1 <html><head><meta http-equiv=
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"text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"><title>Fri kultur
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"Om forfatteren Lawrense Lessig (http://www.lessig.org), professor i juss og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School, er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i Creative Commons (http://creativecommons.org). Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) og Code: And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), og er medlem av styrene i Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public Knowledge. Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," og omtalt som en av Scientific American's "50 visjonærer". Etter utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."></head><body bgcolor=
"white" text=
"black" link=
"#0000FF" vlink=
"#840084" alink=
"#0000FF"><div lang=
"nb" class=
"book" title=
"Fri kultur"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"index"></a>Fri kultur
</h1></div><div><h2 class=
"subtitle">Hvordan store medieaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
2 og kontrollere kreativiteten
</h2></div><div><div class=
"authorgroup"><div class=
"author"><h3 class=
"author"><span class=
"firstname">Lawrence
</span> <span class=
"surname">Lessig
</span></h3></div></div></div><div><p class=
"releaseinfo">Versjon
2004-
02-
10</p></div><div><p class=
"copyright">Opphavsrett ©
2004 Lawrence Lessig
</p></div><div><div class=
"legalnotice" title=
"Rettslig merknad"><a name=
"id2606694"></a><p>
3 <span class=
"inlinemediaobject"><img src=
"images/cc.png" align=
"middle" width=
"100%" alt=
"Creative Commons, noen rettigheter reservert"></span>
5 Denne versjonen av
<em class=
"citetitle">Fri Kultur
</em> er lisensiert med en
6 Creative Commons-lisens. Denne lisensen tillater ikke-kommersiell
7 utnyttelse av verket, hvis opphavsinnehaveren er navngitt. For mer
8 informasjon om lisensen, klikk på ikonet over eller besøk
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/" target=
"_top">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</a>
9 </p></div></div><div><p class=
"pubdate">2004-
03-
25</p></div><div><div class=
"abstract" title=
"Om forfatteren"><p class=
"title"><b>Om forfatteren
</b></p><p>
10 Lawrense Lessig (
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://www.lessig.org" target=
"_top">http://www.lessig.org
</a>), professor i juss
11 og en John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar ved Stanford Law School,
12 er stifteren av Stanford Center for Internet and Society og styreleder i
13 Creative Commons (
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://creativecommons.org" target=
"_top">http://creativecommons.org
</a>).
14 Forfatteren har gitt ut The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) og Code:
15 And other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), og er medlem av styrene i
16 Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, og Public
17 Knowledge. Han har vunnet Free Software Foundation's Award for the
18 Advancement of Free Software, to ganger vært oppført i BusinessWeek's "e.biz
19 25," og omtalt som en av Scientific American's "
50 visjonærer". Etter
20 utdanning ved University of Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, og Yale Law
21 School, assisterte Lessig dommer Richard Posner ved U.S. Seventh Circuit
23 </p></div></div></div><hr></div><div class=
"dedication" title=
"Dedikasjon"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"id2561670"></a>Dedikasjon
</h2></div></div></div><p>
24 Til Eric Eldred
— hvis arbeid først trakk meg til denne saken, og for
25 hvem saken fortsetter.
26 </p></div><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"preface"><a href=
"#preface">Forord
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#c-introduction">1. Introduksjon
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"part"><a href=
"#c-piracy">I. "Piratvirksomhet"
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#creators">2. Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#mere-copyists">3. Kapittel to:
"Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#catalogs">4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#pirates">5. Kapittel fire:
"Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#film">Film
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#radio">Radio
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#piracy">6. Kapittel fem:
"Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"part"><a href=
"#c-property">II. "Eiendom"
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#founders">7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#recorders">8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#transformers">9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#collectors">10. Kapittel ni: Samlere
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#property-i">11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#beginnings">Opphav
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawduration">Loven: Varighet
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#together">Sammen
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"part"><a href=
"#c-puzzles">III. Nøtter
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#chimera">12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#harms">13. Kapittel tolv: Skader
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#constrain">Constraining Creators
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"part"><a href=
"#c-balances">IV. Maktfordeling
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#eldred">14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#eldred-ii">15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#c-conclusion">16. Konklusjon
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#c-afterword">17. Etterord
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#usnow">Oss, nå
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#themsoon">Dem, snart
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#c-notes">18. Notater
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#c-acknowledgments">19. Takk til
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"index"><a href=
"#id2641381">Indeks
</a></span></dt></dl></div><div class=
"list-of-figures"><p><b>Figuroversikt
</b></p><dl><dt>11.1.
<a href=
"#fig-1331">How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
27 the right or regulation.
</a></dt><dt>11.2.
<a href=
"#fig-1361">Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</a></dt><dt>11.3.
<a href=
"#fig-1371">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</a></dt><dt>11.4.
<a href=
"#fig-1381">effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</a></dt><dt>11.5.
<a href=
"#fig-1441">Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</a></dt><dt>11.6.
<a href=
"#fig-1442">"Opphavsrett" i dag.
</a></dt><dt>11.7.
<a href=
"#fig-1521">Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.
</a></dt><dt>11.8.
<a href=
"#fig-1531">Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.
</a></dt><dt>11.9.
<a href=
"#fig-1541">Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
28 copyrighted work.
</a></dt><dt>11.10.
<a href=
"#fig-1542">Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".
</a></dt><dt>11.11.
<a href=
"#fig-1551">Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
29 regulated.
</a></dt><dt>11.12.
<a href=
"#fig-1611">Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.
</a></dt><dt>11.13.
<a href=
"#fig-1612">List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</a></dt><dt>11.14.
<a href=
"#fig-1621">E-bok av Aristoteles "Politikk"
</a></dt><dt>11.15.
<a href=
"#fig-1622">Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".
</a></dt><dt>11.16.
<a href=
"#fig-1631">List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".
</a></dt><dt>11.17.
<a href=
"#fig-1641">List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".
</a></dt><dt>11.18.
<a href=
"#fig-1711">VCR/handgun cartoon.
</a></dt><dt>11.19.
<a href=
"#fig-1761">Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.
</a></dt><dt>14.1.
<a href=
"#fig-18">Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"list-of-tables"><p><b>tabelloversikt
</b></p><dl><dt>6.1.
<a href=
"#t1">Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress
</a></dt><dt>11.1.
<a href=
"#t2">Law status in
1790</a></dt><dt>11.2.
<a href=
"#t3">Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory
</a></dt><dt>11.3.
<a href=
"#t4">Law status in
1975</a></dt><dt>11.4.
<a href=
"#t5">Law status now
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"colophon" title=
"Kolofon"><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"id2609576"></a>Kolofon
</h2><p>
30 Du kan kjøpe en kopi av denne boken ved å klikke på en av lenkene nedenfor:
31 </p><div class=
"itemizedlist"><ul class=
"itemizedlist" type=
"number" compact
><li class=
"listitem" style=
"list-style-type: number"><p><a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://www.amazon.com/" target=
"_top">Amazon
</a></p></li><li class=
"listitem" style=
"list-style-type: number"><p><a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/" target=
"_top">B
&N
</a></p></li><li class=
"listitem" style=
"list-style-type: number"><p><a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://www.penguin.com/" target=
"_top">Penguin
</a></p></li></ul></div><p>
32 Andre bøker av Lawrence Lessig
34 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
36 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
38 The Penguin Press, New York
42 Hvordan store medieaktører bruker teknologi og loven til å låse ned kulturen
43 og kontrollere kreativiteten
47 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street
50 Opphavsrettbeskyttet © Lawrence Lessig. Alle rettigheter reservert.
52 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
53 <em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
54 ©
2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
56 Cartoon in
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#fig-1711" title=
"Figur 11.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.">Figur
11.18,
“VCR/handgun cartoon.
”</a> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
57 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
59 Diagram in
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#fig-1761" title=
"Figur 11.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.">Figur
11.19,
“Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.
”</a> courtesy of the office of FCC
60 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
62 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
64 Lessig, Lawrence. Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law
65 to lock down culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
71 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
73 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United
76 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United
83 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
85 Printed in the United States of America
89 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
91 Oversatt til bokmål av Petter Reinholdtsen og Anders Hagen
92 Jarmund. Kildefilene til oversetterprosjektet er
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"https://github.com/petterreinholdtsen/free-culture-lessig" target=
"_top">tilgjengelig
93 fra github
</a>. Rapporter feil med oversettelsen via github.
95 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this
96 publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval
97 system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
98 photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission
99 of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book. The
100 scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via
101 any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and
102 punishable by law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and
103 do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
104 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
105 </p></div><div class=
"preface" title=
"Forord"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"preface"></a>Forord
</h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxpoguedavid"></a><p>
106 David Pogue, en glimrende skribent og forfatter av utallige tekniske
107 datarelaterte tekster, skrev dette på slutten av hans gjennomgang av min
108 første bok,
<em class=
"citetitle">Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
</em>:
109 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
110 I motsetning til faktiske lover, så har ikke internett-programvare
111 kapasiteten til å straffe. Den påvirker ikke folk som ikke er online (og
112 kun en veldig liten minoritet av verdens befolkning er online). Og hvis du
113 ikke liker systemet på internett, så kan du alltid slå av
114 modemet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"preface01" href=
"#ftn.preface01" class=
"footnote">1</a>]
</sup>
115 </p></blockquote></div><p>
116 Pogue var skeptisk til argumentet som er kjernen av boken
— at
117 programvaren, eller "koden", fungerte som en slags lov
— og foreslo i
118 sin anmeldelse den lykkelig tanken at hvis livet i cyberspace gikk dårlig,
119 så kan vi alltid som med en trylleformel slå over en bryter og komme hjem
120 igjen. Slå av modemet, koble fra datamaskinen, og eventuelle problemer som
121 finnes
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>den
</em></span> virkeligheten ville ikke "påvirke" oss mer.
124 Pogue kan ha hatt rett i
1999 — jeg er skeptisk, men det kan
125 hende. Men selv om han hadde rett da, så er ikke argumentet gyldig
126 nå.
<em class=
"citetitle">Fri Kultur
</em> er om problemene internett forårsaker
127 selv etter at modemet er slått av. Den er et argument om hvordan slagene
128 som nå brer om seg i livet on-line har fundamentalt påvirket "folk som er
129 ikke pålogget." Det finnes ingen bryter som kan isolere oss fra
131 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2561256"></a><p>
132 Men i motsetning til i boken
<em class=
"citetitle">Code
</em>, er argumentet her
133 ikke så mye om internett i seg selv. Istedet er det om konsekvensen av
134 internett for en del av vår tradisjon som er mye mer grunnleggende, og
135 uansett hvor hardt dette er for en geek-wanna-be å innrømme, mye viktigere.
137 Den tradisjonen er måten vår kultur blir laget på. Som jeg vil forklare i
138 sidene som følger, kommer vi fra en tradisjon av "fri kultur"
—ikke
139 "fri" som i "fri bar" (for å låne et uttrykk fra stifteren av fri
140 programvarebevegelsen
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2561237" href=
"#ftn.id2561237" class=
"footnote">2</a>]
</sup>), men "fri" som i
141 "talefrihet", "fritt marked", "frihandel", "fri konkurranse", "fri vilje" og
142 "frie valg". En fri kultur støtter og beskytter skapere og oppfinnere.
143 Dette gjør den direkte ved å tildele immaterielle rettigheter. Men det gjør
144 den indirekte ved å begrense rekkevidden for disse rettighetene, for å
145 garantere at neste generasjon skapere og oppfinnere forblir
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>så fri
146 som mulig
</em></span> fra kontroll fra fortiden. En fri kultur er ikke en
147 kultur uten eierskap, like lite som et fritt marked er et marked der alt er
148 gratis. Det motsatte av fri kultur er "tillatelseskultur"
—en kultur
149 der skapere kun kan skape med tillatelse fra de mektige, eller fra skaperne
152 Hvis vi forsto denne endringen, så tror jeg vi ville stå imot den. Ikke
153 "vi" på venstresiden eller "dere" på høyresiden, men vi som ikke har
154 investert i den bestemt kulturindustrien som har definert det tjuende
155 århundre. Enten du er på venstre eller høyresiden, hvis du i denne forstand
156 ikke har interesser, vil historien jeg forteller her gi deg problemer. For
157 endringene jeg beskriver påvirker verdier som begge sider av vår politiske
158 kultur anser som grunnleggende.
159 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2561976"></a><p>
160 Vi så et glimt av dette tverrpolitiske raseri på forsommeren i
2003. Da FCC
161 vurderte endringer i reglene for medieeierskap som ville slakke på
162 begrensningene rundt mediekonsentrasjon, sendte en ekstraordinær koalisjon
163 mer enn
700 000 brev til FCC for å motsette seg endringen. Mens William
164 Safire beskrev å marsjere "ubehagelig sammen med CodePink Women for Peace
165 and the National Rifle Association, mellom liberale Olympia Snowe og
166 konservative Ted Stevens", formulerte han kanskje det enkleste uttrykket
167 for hva som var på spill: konsentrasjonen av makt. Så spurte han:
168 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2561995"></a>
169 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
170 Høres dette ikke-konservativt ut? Ikke for meg. Denne konsentrasjonen av
171 makt
—politisk, selskapsmessig, pressemessig, kulturelt
—bør være
172 bannlyst av konservative. Spredningen av makt gjennom lokal kontroll, og
173 derigjennom oppmuntre til individuell deltagelse, er essensen i føderalismen
174 og det største uttrykk for demokrati.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2562018" href=
"#ftn.id2562018" class=
"footnote">3</a>]
</sup>
175 </p></blockquote></div><p>
176 Denne idéen er et element i argumentet til
<em class=
"citetitle">Fri
177 Kultur
</em>, selv om min fokus ikke bare er på konsentrasjonen av
178 makt som følger av konsentrasjonen i eierskap, men mer viktig, og fordi det
179 er mindre synlig, på konsentrasjonen av makt som er resultat av en radikal
180 endring i det effektive virkeområdet til loven. Loven er i endring, og
181 endringen forandrer på hvordan vår kultur blir skapt. Den endringen bør
182 bekymre deg
—Uansett om du bryr deg om internett eller ikke, og uansett
183 om du er til venstre for Safires eller til høyre. Inspirasjonen til tittelen
184 og mye av argumentet i denne boken kommer fra arbeidet til Richard Stallman
185 og Free Software Foundation. Faktisk, da jeg leste Stallmans egne tekster på
186 nytt, spesielt essyene i
<em class=
"citetitle">Free Software, Free Society
</em>,
187 innser jeg at alle de teoretiske innsiktene jeg utvikler her er innsikter
188 som Stallman beskrev for tiår siden. Man kan dermed godt argumentere for at
189 dette verket kun er et avledet verk.
192 Jeg godtar kritikken, hvis det faktisk er kritikk. Arbeidet til en advokat
193 er alltid avledede verker, og jeg mener ikke å gjøre noe mer i denne boken
194 enn å minne en kultur om en tradisjon som alltid har vært deres egen. Som
195 Stallman forsvarer jeg denne tradisjonen på grunnlag av verdier. Som
196 Stallman tror jeg dette er verdiene til frihet. Og som Stallman, tror jeg
197 dette er verdier fra vår fortid som må forsvares i vår fremtid. En fri
198 kultur har vært vår fortid, men vil bare være vår fremtid hvis vi endrer
199 retningen vi følger akkurat nå. På samme måte som Stallmans argumenter for
200 fri programvare, treffer argumenter for en fri kultur på forvirring som er
201 vanskelig å unngå, og enda vanskeligere å forstå. En fri kultur er ikke en
202 kultur uten eierskap. Det er ikke en kultur der kunstnere ikke får
203 betalt. En kultur uten eierskap eller en der skaperne ikke kan få betalt, er
204 anarki, ikke frihet. Anarki er ikke hva jeg fremmer her.
206 I stedet er den frie kulturen som jeg forsvarer i denne boken en balanse
207 mellom anarki og kontroll. En fri kultur, i likhet med et fritt marked, er
208 fylt med eierskap. Den er fylt med regler for eierskap og kontrakter som
209 blir håndhevet av staten. Men på samme måte som det frie markedet blir
210 pervertert hvis dets eierskap blir føydalt, så kan en fri kultur bli ødelagt
211 av ekstremisme i eierskapsrettighetene som definerer den. Det er dette jeg
212 frykter om vår kultur i dag. Det er som motpol til denne ekstremismen at
213 denne boken er skrevet.
214 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.preface01" href=
"#preface01" class=
"para">1</a>]
</sup>
215 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York
216 Times
</em>,
30. januar
2000
217 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2561237" href=
"#id2561237" class=
"para">2</a>]
</sup>
218 Richard M. Stallman,
<em class=
"citetitle">Fri programvare, Frie samfunn
</em> 57
219 (Joshua Gay, red.
2002).
220 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2562018" href=
"#id2562018" class=
"para">3</a>]
</sup> William Safire, "The Great Media Gulp,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York
221 Times
</em>,
22. mai
2003.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2562026"></a>
222 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 1. Introduksjon"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-introduction"></a>Kapittel
1. Introduksjon
</h2></div></div></div><p>
223 17. desember
1903, på en vindfylt strand i Nord-Carolina i såvidt under
224 hundre sekunder, demonstrerte Wright-brødrene at et selvdrevet fartøy tyngre
225 enn luft kunne fly. Øyeblikket var elektrisk, og dens betydning ble alment
226 forstått. Nesten umiddelbart, eksploderte interessen for denne nye
227 teknologien som muliggjorde bemannet luftfart og en hærskare av oppfinnere
228 begynte å bygge videre på den.
230 Da Wright-brødrene fant opp flymaskinen, hevdet loven i USA at en grunneier
231 ble antatt å eie ikke bare overflaten på området sitt, men også alt landet
232 under bakken, helt ned til senterpunktet i jorda, og alt volumet over
233 bakken, "i ubestemt grad, oppover".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2562182" href=
"#ftn.id2562182" class=
"footnote">4</a>]
</sup> I
234 mange år undret lærde over hvordan en best skulle tolke idéen om at
235 eiendomsretten gikk helt til himmelen. Betød dette at du eide stjernene?
236 Kunne en dømme gjess for at de regelmessig og med vilje tok seg inn på annen
239 Så kom flymaskiner, og for første gang hadde dette prinsippet i lovverket i
240 USA
—dypt nede i grunnlaget for vår tradisjon og akseptert av de
241 viktigste juridiske tenkerne i vår fortid
—en betydning. Hvis min
242 eiendom rekker til himmelen, hva skjer når United flyr over mitt område?
243 Har jeg rett til å nekte dem å bruke min eiendom? Har jeg mulighet til å
244 inngå en eksklusiv avtale med Delta Airlines? Kan vi gjennomføre en auksjon
245 for å finne ut hvor mye disse rettighetene er verdt?
246 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2562202"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2562227"></a><p>
247 I
1945 ble disse spørsmålene en føderal sak. Da bøndene Thomas Lee og Tinie
248 Causby i Nord Carolina begynte å miste kyllinger på grunn av lavtflygende
249 militære fly (vettskremte kyllinger fløy tilsynelatende i låveveggene og
250 døde), saksøkte Causbyene regjeringen for å trenge seg inn på deres
251 eiendom. Flyene rørte selvfølgelig aldri overflaten på Causbys' eiendom. Men
252 hvis det stemte som Blackstone, Kent, og Cola hadde sagt, at deres eiendom
253 strakk seg "i ubestemt grad, oppover," så hadde regjeringen trengt seg inn
254 på deres eiendom, og Causbys ønsket å sette en stopper for dette.
255 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2562247"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2562254"></a><p>
256 Høyesterett gikk med på å ta opp Causbys sak. Kongressen hadde vedtatt at
257 luftfartsveiene var tilgjengelig for alle, men hvis ens eiendom virkelig
258 rakk til himmelen, da kunne muligens kongressens vedtak ha vært i strid med
259 grunnlovens forbud mot å "ta" eiendom uten kompensasjon. Retten erkjente at
260 "det er gammel doktrine etter sedvane at en eiendom rakk til utkanten av
261 universet.", men dommer Douglas hadde ikke tålmodighet for forhistoriske
262 doktriner. I et enkelt avsnitt, ble hundrevis av år med
263 eiendomslovgivningen strøket. Som han skrev på vegne av retten,
264 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
265 [Denne] doktrinen har ingen plass i den moderne verden. Luften er en
266 offentlig motorvei, slik kongressen har erklært. Hvis det ikke var
267 tilfelle, ville hver eneste transkontinentale flyrute utsette operatørene
268 for utallige søksmål om inntrenging på annen manns eiendom. Idéen er i
269 strid med sunn fornuft. Å anerkjenne slike private krav til luftrommet
270 ville blokkere disse motorveiene, seriøst forstyrre muligheten til kontroll
271 og utvikling av dem i fellesskapets interesse og overføre til privat
272 eierskap det som kun fellesskapet har et rimelig krav til.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2562293" href=
"#ftn.id2562293" class=
"footnote">5</a>]
</sup>
273 </p></blockquote></div><p>
274 "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft."
277 Det er hvordan loven vanligvis fungerer. Ikke ofte like brått eller
278 utålmodig, men til slutt er dette hvordan loven fungerer. Det var ikke
279 stilen til Douglas å utbrodere. Andre dommere ville ha skrevet mange flere
280 sider før de nådde sin konklusjon, men for Douglas holdt det med en enkel
281 linje: "Idéen er i strid med sunn fornuft.". Men uansett om det tar flere
282 sider eller kun noen få ord, så er det en genial egenskap med et
283 lovpraksis-system, slik som vårt er, at loven tilpasser seg til aktuelle
284 teknologiene. Og mens den tilpasser seg, så endres den. Idéer som var
285 solide som fjell i en tidsalder knuses i en annen.
286 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617473"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617480"></a><p>
287 Eller, det er hvordan ting skjer når det ikke er noen mektige på andre siden
288 av endringen. Causbyene var bare bønder. Og selv om det uten tvil var
289 mange som dem som var lei av den økende trafikken i luften (og en håper ikke
290 for mange kyllinger flakset seg inn i vegger), ville Causbyene i verden
291 finne det svært hardt å samles for å stoppe idéen, og teknologien, som
292 Wright-brødrene hadde ført til verden. Wright-brødrene spyttet flymaskiner
293 inn i den teknologiske meme-dammen. Idéen spredte seg deretter som et virus
294 i en kyllingfarm. Causbyene i verden fant seg selv omringet av "det synes
295 rimelig" gitt teknologien som Wright-brødrene hadde produsert. De kunne stå
296 på sine gårder, med døde kyllinger i hendene, og heve knyttneven mot disse
297 nye teknologiene så mye de ville. De kunne ringe sine representanter eller
298 til og med saksøke. Men når alt kom til alt, ville kraften i det som virket
299 "åpenbart" for alle andre
—makten til "sunn fornuft"
—ville vinne
300 frem. Deres "personlige interesser" ville ikke få lov til å nedkjempe en
301 åpenbar fordel for fellesskapet.
303 Edwin Howard Armstrong er en av USAs glemte oppfinnergenier. Han dukket opp
304 på oppfinnerscenen etter titaner som Thomas Edison og Alexander Graham
305 Bell. Alle hans bidrag på området radioteknologi gjør han til kanskje den
306 viktigste av alle enkeltoppfinnere i de første femti årene av radio. Han
307 var bedre utdannet enn Michael Faraday, som var bokbinderlærling da han
308 oppdaget elektrisk induksjon i
1831. Men han hadde like god intuisjon om
309 hvordan radioverden virket, og ved minst tre anledninger, fant Armstrong opp
310 svært viktig teknologier som brakte vår forståelse av radio et hopp videre.
311 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617541"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617550"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617556"></a>
313 Dagen etter julaften i
1933, ble fire patenter utstedt til Armstrong for
314 hans mest signifikante oppfinnelse
—FM-radio. Inntil da hadde
315 forbrukerradioer vært amplitude-modulert (AM) radio. Tidens teoretikere
316 hadde sagt at frekvens-modulert (FM) radio. De hadde rett når det gjelder
317 et smalt bånd av spektrumet. Men Armstrong oppdaget at frekvens-modulert
318 radio i et vidt bånd i spektrumet leverte en forbløffende gjengivelse av
319 lyd, med mye mindre senderstyrke og støy.
