 Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others
—the potential is
7608 endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists, these technologies
7609 help build a creativity with play lists that is itself independently
7610 valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and meaningful in their own
7613 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records. But
7614 unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens (or so
7615 the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair return
7616 from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to experiment with
7617 technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These technologies, for
7618 example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or they might enable spy
7619 programs to identify ripped content on people's machines.
7622 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of your
7623 own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker circles,
7624 and get technology to disable the technologies that protect the
7625 content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that doesn't
7626 bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people, these
7627 protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving use of
7628 CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to the world
7629 where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of plastic or were
7630 part of a massively complex "digital rights management" system.
7632 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination of the
7633 ability to freely move content, then these technologies to interfere with
7634 the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what if there were
7635 another way to assure that artists are paid, without locking down any
7636 content? What if, in other words, a different system could assure
7637 compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom to move content
7640 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer a
7641 version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now, the only
7642 point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system achieved
7643 the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright system achieved,
7644 but left consumers and creators much more free, then we'd have a very good
7645 reason to pursue this alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in
7646 other words, would not be between property and piracy; the choice would be
7647 between different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
7649 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without turning
7650 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature of this
7651 alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for producing
7652 and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today control the vast
7653 majority of the distribution of content in the world, would no longer
7654 exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go the way of the
7657 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
7658 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this new form
7659 of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree million Americans
7660 as criminals and their own survival.
7662 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not understandable
7663 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack Valenti is charming;
7664 but not so charming as to justify giving up a tradition as deep and
7665 important as our tradition of free culture. There's one more aspect to this
7666 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and follows
7667 directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation
7668 attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that
7669 "arises whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
7670 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
7671 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2654027"></a>
7673 "Hvis du kan behandle noen som en antatt lovbryter," forklarer von Lohmann,
7674 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2654040"></a>
7675 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7676 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections evaporate to
7677 one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright infringer, how can you
7678 hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright infringer, how can
7679 you hope to be secure against seizures of your computer? How can you hope to
7680 continue to receive Internet access?
… Our sensibilities change as
7681 soon as we think, "Oh, well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker."
7682 Well, what this campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
7683 percentage of the American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
7684 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7685 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public into
7686 criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
7687 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
7689 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
7690 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over the
7691 names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
7692 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a judge,
7693 and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of an Internet
7697 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy to
7698 sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have downloaded
7699 copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've seen, the
7700 potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a family's computer
7701 is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the family could be liable
7702 for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop the RIAA from suing a number of
7703 these families, just as they had sued Jesse Jordan.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2580078" href=
"#ftn.id2580078" class=
"footnote">176</a>]
</sup>
7706 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the RIAA. A
7707 report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the RIAA had adopted
7708 to track Napster users.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2580121" href=
"#ftn.id2580121" class=
"footnote">177</a>]
</sup> Using a
7709 sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a
7710 fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those
7711 MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
7713 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a friend gives a
7714 CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just like the cassettes you
7715 used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does your daughter, where
7716 these songs came from. But she copies these songs onto her computer. She
7717 then takes her computer to college and connects it to a college network, and
7718 if the college network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she
7719 hasn't properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to
7720 do that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as
7721 a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning to
7722 deploy,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2653990" href=
"#ftn.id2653990" class=
"footnote">178</a>]
</sup> your daughter can lose the
7723 right to use the university's computer network. She can, in some cases, be
7726 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire a
7727 lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead that
7728 she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that they came
7729 from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes her. But the
7730 university might not believe her. It might treat this "contraband" as
7731 presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students have already
7732 learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in the middle of wars of
7733 prohibition. This war is no different. Says von Lohmann,
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2580218"></a>
7734 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7735 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million Americans
7736 that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a situation where the
7737 civil liberties of those people are very much in peril in a general
7738 matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where you could randomly
7739 choose any person off the street and be confident that they were committing
7740 an unlawful act that could put them on the hook for potential felony
7741 liability or hundreds of millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly
7742 we all speed, but speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely
7743 forfeit civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
7744 closest analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has eroded
7745 all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many Americans as
7746 criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of
7747 magnitude larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to
7748 sixty million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
7749 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
7751 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7752 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under the
7753 law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
— securing
7754 rights to authors
—without these millions being considered "criminals,"
7755 who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is American, a constant war
7756 on our own people or a concerted effort through our democracy to change our
7758 </p></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2652320" href=
"#id2652320" class=
"para">157</a>]
</sup>
7760 Se Lynne W. Jeter,
<em class=
"citetitle">Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at
7761 WorldCom
</em> (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204;
7762 for detaljer om dette forliket, se pressemelding fra MCI, "MCI Wins
7763 U.S. District Court Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7. juli
2003),
7764 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
7765 #
37</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652343"></a>
7766 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2652356" href=
"#id2652356" class=
"para">158</a>]
</sup>
7767 The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
7768 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For an
7769 overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,' Say
7770 Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
38</a>, and "Senate Turns Back
7771 Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
39</a>. President Bush has
7772 continued to urge tort reform in recent months.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652379"></a>
7773 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2651931" href=
"#id2651931" class=
"para">159</a>]
</sup>
7777 Se Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Wired
</em>,
7778 7. juli
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
40</a>. For en oversikt over
7779 utstillingen, se
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
7781 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2652808" href=
"#id2652808" class=
"para">160</a>]
</sup>
7784 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Los
7785 Angeles Times
</em>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the
7786 effects on innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The
7787 Music Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
7788 at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
42</a>. See also
7789 Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Los Angeles
7790 Times
</em>,
28 May
2001.
7791 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2652551" href=
"#id2652551" class=
"para">161</a>]
</sup>
7793 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Business
7794 2.0</em>,
16. juni
2003, tilgjengelig via
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
43</a>. Jeg er Dr. Mohammad
7795 Al-Ubaydli takknemlig mot for dette eksemplet.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2652895"></a>
7796 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653002" href=
"#id2653002" class=
"para">162</a>]
</sup>
7798 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and the
7799 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (
2003),
7800 33–35, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
7802 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653024" href=
"#id2653024" class=
"para">163</a>]
</sup>
7805 GartnerG2,
26–27.
7806 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653048" href=
"#id2653048" class=
"para">164</a>]
</sup>
7809 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes, February
7810 2002 (Entertainment).
7811 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653094" href=
"#id2653094" class=
"para">165</a>]
</sup>
7813 Jessica Litman,
<em class=
"citetitle">Digital Copyright
</em> (Amherst, N.Y.:
7814 Prometheus Books,
2001).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653101"></a>
7815 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653129" href=
"#id2653129" class=
"para">166</a>]
</sup>
7818 The only circuit court exception is found in
<em class=
"citetitle">Recording Industry
7819 Association of America (RIAA)
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Diamond Multimedia
7820 Systems
</em>,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of
7821 appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player
7822 were not liable for contributory copyright infringement for a device that is
7823 unable to record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function
7824 is to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard drive).
7825 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
7826 <em class=
"citetitle">Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
7827 Inc
</em>. v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Grokster, Ltd
</em>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
7828 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
7829 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
7830 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
7831 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653164" href=
"#id2653164" class=
"para">167</a>]
</sup>
7833 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
7834 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
7835 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
7836 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In August
7837 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
7838 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
7839 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
7840 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
7841 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act,
7842 which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
7843 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
7844 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
44</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653186"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653197"></a>
7845 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2652878" href=
"#id2652878" class=
"para">168</a>]
</sup>
7849 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653070" href=
"#id2653070" class=
"para">169</a>]
</sup>
7853 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653377" href=
"#id2653377" class=
"para">170</a>]
</sup>
7855 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright Arbitration
7856 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example offered by
7857 Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
7858 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain submitted
7859 testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected. See Jonathan
7860 Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
7861 Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP DTRA
1 and
2, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
45</a>. For an excellent
7862 analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry
7863 Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Antitrust
7864 Bulletin
</em> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was not confusion, these
7865 are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected
7866 from digital entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is
7867 done in the name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the
7868 play of powerful interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral
7869 way."
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653406"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2653416"></a>
7870 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653687" href=
"#id2653687" class=
"para">171</a>]
</sup>
7872 Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew Internet
7873 and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
46</a>. The Pew Internet and
7874 American Life Project reported that
37 million Americans had downloaded
7875 music files from the Internet by early
2001.
7876 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653367" href=
"#id2653367" class=
"para">172</a>]
</sup>
7879 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
7880 <em class=
"citetitle">Los Angeles Times
</em>,
10 September
2003, Business.
7881 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653761" href=
"#id2653761" class=
"para">173</a>]
</sup>
7884 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
7885 Prohibition,"
<em class=
"citetitle">American Economic Review
</em> 81, no.
2
7887 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653774" href=
"#id2653774" class=
"para">174</a>]
</sup>
7890 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government Reform
7891 Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of John
7892 P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
7893 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653791" href=
"#id2653791" class=
"para">175</a>]
</sup>
7896 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax Compliance,"
7897 <em class=
"citetitle">Journal of Economic Literature
</em> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey
7898 of compliance literature).
7899 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2580078" href=
"#id2580078" class=
"para">176</a>]
</sup>
7902 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in
7903 Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington
7904 Post
</em>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
7905 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
7906 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being Sued,"
7907 <em class=
"citetitle">Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</em>,
30 August
2003, C1;
7908 Jefferson Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents,"
<em class=
"citetitle">USA
7909 Today
</em>,
15 September
2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No
7910 Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
7911 25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a Criminal?"
7912 <em class=
"citetitle">Toronto Star
</em>,
18 September
2003, P7.
7913 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2580121" href=
"#id2580121" class=
"para">177</a>]
</sup>
7916 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses Some
7917 Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
47</a>.
7918 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2653990" href=
"#id2653990" class=
"para">178</a>]
</sup>
7921 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
7922 <em class=
"citetitle">Boston Globe
</em>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank
7923 Ahrens, "Four Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File
7924 Sharing at Colleges,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington Post
</em>,
4 April
2003,
7925 E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
7926 <em class=
"citetitle">Christian Science Monitor
</em>,
2 September
2003,
20;
7927 Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two
7928 Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Chicago
7929 Tribune
</em>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy
7930 Guns on Universities,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Internet News
</em>,
30 January
7931 2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
7932 #
48</a>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman Orientation
7933 This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing,"
7934 <em class=
"citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle
</em>,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid,
7935 Letters Are Weapons at Universities,"
<em class=
"citetitle">USA Today
</em>,
26
7937 </p></div></div></div></div><div class=
"part" title=
"Part IV. Maktfordeling"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-balances"></a>Part IV. Maktfordeling
</h1></div></div></div><div class=
"partintro" title=
"Maktfordeling"><div></div><p>
7938 Så her er bildet: Du står på siden av veien. Bilen din er på brann. Du er
7939 sint og opprørt fordi du delvis bidro til å starte brannen. Nå vet du ikke
7940 hvordan du slokker den. Ved siden av deg er en bøtte, fylt med
7941 bensin. Bensin vil åpenbart ikke slukke brannen.
7943 Mens du tenker over situasjonen, kommer noen andre forbi. I panikk griper
7944 hun bøtta, og før du har hatt sjansen til å be henne stoppe
—eller før
7945 hun forstår hvorfor hun bør stoppe
—er bøtten i svevet. Bensinen er på
7946 tur mot den brennende bilen. Og brannen som bensinen kommer til å fyre opp
7947 vil straks sette fyr på alt i omgivelsene.
7949 En krig om opphavsrett pågår over alt
— og vi fokuserer alle på feil
7950 ting. Det er ingen tvil om at dagens teknologier truer eksisterende
7951 virksomheter. Uten tvil kan de true artister. Men teknologier endrer seg.
7952 Industrien og teknologer har en rekke måter å bruke teknologi til å beskytte
7953 dem selv mot dagens trusler på Internet. Dette er en brann som overlatt til
7954 seg selv vil brenne ut.
7958 Likevel er ikke besluttningstagere villig til å la denne brannen i fred.
7959 Ladet med masse penger fra lobbyister er de lystne på å gå i mellom for å
7960 fjerne problemet slik de oppfatter det. Men problemet slik de oppfatter det
7961 er ikke den reelle trusselen som denne kulturen står med ansiktet mot. For
7962 mens vi ser på denne lille brannen i hjørnet er det en massiv endring i
7963 hvordan kultur blir skapt som pågår over alt.
7965 På en eller annen måte må vi klare å snu oppmerksomheten mot dette mer
7966 viktige og fundametale problemet. Vi må finne en måte å unngå å helle
7967 bensin på denne brannen.
7969 Vi har ikke funne denne måten ennå. Istedet synes vi å være fanget i en
7970 enklere og sort-hvit tenkning. Uansett hvor mange folk som presser på for å
7971 gjøre rammen for debatten litt bredere, er det dette enkle sort-hvit-synet
7972 som består. Vi kjører sakte forbi og stirrer på brannen når vi i stedet
7973 burde holde øynene på veien.
7975 Denne utfordringen har vært livet mitt de siste årene. Det har også vært
7976 min falitt. I de to neste kapittlene, beskriver jeg en liten innsats, så
7977 langt uten suksess, på å finne en måte å endre fokus på denne debatten. Vi
7978 må forstå disse mislyktede forsøkene hvis vi skal forstå hva som kreves for
7980 </p></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"13. Kapittel tretten: Eldred"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"eldred"></a>13. Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxhawthornenathaniel"></a><p>
7981 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
7982 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least one
7983 did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in
7984 New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
7985 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would make this
7986 nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
7988 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find Hawthorne
7989 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave birth to a
7990 hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a library of public
7991 domain works by scanning these works and making them available for free.
7994 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain works,
7995 though even a copy would have been of great value to people across the world
7996 who can't get access to printed versions of these works. Instead, Eldred was
7997 producing derivative works from these public domain works. Just as Disney
7998 turned Grimm into stories more accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred
7999 transformed Hawthorne, and many others, into a form more
8000 accessible
—technically accessible
—today.
8002 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same source
8003 as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<em class=
"citetitle">Scarlet Letter
</em> had passed
8004 into the public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
8005 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover Press
8006 and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and produce printed
8007 editions, which they sell in bookstores across the country. Others, such as
8008 Disney, take these stories and turn them into animated cartoons, sometimes
8009 successfully (
<em class=
"citetitle">Cinderella
</em>), sometimes not
8010 (
<em class=
"citetitle">The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</em>,
<em class=
"citetitle">Treasure
8011 Planet
</em>). These are all commercial publications of public domain
8013 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2654756"></a><p>
8014 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of public
8015 domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally thousands of
8016 others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have discovered this
8017 platform of expression and now use it to share works that are, by law, free
8018 for the taking. This has produced what we might call the "noncommercial
8019 publishing industry," which before the Internet was limited to people with
8020 large egos or with political or social causes. But with the Internet, it
8021 includes a wide range of individuals and groups dedicated to spreading
8022 culture generally.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2654776" href=
"#ftn.id2654776" class=
"footnote">179</a>]
</sup>
8024 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's collection
8025 of poems
<em class=
"citetitle">New Hampshire
</em> was slated to pass into the
8026 public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
8027 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”">10</a>, in
1998, for the
8028 eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of existing
8029 copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add
8030 any works more recent than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no
8031 copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until that year (and not
8032 even then, if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same
8033 period, more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
8037 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), enacted in
8038 memory of the congressman and former musician Sonny Bono, who, his widow,
8039 Mary Bono, says, believed that "copyrights should be forever."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2654846" href=
"#ftn.id2654846" class=
"footnote">180</a>]
</sup>
8042 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
8043 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
8044 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a second law
8045 passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act of publishing
8046 would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone complained. This was a
8047 dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer to undertake.
8049 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
8050 constitutional scholar whose first passion was constitutional
8051 interpretation. And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
8052 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as importantly
8053 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
8054 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8055 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
… by
8056 securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to their
8057 … Writings.
…
8058 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8059 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting clause of
8060 Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause granting power
8061 to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do something
—for
8062 example, to regulate "commerce among the several states" or "declare War."
8063 But here, the "something" is something quite specific
—to "promote
8064 … Progress"
—through means that are also specific
— by
8065 "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
8067 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of extending
8068 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me about this was, if
8069 Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then the Constitution's
8070 requirement that terms be "limited" will have no practical effect. If every
8071 time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the power to extend its
8072 term, then Congress can achieve what the Constitution plainly
8073 forbids
—perpetual terms "on the installment plan," as Professor Peter
8074 Jaszi so nicely put it.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2654872"></a>
8076 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember sitting
8077 late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious consideration
8078 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's practice of extending
8079 existing terms. That failure may in part be why Congress seemed so
8080 untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the practice had become so
8081 lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that copyright owners will be willing
8082 to pay a great deal of money to see their copyright terms extended. And so
8083 Congress is quite happy to keep this gravy train going.
8085 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
8086 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
8087 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the beneficiaries
8088 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce it to
8089 act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can do. Why
8090 not limit its actions to those things it must do
—and those things that
8091 pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
8093 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one of the
8094 very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to make money one
8095 hundred years after it was created. The Estate of Robert Frost is a good
8096 example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry continues to be extraordinarily
8097 valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate benefits greatly from any extension
8098 of copyright, since no publisher would pay the estate any money if the poems
8099 Frost wrote could be published by anyone for free.
8101 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from three of
8102 Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems is about to
8103 expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate. Your financial
8104 adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim report:
8107 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B, and C
8108 will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be receiving
8109 the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of those works.
8111 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that could change
8112 this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the terms of copyright
8113 by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily valuable to us. So we
8114 should hope this bill passes."
8116 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something about it?"
8118 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute to the
8119 campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that they support
8122 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want to know
8123 whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much would we get if this
8124 extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How much is it worth?"
8126 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue to get
8127 at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the `discount
8128 rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent), then this law
8129 would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
8131 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the correct
8134 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than $
1,
000,
000 in
8135 campaign contributions if we were confident those contributions would assure
8136 that the bill was passed?"
8138 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to contribute up
8139 to the `present value' of the income you expect from these copyrights. Which
8140 for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
8143 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I trust,
8144 you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every beneficiary
8145 in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same choice: If they
8146 can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights, they will benefit
8147 greatly from that extension. And so each time copyrights are about to
8148 expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get the copyright term
8151 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation can be
8152 bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in the world to
8153 buy further extensions of copyright.
8155 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
8156 Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved real. Ten of the
8157 thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House received the maximum
8158 contribution from Disney's political action committee; in the Senate, eight
8159 of the twelve sponsors received contributions.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655057" href=
"#ftn.id2655057" class=
"footnote">181</a>]
</sup> The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over $
1.5 million
8160 lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more than $
200,
000 in
8161 campaign contributions.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655072" href=
"#ftn.id2655072" class=
"footnote">182</a>]
</sup> Disney is
8162 estimated to have contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in
8163 the cycle.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655087" href=
"#ftn.id2655087" class=
"footnote">183</a>]
</sup>
8166 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least, it need not
8167 be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this reality about the
8168 never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term was central to my
8169 thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed to interpreting and
8170 applying the Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the
8171 power to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
8172 constitutional requirement that terms be "limited." If they could extend it
8173 once, they would extend it again and again and again.
8176 It was also my judgment that
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>this
</em></span> Supreme Court would
8177 not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
8178 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power of
8179 Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the power
8180 granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional scholars, the most
8181 famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's decision in
1995 to
8182 strike down a law that banned the possession of guns near schools.
8184 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted powers very
8185 broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
8186 only "commerce among the several states" (aka "interstate commerce"), the
8187 Supreme Court had interpreted that power to include the power to regulate
8188 any activity that merely affected interstate commerce.
8190 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was no
8191 limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every activity, when
8192 considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce. A Constitution
8193 designed to limit Congress's power was instead interpreted to impose no
8195 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655152"></a><p>
8196 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed that in
8197 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>. The
8198 government had argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
8199 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values,
8200 and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government
8201 whether there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce
8202 under the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there was
8203 not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then that
8204 activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the government
8205 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
8207 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments," the
8208 Chief Justice wrote.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655193" href=
"#ftn.id2655193" class=
"footnote">184</a>]
</sup> If anything
8209 Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be considered interstate
8210 commerce, then there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in
8211 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> was reaffirmed five years later in
8212 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
</em>
8213 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Morrison
</em>.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655220" href=
"#ftn.id2655220" class=
"footnote">185</a>]
</sup>
8216 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
8217 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655240" href=
"#ftn.id2655240" class=
"footnote">186</a>]
</sup>
8218 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should yield the
8219 conclusion that Congress can't extend an existing term. If Congress could
8220 extend an existing term, then there would be no "stopping point" to
8221 Congress's power over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that
8222 there is such a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to
8223 grant copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
8224 term of existing copyrights.
8226 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>If
</em></span>, that is, the principle announced in
8227 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> stood for a principle. Many believed the
8228 decision in
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> stood for politics
—a
8229 conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its
8230 power over Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
8231 rejected that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
8232 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
8233 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides
8234 cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was
8235 not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine
8236 Justices were going to be petty politicians.
8238 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the argument in
8239 <em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> was not about. By insisting on the
8240 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
8241 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
8242 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work
8243 and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was
8244 just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
8245 already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had gotten
8246 the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In exchange for
8247 a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new work. But now
8248 these entities were using their power
—expressed through the power of
8249 lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That
8250 twenty-year dollop would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was
8251 fighting a piracy that affects us all.
8253 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief before the
8254 Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association wrote that the public
8255 domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655319" href=
"#ftn.id2655319" class=
"footnote">187</a>]
</sup> But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our
8256 constitutional system, our law requires it. Some may not like the
8257 Constitution's requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a
8258 pirate's charter.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655344"></a>
8260 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on copyright as a
8261 way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily influence the
8262 development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric Eldred discovered,
8263 we have set up a system that assures that copyright terms will be repeatedly
8264 extended, and extended, and extended. We have created the perfect storm for
8265 the public domain. Copyrights have not expired, and will not expire, so long
8266 as Congress is free to be bought to extend them again.
8268 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being extended.
8269 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too valuable for
8270 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from copyright
8271 extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's. Forget Mickey
8272 Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from the
1920s and
1930s
8273 that have continuing commercial value. The real harm of term extension comes
8274 not from these famous works. The real harm is to the works that are not
8275 famous, not commercially exploited, and no longer available as a result.
8277 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
1942)
8278 affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
2 percent of that
8279 work has any continuing commercial value. It was the copyright holders for
8280 that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through. But the law and its effect were
8281 not limited to that
2 percent. The law extended the terms of copyright
8282 generally.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655386" href=
"#ftn.id2655386" class=
"footnote">188</a>]
</sup>
8286 Think practically about the consequence of this extension
—practically,
8287 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal work. In
1930,
8288 10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those books were still in
8289 print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you wanted to make available
8290 to the world in your iArchive project the remaining
9,
873. What would you
8293 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were still
8294 under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are not
8295 on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the titles and
8296 authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration and renewal
8297 records for works published in
1930. That will produce a list of books still
8300 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate the
8301 current copyright owners. How would you do that?
8303 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright owners
8304 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be thousands and
8305 thousands of government monopolies without there being at least a list?
8307 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
1959, of
8308 the person who registered the copyright. But just think practically about
8309 how impossibly difficult it would be to track down thousands of such
8310 records
—especially since the person who registered is not necessarily
8311 the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
8313 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the apologists for
8314 the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright owners?"
8316 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>are
</em></span> plenty
8317 of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles
8318 to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty
8319 good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in
8320 your backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a
8321 pretty good way to know who owns what tangible property.
8324 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who owns the house
8325 by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see a car, there is
8326 ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the car. If you see a
8327 bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a house, it's fairly
8328 easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you happen to see a baseball
8329 lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look around for a second for some
8330 kids playing ball. If you don't see any kids, then okay: Here's a bit of
8331 property whose owner we can't easily determine. It is the exception that
8332 proves the rule: that we ordinarily know quite well who owns what property.
8334 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library. The
8335 library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've already
8336 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors' names, of
8337 course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or passed down in an
8338 estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who owns what, you would have to
8339 hire a private detective. The bottom line: The owner cannot easily be
8340 located. And in a regime like ours, in which it is a felony to use such
8341 property without the property owner's permission, the property isn't going
8344 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be digitized,
8345 and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the consequence for other
8346 creative works is much more dire.
8347 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655508"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655514"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655520"></a><p>
8348 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios, which
8349 owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a direct
8350 beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were made between
8351 1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Lucky
8352 Dog
</em>, is currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made
8353 after
1923 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee
8354 controls the exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal
8355 of money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
8356 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent films."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655542" href=
"#ftn.id2655542" class=
"footnote">189</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655559"></a>
8358 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in this
8359 culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme Court that
8360 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left standing, destroy
8361 a whole generation of American film.
8364 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has any
8365 continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it survives at
8366 all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work
8367 not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the owners of
8368 the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit from the work
8369 must exceed the costs of making the work available for distribution.
8371 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs. For most
8372 of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very high; digital
8373 technology has lowered these costs substantially. While it cost more than
8374 $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white film in
1993, it can now
8375 cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of mm film.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655596" href=
"#ftn.id2655596" class=
"footnote">190</a>]
</sup>
8378 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most important.
8379 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
8380 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
8381 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
8382 locate the copyright owner.
8384 Or more accurately,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>owners
</em></span>. As we've seen, there isn't
8385 only a single copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't
8386 a single person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
8387 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
8388 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
8391 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
8392 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
8393 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when she
8394 does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you have
8395 made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
8396 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
8397 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way, you
8398 have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have to
8399 talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
8402 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed these
8403 costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the benefit would
8404 outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old films, Agee
8405 argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until the copyright
8408 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will have
8409 expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and nitrate stock
8410 dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal canisters in which
8411 they are now stored will be filled with nothing more than dust.
8413 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has
8414 continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a
8415 crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright
8416 creates incentives to produce and distribute the creative work. For that
8417 tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of free expression."
8419 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the creative
8420 work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've indicated, most books
8421 go out of print within one year. The same is true of music and
8422 film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving. And when a
8423 creative work falls out of favor with the commercial distributors, the
8424 commercial life ends.
8426 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't keep
8427 libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and we don't
8428 have archives of films because we expect people to choose between spending
8429 Friday night watching new movies and spending Friday night watching a
1930
8430 news documentary. The noncommercial life of culture is important and
8431 valuable
—for entertainment but also, and more importantly, for
8432 knowledge. To understand who we are, and where we came from, and how we have
8433 made the mistakes that we have, we need to have access to this history.
8436 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression. In
8437 this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in this
8440 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of our
8441 history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
8442 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright-related use
</em></span> that would be inhibited by an
8443 exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a
8444 publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a
8445 used book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
8446 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
8447 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
8449 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring a
8450 film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were so high,
8451 it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains
8452 of a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
8453 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the end
8454 of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
8456 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most of our
8457 history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works that lost
8458 their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works would not have
8459 interfered with anything.
8461 But this situation has now changed.
8463 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital technologies
8464 is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of. Digital
8465 technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access to all sorts
8466 of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now imagine digitizing
8467 it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once a film goes out of
8468 distribution, we could digitize it and make it available to everyone,
8469 forever. Digital technologies give new life to copyrighted material after it
8470 passes out of its commercial life. It is now possible to preserve and assure
8471 universal access to this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
8475 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing this
8476 digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
8477 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires permission
8478 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other aspect of
8479 our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these things
8480 available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want to
8481 explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
8482 radically different context.
8484 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
8485 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law gets in
8486 the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
8487 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright
</em></span> purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to
8488 enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
8489 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright
8490 is serving no purpose
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>at all
</em></span> related to the spread of
8491 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
8492 expression. Copyright is a brake.
8494 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for Brewster
8495 Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too. So won't
8496 Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading culture widely?"
8498 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
8499 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble offered
8500 to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that eliminate the need
8501 for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a library is to serve
8502 what "the market" would demand. But if you think the role of a library is
8503 bigger than this
—if you think its role is to archive culture, whether
8504 there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture or not
—then we
8505 can't count on the commercial market to do our library work for us.
8507 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We should
8508 rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable culture. My
8509 message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the market is not
8510 doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the freedom to fill the
8511 gaps. As one researcher calculated for American culture,
94 percent of the
8512 films, books, and music produced between and
1946 is not commercially
8513 available. However much you love the commercial market, if access is a
8514 value, then
6 percent is a failure to provide that value.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2655825" href=
"#ftn.id2655825" class=
"footnote">191</a>]
</sup>
8517 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
8518 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the Sonny
8519 Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two central claims
8520 that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms violated the
8521 Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that extending terms by
8522 another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
8524 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an argument. A
8525 panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also dismissed our
8526 claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But that decision at
8527 least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative judges on that
8528 court. That dissent gave our claims life.
8530 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that copyrights
8531 be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as it was simple:
8532 If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no "stopping point" to
8533 Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The power to extend existing
8534 terms means Congress is not required to grant terms that are "limited."
8535 Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to interpret the term "limited
8536 Times" to give it meaning. And the best interpretation, Judge Sentelle
8537 argued, would be to deny Congress the power to extend existing terms.
8539 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to hear the
8540 case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for important
8541 cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a whole, where
8542 the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
8545 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc. This
8546 time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
8547 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the most
8548 liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had overstepped its
8551 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the Supreme
8552 Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It hears about one
8553 hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand appeals.) And it
8554 practically never reviews a decision that upholds a statute when no other
8555 court has yet reviewed the statute.
8557 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by granting our
8558 petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument was set for October of
8559 2002. The summer would be spent writing briefs and preparing for argument.
8561 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
8562 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we lost
8563 the appeal. And if you know something more than just the minimum, you
8564 probably think there was no way this case could have been won. After our
8565 defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and
8566 supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed
8567 cause. And none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail
8568 from my client, Eric Eldred.
8570 Men min klient og disse vennene tok feil. Denne saken kunne vært vunnet. Det
8571 burde ha vært vunnet. Og uansett hvor hardt jeg prøver å fortelle den
8572 historien til meg selv, kan jeg aldri unnslippe troen på at det er min feil
8574 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655945"></a><p>
8576 Feil ble gjort tidlig, skjønt den ble først åpenbart på slutten. Vår sak
8577 hadde støtte hos en ekstraordinær advokat, Geoffrey Stewart, helt fra
8578 starten, og hos advokatfirmaet hadde han flyttet til, Jones, Day, Reavis og
8579 Pogue. Jones Day mottok mye press fra sine opphavsrettsbeskyttende klienter
8580 på grunn av sin støtte til oss. De ignorert dette presset (noe veldig få
8581 advokatfirmaer noen sinne ville gjøre), og ga alt de hadde gjennom hele
8583 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655968"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655974"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2655980"></a><p>
8584 Det var tre viktige advokater på saken fra Jones DaY. Geoff Stewart var den
8585 først, men siden ble Dan Bromberg og Don Ayer ganske involvert. Bromberg og
8586 Ayer spesielt hadde en felles oppfatning om hvordan denne saken ville bli
8587 vunnet: vi ville bare vinne, fortalte de gjentatte ganger til meg, hvis vi
8588 få problemet til å virke "viktig" for Høyesterett. Det måtte synes som om
8589 dramatisk skade ble gjort til ytringsfriheten og fri kultur, ellers ville de
8590 aldri stemt mot "de mektigste mediaselskapene i verden".
8592 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act was a
8593 dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still think it
8594 is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based on how
8595 important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be "right" as
8596 in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be that
8597 way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the framers of
8598 our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the CTEA was
8599 unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful interpretation of what
8600 the First Amendment means would yield the conclusion that the power to
8601 extend existing copyright terms is unconstitutional, I was not persuaded
8602 that we had to sell our case like soap. Just as a law that bans the
8603 swastika is unconstitutional not because the Court likes Nazis but because
8604 such a law would violate the Constitution, so too, in my view, would the
8605 Court decide whether Congress's law was constitutional based on the
8606 Constitution, not based on whether they liked the values that the framers
8607 put in the Constitution.
8609 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and the harm
8610 caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review? There was no
8611 reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they weren't convinced that
8612 this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we didn't need to persuade them
8613 that this law was bad, we needed to show why it was unconstitutional.
8616 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter and in
8617 which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced that the Court
8618 would not hear our arguments if it thought these were just the arguments of
8619 a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was not about to launch into a
8620 new field of judicial review if it seemed that this field of review was
8621 simply the preference of a small political minority. Although my focus in
8622 the case was not to demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to
8623 demonstrate that it was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument
8624 against a background of briefs that covered the full range of political
8625 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
8626 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>law
</em></span> and not politics, then, we tried to gather the
8627 widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they were rich
8628 and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated that this law
8629 was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
8631 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
8632 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very beginning.
8633 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In November
1998,
8634 she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the Republican Congress for
8635 allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you sometimes wonder why bills
8636 that create a financial windfall to narrow special interests slide easily
8637 through the intricate legislative process, while bills that benefit the
8638 general public seem to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial
8639 documented, was the power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's
8640 contributions to the key players on the committees. It was money, not
8641 justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control,
8642 Schlafly argued.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656085"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656092"></a>
8644 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief supporting
8645 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the core claim in
8646 the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of existing copyrights,
8647 there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms. That strong
8648 conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
8650 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as it
8651 gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free Software
8652 Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux possible). They
8653 included a powerful brief about the costs of uncertainty by Intel. There
8654 were two law professors' briefs, one by copyright scholars and one by First
8655 Amendment scholars. There was an exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the
8656 world's experts in the history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there
8657 was a new brief by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
8658 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656121"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656129"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656135"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656142"></a>
8660 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal argument,
8661 there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and archives, including
8662 the Internet Archive, the American Association of Law Libraries, and the
8663 National Writers Union.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656155"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656162"></a>
8664 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656170"></a><p>
8665 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the argument I've
8666 already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that unless the law
8667 was struck, a whole generation of American film would disappear. The other
8668 made the economic argument absolutely clear.
8669 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656184"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656190"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656196"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656203"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656209"></a><p>
8670 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including five
8671 Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Milton
8672 Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as the list of
8673 Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political spectrum. Their
8674 conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible claim that extending the
8675 terms of existing copyrights would do anything to increase incentives to
8676 create. Such extensions were nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the
8677 fancy term economists use to describe special-interest legislation gone
8680 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered to
8681 write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with us from
8682 the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we added three
8683 lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan Morrison, a
8684 lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had made constitutional
8685 history with a series of seminal victories in the Supreme Court defending
8686 individual rights; my colleague and dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued
8687 many cases in the Court, and who had advised us early on about a First
8688 Amendment strategy; and finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
8689 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656220"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656251"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656257"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656264"></a>
8691 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
8692 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give media
8693 companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried was the only
8694 one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up for something he
8695 believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer in the Supreme
8696 Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that limited Congress's power
8697 in the context of the Commerce Clause. And while he had argued many
8698 positions in the Supreme Court that I personally disagreed with, his joining
8699 the cause was a vote of confidence in our argument.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656284"></a>
8701 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of friends, as
8702 well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included historians or
8703 economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were written
8704 exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and copyright holders.
8706 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain from the
8707 law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they were defending
8708 their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of contributions such power
8709 induced. And of course it was not surprising that the copyright holders
8710 would defend the idea that they should continue to have the right to control
8711 who did what with content they wanted to control.
8713 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was better for the
8714 Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to Dr. Seuss's work
— better
8715 than allowing it to fall into the public domain
—because if this
8716 creativity were in the public domain, then people could use it to "glorify
8717 drugs or to create pornography."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2656314" href=
"#ftn.id2656314" class=
"footnote">192</a>]
</sup> That
8718 was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection"
8719 of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license
8720 <em class=
"citetitle">Porgy and Bess
</em> to anyone who refuses to use African
8721 Americans in the cast.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2656339" href=
"#ftn.id2656339" class=
"footnote">193</a>]
</sup> That's their
8722 view of how this part of American culture should be controlled, and they
8723 wanted this law to help them effect that control.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656353"></a>
8725 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this debate.
8726 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing copyrights, Congress is
8727 making a choice about which speakers it will favor. Famous and beloved
8728 copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate and Dr. Seuss, come to
8729 Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to control the speech about these
8730 icons of American culture. We'll do better with them than anyone else."
8731 Congress of course likes to reward the popular and famous by giving them
8732 what they want. But when Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak
8733 in a certain way, that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally
8736 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA mean
8737 that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
8738 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
8739 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
8740 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak. Between
8741 February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing for this
8742 case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
8743 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656379"></a><p>
8744 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we called
8745 "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The Conservatives
8746 included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice
8747 Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had been the most consistent in
8748 limiting Congress's power. They were the five who had supported the
8749 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez/Morrison
</em> line of cases that said that an
8750 enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's powers had
8752 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656409"></a><p>
8754 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
8755 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
8756 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that the
8757 Constitution gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement
8758 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
8759 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four justices
8760 were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed with, they
8761 were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
8763 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to her
8764 general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of gender are
8765 involved), she had been particularly deferential in the context of
8766 intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an excellent and
8767 well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from the same
8768 intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with the writings
8769 of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this context to do as it
8770 wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
8771 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656444"></a><p>
8772 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
8773 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly favored
8774 deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were also very
8775 sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly believed, there was a
8776 very important free speech argument against these retrospective extensions.
8778 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
8779 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest judges
8780 on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just means that no
8781 simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he had consistently argued
8782 for limits in the context of intellectual property generally. We were fairly
8783 confident he would recognize limits here.
8785 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to be:
8786 on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these five and
8787 get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single overriding argument
8788 that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives' most important
8789 jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge Sentelle had relied
8790 upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power must be interpreted so
8791 that its enumerated powers have limits.
8794 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
8795 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
8796 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> case, under the government's argument here,
8797 Congress would always have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If
8798 anything was plain about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was
8799 that this power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
8800 Court to reconcile
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> with
8801 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce was
8802 limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright be
8805 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has done
8806 it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government claimed that
8807 from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
8808 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say that
8809 practice is unconstitutional.
8811 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We certainly
8812 agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831 and in
1909. And of
8813 course, in
1962, Congress began extending existing terms
8814 regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
8817 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress extended
8818 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic. It then
8819 extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare extensions
8820 are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending existing
8821 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that restraint was
8822 now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there was no reason to
8823 expect that cycle would end. This Court had not hesitated to intervene where
8824 Congress was in a similar cycle of extension. There was no reason it
8825 couldn't intervene here. Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in
8826 October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
8827 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to help in
8828 the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where wannabe justices
8829 fire questions at wannabe winners.
8831 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a single
8832 point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to the
8833 power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that terms would be
8834 effectively unlimited; going with us would give Congress a clear line to
8835 follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots were an effective practice; I
8836 found ways to take every question back to this central idea.
8837 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656556"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656562"></a><p>
8838 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the skeptic. He
8839 had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor General Charles
8840 Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme Court. And in his review
8841 of the moot, he let his concern speak:
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656575"></a>
8843 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be willing
8844 to upset this practice that the government says has been a consistent
8845 practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the
8846 harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don't see
8847 that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
8848 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656585"></a><p>
8850 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but he didn't
8851 understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the right
8852 thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
8853 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court does the
8854 right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As I
8855 listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood his
8856 point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough. Let the
8857 politicians learn to see that it was also good. The night before the
8858 argument, a line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The
8859 case had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
8860 culture. Hundreds stood in line for the chance to see the
8861 proceedings. Scores spent the night on the Supreme Court steps so that they
8862 would be assured a seat.