321 Den
5. november
1935 demonstrerte han teknologien på et møte hos institutt
322 for radioingeniører ved Empire State-bygningen i New York City. Han vred
323 radiosøkeren over en rekke AM-stasjoner, inntil radioen låste seg mot en
324 kringkasting som han hadde satt opp
27 kilometer unna. Radioen ble helt
325 stille, som om den var død, og så, med en klarhet ingen andre i rommet noen
326 gang hadde hørt fra et elektrisk apparat, produserte det lyden av en
327 opplesers stemme: "Dette er amatørstasjon W2AG ved Yonkers, New York, som
328 opererer på frekvensmodulering ved to og en halv meter."
330 Publikum hørte noe ingen hadde trodd var mulig:
331 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
332 Et glass vann ble fylt opp foran mikrofonen i Yonkers, og det hørtes ut som
333 et glass som ble fylt opp.
… Et papir ble krøllet og revet opp, og
334 det hørtes ut som papir og ikke som en sprakende skogbrann.
…
335 Sousa-marsjer ble spilt av fra plater og en pianosolo og et gitarnummer ble
336 utført.
… Musikken ble presentert med en livaktighet som sjeldent om
337 noen gang før hadde vært hørt fra en radio-"musikk-boks".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2617608" href=
"#ftn.id2617608" class=
"footnote">6</a>]
</sup>
338 </p></blockquote></div><p>
340 Som vår egen sunn fornuft forteller oss, hadde Armstrong oppdaget en mye
341 bedre radioteknologi. Men på tidspunktet for hans oppfinnelse, jobbet
342 Armstrong for RCA. RCA var den dominerende aktøren i det da dominerende
343 AM-radiomarkedet. I
1935 var det tusen radiostasjoner over hele USA, men
344 stasjonene i de store byene var alle eid av en liten håndfull selskaper.
347 Presidenten i RCA, David Sarnoff, en venn av Armstrong, var ivrig etter å få
348 Armstrong til å oppdage en måte å fjerne støyen fra AM-radio. Så Sarnoff var
349 ganske spent da Armstrong fortalte ham at han hadde en enhet som fjernet
350 støy fra "radio.". Men da Armstrong demonstrerte sin oppfinnelse, var ikke
351 Sarnoff fornøyd.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617664"></a>
352 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
353 Jeg trodde Armstrong ville finne opp et slags filter for å fjerne skurring
354 fra AM-radioen vår. Jeg trodde ikke han skulle starte en revolusjon
—
355 starte en hel forbannet ny industri i konkurranse med RCA.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2617568" href=
"#ftn.id2617568" class=
"footnote">7</a>]
</sup>
356 </p></blockquote></div><p>
357 Armstrongs oppfinnelse truet RCAs AM-herredømme, så selskapet lanserte en
358 kampanje for å knuse FM-radio. Mens FM kan ha vært en overlegen teknologi,
359 var Sarnoff en overlegen taktiker. En forfatter beskrev det slik,
360 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617706"></a>
361 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
362 Kreftene til fordel for FM, i hovedsak ingeniørfaglige, kunne ikke overvinne
363 tyngden til strategien utviklet av avdelingene for salg, patenter og juss
364 for å undertrykke denne trusselen til selskapets posisjon. For FM utgjorde,
365 hvis det fikk utvikle seg uten begrensninger
… en komplett endring i
366 maktforholdene rundt radio
… og muligens fjerningen av det nøye
367 begrensede AM-systemet som var grunnlaget for RCA stigning til
368 makt.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2617733" href=
"#ftn.id2617733" class=
"footnote">8</a>]
</sup>
369 </p></blockquote></div><p>
370 RCA holdt først teknologien innomhus, og insistere på at det var nødvendig
371 med ytterligere tester. Da Armstrong, etter to år med testing, ble
372 utålmodig, begynte RCA å bruke sin makt hos myndighetene til holde tilbake
373 den generelle spredningen av FM-radio. I
1936, ansatte RCA den tidligere
374 lederen av FCC og ga ham oppgaven med å sikre at FCC tilordnet
375 radiospekteret på en måte som ville kastrere FM
—hovedsakelig ved å
376 flytte FM-radio til et annet band i spekteret. I første omgang lyktes ikke
377 disse forsøkene. Men mens Armstrong og nasjonen var distrahert av andre
378 verdenskrig, begynte RCAs arbeid å bære frukter. Like etter at krigen var
379 over, annonserte FCC et sett med avgjørelser som ville ha en klar effekt:
380 FM-radio ville bli forkrøplet.Lawrence lessing beskrevet det slik,
381 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
382 Serien med slag mot kroppen som FM-radio mottok rett etter krigen, i en
383 serie med avgjørelser manipulert gjennom FCC av de store radiointeressene,
384 var nesten utrolige i deres kraft og underfundighet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2617749" href=
"#ftn.id2617749" class=
"footnote">9</a>]
</sup>
385 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617789"></a><p>
386 For å gjøre plass i spektrumet for RCAs nyeste satsingsområde, televisjon,
387 skulle FM-radioens brukere flyttes til et helt nytt band i spektrumet.
388 Sendestyrken til FM-radioene ble også redusert, og gjorde at FM ikke lenger
389 kunne brukes for å sende programmer fra en del av landet til en annen.
390 (Denne endringen ble sterkt støttet av AT
&T, på grunn av at fjerningen
391 av FM-videresendingsstasjoner ville bety at radiostasjonene ville bli nødt
392 til å kjøpe kablede linker fra AT
&T.) Spredningen av FM-radio var
393 dermed kvalt, i hvert fall midlertidig.
395 Armstrong sto imot RCAs innsats. Som svar motsto RCA Armstrongs patenter.
396 Etter å ha bakt FM-teknologi inn i den nye standarden for TV, erklærte RCS
397 patentene ugyldige
—uten grunn og nesten femten år etter at de ble
398 utstedet. De nektet dermed å betale ham for bruken av patentene. I seks år
399 kjempet Armstrong en dyr søksmålskrig for å forsvare patentene sine. Til
400 slutt, samtidig som patentene utløp, tilbød RCA et forlik så lavt at det
401 ikke engang dekket Armstrongs advokatregning. Beseiret, knust og nå blakk,
402 skrev Armstrong i
1954 en kort beskjed til sin kone, før han gikk ut av et
403 vindu i trettende etasje og falt i døden.
406 Dette er slik loven virker noen ganger. Ikke ofte like tragisk, og sjelden
407 med heltemodig drama, men noen ganger er det slik det virker. Fra starten
408 har myndigheter og myndighetsorganer blitt tatt til fange. Det er mer
409 sannsynlig at de blir fanget når en mektig interesse er truet av enten en
410 juridisk eller teknologisk endring. Denne mektige interessen utøver for
411 ofte sin innflytelse hos myndighetene til å få myndighetene til å beskytte
412 den. Retorikken for denne beskyttelsen er naturligvis alltid med fokus på
413 fellesskapets beste. Realiteten er noe annet. Idéer som kan være solide
414 som fjell i en tidsalder, men som overlatt til seg selv, vil falle sammen i
415 en annen, er videreført gjennom denne subtile korrupsjonen i vår politiske
416 prosess. RCA hadde hva Causby-ene ikke hadde: Makten til å undertrykke
417 effekten av en teknologisk endring.
419 Det er ingen enkeltoppfinner av Internet. Ei heller er det en god dato som
420 kan brukes til å markere når det ble født. Likevel har internettet i løpet
421 av svært kort tid blitt en del av vanlige amerikaneres liv. I følge the Pew
422 Internet and American Life-prosjektet, har
58 prosent av amerikanerne hatt
423 tilgang til internettet i
2002, opp fra
49 prosent to år
424 tidligere.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2617870" href=
"#ftn.id2617870" class=
"footnote">10</a>]
</sup> Det tallet kan uten
425 problemer passere to tredjedeler av nasjonen ved utgangen av
2004.
427 Etter hvert som internett er blitt integrert inn i det vanlige liv har ting
428 blitt endret. Noen av disse endringene er teknisk
—internettet har
429 gjort kommunikasjon raskere, det har redusert kostnaden med å samle inn
430 data, og så videre. Disse tekniske endringene er ikke fokus for denne
431 boken. De er viktige. De er ikke godt forstått. Men de er den type ting
432 som ganske enkelt ville blir borte hvis vi alle bare slo av internettet. De
433 påvirker ikke folk som ikke bruker internettet, eller i det miste påvirker
434 det ikke dem direkte. De er et godt tema for en bok om internettet. Men
435 dette er ikke en bok om internettet.
437 I stedet er denne boken om effekten av internettet ut over internettet i seg
438 selv. En effekt på hvordan kultur blir skapt. Min påstand er at
439 internettet har ført til en viktig og ukjent endring i denne prosessen.
440 Denne endringen vil forandre en tradisjon som er like gammel som republikken
441 selv. De fleste, hvis de la merke til denne endringen, ville avvise den.
442 Men de fleste legger ikke engang merke til denne endringen som internettet
446 Vi kan få en følelse av denne endringen ved å skille mellom kommersiell og
447 ikke-kommersiell kultur, ved å knytte lovens reguleringer til hver av dem.
448 Med "kommersiell kultur" mener jeg den delen av vår kultur som er produsert
449 og solgt eller produsert for å bli solgt. Med "ikke-kommersiell kultur"
450 mener jeg alt det andre. Da gamle menn satt rundt i parker eller på
451 gatehjørner og fortalte historier som unger og andre lyttet til, så var det
452 ikke-kommersiell kultur. Da Noah Webster publiserte sin "Reader", eller
453 Joel Barlow sin poesi, så var det kommersiell kultur.
455 Fra historisk tid, og for omtrent hele vår tradisjon, har ikke-kommersiell
456 kultur i hovedsak ikke vært regulert. Selvfølgelig, hvis din historie var
457 utuktig, eller hvis dine sanger forstyrret freden, kunne loven gripe inn.
458 Men loven var aldri direkte interessert i skapingen eller spredningen av
459 denne form for kultur, og lot denne kulturen være "fri". Den vanlige måten
460 som vanlige individer delte og formet deres kultur
—historiefortelling,
461 formidling av scener fra teater eller TV, delta i fan-klubber, deling av
462 musikk, laging av kassetter
—ble ikke styrt av lovverket.
464 Fokuset på loven var kommersiell kreativitet. I starten forsiktig, etter
465 hvert betraktelig, beskytter loven insentivet til skaperne ved å tildele dem
466 en eksklusiv rett til deres kreative verker, slik at de kan selge disse
467 eksklusive rettighetene på en kommersiell markedsplass.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2617963" href=
"#ftn.id2617963" class=
"footnote">11</a>]
</sup> Dette er også, naturligvis, en viktig del av
468 kreativitet og kultur, og det har blitt en viktigere og viktigere del i
469 USA. Men det var på ingen måte dominerende i vår tradisjon. Det var i
470 stedet bare en del, en kontrollert del, balansert mot det frie.
472 Denne grove inndelingen mellom den frie og den kontrollerte har nå blitt
473 fjernet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2618000" href=
"#ftn.id2618000" class=
"footnote">12</a>]
</sup> Internettet har satt scenen
474 for denne fjerningen, og pressen frem av store medieaktører har loven nå
475 påvirket det. For første gang i vår tradisjon, har de vanlige måtene som
476 individer skaper og deler kultur havnet innen rekekvidde for reguleringene
477 til loven, som har blitt utvidet til å dra inn i sitt kontrollområde den
478 enorme mengden kultur og kreativitet som den aldri tidligere har nådd over.
479 Teknologien som tok vare på den historiske balansen
—mellom bruken av
480 den delen av kulturen vår som var fri og bruken av vår kultur som krevde
481 tillatelse
—har blitt borte. Konsekvensen er at vi er mindre og mindre
482 en fri kultur, og mer og mer en tillatelseskultur.
484 Denne endringen blir rettferdiggjort som nødvendig for å beskytte
485 kommersiell kreativitet. Og ganske riktig, proteksjonisme er nøyaktig det
486 som motiverer endringen. Men proteksjonismen som rettferdiggjør endringene
487 som jeg skal beskrive lenger ned er ikke den begrensede og balanserte typen
488 som har definert loven tidligere. Dette er ikke en proteksjonisme for å
489 beskytte artister. Det er i stedet en proteksjonisme for å beskytte
490 bestemte forretningsformer. Selskaper som er truet av potensialet til
491 internettet for å endre måten både kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell kultur
492 blir skapt og delt, har samlet seg for å få lovgiverne til å bruke loven for
493 å beskytte selskapene. Dette er historien om RCA og Armstrong, og det er
494 drømmen til Causbyene.
496 For internettet har sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mulighet for mange til å
497 delta i prosessen med å bygge og kultivere en kultur som rekker lagt utenfor
498 lokale grenselinjer. Den makten har endret markedsplassen for å lage og
499 kultivere kultur generelt, og den endringen truer i neste omgang etablerte
500 innholdsindustrier. Internettet er dermed for industriene som bygget og
501 distribuerte innhold i det tjuende århundret hva FM-radio var for AM-radio,
502 eller hva traileren var for jernbaneindustrien i det nittende århundret:
503 begynnelsen på slutten, eller i hvert fall en markant endring. Digitale
504 teknologier, knyttet til internettet, kunne produsere et mye mer
505 konkurransedyktig og levende marked for å bygge og kultivere kultur. Dette
506 markedet kunne inneholde en mye videre og mer variert utvalg av skapere.
507 Disse skaperne kunne produsere og distribuere et mye mer levende utvalg av
508 kreativitet. Og avhengig av noen få viktige faktorer, så kunne disse
509 skaperne tjenere mer i snitt fra dette systemet enn skaperne gjør i
510 dag
—så lenge RCA-ene av i dag ikke bruker loven til å beskytte dem
511 selv mot denne konkurransen.
513 Likevel, som jeg argumenterer for i sidene som følger, er dette nøyaktig det
514 som skjer i vår kultur i dag. Dette som er dagens ekvivalenter til tidlig
515 tjuende århundres radio og nittende århundres jernbaner bruker deres makt
516 til å få loven til å beskytte dem mot dette nye, mer effektive, mer levende
517 teknologi for å bygge kultur. De lykkes i deres plan om å gjøre om
518 internettet før internettet gjør om på dem.
520 Det ser ikke slik ut for mange. Kamphandlingene over opphavsrett og
521 internettet er fjernt for de fleste. For de få som følger dem, virker de i
522 hovedsak å handle om et enklere sett med spørsmål
—hvorvidt
523 "piratvirksomhet" vil bli akseptert, og hvorvidt "eiendomsretten" vil bli
524 beskyttet. "Krigen" som har blitt erklært mot teknologiene til
525 internettet
—det presidenten for Motion Picture Association of America
526 (MPAA) Jack Valenti kaller sin "egen terroristkrig"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2618128" href=
"#ftn.id2618128" class=
"footnote">13</a>]
</sup>—har blitt rammet inn som en kamp om å følge
527 loven og respektere eiendomsretten. For å vite hvilken side vi bør ta i
528 denne krigen, de fleste tenker at vi kun trenger å bestemme om hvorvidt vi
529 er for eiendomsrett eller mot den.
531 Hvis dette virkelig var alternativene, så ville jeg være enig med Jack
532 Valenti og innholdsindustrien. Jeg tror også på eiendomsretten, og spesielt
533 på viktigheten av hva Mr. Valenti så pent kaller "kreativ eiendomsrett".
534 Jeg tror at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at loven, riktig innstilt, bør
535 straffe "piratvirksomhet", både på og utenfor internettet.
537 Men disse enkle trosoppfatninger maskerer et mye mer grunnleggende spørsmål
538 og en mye mer dramatisk endring. Min frykt er at med mindre vi begynner å
539 legge merke til denne endringen, så vil krigen for å befri verden fra
540 internettets "pirater" også fjerne verdier fra vår kultur som har vært
541 integrert til vår tradisjon helt fra starten.
543 Disse verdiene bygget en tradisjon som, for i hvert fall de første
180 årene
544 av vår republikk, garanterte skaperne rettigheten til å bygge fritt på deres
545 fortid, og beskyttet skaperne og innovatørene fra både statlig og privat
546 kontroll. Det første grunnlovstillegget beskyttet skaperne fra statlig
547 kontroll. Og som professor Neil Netanel kraftfylt argumenterer,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2618193" href=
"#ftn.id2618193" class=
"footnote">14</a>]
</sup> opphavsrettslov, skikkelig balansert, beskyttet
548 skaperne mot privat kontroll. Vår tradisjon var dermed hverken Sovjet eller
549 tradisjonen til velgjørere. I stedet skar det ut en bred manøvreringsrom
550 hvor skapere kunne kultivere og utvide vår kultur.
552 Likevel har lovens respons til internettet, når det knyttes sammen til
553 endringer i teknologien i internettet selv, ført til massiv økting av den
554 effektive reguleringen av kreativitet i USA. For å bygge på eller kritisere
555 kulturen rundt oss må en spørre, som Oliver Twist, om tillatelse først.
556 Tillatelse er, naturligvis, ofte innvilget
—men det er ikke ofte
557 innvilget til den kritiske eller den uavhengige. Vi har bygget en slags
558 kulturell adel. De innen dette adelskapet har et enkelt liv, mens de på
559 utsiden har det ikke. Men det er adelskap i alle former som er fremmed for
562 Historien som følger er om denne krigen. Er det ikke om "betydningen av
563 teknologi" i vanlig liv. Jeg tror ikke på guder, hverken digitale eller
564 andre typer. Det er heller ikke et forsøk på å demonisere noen individer
565 eller gruppe, jeg tro heller ikke i en djevel, selskapsmessig eller på annen
566 måte. Det er ikke en moralsk historie. Ei heller er det et rop om hellig
567 krig mot en industri.
569 Det er i stedet et forsøk på å forstå en håpløst ødeleggende krig som er
570 inspirert av teknologiene til internettet, men som rekker lang utenfor dens
571 kode. Og ved å forstå denne kampen er den en innsats for å finne veien til
572 fred. Det er ingen god grunn for å fortsette dagens batalje rundt
573 internett-teknologiene. Det vil være til stor skade for vår tradisjon og
574 kultur hvis den får lov til å fortsette ukontrollert. Vi må forstå kilden
575 til denne krigen. Vi må finne en løsning snart.
576 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618276"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618281"></a><p>
577 Lik Causbyenes kamp er denne krigen, delvis, om "eiendomsrett". Eiendommen i
578 denne krigen er ikke like håndfast som den til Causbyene, og ingen uskyldige
579 kyllinger har så langt mistet livet. Likevel er idéene rundt denne
580 "eiendomsretten" like åpenbare for de fleste som Causbyenes krav om
581 ukrenkeligheten til deres bondegård var for dem. De fleste av oss tar for
582 gitt de uvanlig mektige krav som eierne av "immaterielle rettigheter" nå
583 hevder. De fleste av oss, som Causbyene, behandler disse kravene som
584 åpenbare. Og dermed protesterer vi, som Causbyene,, når ny teknologi griper
585 inn i denne eiendomsretten. Det er så klart for oss som det var fro dem at
586 de nye teknologiene til internettet "tar seg til rette" mot legitime krav
587 til "eiendomsrett". Det er like klart for oss som det var for dem at loven
588 skulle ta affære for å stoppe denne inntrengingen i annen manns eiendom.
589 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618324"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618330"></a><p>
591 Og dermed, når nerder og teknologer forsvarer sin tids Armstrong og
592 Wright-brødenes teknologi, får de lite sympati fra de fleste av oss. Sunn
593 fornuft gjør ikke opprør. I motsetning til saken til de uheldige Causbyene,
594 er sunn fornuft på samme side som eiendomseierne i denne krigen. I
595 motsetning til hos de heldige Wright-brødrene, har internettet ikke
596 inspirert en revolusjon til fordel for seg.
598 Mitt håp er å skyve denne sunne fornuften videre. Jeg har blitt stadig mer
599 overrasket over kraften til denne idéen om immaterielle rettigheter og, mer
600 viktig, dets evne til å slå av kritisk tanke hos lovmakere og innbyggere.
601 Det har aldri før i vår historie vært så mye av vår "kultur" som har vært
602 "eid" enn det er nå. Og likevel har aldri før konsentrasjonen av makt til å
603 kontrollere
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>bruken
</em></span> av kulturen vært mer akseptert uten
604 spørsmål enn det er nå.
606 Gåten er, hvorfor det? Er det fordi vi fått en innsikt i sannheten om
607 verdien og betydningen av absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur? Er det
608 fordi vi har oppdaget at vår tradisjon med å avvise slike absolutte krav var
611 Eller er det på grunn av at idéer om absolutt eierskap over idéer og kultur
612 gir fordeler til RCA-ene i vår tid, og passer med vår ureflekterte
615 Er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår tradisjon om fri kultur en
616 forekomst av USA som korrigerer en feil fra sin fortid, slik vi gjorde det
617 etter en blodig krig mot slaveri, og slik vi sakte gjør det mot
618 forskjellsbehandling? Eller er denne radikale endringen vekk fra vår
619 tradisjon med fri kultur nok et eksempel på at vårt politiske system er
620 fanget av noen få mektige særinteresser?
622 Fører sunn fornuft til det ekstreme i dette spørsmålet på grunn av at sunn
623 fornuft faktisk tror på dette ekstreme? Eller står sunn fornuft i stillhet
624 i møtet med dette ekstreme fordi, som med Armstrong versus RCA, at den mer
625 mektige siden har sikret seg at det har et mye mer mektig synspunkt?
626 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618419"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618426"></a><p>
628 Jeg forsøker ikke å være mystisk. Mine egne synspunkter er klare. Jeg mener
629 det var riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør mot ekstremismen til
630 Causbyene. Jeg mener det ville være riktig for sunn fornuft å gjøre opprør
631 mot de ekstreme krav som gjøres i dag på vegne av "immaterielle
632 rettigheter". Det som loven krever i dag er mer å mer like dumt som om
633 lensmannen skulle arrestere en flymaskin for å trenge inn på annen manns
634 eiendom. Men konsekvensene av den nye dumskapen vil bli mye mer
638 Basketaket som pågår akkurat nå senterer seg rundt to idéer:
639 "piratvirksomhet" og "eiendom". Mitt mål med denne bokens neste to deler er
640 å utforske disse to idéene.
642 Metoden min er ikke den vanlige metoden for en akademiker. Jeg ønsker ikke
643 å pløye deg inn i et komplisert argument, steinsatt med referanser til
644 obskure franske teoretikere
—uansett hvor naturlig det har blitt for
645 den rare sorten vi akademikere har blitt. Jeg vil i stedet begynne hver del
646 med en samling historier som etablerer en sammenheng der disse
647 tilsynelatende enkle idéene kan bli fullt ut forstått.
649 De to delene setter opp kjernen i påstanden til denne boken: at mens
650 internettet faktisk har produsert noe fantastisk og nytt, bidrar våre
651 myndigheter, presset av store medieaktører for å møte dette "noe nytt" til å
652 ødelegge noe som er svært gammelt. I stedet for å forstå endringene som
653 internettet kan gjøre mulig, og i stedet for å ta den tiden som trengs for å
654 la "sunn fornuft" finne ut hvordan best svare på utfordringen, så lar vi de
655 som er mest truet av endringene bruke sin makt til å endre loven
—og
656 viktigere, å bruke sin makt til å endre noe fundamentalt om hvordan vi
659 Jeg tror vi tillater dette, ikke fordi det er riktig, og heller ikke fordi
660 de fleste av oss tror på disse endringene. Vi tillater det på grunn av at
661 de interessene som er mest truet er blant de mest mektige aktørene i vår
662 deprimerende kompromitterte prosess for å utforme lover. Denne boken er
663 historien om nok en konsekvens for denne type korrupsjon
—en konsekvens
664 for de fleste av oss forblir ukjent med.
665 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2562182" href=
"#id2562182" class=
"para">4</a>]
</sup>
666 St. George Tucker,
<em class=
"citetitle">Blackstone's Commentaries
</em> 3 (South
667 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
668 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2562293" href=
"#id2562293" class=
"para">5</a>]
</sup>
669 USA mot Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. Domstolen fant at det kunne være
670 å "ta" hvis regjeringens bruk av sitt land reelt sett hadde ødelagt verdien
671 av eiendomen til Causby. Dette eksemplet ble foreslått for meg i Keith
672 Aokis flotte stykke, "(intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward
673 a cultural Geography of Authorship",
<em class=
"citetitle">Stanford Law
674 Review
</em> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. Se også Paul Goldstein,
675 <em class=
"citetitle">Real Property
</em> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press
676 (
1984)),
1112–13.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617444"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2562323"></a>
677 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2617608" href=
"#id2617608" class=
"para">6</a>]
</sup>
678 Lawrence Lessing,
<em class=
"citetitle">Man of High Fidelity:: Edwin Howard
679 Armstrong
</em> (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
680 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2617568" href=
"#id2617568" class=
"para">7</a>]
</sup> Se "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the Electronic Era," første
681 elektroniske kirke i USA, hos www.webstationone.com/fecha, tilgjengelig fra
682 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
1</a>.