8864 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can ask for
8865 seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for my
8866 parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get a seat in a
8867 special section reserved for them. And senators and congressmen have a
8868 special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of course, the press
8869 has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on the Court. As we
8870 entered that morning, there was no place that was not taken. This was an
8871 argument about intellectual property law, yet the halls were filled. As I
8872 walked in to take my seat at the front of the Court, I saw my parents
8873 sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table, I saw Jack Valenti sitting
8874 in the special section ordinarily reserved for family of the Justices.
8876 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began where I
8877 intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's power. This
8878 was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether those enumerated
8879 powers had any limit.
8881 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening. The history
8883 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8884 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often through the years,
8885 and if you are right, don't we run the risk of upsetting previous extensions
8886 of time? I mean, this seems to be a practice that began with the very first
8888 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8889 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face of
8890 what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again was to
8891 emphasize limits on Congress's power.
8892 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8894 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in mind,
8895 then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their words that gives
8896 effect to what they had in mind, and the answer is yes.
8897 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8898 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen where the
8899 Court was going. The first was a question by Justice Kennedy, who observed,
8900 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8901 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that the '
76 act,
8902 too, should have been declared void, and that we might leave it alone
8903 because of the disruption, is that for all these years the act has impeded
8904 progress in science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical
8906 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8907 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a student, I
8909 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8910 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all. Nothing
8911 in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical assertion about
8912 impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a structural limit necessary
8913 to assure that what would be an effectively perpetual term not be permitted
8914 under the copyright laws.
8915 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656711"></a><p>
8916 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right answer
8917 was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any number of
8918 briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And here was the
8919 place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a softball; my answer
8920 was a swing and a miss.
8922 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
8923 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>
8924 ruling, and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
8927 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all sympathetic.
8928 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
8931 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8932 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the right to copy
8933 verbatim other people's books, don't you?
8935 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that should be in the
8936 public domain and would be in the public domain but for a statute that
8937 cannot be justified under ordinary First Amendment analysis or under a
8938 proper reading of the limits built into the Copyright Clause.
8939 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8940 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument; for now the
8941 Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia asked Solicitor
8943 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8944 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited time
8945 would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely the
8946 argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited time which is
8947 extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited time.
8948 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8949 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal. Olson's
8950 flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed to the
8951 academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if this were the
8952 first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright and Patent Clause
8953 power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I closed by pointing out the
8954 long history of the Court imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of
8955 the Copyright and Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking
8956 a law of Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon
8957 the Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
8961 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I wished I
8962 could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had answered
8963 differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me optimistic.
8965 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit? Over
8966 and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was precisely the
8967 answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not imagine how the Court
8968 could understand that the government believed Congress's power was unlimited
8969 under the terms of the Copyright Clause, and sustain the government's
8970 argument. The solicitor general had made my argument for me. No matter how
8971 often I tried, I could not understand how the Court could find that
8972 Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
8973 Copyright Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe
8974 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
8975 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the
8976 rule of law that it had established elsewhere.
8978 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office and
8979 missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the
8980 message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
8981 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
8982 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
8984 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the phone off
8985 the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat down to see where I
8986 had been wrong in my reasoning.
8988 My
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>reasoning
</em></span>. Here was a case that pitted all the money
8989 in the world against
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>reasoning
</em></span>. And here was the last
8990 naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
8992 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would distinguish the
8993 principle in this case from the principle in
8994 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case
8995 was not even cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did
8996 not even appear in the Court's opinion.
9001 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument. Consistent
9002 with her view that Congress's power was not limited generally, she had found
9003 Congress's power not limited here.
9005 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
9006 Souter. Neither believes in
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>. It would be too
9007 much to expect them to write an opinion that recognized, much less
9008 explained, the doctrine they had worked so hard to defeat.
9010 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I was
9011 reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile limited
9012 powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the Progress
9013 Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could reconcile the two
9014 simply
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>by not addressing the argument
</em></span>. There was no
9015 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together. There was
9016 therefore no principle that followed from the
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>
9017 case: In that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this
9018 context it would not.
9020 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values they
9021 would respect? By what right did they
—the silent five
—get to
9022 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the values
9023 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that I said I
9024 hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue here was
9025 important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I might hate a
9026 system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional values that it
9027 will respect, that is the system we have.
9028 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656902"></a><p>
9029 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's opinion
9030 was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
9031 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension of
9032 terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had governed in the
9033 context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court discounted the
9034 parallel
—without explaining how the very same words in the Progress
9035 Clause could come to mean totally different things depending upon whether
9036 the words were about patents or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's
9037 charge go unanswered.
9038 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2656920"></a><p>
9041 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever written, was
9042 external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of copyrights has
9043 become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said that under the
9044 current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8 percent of the value of a
9045 perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the actual number was
9046 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the point was clear: If the
9047 Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and the existing term was so
9048 long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
9050 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But because
9051 neither believed in the
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> case, neither was
9052 willing to push it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was
9053 decided without anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried
9054 from Judge Sentelle. It was
<em class=
"citetitle">Hamlet
</em> without the
9057 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when depression
9058 gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure the
9059 depression. This anger was of two sorts.
9061 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been one
9062 thing for them to have explained why the principle of
9063 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> didn't apply in this case. That wouldn't have
9064 been a very convincing argument, I don't believe, having read it made by
9065 others, and having tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been
9066 an act of integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that
9067 the proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
9068 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light
9069 of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
9070 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was
9071 their "originalism" now?
9074 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain what the
9075 framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they did; they joined
9076 an opinion that never once tried to explain how the structure of that clause
9077 would affect the interpretation of Congress's power. And they joined an
9078 opinion that didn't even try to explain why this grant of power could be
9079 unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause would be limited. In short, they had
9080 joined an opinion that did not apply to, and was inconsistent with, their
9081 own method for interpreting the Constitution. This opinion may well have
9082 yielded a result that they liked. It did not produce a reason that was
9083 consistent with their own principles.
9085 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with myself. For I
9086 had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of the law as
9088 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657020"></a><p>
9089 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for idealism
9090 about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular. Most have a
9091 much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this case would be won
9092 based on whether I could convince the Justices that the framers' values were
9093 important, I fought the idea, because I didn't want to believe that that is
9094 how this Court decides. I insisted on arguing this case as if it were a
9095 simple application of a set of principles. I had an argument that followed
9096 in logic. I didn't need to waste my time showing it should also follow in
9100 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I can see
9101 a hundred places where the answers could have taken the conversation in
9102 different directions, where the truth about the harm that this unchecked
9103 power will cause could have been made clear to this Court. Justice Kennedy
9104 in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically, corrected his
9105 question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown the First
9106 Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the question to make the
9107 logical point. I had shown them how they could strike this law of Congress
9108 if they wanted to. There were a hundred places where I could have helped
9109 them want to, yet my stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have
9110 stood before hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion
9111 in that effort to persuade; but I refused to stand before this audience and
9112 try to persuade with the passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis
9113 on which a court should decide the issue.
9114 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657062"></a><p>
9115 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it have
9116 been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or Kathleen
9117 Sullivan?
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657073"></a>
9119 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court was not
9120 ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It would take
9121 a great deal more to show our society why our framers were right. And when
9122 we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
9124 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in doing
9125 anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have little
9126 reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had stepped
9127 down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could have
9130 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
9131 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
9132 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case
9133 was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
9134 not be raised until it is.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657104"></a>
9137 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and publicly,
9138 that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have been persuaded,
9139 then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that here again Peter
9140 was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in a way that would do
9141 some good or they were not ready to hear this case in a way that would do
9142 some good. Either way, the decision to bring this case
—a decision I
9143 had made four years before
—was wrong. While the reaction to the Sonny
9144 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's
9145 decision was mixed. No one, at least in the press, tried to say that
9146 extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over
9147 ideas. Where the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had
9148 been skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
9149 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was
9150 attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful
9151 law.
<em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em> wrote in its editorial,
9152 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
9153 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are seeing
9154 the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of copyright
9155 perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment, one that should
9156 not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on the entire creative
9157 output of humanity is one of the reasons we live in a time of such fruitful
9159 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9160 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of hilarious
9161 images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view of the
9162 case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page (
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#fig-18" title=
"Figure 13.1. Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon">Figure
13.1,
“Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
”</a>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But
9163 the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657164"></a>
9164 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-18"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figure
13.1. Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/18.png" alt=
"Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon"></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657184"></a></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
9165 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the quote from
9166 <em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em>. That "grand experiment" we call
9167 the "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey, I
9168 shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in our
9169 Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I fathered, the
9170 Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A better lawyer would
9171 have made them see differently.
9172 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2654776" href=
"#id2654776" class=
"para">179</a>]
</sup>
9175 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
9176 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world of
9177 noncommercial pornographers
—people who were distributing porn but were
9178 not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution. Such a
9179 class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the costs of
9180 distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got
9181 special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the
9182 Communications Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
9183 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
9184 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial publishers
9185 after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the world before the
9186 Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at least as important to
9187 protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect noncommercial pornographers.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2654846" href=
"#id2654846" class=
"para">180</a>]
</sup>
9190 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
9191 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
9192 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
9193 copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is
9194 also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one
9195 day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress,"
144
9196 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
9197 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655057" href=
"#id2655057" class=
"para">181</a>]
</sup>
9199 Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse
9200 Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
9201 <em class=
"citetitle">Chicago Tribune
</em>,
17. oktober
1998,
22.
9202 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655072" href=
"#id2655072" class=
"para">182</a>]
</sup>
9204 Se Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information Age,"
9205 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
9207 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655087" href=
"#id2655087" class=
"para">183</a>]
</sup>
9210 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
9211 <em class=
"citetitle">Congressional Quarterly This Week
</em>,
8. august
1990,
9212 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
9214 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655193" href=
"#id2655193" class=
"para">184</a>]
</sup>
9216 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>,
514
9217 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
9218 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655220" href=
"#id2655220" class=
"para">185</a>]
</sup>
9221 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Morrison
</em>,
529
9223 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655240" href=
"#id2655240" class=
"para">186</a>]
</sup>
9226 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
9227 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the context of
9228 the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the government
9229 would allow the government unending power to regulate commerce
—the
9230 limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The same point is true in
9231 the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's
9232 interpretation would allow the government unending power to regulate
9233 copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
9234 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655319" href=
"#id2655319" class=
"para">187</a>]
</sup>
9237 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
9238 <em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
537 U.S.
9239 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
51</a>.
9240 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655386" href=
"#id2655386" class=
"para">188</a>]
</sup>
9242 The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
9243 Congressional Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal
9244 ranges. See Brief of Petitioners,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
9245 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
7, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
52</a>.
9246 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655542" href=
"#id2655542" class=
"para">189</a>]
</sup>
9249 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
9250 <em class=
"citetitle">Los Angeles Times
</em>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
9251 "Classic Movies, Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today
9252 on Striking Down Copyright Extension,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Orlando Sentinel
9253 Tribune
</em>,
9 October
2002.
9254 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655596" href=
"#id2655596" class=
"para">190</a>]
</sup>
9257 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
9258 Petitoners,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
9259 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
9260 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by the
9261 Internet Archive,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
9262 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
53</a>.
9263 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2655825" href=
"#id2655825" class=
"para">191</a>]
</sup>
9266 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20 December
9267 2002, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
9269 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2656314" href=
"#id2656314" class=
"para">192</a>]
</sup>
9272 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
9273 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
537 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
9274 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2656339" href=
"#id2656339" class=
"para">193</a>]
</sup>
9277 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins
9278 the Fray,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
28 March
1998, B7.
9279 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"14. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"eldred-ii"></a>14. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</h2></div></div></div><p>
9280 The day
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> was decided, fate would have it that I
9281 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
9282 <em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> was denied
—meaning the case was really
9283 finally over
—fate would have it that I was giving a speech to
9284 technologists at Disney World.) This was a particularly long flight to my
9285 least favorite city. The drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because
9286 of traffic, so I opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
9287 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657228"></a><p>
9288 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
9289 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head the same
9290 advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is important. And
9291 alternating with that command was the question of Justice Kennedy: "For all
9292 these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts. I
9293 just don't see any empirical evidence for that." And so, having failed in
9294 the argument of constitutional principle, finally, I turned to an argument
9298 <em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em> published the piece. In it, I
9299 proposed a simple fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the
9300 copyright owner would be required to register the work and pay a small
9301 fee. If he paid the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of
9302 copyright. If he did not, the work passed into the public domain.
9304 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name. Eric
9305 Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as he said
9306 early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
9308 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this is either
9309 the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright Term Deregulation
9310 Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear and obvious: Remove
9311 copyright where it is doing nothing except blocking access and the spread of
9312 knowledge. Leave it for as long as Congress allows for those works where its
9313 worth is at least $
1. But for everything else, let the content go.
9314 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657284"></a><p>
9315 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed it in
9316 an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters expressing
9317 support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people can see the
9318 copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican might say, here
9319 government regulation is simply getting in the way of innovation and
9320 creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the government is
9321 blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no good reason. Indeed,
9322 there is no real difference between Democrats and Republicans on this
9323 issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm of the present system.
9325 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
9326 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system for
9327 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to look
9328 for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not required, since
9329 marking content is not required, since no formality at all is required, it
9330 is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask permission to use
9331 or license their work. This system would lower these costs, by establishing
9332 at least one registry where copyright owners could be identified.
9333 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657318"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657324"></a><p>
9335 As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”">10</a>, formalities in copyright law were removed in
1976,
9336 when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning any formal requirement
9337 before a copyright is granted.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2657341" href=
"#ftn.id2657341" class=
"footnote">194</a>]
</sup> The
9338 Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
9339 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American tradition
9340 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were to be
9341 protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the dignity of
9342 the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not upon the
9343 special favor of the government.
9345 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is absurd
9346 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a world
9347 without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread "Walt Disney
9348 creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to know what's
9349 protected and what's not.
9350 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657407"></a><p>
9351 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin in
9352 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne Convention in
1908,
9353 to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as the
9354 abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated because the
9355 stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was as if a Charles
9356 Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
9357 <em class=
"citetitle">i
</em> or cross a
<em class=
"citetitle">t
</em> resulted in the
9358 loss of widows' only income.
9360 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
9361 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
9362 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
9363 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities totally,
9364 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more equitable system
9367 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration in the
9368 nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was also a
9369 hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save the
9370 starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory burden
9371 imposed upon creators.
9374 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was a moral
9375 claim as well. There was no reason that creative property should be a
9376 second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table, his rights
9377 over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the government. He has
9378 a property right over the table "naturally," and he can assert that right
9379 against anyone who would steal the table, whether or not he has informed the
9380 government of his ownership of the table.
9382 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
9383 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative property
9384 being second-class property. The argument in favor of formalities turns upon
9385 the special problems that creative property presents. The law of
9386 formalities responds to the special physics of creative property, to assure
9387 that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
9389 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just because
9390 you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is to be
9391 effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just because
9392 you must register the car with the state and tag it with a license. In both
9393 of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important reason to secure
9394 registration
—both because it makes the markets more efficient and
9395 because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without a registration
9396 system for land, landowners would perpetually have to guard their
9397 property. With registration, they can simply point the police to a
9398 deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would be much
9399 easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden to sell a
9400 stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but those
9401 burdens produce a much better system of protection for property generally.
9403 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
9404 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
9405 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
9406 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
9407 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
9408 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property with
9409 confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is the author
9410 and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in a world without
9411 formalities. Complex, expensive,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>lawyer
</em></span> transactions
9412 take their place.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657509"></a>
9414 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono Act that we
9415 tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it didn't "get."
9416 Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no way easily to
9417 build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright terms were, as Justice
9418 Story said they would be, "short," then this wouldn't matter much. For
9419 fourteen years, under the framers' system, a work would be presumptively
9420 controlled. After fourteen years, it would be presumptively uncontrolled.
9422 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the inability to
9423 know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a huge and obvious
9424 burden on the creative process. If the only way a library can offer an
9425 Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a lawyer to clear the rights
9426 to every image and sound, then the copyright system is burdening creativity
9427 in a way that has never been seen before
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>because there are no
9428 formalities
</em></span>.
9430 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If it is
9431 worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the longer
9432 term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how to get your
9433 permission if they want to use your work. And you will get the benefit of an
9434 extended copyright term.
9436 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
9437 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
9438 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public domain
9439 where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a movie based
9440 on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
9442 Noen bekymrer seg over byrden på forfattere. Gjør ikke byrden med å
9443 registrere verket at beløpet $
1 egentlig er misvisende? Er ikke
9444 ekstraarbeidet verdt mer enn $
1? Er ikke dette det virkelige problemet med
9448 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
9449 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no doubt
9450 because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
9451 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must address
9452 the real problem of
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>governments
</em></span> standing at the core of
9453 any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
9454 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it was
9455 Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
9456 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click registration
9457 fifty years after a work was published. Based upon historical data, that
9458 system would move up to
98 percent of commercial work, commercial work that
9459 no longer had a commercial life, into the public domain within fifty
9460 years. What do you think?
9461 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657596"></a><p>
9462 Da Steve Forbes støttet idéen, begynte enkelte i Washington å følge
9463 med. Mange kontaktet meg med tips til representanter som kan være villig til
9464 å introdusere en Eldred-lov. og jeg hadde noen få som foreslo direkte at de
9465 kan være villige til å ta det første skrittet.
9467 En representant, Zoe Lofgren fra California, gikk så langt som å få
9468 lovforslaget utarbeidet. Utkastet løste noen problemer med internasjonal
9469 lov. Det påla de enklest mulige forutsetninger på innehaverne av
9470 opphavsretter. I mai
2003 så det ut som om loven skulle være introdusert.
9471 16. mai, postet jeg på Eldred Act-bloggen, "vi er nære". Det oppstod en
9472 generell reaksjon i blogg-samfunnet om at noe godt kunne skje her.
9473 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657629"></a>
9475 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and the
9476 MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give the view of
9477 the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti informed the
9478 congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred Act. The reasons are
9479 embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their thinness shows something clear
9480 about what this debate is really about.
9483 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central concept
9484 in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That was true, but
9485 irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred long before the
9486 Internet made subsequent uses much more likely. Second, they argued that
9487 the proposal would harm poor copyright owners
—apparently those who
9488 could not afford the $
1 fee. Third, they argued that Congress had determined
9489 that extending a copyright term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in
9490 the case of the small percentage of work covered by copyright law that is
9491 still commercially valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal
9492 would not cut off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth,
9493 the MPAA argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
9494 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are certainly
9495 less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright whose owner is
9496 not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the copyright to a story
9497 underlying a film were to pass into the public domain. But what risk is
9498 that? If it is in the public domain, then the film is a valid derivative
9501 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to do
9502 this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are thousands of
9503 copyright owners who don't even know they have a copyright to give. Whether
9504 they are free to give away their copyright or not
—a controversial
9505 claim in any case
—unless they know about a copyright, they're not
9508 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law reacting to
9509 changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed. In the other,
9510 common sense was delayed. The difference between the two stories was the
9511 power of the opposition
—the power of the side that fought to defend
9512 the status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
9513 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
9514 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
9516 Jeg brukte disse to tilfellene som en måte å ramme inn krigen som denne
9517 boken har handlet om. For her er det også en ny teknologi som tvinger loven
9518 til å reagere. Og her bør vi også spørre, er loven i tråd med eller i strid
9519 med sunn fornuft. Hvis sunn fornuft støtter loven, hva forklarer denne
9525 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the copyright
9526 owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and harmful, and the
9527 law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is p2p sharing, it is easy
9528 to understand why the law backs the owners still: Much of this sharing is
9529 wrong, even if much is harmless. When the issue is copyright terms for the
9530 Mickey Mouses of the world, it is possible still to understand why the law
9531 favors Hollywood: Most people don't recognize the reasons for limiting
9532 copyright terms; it is thus still possible to see good faith within the
9535 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred Act,
9536 then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked selfinterest
9537 driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary range of content that
9538 is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with any copyright owner's desire
9539 to exercise continued control over his content. It would simply liberate
9540 what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark Content" that fills archives around the
9541 world. So when the warriors oppose a change like this, we should ask one
9542 simple question:
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657735"></a>
9544 Hva ønsker denne industrien egentlig?
9546 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So the
9547 effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about protecting
9548 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>their
</em></span> content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an
9549 effort to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is
9550 another step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
9551 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
9552 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require
9553 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>their
</em></span> permission first.