683 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2617733" href=
"#id2617733" class=
"para">8</a>]
</sup>Lessing,
226.
684 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2617749" href=
"#id2617749" class=
"para">9</a>]
</sup>
686 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2617870" href=
"#id2617870" class=
"para">10</a>]
</sup>
687 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
688 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American Life
689 Project,
15. april
2003:
6, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
2</a>.
690 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2617963" href=
"#id2617963" class=
"para">11</a>]
</sup>
691 Dette er ikke det eneste formålet med opphavsrett, men det er helt klart
692 hovedformålet med opphavsretten slik den er etablert i føderal grunnlov.
693 Opphavsrettslovene i delstatene beskyttet historisk ikke bare kommersielle
694 interesse når det gjaldt publikasjoner, men også personverninteresser. Ved
695 å gi forfattere eneretten til å publisere først, ga delstatenes
696 opphavsrettslovene forfatterne makt til å kontrollere spredningen av fakta
697 om seg selv. Se Samuel D. Warren og Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy",
698 Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
198–200.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2617623"></a>
699 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2618000" href=
"#id2618000" class=
"para">12</a>]
</sup>
700 Se Jessica Litman,
<em class=
"citetitle">Digital Copyright
</em> (New York:
701 Prometheus bøker,
2001), kap.
13.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618008"></a>
702 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2618128" href=
"#id2618128" class=
"para">13</a>]
</sup>
703 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates Use New Tools
704 to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York
705 Times
</em>,
17. januar
2002.
706 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2618193" href=
"#id2618193" class=
"para">14</a>]
</sup>
707 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Yale
708 Law Journal
</em> 106 (
1996):
283.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618202"></a>
709 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"part" title='Del I.
"Piratvirksomhet"'
><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-piracy"></a>Del I. "Piratvirksomhet"
</h1></div></div></div><div class=
"partintro" title='
"Piratvirksomhet"'
><div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxmansfield1"></a><p>
710 Helt siden loven begynte å regulere kreative eierrettigheter, har det vært
711 en krig mot "piratvirksomhet". De presise konturene av dette konseptet,
712 "piratvirksomhet", har vært vanskelig å tegne opp, men bildet av
713 urettferdighet er enkelt å beskrive. Som Lord Mansfield skrev i en sak som
714 utvidet rekkevidden for engelsk opphavsrettslov til å inkludere noteark,
715 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
716 En person kan bruke kopien til å spille den, men han har ingen rett til å
717 robbe forfatteren for profitten, ved å lage flere kopier og distribuere
718 etter eget forgodtbefinnende.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2618562" href=
"#ftn.id2618562" class=
"footnote">15</a>]
</sup>
719 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618576"></a></blockquote></div><p>
721 I dag er vi midt inne i en annen "krig" mot "piratvirksomhet". Internettet
722 har fremprovosert denne krigen. Internettet gjør det mulig å effektivt spre
723 innhold. Peer-to-peer (p2p) fildeling er blant det mest effektive av de
724 effektive teknologier internettet muliggjør. Ved å bruke distribuert
725 intelligens, kan p2p-systemer muliggjøre enkel spredning av innhold på en
726 måte som ingen forestilte seg for en generasjon siden.
729 Denne effektiviteten respekterer ikke de tradisjonelle skillene i
730 opphavsretten. Nettverket skiller ikke mellom deling av
731 opphavsrettsbeskyttet og ikke opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold. Dermed har det
732 vært deling av en enorm mengde opphavsrettsbeskyttet innhold. Denne
733 delingen har i sin tur ansporet til krigen, på grunn av at eiere av
734 opphavsretter frykter delingen vil "frata forfatteren overskuddet."
736 Krigerne har snudd seg til domstolene, til lovgiverne, og i stadig større
737 grad til teknologi for å forsvare sin "eiendom" mot denne
738 "piratvirksomheten". En generasjon amerikanere, advarer krigerne, blir
739 oppdratt til å tro at "eiendom" skal være "gratis". Glem tatoveringer, ikke
740 tenk på kroppspiercing
—våre barn blir
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>tyver
</em></span>!
742 Det er ingen tvil om at "piratvirksomhet" er galt, og at pirater bør
743 straffes. Men før vi roper på bødlene, bør vi sette dette
744 "piratvirksomhets"-begrepet i en sammenheng. For mens begrepet blir mer og
745 mer brukt, har det i sin kjerne en ekstraordinær idé som nesten helt sikkert
748 Idéen høres omtrent slik ut:
749 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
750 Kreativt arbeid har verdi. Når jeg bruker, eller tar, eller bygger på det
751 kreative arbeidet til andre, så tar jeg noe fra dem som har verdi. Når jeg
752 tar noe av verdi fra noen andre, bør jeg få tillatelse fra dem. Å ta noe
753 som har verdi fra andre uten tillatelse er galt. Det er en form for
755 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618675"></a><p>
756 Dette synet går dypt i de pågående debattene. Det er hva jussprofessor
757 Rochelle Dreyfuss ved NYU kritiserer som "hvis verdi, så rettighet"-teorien
758 for kreative eierrettigheter
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2618689" href=
"#ftn.id2618689" class=
"footnote">16</a>]
</sup>—hvis det finnes verdi, så må noen ha rettigheten til denne
759 verdien. Det er perspektivet som fikk komponistenes rettighetsorganisasjon,
760 ASCAP, til å saksøke jentespeiderne for å ikke betale for sangene som
761 jentene sagt rundt jentespeidernes leirbål.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2618709" href=
"#ftn.id2618709" class=
"footnote">17</a>]
</sup> Det fantes "verdi" (sangene), så det måtte ha vært en
762 "rettighet"
—til og med mot jentespeiderne.
763 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618738"></a><p>
765 Denne idéen er helt klart en mulig forståelse om hvordan kreative
766 eierrettigheter bør virke. Det er helt klart et mulig design for et
767 lovsystem som beskytter kreative eierrettigheter. Men teorien om "hvis
768 verdi, så rettighet" for kreative eierrettigheter har aldri vært USAs teori
769 for kreative eierrettigheter. It har aldri stått rot i vårt lovverk.
771 I vår tradisjon har immaterielle rettigheter i stedet vært et instrument.
772 Det bygger fundamentet for et rikt kreativt samfunn, men er fortsatt servilt
773 til verdien av kreativitet. Dagens debatt har snudd dette helt rundt. Vi
774 har blitt så opptatt av å beskytte instrumentet at vi mister verdien av
777 Kilden til denne forvirringen er et skille som loven ikke lenger bryr seg om
778 å markere
—skillet mellom å gjenpublisere noens verk på den ene siden,
779 og bygge på og gjøre om verket på den andre. Da opphavsretten kom var det
780 kun publisering som ble berørt. Opphavsretten i dag regulerer begge.
782 Før teknologiene til internettet dukket opp, betød ikke denne begrepsmessige
783 sammenblandingen mye. Teknologiene for å publisere var kostbare, som betød
784 at det meste av publisering var kommersiell. Kommersielle aktører kunne
785 håndtere byrden pålagt av loven
—til og med byrden som den bysantiske
786 kompleksiteten som opphavsrettsloven har blitt. Det var bare nok en kostnad
787 ved å drive forretning.
788 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618792"></a><p>
789 Men da internettet dukket opp, forsvant denne naturlige begrensningen til
790 lovens virkeområde. Loven kontrollerer ikke bare kreativiteten til
791 kommersielle skapere, men effektivt sett kreativiteten til alle. Selv om
792 utvidelsen ikke ville bety stort hvis opphavsrettsloven kun regulerte
793 "kopiering", så betyr utvidelsen mye når loven regulerer så bredt og obskurt
794 som den gjør. Byrden denne loven gir oppveier nå langt fordelene den ga da
795 den ble vedtatt
—helt klart slik den påvirker ikke-kommersiell
796 kreativitet, og i stadig større grad slik den påvirker kommersiell
797 kreativitet. Dermed, slik vi ser klarere i kapitlene som følger, er lovens
798 rolle mindre og mindre å støtte kreativitet, og mer og mer å beskytte
799 enkelte industrier mot konkurranse. Akkurat på tidspunktet da digital
800 teknologi kunne sluppet løs en ekstraordinær mengde med kommersiell og
801 ikke-kommersiell kreativitet, tynger loven denne kreativiteten med sinnsykt
802 kompliserte og vage regler og med trusselen om uanstendig harde straffer.
803 Vi ser kanskje, som Richard Florida skriver, "Fremveksten av den kreative
804 klasse"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2618801" href=
"#ftn.id2618801" class=
"footnote">18</a>]
</sup> Dessverre ser vi også en
805 ekstraordinær fremvekst av reguleringer av denne kreative klassen.
807 Disse byrdene gir ingen mening i vår tradisjon. Vi bør begynne med å forstå
808 den tradisjonen litt mer, og ved å plassere dagens slag om oppførsel med
809 merkelappen "piratvirksomhet" i sin rette sammenheng.
810 </p><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#creators">2. Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#mere-copyists">3. Kapittel to:
"Kun etter-apere"</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#catalogs">4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#pirates">5. Kapittel fire:
"Pirater"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#film">Film
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#radio">Radio
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#piracy">6. Kapittel fem:
"Piratvirksomhet"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2618562" href=
"#id2618562" class=
"para">15</a>]
</sup>
813 <em class=
"citetitle">Bach
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Longman
</em>,
98
814 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
815 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2618689" href=
"#id2618689" class=
"para">16</a>]
</sup>
818 Se Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the
819 Pepsi Generation,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Notre Dame Law Review
</em> 65 (
1990):
821 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2618709" href=
"#id2618709" class=
"para">17</a>]
</sup>
823 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay Up,"
824 <em class=
"citetitle">Wall Street Journal
</em>,
21. august
1996, tilgjengelig
825 fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
3</a>; Jonathan
826 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
827 Speech, No One Wins,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Boston Globe
</em>,
24. november
828 2002.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618727"></a>
829 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2618801" href=
"#id2618801" class=
"para">18</a>]
</sup>
831 I
<em class=
"citetitle">The Rise of the Creative Class
</em> (New York: Basic
832 Books,
2002), dokumenterer Richard Florida en endring i arbeidsstokken mot
833 kreativitetsarbeide. Hans tekst omhandler derimot ikke direkte de juridiske
834 vilkår som kreativiteten blir muliggjort eller hindret under. Jeg er helt
835 klart enig med ham i viktigheten og betydningen av denne endringen, men jeg
836 tror også at vilkårene som disse endringene blir aktivert under er mye
837 vanskeligere.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2618864"></a>
838 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 2. Kapittel en: Skaperne"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"creators"></a>Kapittel
2. Kapittel en: Skaperne
</h2></div></div></div><p>
839 I
1928 ble en tegnefilmfigur født. En tidlig Mikke Mus debuterte i mai
840 dette året, i en stille flopp ved navn
<em class=
"citetitle">Plane Crazy
</em>.
841 I november, i Colony teateret i New York City, ble den første vidt
842 distribuerte tegnefilmen med synkronisert lyd,
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat
843 Willy
</em>, vist frem med figuren som skulle bli til Mikke Mus.
845 Film med synkronisert lyd hadde blitt introdusert et år tidligere i filmen
846 <em class=
"citetitle">The Jazz Singer
</em>. Suksessen fikk Walt Disney til å
847 kopiere teknikken og mikse lyd med tegnefilm. Ingen visste hvorvidt det
848 ville virke eller ikke, og om det fungere, hvorvidt publikum villa ha sans
849 for det. Men da Disney gjorde en test sommeren
1928, var resultatet
850 entydig. Som Disney beskriver dette første eksperimentet,
851 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
853 Et par av guttene mine kunne lese noteark, og en av dem kunne spille
854 munnspill. Vi stappet dem inn i et rom hvor de ikke kunne se skjermen, og
855 gjorde det slik at lyden de spilte ble sendt videre til et rom hvor våre
856 koner og venner var plassert for å se på bildet.
859 Guttene brukte et note- og lydeffekt-ark. Etter noen dårlige oppstarter,
860 kom endelig lyd og handling i gang med et smell. Munnspilleren spilte
861 melodien, og resten av oss i lydavdelingen slamret på tinnkasseroller og
862 blåste på slide-fløyte til rytmen. Synkroniseringen var nesten helt riktig.
864 Effekten på vårt lille publikum var intet mindre enn elektrisk. De reagerte
865 nesten instinktivt til denne union av lyd og bevegelse. Jeg trodde de
866 tullet med meg. Så de puttet meg i publikum og satte igang på nytt. Det
867 var grufullt, men det var fantastisk. Og det var noe nytt!
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2618980" href=
"#ftn.id2618980" class=
"footnote">19</a>]
</sup>
868 </p></blockquote></div><p>
869 Disneys daværende partner, og en av animasjonsverdenens mest ekstraordinære
870 talenter, Ub Iwerks, uttalte det sterkere: "Jeg har aldri vært så begeistret
871 i hele mitt liv. Ingenting annet har noen sinne vært like bra."
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2619002"></a>
873 Disney hadde laget noe helt nyt, basert på noe relativt nytt. Synkronisert
874 lyd ga liv til en form for kreativitet som sjeldent hadde
—unntatt fra
875 Disneys hender
—vært noe annet en fyllstoff for andre filmer. Gjennom
876 animasjonens tidligere historie var det Disneys oppfinnelse som satte
877 standarden som andre måtte sloss for å oppfylle. Og ganske ofte var Disneys
878 store geni, hans gnist av kreativitet, bygget på arbeidet til andre.
880 Dette er kjent stoff. Det du kanskje ikke vet er at
1928 også markerer en
881 annen viktig overgang. I samme år laget et komedie-geni (i motsetning til
882 tegnefilm-geni) sin siste uavhengig produserte stumfilm. Dette geniet var
883 Buster Keaton. Filmen var
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr
</em>.
885 Keaton ble født inn i en vauderville-familie i
1895. I stumfilm-æraen hadde
886 han mestret bruken av bredpenslet fysisk komedie på en måte som tente
887 ukontrollerbar latter fra hans publikum.
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Bill,
888 Jr
</em>. var en klassiker av denne typen, berømt blant film-elskere
889 for sine utrolige stunts. Filmen var en klassisk Keaton
—fantastisk
890 populær og blant de beste i sin sjanger.
892 <em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr
</em>. kom før Disneys tegnefilm
893 Steamboat Willie. Det er ingen tilfeldighet at titlene er så
894 like. Steamboat Willie er en direkte tegneserieparodi av Steamboat
895 Bill,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2619073" href=
"#ftn.id2619073" class=
"footnote">20</a>]
</sup> og begge bygger på en felles sang
896 som kilde. Det er ikke kun fra nyskapningen med synkronisert lyd i
897 <em class=
"citetitle">The Jazz Singer
</em> at vi får
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat
898 Willie
</em>. Det er også fra Buster Keatons nyskapning Steamboat
899 Bill, Jr., som igjen var inspirert av sangen "Steamboat Bill", at vi får
900 Steamboat Willie. Og fra Steamboat Willie får vi så Mikke Mus.
902 Denne "låningen" var ikke unik, hverken for Disney eller for industrien.
903 Disney apet alltid etter full-lengde massemarkedsfilmene rundt
904 ham.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2619126" href=
"#ftn.id2619126" class=
"footnote">21</a>]
</sup> Det samme gjorde mange andre.
905 Tidlige tegnefilmer er stappfulle av etterapninger
—små variasjoner
906 over suksessfulle temaer, gamle historier fortalt på nytt. Nøkkelen til
907 suksess var brilliansen i forskjellene. Med Disney var det lyden som ga
908 gnisten til hans animasjoner. Senere var det kvaliteten på hans arbeide
909 relativt til de masseproduserte tegnefilmene som han konkurrerte med.
910 Likevel var disse bidragene bygget på toppen av fundamentet som var lånt.
911 Disney bygget på arbeidet til andre som kom før han, og skapte noe nytt ut
912 av noe som bare var litt gammelt.
914 Noen ganger var låningen begrenset, og noen ganger var den betydelig. Tenkt
915 på eventyrene til brødrene Grimm. Hvis du er like ubevisst som jeg var, så
916 tror du sannsynlighvis at disse fortellingene er glade, søte historier som
917 passer for ethvert barn ved leggetid. Realiteten er at Grimm-eventyrene er,
918 for oss, ganske dystre. Det er noen sjeldne og kanskje spesielt ambisiøse
919 foreldre som ville våge å lese disse blodige moralistiske historiene til
920 sine barn, ved leggetid eller hvilken som helst annet tidspunkt.
923 Disney tok disse historiene og fortalte dem på nytt på en måte som førte dem
924 inn i en ny tidsalder. Han ga historiene liv, med både karakterer og
925 lys. Uten å fjerne bitene av frykt og fare helt, gjorde han morsomt det som
926 var mørkt og satte inn en ekte følelse av medfølelse der det før var
927 frykt. Og ikke bare med verkene av brødrene Grimm. Faktisk er katalogen
928 over Disney-arbeid som baserer seg på arbeidet til andre ganske forbløffende
929 når den blir samlet:
<em class=
"citetitle">Snøhvit
</em> (
1937),
930 <em class=
"citetitle">Fantasia
</em> (
1940),
<em class=
"citetitle">Pinocchio
</em>
931 (
1940),
<em class=
"citetitle">Dumbo
</em> (
1941),
<em class=
"citetitle">Bambi
</em>
932 (
1942),
<em class=
"citetitle">Song of the South
</em> (
1946),
933 <em class=
"citetitle">Askepott
</em> (
1950),
<em class=
"citetitle">Alice in
934 Wonderland
</em> (
1951),
<em class=
"citetitle">Robin Hood
</em> (
1952),
935 <em class=
"citetitle">Peter Pan
</em> (
1953),
<em class=
"citetitle">Lady og
936 landstrykeren
</em> (
1955),
<em class=
"citetitle">Mulan
</em> (
1998),
937 <em class=
"citetitle">Tornerose
</em> (
1959),
<em class=
"citetitle">101
938 dalmatinere
</em> (
1961),
<em class=
"citetitle">Sverdet i steinen
</em>
939 (
1963), og
<em class=
"citetitle">Jungelboken
</em> (
1967)
—for ikke å nevne
940 et nylig eksempel som vi bør kanskje glemme raskt,
<em class=
"citetitle">Treasure
941 Planet
</em> (
2003). I alle disse tilfellene, har Disney (eller
942 Disney, Inc.) hentet kreativitet fra kultur rundt ham, blandet med
943 kreativiteten fra sitt eget ekstraordinære talent, og deretter brent denne
944 blandingen inn i sjelen til sin kultur. Hente, blande og brenne.
946 Dette er en type kreativitet. Det er en kreativitet som vi bør huske på og
947 feire. Det er noen som vil si at det finnes ingen kreativitet bortsett fra
948 denne typen. Vi trenger ikke gå så langt for å anerkjenne dens betydning.
949 Vi kan kalle dette "Disney-kreativitet", selv om det vil være litt
950 misvisende. Det er mer presist "Walt Disney-kreativitet"
—en
951 uttrykksform og genialitet som bygger på kulturen rundt oss og omformer den
953 </p><p> I
1928 var kulturen som Disney fritt kunne trekke veksler på relativt
954 fersk. Allemannseie i
1928 var ikke veldig gammelt og var dermed ganske
955 levende. Gjennomsnittelig vernetid i opphavsretten var bare rundt tredve
956 år
—for den lille delen av kreative verk som faktisk var
957 opphavsrettsbeskyttet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2619268" href=
"#ftn.id2619268" class=
"footnote">22</a>]
</sup> Det betyr at i
958 tredve år, i gjennomsnitt, hadde forfattere eller kreative verks
959 opphavsrettighetsinnehaver en "eksklusiv rett" til a kontrollere bestemte
960 typer bruk av verket. For å bruke disse opphavsrettsbeskyttede verkene på
961 de begrensede måtene krevde tillatelse fra opphavsrettsinnehaveren.
963 Når opphavsrettens vernetid er over, faller et verk i det fri og blir
964 allemannseie. Ingen tillatelse trengs da for å bygge på eller bruke dette
965 verket. Ingen tillatelse og dermed, ingen advokater. Allemannseie er en
966 "advokat-fri sone". Det meste av innhold fra det nittende århundre var
967 dermed fritt tilgjengelig for Disney å bruke eller bygge på i
1928. Det var
968 tilgjengelig for enhver
—uansett om de hadde forbindelser eller ikke,
969 om de var rik eller ikke, om de var akseptert eller ikke
—til å bruke
973 Dette er slik det alltid har vært
—inntil ganske nylig. For
974 mesteparten av vår historie, har allemannseiet vært like over horisonten.
975 Fram til
1978 var den gjennomsnittlige opphavsrettslige vernetiden aldri mer
976 enn trettito år, som gjorde at det meste av kultur fra en og en halv
977 generasjon tidligere var tilgjengelig for enhver å bygge på uten tillatelse
978 fra noen. Tilsvarende for i dag ville være at kreative verker fra
1960- og
979 1970-tallet nå ville være fritt tilgjengelig for de neste Walt Disney å
980 bygge på uten tillatelse. Men i dag er allemannseie presumtivt kun for
981 innhold fra før mellomkrigstiden.
983 Walt Disney hadde selvfølgelig ikke monopol på "Walt Disney-kreativitet".
984 Det har heller ikke USA. Normen med fri kultur har, inntil nylig, og
985 unntatt i totalitære nasjoner, vært bredt utnyttet og svært universell.
987 Vurder for eksempel en form for kreativitet som synes underlig for mange
988 amerikanere, men som er overalt i japansk kultur:
989 <em class=
"citetitle">manga
</em>, eller tegneserier. Japanerne er fanatiske når
990 det gjelder tegneserier. Over
40 prosent av publikasjoner er tegneserier,
991 og
30 prosent av publikasjonsomsetningen stammer fra tegneserier. De er
992 over alt i det japanske samfunnet, tilgjengelig fra ethvert
993 tidsskriftsutsalg, og i hendene på en stor andel av pendlere på Japans
994 ekstraordinære system for offentlig transport.
996 Amerikanere har en tendens til å se ned på denne formen for kultur. Det er
997 et lite attraktivt kjennetegn hos oss. Vi misforstår sannsynligvis mye
998 rundt manga, på grunn av at få av oss noen gang har lest noe som ligner på
999 historiene i disse "grafiske historiene" forteller. For en japaner dekker
1000 manga ethvert aspekt ved det sosiale liv. For oss er tegneserier "menn i
1001 strømpebukser". Og uansett er det ikke slik at T-banen i New York er full
1002 av folk som leser Joyse eller Hemingway for den saks skyld. Folk i ulike
1003 kulturer skiller seg ut på forskjellig måter, og japanerne på dette
1006 Men mitt formål her er ikke å forstå manga. Det er å beskrive en variant av
1007 manga som fra en advokats perspektiv er ganske merkelig, men som fra en
1008 Disneys perspektiv er ganske godt kjent.
1011 Dette er fenomenet
<em class=
"citetitle">doujinshi
</em>. Doujinshi er også
1012 tegneserier, men de er slags etterapings-tegneserier. En rik etikk styrer
1013 de som skaper doujinshi. Det er ikke doujinshi hvis det
1014 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>bare
</em></span> er en kopi. Kunstneren må gjøre et bidrag til
1015 kunsten han kopierer ved å omforme det enten subtilt eller betydelig. En
1016 doujinshi-tegneserie kan dermed ta en massemarkeds-tegneserie og utvikle den
1017 i en annen retning
—med en annen historie-linje. Eller tegneserien kan
1018 beholde figuren som seg selv men endre litt på utseendet. Det er ingen
1019 bestemt formel for hva som gjør en doujinshi tilstrekkelig "forskjellig".
1020 Men de må være forskjellige hvis de skal anses som ekte doujinshi. Det er
1021 faktisk komiteer som går igjennom doujinshi for å bli med på messer, og
1022 avviser etterapninger som bare er en kopi.