9555 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side is. The
9556 most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as its aim not
9557 the protection of "property" but the rejection of a tradition. Their aim is
9558 not simply to protect what is theirs.
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Their aim is to assure that
9559 all there is is what is theirs
</em></span>.
9562 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not hard
9563 to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public domain
9564 tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA feared the
9565 competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public domain connected to
9566 a public that now has the means to create with it and to share its own
9568 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657788"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657795"></a><p>
9569 Det som er vanskelig å forstå er hvorfor folket innehar dette synet. Det er
9570 som om loven gjorde at flymaskiner tok seg inn på annen manns eiendom. MPAA
9571 står side om side med Causbyene og krever at deres fjerne og ubrukelige
9572 eierrettigheter blir respektert, slik at disse fjerne og glemte
9573 opphavsrettsinnehaverne kan blokkere fremgangen til andre.
9575 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
9576 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so long
9577 as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of the
9578 Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission society." The
9579 past can be cultivated only if you can identify the owner and gain
9580 permission to build upon his work. The future will be controlled by this
9581 dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
9582 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2657341" href=
"#id2657341" class=
"para">194</a>]
</sup>
9585 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
9586 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
9587 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
9588 author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act, every text
9589 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
9590 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any formality."
9591 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article
5(
2) of
9592 the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue to impose
9593 some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as a condition
9594 of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
9595 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum. Copies of
9596 books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in the British
9597 Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar of Authors where
9598 the author's true name can be filed in the case of anonymous or pseudonymous
9599 works. Paul Goldstein,
<em class=
"citetitle">International Intellectual Property Law,
9600 Cases and Materials
</em> (New York: Foundation Press,
2001),
9601 153–54.
</p></div></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"15. Konklusjon"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-conclusion"></a>15. Konklusjon
</h2></div></div></div><p>
9602 Det er mer enn trettifem millioner mennesker over hele verden med
9603 AIDS-viruset. Tjuefem millioner av dem bor i Afrika sør for Sahara. Sytten
9604 millioner har allerede dødd. Sytten millioner afrikanere er prosentvis
9605 proporsjonalt med syv millioner amerikanere. Viktigere er det at dette er
9606 17 millioner afrikanere.
9608 Det finnes ingen kur for AIDS, men det finnes medisiner som kan hemme
9609 sykdommens utvikling. Disse antiretrovirale terapiene er fortsatt
9610 eksperimentelle, men de har hatt en dramatisk effekt allerede. I USA øker
9611 AIDS-pasienter som regelmessig tar en cocktail av disse medisinene sin
9612 levealder med ti til tjue år. For noen gjøre medisinene sykdommen nesten
9615 Disse medisinene er dyre. Da de ble først introdusert i USA, kostet de
9616 mellom $
10 000 og $
15 000 pr. person hvert år. I dag koster noen
9617 av dem $
25 000 pr. år. Med disse prisene har, selvfølgelig, ingen
9618 afrikansk stat råd til medisinen for det store flertall av sine innbyggere:
9619 $
15 000 er tredve ganger brutto nasjonalprodukt pr. innbygger i
9620 Zimbabwe. Med slike priser er disse medisinene fullstendig
9621 utilgjengelig.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2657875" href=
"#ftn.id2657875" class=
"footnote">195</a>]
</sup>
9625 Disse prisene er ikke høye fordi ingrediensene til medisinene er dyre.
9626 Disse prisene er høye fordi medisinene er beskyttet av patenter.
9627 Farmasiselskapene som produserer disse livreddende blandingene nyter minst
9628 tjue års monopol på sine oppfinnelser. De bruker denne monopolmakten til å
9629 hente ut så mye de kan fra markedet. Ved hjelp av denne makten holder de
9632 Det er mange som er skeptiske til patenter, spesielt patenter på
9633 medisiner. Det er ikke jeg. Faktisk av alle forskningsområder som kan være
9634 støttet av patenter, er forskning på medisiner, etter min mening, det
9635 klareste tilfelle der patenter er nødvendig. Patenter gir et farmasøytiske
9636 firma en viss forsikring om at hvis det lykkes i å finne opp et nytt
9637 medikament som kan behandle en sykdom, vil det kunne tjene tilbake
9638 investeringen og mer til. Dette ber sosialt et ekstremt verdifullt
9639 insentiv. Jeg er den siste personen som vil argumentere for at loven skal
9640 avskaffe dette, i det minste uten andre endringer.
9642 Men det er én ting å støtte patenter, selv patenter på medisiner. Det er en
9643 annen ting å avgjøre hvordan en best skal håndtere en krise. Og i det
9644 afrikanske ledere begynte å erkjenne ødeleggelsen AIDS brakte, begynte de å
9645 se etter måter å importere HIV-medisiner til kostnader betydelig under
9648 I
1997 forsøkte Sør-Afrika seg på en tilnærming. Landet vedtok en lov som
9649 tillot import av patenterte medisiner som hadde blitt produsert og solgt i
9650 en annen nasjons marked med godkjenning fra patenteieren. For eksempel,
9651 hvis medisinen var solgt i India, så kunne den bli importert inn til Afrika
9652 fra India. Dette kalles "parallellimport" og er generelt tillatt i
9653 internasjonal handelslovgivning, og spesifikt tillatt i den europeiske
9654 union.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2657957" href=
"#ftn.id2657957" class=
"footnote">196</a>]
</sup>
9656 Men USA var imot lovendringen. Og de nøyde seg ikke med å være imot. Som
9657 International Intellectual Property Association karakteriserte det,
9658 "Myndighetene i USA presset Sør-Afrika
… til å ikke tillate tvungen
9659 lisensiering eller parallellimport"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2654898" href=
"#ftn.id2654898" class=
"footnote">197</a>]
</sup>
9660 Gjennom kontoret til USAs handelsrepresentant (USTR), ba myndighetene
9661 Sør-Afrika om å endre loven
—og for å legge press bak den
9662 forespørselen, listet USTR i
1998 opp Sør-Afrika som et land som burde
9663 vurderes for handelsrestriksjoner. Samme år gikk mer enn førti
9664 farmasiselskaper til retten for å utfordre myndighetenes handlinger. USA
9665 fikk selskap av andre myndigheter fra EU. Deres påstand, og påstanden til
9666 farmasiselskapene, var at Sør-Afrika brøt sine internasjonale forpliktelser
9667 ved å diskriminere mot en bestemt type patenter
—farmasøytiske
9668 patenter. Kravet fra disse myndighetene, med USA i spissen, var at
9669 Sør-Afrika skulle respektere disse patentene på samme måte som alle andre
9670 patenter, uavhengig av eventuell effekt på behandlingen av AIDS i
9671 Sør-Afrika.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2658023" href=
"#ftn.id2658023" class=
"footnote">198</a>]
</sup>
9673 Vi bør sette intervensjonen til USA i sammenheng. Det er ingen tvil om at
9674 patenter ikke er den viktigste årsaken til at Afrikanere ikke har tilgang
9675 til medisiner. Fattigdom og den totale mangel på effektivt helsevesen betyr
9676 mer. Men uansett om patenter er en viktigste grunnen eller ikke, så har
9677 prisen på medisiner en effekt på etterspørselen, og patenter påvirker
9678 prisen. Så uansett, massiv eller marginal, så var det en effekt av våre
9679 myndigheters intervensjon for å stoppe flyten av medisiner inn til Afrika.
9681 Ved å stoppe flyten av HIV-behandling til Afrika, sikret ikke myndighetene i
9682 USA medisiner til USA borgere. Dette er ikke som hvete (hvis de spise det så
9683 kan ikke vi spise det). Det som USA i effekt intervenerte for å stoppe, var
9684 flyten av kunnskap: Informasjon om hvordan en kan ta kjemikalier som finnes
9685 i Afrika og gjøre disse kjemikaliene om til medisiner som kan redde
15 til
9688 Intervensjonen fra USA ville heller ikke beskytte fortjenesten til
9689 medisinselskapene i USA
— i hvert fall ikke betydelig. Det var jo ikke
9690 slik at disse landene hadde mulighet til å kjøpe medisinene til de prisene
9691 som medisinselskapene forlangte. Igjen var afrikanerne for fattige til å ha
9692 råd til disse medisinene til de tilbudte prisene. Å blokkere for
9693 parallellimport av disse medisinene ville ikke øke salget til de amerikanske
9694 selskapene betydelig.
9696 I stedet var argumentet til fordel for restriksjoner på denne flyten av
9697 informasjon, som var nødvendig for å redde millioner av liv, et argument om
9698 eiendoms ukrenkelighet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2658118" href=
"#ftn.id2658118" class=
"footnote">199</a>]
</sup> Det var på
9699 grunn av at "intellektuell eiendom" ville bli krenket at disse medisinene
9700 ikke skulle flomme inn til Afrika. Det var prinsippet om viktigheten av
9701 "intellektuell eiendom" som fikk disse myndighetsaktørene til å intervenere
9702 mot Sør-Afrikas mottiltak mot AIDS.
9704 La oss ta et skritt tilbake for et øyeblikk. En gang om tredve år vil våre
9705 barn se tilbake på oss og spørre, hvordan kunne vi la dette skje? Hvordan
9706 kunne vi tillate å gjennomføre en politikk hvis direkte kostnad var få
15
9707 til
30 millioner afrikanere til å dø raskere, og hvis eneste virkelige
9708 fordel var å opprettholde "ukrenkeligheten" til en idé? Hva slags
9709 berettigelse kan noen sinne eksistere for en politikk som resulterer i så
9710 mange døde? Hva slags galskap er det egentlig som tillater at så mange dør
9711 for slik en abstraksjon?
9713 Noen skylder på farmasiselskapene. Det gjør ikke jeg. De er selskaper, og
9714 deres ledere er lovpålagt å tjene penger for selskapene. De presser på for
9715 en bestemt patentpolitikk, ikke på grunn av idealer, men fordi det er dette
9716 som gjør at de tjener mest penger. Og dette gjør kun at de tjener mest
9717 penger på grunn av en slags korrupsjon i vårt politiske system
— en
9718 korrupsjon som farmasiselskapene helt klart ikke er ansvarlige for.
9720 Denne korrupsjonen er våre egne politikeres manglende integritet. For
9721 medisinprodusentene ville elske
—sier de selv, og jeg tror dem
—
9722 å selge sine medisiner så billig som de kan til land i Afrika og andre
9723 steder. Det er utfordringer de må løse å sikre at medisinene ikke kommer
9724 tilbake til USA, men dette er bare teknologiske utfordring. De kan bli
9728 Et annet problem kan derimot ikke løses. Det er frykten for at en politiker
9729 som skal vise seg og kaller inn lederne hos medisinprodusentene til høring i
9730 senatet eller representantenes hus og spør, "hvordan har det seg at du kan
9731 selge HIV-medisinen i Afrika for bare $
1 pr. pille, mens samme pille koster
9732 en amerikansker $
1 500?" Da det ikke finnes et "kjapt svar" på det
9733 spørsmålet, ville effekten bli regulering av priser i Amerika.
9734 Medisinprodusentene unngår dermed denne spiralen ved å sikre at det første
9735 steget ikke tas. De forsterker idéen om at eierrettigheter skal være
9736 ukrenkelige. De legger seg på en rasjonell strategi i en irrasjonell
9737 omgivelse, med den utilsiktede konsekvens at kanskje millioner dør. Og den
9738 rasjonelle strategien rammes dermed inn ved hjel av dette
9739 ideal
—helligheten til en idé som kalles "immaterielle rettigheter".
9741 Så når du konfronteres av ditt barns sunne fornuft, hva vil du si? Når den
9742 sunne fornuften hos en generasjon endelig gjør opprør mot hva vi har gjort,
9743 hvordan vil vi rettferdiggjøre det? Hva er argumentet?
9745 En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk støtte til
9746 patentsystemet uten å måtte nå alle overalt på nøyaktig samme måte. På samme
9747 måte som en fornuftig opphavsrettspolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk
9748 støtte til et opphavsretts-system uten å måtte regulere spredningen av
9749 kultur perfekt og for alltid. En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for
9750 og gi sterk støtte til et patentsystem uten å måtte blokkere spredning av
9751 medisiner til et land som uansett ikke er rikt nok til å ha råd til
9752 markedsprisen. En fornuftig politikk kan en dermed si kunne være en
9753 balansert politikk. For det meste av vår historie har både opphavsrett- og
9754 patentpolitikken i denne forstand vært balansert.
9757 Men vi som kultur har mistet denne følelsen for balanse. Vi har mistet det
9758 kritiske blikket som hjelper oss til å se forskjellen mellom sannhet og
9759 ekstremisme. En slags eiendomsfundamentalisme, uten grunnlag i vår
9760 tradisjon, hersker nå i vår kultur
—sært, og med konsekvenser mer
9761 alvorlig for spredningen av idéer og kultur enn nesten enhver annen politisk
9762 enkeltavgjørelse vi som demokrati kan fatte. En enkel idé blender oss, og
9763 under dekke av mørket skjer mye som de fleste av oss ville avvist hvis vi
9764 hadde fulgt med. Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om eierskap til idéer at
9765 vi ikke engang legger merke til hvor uhyrlig det er å nekte tilgang til
9766 idéer for et folk som dør uten dem. Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om
9767 eiendom til kulturen at vi ikke engang stiller spørsmål ved når kontrollen
9768 over denne eiendommen fjerner vår evne, som folk, til å utvikle vår kultur
9769 demokratisk. Blindhet blir vår sunne fornuft, og utfordringen for enhver
9770 som vil gjenvinne retten til å dyrke vår kultur er å finne en måte å få
9771 denne sunne fornuften til å åpne sine øyne.
9773 Så langt sover sunn fornuft. Det er intet opprør. Sunn fornuft ser ennå
9774 ikke hva det er å gjøre opprør mot. Ekstremismen som nå dominerer denne
9775 debatten resonerer med idéer som virker naturlige, og resonansen er
9776 forsterket av våre moderne RCA-ene. De fører en frenetisk krig for å
9777 bekjempe "piratvirksomhet" og knuser kreativitetskultur. De forsvarer idéen
9778 om "kreativt eierskap", mens de endrer ekte skapere til moderne
9779 leilendinger. De blir fornærmet av idéen om at rettigheter skulle være
9780 balanserte, selv om hver av hovedaktørene i denne innholdskrigen selv hadde
9781 fordeler av et mer balansert ideal. Hykleriet rår. Men i en by som
9782 Washington blir ikke hykleriet en gang lagt merke til. Mektige lobbyister,
9783 kompliserte problemer og MTV-oppmerksomhetsspenn gir en "perfekt storm" for
9785 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658295"></a><p>
9786 I august
2003 brøt en kamp ut i USA om en avgjørelse fra World Intellectual
9787 Property Organiation om å avlyse et møte.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2658355" href=
"#ftn.id2658355" class=
"footnote">200</a>]
</sup> På forespørsel fra en lang rekke med interressenter hadde WIPO
9788 bestemt å avholde et møte for å diskutere "åpne og samarbeidende prosjekter
9789 for å skape goder for felleskapet". Disse prosjektene som hadde lyktes i å
9790 produsere goder for fellesskapet uten å basere seg eksklusivt på bruken av
9791 proprietære immaterielle rettigheter. Eksempler inkluderer internettet og
9792 verdensveven, begge som ble utviklet på grunnlag av protokoller i
9793 allemannseie. Det hadde med en begynnende trend for å støtte åpne
9794 akademiske tidsskrifter, og inkluderte Public Library of Science-prosjektet
9795 som jeg beskriver i etterordet. Det inkluderte et prosjekt for a utvikle
9796 enkeltnukleotidforskjeller (SNPs), som er antatt å få stor betydning i
9797 biomedisinsk forskning. (Dette ideelle prosjektet besto av et konsortium av
9798 Wellcome Trust og farmasøytiske og teknologiske selskaper, inkludert
9799 Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
9800 Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, og
9801 Searle.) Det inkluderte Globalt posisjonssystem (GPS) som Ronald Reagen
9802 frigjorde tidlig på
1980-tallet. Og det inkluderte "åpen kildekode og fri
9803 programvare".
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658426"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658434"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658440"></a>
9805 Formålet med møtet var å vurdere denne rekken av prosjekter fra et felles
9806 perspektiv: at ingen av disse prosjektene hadde som grunnlag immateriell
9807 ekstremisme. I stedet, hos alle disse, ble immaterielle rettigheter
9808 balansert med avtaler om å holde tilgang åpen, eller for å legge
9809 begrensninger på hvordan proprietære krav kan bli brukt.
9811 Dermed var, fra perspektivet i denne boken, denne konferansen
9812 ideell.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2658465" href=
"#ftn.id2658465" class=
"footnote">201</a>]
</sup> Prosjektene innenfor temaet var
9813 både kommersielle og ikkekommersielle verker. De involverte i hovedsak
9814 vitenskapen, men fra mange perspektiver. Og WIPO var et ideelt sted for
9815 denne diskusjonen, siden WIPO var den fremstående internasjonale aktør som
9816 drev med immaterielle rettighetsspørsmål.
9819 Faktisk fikk jeg en gang offentlig kjeft for å ikke anerkjenne dette faktum
9820 om WIPO. I februar
2003 leverte jeg et hovedinnlegg på en forberedende
9821 konferanse for World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). På en
9822 pressekonferanse før innlegget, ble jeg spurt hva jeg skulle snakke om. Jeg
9823 svarte at jeg skulle snakke litt om viktigheten av balanse rundt
9824 immaterielle verdier for utviklingen av informasjonssamfunnet. Ordstyreren
9825 på arrangementet avbrøt meg da brått for å informere meg og journalistene
9826 tilstede at ingen spørsmål rundt immaterielle verdier ville bli diskutert av
9827 WSIS, da slike spørsmål kun skulle diskuteres i WIPO. I innlegget jeg hadde
9828 forberedt var temaet om immaterielle verdier en forholdvis liten del av det
9829 hele. Men etter denne forbløffende uttalelsen, gjorde jeg immaterielle
9830 verdier til hovedfokus for mitt innlegg. Det var ikke mulig å snakke om et
9831 "informasjonssamfunn" uten at en også snakket om andelen av informasjon og
9832 kultur som ikke er vernet av opphavsretten. Mitt innlegg gjorde ikke min
9833 overivrige moderator veldig glad. Og hun hadde uten tvil rett i at omfanget
9834 til vern av immaterielle rettigheter normalt hørte inn under WIPO. Men
9835 etter mitt syn, kunne det ikke bli for mye diskusjon om hvor mye
9836 immaterielle rettigheter som trengs, siden etter mitt syn, hadde selve idéen
9837 om en balanse rundt immaterielle rettigheter hadde gått tapt.
9839 Så uansett om WSIS kan diskutere balanse i intellektuell eiendom eller ikke,
9840 så hadde jeg trodd det var tatt for gitt at WIPO kunne og burde. Og dermed
9841 møtet om "åpne og samarbeidende prosjekter for å skape fellesgoder" virker å
9842 passe perfekt for WIPOs agenda.
9844 Men det er ett prosjekt i listen som er svært kontroversielt, i hvert fall
9845 blant lobbyister. Dette prosjektet er "åpen kildekode og fri
9846 programvare". Microsoft spesielt er skeptisk til diskusjon om emnet. Fra
9847 deres perspektiv, ville en konferanse for å diskutere åpen kildekode og fri
9848 programvare være som en konferanse for å diskutere Apples operativsystem.