1024 Disse etterapings-tegneseriene er ikke en liten del av manga-markedet. Det
1025 er enorme. Mer en
33 000 "sirkler" av skapere over hele Japan som
1026 produserer disse bitene av Walt Disney-kreativitet. Mer en
450 000 japanere
1027 samles to ganger i året, i den største offentlige samlingen i langet, for å
1028 bytte og selge dem. Dette markedet er parallelt med det kommersielle
1029 massemarkeds-manga-markedet. På noen måter konkurrerer det åpenbart med det
1030 markedet, men det er ingen vedvarende innsats fra de som kontrollerer det
1031 kommersielle manga-markedet for å stenge doujinshi-markedet. Det blomstrer,
1032 på tross av konkurransen og til tross for loven.
1034 Den mest gåtefulle egenskapen med doujinshi-markedet, for de som har
1035 juridisk trening i hvert fall, er at det overhodet tillates å eksistere.
1036 Under japansk opphavsrettslov, som i hvert fall på dette området (på
1037 papiret) speiler USAs opphavsrettslov, er doujinshi-markedet ulovlig.
1038 Doujinshi er helt klart "avledede verk". Det er ingen generell praksis hos
1039 doujinshi-kunstnere for å sikre seg tillatelse hos manga-skaperne. I stedet
1040 er praksisen ganske enkelt å ta og endre det andre har laget, slik Walt
1041 Disney gjorde med
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Bill, Jr
</em>. For både
1042 japansk og USAs lov, er å "ta" uten tillatelse fra den opprinnelige
1043 opphavsrettsinnehaver ulovlig. Det er et brudd på opphavsretten til det
1044 opprinnelige verket å lage en kopi eller et avledet verk uten tillatelse fra
1045 den opprinnelige rettighetsinnehaveren.
1046 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxwinickjudd"></a><p>
1047 Likevel eksisterer dette illegale markedet og faktisk blomstrer i Japan, og
1048 etter manges syn er det nettopp fordi det eksisterer at japansk manga
1049 blomstrer. Som USAs tegneserieskaper Judd Winick fortalte meg, "I
1050 amerikansk tegneseriers første dager var det ganske likt det som foregår i
1051 Japan i dag.
… Amerikanske tegneserier kom til verden ved å kopiere
1052 hverandre.
… Det er slik [kunstnerne] lærer å tegne
—ved å se i
1053 tegneseriebøker og ikke følge streken, men ved å se på dem og kopiere dem"
1054 og bygge basert på dem.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2560477" href=
"#ftn.id2560477" class=
"footnote">23</a>]
</sup>
1056 Amerikanske tegneserier nå er ganske annerledes, forklarer Winick, delvis på
1057 grunn av de juridiske problemene med å tilpasse tegneserier slik doujinshi
1058 får lov til. Med for eksempel Supermann, fortalte Winick meg, "er det en
1059 rekke regler, og du må følge dem". Det er ting som Supermann "ikke kan"
1060 gjøre. "For en som lager tegneserier er det frustrerende å måtte begrense
1061 seg til noen parameter som er femti år gamle."
1062 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2560575"></a><p>
1063 Normen i Japan reduserer denne juridiske utfordringen. Noen sier at det
1064 nettopp er den oppsamlede fordelen i det japanske mangamarkedet som
1065 forklarer denne reduksjonen. Jussprofessor Salil Mehra ved Temple
1066 University hypotiserer for eksempel med at manga-markedet aksepterer disse
1067 teoretiske bruddene fordi de får mangamarkedet til å bli rikere og mer
1068 produktivt. Alle ville få det verre hvis doujinshi ble bannlyst, så loven
1069 bannlyser ikke doujinshi.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2619729" href=
"#ftn.id2619729" class=
"footnote">24</a>]
</sup>
1071 Problemet med denne historien, derimot, og som Mehra helt klart erkjenner,
1072 er at mekanismen som produserer denne "hold hendene borte"-responsen ikke er
1073 forstått. Det kan godt være at markedet som helhet gjør det bedre hvis
1074 doujinshi tillates i stedet for å bannlyse den, men det forklarer likevel
1075 ikke hvorfor individuelle opphavsrettsinnehavere ikke saksøker. Hvis loven
1076 ikke har et generelt unntak for doujinshi, og det finnes faktisk noen
1077 tilfeller der individuelle manga-kunstnere har saksøkt doujinshi-kunstnere,
1078 hvorfor er det ikke et mer generelt mønster for å blokkere denne "frie
1079 takingen" hos doujinshi-kulturen?
1081 Jeg var fire nydelige måneder i Japan, og jeg stilte dette spørsmål så ofte
1082 som jeg kunne. Kanskje det beste svaret til slutt kom fra en venn i et
1083 større japansk advokatfirma. "Vi har ikke nok advokater", fortalte han meg
1084 en ettermiddag. Det er "bare ikke nok ressurser til å tiltale tilfeller som
1088 Dette er et tema vi kommer tilbake til: at lovens regulering både er en
1089 funksjon av ordene i bøkene, og kostnadene med å få disse ordene til å ha
1090 effekt. Akkurat nå er det endel åpenbare spørsmål som presser seg frem:
1091 Ville Japan gjøre det bedre med flere advokater? Ville manga være rikere
1092 hvis doujinshi-kunstnere ble regelmessig rettsforfulgt? Ville Japan vinne
1093 noe viktig hvis de kunne stoppe praksisen med deling uten kompensasjon?
1094 Skader piratvirksomhet ofrene for piratvirksomheten, eller hjelper den dem?
1095 Ville advokaters kamp mot denne piratvirksomheten hjelpe deres klienter,
1096 eller skade dem? La oss ta et øyeblikks pause.
1098 Hvis du er som meg et tiår tilbake, eller som folk flest når de først
1099 begynner å tenke på disse temaene, da bør du omtrent nå være rådvill om noe
1100 du ikke hadde tenkt igjennom før.
1102 Vi lever i en verden som feirer "eiendom". Jeg er en av de som feierer.
1103 Jeg tror på verdien av eiendom generelt, og jeg tror også på verdien av den
1104 sære formen for eiendom som advokater kaller "immateriell
1105 eiendom".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2619822" href=
"#ftn.id2619822" class=
"footnote">25</a>]
</sup> Et stort og variert samfunn
1106 kan ikke overleve uten eiendom, og et moderne samfunn kan ikke blomstre uten
1107 immaterielle eierrettigheter.
1109 Men det tar bare noen sekunders refleksjon for å innse at det er masse av
1110 verdi der ute som "eiendom" ikke dekker. Jeg mener ikke "kjærlighet kan
1111 ikke kjøpes med penger" men heller, at en verdi som ganske enkelt er del av
1112 produksjonsprosessen, både for kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell produksjon.
1113 Hvis Disneys animatører hadde stjålet et sett med blyanter for å tegne
1114 Steamboat Willie, vi ville ikke nølt med å dømme det som galt
—selv om
1115 det er trivielt og selv om det ikke blir oppdaget. Men det var intet galt,
1116 i hvert fall slik loven var da, med at Disney tok fra Buster Keaton eller
1117 fra Grimm-brødrene. Det var intet galt med å ta fra Keaton, fordi Disneys
1118 bruk ville blitt ansett som "rimelig". Det var intet galt med å ta fra
1119 brødrene Grimm fordi deres verker var allemannseie.
1122 Dermed, selv om de tingene som Disney tok
—eller mer generelt, tingene
1123 som blir tatt av enhver som utøver Walt Disney-kreativitet
—er
1124 verdifulle, så anser ikke vår tradisjon det som galt å ta disse tingene.
1125 Noen ting forblir frie til å bli tatt i en fri kultur og denne friheten er
1128 Det er det samme med doujinshi-kulturen. Hvis en doujinshi-kunstner brøt
1129 seg inn på kontoret til en forlegger, og stakk av med tusen kopier av hans
1130 siste verk
—eller bare en kopi
—uten å betale, så ville vi uten å
1131 nøle si at kunstneren har gjort noe galt. I tillegg til å ha trengt seg inn
1132 på andres eiendom, ville han ha stjålet noe av verdi. Loven forbyr stjeling
1133 i enhver form, uansett hvor stort eller lite som blir tatt.
1135 Likevel er det en åpenbar motvilje, selv blant japanske advokater, for å si
1136 at etterapende tegneseriekunstnere "stjeler". Denne formen for Walt
1137 Disney-kreativitet anses som rimelig og riktig, selv om spesielt advokater
1138 synes det er vanskelig å forklare hvorfor.
1140 Det er det same med tusen eksempler som dukker opp over alt med en gang en
1141 begynner å se etter dem. Forskene bygger på arbeidet til andre forskere
1142 uten å spørre eller betale for privilegiet. ("Unnskyld meg, professor
1143 Einstein, men kan jeg få tillatelse til å bruke din relativitetsteori til å
1144 vise at du tok feil om kvantefysikk?") Teatertropper viser frem
1145 bearbeidelser av verkene til Shapespere uten å sikre seg noen tillatelser.
1146 (Er det
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>noen
</em></span> som tror at Shakespeare ville vært mer
1147 spredt i vår kultur om det var et sentralt rettighetsklareringskontor for
1148 Shakespeare som alle som laget Shakespear-produksjoner måtte appelere til
1149 først?) Og Hollywood går igjennom sykluser med en bestemt type filmer: fem
1150 astroidefilmer i slutten av
1990-tallet, to vulkamkatastrofefilmer i
1997.
1153 Skapere her og overalt har alltid og til alle tider bygd på kreativiteten
1154 som eksisterte før og som omringer dem nå. Denne byggingen er alltid og
1155 overalt i det minste delvis gjort uten tillatelse og uten å kompensere den
1156 opprinnelige skaperen. Intet samfunn, fritt eller kontrollert, har noen
1157 gang krevd at enhver bruk skulle bli betalt for eller at tillatelse for Walt
1158 Disney-kreativitet alltid måtte skaffes. Istedet har ethvert samfunn latt
1159 en bestemt bit av sin kultur være fritt tilgjenglig for alle å ta
—frie
1160 samfunn muligens i større grad enn ufrie, men en viss grad i alle samfunn.
1163 Det vanskelige spørsmålet er derfor ikke
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>om
</em></span> en kultur
1164 er fri. Alle kulturer er frie til en viss grad. Det vanskelige spørsmålet
1165 er i stedet "
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>hvor
</em></span> fri er denne kulturen er?" Hvor mye
1166 og hvor bredt, er kulturen fritt tilgjengelig for andre å ta, og bygge på?
1167 Er den friheten begrenset til partimedlemmer? Til medlemmer av
1168 kongefamilien? Til de ti største selskapene på New York-børsen? Eller er
1169 at frihet bredt tilgjengelig? Til kunstnere generelt, uansett om de er
1170 tilknyttet til nasjonalmuseet eller ikke? Til musikere generelt, uansett om
1171 de er hvite eller ikke? Til filmskapere generelt, uansett om de er
1172 tilknyttet et studio eller ikke?
1174 Frie kulturer er kulturer som etterlater mye åpent for andre å bygge på.
1175 Ufrie, eller tillatelse-kulturer etterlater mye mindre. Vår var en fri
1176 kultur. Den er på tur til å bli mindre fri.
1177 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2618980" href=
"#id2618980" class=
"para">19</a>]
</sup>
1180 Leonard Maltin,
<em class=
"citetitle">Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1181 Cartoons
</em> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1182 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2619073" href=
"#id2619073" class=
"para">20</a>]
</sup>
1185 Jeg er takknemlig overfor David Gerstein og hans nøyaktige historie,
1186 beskrevet på
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
4</a>. I
1187 følge Dave Smith ved the Disney Archives, betalte Disney for å bruke
1188 musikken til fem sanger i
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat Willie
</em>:
1189 "Steamboat Bill," "The Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara),
1190 "Joyful Hurry No.
1" (Baron), og "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). En sjette sang, "The
1191 Turkey in the Straw," var allerede allemannseie. Brev fra David Smith til
1192 Harry Surden,
10. juli
2003, tilgjenglig i arkivet til forfatteren.
1193 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2619126" href=
"#id2619126" class=
"para">21</a>]
</sup>
1196 Han var også tilhenger av allmannseiet. Se Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse that
1197 Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5. mars
2002, fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
5</a>.
1198 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2619268" href=
"#id2619268" class=
"para">22</a>]
</sup>
1201 Inntil
1976 ga opphavsrettsloven en forfatter to mulige verneperioder: en
1202 initiell periode, og en fornyingsperiode. Jeg har beregnet
1203 "gjennomsnittlig" vernetid ved å finne vektet gjennomsnitt av de totale
1204 registreringer for et gitt år, og andelen fornyinger. Hvis
100
1205 opphavsretter ble registrert i år
1, bare
15 av dem ble fornyet, og
1206 fornyingsvernetiden er
28 år, så er gjennomsnittelig vernetid
32,
2
1207 år. Fornyingsdata og andre relevante data ligger på nettsidene tilknyttet
1208 denne boka, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
1210 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2560477" href=
"#id2560477" class=
"para">23</a>]
</sup>
1213 For en utmerket historie, se Scott McCloud,
<em class=
"citetitle">Reinventing
1214 Comics
</em> (New York: Perennial,
2000).
1215 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2619729" href=
"#id2619729" class=
"para">24</a>]
</sup>
1218 Se Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All
1219 the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?"
<em class=
"citetitle">Rutgers Law
1220 Review
</em> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
"det kan være en kollektiv økonomisk
1221 rasjonalitet som får manga- og anime-kunstnere til ikke å saksøke for
1222 opphavsrettsbrudd. Én hypotese er at alle manga-kunstnere kan være bedre
1223 stilt hvis de setter sin individuelle egeninteresse til side og bestemmer
1224 seg for ikke å forfølge sine juridiske rettigheter. Dette er essensielt en
1225 løsning på fangens dilemma."
1226 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2619822" href=
"#id2619822" class=
"para">25</a>]
</sup>
1228 Begrepet
<em class=
"citetitle">immateriell eiendom
</em> er av relativ ny
1229 opprinnelse. Se See Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyrights and
1230 Copywrongs
</em>,
11 (New York: New York University Press,
2001). Se
1231 også Lawrence Lessig,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em> (New York:
1232 Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. Begrepet presist beskriver et sett med
1233 "eiendoms"-rettigheter
—opphavsretter, patenter, varemerker og
1234 forretningshemmeligheter
—men egenskapene til disse rettighetene er
1235 svært forskjellige.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2619841"></a>
1236 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title='Kapittel
3. Kapittel to:
"Kun etter-apere"'
><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"mere-copyists"></a>Kapittel
3. Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxphotography"></a><p>
1237 I
1839 fant Louis Daguerre opp den første praktiske teknologien for å
1238 produsere det vi ville kalle "fotografier". Rimelig nok ble de kalt
1239 "daguerreotyper". Prosessen var komplisert og kostbar, og feltet var dermed
1240 begrenset til profesjonelle og noen få ivrige og velstående amatører. (Det
1241 var til og med en amerikansk Daguerre-forening som hjalp til med å regulere
1242 industrien, slik alle slike foreninger gjør, ved å holde konkurransen ned
1243 slikat prisene var høye.)
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620067"></a>
1245 Men til tross for høye priser var etterspørselen etter daguerreotyper
1246 sterk. Dette inspirerte oppfinnere til å finne enklere og billigere måter å
1247 lage "automatiske bilder". William Talbot oppdaget snart en prosess for å
1248 lage "negativer". Men da negativene var av glass, og måtte holdes fuktige,
1249 forble prosessen kostbar og tung. På
1870-tallet ble tørrplater utviklet,
1250 noe som gjorde det enklere å skille det å ta et bilde fra å fremkalle det.
1251 Det var fortsatt plater av glass, og dermed var det fortsatt ikke en prosess
1252 som var innenfor rekkevidden til de fleste amatører.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620088"></a>
1253 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxeastmangeorge"></a><p>
1255 Den teknologiske endringen som gjorde masse-fotografering mulig skjedde ikke
1256 før i
1888, og det var takket være en eneste mann. George Eastman, selv en
1257 amatørfotograf, var frustrert over den plate-baserte fotografi-teknologien.
1258 I et lysglimt av innsikt (for å si det slik), forsto Eastman at hvis filmen
1259 kunne gjøres bøybar, så kunne den holdes pæ en enkel rull. Denne rullen
1260 kunne så sendes til en fremkaller, og senke kostnadene til fotografering
1261 vesentlig. Ved å reduseere kostnadene, forventet Eastman at han dramatisk
1262 kunne utvide andelen fotografer.
1264 Eastman utviklet bøybart, emulsjons-belagt papirfil og plasserte ruller med
1265 dette i små, enkle kameraer: Kodaken. Enheten ble markedsfør med grunnlag
1266 dens enkelhet. "Du trykker på knappen og vi fikser resten."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620135" href=
"#ftn.id2620135" class=
"footnote">26</a>]
</sup> Som han beskrev det i
<em class=
"citetitle">The Kodak
1268 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
1269 Prinsippet til Kodak-systemet er skillet mellom arbeidet som enhver kan
1270 utføre når en tar fotografier, fra arbeidet som kun en ekspert kan
1271 gjøre.
… Vi utstyrte alle, menn, kvinner og barn, som hadde
1272 tilstrekkelig intelligens til å peke en boks i riktig retning og trykke på
1273 en knapp, med et instrument som helt fjernet fra praksisen med å fotografere
1274 nødvendigheten av uvanlig utstyr eller for den del, noe som helst spesiell
1275 kunskap om kunstarten. Det kan tas i bruk uten forutgående studier, uten et
1276 mørkerom og uten kjemikalier.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2617804" href=
"#ftn.id2617804" class=
"footnote">27</a>]
</sup>
1277 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1278 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded with film,
1279 and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an Eastman factory,
1280 where the film was developed. Over time, of course, the cost of the camera
1281 and the ease with which it could be used both improved. Roll film thus
1282 became the basis for the explosive growth of popular photography. Eastman's
1283 camera first went on sale in
1888; one year later, Kodak was printing more
1284 than six thousand negatives a day. From
1888 through
1909, while industrial
1285 production was rising by
4.7 percent, photographic equipment and material
1286 sales increased by
11 percent.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620216" href=
"#ftn.id2620216" class=
"footnote">28</a>]
</sup> Eastman
1287 Kodak's sales during the same period experienced an average annual increase
1288 of over
17 percent.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620225" href=
"#ftn.id2620225" class=
"footnote">29</a>]
</sup>
1289 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620234"></a><p>
1292 Den virkelige betydningen av oppfinnelsen til Eastman, var derimot ikke
1293 økonomisk. Den var sosial. Profesjonell fotografering ga individer et
1294 glimt av steder de ellers aldri ville se. Amatørfotografering ga dem
1295 mulihgeten til å arkivere deres liv på en måte som de aldri hadde vært i
1296 stand til tidligere. Som forfatter Brian Coe skriver, "For første gang
1297 tilbød fotoalbumet mannen i gata et permanent arkiv over hans familie og
1298 dens aktiviteter.
… For første gang i historien fantes det en
1299 autentisk visuell oppføring av utseende og aktivitet til vanlige mennesker
1300 laget uten [skrivefør] tolkning eller forutinntatthet."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620159" href=
"#ftn.id2620159" class=
"footnote">30</a>]
</sup>
1302 På denne måten var Kodak-kameraet og film uttrykksteknologier. Blyanten og
1303 malepenselen var selvfølgelig også en uttrykksteknologi. Men det tok årevis
1304 med trening før de kunne bli brukt nyttig og effektiv av amatører. Med
1305 Kodaken var uttrykk mulig mye raskere og enklere. Barriæren for å uttrykke
1306 seg var senket. Snobber ville fnyse over "kvaliteten", profesjonelle ville
1307 avvise den som irrelevant. Men se et barn studere hvordan best velge
1308 bildemotiv og du får følelsen av hva slags kreativitesterfaring som Kodaken
1309 muliggjorde. Demokratiske verktøy ga vanlige folk en måte å uttrykke dem
1310 selv på enklere enn noe annet verktøy kunne ha gjort før.
1312 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously, Eastman's
1313 genius was an important part. But also important was the legal environment
1314 within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in the history of
1315 photography, there was a series of judicial decisions that could well have
1316 changed the course of photography substantially. Courts were asked whether
1317 the photographer, amateur or professional, required permission before he
1318 could capture and print whatever image he wanted. Their answer was
1319 no.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620311" href=
"#ftn.id2620311" class=
"footnote">31</a>]
</sup>
1322 Argumentene til fordel for å kreve tillatelser vil høres overraskende kjent
1323 ut. Fotografen "tok" noe fra personen eller bygningen som ble
1324 fotografert
—røvet til seg noe av verdi. Noen trodde til og med at han
1325 tok målets sjel. På samme måte som Disney ikke var fri til å ta blyantene
1326 som hans animatører brukte til å tegne Mikke, så skulle heller ikke disse
1327 fotografene være fri til å ta bilder som de fant verdi i.
1328 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620343"></a><p>
1329 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well. Sure,
1330 there may be something of value being used. But citizens should have the
1331 right to capture at least those images that stand in public view. (Louis
1332 Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought the rule should
1333 be different for images from private spaces.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620373" href=
"#ftn.id2620373" class=
"footnote">32</a>]
</sup>) It may be that this means that the photographer gets something for
1334 nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
<em class=
"citetitle">Steamboat
1335 Bill, Jr
</em>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be free
1336 to capture an image without compensating the source.
1338 Heldigvis for Mr. Eastman, og for fotografering generelt, gikk disse
1339 tidligere avgjørelsene i favør av piratene. Generelt ble det ikke nødvendig
1340 å sikre seg tillatelse før et bilde kunne tas og deles med andre. I stedet
1341 var det antatt at tillatelse var gitt. Frihet var utgangspunktet. (Loven
1342 ga etter en stund et unntak for berømte personer: kommersielle fotografer
1343 som tok bilder av berømte personer for kommersielle formål har flere
1344 begresninger enn resten av oss. Men i det vanlige tilfellet, kan bildet
1345 fanges uten å klarere rettighetene for a fange det.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620421" href=
"#ftn.id2620421" class=
"footnote">33</a>]
</sup>)
1347 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had the law
1348 gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the photographer,
1349 then the photographer would have had to demonstrate permission. Perhaps
1350 Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate permission, too, before it
1351 developed the film upon which images were captured. After all, if permission
1352 were not granted, then Eastman Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft"
1353 committed by the photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1354 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting from the
1355 "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could imagine the law
1356 then requiring that some form of permission be demonstrated before a company
1357 developed pictures. We could imagine a system developing to demonstrate that
1363 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be very hard
1364 to see how photography could have flourished as it did if the requirement
1365 for permission had been built into the rules that govern it. Photography
1366 would have existed. It would have grown in importance over
1367 time. Professionals would have continued to use the technology as they
1368 did
—since professionals could have more easily borne the burdens of
1369 the permission system. But the spread of photography to ordinary people
1370 would not have occurred. Nothing like that growth would have been
1371 realized. And certainly, nothing like that growth in a democratic technology
1372 of expression would have been realized. If you drive through San
1373 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses painted
1374 over with colorful and striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place
1375 of the name of a school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the
1376 projects that these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies
1377 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1378 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think! is a
1379 project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand and critique
1380 the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each year, these busses
1381 travel to more than thirty schools and enable three hundred to five hundred
1382 children to learn something about media by doing something with media. By
1383 doing, they think. By tinkering, they learn.
1384 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620466"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620503"></a><p>
1385 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is increasingly
1386 so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has fallen
1387 dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good real-time
1388 digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get professional
1389 quality for $
595."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620518" href=
"#ftn.id2620518" class=
"footnote">34</a>]
</sup> These buses are
1390 filled with technology that would have cost hundreds of thousands just ten
1391 years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not just buses like this, but
1392 classrooms across the country where kids are learning more and more of
1393 something teachers call "media literacy."
1396 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just Think!,
1397 puts it, "is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and deconstruct
1398 media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the way media works,
1399 the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and the way people access
1400 it."
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620255"></a>
1402 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most people,
1403 literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway and noticing
1404 split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know about.
1406 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of television
1407 commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000 commercials
1408 generally,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620568" href=
"#ftn.id2620568" class=
"footnote">35</a>]
</sup> it is increasingly important
1409 to understand the "grammar" of media. For just as there is a grammar for the
1410 written word, so, too, is there one for media. And just as kids learn how to
1411 write by writing lots of terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by
1412 constructing lots of (at least at first) terrible media.
1414 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy as
1415 crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who has written
1416 understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult it is to sequence
1417 the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft language to be
1418 understandable
—few of us have any real sense of how difficult media
1419 is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense of how media works, how it
1420 holds an audience or leads it through a story, how it triggers emotion or
1423 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well. But
1424 even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about the
1425 film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not from
1426 reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then reflecting
1427 upon what one has written. One learns to write with images by making them
1428 and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1429 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620611"></a><p>
1430 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film, as
1431 Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1432 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the USC School
1433 of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was about "the placement
1434 of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and texture."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620542" href=
"#ftn.id2620542" class=
"footnote">36</a>]
</sup> But as computers open up an interactive space where
1435 a story is "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1436 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1437 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction. But when he
1438 tried to design a computer game based on one of his works, it was a new
1439 craft he had to learn. How to lead people through a game without their
1440 feeling they have been led was not obvious, even to a wildly successful
1441 author.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620658" href=
"#ftn.id2620658" class=
"footnote">37</a>]
</sup>
1442 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620680"></a><p>
1443 Akkurat denne ferdigheten er håndverket en lærer til de som lager
1444 filmer. Som Daley skriver, "folk er svært overrrasket over hvordan de blir
1445 ledet gjennom en film. Den er perfekt konstruert for å hindre deg fra å se
1446 det, så du aner det ikke. Hvis en som lager filmer lykkes så vet du ikke at
1447 du har vært ledet." Hvis du vet at du ble ledet igjennom en film, så har
1450 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text to
1451 include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better film
1452 directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of filmmaking at all.
1453 Instead, as Daley explained,
1454 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
1455 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide is not
1456 access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the language that
1457 that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people can write with this
1458 language, and all the rest of us are reduced to being read-only.
1459 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1460 "Skrivebeskyttet." Passive mottakerne av kultur produsert andre
1461 steder. Sofapoteter. Forbrukere. Dette er medieverden fra det tjuende
1464 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial point: It
1465 could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better understanding
1466 the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding the tools that
1467 enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any literacy, and this
1468 literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the appropriate
1469 language for what they need to create or express."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620738" href=
"#ftn.id2620738" class=
"footnote">38</a>]
</sup> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
1470 language of the twenty-first century."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620756" href=
"#ftn.id2620756" class=
"footnote">39</a>]
</sup>
1471 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620763"></a><p>
1472 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
1473 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
1474 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the Institute for
1475 Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe one particularly
1476 poignant example of a project they ran in a high school. The high school
1477 was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles school. In all the traditional
1478 measures of success, this school was a failure. But Daley and Barish ran a
1479 program that gave kids an opportunity to use film to express meaning about
1480 something the students know something about
—gun violence.
1482 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively new
1483 problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was getting the
1484 kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them away. The "kids
1485 were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night," said Barish. They were
1486 working harder than in any other class to do what education should be
1487 about
—learning how to express themselves.
1489 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple tools
1490 to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said this class
1491 produced a series of projects that showed something about gun violence that
1492 few would otherwise understand. This was an issue close to the lives of
1493 these students. The project "gave them a tool and empowered them to be able
1494 to both understand it and talk about it," Barish explained. That tool
1495 succeeded in creating expression
—far more successfully and powerfully
1496 than could have been created using only text. "If you had said to these
1497 students, `you have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands
1498 up and gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
1499 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students can do
1500 well. Yet neither is text a form in which
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>these
</em></span> ideas
1501 can be expressed well. The power of this message depended upon its
1502 connection to this form of expression.
1507 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part, of
1508 course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education, Daley
1509 explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing meaning." To say
1510 that that means just writing is like saying teaching writing is only about
1511 teaching kids how to spell. Text is one part
—and increasingly, not the
1512 most powerful part
—of constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the
1513 most moving part of our interview,
1514 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
1515 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing meaning. If all
1516 you give them is text, they're not going to do it. Because they can't. You
1517 know, you've got Johnny who can look at a video, he can play a video game,
1518 he can do graffiti all over your walls, he can take your car apart, and he
1519 can do all sorts of other things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny
1520 comes to school and you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do
1521 matters." Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
1522 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
1523 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you can
1524 do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think reflects
1525 that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw for me
1526 something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video camera and
1527 … saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and make a little
1528 movie." But instead, really help you take these elements that you
1529 understand, that are your language, and construct meaning about the
1532 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of course, is eventually,
1533 as it has happened in all these classes, they bump up against the fact, "I
1534 need to explain this and I really need to write something." And as one of
1535 the teachers told Stephanie, they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8
1536 times, till they got it right.
1539 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They needed to say
1540 something, as opposed to just jumping through your hoops. They actually
1541 needed to use a language that they didn't speak very well. But they had come
1542 to understand that they had a lot of power with this language."
1543 </p></blockquote></div><p>
1544 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
1545 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the world
1546 shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for that week,
1547 and for weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold
1548 the story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a retelling,
1549 because we had seen the events that were described. The genius of this awful
1550 act of terrorism was that the delayed second attack was perfectly timed to
1551 assure that the whole world would be watching.
1553 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music scored
1554 for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across the
1555 screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance," and
1556 seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have increasingly
1557 come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the entertainment is
1559 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620904"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620910"></a><p>
1560 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
11,"
1561 those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different production as
1562 well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same events. Yet these
1563 Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some people constructed photo
1564 pages that captured images from around the world and presented them as slide
1565 shows with text. Some offered open letters. There were sound
1566 recordings. There was anger and frustration. There were attempts to provide
1567 context. There was, in short, an extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in
1568 the sense Mike Godwin uses the term in his book
<em class=
"citetitle">Cyber
1569 Rights
</em>, around a news event that had captured the attention of
1570 the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there was also the Internet.
1573 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
1574 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean instead
1575 to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a Kodak, the
1576 Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a movie by a student
1577 on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed with sound or
1580 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet allows
1581 these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of people,
1582 practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
1583 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically, and
1584 obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but that this
1585 mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely spread
1586 practically instantaneously.
1588 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the same
1589 time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was just beginning
1590 to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or blog. The blog is a kind
1591 of public diary, and within some cultures, such as in Japan, it functions
1592 very much like a diary. In those cultures, it records private facts in a
1593 public way
—it's a kind of electronic
<em class=
"citetitle">Jerry
1594 Springer
</em>, available anywhere in the world.
1596 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different character.
1597 There are some who use the space simply to talk about their private
1598 life. But there are many who use the space to engage in public
1599 discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing others who are
1600 mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about the decisions they
1601 make, offering solutions to problems we all see: blogs create the sense of a
1602 virtual public meeting, but one in which we don't all hope to be there at
1603 the same time and in which conversations are not necessarily linked. The
1604 best of the blog entries are relatively short; they point directly to words
1605 used by others, criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the
1606 most important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
1609 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as it
1610 does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most difficult for
1611 those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy has atrophied. Of
1612 course we have elections, and most of the time the courts allow those
1613 elections to count. A relatively small number of people vote in those
1614 elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally professionalized
1615 and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
1617 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy means rule by
1618 the people, but rule means something more than mere elections. In our
1619 tradition, it also means control through reasoned discourse. This was the
1620 idea that captured the imagination of Alexis de Tocqueville, the
1621 nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the most important account of
1622 early "Democracy in America." It wasn't popular elections that fascinated
1623 him
—it was the jury, an institution that gave ordinary people the
1624 right to choose life or death for other citizens. And most fascinating for
1625 him was that the jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would
1626 impose. They deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they
1627 tried to persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
1628 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to come to
1629 an end.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2620951" href=
"#ftn.id2620951" class=
"footnote">40</a>]
</sup>
1631 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its place,
1632 there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some are
1633 pushing to create just such an institution.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621018" href=
"#ftn.id2621018" class=
"footnote">41</a>]
</sup> And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
1634 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or place
1635 for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
1637 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to occur. We,
1638 the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a strong norm
1639 against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about politics with people
1640 you agree with. But it is rude to argue about politics with people you
1641 disagree with. Political discourse becomes isolated, and isolated discourse
1642 becomes more extreme.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621062" href=
"#ftn.id2621062" class=
"footnote">42</a>]
</sup> We say what our
1643 friends want to hear, and hear very little beyond what our friends say.
1646 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
1647 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they want
1648 to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time. Technologies that
1649 enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail, increase the opportunity
1650 for communication. Blogs allow for public discourse without the public ever
1651 needing to gather in a single public place.
1653 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
1654 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
1655 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and the
1656 left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian, but
1657 there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
1658 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
1660 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The name
1661 Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race but for
1662 blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading is having an
1663 effect.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621105"></a>
1665 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
1666 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott "misspoke"
1667 at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising Thurmond's
1668 segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this story would
1669 disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight hours. It did. But he
1670 didn't calculate its life cycle in blog space. The bloggers kept researching
1671 the story. Over time, more and more instances of the same "misspeaking"
1672 emerged. Finally, the story broke back into the mainstream press. In the
1673 end, Lott was forced to resign as senate majority leader.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621125" href=
"#ftn.id2621125" class=
"footnote">43</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621133"></a>
1675 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures don't
1676 exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and newspapers are
1677 commercial entities. They must work to keep attention. If they lose
1678 readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move on.
1680 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they can
1681 focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a particularly
1682 interesting story, more and more people link to that story. And as the
1683 number of links to a particular story increases, it rises in the ranks of
1684 stories. People read what is popular; what is popular has been selected by a
1685 very democratic process of peer-generated rankings.
1686 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxwinerdave"></a><p>
1688 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle from
1689 the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this movement and
1690 a software author for many decades, told me, another difference is the
1691 absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you have to take the
1692 conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me. "An amateur
1693 journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the conflict of
1694 interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of get it out of
1696 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621185"></a><p>
1697 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more concentrated
1698 (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more from the public
1699 than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted it did after the Iraq
1700 war because it was afraid of the consequences to its own
1701 employees.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621019" href=
"#ftn.id2621019" class=
"footnote">44</a>]
</sup> It also needs to sustain a
1702 more coherent account. (In the middle of the Iraq war, I read a post on the
1703 Internet from someone who was at that time listening to a satellite uplink
1704 with a reporter in Iraq. The New York headquarters was telling the reporter
1705 over and over that her account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer
1706 a more optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
1707 told her
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>that
</em></span> they were writing "the story.")
1708 </p><p> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the debate
—"amateur" not in
1709 the sense of inexperienced, but in the sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning
1710 not paid by anyone to give their reports. It allows for a much broader range
1711 of input into a story, as reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when
1712 hundreds from across the southwest United States turned to the Internet to
1713 retell what they had seen.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621220" href=
"#ftn.id2621220" class=
"footnote">45</a>]
</sup> And it
1714 drives readers to read across the range of accounts and "triangulate," as
1715 Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are "communicating directly
1716 with our constituency, and the middle man is out of it"
—with all the
1717 benefits, and costs, that might entail.
1720 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected with
1721 blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts, for public
1722 figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's not clear that
1723 "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists have been told to
1724 curtail their blogging.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621250" href=
"#ftn.id2621250" class=
"footnote">46</a>]
</sup> But it is clear
1725 that we are still in transition. "A lot of what we are doing now is warm-up
1726 exercises," Winer told me. There is a lot that must mature before this
1727 space has its mature effect. And as the inclusion of content in this space
1728 is the least infringing use of the Internet (meaning infringing on
1729 copyright), Winer said, "we will be the last thing that gets shut down."
1731 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you don't
1732 have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper." That is
1733 true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As more and more
1734 citizens express what they think, and defend it in writing, that will change
1735 the way people understand public issues. It is easy to be wrong and
1736 misguided in your head. It is harder when the product of your mind can be
1737 criticized by others. Of course, it is a rare human who admits that he has
1738 been persuaded that he is wrong. But it is even rarer for a human to ignore
1739 when he has been proven wrong. The writing of ideas, arguments, and
1740 criticism improves democracy. Today there are probably a couple of million
1741 blogs where such writing happens. When there are ten million, there will be
1742 something extraordinary to report.
1743 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621316"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxbrownjohnseely"></a><p>
1744 John Seely Brown er sjefsforsker ved Xerox Corporation. Hans arbeid, i
1745 følge hans eget nettsted, er "menneskelig læring og
… å skape
1746 kunnskapsøkologier for å skape
… innovasjon".
1748 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
1749 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he would be
1750 excited about any technology that might improve democracy. But his real
1751 excitement comes from how these technologies affect learning.
1754 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up," he
1755 explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower engines,
1756 automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies enable a different
1757 kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though in concrete form. The
1758 kids at Just Think! not only think about how a commercial portrays a
1759 politician; using digital technology, they can take the commercial apart and
1760 manipulate it, tinker with it to see how it does what it does. Digital
1761 technologies launch a kind of bricolage, or "free collage," as Brown calls
1762 it. Many get to add to or transform the tinkering of many others.
1764 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
1765 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose source
1766 code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a FS/OSS
1767 program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of FS/OSS
1768 technology works can tinker with the code.
1770 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform," as
1771 Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you
… unleash a
1772 free collage on the community, so that other people can start looking at
1773 your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing if they can improve it."
1774 Each effort is a kind of apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major
1775 apprenticeship platform."
1777 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract. They
1778 are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the abstract, and
1779 this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that you're doing in your
1780 garage. You are tinkering with a community platform.
… You are
1781 tinkering with other people's stuff. The more you tinker the more you
1782 improve." The more you improve, the more you learn.
1784 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
1785 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts it,
1786 "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
1787 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
1788 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
1789 text. "The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if you
1790 are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a lot you
1791 can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor these
1792 multiple forms of intelligence."
1793 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621392"></a><p>
1795 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and Just
1796 Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well as
1797 creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different kind of
1800 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed. Indeed, as
1801 we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is increasingly
1802 highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father had the right to
1803 tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that your child will have
1804 the right to tinker with the images she finds all around. The law and,
1805 increasingly, technology interfere with a freedom that technology, and
1806 curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
1808 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
1809 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
>11</a>) has developed a
1810 powerful argument in favor of the "right to tinker" as it applies to
1811 computer science and to knowledge in general.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621451" href=
"#ftn.id2621451" class=
"footnote">47</a>]
</sup> But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It
1812 is about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
1814 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
1815 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think and want
1818 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will evince, "we
1819 are building a legal system that completely suppresses the natural
1820 tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an architecture
1821 that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal system that closes down
1822 that part of the brain."
1823 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621476"></a><p>
1824 Vi bygger en teknologi som tar magien til Kodak, misker inn bevegelige
1825 bilder og lyd, og legger inn plass for kommentarer og en mulighet til å spre
1826 denne kreativiteten over alt. Men vi bygger loven for å stenge ned denne
1829 "Ikke måten å drive en kultur på", sa Brewster Kahle, som vi møtte i
1830 kapittel
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#collectors" title=
"Kapittel 10. Kapittel ni: Samlere">10</a>,
1831 kommenterte til meg i et sjeldent øyeblikk av nedstemthet.
1832 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620135" href=
"#id2620135" class=
"para">26</a>]
</sup>
1835 Reese V. Jenkins,
<em class=
"citetitle">Images and Enterprise
</em> (Baltimore:
1836 Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1837 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2617804" href=
"#id2617804" class=
"para">27</a>]
</sup>
1839 Brian Coe,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Birth of Photography
</em> (New York:
1840 Taplinger Publishing,
1977),
53.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620182"></a>
1841 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620216" href=
"#id2620216" class=
"para">28</a>]
</sup>
1845 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620225" href=
"#id2620225" class=
"para">29</a>]
</sup>
1848 Basert på et diagram i Jenkins, s.
178.
1849 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620159" href=
"#id2620159" class=
"para">30</a>]
</sup>
1853 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620311" href=
"#id2620311" class=
"para">31</a>]
</sup>
1856 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<em class=
"citetitle">Pavesich
</em>
1857 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">N.E. Life Ins. Co
</em>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1858 <em class=
"citetitle">Foster-Milburn Co
</em>. v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Chinn
</em>,
1859 123090 S.W.
364,
366 (Ky.
1909);
<em class=
"citetitle">Corliss
</em>
1860 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Walker
</em>,
64 F.
280 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1894).
1861 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620373" href=
"#id2620373" class=
"para">32</a>]
</sup>
1863 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1864 <em class=
"citetitle">Harvard Law Review
</em> 4 (
1890):
193.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620382"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620390"></a>
1865 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620421" href=
"#id2620421" class=
"para">33</a>]
</sup>
1868 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Law and
1869 Contemporary Problems
</em> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
1870 "Privacy," <em class=
"citetitle">California Law Review
</em> 48 (
1960)
1871 398–407;
<em class=
"citetitle">White
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Samsung
1872 Electronics America, Inc
</em>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992),
1873 cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951 (
1993).
1874 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620518" href=
"#id2620518" class=
"para">34</a>]
</sup>
1877 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and Software You
1878 Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations," cadalyst, februar
2002,
1879 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
7</a>.
1880 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620568" href=
"#id2620568" class=
"para">35</a>]
</sup>
1883 Judith Van Evra,
<em class=
"citetitle">Television and Child Development
</em>
1884 (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family
1885 and TV Study,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Denver Post
</em>,
25 May
1997, B6.
1886 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620542" href=
"#id2620542" class=
"para">36</a>]
</sup>
1888 Intervju med Elizabeth Daley og Stephanie Barish,
13. desember
2002.
1889 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620634"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620643"></a>
1890 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620658" href=
"#id2620658" class=
"para">37</a>]
</sup>
1893 Se Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4. november
1894 2000, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
1895 #
8</a>; "Timeline,"
22. november
2000, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
9</a>.
1896 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620738" href=
"#id2620738" class=
"para">38</a>]
</sup>
1898 Intervju med Daley og Barish.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2620745"></a>
1899 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620756" href=
"#id2620756" class=
"para">39</a>]
</sup>
1903 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2620951" href=
"#id2620951" class=
"para">40</a>]
</sup>
1906 Se for eksempel Alexis de Tocqueville,
<em class=
"citetitle">Democracy in
1907 America
</em>, bk.
1, overs. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
1909 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621018" href=
"#id2621018" class=
"para">41</a>]
</sup>
1912 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Journal of
1913 Political Philosophy
</em> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
1914 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621062" href=
"#id2621062" class=
"para">42</a>]
</sup>
1917 Cass Sunstein,
<em class=
"citetitle">Republic.com
</em> (Princeton: Princeton
1918 University Press,
2001),
65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
1919 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621125" href=
"#id2621125" class=
"para">43</a>]
</sup>
1922 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New York
1923 Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
1924 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621019" href=
"#id2621019" class=
"para">44</a>]
</sup>
1927 Telefonintervju med David Winer,
16. april
2003.
1928 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621220" href=
"#id2621220" class=
"para">45</a>]
</sup>
1931 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of Information
1932 Online,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
1933 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall," Online
1934 Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
10</a>.
1935 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621250" href=
"#id2621250" class=
"para">46</a>]
</sup>
1937 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
1938 <em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news
1939 organizations have been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a
1940 CNN correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the war
1941 on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses' request. Last year
1942 Steve Olafson, a
<em class=
"citetitle">Houston Chronicle
</em> reporter, was
1943 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym, that
1944 dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621282"></a>
1945 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621451" href=
"#id2621451" class=
"para">47</a>]
</sup>
1948 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
1949 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
1950 <em class=
"citetitle">Communications of the Association for Computer
1951 Machinery
</em> 43 (
2000):
9.
1952 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"catalogs"></a>Kapittel
4. Kapittel tre: Kataloger
</h2></div></div></div><p>
1953 Høsten
2001, ble Jesse Jordan fra Oceanside, New York, innrullert som
1954 førsteårsstudent ved Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, i Troy, New York.
1955 Hans studieprogram ved RPI var informasjonsteknologi. Selv om han ikke var
1956 en programmerer, bestemte Jesse seg i oktober å begynne å fikle med en
1957 søkemotorteknologi som var tilgjengelig på RPI-nettverket.
1959 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions. It
1960 offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering to
1961 information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
1962 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
1963 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to imagine
1964 and then build, a generation for the network age.
1966 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to one
1967 another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything available on the
1968 RPI network is available on the Internet. But the network is designed to
1969 enable students to get access to the Internet, as well as more intimate
1970 access to other members of the RPI community.
1973 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google brought the
1974 Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically improving the quality of
1975 search on the network. Specialty search engines can do this even better. The
1976 idea of "intranet" search engines, search engines that search within the
1977 network of a particular institution, is to provide users of that institution
1978 with better access to material from that institution. Businesses do this
1979 all the time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
1980 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
1982 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself. Microsoft, for
1983 example, has a network file system that makes it very easy for search
1984 engines tuned to that network to query the system for information about the
1985 publicly (within that network) available content. Jesse's search engine was
1986 built to take advantage of this technology. It used Microsoft's network file
1987 system to build an index of all the files available within the RPI network.
1989 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network. Indeed,
1990 his engine was a simple modification of engines that others had built. His
1991 single most important improvement over those engines was to fix a bug within
1992 the Microsoft file-sharing system that could cause a user's computer to
1993 crash. With the engines that existed before, if you tried to access a file
1994 through a Windows browser that was on a computer that was off-line, your
1995 computer could crash. Jesse modified the system a bit to fix that problem,
1996 by adding a button that a user could click to see if the machine holding the
1997 file was still on-line.
1999 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six months,
2000 he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By March, the system
2001 was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one million files in his
2002 directory, including every type of content that might be on users'
2006 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which students
2007 could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or research; copies
2008 of information pamphlets; movie clips that students might have created;
2009 university brochures
—basically anything that users of the RPI network
2010 made available in a public folder of their computer.
2012 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the files
2013 that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that means, of
2014 course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this point is
2015 absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to put music files
2016 in their public folders. He did nothing to target the search engine to these
2017 files. He was a kid tinkering with a Google-like technology at a university
2018 where he was studying information science, and hence, tinkering was the
2019 aim. Unlike Google, or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from
2020 this tinkering; he was not connected to any business that would make any
2021 money from this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2022 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2025 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at RPI. The
2026 dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association of America, the
2027 RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three other students whom he
2028 didn't even know, two of them at other universities. A few hours later,
2029 Jesse was served with papers from the suit. As he read these papers and
2030 watched the news reports about them, he was increasingly astonished.
2032 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything wrong.
… I
2033 don't think there's anything wrong with the search engine that I ran or
2034 … what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't modified it in any way that
2035 promoted or enhanced the work of pirates. I just modified the search engine
2036 in a way that would make it easier to use"
—again, a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>search
2037 engine
</em></span>, which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows
2038 filesharing system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of
2039 the RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2040 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do with
2044 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a network and
2045 had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They demanded that he pay
2046 them the damages for his wrong. For cases of "willful infringement," the
2047 Copyright Act specifies something lawyers call "statutory damages." These
2048 damages permit a copyright owner to claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the
2049 RIAA alleged more than one hundred specific copyright infringements, they
2050 therefore demanded that Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2052 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2053 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2054 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case was
2055 different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same: huge
2056 demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to. If you
2057 added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in the United
2058 States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2059 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>billion
</em></span>—six times the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>total
</em></span>
2060 profit of the film industry in
2001.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621709" href=
"#ftn.id2621709" class=
"footnote">48</a>]
</sup>
2062 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened. An
2063 uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They demanded to
2064 know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved $
12,
000 from summer jobs and
2065 other employment. They demanded $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2067 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He refused. They
2068 wanted him to agree to an injunction that would essentially make it
2069 impossible for him to work in many fields of technology for the rest of his
2070 life. He refused. They made him understand that this process of being sued
2071 was not going to be pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief
2072 lawyer on the case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay
2073 another visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2074 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2077 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight. But
2078 Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the American
2079 legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even win. But the cost of
2080 fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be at least $
250,
000. If
2081 he won, he would not recover that money. If he won, he would have a piece of
2082 paper saying he had won, and a piece of paper saying he and his family were
2085 Så Jesse hadde et mafia-lignende valg: $
250,
000 og en sjanse til å vinne,
2086 eller $
12.000 og et forlik.
2088 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality. Let's
2089 put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality. Where is the
2090 morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in scapegoatism? The
2091 RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The president of the RIAA is
2092 reported to make more than $
1 million a year. Artists, on the other hand,
2093 are not well paid. The average recording artist makes $
45,
900.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621773" href=
"#ftn.id2621773" class=
"footnote">49</a>]
</sup> There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect and
2094 direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a student for
2095 running a search engine?