9849 Både åpen kildekode og fri programvare konkurrerer med Microsofts
9850 programvare. Og internasjonalt har mange myndigheter begynt å utforske krav
9851 om at de skal bruke åpen kildekode eller fri programvare, i stedet for
9852 "proprietær programvare," til sine egne interne behov.
9854 Jeg mener ikke å gå inn i den debatten her. Det er viktig kun for å gjøre
9855 det klart at skillet ikke er mellom kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell
9856 programvare. Det er mange viktige selskaper som er fundamentalt avhengig av
9857 fri programvare, der IBM er den mest fremtredende. IBM har i stadig større
9858 grad skiftet sitt fokus til GNU/Linux-operativsystemet, det mest berømte
9859 biten av "fri programvare"
—og IBM er helt klart en kommersiell
9860 aktør. Dermed er det å støtte "fri programvare" ikke å motsette seg
9861 kommersielle aktører. Det er i stedet å støtte en måte å drive
9862 programvareutvikling som er forskjellig fra Microsofts.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2658300" href=
"#ftn.id2658300" class=
"footnote">202</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658619"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658625"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658631"></a>
9863 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658638"></a>
9866 Mer viktig for våre formål, er at å støtte "åpen kildekode og fri
9867 programvare" ikke er å motsette seg opphavsrett. "Åpen kildekode og fri
9868 programvare" er ikke programvare uten opphavsrettslig vern. Istedet, på
9869 samme måte som programvare fra Microsoft, insisterer opphavsrettsinnehaverne
9870 av fri programvare ganske sterkt at vilkårene i deres programvarelisens blir
9871 respektert av de som tar i bruk fri programvare. Vilkårene i den lisensen
9872 er uten tvil forskjellig fra vilkårene i en proprietær programvarelisens.
9873 For eksempel krever fri programvare lisensiert med den generelle offentlige
9874 lisensen (GPL), at kildekoden for programvare gjøres tilgjengelig for alle
9875 som endrer og videredistribuerer programvaren. Men dette kravet er kun
9876 effektivt hvis opphavsrett råder over programvare. Hvis opphavsretten ikke
9877 råder over programvare, så kunne ikke fri programvare pålegge slike krav på
9878 de som tar i bruk programvaren. Den er dermed like avhengig av
9879 opphavsrettsloven som Microsoft.
9881 Det er dermed forståelig at Microsoft, som utviklere av proprietær
9882 programvare, gikk imot et slikt WIPO-møte, og like fullt forståelig at de
9883 bruker sine lobbyister til å få USAs myndigheter til å gå imot møtet. Og
9884 ganske riktig, det er akkurat dette som i følge rapporter hadde skjedd. I
9885 følge Jonathan Krim i
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington Post
</em>, lyktes
9886 Microsofts lobbyister i å få USAs myndigheter til å legge ned veto mot et
9887 slikt møte.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2658701" href=
"#ftn.id2658701" class=
"footnote">203</a>]
</sup> Og uten støtte fra USA ble
9888 møtet avlyst.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658716"></a>
9890 Jeg klandrer ikke Microsoft for å gjøre det de kan for å fremme sine egne
9891 interesser i samsvar med loven. Og lobbyvirksomhet mot myndighetene er
9892 åpenbart i samsvar med loven. Det er ikke noe overraskende her med deres
9893 lobbyvirksomhet, og ikke veldig overraskende at den mektigste
9894 programvareprodusenten i USA har lyktes med sin lobbyvirksomhet.
9896 Det som var overraskende var USAs regjerings begrunnelse for å være imot
9897 møtet. Igjen, sitert av Krim, forklarte Lois Boland, direktør for
9898 internasjonale forbindelser ved USAs patent og varemerkekontor, at
9899 "programvare med åpen kildekode går imot til formålet til WIPO, som er å
9900 fremme immaterielle rettigheter.". Hun skal i følge sitatet ha sagt, "Å
9901 holde et møte som har som formål å fraskrive seg eller frafalle slike
9902 rettigheter synes for oss å være i strid med formålene til WIPO."
9904 Disse utsagnene er forbløffende på flere nivåer.
9906 For det første er de ganske enkelt ikke riktige. Som jeg beskrev, er det
9907 meste av åpen kildekode og fri programvare fundamentalt avhengig av den
9908 immaterielle retten kalt "opphavsrett". Uten den vil begrensningene
9909 definert av disse lisensene ikke fungere. Dermed er det å si at de "går
9910 imot" formålet om å fremme immaterielle rettigheter å avsløre en
9911 ekstraordinær mangel på forståelse
—den type feil som er tilgivelig hos
9912 en førsteårs jusstudent, men pinlig fra en høyt plassert statstjenestemann
9913 som håndterer utfordringer rundt immaterielle rettigheter.
9915 For det andre, hvem har noen gang hevdet at WIPOs eksklusive mål var å
9916 "fremme" immaterielle rettigheter maksimalt? Som jeg fikk kjeft om på den
9917 forberedende konferansen til WSIS, skal WIPO vurdere ikke bare hvordan best
9918 beskytte immaterielle rettigheter, men også hva som er den beste balansen
9919 rundt immaterielle rettigheter. Som enhver økonom og advokat vet, er det
9920 vanskelige spørsmålet i immaterielle rettighetsjuss å finne den balansen.
9921 Men at det skulle være en grense, trodde jeg, var ubestridt. Man ønsker å
9922 spørre Ms. Boland om generelle medisiner (medisiner basert på medisiner med
9923 patenter som er utløpt) i strid med WIPOs oppdrag? Svekker allemannseie
9924 immaterielle rettigheter? Ville det vært bedre om internettets protokoller
9925 hadde vært patentert?
9927 For det tredje, selv om en tror at formålet med WIPO var å maksimere
9928 immaterielle rettigheter, så innehas immaterielle rettigheter, i vår
9929 tradisjon, av individer og selskaper. De får bestemme hva som skal gjøres
9930 med disse rettighetene, igjen fordi det er
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>de
</em></span> som eier
9931 rettighetene. Hvis de ønsker å "frafalle" eller "frasi" seg sine
9932 rettigheter, så er det helt etter boka i vår tradisjon. Når Bill Gates gir
9933 bort mer enn $
20 milliarder til gode formål, så er ikke det uforenelig med
9934 målene til eiendomssystemet. Det er heller tvert i mot, akkurat hva
9935 eiendomssysstemet er ment å oppnå, at individer har retten til å bestemme
9936 hva de vil gjøre med
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>sin
</em></span> eiendom.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658845"></a>
9939 Når Ms. Boland sier at det er noe galt med et møte "som har som sitt formål
9940 å fraskrive eller frafalle slike rettigheter", så sier hun at WIPO har en
9941 interesse i å påvirke valgene til enkeltpersoner som eier immaterielle
9942 rettigheter. At på en eller annen WIPOs oppdrag bør være å stoppe individer
9943 fra å "fraskrive" eller "frafalle" seg sine immaterielle rettigheter. At
9944 interessen til WIPO ikke bare er maksimale immaterielle rettigheter, men
9945 også at de skal utøves på den mest ekstreme og restriktive mulig måten.
9947 Det er en historie om akkurat et slikt eierskapssystem som er velkjent i den
9948 anglo-amerikansk tradisjon. Det kalles "føydalisme". Under føydalismen var
9949 eiendommer ikke bare kontrollert av et relativt lite antall individer og
9950 aktører. Men det føydale systemet hadde en sterk interesse i å sikre at
9951 landeier i systemet ikke svekke føydalismen ved å frigjøre folkene og
9952 eiendomene som de kontrollerte til det frie markedet. Føydalismen var
9953 avhengig av maksimal kontroll og konsentrasjon. Det sloss mot enhver frihet
9954 som kunne forstyrre denne kontrollen.
9955 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658886"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658892"></a><p>
9956 Som Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite beskriver, dette er nøyaktig det valget
9957 vi nå gjør om immaterielle rettigheter.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2658904" href=
"#ftn.id2658904" class=
"footnote">204</a>]
</sup>
9958 Vi kommer til å få et informasjonssamfunn. Så mye er sikkert. Vårt eneste
9959 valg nå er hvorvidt dette informasjonssamfunnet skal være
9960 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>fritt
</em></span> eller
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>føydalt
</em></span>. Trenden er
9963 Da denne bataljen brøt ut, blogget jeg om dette. En heftig debatt brøt ut i
9964 kommentarfeltet. Ms. Boland hadde en rekke støttespillere som forsøkte å
9965 vise hvorfor hennes kommentarer ga mening. Men det var spesielt en
9966 kommentar som gjorde meg trist. En anonym kommentator skrev,
9967 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
9969 George, du misforstår Lessig: Han snakker bare om verden slik den burde være
9970 ("målet til WIPO, og målet til enhver regjering, bør være å fremme den
9971 riktige balansen for immaterielle rettigheter, ikke bare å fremme
9972 immaterielle rettigheter"), ikke som den er. Hvis vi snakket om verden slik
9973 den er, så har naturligvis Boland ikke sagt noe galt. Men i verden slik
9974 Lessig vil at den skal være, er det åpenbart at hun har sagt noe galt. En
9975 må alltid være oppmerksom på forskjellen mellom Lessigs og vår verden.
9976 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9977 Jeg gikk glipp av ironien først gangen jeg leste den. Jeg lese den raskt og
9978 trodde forfatteren støttet idéen om at det våre myndigheter burde gjøre var
9979 å søke balanse. (Min kritikk av Ms Boland, selvfølgelig, var ikke om
9980 hvorvidt hun søkte balanse eller ikke; min kritikk var at hennes kommentarer
9981 avslørte en feil kun en førsteårs jusstudent burde kunne gjøre. Jeg har noen
9982 illusjon om ekstremismen hos våre myndigheter, uansett om de er
9983 republikanere eller demokrater. Min eneste tilsynelatende illusjon er
9984 hvorvidt våre myndigheter bør snakke sant eller ikke.)
9986 Det var derimot åpenbart at den som postet meldingen ikke støttet idéen. I
9987 stedet latterliggjorde forfatteren selve idéen om at i den virkelig verden
9988 skulle "målet" til myndighetene være "å fremme den riktige balanse" for
9989 immaterielle rettigheter. Det var åpenbart tåpelig for ham. Og det
9990 avslørte åpenbart, trodde han, min egen tåpelige utopisme. "Typisk for en
9991 akademiker", kunne forfatteren like gjerne ha fortsatt.
9993 Jeg forstår kritikken av akademisk utopisme. Jeg mener også at utopisme er
9994 tåpelig, og jeg vil være blant de første til å gjøre narr av de absurde
9995 urealistiske idealer til akademikere gjennom historien (og ikke bare i vårt
9996 eget lands historie).
9998 Men når det har blitt dumt å anta at rollen til våre myndigheter bør være å
9999 "oppnå balanse", da kan du regne meg blant de dumme, for det betyr at dette
10000 faktisk har blitt ganske seriøst. Hvis det bør være åpenbart for alle at
10001 myndighetene ikke søker å oppnå balanse, at myndighetene ganske enkelt et
10002 verktøy for de mektigste lobbyistene, at idéen om å forvente bedre av
10003 myndighetene er absurd, at idéen om å kreve at myndighetene snakker sant og
10004 ikke lyver bare er naiv, hva har da vi, det mektigste demokratiet i verden,
10008 Det kan være galskap å forvente at en mektig myndigshetsperson skal si
10009 sannheten. Det kan være galskap å tro at myndighetenes politikk skal gjøre
10010 mer enn å tjene de mektigste interesser. Det kan være galskap å argumentere
10011 for å bevare en tradisjon som har vært en del av vår tradisjon for
10012 mesteparten av vår historie
—fri kultur.
10013 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659030"></a><p>
10014 Hvis dette er galskap, så la det være mer gærninger. Snart. Det finnes
10015 øyeblikk av håp i denne kampen. Og øyeblikk som overrasker. Da FCC vurderte
10016 mindre strenge eierskapsregler, som ville ytterligere konsentrere
10017 medieeierskap, dannet det seg en en ekstraordinær koalisjon på tvers av
10018 partiene for å bekjempe endringen. For kanskje første gang i historien
10019 organiserte interesser så forskjellige som NRA, ACLU, moveon.org, William
10020 Safire, Ted Turner og Codepink Women for Piece seg for å protestere på denne
10021 endringen i FCC-reglene. Så mange som
700 000 brev ble sendt til FCC med
10022 krav om flere høringer og et annet resultat.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659051"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659057"></a>
10024 Disse protestene stoppet ikke FCC, men like etter stemte en bred koalisjon i
10025 senatet for å reversere avgjørelsen i FCC. De fiendtlige høringene som ledet
10026 til avstemmingen avslørte hvor mektig denne bevegelsen hadde blitt. Det var
10027 ingen betydningsfull støtte for FCCs avgjørelse, mens det var bred og
10028 vedvarende støtte for å bekjempe ytterligere konsentrasjon i media.
10030 Men selv denne bevegelsen går glipp av en viktig brikke i puslespillet. Å
10031 være stor er ikke ille i seg selv. Frihet er ikke truet bare på grunn av at
10032 noen blir veldig rik, eller på grunn av at det bare er en håndfull store
10033 aktører. Den dårlige kvaliteten til Big Macs eller Quartar Punders betyr
10034 ikke at du ikke kan få en god hamburger andre steder.
10036 Faren med mediekonsentrasjon kommer ikke fra selve konsentrasjonen, men
10037 kommer fra føydalismen som denne konsentrasjonen fører til når den kobles
10038 til endringer i opphavsretten. Det er ikke kun at det er noen mektige
10039 selskaper som styrer en stadig voksende andel av mediene. Det er at denne
10040 konsentrasjonen kan påkalle en like oppsvulmet rekke
10041 rettigheter
—eiendomsrettigheter i en historisk ekstrem form
—som
10042 gjør størrelsen ille.
10044 Det er derfor betydningsfullt at så mange vil kjempe for å kreve konkurranse
10045 og økt mangfold. Likevel, hvis kampanjen blir forstått til å kun gjelde
10046 størrelse, så er ikke det veldig overraskende. Vi amerikanere har en lang
10047 historie med å slåss mot "stort", klokt eller ikke. At vi kan være motivert
10048 til å slåss mot "store" igjen ikke noe nytt.
10050 Det ville vært noe nytt, og noe veldig viktig, hvis like mange kan være med
10051 på en kampanje for å bekjempe økende ekstremisme bygget inn i idéen om
10052 "intellektuell eiendom". Ikke fordi balanse er fremmed for vår
10053 tradisjon. Jeg argumenterer for at balanse er vår tradisjon. Men fordi
10054 evnen til å tenke kritisk på omfanget av alt som kalles "eiendom" ikke er
10055 lenger er godt trent i denne tradisjonen.
10057 Hvis vi var Akilles, så ville dette være vår hæl. Dette ville være stedet
10059 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659150"></a><p>
10060 Mens jeg skriver disse avsluttende ordene, er nyhetene fylt med historier om
10061 at RIAA saksøker nesten tre hundre individer.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2659162" href=
"#ftn.id2659162" class=
"footnote">205</a>]
</sup> Eminem har nettopp blitt saksøkt for å ha "samplet" noen andres
10062 musikk.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2659208" href=
"#ftn.id2659208" class=
"footnote">206</a>]
</sup> Historien om hvordan Bob Dylan
10063 har "stjålet" fra en japansk forfatter har nettopp gått verden
10064 over.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2659226" href=
"#ftn.id2659226" class=
"footnote">207</a>]
</sup> En på innsiden i
10065 Hollywood
—som insisterer på at han må forbli anonym
—rapporterer
10066 "en utrolig samtale med disse studiofolkene. De har fantastisk [gammelt]
10067 innhold som de ville elske å bruke, men det kan de ikke på grunn av at de
10068 først må klarere rettighetene. De har hauger med ungdommer som kunne gjøre
10069 fantastiske ting med innholdet, men det vil først kreve hauger med advokater
10070 for å klarere det først". Kongressrepresentanter snakker om å gi datavirus
10071 politimyndighet for å ta ned datamaskiner som antas å bryte loven.
10072 Universiteter truer med å utvise ungdommer som bruker en datamaskin for å
10074 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659262"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659268"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659274"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659280"></a><p>
10076 I mens på andre siden av Atlanteren har BBC nettopp annonsert at de vil
10077 bygge opp et "kreativt arkiv" som britiske borgere kan laste ned BBC-innhold
10078 fra, og rippe, mikse og brenne det ut.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2659297" href=
"#ftn.id2659297" class=
"footnote">208</a>]
</sup>
10079 Og i Brasil har kulturministeren, Gilberto Gil, i seg selv en folkehelt i
10080 brasiliansk musikk, slått seg sammen med Creative Commons for å gi ut
10081 innhold og frie lisenser i dette latinamerikanske landet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2659318" href=
"#ftn.id2659318" class=
"footnote">209</a>]
</sup> Jeg har fortalt en mørk historie. Sannheten er
10082 mer blandet. En teknologi har gitt oss mer frihet. Sakte begynner noen å
10083 forstå at denne friheten trenger ikke å bety anarki. Vi kan få med oss fri
10084 kultur inn i det tjueførste århundre, uten at artister taper og uten at
10085 potensialet for digital teknologi blir knust. Det vil kreve omtanke, og
10086 viktigere, det vil kreve at noen omforme RCAene av i dag til Causbyere.
10089 Sunn fornuft må gjøre opprør. Den må handle for å frigjøre kulturen. Og
10090 snart, hvis dette potensialet skal noen gang bli realisert.
10094 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2657875" href=
"#id2657875" class=
"para">195</a>]
</sup>
10096 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
10097 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
10098 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
10099 #
55</a>. I følge en pressemelding fra verdens helseorganisasjon sendt ut
10100 9. juli
2002, mottar kun
320 000 av de
6 millioner som trenger medisiner i
10101 utviklingsland dem de trenger
—og halvparten av dem er i Brasil.
10102 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2657957" href=
"#id2657957" class=
"para">196</a>]
</sup>
10104 Se Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
<em class=
"citetitle">Who
10105 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</em> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10106 37.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657966"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2657974"></a>
10107 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2654898" href=
"#id2654898" class=
"para">197</a>]
</sup>
10110 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<em class=
"citetitle">Patent
10111 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a
10112 Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization
</em>
10113 (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
56</a>. For a firsthand
10114 account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing Before the
10115 Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House
10116 Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22
10117 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James Love).
10118 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2658023" href=
"#id2658023" class=
"para">198</a>]
</sup>
10121 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<em class=
"citetitle">Patent
10122 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, en
10123 rapport forberedt for the World Intellectual Property
10124 Organization
</em> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2658118" href=
"#id2658118" class=
"para">199</a>]
</sup>
10128 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's Needs at
10129 Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,"
<em class=
"citetitle">San Francisco
10130 Chronicle
</em>,
24 May
1999, A1, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
57</a> ("compulsory licenses
10131 and gray markets pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property
10132 protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
10133 Access to Essential Medicines,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Foreign Policy in
10134 Focus
</em> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
58</a> (describing
10135 U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the
10136 HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property
10137 Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Widener Law Symposium
10138 Journal
</em> (Spring
2001):
175.
10140 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2658355" href=
"#id2658355" class=
"para">200</a>]
</sup>
10142 Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington
10143 Post
</em>, august
2003, E1, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
59</a>; William New, "Global
10144 Group's Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,"
<em class=
"citetitle">National
10145 Journal's Technology Daily
</em>,
19. august
2003, tilgjengelig fra
10146 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
60</a>; William New,
10147 "U.S. Official Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,"
<em class=
"citetitle">National
10148 Journal's Technology Daily
</em>,
19. august
2003, tilgjengelig fra
10149 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
61</a>.
10150 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2658465" href=
"#id2658465" class=
"para">201</a>]
</sup>
10152 Jeg bør nevne at jeg var en av folkene som ba WIPO om dette møtet.
10153 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2658300" href=
"#id2658300" class=
"para">202</a>]
</sup>
10156 Microsofts posisjon om åpen kildekode og fri programvare er mer
10157 sofistikert. De har flere ganger forklart at de har ikke noe problem med
10158 programvare som er "åpen kildekode" eller programvare som er allemannseie.