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621789" href=
"#ftn.id2621789" class=
"footnote">50</a>]
</sup>
2097 23. juni overførte Jesse alle sine oppsparte midler til advokaten som jobbet
2098 for RIA. Saken mot ham ble trukket. Og med dette, ble unggutten som hadde
2099 fiklet med en datamaskin og blitt saksøkt for
15 millioner dollar en
2101 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2102 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be an
2103 activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I ever
2104 foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely absurd what the
2106 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2107 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As his
2108 father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2109 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they
2110 would pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2111 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2112 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621709" href=
"#id2621709" class=
"para">48</a>]
</sup>
2116 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks: Suit
2117 Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Professional Media Group
2118 LCC
</em> 6 (
2003):
5, tilgjengelig fra
2003 WL
55179443.
2119 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621773" href=
"#id2621773" class=
"para">49</a>]
</sup>
2122 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2123 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2124 the Arts,
<em class=
"citetitle">More Than One in a Blue Moon
</em> (
2000).
2125 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621789" href=
"#id2621789" class=
"para">50</a>]
</sup>
2128 Douglas Lichtman kommer med et relatert poeng i "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2129 <em class=
"citetitle">Wall Street Journal
</em>,
10. september
2003, A24.
2130 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title='Kapittel
5. Kapittel fire:
"Pirater"'
><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"pirates"></a>Kapittel
5. Kapittel fire: "Pirater"
</h2></div></div></div><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#film">Film
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#radio">Radio
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
2131 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without their
2132 permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2133 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of "big
2134 media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2135 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2136 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2137 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"Film"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"film"></a>Film
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2139 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621867" href=
"#ftn.id2621867" class=
"footnote">51</a>]
</sup> Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast
2140 to California in the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that
2141 patents granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls
2142 were exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2143 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative property
—patents.
2144 Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights this creative property gave
2145 him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2147 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2148 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2149 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with the
2150 license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to themselves as
2151 independents protested the trust and carried on business without submitting
2152 to the Edison monopoly. In the summer of
1909 the independent movement was
2153 in full-swing, with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2154 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2156 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2157 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement by
2158 forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company to block
2159 the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics that have
2160 become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed equipment,
2161 discontinued product supply to theaters which showed unlicensed films, and
2162 effectively monopolized distribution with the acquisition of all U.S. film
2163 exchanges, except for the one owned by the independent William Fox who
2164 defied the Trust even after his license was revoked.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621932" href=
"#ftn.id2621932" class=
"footnote">52</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621958"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621965"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621971"></a>
2165 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2166 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like Fox. And
2167 no less than today, these independents were vigorously resisted. "Shooting
2168 was disrupted by machinery stolen, and `accidents' resulting in loss of
2169 negatives, equipment, buildings and sometimes life and limb frequently
2170 occurred."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621987" href=
"#ftn.id2621987" class=
"footnote">53</a>]
</sup> That led the independents to
2171 flee the East Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2172 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the law. And
2173 the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently, did just that.
2176 California vokste naturligvis raskt, og effektiv håndhevelse av føderale
2177 lover spredte seg til slutt vestover. Men fordi patenter tildeler
2178 patentinnehaveren et i sannhet "begrenset" monopol (kun sytten år på den
2179 tiden), så patentene var utgått før nok føderale lovmenn dukket opp. En ny
2180 industri var født, delvis fra piratvirksomhet mot Edison's kreative
2182 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Innspilt musikk"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"recordedmusic"></a>Innspilt musikk
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2183 Plateindustrien ble født av en annen type piratvirksomhet, dog for å forstå
2184 hvordan krever at en setter seg inn i detaljer om hvordan loven regulerer
2186 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxfourneauxhenri"></a><p>
2187 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines for
2188 reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player piano), the
2189 law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of their music and
2190 the exclusive right to control public performances of their music. In other
2191 words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
1899 hit "Happy Mose,"
2192 the law said I would have to pay for the right to get a copy of the musical
2193 score, and I would also have to pay for the right to perform it publicly.
2194 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622068"></a><p>
2195 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph or
2196 Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear enough that I
2197 would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I performed in making
2198 this recording. And it was clear enough that I would have to pay for any
2199 public performance of the work I was recording. But it wasn't totally clear
2200 that I would have to pay for a "public performance" if I recorded the song
2201 in my own house (even today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing
2202 their songs in the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in
2203 your brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2204 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own home,
2205 it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more importantly, it
2206 wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I then made copies of
2207 those recordings. Because of this gap in the law, then, I could effectively
2208 pirate someone else's song without paying its composer anything.
2209 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622076"></a><p>
2211 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about this capacity to
2212 pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge put it,
2213 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2214 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an opera. A
2215 publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and copyrights
2216 it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who cut music rolls
2217 and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the composer and publisher
2218 without any regard for [their] rights.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622123" href=
"#ftn.id2622123" class=
"footnote">54</a>]
</sup>
2219 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2220 The innovators who developed the technology to record other people's works
2221 were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and genius of American
2222 composers,"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622146" href=
"#ftn.id2622146" class=
"footnote">55</a>]
</sup> and the "music publishing
2223 industry" was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one
2224 pirate."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622157" href=
"#ftn.id2622157" class=
"footnote">56</a>]
</sup> As John Philip Sousa put it,
2225 in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money out of my pieces, I
2226 want a share of it."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622168" href=
"#ftn.id2622168" class=
"footnote">57</a>]
</sup>
2228 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too, do the
2229 arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the player piano
2230 argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the introduction of automatic
2231 music players has not deprived any composer of anything he had before their
2232 introduction." Rather, the machines increased the sales of sheet
2233 music.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622186" href=
"#ftn.id2622186" class=
"footnote">58</a>]
</sup> In any case, the innovators
2234 argued, the job of Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the
2235 public], whom they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2236 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company wrote, "is
2237 the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas musical, literary
2238 or artistic, except as defined by statute."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622191" href=
"#ftn.id2622191" class=
"footnote">59</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622211"></a>
2241 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2242 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>and
</em></span> the recording artist. Congress amended the law to
2243 make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical reproductions" of
2244 their music. But rather than simply granting the composer complete control
2245 over the right to make mechanical reproductions, Congress gave recording
2246 artists a right to record the music, at a price set by Congress, once the
2247 composer allowed it to be recorded once. This is the part of copyright law
2248 that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer authorizes a recording of
2249 his song, others are free to record the same song, so long as they pay the
2250 original composer a fee set by the law.
2252 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will refer
2253 to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license whose key
2254 terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the Copyright Act in
2255 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies of recordings so long
2256 as they paid the composer (or copyright holder) the fee set by the statute.
2258 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham writes a
2259 novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if Grisham gives the
2260 publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to charge whatever he wants
2261 for that permission. The price to publish Grisham is thus set by Grisham,
2262 and copyright law ordinarily says you have no permission to use Grisham's
2263 work except with permission of Grisham.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622258"></a>
2265 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And thus, in
2266 effect, the law
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>subsidizes
</em></span> the recording industry
2267 through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a weaker right
2268 than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles have less control over
2269 their creative work than Grisham does. And the beneficiaries of this less
2270 control are the recording industry and the public. The recording industry
2271 gets something of value for less than it otherwise would pay; the public
2272 gets access to a much wider range of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress
2273 was quite explicit about its reasons for granting this right. Its fear was
2274 the monopoly power of rights holders, and that that power would stifle
2275 follow-on creativity.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621891" href=
"#ftn.id2621891" class=
"footnote">60</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622299"></a>
2277 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
2278 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
2279 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary relates,
2280 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2281 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory license system
2282 must be retained. They asserted that the record industry is a
2283 half-billion-dollar business of great economic importance in the United
2284 States and throughout the world; records today are the principal means of
2285 disseminating music, and this creates special problems, since performers
2286 need unhampered access to musical material on nondiscriminatory
2287 terms. Historically, the record producers pointed out, there were no
2288 recording rights before
1909 and the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory
2289 license as a deliberate anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these
2290 rights. They argue that the result has been an outpouring of recorded music,
2291 with the public being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
2292 choice.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622331" href=
"#ftn.id2622331" class=
"footnote">61</a>]
</sup>
2293 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2294 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their creative
2295 work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
2296 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Radio"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"radio"></a>Radio
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2297 Radio was also born of piracy.
2299 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a "public
2300 performance" of the composer's work.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622367" href=
"#ftn.id2622367" class=
"footnote">62</a>]
</sup> As
2301 I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder) an
2302 exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio station thus
2303 owes the composer money for that performance.
2306 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a copy
2307 of the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>composer's
</em></span> work. The radio station is also
2308 performing a copy of the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>recording artist's
</em></span> work. It's
2309 one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the local children's
2310 choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the Rolling Stones or Lyle
2311 Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the value of the composition
2312 performed on the radio station. And if the law were perfectly consistent,
2313 the radio station would have to pay the recording artist for his work, just
2314 as it pays the composer of the music for his work.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622433"></a>
2318 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
2319 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station need
2320 only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of something for
2321 nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work for free, even if it
2322 must pay the composer something for the privilege of playing the song.
2323 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxmadonna"></a><p>
2324 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music. Imagine
2325 it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize public
2326 performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your song in public,
2327 she has to get your permission.
2329 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She then
2330 decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top hit. Under
2331 our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you get some money. But
2332 Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on the sale of her CDs. The
2333 public performance of her recording is not a "protected" right. The radio
2334 station thus gets to
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>pirate
</em></span> the value of Madonna's work
2335 without paying her anything.
2336 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622484"></a><p>
2337 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
2338 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
2339 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law ordinarily
2340 gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making the choice for
2341 him or her, the law gives the radio station the right to take something for
2343 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Kabel-TV"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"cabletv"></a>Kabel-TV
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2345 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
2348 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
2349 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content that
2350 they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies started
2351 selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay for what they
2352 sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing broadcasters' content, but more
2353 egregiously than anything Napster ever did
— Napster never charged for
2354 the content it enabled others to give away.
2355 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622519"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622535"></a><p>
2356 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft. Rosel
2357 Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of "unfair and
2358 potentially destructive competition."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622547" href=
"#ftn.id2622547" class=
"footnote">63</a>]
</sup>
2359 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable TV,
2360 but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association of
2361 Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
2362 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622562" href=
"#ftn.id2622562" class=
"footnote">64</a>]
</sup> As another broadcaster put it,
2363 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2364 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the only
2365 business I know of where the product that is being sold is not paid
2366 for.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622580" href=
"#ftn.id2622580" class=
"footnote">65</a>]
</sup>
2367 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2368 Igjen, kravene til opphavsrettsinnehaverne virket rimelige nok:
2369 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2370 Alt vi ber om er en veldig enkel ting, at folk som tar vår eiendom gratis
2371 betaler for den. Vi forsøker å stoppe piratvirksomhet og jeg kan ikke tenke
2372 på et svakere ord for å beskrive det. Jeg tror det er sterkere ord som
2373 ville passe.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622608" href=
"#ftn.id2622608" class=
"footnote">66</a>]
</sup>
2374 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2375 Disse var "gratispassasjerer", sa presidenten Charlton Heston i Screen
2376 Actor's Guild, som "tok lønna fra skuespillerne"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622625" href=
"#ftn.id2622625" class=
"footnote">67</a>]
</sup>
2378 Men igjen, det er en annen side i debatten. Som assisterende justisminister
2379 Edwin Zimmerman sa det,
2380 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
2381 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any copyright
2382 protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright holders who are
2383 already compensated, who already have a monopoly, should be permitted to
2384 extend that monopoly.
… The question here is how much compensation
2385 they should have and how far back they should carry their right to
2386 compensation.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2621818" href=
"#ftn.id2621818" class=
"footnote">68</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622671"></a>
2387 </p></blockquote></div><p>
2388 Opphavsrettinnehaverne tok kabelselskapene til retten. Høyesterett fant to
2389 ganger at kabelselskaper ikke skyldte opphavsrettinnehaverne noen ting.
2391 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question of
2392 whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated." In the
2393 end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it resolved the
2394 question about record players and player pianos. Yes, cable companies would
2395 have to pay for the content that they broadcast; but the price they would
2396 have to pay was not set by the copyright owner. The price was set by law,
2397 so that the broadcasters couldn't exercise veto power over the emerging
2398 technologies of cable. Cable companies thus built their empire in part upon
2399 a "piracy" of the value created by broadcasters' content.
2401 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means using value
2402 from someone else's creative property without permission from that
2403 creator
—as it is increasingly described today
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622658" href=
"#ftn.id2622658" class=
"footnote">69</a>]
</sup> — then
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>every
</em></span> industry
2404 affected by copyright today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind
2405 of piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
2406 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
2407 last. Every generation
—until now.
2408 </p></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621867" href=
"#id2621867" class=
"para">51</a>]
</sup>
2410 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2411 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyrights and
2412 Copywrongs
</em>,
87–93, which details Edison's "adventures"
2413 with copyright and patent.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2621780"></a>
2414 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621932" href=
"#id2621932" class=
"para">52</a>]
</sup>
2417 J. A. Aberdeen,
<em class=
"citetitle">Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent
2418 Motion Picture Producers
</em> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and
2419 expanded texts posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture
2420 Patents Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
11</a>. For a discussion of
2421 the economic motive behind both these limits and the limits imposed by
2422 Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
2423 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright"
2424 (September
2002), University of Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in
2425 Law and Economics, Working Paper No.
159.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621987" href=
"#id2621987" class=
"para">53</a>]
</sup>
2428 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios,"
<em class=
"citetitle">The Silents
2429 Majority
</em>, arkivert på
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
12</a>.
2430 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622123" href=
"#id2622123" class=
"para">54</a>]
</sup>
2433 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on S.
6330
2434 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th Cong.
59,
1st
2435 sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge, of South Dakota,
2436 chairman), reprinted in
<em class=
"citetitle">Legislative History of the Copyright
2437 Act
</em>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2438 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2439 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622146" href=
"#id2622146" class=
"para">55</a>]
</sup>
2442 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223 (statement of
2443 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2444 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622157" href=
"#id2622157" class=
"para">56</a>]
</sup>
2447 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226 (statement of
2448 Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2449 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622168" href=
"#id2622168" class=
"para">57</a>]
</sup>
2452 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23 (statement of
2453 John Philip Sousa, composer).
2454 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622186" href=
"#id2622186" class=
"para">58</a>]
</sup>
2458 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2459 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music Perforating
2460 Company of New York).
2461 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622191" href=
"#id2622191" class=
"para">59</a>]
</sup>
2464 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
2465 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2466 Graphophone Company Association).
2467 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621891" href=
"#id2621891" class=
"para">60</a>]
</sup>
2471 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
2472 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st sess.,
2473 217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted in
2474 <em class=
"citetitle">Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</em>,
2475 E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman
2477 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622331" href=
"#id2622331" class=
"para">61</a>]
</sup>
2480 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee on
2481 the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8 March
2482 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to this report.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622367" href=
"#id2622367" class=
"para">62</a>]
</sup>
2484 See
17 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>, sections
106 and
110. At
2485 the beginning, record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast"
2486 and other messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
2487 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a warning
2488 attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio station. See
2489 <em class=
"citetitle">RCA Manufacturing
2490 Co
</em>. v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Whiteman
</em>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
2491 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag:
2492 Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright,"
2493 <em class=
"citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review
</em> 70 (
2003):
281.
2494 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622392"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622401"></a>
2495 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622547" href=
"#id2622547" class=
"para">63</a>]
</sup>
2498 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
2499 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
2500 on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966) (statement of Rosel
2501 H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission).
2502 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622562" href=
"#id2622562" class=
"para">64</a>]
</sup>
2505 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
2506 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
2507 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622580" href=
"#id2622580" class=
"para">65</a>]
</sup>
2510 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
2511 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
2512 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622608" href=
"#id2622608" class=
"para">66</a>]
</sup>
2515 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B. Krim,
2516 president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of United
2517 Artists Television, Inc.).
2518 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622625" href=
"#id2622625" class=
"para">67</a>]
</sup>
2521 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (vitnemål fra Charlton Heston,
2522 president i Screen Actors Guild).
2523 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2621818" href=
"#id2621818" class=
"para">68</a>]
</sup>
2525 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M. Zimmerman,
2526 acting assistant attorney general).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622631"></a>
2527 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622658" href=
"#id2622658" class=
"para">69</a>]
</sup>
2530 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<em class=
"citetitle">The
2531 Engine of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
2532 Information
</em>, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
13</a>. "The threat of
2533 piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without permission or
2534 compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
2535 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title='Kapittel
6. Kapittel fem:
"Piratvirksomhet"'
><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"piracy"></a>Kapittel
6. Kapittel fem: "Piratvirksomhet"
</h2></div></div></div><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
2536 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in
2537 many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized
2538 taking of other people's content within a commercial context. Despite the
2539 many justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
2540 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
2543 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking" that is
2544 more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems wrong to
2545 many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this taking
2546 "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more. For the harm
2547 of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than outright copying, and
2548 the law should account for that ambiguity, as it has so often done in the
2551 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"Piracy I"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"piracy-i"></a>Piracy I
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2552 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there are
2553 businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted content,
2554 copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
2555 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
2556 every year to physical piracy
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622650" href=
"#ftn.id2622650" class=
"footnote">70</a>]
</sup> (that
2557 works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA estimates that it
2558 loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
2560 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this book, nor
2561 in the argument that most people make when talking about the subject of this
2562 book, should draw into doubt this simple point: This piracy is wrong.
2564 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made for
2565 it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one hundred
2566 years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign copyrights. We
2567 were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might therefore seem
2568 hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other developing nations
2569 treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years of our existence,
2572 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban the
2573 taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
2574 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works without the
2575 permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule. The copy shops
2576 in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian law does protect
2577 foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops violate that law. So
2578 the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not just a moral wrong, but a
2579 legal wrong, and not just an internationally legal wrong, but a locally
2580 legal wrong as well.
2583 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
2584 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose not to
2585 protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a pirate nation,
2586 but we will not allow any other nation to have a similar childhood.
2588 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are its
2589 laws regardless of their source. The international law under which these
2590 nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden of
2591 intellectual property law.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622860" href=
"#ftn.id2622860" class=
"footnote">71</a>]
</sup> In my view,
2592 more developing nations should take advantage of that opportunity, but when
2593 they don't, then their laws should be respected. And under the laws of these
2594 nations, this piracy is wrong.
2596 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in any
2597 case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access to
2598 American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have bought those
2599 American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any less money than they
2600 otherwise would have had.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622905" href=
"#ftn.id2622905" class=
"footnote">72</a>]
</sup>
2602 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many thousands
2603 of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay for the content they
2604 have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree the harm caused by such
2605 taking. Extremists in this debate love to say, "You wouldn't go into Barnes
2606 & Noble and take a book off of the shelf without paying; why should it
2607 be any different with on-line music?" The difference is, of course, that
2608 when you take a book from Barnes
& Noble, it has one less book to
2609 sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3 from a computer network, there is
2610 not one less CD that can be sold. The physics of piracy of the intangible
2611 are different from the physics of piracy of the tangible.
2614 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a property
2615 right of a very special sort, it
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>is
</em></span> a property
2616 right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the owner the right to
2617 decide the terms under which content is shared. If the copyright owner
2618 doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There are exceptions: important
2619 statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted content regardless of the wish
2620 of the copyright owner. Those licenses give people the right to "take"
2621 copyrighted content whether or not the copyright owner wants to sell. But
2622 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is wrong to
2623 take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have a property
2624 system, and that system is properly balanced to the technology of a time,
2625 then it is wrong to take property without the permission of a property
2626 owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
2628 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
2629 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal" Windows,
2630 that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft loses the value of
2631 the software that was taken. But it gains users who are used to life in the
2632 Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation grows more wealthy, more and more
2633 people will buy software rather than steal it. And hence over time, because
2634 that buying will benefit Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If
2635 instead of pirating Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux
2636 operating system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
2637 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623000"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623007"></a>
2638 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623013"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623025"></a>
2640 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
2641 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law students,
2642 for example, are given free access to the two largest legal databases. The
2643 companies marketing both hope the students will become so used to their
2644 service that they will want to use it and not the other when they become
2645 lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
2647 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the alcoholic
2648 a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that will make it
2649 more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we ordinarily allow
2650 businesses to decide for themselves when it is best to give their product
2651 away. If Microsoft fears the competition of GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can
2652 give its product away, as it did, for example, with Internet Explorer to
2653 fight Netscape. A property right means giving the property owner the right
2654 to say who gets access to what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law
2655 properly balances the rights of the copyright owner with the rights of
2656 access, then violating the law is still wrong.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622784"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623050"></a>
2660 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy, and I
2661 certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts at
2662 justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy is
2663 rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it steals; it
2664 doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives someone access
2665 to something that the law says he should not have. Nothing has changed to
2666 draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy is flat out wrong.
2668 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
2669 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or at
2670 least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the way it is
2671 increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful and productive,
2672 to produce either new content or new ways of doing business. Neither our
2673 tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all "piracy" in that sense of
2676 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest piracy
2677 concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we need to
2678 understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before we condemn it
2679 to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
2681 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
2682 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
2683 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable TV, no
2684 one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
2686 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They should push
2687 us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this sharing to survive.
2688 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Piracy II"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"piracy-ii"></a>Piracy II
</h2></div></div></div><p>
2690 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s] the
2691 author of [his] profit."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623132" href=
"#ftn.id2623132" class=
"footnote">73</a>]
</sup> This means we
2692 must determine whether and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how
2693 strongly the law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to
2694 assure the author of his profit.
2696 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of the
2697 Napster technology had not made any major technological innovations. Like
2698 every great advance in innovation on the Internet (and, arguably, off the
2699 Internet as well
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623156" href=
"#ftn.id2623156" class=
"footnote">74</a>]
</sup>), Shawn Fanning and
2700 crew had simply put together components that had been developed
2701 independently.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623185"></a>
2703 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999, Napster
2704 amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After eighteen months,
2705 there were close to
80 million registered users of the system.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623198" href=
"#ftn.id2623198" class=
"footnote">75</a>]
</sup> Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other
2706 services emerged to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p
2707 service. It boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are
2708 different architecturally, though not very different in function: Each
2709 enables users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
2710 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
2711 or your
20,
000 best friends.
2713 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans have
2714 tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in September
2002
2715 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded music
—28 percent of
2716 Americans older than
12.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623233" href=
"#ftn.id2623233" class=
"footnote">76</a>]
</sup> A survey by
2717 the NPD group quoted in
<em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em> estimated
2718 that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to exchange content in
2719 May
2003.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623261" href=
"#ftn.id2623261" class=
"footnote">77</a>]
</sup> The vast majority of these
2720 are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a massive quantity of content is
2721 being "taken" on these networks. The ease and inexpensiveness of
2722 file-sharing networks have inspired millions to enjoy music in a way that
2725 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
2726 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright infringement,
2727 calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more complicated than one
2728 might think. So consider
—a bit more carefully than the polarized
2729 voices around this debate usually do
—the kinds of sharing that file
2730 sharing enables, and the kinds of harm it entails.
2734 Fildelerne deler ulike typer innhold. Vi kan derel disse ulike typene inn i
2736 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"A"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
2738 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
2739 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying the CD,
2740 these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether everyone who
2741 takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't make it available
2742 for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly there are some who
2743 would. The latter are the target of category A: users who download instead
2744 of purchasing.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623315"></a>
2745 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
2748 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before purchasing
2749 it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist he's not heard
2750 of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This is a kind of
2751 targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the friend recommending
2752 the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation, then one could expect
2753 that the recommendations will actually be quite good. The net effect of this
2754 sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased.
2755 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
2758 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted content
2759 that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased because the
2760 transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of sharing networks is
2761 among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were part of your childhood
2762 but have long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on the
2763 network. (One friend told me that when she discovered Napster, she spent a
2764 solid weekend "recalling" old songs. She was astonished at the range and mix
2765 of content that was available.) For content not sold, this is still
2766 technically a violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is
2767 not selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
2768 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to a
2770 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
2775 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to content
2776 that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner wants to give away.
2777 </p></li></ol></div><p>
2778 Hvordan balanserer disse ulike delingstypene?
2780 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the perspective of
2781 the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the perspective of
2782 economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623383" href=
"#ftn.id2623383" class=
"footnote">78</a>]
</sup> Type B sharing is illegal but plainly
2783 beneficial. Type C sharing is illegal, yet good for society (since more
2784 exposure to music is good) and harmless to the artist (since the work is
2785 not otherwise available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard
2786 question to answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
2787 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
2789 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how harmful
2790 type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood, composers
2791 complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained about radio, and
2792 broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music industry complains that
2793 type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is "devastating" the industry.
2795 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how harmful is harder
2796 to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's practice to blame
2797 technology for any drop in sales. The history of cassette recording is a
2798 good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young put it, "Rather
2799 than exploiting this new, popular technology, the labels fought
2800 it."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623427" href=
"#ftn.id2623427" class=
"footnote">79</a>]
</sup> The labels claimed that every
2801 album taped was an album unsold, and when record sales fell by
11.4 percent
2802 in
1981, the industry claimed that its point was proved. Technology was the
2803 problem, and banning or regulating technology was the answer.
2805 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity to enact
2806 regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record turnaround. "In
2807 the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis'
… was not the fault of
2808 the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into being]
—but had
2809 to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical innovation at the
2810 major labels."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2622915" href=
"#ftn.id2622915" class=
"footnote">80</a>]
</sup>
2812 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is wrong
2813 today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to the industry
2814 in particular, and society in general
—or at least the society that
2815 inherits the tradition that gave us the film industry, the record industry,
2816 the radio industry, cable TV, and the VCR
—the question is not simply
2817 whether type A sharing is harmful. The question is also
2818 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>how
</em></span> harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the
2819 other types of sharing are.
2821 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
2822 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause. The
2823 "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type A sharing
2824 exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records through sampling
2825 than they lost through substitution, then sharing networks would actually
2826 benefit music companies on balance. They would therefore have little
2827 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>static
</em></span> reason to resist them.
2830 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because of file
2831 sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales actually suggest
2834 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent, from
882
2835 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7 percent.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623523" href=
"#ftn.id2623523" class=
"footnote">81</a>]
</sup> This confirms a trend over the past few years. The
2836 RIAA blames Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other
2837 causes that could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a
2838 more than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
2839 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
2840 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average price
2841 of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623566" href=
"#ftn.id2623566" class=
"footnote">82</a>]
</sup> Competition from other forms of media could also
2842 account for some of the decline. As Jane Black of
2843 <em class=
"citetitle">BusinessWeek
</em> notes, "The soundtrack to the film
2844 <em class=
"citetitle">High Fidelity
</em> has a list price of $
18.98. You could
2845 get the whole movie [on DVD] for $
19.99."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623599" href=
"#ftn.id2623599" class=
"footnote">83</a>]
</sup>
2850 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales is
2851 because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period that the
2852 RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA estimates that
2.1
2853 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus, although
2.6 times the total
2854 number of CDs sold were downloaded for free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7
2857 There are too many different things happening at the same time to explain
2858 these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable: The recording
2859 industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between downloading a song
2860 and stealing a CD?"
—but their own numbers reveal the difference. If I
2861 steal a CD, then there is one less CD to sell. Every taking is a lost
2862 sale. But on the basis of the numbers the RIAA provides, it is absolutely
2863 clear that the same is not true of downloads. If every download were a lost
2864 sale
—if every use of Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his]
2865 profit"
—then the industry would have suffered a
100 percent drop in
2866 sales last year, not a
7 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold
2867 were downloaded for free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent,
2868 then there is a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a
2871 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's assume,
2872 real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the recording
2873 industry. What value does it produce in addition to these costs?
2875 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that is
2876 technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially available.
2877 This is not a small category of content. There are millions of tracks that
2878 are no longer commercially available.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623623" href=
"#ftn.id2623623" class=
"footnote">84</a>]
</sup>
2879 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
2880 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
2881 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
2882 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic sense
2883 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>to the company
</em></span> to make it available.
2885 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
2886 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are thousands
2887 of used book and used record stores in America today.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623680" href=
"#ftn.id2623680" class=
"footnote">85</a>]
</sup> These stores buy content from owners, then sell the
2888 content they buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell
2889 this content,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>even if the content is still under
2890 copyright
</em></span>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used book and
2891 record stores are commercial entities; their owners make money from the
2892 content they sell; but as with cable companies before statutory licensing,
2893 they don't have to pay the copyright owner for the content they sell.
2894 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623727"></a><p>
2895 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used record
2896 stores. It is different, of course, because the person making the content
2897 available isn't making money from making the content available. It is also
2898 different, of course, because in real space, when I sell a record, I don't
2899 have it anymore, while in cyberspace, when someone shares my
1949 recording
2900 of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs," I still have it. That difference would
2901 matter economically if the owner of the copyright were selling the record in
2902 competition to my sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that
2903 is not currently commercially available. The Internet is making it
2904 available, through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
2906 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
2907 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may well
2908 be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
2909 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
2910 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be shut as
2914 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable type D
2915 sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners want to
2916 have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This sharing
2917 clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author Cory Doctorow,
2918 for example, released his first novel,
<em class=
"citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
2919 Kingdom
</em>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
2920 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
2921 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read part
2922 on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If they liked
2923 it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is type D
2924 content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then both he and
2925 society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a great book!)
2927 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society with
2928 no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem of type A
2929 sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we lose something
2930 important in order to protect type A content.
2932 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry understandably
2933 says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask, "How much has society
2934 gained from p2p sharing? What are the efficiencies? What is the content that
2935 otherwise would be unavailable?"
2937 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this chapter, much
2938 of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly legal and good. And
2939 like the piracy I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#pirates" title='Kapittel
5. Kapittel fire:
"Pirater"'
>5</a>, much of this piracy is motivated by a new way of
2940 spreading content caused by changes in the technology of distribution. Thus,
2941 consistent with the tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording
2942 industry, and cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing
2943 is how best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
2944 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
2945 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be found
2948 Men er ikke krigen bare en krig mot ulovlig deling? Er ikke angrepsmålet
2949 bare det du kaller type A-deling?
2951 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The effect of
2952 the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far beyond that
2953 one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the Napster case
2954 itself. When Napster told the district court that it had developed a
2955 technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified infringing
2956 material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4 percent was not
2957 good enough. Napster had to push the infringements "down to
2958 zero."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623836" href=
"#ftn.id2623836" class=
"footnote">86</a>]
</sup>
2960 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
2961 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to assure
2962 that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance with the
2963 law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of VCRs or
100
2964 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns are used in compliance
2965 with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p. The court's ruling means that
2966 we as a society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally legal
2967 and beneficial uses they serve, simply to assure that there are zero
2968 copyright infringements caused by p2p.
2970 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the content
2971 industry that we know today. The history of American law has been a process
2972 of balance. As new technologies changed the way content was distributed, the
2973 law adjusted, after some time, to the new technology. In this adjustment,
2974 the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting
2975 innovation. Sometimes this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes
2978 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the interests
2979 of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers against the
2980 interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to composers, but
2981 also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but at a price set
2982 by Congress. But when radio started broadcasting the recordings made by
2983 these recording artists, and they complained to Congress that their
2984 "creative property" was not being respected (since the radio station did not
2985 have to pay them for the creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their
2986 claim. An indirect benefit was enough.
2988 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts rejected the
2989 claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content they rebroadcast,
2990 Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to compensation, but at a
2991 level set by the law. It likewise gave cable companies the right to the
2992 content, so long as they paid the statutory price.
2997 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player pianos,
2998 served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals of any
2999 copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new innovators would have
3000 the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content. Second, the law assured
3001 that copyright holders would be paid for the content that was
3002 distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply required cable TV to pay
3003 copyright holders whatever they demanded for their content, then copyright
3004 holders associated with broadcasters would use their power to stifle this
3005 new technology, cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use
3006 broadcasters' content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized
3007 cable. Thus Congress chose a path that would assure
3008 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>compensation
</em></span> without giving the past (broadcasters)
3009 control over the future (cable).
3010 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623944"></a><p>
3011 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major producers and
3012 distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another technology, the
3013 video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to them today, VCRs) that Sony had
3014 produced, the Betamax. Disney's and Universal's claim against Sony was
3015 relatively simple: Sony produced a device, Disney and Universal claimed,
3016 that enabled consumers to engage in copyright infringement. Because the
3017 device that Sony built had a "record" button, the device could be used to
3018 record copyrighted movies and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the
3019 copyright infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3020 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3023 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did decide to
3024 design its machine to make it very simple to record television shows. It
3025 could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct copying from a
3026 television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the machine to copy
3027 only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the line. It was clear that
3028 there were many television shows that did not grant anyone permission to
3029 copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no doubt the majority of shows would not
3030 have authorized copying. And in the face of this obvious preference, Sony
3031 could have designed its system to minimize the opportunity for copyright
3032 infringement. It did not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold
3033 it responsible for the architecture it chose.
3035 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal champion. Valenti
3036 called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
20,
30,
40 million of
3037 these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by millions of `tapeworms,'
3038 eating away at the very heart and essence of the most precious asset the
3039 copyright owner has, his copyright."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624005" href=
"#ftn.id2624005" class=
"footnote">87</a>]
</sup>
3040 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and creative
3041 judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation on the
3042 after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of tapings that
3043 will adversely impact on the future of the creative community in this
3044 country. It is simply a question of basic economics and plain common
3045 sense."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624022" href=
"#ftn.id2624022" class=
"footnote">88</a>]
</sup> Indeed, as surveys would later
3046 show, percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or
3047 more
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624031" href=
"#ftn.id2624031" class=
"footnote">89</a>]
</sup> — a use the Court would
3048 later hold was not "fair." By "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the
3049 means of an exemption from copyright infringementwithout creating a
3050 mechanism to compensate copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would
3051 "take from the owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive
3052 right to control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and
3053 thereby profit from its reproduction."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623926" href=
"#ftn.id2623926" class=
"footnote">90</a>]
</sup>
3055 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme Court. In
3056 the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which includes Hollywood in
3057 its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex Kozinski, who sits on that court,
3058 refers to it as the "Hollywood Circuit"
—held that Sony would be liable
3059 for the copyright infringement made possible by its machines. Under the
3060 Ninth Circuit's rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack
3061 Valenti had called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry"
3062 (worse yet, it was a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Japanese
</em></span> Boston Strangler of the
3063 American film industry)
—was an illegal technology.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624065" href=
"#ftn.id2624065" class=
"footnote">91</a>]
</sup>
3066 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. And in
3067 its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of when and
3068 whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the Court wrote,
3069 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
3070 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
3071 Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
3072 copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the
3073 institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
3074 competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
3075 technology.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624111" href=
"#ftn.id2624111" class=
"footnote">92</a>]
</sup>
3076 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3077 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as with
3078 the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress ignored the
3079 request. Congress was convinced that American film got enough, this "taking"
3080 notwithstanding. If we put these cases together, a pattern is clear:
3081 </p><div class=
"table"><a name=
"t1"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Tabell
6.1. Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress
</b></p><div class=
"table-contents"><table summary=
"Mønster for respons fra rett og kongress" border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char">CASE
</th><th align=
"char">WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</th><th align=
"char">RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</th><th align=
"char">RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Innspillinger
</td><td align=
"char">Komponister
</td><td align=
"char">Ingen beskyttelse
</td><td align=
"char">Statutory license
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Radio
</td><td align=
"char">Innspillingsartister
</td><td align=
"char">N/A
</td><td align=
"char">Ingenting
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Kabel-TV
</td><td align=
"char">Kringkastere
</td><td align=
"char">Ingen beskyttelse
</td><td align=
"char">Statutory license
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">VCR
</td><td align=
"char">Filmskapere
</td><td align=
"char">Ingen beskyttelse
</td><td align=
"char">Ingenting
</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class=
"table-break"><p>
3082 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the way
3083 content was distributed.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624241" href=
"#ftn.id2624241" class=
"footnote">93</a>]
</sup> In each case,
3084 throughout our history, that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on
3085 someone else's work.
3088 In
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>none
</em></span> of these cases did either the courts or
3089 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>none
</em></span> of these
3090 cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should assure that the
3091 copyright holder get all the value that his copyright created. In every
3092 case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy." In every case, Congress
3093 acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in the behavior of the "pirates."
3094 In each case, Congress allowed some new technology to benefit from content
3095 made before. It balanced the interests at stake.
3098 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that make up
3099 the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes sense. Was Walt
3100 Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators had to ask
3101 permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and spread images as
3102 a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better regulated? Is it
3103 really right that building a search engine should expose you to $
15 million
3104 in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had controlled film? Should
3105 every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get permission to record a song?
3107 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition has
3108 answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated, copyright
3109 "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible
3110 uses of his work."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624322" href=
"#ftn.id2624322" class=
"footnote">94</a>]
</sup> Instead, the
3111 particular uses that the law regulates have been defined by balancing the
3112 good that comes from granting an exclusive right against the burdens such an
3113 exclusive right creates. And this balancing has historically been done
3114 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>after
</em></span> a technology has matured, or settled into the mix
3115 of technologies that facilitate the distribution of content.
3117 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the Internet is
3118 changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet (wires
3119 vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network should not
3120 become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither should the law become
3121 a tool to entrench one particular way in which artists (or more accurately,
3122 distributors) get paid. As I describe in some detail in the last chapter of
3123 this book, we should be securing income to artists while we allow the market
3124 to secure the most efficient way to promote and distribute content. This
3125 will require changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes
3126 should be designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
3127 public interest that innovation continue.
3131 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly superior mode
3132 of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies can be ideally
3133 efficient in moving content across a widely diverse network. Left to
3134 develop, they could make the network vastly more efficient. Yet these
3135 "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz writes in
<em class=
"citetitle">The New
3136 York Times
</em>, "could be delayed in the P2P fight."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624373" href=
"#ftn.id2624373" class=
"footnote">95</a>]
</sup> Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the
3137 copyright warriors raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about
3138 balance and incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our
3139 content," the warriors insist, "is our
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>property
</em></span>. Why
3140 should we wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have
3141 to wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
3142 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask
3143 whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?"
3145 "It is
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>our property
</em></span>," the warriors insist. "And it
3146 should be protected just as any other property is protected."
3147 </p></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622650" href=
"#id2622650" class=
"para">70</a>]
</sup>
3150 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
3151 <em class=
"citetitle">The Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</em>,
3152 July
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
3153 #
14</a>. See also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
3154 <em class=
"citetitle">Financial Times
</em>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3155 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622860" href=
"#id2622860" class=
"para">71</a>]
</sup>
3157 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3158 <em class=
"citetitle">Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</em> (New York: The New
3159 Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
3160 Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create
3161 administrative and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights,
3162 a costly proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights
3163 may lead to higher prices for staple industries such as agriculture. Critics
3164 of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens imposed upon developing
3165 countries and benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does
3166 permit governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3167 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may be
3168 able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3169 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS
3170 framework.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622192"></a>
3171 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622905" href=
"#id2622905" class=
"para">72</a>]
</sup>
3173 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3174 Liebowitz,
<em class=
"citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy
</em> (New York:
3175 Amacom,
2002),
144–90. "In some instances
… the impact of
3176 piracy on the copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the
3177 work will be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the
3178 individual engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3179 pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622869"></a>
3180 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623132" href=
"#id2623132" class=
"para">73</a>]
</sup>
3183 <em class=
"citetitle">Bach
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Longman
</em>,
98
3184 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3185 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623156" href=
"#id2623156" class=
"para">74</a>]
</sup>
3187 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
3188 Revolutionary National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do
3189 Business
</em> (New York: HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen
3190 examines why companies that give rise to and dominate a product area are
3191 frequently unable to come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses
3192 for their own products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3193 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3194 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<em class=
"citetitle">Future
</em>,
3195 89–92,
139.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2622914"></a>
3196 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623198" href=
"#id2623198" class=
"para">75</a>]
</sup>
3199 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
3200 <em class=
"citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle
</em>,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock
3201 'n' Roll Suicide,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New Scientist
</em>,
6 July
2002,
42;
3202 Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO, Secures New Financing,"
3203 <em class=
"citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle
</em>,
23 May
2003, C1; "Napster's
3204 Wake-Up Call,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Economist
</em>,
24 June
2000,
23; John
3205 Naughton, "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
3206 <em class=
"citetitle">Times
</em>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3207 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623233" href=
"#id2623233" class=
"para">76</a>]
</sup>
3211 See Ipsos-Insight,
<em class=
"citetitle">TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music
3212 Distribution
</em> (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of
3213 Americans aged twelve and older have downloaded music off of the Internet
3214 and
30 percent have listened to digital music files stored on their
3216 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623261" href=
"#id2623261" class=
"para">77</a>]
</sup>
3219 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New
3220 York Times
</em>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3221 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623383" href=
"#id2623383" class=
"para">78</a>]
</sup>
3223 Se Liebowitz,
<em class=
"citetitle">Rethinking the Network Economy
</em>,
3224 148–49.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623174"></a>
3225 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623427" href=
"#id2623427" class=
"para">79</a>]
</sup>
3228 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<em class=
"citetitle">Technology Evolution and the
3229 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</em> (
2003),
3. This report
3230 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding practice of
3231 cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising campaign featuring a
3232 cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping is killing music." At the
3233 time digital audio tape became a threat, the Office of Technical Assessment
3234 conducted a survey of consumer behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers
3235 older than ten had taped music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office
3236 of Technology Assessment,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying: Technology
3237 Challenges the Law
</em>, OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
3238 Government Printing Office, October
1989),
145–56.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2622915" href=
"#id2622915" class=
"para">80</a>]
</sup>
3241 U.S. Congress,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright and Home Copying
</em>,
4.
3242 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623523" href=
"#id2623523" class=
"para">81</a>]
</sup>
3245 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<em class=
"citetitle">2002 Yearend
3246 Statistics
</em>, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
15</a>. A later report
3247 indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry Association of
3248 America,
<em class=
"citetitle">Some Facts About Music Piracy
</em>,
25 June
2003,
3249 available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
16</a>:
3250 "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music have fallen by
26
3251 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million units in
2002 in the
3252 United States (based on units shipped). In terms of sales, revenues are
3253 down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6 billion last year (based on
3254 U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music industry worldwide has gone from
3255 a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based
3256 on U.S. dollar value of shipments)."
3257 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623566" href=
"#id2623566" class=
"para">82</a>]
</sup>
3258 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13. februar
3259 2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
3260 #
17</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623580"></a>
3261 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623599" href=
"#id2623599" class=
"para">83</a>]
</sup>
3265 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623623" href=
"#id2623623" class=
"para">84</a>]
</sup>
3268 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels is no
3269 longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright Law
—Coming
3270 Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on
3271 the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
2001) (prepared statement of
3272 the Future of Music Coalition), available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
18</a>.
3273 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623680" href=
"#id2623680" class=
"para">85</a>]
</sup>
3276 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3277 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3278 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<em class=
"citetitle">The
3279 Quiet Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</em> (
2002),
3280 available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
3281 #
19</a>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3282 National Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3283 Results," available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
3285 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623836" href=
"#id2623836" class=
"para">86</a>]
</sup>
3288 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
35
3289 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183 MHP, available at
3290 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
21</a>. For an account
3291 of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
<em class=
"citetitle">All
3292 the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</em> (New
3293 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3294 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624005" href=
"#id2624005" class=
"para">87</a>]
</sup>
3297 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on S.
1758
3298 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st and
2nd sess.,
3299 459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion Picture Association
3301 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624022" href=
"#id2624022" class=
"para">88</a>]
</sup>
3304 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
3305 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624031" href=
"#id2624031" class=
"para">89</a>]
</sup>
3308 <em class=
"citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc
</em>. v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Sony
3309 Corp. of America
</em>,
480 F. Supp.
429, (C.D. Cal.,
1979).
3310 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623926" href=
"#id2623926" class=
"para">90</a>]
</sup>
3313 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony of Jack
3315 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624065" href=
"#id2624065" class=
"para">91</a>]
</sup>
3318 <em class=
"citetitle">Universal City Studios, Inc
</em>. v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Sony
3319 Corp. of America
</em>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
1981).
3320 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624111" href=
"#id2624111" class=
"para">92</a>]
</sup>
3323 <em class=
"citetitle">Sony Corp. of America
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Universal City
3324 Studios, Inc
</em>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
3325 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624241" href=
"#id2624241" class=
"para">93</a>]
</sup>
3327 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
3328 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example, was
3329 regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy Congress
3330 imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and controlling the
3331 technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
1992 (Title
17 of the
3332 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
3333 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
3334 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
3335 Lessig,
<em class=
"citetitle">Future
</em>,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to
3336 the Broadcast Flag,"
<em class=
"citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review
</em>
3337 70 (
2003):
293–96.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2623859"></a>
3338 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624322" href=
"#id2624322" class=
"para">94</a>]
</sup>
3341 <em class=
"citetitle">Sony Corp. of America
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Universal City
3342 Studios, Inc
</em>.,
464 U.S.
417, (
1984).
3343 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624373" href=
"#id2624373" class=
"para">95</a>]
</sup>
3346 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software Echoes Past
3347 Efforts,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
22 September
2003, C3.
3348 </p></div></div></div></div><div class=
"part" title='Del II.
"Eiendom"'
><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-property"></a>Del II. "Eiendom"
</h1></div></div></div><div class=
"partintro" title='
"Eiendom"'
><div></div><p>
3352 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of property. It can
3353 be owned and sold, and the law protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the
3354 copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the
3355 supply and demand that partially determine the price she can get.
3357 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a bit
3358 misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of property.
3359 Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any expression is very
3360 odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the picnic table you put in
3361 your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic table, and after I take it,
3362 you don't have it. But what am I taking when I take the good
3363 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>idea
</em></span> you had to put a picnic table in the
3364 backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a table, and putting
3365 it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking then?
3367 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus ideas,
3368 though that's an important difference. The point instead is that in the
3369 ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a narrow
3370 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't take
3371 anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I might seem
3372 weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
3373 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true when I
3374 copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea from me,
3375 receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
3376 taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624447" href=
"#ftn.id2624447" class=
"footnote">96</a>]
</sup>
3378 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the reach of the
3379 law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that I won't discuss
3380 here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or expression without my
3381 permission: The law turns the intangible into property.
3383 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details, in other
3384 words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice of turning the
3385 intangible into property emerged, we need to place this "property" in its
3386 proper context.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624492" href=
"#ftn.id2624492" class=
"footnote">97</a>]
</sup>
3388 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the preceding
3389 part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of "copyright material is
3390 property" in context. Where did the idea come from? What are its limits? How
3391 does it function in practice? After these stories, the significance of this
3392 true statement
—"copyright material is property"
— will be a bit
3393 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different from
3394 the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
3395 </p><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#founders">7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#recorders">8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#transformers">9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#collectors">10. Kapittel ni: Samlere
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#property-i">11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#beginnings">Opphav
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawduration">Loven: Varighet
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#together">Sammen
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624447" href=
"#id2624447" class=
"para">96</a>]
</sup>
3398 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
3399 <em class=
"citetitle">The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</em>, vol.
6 (Andrew
3400 A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
3401 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624492" href=
"#id2624492" class=
"para">97</a>]
</sup>
3404 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
3405 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
3406 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not attach
3407 to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if the object to
3408 which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See Adam Mossoff, "What
3409 Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Arizona Law
3410 Review
</em> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
3411 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"founders"></a>Kapittel
7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</h2></div></div></div><p>
3412 William Shakespeare skrev
<em class=
"citetitle">Romeo og Julie
</em> i
3413 1595. Skuespillet ble først utgitt i
1597. Det var det ellevte store
3414 skuespillet Shakespeare hadde skrevet. Han fortsatte å skrive skuespill helt
3415 til
1613, og stykkene han skrevhar fortsatt å definere angloamerikansk
3416 kultur siden. Så dypt har verkene av en
1500-talls forfatter sunket inn i
3417 vår kultur at vi ofte ikke engang kjenner kilden. Jeg overhørte en gang noen
3418 som kommentere Kenneth Branaghs utgave av Henry V: "Jeg likte det, men
3419 Shakespeare er så full av klisjeer."
3422 I
1774, nesten
180 år etter at
<em class=
"citetitle">Romeo og Julie
</em> ble
3423 skrevet, mente mange at "opphavsretten" kun tilhørte én eneste utgiver i
3424 London, John Tonson.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624568" href=
"#ftn.id2624568" class=
"footnote">98</a>]
</sup> Tonson var den
3425 mest fremstående av en liten gruppe utgivere kalt "the Conger"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624598" href=
"#ftn.id2624598" class=
"footnote">99</a>]
</sup>, som kontrollerte boksalget i England gjennom hele
3426 1700-tallet. The Conger hevdet at de hadde en evigvarende rett over "kopier"
3427 av bøker de hadde fått av forfatterne. Denne evigvarende retten innebar at
3428 ingen andre kunne publisere kopier av disse bøkene. Slik ble prisen på
3429 klassiske bøker holdt oppe; alle konkurrenter som lagde bedre eller
3430 billigere utgaver, ble fjernet.