10159 Microsofts prinsipielle motstand er mot "fri programvare" lisensiert med en
10160 "copyleft"-lisens, som betyr at lisensen krever at de som lisensierer skal
10161 adoptere same vilkår for ethvert avledet verk. Se Bradford L. Smith, "The
10162 Future of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,"
10163 <em class=
"citetitle">Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
</em>
10164 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
10165 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
10166 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
10167 #
62</a>. Se også Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
10168 <em class=
"citetitle">The Commercial Software Model
</em>, diskusjon ved New York
10169 University Stern School of Business (
3. mai
2001), tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
63</a>.
10170 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2658701" href=
"#id2658701" class=
"para">203</a>]
</sup>
10173 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
64</a>.
10174 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2658904" href=
"#id2658904" class=
"para">204</a>]
</sup>
10176 Se Drahos with Braithwaite,
<em class=
"citetitle">Information Feudalism
</em>,
10177 210–20.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2658018"></a>
10178 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2659162" href=
"#id2659162" class=
"para">205</a>]
</sup>
10181 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, september
2003,
10182 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
10183 #
65</a>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8
10184 september
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
66</a>; Soni Sangha og Phyllis
10185 Furman sammen med Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song, N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
10186 261 Cited as Sharers,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Daily News
</em>,
10187 9. september
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets;
10188 Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10189 <em class=
"citetitle">Washington Post
</em>,
10. september
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
10190 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Wired News
</em>,
10191 10. september
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
67</a>.
10192 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2659208" href=
"#id2659208" class=
"para">206</a>]
</sup>
10195 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
10196 17. september
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
68</a>.
10197 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2659226" href=
"#id2659226" class=
"para">207</a>]
</sup>
10201 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for Dylan
10202 Songs," Kansascity.com,
9. juli
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
69</a>.
10204 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2659297" href=
"#id2659297" class=
"para">208</a>]
</sup>
10206 "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," pressemelding fra BBC,
10207 24. august
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
70</a>.
10208 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2659318" href=
"#id2659318" class=
"para">209</a>]
</sup>
10211 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6. august
2003,
10212 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
10214 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"16. Etterord"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-afterword"></a>16. Etterord
</h2></div></div></div><p>
10218 I hvert fall noen av de som har lest helt hit vil være enig med meg om at
10219 noe må gjøres for å endre retningen vi holder. Balansen i denne boken
10220 kartlegger hva som kan gjøres.
10222 Jeg deler dette kartet i to deler: det som enhver kan gjøre nå, og det som
10223 krever hjelp fra lovgiverne. Hvis det er en lærdom vi kan trekke fra
10224 historien om å endre på sunn fornuft, så er det at det krever å endre
10225 hvordan mange mennesker tenker på den aktuelle saken.
10227 Det betyr at denne bevegelsen må starte i gatene. Det må rekrutteres et
10228 signifikant antall foreldre, lærere, bibliotekarer, skapere, forfattere,
10229 musikere, filmskapere, forskere
—som alle må fortelle denne historien
10230 med sine egne ord, og som kan fortelle sine naboer hvorfor denne kampen er
10233 Når denne bevegelsen har hatt sin effekt i gatene, så er det et visst håp om
10234 at det kan ha effekt i Washington. Vi er fortsatt et demokrati. Hva folk
10235 mener betyr noe. Ikke så mye som det burde, i hvert fall når en RCA står
10236 imot, men likevel, det betyr noe. Og dermed vil jeg skissere, i den andre
10237 delen som følger, endringer som kongressen kunne gjøre for å bedre sikre en
10239 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"16.1. Oss, nå"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"usnow"></a>16.1. Oss, nå
</h2></div></div></div><p>
10240 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far has
10241 been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either property or
10242 anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is
10243 the choice, then the warriors should win.
10245 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are extremes in
10246 this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There are those who
10247 believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights Reserved"
— and those
10248 who reject copyright
—"No Rights Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved"
10249 sorts believe that you should ask permission before you "use" a copyrighted
10250 work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able
10251 to do with content as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or
10255 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
10256 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
10257 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
10258 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
10259 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
10260 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively unprotected.
10262 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite equal)
10263 by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this book. Through
10264 legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's design, copyright
10265 holders have been able to change the essential character of the environment
10266 of the original Internet. If the original architecture made the effective
10267 default "no rights reserved," the future architecture will make the
10268 effective default "all rights reserved." The architecture and law that
10269 surround the Internet's design will increasingly produce an environment
10270 where all use of content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world
10271 that defines the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and
10272 paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
10274 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither "all
10275 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"
—
10276 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as
10277 they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of freedoms
10278 that we could just take for granted before.
10279 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"16.1.1. Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"examples"></a>16.1.1. Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10280 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
10281 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before the
10282 Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about our lives
10283 that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore and browsed
10284 through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need to worry about
10285 explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of
10286 your browsing habits was assured.
10288 Hva gjorde at det var sikret?
10290 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”">10</a>, your privacy was
10291 assured because of an inefficient architecture for gathering data and hence
10292 a market constraint (cost) on anyone who wanted to gather that data. If you
10293 were a suspected spy for North Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your
10294 privacy would not be assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope)
10295 find it valuable enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But
10296 for most of us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly
10297 inefficient architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust
10298 amount of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
10299 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many places,
10300 not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs
10301 that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
10302 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659534"></a><p>
10303 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular has
10304 become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you browse the
10305 pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked at. You know this
10306 because at the side of the page, there's a list of "recently viewed"
10307 pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and the function of
10308 cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than not. The friction
10309 has disappeared, and hence any "privacy" protected by the friction
10310 disappears, too.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659551"></a>
10312 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry about
10313 libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that people
10314 should have the "right" to browse in a library without the government
10315 knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties, too), then this
10316 change in the technology of monitoring might concern you. If it becomes
10317 simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic spaces, then the
10318 friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.
10321 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy" on the
10322 Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what friction
10323 before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what friction
10324 did.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2659578" href=
"#ftn.id2659578" class=
"footnote">210</a>]
</sup> And whether you're in favor of
10325 those laws or not, it is the pattern that is important here. We must take
10326 affirmative steps to secure a kind of freedom that was passively provided
10327 before. A change in technology now forces those who believe in privacy to
10328 affirmatively act where, before, privacy was given by default.
10330 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
10331 movement. When computers with software were first made available
10332 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
10333 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data
10334 General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
10335 about controlling their software.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659616"></a>
10336 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659628"></a><p>
10337 Dette var verden Richard Stallman ble født inn i, og mens han var forsker
10338 ved MIT, lærte han til å elske samfunnet som utviklet seg når en var fri til
10339 å utforske og fikle med programvaren som kjørte på datamaskiner. Av den
10340 smarte sorten selv, og en talentfull programmerer, begynte Stallman å basere
10341 seg frihet til å legge til eller endre på andre personers arbeid.
10343 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In a
10344 math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that someone
10345 offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a theorem, you could
10346 take what someone else did and change it. In a classics department, if you
10347 believed a colleague's translation of a recently discovered text was flawed,
10348 you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you
10349 should be free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
10350 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like anything
10353 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue for
10354 computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from one system
10355 to another, it became economically attractive (at least in the view of some)
10356 to hide the code of your program. So, too, as companies started selling
10357 peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just take your printer driver
10358 and copy it, then that would make it easier for me to sell a printer to the
10359 market than it was for you.
10362 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the early
10363 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code. The world of
10364 free software had been erased by a change in the economics of computing. And
10365 as he believed, if he did nothing about it, then the freedom to change and
10366 share software would be fundamentally weakened.
10368 Derfor, i
1984, startet Stallmann på et prosjekt for å bygge et fritt
10369 operativsystem, slik i hvert fall en flik av fri programvare skulle
10370 overleve. Dette var starten på GNU-prosjektet, som "Linux"-kjernen til
10371 Linus Torvalds senere ble lagt til i for å produsere
10372 GNU/Linux-operativsystemet.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659697"></a>
10373 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659703"></a>
10375 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of software
10376 that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free Software
10377 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the source code
10378 for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone building upon
10379 GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free as well. This would
10380 assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code would develop that
10381 remained free for others to build upon. His fundamental goal was freedom;
10382 innovative creative code was a byproduct.
10384 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now do for
10385 privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that was taken
10386 for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses that bind
10387 copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a space where free
10388 software would survive. He was actively protecting what before had been
10389 passively guaranteed.
10391 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates with
10392 the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and scientific
10393 journals are produced.
10394 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxacademocjournals"></a><p>
10396 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
10397 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them to
10398 libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
10399 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
10400 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
10401 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
10402 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
10403 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
10404 service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and anyone is
10405 free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free to
10406 charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme Court
10407 opinion through their respective services.
10409 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
10410 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive for
10411 people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge. The law has
10412 agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed to flourish. And if
10413 there's nothing wrong with selling the public domain, then there could be
10414 nothing wrong, in principle, with selling access to material that is not in
10417 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data was
10418 through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to browse this
10419 data except by paying for a subscription?
10421 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
10422 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
10423 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to the
10424 library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts because the
10425 library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand the risks of a
10426 certain treatment could research those risks by reading all available
10427 articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a function of the
10428 institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of paper journals
10429 (architecture)
—namely, that it was very hard to control access to a
10432 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding that
10433 libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This means
10434 that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries begin to
10435 disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing technology
10436 and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
10438 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to restore the
10439 freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science (PLoS), for
10440 example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making scientific research
10441 available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors of scientific work submit
10442 that work to the Public Library of Science. That work is then subject to
10443 peer review. If accepted, the work is then deposited in a public, electronic
10444 archive and made permanently available for free. PLoS also sells a print
10445 version of its work, but the copyright for the print journal does not
10446 inhibit the right of anyone to redistribute the work for free.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659826"></a>
10448 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for granted
10449 before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets. There's no
10450 doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional publishers and
10451 their efforts to make money from the exclusive distribution of content. But
10452 competition in our tradition is presumptively a good
—especially when
10453 it helps spread knowledge and science.
10454 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659837"></a></div><div class=
"section" title=
"16.1.2. Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"oneidea"></a>16.1.2. Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</h3></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxcc"></a><p>
10455 Den samme strategien kan brukes på kultur, som et svar på den økende
10456 kontrollen som gjennomføres gjennom lov og teknologi.
10458 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation
10459 established in Massachusetts, but with its home at Stanford University. Its
10460 aim is to build a layer of
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>reasonable
</em></span> copyright on top
10461 of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to
10462 build upon other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express
10463 the freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags, tied
10464 to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this
10468 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Simple
</em></span>—which means without a middleman, or
10469 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people can
10470 attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content
10471 that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
10472 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers automatically
10473 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three expressions
10474 together
—a legal license, a human-readable description, and
10475 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
10476 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
10477 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal that
10478 the person associated with the license believes in something different than
10479 the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the CC mark, which does
10480 not mean that copyright is waived, but that certain freedoms are given.
10482 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their precise
10483 contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The creator can choose a
10484 license that permits any use, so long as attribution is given. She can
10485 choose a license that permits only noncommercial use. She can choose a
10486 license that permits any use so long as the same freedoms are given to other
10487 uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is
10488 made. Or any use at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so
10489 long as full copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
10491 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
10492 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional fair
10493 use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way that
10494 subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
10495 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content, governed by
10496 a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build upon. Voluntary
10497 choice of individuals and creators will make this content available. And
10498 that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a public domain.
10500 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And of
10501 course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
10502 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from many is
10503 that we are not interested only in talking about a public domain or in
10504 getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our aim is to build a
10505 movement of consumers and producers of content ("content conducers," as
10506 attorney Mia Garlick calls them) who help build the public domain and, by
10507 their work, demonstrate the importance of the public domain to other
10508 creativity.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659978"></a>
10510 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
10511 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture are
10512 produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written centuries
10513 ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have imagined. The
10514 rules may well have made sense against a background of technologies from
10515 centuries ago, but they do not make sense against the background of digital
10516 technologies. New rules
—with different freedoms, expressed in ways so
10517 that humans without lawyers can use them
—are needed. Creative Commons
10518 gives people a way effectively to begin to build those rules.
10520 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some participate
10521 to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example, is a science
10522 fiction author. His first novel,
<em class=
"citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
10523 Kingdom
</em>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
10524 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
10526 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher reasoned
10527 like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1) those who will buy
10528 Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (
2) those who may never
10529 hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for free on the
10530 Internet. Some part of (
1) will download Cory's book instead of buying
10531 it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2) will download Cory's book, like
10532 it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (
2)-goods. If there are more
10533 (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line
10534 will probably
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>increase
</em></span> sales of Cory's book.
10536 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that conclusion.
10537 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the publisher had
10538 expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was a total success.
10540 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content was
10541 confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner, who wrote a
10542 book about the free software movement titled
<em class=
"citetitle">Free for
10543 All
</em>, made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a
10544 Creative Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
10545 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
10546 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as well.
10547 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660050"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660059"></a>
10548 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660066"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660072"></a><p>
10549 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
10550 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the Commons. There
10551 are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other reasons. Many who use
10552 the "sampling license" do so because anything else would be
10553 hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are free, for commercial
10554 or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from the licensed work; they
10555 are just not free to make full copies of the licensed work available to
10556 others. This is consistent with their own art
—they, too, sample from
10557 others. Because the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>legal
</em></span> costs of sampling are so high
10558 (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
10559 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow" Public
10560 Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so high
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2660087" href=
"#ftn.id2660087" class=
"footnote">211</a>]
</sup>), these artists release into the creative
10561 environment content that others can build upon, so that their form of
10562 creativity might grow.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660119"></a>
10564 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
10565 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
10566 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is, you
10567 are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved" model. Good
10568 for you, but many do not. Many believe that however appropriate that rule is
10569 for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate description of how most
10570 creators view the rights associated with their content. The Creative Commons
10571 license expresses this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the
10572 chance to say it to others.
10575 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
1 million
10576 objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next step is
10577 partnerships with middleware content providers to help them build into their
10578 technologies simple ways for users to mark their content with Creative
10579 Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and celebrate creators who
10580 build content based upon content set free.
10582 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not mere
10583 arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first step to
10584 showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
10585 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve this
10586 rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary steps are
10589 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by individuals and
10590 creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the creative field. The
10591 project does not compete with copyright; it complements it. Its aim is not
10592 to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it easier for authors and
10593 creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and cheaply. That
10594 difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread more easily.
10595 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660180"></a></div></div><div class=
"section" title=
"16.2. Dem, snart"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"themsoon"></a>16.2. Dem, snart
</h2></div></div></div><p>
10596 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will also
10597 take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before the
10598 politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms. But
10599 that also means that we have time to build awareness around the changes that
10602 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general, and
10603 one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each is a
10604 step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way to our
10606 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"16.2.1. 1. Flere formaliteter"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"formalities"></a>16.2.1.
1. Flere formaliteter
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10607 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
10608 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed. If
10609 you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
10610 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
10614 These are all formalities associated with property. They are requirements
10615 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
10617 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a copyright,
10618 regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You don't have to
10619 register. You don't even have to mark your content. The default is control,
10620 and "formalities" are banished.
10624 As I suggested in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title=
"10. Kapittel ti: “Eiendom”">10</a>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a good
10625 one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities imposed a burden
10626 on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it was progress when the
10627 law relaxed the formal requirements that a copyright owner must bear to
10628 protect and secure his work. Those formalities were getting in the way.
10630 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
10631 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that burdens
10632 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with
10633 whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the creative work of
10634 others. There are no records, there is no system to trace
— there is no
10635 simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the massive increase in
10636 the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is a necessary step for
10637 any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>lack
</em></span>
10638 of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
10640 The law should therefore change this requirement
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2660285" href=
"#ftn.id2660285" class=
"footnote">212</a>]
</sup>—but it should not change it by going back to the old, broken
10641 system. We should require formalities, but we should establish a system that
10642 will create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
10644 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work, registering
10645 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally, the first of
10646 these three was something the copyright owner did; the second two were
10647 something the government did. But a revised system of formalities would
10648 banish the government from the process, except for the sole purpose of
10649 approving standards developed by others.
10650 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"16.2.1.1. Registrering og fornying"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h4 class=
"title"><a name=
"registration"></a>16.2.1.1. Registrering og fornying
</h4></div></div></div><p>
10651 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with the
10652 Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
10653 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
10654 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the burden
10655 of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee. And as
10656 the Copyright Office is not a main target of government policymaking, the
10657 office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus, when people who
10658 know something about the process hear this idea about formalities, their
10659 first reaction is panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to
10660 deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
10662 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition of
10663 extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer think
10664 innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed. Just because
10665 there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't follow that the
10666 government must actually administer the role. Instead, we should be creating
10667 incentives for private parties to serve the public, subject to standards
10668 that the government sets.
10670 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet. There
10671 are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world. Domain name
10672 owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their registration
10673 alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net), there is a central
10674 registry. The actual registrations are, however, performed by many competing
10675 registrars. That competition drives the cost of registering down, and more
10676 importantly, it drives the ease with which registration occurs up.
10679 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
10680 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry, but
10681 it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should establish a
10682 database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
10683 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete with
10684 one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for registering and
10685 renewing copyrights. That competition would substantially lower the burden
10686 of this formality
—while producing a database of registrations that
10687 would facilitate the licensing of content.
10688 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"16.2.1.2. Merking"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h4 class=
"title"><a name=
"marking"></a>16.2.1.2. Merking
</h4></div></div></div><p>
10689 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
10690 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh punishment for
10691 failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to imposing the death
10692 penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights. Here again,
10693 there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be enforced in this
10694 way. And more importantly, there is no reason a marking requirement needs to
10695 be enforced uniformly across all media.
10697 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is copyrighted
10698 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also makes it easy
10699 to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use the work.
10701 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was that
10702 different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't clear
10703 how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A new
10704 marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing the
10705 differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to evolve as
10706 technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special signal from the
10707 failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the loss of the
10708 right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
10711 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work to be
10712 published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that failure need
10713 not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could instead be that
10714 anyone has the right to use this work, until the copyright owner complains
10715 and demonstrates that it is his work and he doesn't give
10716 permission.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2660408" href=
"#ftn.id2660408" class=
"footnote">213</a>]
</sup> The meaning of an unmarked
10717 work would therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
10718 complain, then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
10719 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses. This
10720 would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark their work.
10722 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be marked. Here
10723 again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies evolve. The best way
10724 to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the Copyright Office's role to
10725 that of approving standards for marking content that have been crafted
10728 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
10729 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The Copyright
10730 Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could be made. The
10731 Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it judged preferable,
10732 and it would base that choice
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>solely
</em></span> upon the
10733 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the registration
10734 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to innovate; but we
10735 would count on the government to keep the product of innovation in line with
10736 its other important functions.
10738 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration requirements.
10739 If photographs were marked by author and year, there would be little reason
10740 not to allow a photographer to reregister, for example, all photographs
10741 taken in a particular year in one quick step. The aim of the formality is
10742 not to burden the creator; the system itself should be kept as simple as
10745 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing system
10746 does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to make things
10749 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
10750 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed. It
10751 would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it would be
10752 simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular kind of content;
10753 it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew that assertion at
10754 the appropriate time.
10755 </p></div></div><div class=
"section" title=
"16.2.2. 2. Kortere vernetid"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"shortterms"></a>16.2.2.
2. Kortere vernetid
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10756 Vernetiden i opphavsretten har gått fra fjorten år til nittifem år der
10757 selskap har forfatterskapet , og livstiden til forfatteren pluss sytti år
10758 for individuelle forfattere.
10760 In
<em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em>, I proposed a
10761 seventy-five-year term, granted in five-year increments with a requirement
10762 of renewal every five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But
10763 after we lost
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
10764 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>, the proposals became even more
10765 radical.
<em class=
"citetitle">The Economist
</em> endorsed a proposal for a
10766 fourteen-year copyright term.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2660533" href=
"#ftn.id2660533" class=
"footnote">214</a>]
</sup> Others
10767 have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
10769 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in copyright's
10770 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four principles
10771 that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
10772 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"1"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10775 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Keep it short:
</em></span> The term should be as long as necessary
10776 to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
10777 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
10778 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
10779 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal regulations
10780 when it no longer benefits an author.
10781 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10785 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Gjør det enkelt:
</em></span> Skillelinjen mellom verker uten
10786 opphavsrettslig vern og innhold som er beskyttet må forbli klart. Advokater
10787 liker uklarheten som "rimelig bruk" og forskjellen mellom "idéer" og
10788 "uttrykk" har. Denne type lovverk gir dem en masse arbeid. Men de som
10789 skrev grunnloven hadde en enklere idé: vernet versus ikke vernet. Verdien av
10790 korte vernetider er at det er lite behov for å bygge inn unntak i
10791 opphavsretten når vernetiden holdes kort. En klar og aktiv "advokat-fri
10792 sone" gjør komplesiteten av "rimelig bruk" og "idé/uttrykk" mindre nødvendig
10795 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10797 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Keep it alive:
</em></span> Copyright should have to be renewed.
10798 Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be
10799 required to signal periodically that he wants the protection continued. This
10800 need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly
10801 protection has to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes
10802 for a veteran to apply for a pension.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2660627" href=
"#ftn.id2660627" class=
"footnote">215</a>]
</sup>
10803 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't require
10804 authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
10805 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660646"></a>
10806 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10809 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Keep it prospective:
</em></span> Whatever the term of copyright
10810 should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once
10811 given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the
10812 law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
10813 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got fewer
10814 authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct
10815 that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we
10816 will not increase the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can
10817 increase the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
10818 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
10819 increasing their reward will not increase their creativity in
1923. What's
10820 not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</p></li></ol></div><p>
10821 Disse endringene vil sammen gi en
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>gjennomsnittlig
</em></span>
10822 opphavsrettslig vernetid som er mye kortere enn den gjeldende vernetiden.
10823 Frem til
1976 var gjennomsnittlig vernetid kun
32.2 år. Vårt mål bør være
10826 Uten tvil vil ekstremistene kalle disse idéene "radikale". (Tross alt, så
10827 kaller jeg dem "ekstremister".) Men igjen, vernetiden jeg anbefalte var
10828 lengre enn vernetiden under Richard Nixon. hvor "radikalt" kan det være å be
10829 om en mer sjenerøs opphavsrettighet enn da Richard Nixon var president?
10830 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"16.2.3. 3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"freefairuse"></a>16.2.3.
3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10831 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally granted
10832 property owners the right to control their property from the ground to the
10833 heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property rights quickly
10834 changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional challenge. It made no sense
10835 anymore to grant that much control, given the emergence of that new
10838 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive right"
10839 to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive right to "their
10840 writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that are
10841 sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
10842 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the right to
10843 release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
10845 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it expanded the
10846 exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control translations and
10847 dramatizations of a work.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2660741" href=
"#ftn.id2660741" class=
"footnote">216</a>]
</sup> The courts
10848 have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This
10849 expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
10850 Benjamin Kaplan.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660756"></a>
10851 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
10852 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a large range
10853 of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense the oddity of
10854 accepting such an enlargement of copyright while yet intoning the
10855 abracadabra of idea and expression.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2660772" href=
"#ftn.id2660772" class=
"footnote">217</a>]
</sup>
10856 </p></blockquote></div><p>
10857 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
10858 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
10859 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that a
10860 copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant. Consider
10861 each limitation in turn.
10863 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Term:
</em></span> If Congress wants to grant a derivative right,
10864 then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect
10865 John Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at
10866 least I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that
10867 right to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
10868 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
10869 after the creative work is done.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2660802"></a>
10871 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Scope:
</em></span> Likewise should the scope of derivative rights
10872 be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are
10873 important. Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines
10874 around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
10875 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses, perhaps
10876 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer makes
10877 sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the creative
10878 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses
10879 into the machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does
10880 to the creative process. Smothers it.
10882 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the Clint
10883 Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for foreseeable
10884 derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a poem into a
10885 musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require negotiation for the
10886 unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much more sense.
10888 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are protected, and
10889 the presumption should be that other uses are not protected. This is the
10890 reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul Goldstein.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2660845" href=
"#ftn.id2660845" class=
"footnote">218</a>]
</sup> His view is that the law should be written so that
10891 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
10893 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
10894 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of the
10895 Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the incentives
10896 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a strong
10897 copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
10900 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection beyond the
10901 part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon certain statutory
10902 conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great deal of culture
10903 to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights regime, that reuse
10904 would earn artists more income.
10905 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"16.2.4. 4. Frigjør musikken—igjen"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"liberatemusic"></a>16.2.4.
4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10906 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't be
10907 fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most people,
10908 most pressing
—music. There is no other policy issue that better
10909 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing of
10912 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the Internet's
10913 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more powerfully than any
10914 other single application. It was the Internet's killer app
—possibly in
10915 two senses of that word. It no doubt was the application that drove demand
10916 for bandwidth. It may well be the application that drives demand for
10917 regulations that in the end kill innovation on the network.
10919 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
10920 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed, performed,
10921 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving an exclusive
10922 right to a composer to control public performances of his work, and to a
10923 performing artist to control copies of her performance.
10925 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
10926 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course, that's not
10927 all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#piracy" title=
"5. Kapittel fem: “Piratvirksomhet”">5</a>, they enable four
10928 different kinds of sharing:
10929 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"A"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10932 Det er noen som bruker delingsnettverk som erstatninger for å kjøpe CDer.
10933 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10936 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample, on the way to
10938 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10943 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk til å få tilgang til innhold som
10944 ikke lenger er i salg, men fortsatt er vernet av opphavsrett eller som ville
10945 ha vært altfor vanskelig å få kjøpt via nettet.
10946 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10949 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk for å få tilgang til innhold som
10950 ikke er opphavsrettsbeskyttet, eller for å få tilgang som
10951 opphavsrettsinnehaveren åpenbart går god for.
10952 </p></li></ol></div><p>
10953 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It must
10954 avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The eagerness
10955 with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover, should depend upon
10956 the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net effect of sharing is
10957 actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is significantly
10960 As I said in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#piracy" title=
"5. Kapittel fem: “Piratvirksomhet”">5</a>, the actual harm caused by sharing is controversial. For
10961 the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is real. I assume,
10962 in other words, that type A sharing is significantly greater than type B,
10963 and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
10965 Uansett, det er et avgjørende faktum om den gjeldende teknologiske
10966 omgivelsen som vi må huske på hvis vi skal forstå hvordan loven bør reagere.
10968 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
10969 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
10970 content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of
10971 content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and
10972 slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at
10973 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and
10974 down. Although wireless access is growing, most of us still get access
10975 across wires. Most only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The
10976 idea of the always on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
10979 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to the
10980 Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should not make
10981 policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should make policy on
10982 the basis of where the technology is going. The question should not be, how
10983 should the law regulate sharing in this world? The question should be, what
10984 law will we require when the network becomes the network it is clearly
10985 becoming? That network is one in which every machine with electricity is
10986 essentially on the Net; where everywhere you are
—except maybe the
10987 desert or the Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
10988 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service,
10989 where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
10991 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that give
10992 you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio, content that
10993 is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the critical
10994 point: When it is
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>extremely
</em></span> easy to connect to services
10995 that give access to content, it will be
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>easier
</em></span> to
10996 connect to services that give you access to content than it will be to
10997 download and store content
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>on the many devices you will have for
10998 playing content
</em></span>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
10999 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
11000 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially is. Content
11001 services will compete with content sharing, even if the services charge
11002 money for the content they give access to. Already cell-phone services in
11003 Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell phones (enhanced with plugs
11004 for headphones). The Japanese are paying for this content even though "free"
11005 content is available in the form of MP3s across the Web.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2661089" href=
"#ftn.id2661089" class=
"footnote">219</a>]
</sup>
11009 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
11010 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
11011 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem that
11012 will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to the
11013 Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today
11014 to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology that will be gone
11015 tomorrow. The question should not be how to regulate the Internet to
11016 eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that problem away). The question
11017 instead should be how to assure that artists get paid, during this
11018 transition between twentieth-century models for doing business and
11019 twenty-first-century technologies.
11021 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems" here
11022 to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted content or
11023 copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The "problem" with this
11024 content is to make sure that the technology that would enable this kind of
11025 sharing is not rendered illegal. You can think of it this way: Pay phones
11026 are used to deliver ransom demands, no doubt. But there are many who need
11027 to use pay phones who have nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to
11028 ban pay phones in order to eliminate kidnapping.
11030 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was, at
11031 one time, published and is no longer available. It may be unavailable
11032 because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the record label he
11033 signed with to carry his work. Or it may be unavailable because the work is
11034 forgotten. Either way, the aim of the law should be to facilitate the access
11035 to this content, ideally in a way that returns something to the artist.
11037 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of print,
11038 it may still be available in libraries and used book stores. But libraries
11039 and used book stores don't pay the copyright owner when someone reads or
11040 buys an out-of-print book. That makes total sense, of course, since any
11041 other system would be so burdensome as to eliminate the possibility of used
11042 book stores' existing. But from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of
11043 his content without his being compensated is less than ideal.
11045 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
11046 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of the
11047 music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial providers would
11048 be free, under this rule, to "share" that content, even though the sharing
11049 involved making a copy. The copy here would be incidental to the trade; in a
11050 context where commercial publishing has ended, trading music should be as
11051 free as trading books.
11056 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would ensure
11057 that artists get something from the trade of their work. For example, if the
11058 law set a low statutory rate for the commercial sharing of content that was
11059 not offered for sale by a commercial publisher, and if that rate were
11060 automatically transferred to a trust for the benefit of the artist, then
11061 businesses could develop around the idea of trading this content, and
11062 artists would benefit from this trade.
11064 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep works
11065 available commercially. Works that are available commercially would not be
11066 subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect the right to charge
11067 whatever they want for content if they kept the work commercially
11068 available. But if they don't keep it available, and instead, the computer
11069 hard disks of fans around the world keep it alive, then any royalty owed for
11070 such copying should be much less than the amount owed a commercial
11073 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is hard only
11074 because the extent of the problem will change over time, as the technologies
11075 for gaining access to content change. The law's solution should be as
11076 flexible as the problem is, understanding that we are in the middle of a
11077 radical transformation in the technology for delivering and accessing
11080 Så her er en løsning som i første omgang kan virke veldig undelig for begge
11081 sider i denne krigen, men som jeg tror vil gi mer mening når en får tenkt
11084 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic claim of
11085 the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet) has harmed a
11086 set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to be protected,
11087 then the content industry should be compensated for that harm. Just as the
11088 technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions of Americans, or the
11089 technology of asbestos caused grave illness to thousands of miners, so, too,
11090 has the technology of digital networks harmed the interests of the content
11095 Jeg elsker internett, så jeg liker ikke å sammenligne det med tobakk eller
11096 asbest. Men analogien er rimelig når en ser det fra lovens perspektiv. Og
11097 det foreslår en rimelig respons: I stedet for å forsøke å ødelegge internett
11098 eller p2p-teknologien som i dag skader innholdsleverandører på internett, så
11099 bør vi finne en relativt enkel måte å kompensere de som blir skadelidende.
11101 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been floated by
11102 Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2661245" href=
"#ftn.id2661245" class=
"footnote">220</a>]
</sup>
11103 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
11104 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission would
11105 (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to
11106 evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once
11107 the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (
2) systems to
11108 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the basis of
11109 those numbers, then (
3) artists would be compensated. The compensation would
11110 be paid for by (
4) an appropriate tax.
11112 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
11113 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
11114 <em class=
"citetitle">Promises to Keep
</em>. The modification that I would make
11115 is relatively simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing
11116 copyright system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim
11117 of the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
11118 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at facilitating
11119 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal after a period of
11120 years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free exchange of content,
11121 supported through a taxation system, then it can be continued. If this form
11122 of protection is no longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the
11123 old system of controlling access.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2661423"></a>
11126 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim is
11127 not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the system
11128 supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But the aims of
11129 semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes I described were
11130 accomplished
—in particular, the limits on derivative uses. A system
11131 that simply charges for access would not greatly burden semiotic democracy
11132 if there were few limitations on what one was allowed to do with the content
11134 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2661434"></a><p>
11135 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of "harm" to
11136 an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation would be
11137 outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This background system
11138 to compensate would also not need to interfere with innovative proposals
11139 such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted when Apple launched the
11140 MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being easier than free is. This has
11141 proven correct: Apple has sold millions of songs at even the very high price
11142 of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents, the cost is the equivalent of a per-song
11143 CD price, though the labels have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's
11144 move was countered by Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a
11145 song. And no doubt there will be a great deal of competition to offer and
11146 sell music on-line.
11148 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free" music
11149 from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known for thirty
11150 years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than that, there is
11151 nothing impossible at all about "competing with free." Indeed, if anything,
11152 the competition spurs the competitors to offer new and better products. This
11153 is precisely what the competitive market was to be about. Thus in Singapore,
11154 though piracy is rampant, movie theaters are often luxurious
—with
11155 "first class" seats, and meals served while you watch a movie
—as they
11156 struggle and succeed in finding ways to compete with "free."
11158 Dette konkurranseregimet, med en sikringsmekanisme for å sikre at kunstnere
11159 ikke taper, ville bidra mye til nyskapning innen levering av
11160 innhold. Konkurransen ville fortsette å redusere type-A-deling. Det ville
11161 inspirere en ekstraordinær rekke av nye innovatører
—som ville ha
11162 retten til a bruke innhold, og ikke lenger frykte usikre og barbarisk
11163 strenge straffer fra loven.
11165 Oppsummert, så er dette mitt forslag:
11170 Internett er i endring. Vi bør ikke regulere en teknologi i endring. Vi bør
11171 i stedet regulere for å minimere skaden påført interesser som er berørt av
11172 denne teknologiske endringen, samtidig vi muliggjør, og oppmuntrer, den mest
11173 effektive teknologien vi kan lage.
11175 Vi kan minimere skaden og samtidig maksimere fordelen med innovasjon ved å
11176 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"1"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
11179 garantere retten til å engasjere seg i type-D-deling;
11180 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
11183 tillate ikke-kommersiell type-C-deling uten erstatningsansvar, og
11184 kommersiell type-C-deling med en lav og fast rate fastsatt ved lov.
11185 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
11188 mens denne overgangen pågår, skattlegge og kompensere for type-A-deling, i
11189 den grad faktiske skade kan påvises.
11190 </p></li></ol></div><p>
11191 Men hva om "piratvirksomheten" ikke forsvinner? Hva om det finnes et
11192 konkurranseutsatt marked som tilbyr innhold til en lav kostnad, men et
11193 signifikant antall av forbrukere fortsetter å "ta" innhold uten å betale?
11194 Burde loven gjøre noe da?
11196 Ja, det bør den. Men, nok en gang, hva den bør gjøre avhenger hvordan
11197 realitetene utvikler seg. Disse endringene fjerner kanskje ikke all
11198 type-A-deling. Men det virkelige spørmålet er ikke om de eliminerer deling i
11199 abstrakt betydning. Det virkelige spørsmålet er hvilken effekt det har på
11200 markedet. Er det bedre (a) å ha en teknologi som er
95 prosent sikker og
11201 gir et marked av størrelse
<em class=
"citetitle">x
</em>, eller (b) å ha en
11202 teknologi som er
50 prosent sikker, og som gir et marked som er fem ganger
11203 større enn
<em class=
"citetitle">x
</em>? Mindre sikker kan gi mer uautorisert
11204 deling, men det vil sannsynligvis også gi et mye større marked for
11205 autorisert deling. Det viktigste er å sikre kunstneres kompensasjon uten å
11206 ødelegge internettet. Når det er på plass, kan det hende det er riktig å
11207 finne måter å spore opp de smålige piratene.
11210 Men vi er langt unna å spikke problemet ned til dette delsettet av
11211 type-A-delere. Og vårt fokus inntil er der bør ikke være å finne måter å
11212 ødelegge internettet. Var fokus inntil vi er der bør være hvordan sikre at
11213 artister får betalt, mens vi beskytter rommet for nyskapning og kreativitet
11214 som internettet er.
11215 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"16.2.5. 5. Spark en masse advokater"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"firelawyers"></a>16.2.5.
5. Spark en masse advokater
</h3></div></div></div><p>
11216 Jeg er en advokat. Jeg lever av å utdanne advokater. Jeg tror på loven. Jeg
11217 tror på opphavsrettsloven. Jeg har faktisk viet livet til å jobbe med loven,
11218 ikke fordi det er mye penger å tjene, men fordi det innebærer idealer som
11219 jeg elsker å leve opp til.
11221 Likevel har mye av denne boken vært kritikk av advokater, eller rollen
11222 advokater har spilt i denne debatten. Loven taler om idealer, mens det er
11223 min oppfatning av vår yrkesgruppe er blitt for knyttet til klienten. Og i
11224 en verden der rike klienter har sterke synspunkter vil uviljen hos vår
11225 yrkesgruppe til å stille spørsmål med eller protestere mot dette sterke
11226 synet ødelegge loven.
11228 Indisiene for slik bøyning er overbevisene. Jeg er angrepet som en
11229 "radikal" av mange innenfor yrket, og likevel er meningene jeg argumenterer
11230 for nøyaktig de meningene til mange av de mest moderate og betydningsfulle
11231 personene i historien til denne delen av loven. Mange trodde for eksempel at
11232 vår utfordring til lovforslaget om å utvide opphavsrettens vernetid var
11233 galskap. Mens bare tredve år siden mente den dominerende foreleser og
11234 utøver i opphavsrettsfeltet, Melville Nimmer, at den var
11235 åpenbar.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2661665" href=
"#ftn.id2661665" class=
"footnote">221</a>]
</sup>
11238 Min kritikk av rollen som advokater har spilt i denne debatten handler
11239 imidlertid ikke bare om en profesjonell skjevhet. Det handler enda viktigere
11240 om vår manglende evne til å faktisk ta inn over oss hva loven koster.
11242 Økonomer er forventet å være gode til å forstå utgifter og inntekter. Men
11243 som oftest antar økonomene uten peiling på hvordan det juridiske systemet
11244 egentlig fungerer, at transaksjonskostnaden i det juridiske systemet er
11245 lav.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2661698" href=
"#ftn.id2661698" class=
"footnote">222</a>]
</sup> De ser et system som har
11246 eksistert i hundrevis av år, og de antar at det fungerer slik grunnskolens
11247 samfunnsfagsundervisning lærte dem at det fungerer.
11251 Men det juridiske systemet fungerer ikke. Eller for å være mer nøyaktig, det
11252 fungerer kun for de med mest ressurser. Det er ikke fordi systemet er
11253 korrupt. Jeg tror overhodet ikke vårt juridisk system (på føderalt nivå, i
11254 hvert fall) er korrupt. Jeg mener ganske enkelt at på grunn av at kostnadene
11255 med vårt juridiske systemet er så hårreisende høyt vil en praktisk talt
11256 aldri oppnå rettferdighet.
11258 Disse kostnadene forstyrrer fri kultur på mange vis. En advokats tid
11259 faktureres hos de største firmaene for mer enn $
400 pr. time. Hvor mye tid
11260 bør en slik advokat bruke på å lese sakene nøye, eller undersøke obskure
11261 rettskilder. Svaret er i økende grad: svært lite. Jussen er avhengig av
11262 nøye formulering og utvikling av doktrine, men nøye formulering og utvikling
11263 av doktrine er avhengig av nøyaktig arbeid. Men nøyaktig arbeid koster for
11264 mye, bortsett fra i de mest høyprofilerte og kostbare sakene.
11266 Kostbarheten, klomsetheten og tilfeldigheten til dette systemet håner vår
11267 tradisjon. Og advokater, såvel som akademikere, bør se det som sin plikt å
11268 endre hvordan loven praktiseres
— eller bedre, endre loven slik at den
11269 fungerer. Det er galt at systemet fungerer godt bare for den øverste
11270 1-prosenten av klientene. Det kan gjøres radikalt mer effektivt, og billig,
11271 og dermed radikalt mer rettferdig.
11273 Men inntil en slik reform er gjennomført, bør vi som samfunn holde lover
11274 unna områder der vi vet den bare vil skade. Og det er nettopp det loven
11275 altfor ofte vil gjøre hvis for mye av vår kultur er lovregulert.
11277 Tenk på de fantastiske tingene ditt barn kan gjøre eller lage med digital
11278 teknologi
—filmen, musikken, web-siden, bloggen. Eller tenk på de
11279 fantastiske tingene ditt fellesskap kunne få til med digital
11280 teknologi
—en wiki, oppsetting av låve, kampanje til å endre noe. Tenk
11281 på alle de kreative tingene, og tenk deretter på kald sirup helt inn i
11282 maskinene. Dette er hva et hvert regime som krever tillatelser fører
11283 til. Dette er virkeligheten slik den var i Brezhnevs Russland.
11286 Loven bør regulere i visse områder av kulturen
—men det bør regulere
11287 kultur bare der reguleringen bidrar positivt. Likevel tester advokater
11288 sjeldent sin kraft, eller kraften som de fremmer, mot dette enkle pragmatisk
11289 spørsmålet: "vil det bidra positivt?". Når de blir utfordret om det
11290 utvidede rekkevidden til loven, er advokat-svaret, "Hvorfor ikke?"
11292 Vi burde spørre: "Hvorfor?". Vis meg hvorfor din regulering av kultur er
11293 nødvendig og vis meg hvordan reguleringen bidrar positivt. Før du kan vise
11294 meg begge, holde advokatene din unna.
11295 </p></div></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2659578" href=
"#id2659578" class=
"para">210</a>]
</sup>
11299 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
11300 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),"
<em class=
"citetitle">Stanford
11301 Technology Law Review
</em> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
11302 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
72</a> (describing
11303 examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey
11304 Rosen,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an
11305 Anxious Age
</em> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
11306 between technology and privacy).
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2660087" href=
"#id2660087" class=
"para">211</a>]
</sup>
11309 <em class=
"citetitle">Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
11310 Culture Wars
</em> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
11311 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
72</a>.
11312 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2660285" href=
"#id2660285" class=
"para">212</a>]
</sup>
11315 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
11316 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
11317 by other countries as well.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2660408" href=
"#id2660408" class=
"para">213</a>]
</sup>
11320 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not solved
11321 here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated system
11322 than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
11323 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2660533" href=
"#id2660533" class=
"para">214</a>]
</sup>
11327 "A Radical Rethink,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Economist
</em>,
366:
8308 (
25. januar
11328 2003):
15, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
11330 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2660627" href=
"#id2660627" class=
"para">215</a>]
</sup>
11333 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
11334 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001), tilgjengelig
11335 fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
75</a>.
11336 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2660741" href=
"#id2660741" class=
"para">216</a>]
</sup>
11339 Benjamin Kaplan,
<em class=
"citetitle">An Unhurried View of Copyright
</em> (New
11340 York: Columbia University Press,
1967),
32.
11341 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2660772" href=
"#id2660772" class=
"para">217</a>]
</sup>
11344 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2660845" href=
"#id2660845" class=
"para">218</a>]
</sup>
11346 Paul Goldstein,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the
11347 Celestial Jukebox
</em> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
11348 187–216.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2659590"></a>
11349 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2661089" href=
"#id2661089" class=
"para">219</a>]
</sup>
11352 For eksempel, se, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3 April
11353 2002, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
11355 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2661245" href=
"#id2661245" class=
"para">220</a>]
</sup>
11357 William Fisher,
<em class=
"citetitle">Digital Music: Problems and
11358 Possibilities
</em> (sist revidert:
10. oktober
2000), tilgjengelig
11359 fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
77</a>; William
11360 Fisher,
<em class=
"citetitle">Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
11361 Entertainment
</em> (kommer) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
11362 2004), kap.
6, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
78</a>. Professor Netanel har
11363 foreslått en relatert idé som ville gjøre at opphavsretten ikke gjelder
11364 ikke-kommersiell deling fra og ville etablere kompenasjon til kunstnere for
11365 å balansere eventuelle tap. Se Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
11366 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," tilgjengelig fra
11367 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
79</a>. For andre
11368 forslag, se Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back Broadband?"
11369 <em class=
"citetitle">Washington Post
</em>,
8. january
2002, A17; Philip
11370 S. Corwin på vegne av Sharman Networks, Et brev til Senator Joseph R. Biden,
11371 Jr., leder i the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26. februar.
2002,
11372 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
11373 #
80</a>; Serguei Osokine,
<em class=
"citetitle">A Quick Case for Intellectual
11374 Property Use Fee (IPUF)
</em>,
3. mars
2002, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
81</a>; Jefferson Graham,
11375 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,"
<em class=
"citetitle">USA
11376 Today
</em>,
13. mai
2002, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
82</a>; Steven M. Cherry,
11377 "Getting Copyright Right," IEEE Spectrum Online,
1. juli
2002, tilgjengelig
11378 fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
83</a>; Declan
11379 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27. august
2002,
11380 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
11381 #
84</a>. Forslaget fra Fisher er ganske likt forslaget til Richard
11382 Stallman når det gjelder DAT. I motsetning til Fishers forslag, ville
11383 Stallmanns forslag ikke betale kunstnere proposjonalt, selv om mer populære
11384 artister ville få mer betalt enn mindre populære. Slik det er typisk med
11385 Stallman, la han fram sitt forslag omtrent ti år før dagens debatt. Se
11386 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
85</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2661360"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2661368"></a>
11387 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2661374"></a>
11388 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2661665" href=
"#id2661665" class=
"para">221</a>]
</sup>
11391 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer Memorial
11392 Lecture),
<em class=
"citetitle">UCLA law Review
</em> 48 (
2001):
1057,
11394 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2661698" href=
"#id2661698" class=
"para">222</a>]
</sup>
11396 Et godt eksempel er arbeidet til professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz bør få
11397 ros for sin nøye gjennomgang av data om opphavsrettsbrudd, som fikk ham til
11398 å stille spørsmål med sin egen uttalte posisjon
—to ganger. I starten
11399 predicated han at nedlasting ville påføre industrien vesentlig skade. Han
11400 endret så sitt syn etter i lys av dataene, og han har siden endret sitt syn
11401 på nytt. Sammenlign Stan J. Liebowitz,
<em class=
"citetitle">Rethinking the Network
11402 Economy: The True Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace
</em> (New
11403 York: Amacom,
2002), (gikk igjennom hans originale syn men uttrykte skepsis)
11404 med Stan J. Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?"
11405 artikkelutkast, juni
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
86</a>. Den nøye analysen til
11406 Liebowitz er ekstremt verdifull i sin estimering av effekten av
11407 fildelingsteknologi. Etter mitt syn underestimerer han forøvrig kostnaden
11408 til det juridiske system. Se, for eksempel,
11409 <em class=
"citetitle">Rethinking
</em>,
174–76.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2661675"></a>
11410 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"17. Notater"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-notes"></a>17. Notater
</h2></div></div></div><p>
11411 I denne teksten er det referanser til lenker på verdensveven. Og som alle
11412 som har forsøkt å bruke nettet vet, så vil disse lenkene være svært
11413 ustabile. Jeg har forsøkt å motvirke denne ustabiliteten ved å omdirigere
11414 lesere til den originale kilden gjennom en nettside som hører til denne
11415 boken. For hver lenke under, så kan du gå til http://free-culture.cc/notes
11416 og finne den originale kilden ved å klikke på nummeret etter #-tegnet. Hvis
11417 den originale lenken fortsatt er i live, så vil du bli omdirigert til den
11418 lenken. Hvis den originale lenken har forsvunnet, så vil du bli omdirigert
11419 til en passende referanse til materialet.
11420 </p></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"18. Takk til"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-acknowledgments"></a>18. Takk til
</h2></div></div></div><p>
11421 Denne boken er produktet av en lang og så langt mislykket kamp som begynte
11422 da jeg leste om Eric Eldreds krig for å sørge for at bøker forble
11423 frie. Eldreds innsats bidro til å lansere en bevegelse, fri
11424 kultur-bevegelsen, og denne boken er tilegnet ham.
11425 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2661918"></a><p>
11426 Jeg fikk veiledning på ulike steder fra venner og akademikere, inkludert
11427 Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner, Mark Rose og
11428 Kathleen Sullivan. Og jeg fikk korreksjoner og veiledning fra mange
11429 fantastiske studenter ved Stanford Law School og Stanford University. Det
11430 inkluderer Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James P. Fellers, Christopher
11431 Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman, Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn,
11432 Brian-Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng og Erica Platt. Jeg er særlig takknemlig
11433 overfor Catherine Crump og Harry Surden, som hjalp til med å styre deres
11434 forskning og til Laura Lynch, som briljant håndterte hæren de samlet, samt
11435 bidro med sitt egen kritisk blikk på mye av dette.
11438 Yuko Noguchi hjalp meg å forstå lovene i Japan, så vel som Japans
11439 kultur. Jeg er henne takknemlig, og til de mange i Japan som hjalp meg med
11440 forundersøkelsene til denne boken: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto
11441 Misaki, Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata og Yoshihiro
11442 Yonezawa. Jeg er også takknemlig til professor Nobuhiro Nakayama og Tokyo
11443 University Business Law Center, som ga meg muligheten til å bruke tid i
11444 Japan, og Tadashi Shiraishi og Kiyokazu Yamagami for deres generøse hjelp
11447 Dette er de tradisjonelle former for hjelp som akademikere regelmessig
11448 trekker på. Men i tillegg til dem, har Internett gjort det mulig å motta råd
11449 og korrigering fra mange som jeg har aldri møtt. Blant de som har svart med
11450 svært nyttig råd etter forespørsler om boken på bloggen min er Dr. Muhammed
11451 Al-Ubaydli, David Gerstein og Peter Dimauro, I tillegg en lang liste med de
11452 som hadde spesifikke idéer om måter å utvikle mine argumenter på. De
11453 inkluderte Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
11454 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
11455 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
11456 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred
11457 Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer,
11458 Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg,
11459 Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink,"
11460 Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," og Richard Yanco. (jeg beklager hvis jeg gikk
11461 glipp av noen, med datamaskiner kommer feil og en krasj i e-postsystemet
11462 mitt gjorde at jeg mistet en haug med flotte svar.)
11464 Richard Stallman og Michael Carroll har begge lest hele boken i utkast, og
11465 hver av dem har bidratt med svært nyttige korreksjoner og råd. Michael hjalp
11466 meg å se mer tydelig betydningen av regulering for avledede verker . Og
11467 Richard korrigerte en pinlig stor mengde feil. Selv om mitt arbeid er
11468 delvis inspirert av Stallmans, er han ikke enig med meg på vesentlige steder
11471 Til slutt, og for evig, er jeg Bettina takknemlig, som alltid har insistert
11472 på at det ville være endeløs lykke utenfor disse kampene, og som alltid har
11473 hatt rett. Denne trege eleven er som alltid takknemlig for hennes
11474 evigvarende tålmodighet og kjærlighet.
11475 </p></div><div class=
"index" title=
"Index"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"id2662039"></a>Index
</h2></div></div></div><div class=
"index"><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>Symbols
</h3><dl><dt>"copyleft" licenses,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>"Country of the Blind, The" (Wells),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>A
</h3><dl><dt>ABC,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Adobe eBook Reader,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Adromeda,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt><dt>Agee, Michael,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>agricultural patents,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></dt><dt>Aibo robothund,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>akademiske tidsskrifter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Akerlof, George,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Alben, Alex,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>alcohol prohibition,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt><dt>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>All in the Family,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Allen, Paul,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt><dt>Amazon,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>American Association of Law Libraries,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>American Graphophone Company,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></dt><dt>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Anello, Douglas,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></dt><dt>Aristoteles,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Arrow, Kenneth,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>artister
</dt><dd><dl><dt>publicity rights on images of,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>ASCAP,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2637767">“Piratvirksomhet
”</a></dt><dt>AT
&T,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Ayer, Don,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>B
</h3><dl><dt>Bacon, Francis,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Barish, Stephanie,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Barlow, Joel,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Barry, Hank,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Beatles,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></dt><dt>Beckett, Thomas,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Bell, Alexander Graham,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Berlin Act (
1908),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Berman, Howard L.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Bern-konvensjonen (
1908),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Bernstein, Leonard,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>Betamax,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>Black, Jane,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>BMG,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>BMW,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Boies, David,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt><dt>Bolling, Ruben,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Boswell, James,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Braithwaite, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Brandeis, Louis D.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Breyer, Stephen,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Bromberg, Dan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Brown, John Seely,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Buchanan, James,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Bunyan, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Burdick, Quentin,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></dt><dt>Bush, George W.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#constrain">Constraining Creators
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>C
</h3><dl><dt>Camp Chaos,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt><dt>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Carson, Rachel,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt><dt>Casablanca,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Causby, Thomas Lee,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Causby, Tinie,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>CBS,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>chimeras,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></dt><dt>Christensen, Clayton M.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Clark, Kim B.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>CNN,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Coase, Ronald,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>CodePink Women in Peace,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#preface">Forord
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Coe, Brian,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Comcast,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Commons, John R.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Conrad, Paul,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Conyers, John, Jr.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></dt><dt>cookies, Internet,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Creative Commons,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt><dt>Crichton, Michael,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Crosskey, William W.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawduration">Loven: Varighet
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>D
</h3><dl><dt>Daguerre, Louis,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Daley, Elizabeth,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>dataspill,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Day After Trinity, The,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></dt><dt>DDT,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt><dt>Dean, Howard,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Diller, Barry,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Disney, Inc.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Drahos, Peter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Dreyfuss, Rochelle,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2637767">“Piratvirksomhet
”</a></dt><dt>Drucker, Peter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt><dt>Dylan, Bob,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>E
</h3><dl><dt>Eagle Forum,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Eastman, George,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Edison, Thomas,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Elektronisk forpost-stiftelsen (EFF),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt><dt>EMI,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Erskine, Andrew,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>F
</h3><dl><dt>Fallows, James,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Fanning, Shawn,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>Faraday, Michael,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Fisher, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></dt><dt>Florida, Richard,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2637767">“Piratvirksomhet
”</a></dt><dt>Forbes, Steve,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>fotografering,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Fourneaux, Henri,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></dt><dt>Fox, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#film">Film
</a></dt><dt>Free for All (Wayner),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt><dt>Fried, Charles,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Friedman, Milton,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>G
</h3><dl><dt>Garlick, Mia,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt><dt>Gates, Bill,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>General Film Company,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#film">Film
</a></dt><dt>Gershwin, George,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Gil, Gilberto,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>GNU/Linux-operativsystemet,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Goldstein, Paul,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</a></dt><dt>Gracie Films,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></dt><dt>Grisham, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>H
</h3><dl><dt>Hal Roach Studios,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Hand, Learned,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a></dt><dt>Hawthorne, Nathaniel,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Henry V,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Henry VIII, Konge av England,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Heston, Charlton,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></dt><dt>Hollings, Fritz,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Hummer Winblad,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Hummer, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Hyde, Rosel H.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>I
</h3><dl><dt>IBM,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Intel,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Internet Explorer,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></dt><dt>Iwerks, Ub,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>J
</h3><dl><dt>Jaszi, Peter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>jernbaneindustri,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt><dt>Johnson, Lyndon,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Johnson, Samuel,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>K
</h3><dl><dt>Kaplan, Benjamin,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</a></dt><dt>Kelly, Kevin,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Kennedy, John F.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Kittredge, Alfred,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></dt><dt>kjørehastighet, begrensninger på,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Kozinski, Alex,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>Krim, Jonathan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>L
</h3><dl><dt>Laurel and Hardy Films,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>law schools,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt><dt>Leaphart, Walter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt><dt>Lear, Norman,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>legal realist movement,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#together">Sammen
</a></dt><dt>Licensing Act (
1662),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Liebowitz, Stan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater
</a></dt><dt>Linux-operativsystemet,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Litman, Jessica,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Lofgren, Zoe,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Lott, Trent,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Lovett, Lyle,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Lucky Dog, The,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>M
</h3><dl><dt>Madonna,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2637767">“Piratvirksomhet
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2637767">“Piratvirksomhet
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Marijuana Policy Project,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Marx Brothers,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>McCain, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>MGM,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Microsoft
</dt><dd><dl><dt>Windows operating system of,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>Milton, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Morrison, Alan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Movie Archive,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere
</a></dt><dt>Moyers, Bill,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Müller, Paul Hermann,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>N
</h3><dl><dt>Nashville Songwriters Association,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>National Writers Union,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>NBC,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Needleman, Rafe,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Netanel, Neil Weinstock,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></dt><dt>Netscape,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></dt><dt>Nimmer, David,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>P
</h3><dl><dt>Paramount Pictures,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Picker, Randal C.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#film">Film
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>PLoS (Public Library of Science),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Pogue, David,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#preface">Forord
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#preface">Forord
</a></dt><dt>Politikk, (Aristotles),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Promises to Keep (Fisher),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></dt><dt>Public Citizen,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Public Enemy,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>Q
</h3><dl><dt>Quayle, Dan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>R
</h3><dl><dt>rap music,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt><dt>Reagan, Ronald,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Real Networks,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></dt><dt>Rehnquist, William H.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#catalogs">Kapittel tre: Kataloger
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#catalogs">Kapittel tre: Kataloger
</a></dt><dt>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2637767">“Piratvirksomhet
”</a></dt><dt>Roberts, Michael,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>robothund,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Rogers, Fred,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Rose, Mark,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-acknowledgments">Takk til
</a></dt><dt>RPI (see Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI))
</dt><dt>Rubenfeld, Jeb,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde
</a></dt><dt>Russel, Phil,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>S
</h3><dl><dt>Safire, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#preface">Forord
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>San Francisco Opera,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></dt><dt>Sarnoff, David,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Schlafly, Phyllis,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Shakespeare, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Silent Sprint (Carson),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt><dt>Sony
</dt><dd><dl><dt>Aibo robothund produsert av,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>Sony Pictures Entertainment,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt><dt>Stallman, Richard,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Steward, Geoffrey,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>T
</h3><dl><dt>Talbot, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Turner, Ted,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Twentieth Century Fox,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>U
</h3><dl><dt>Universal Music Group,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Universal Pictures,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>V
</h3><dl><dt>Vaidhyanathan, Siva,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#film">Film
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#together">Sammen
</a></dt><dt>veterans' pensions,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid
</a></dt><dt>Vivendi Universal,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>von Lohmann, Fred,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>W
</h3><dl><dt>Warner Brothers,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti:
“Eiendom
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Warner Music Group,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Warren, Samuel D.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Wayner, Peter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt><dt>Webster, Noah,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Wells, H. G.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></dt><dt>Windows,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></dt><dt>Winer, Dave,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt><dt>Winick, Judd,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a></dt><dt>WJOA,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Worldcom,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#constrain">Constraining Creators
</a></dt><dt>WRC,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>Y
</h3><dl><dt>Yanofsky, Dave,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to:
“Kun etter-apere
”</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>Z
</h3><dl><dt>Zimmerman, Edwin,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></dt><dt>Zittrain, Jonathan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2637767">“Piratvirksomhet
”</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde
</a></dt></dl></div></div></div></div></body></html>
projects / text-free-culture-lessig.git / blob