3432 Men altså, det er noe spennende med året
1774 for alle som vet litt om
3433 opphavsretts-lovgivning. Det mest kjente året for opphavsrett er
1710, da
3434 det britiske parlamentet vedtok den første loven. Denne loven er kjent som
3435 "Statute of Anne" og sa at alle publiserte verk skulle være beskyttet i
3436 fjorten år, en periode som kunne fornyes én gang dersom forfatteren ennå
3437 levde, og at alle verk publisert i eller før
1710 skulle ha en ekstraperiode
3438 på
22 tillegsår.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624635" href=
"#ftn.id2624635" class=
"footnote">100</a>]
</sup> På grunn av denne
3439 loven, så skulle
<em class=
"citetitle">Rome og Julie
</em> ha falt i det fri i
3440 1731. Hvordan kunne da Tonson fortsatt ha kontroll over verket i
1774?
3442 Årsaken var ganske enkelt at engelskmennene ennå ikke hadde bestemt hva
3443 opphavsrett innebar -- faktisk hadde ingen i verden det. På den tiden da
3444 engelskmennene vedtok "Statute of Anne", var det ingen annen lovgivning om
3445 opphavsrett. Den siste loven som regulerte utgivere var lisensieringsloven
3446 av
1662, utløpt i
1695. At loven ga utgiverne monopol over publiseringen,
3447 noe som gjorde det enklere for kronen å kontrollere hva ble publisert. Men
3448 etter at det har utløpt, var det ingen positiv lov som sa at utgiverne hadde
3449 en eksklusiv rett til å trykke bøker.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2624675"></a>
3451 At det ikke fantes noen
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>positiv
</em></span> lov, betydde ikke at
3452 det ikke fantes noen lov. Den anglo-amerikanske juridiske tradisjon ser både
3453 til lover skapt av politikere (det lovgivende statsorgen)og til lover
3454 (prejudikater) skapt av domstolene for å bestemme hvordan folket skal
3455 leve. Vi kaller politikernes lover for positiv lov og vi kaller lovene fra
3456 dommerne sedvanerett."Common law" angir bakgrunnen for de lovgivendes
3457 lovgivning; retten til lovgiving, vanligvis kan trumfe at bakgrunnen bare
3458 hvis det går gjennom en lov til å forskyve den. Og så var det virkelige
3459 spørsmålet etter lisensiering lover hadde utløpt om felles lov beskyttet
3460 opphavsretten, uavhengig av lovverket positiv.
3463 Dette spørsmålet var viktig for utgiverne eller "bokselgere," som de ble
3464 kalt, fordi det var økende konkurranse fra utenlandske utgivere, Særlig fra
3465 Skottland hvor publiseringen og eksporten av bøker til England hadde økt
3466 veldig. Denne konkurransen reduserte fortjenesten til "The Conger", som
3467 derfor krevde at parlamentet igjen skulle vedta en lov for å gi dem
3468 eksklusiv kontroll over publisering. Dette kravet resulterte i "Statute of
3471 "Statute of Anne" ga forfatteren eller "eieren" av en bok en eksklusiv rett
3472 til å publisere denne boken. Men det var, til bokhandernes forferdelse en
3473 viktig begrensning, nemlig hvor lenge denne retten skulle vare. Etter dette
3474 gikk trykkeretten bort og verket falt i det fri og kunne trykkes av hvem som
3475 helst. Det var ihvertfall det lovgiverne hadde tenkt.
3477 Men nå det mest interessante med dette: Hvorfor ville parlamentet begrense
3478 trykkeretten? Sprøsmålet er ikke hvorfor de bestemte seg for denne perioden,
3479 men hvorfor ville de begrense retten
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>i det hele tatt?
</em></span>
3481 Bokhandlerne, og forfatterne som de representerte, hadde et veldig sterkt
3482 krav. Ta
<em class=
"citetitle">romeo og Julie
</em> som et eksempel: Skuespillet
3483 ble skrevet av Shakespeare. Det var hans kreativitet som brakte det til
3484 verden. Han krenket ikke noens rett da han skrev dette verket (det er en
3485 kontroversiell påstanden, men det er urelevant), og med sin egen rett skapte
3486 han verket, han gjorde det ikke noe vanskeligere for andre til å lage
3487 skuespill. Så hvorfor skulle loven tillate at noen annen kunne komme og ta
3488 Shakespeares verkuten hans, eller hans arvingers, tillatelse? Hvilke grunner
3489 finnes for å tillate at noen "stjeler" Shakespeares verk?
3491 Svaret er todel. Først må vi se på noe spesielt med oppfatningen av
3492 opphavsrett som fantes på tidspunktet da "Statute of Anne" ble
3493 vedtatt. Deretter må vi se på noe spesielt med bokhandlerne.
3496 Først om opphavsretten. I de siste tre hundre år har vi kommet til å bruke
3497 begrepet "copyright" i stadig videre forstand. Men i
1710 var det ikke så
3498 mye et konsept som det var en bestemt rett. Opphavsretten ble født som et
3499 svært spesifikt sett med begrensninger: den forbød andre å reprodusere en
3500 bok. I
1710 var "kopi-rett" en rett til å bruke en bestemt maskin til å
3501 replikere en bestemt arbeid. Den gikk ikke utover dette svært smale
3502 formålet. Den kontrollerte ikke mer generelt hvordan et verk kunne
3503 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>brukes
</em></span>. Idag inkluderer retten en stor samling av
3504 restriksjoner på andres frihet: den gir forfatteren eksklusiv rett til å
3505 kopiere, eksklusiv rett til å distribuere, eksklusiv rett til å fremføre, og
3508 Så selv om f. eks. opphavsretten til Shakespeares verker var evigvarende,
3509 betydde det under den opprinnelige betydningen av begrepet at ingen kunne
3510 trykke Shakespeares arbeid uten tillatelse fra Shakespeares arvinger. Den
3511 ville ikke ha kontrollert noe mer, for eksempel om hvordan verket kunne
3512 fremføres, om verket kunne oversettes eller om Kenneth Branagh ville hatt
3513 lov til å lage filmer. "Kopi-retten" var bare en eksklusiv rett til å
3514 trykke--ikke noe mindre, selvfølgelig, men heller ikke mer.
3516 Selv dnne begrensede retten ble møtt med skepsis av britene. De hadde hatt
3517 en lang og stygg erfaring med "eksklusive rettigheter," spesielt "enerett"
3518 gitt av kronen. Engelskmennene hadde utkjempet en borgerkrig delvis mot
3519 kronens praksis med å dele ut monopoler--spesielt monopoler for verk som
3520 allerede eksisterte. Kong Henrik VIII hadde gitt patent til å trykke Bibelen
3521 og monopol til Darcy for å lage spillkort. Det engelske parlamentet begynte
3522 å kjempe tilbake mot denne makten hos kronen. I
1656 ble "Statute of
3523 Monopolis" vedtatt for å begrense monopolene på patenter for nye
3524 oppfinnelser. Og i
1710 var parlamentet ivrig etter å håndtere det voksende
3525 monopolet på publisering.
3527 Dermed ble "kopi-retten", når den sees på som en monopolrett, en rettighet
3528 som bør være begrenset. (Uansett hvor overbevisende påstanden om at "det er
3529 min eiendom, og jeg skal ha for alltid," prøv hvor overbevisende det er når
3530 men sier "det er mitt monopol, og jeg skal ha det for alltid.") Staten ville
3531 beskytte eneretten, men bare så lenge det gavnet samfunnet. Britene så
3532 skadene særinteresserte kunne skape; de vedtok en lov for å stoppe dem.
3534 Dernest, om bokhandlerne. Det var ikke bare at kopiretten var et
3535 monopol. Det var også et monopol holdt av bokhandlerne. En bokhandler høres
3536 greie og ufarlige ut for oss, men slik var det ikke i syttenhundretallets
3537 England. Medlemmene i "the Conger" ble av en voksende mengde sett på som
3538 monopolister av verste sort - et verktøy for kronens undertrykkelse, de
3539 solgte Englands frihet mot å være garantert en monopolskinntekt. Men
3540 monopolistene ble kvast kritisert: Milton beskrev dem som "gamle
3541 patentholdere og monopolister i bokhandlerkunsten"; de var "menn som derfor
3542 ikke hadde et ærlig arbeide hvor utdanning er nødvendig."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624877" href=
"#ftn.id2624877" class=
"footnote">101</a>]
</sup>
3544 Mange trodde at den makten bokhandlerne utøvde over spredning av kunnskap,
3545 var til skade for selve spredningen, men på dette tidspunktet viste
3546 Opplysningen viktigheten av utdannelse og kunnskap for alle. idéen om at
3547 kunnskap burde være gratis er et kjennetegn for tiden, og disse kraftige
3548 kommersielle interesser forstyrret denne idéen.
3550 For å balansere denne makten, besluttet Parlamentet å øke konkurransen blant
3551 bokhandlerne, og den enkleste måten å gjøre det på, var å spre mengden av
3552 verdifulle bøker. Parlamentet begrenset derfor begrepet om opphavsrett, og
3553 garantert slik at verdifulle bøker ville bli frie for alle utgiver å
3554 publisere etter en begrenset periode. Slik ble det å gi eksisterende verk en
3555 periode på tjueen år et kompromiss for å bekjempe bokhandlernes
3556 makt. Begrensninger med dato var en indirekte måte å skape konkurranse
3557 mellom utgivere, og slik en skapelse og spredning av kultur.
3559 Når
1731 (
1710+
21) kom, ble bokhandlerne engstelige. De så konsekvensene av
3560 mer konkurranse, og som alle konkurrenter, likte de det ikke. Først
3561 ignorerte bokhandlere ganske enkelt "Statute of Anne", og fortsatte å kreve
3562 en evigvarende rett til å kontrollere publiseringen. Men i
1735 og
1737 de
3563 prøvde å tvinge Parlamentet til å utvide periodene. Tjueen år var ikke nok,
3564 sa de; de trengte mer tid.
3566 Parlamentet avslo kravene, Som en pamflett sa, i en vending som levere ennå
3568 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
3569 Jeg ser ingen grunn til å gi en utvidet perioden nå som ikke ville kunne gi
3570 utvidelser om igjen og om igjen, så fort de gamle utgår; så dersom dette
3571 lovforslaget blir vedtatt, vil effekten være: at et evig monopol blir skapt,
3572 et stort nederlag for handelen, et angrep mot kunnskapen, ingen fordel for
3573 forfatterne, men en stor avgift for folket; og alt dette kun for å øke
3574 bokhandlernes personlige rikdom.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2624955" href=
"#ftn.id2624955" class=
"footnote">102</a>]
</sup>
3575 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3576 Etter å ha mislyktes i Parlamentet gikk utgiverne til rettssalen i en rekke
3577 saker. Deres argument var enkelt og direkte: "Statute of Anne" ga
3578 forfatterne en viss beskyttelse gjennom positiv loven, men denne
3579 beskyttelsenvar ikke ment som en erstatning for felles lov. Istedet var de
3580 ment å supplere felles lov. Ifølge sedvanerett var det galt å ta en annen
3581 persons kreative eiendom og bruke den uten hans tillatelse. "Statute of
3582 Anne", hevdet bokhandlere, endret ikke dette faktum. Derfor betydde ikke det
3583 at beskyttelsen gitt av "Statute of Anne" utløp, at beskyttelsen fra
3584 sedvaneretten utløp: Ifølge sedvaneretten hadde de rett til å fordømme
3585 publiseringen av en bok, selv følgelig om "Statute of Anne" sa at de var
3586 falt i det fri. Dette, mente de, var den eneste måten å beskytte
3589 Dette var et godt argument, og hadde støtte fra flere av den tidens ledende
3590 jurister. Det viste også en ekstraordinær chutzpah. Inntail da, som
3591 jusprofessor Raymond Pattetson har sagt, "var utgiverne
… like
3592 bekymret for forfatterne som en gjeter for sine lam."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2623465" href=
"#ftn.id2623465" class=
"footnote">103</a>]
</sup> Bokselgerne brydde seg ikke det spor om
3593 forfatternes rettigheter. Deres bekymring var den monopolske inntekten
3594 forfatterens verk ga.
3596 Men bokhandlernes argument ble ikke godtatt uten kamp. Helten fra denne
3597 kampen var den skotske bokselgeren Alexander Donaldson.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625044" href=
"#ftn.id2625044" class=
"footnote">104</a>]
</sup>
3599 Donaldson var en fremmed for Londons "the Conger". Han startet in karriere i
3600 Edinburgh i
1750. Hans forretningsidé var billige kopier av standardverk
3601 falt i det fri, ihvertfall fri ifølge "Statute of Anne".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625067" href=
"#ftn.id2625067" class=
"footnote">105</a>]
</sup> Donaldsons forlag vokste og ble "et sentrum for
3602 litterære skotter." "Blant dem," skriver professor Mark Rose, var "den unge
3603 James Boswell som, sammen med sin venn Andrew Erskine, publiserte en hel
3604 antologi av skotsk samtidspoesi sammen med Donaldson."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625086" href=
"#ftn.id2625086" class=
"footnote">106</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625094"></a>
3606 Da Londons bokselgere prøvde å få stengt Donaldsons butikk i Skottland, så
3607 flyttet han butikken til London. Her solgte han billige utgaver av "de mest
3608 populære, engelske bøker, i kamp mot sedvanerettens rett til litterær
3609 eiendom."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625112" href=
"#ftn.id2625112" class=
"footnote">107</a>]
</sup> Bøkene hans var mellom
30%
3610 og
50% billigere enn "the Conger"s, og han baserte sin rett til denne
3611 konkurransen på at bøkene, takket være "Statute of Anne", var falt i det
3614 Londons bokselgere begynte straks å slå ned mot "pirater" som
3615 Donaldson. Flere tiltak var vellykkede, den viktigste var den tidlig seieren
3616 i kampen mellom
<em class=
"citetitle">Millar
</em> og
3617 <em class=
"citetitle">Taylor
</em>.
3619 Millar var en bokhandler som i
1729 hadde kjøpt opp rettighetene til James
3620 Thomsons dikt "The Seasons". Millar hadde da full beskyttelse gjennom
3621 "Statute of Anne", men etter at denne beskyttelsen var uløpt, begynte Robert
3622 Taylor å trykke et konkurrerende bind. Millar gikk til sak, og hevdet han
3623 hadde en evig rett gjennom sedvaneretten, uansett hva "Statute of Anne"
3624 sa.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625158" href=
"#ftn.id2625158" class=
"footnote">108</a>]
</sup>
3625 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxmansfield2"></a><p>
3626 Til moderne juristers forbløffelse, var en av, ikke bare datidens, men en av
3627 de største dommere i engelsk historie, Lord Mansfield, enig med
3628 bokhandlerne. Uansett hvilken beskyttelse "Statute of Anne" gav
3629 bokhandlerne, så sa han at den ikke fortrengte noe fra
3630 sedvaneretten. Spørsmålet var hvorvidt sedvaneretten beskyttet forfatterne
3631 mot pirater. Mansfield svar var ja: Sedvaneretten nektet Taylor å
3632 reprodusere Thomsons dikt uten Millars tillatelse. Slik gav sedvaneretten
3633 bokselgerne en evig publiseringsrett til bøker solgt til dem.
3636 Ser man på det som et spørsmål innen abstrakt jus - dersom man resonnere som
3637 om rettferdighet bare var logisk deduksjon fra de første bud - kunne
3638 Mansfields konklusjon gitt mening. Men den overså det Parlamentet hadde
3639 kjempet for i
1710: Hvordan man på best mulig vis kunne innskrenke
3640 utgivernes monopolmakt. Parlamentets strategi hadde vært å kjøpe fred
3641 gjennom å tilby en beskyttelsesperiode også for eksisterende verk, men
3642 perioden måtte være så kort at kulturen ble utsatt for konkurranse innen
3643 rimelig tid. Storbritannia skulle vokse fra den kontrollerte kulturen under
3644 kronen, inn i en fri og åpen kultur.
3645 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625224"></a><p>
3646 Kampen for å forsvare "Statute of Anne"s begrensninger sluttet uansett ikke
3647 der, for nå kommer Donaldson.
3648 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625240"></a><p>
3649 Millar døde kort tid etter sin seier. Boet hans solgte rettighetene over
3650 Thomsons dikt til et syndikat av utgivere, deriblant Thomas
3651 Beckett.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625253" href=
"#ftn.id2625253" class=
"footnote">109</a>]
</sup> Da ga Donaldson ut en
3652 uautorisert utgave av Thomsons verk. Etter avgjørelsen i
3653 <em class=
"citetitle">Millar
</em>-saken, gikk Beckett til sak mot
3654 Donaldson. Donaldson tok saken inn for Overhuset, som da fungerte som en
3655 slags høyesterett. I februar
1774 hadde dette organet muligheten til å tolke
3656 Parlamentets mening med utøpsdatoen fra seksti år før.
3658 Rettssaken
<em class=
"citetitle">Donaldson
</em> mot
3659 <em class=
"citetitle">Beckett
</em> fikk en enorm oppmerksomhet i hele
3660 Storbritannia. Donaldsons advokater mente at selv om det før fantes en del
3661 rettigheter i sedvaneretten, så var disse fortrengt av "Statute of
3662 Anne". Etter at "Statute of Anne" var blitt vedtatt, skulle den eneste
3663 lovlige beskyttelse for trykkerett kom derfra. Og derfor, mente de, i tråd
3664 med vilkårene i "Statute of Anne", falle i det fri så fort
3665 beskyttelsesperioden var over.
3667 Overhuset var en merkelig institusjon. Juridiske spørsmål ble presentert for
3668 huset, og ble først stemt over av "juslorder", medlemmer av enspesiell
3669 rettslig gruppe som fungerte nesten slik som justiariusene i vår
3670 Høyesterett. Deretter, etter at "juslordene" hadde stemt, stemte resten av
3674 Rapportene om juslordene stemmer er uenige. På enkelte punkter ser det ut
3675 som om evigvarende beskyttelse fikk flertall. Men det er ingen tvil om
3676 hvordan resten av Overhuset stemte. Med en majoritet på to mot en (
22 mot
3677 11) stemte de ned forslaget om en evig beskyttelse. Uansett hvordan man
3678 hadde tolket sedvaneretten, var nå kopiretten begrenset til en periode, og
3679 etter denne ville verket falle i det fri.
3681 "Å falle i det fri". Før rettssaken
<em class=
"citetitle">Donaldson
</em> mot
3682 <em class=
"citetitle">Beckett
</em> var det ingen klar oppfatning om hva å falle
3683 i det fri innebar. Før
1774 var det jo en allmenn oppfatning om at
3684 kopiretten var evigvarende. Men etter
1774 ble Public Domain født.For første
3685 gang i angloamerikansk historie var den lovlige beskyttelsen av et verk
3686 utgått, og de største verk i engelsk historie - inkludert Shakespeare,
3687 Bacon, Milton, Johnson og Bunyan - var frie.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625350"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625356"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625362"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625368"></a>
3688 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625375"></a>
3690 Vi kan knapt forestille oss det, men denne avgjørelsen fra Overhuset fyrte
3691 opp under en svært populær og politisk reaksjon. I Skottland, hvor de fleste
3692 piratugiverne hadde holdt til, ble avgjørelsen feiret i gatene. Som
3693 <em class=
"citetitle">Edinburgh Advertiser
</em> skrev "Ingen privatsak har noen
3694 gang fått slik oppmerksomhet fra folket, og ingen sak som har blitt prøvet i
3695 Overhuset har interessert så mange enkeltmennesker." "Stor glede i Edinburgh
3696 etter seieren over litterær eiendom: bål og *illuminations*.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625403" href=
"#ftn.id2625403" class=
"footnote">110</a>]
</sup>
3698 I London, ihvertfall blant utgiverne, var reaksjonen like sterk, men i
3699 motsatt retning.
<em class=
"citetitle">Morning Chronicle
</em> skrev:
3700 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
3701 Gjennom denne avgjørelsen
… er verdier til nesten
200 000 pund, som
3702 er blitt ærlig kjøpt gjennom allment salg, og som i går var eiendom, er nå
3703 redusert til ingenting. Bokselgerne i London og Westminster, mange av dem
3704 har solgt hus og eiendom for å kjøpe kopirettigheter, er med ett ruinerte,
3705 og mange som gjennom mange år har opparbeidet kompetanse for å brødfø
3706 familien, sitter nå uten en shilling til sine.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625020" href=
"#ftn.id2625020" class=
"footnote">111</a>]
</sup>
3707 </p></blockquote></div><p>
3710 Ruinert er en overdrivelse. Men det er ingen overdrivelse å si at endringen
3711 var stor. Vedtaket fra Overhuset betydde at bokhandlerne ikke lenger kunnen
3712 kontrollere hvordan kulturen i England ville vokse og utvikle seg. Kulturen
3713 i England var etter dette
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>fri
</em></span>. Ikke i den betydning at
3714 kopiretten ble ignorert, for utgiverne hadde i en begrenset periode rett
3715 over trykkingen. Og heller ikke i den betydningen at bøker kunne stjeles,
3716 for selv etter at boken var falt i det fri, så måtte den kjøpes. Men
3717 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>fri
</em></span> i betydningen at kulturen og dens vekst ikke lenger
3718 var kontrollert av en liten gruppe utgivere. Som alle frie markeder, ville
3719 dette markedet vokse og utvikle seg etter tilbud og etterspørsel. Den
3720 engelske kulturen ble nå formet slik flertallet Englands lesere ville at det
3721 skulle formes - gjennom valget av hva de kjøpte og skrev, gjennom valget av
3722 *memes* de gjentok og beundret. Valg i en
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>konkurrerende
3723 sammenheng
</em></span>, ikke der hvor valgene var om hvilken kultur som
3724 skulle være tilgjengelig for folket og hvor deres tilgang til den ble styrt
3725 av noen få, på tros av flertallets ønsker.
3727 Til sist, dette var en verden hvor Parlamentet var antimonopolistisk, og
3728 holdt stand mot utgivernes krav. I en verden hvor parlamentet er lett å
3729 påvirke, vil den frie kultur være mindre beskyttet.
3730 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624568" href=
"#id2624568" class=
"para">98</a>]
</sup>
3733 Jacob Tonson er vanligvis husket for sin omgang med
1700-tallets litterære
3734 storheter, spesielt John Dryden, og for hans kjekke"ferdige versjoner" av
3735 klassiske verk. I tillegg til
<em class=
"citetitle">Romeo og Julie
</em>, utga
3736 han en utrolig rekke liste av verk som ennå er hjertet av den engelske
3737 kanon, inkludert de samlede verk av Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, John Milton, og
3738 John Dryden. Se Keith Walker: "Jacob Tonson, Bookseller,"
3739 <em class=
"citetitle">American Scholar
</em> 61:
3 (
1992):
424-
31.
3740 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624598" href=
"#id2624598" class=
"para">99</a>]
</sup>
3743 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright in Historical
3744 Perspective
</em> (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
3746 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624635" href=
"#id2624635" class=
"para">100</a>]
</sup>
3748 Som Siva Vaidhyanathan så pent argumenterer, er det feilaktige å kalle dette
3749 en "opphavsrettslov." Se Vaidhyanathan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyrights and
3750 Copywrongs
</em>,
40.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2624646"></a>
3751 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624877" href=
"#id2624877" class=
"para">101</a>]
</sup>
3755 Philip Wittenberg,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Protection and Marketing of Literary
3756 Property
</em> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
3757 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2624955" href=
"#id2624955" class=
"para">102</a>]
</sup>
3760 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending in the
3761 House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the Eighth Year of the
3762 Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by
3763 Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
3764 Copies, during the Times therein mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici
3765 Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al.,
8,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
3766 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
3767 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2623465" href=
"#id2623465" class=
"para">103</a>]
</sup>
3769 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
3770 <em class=
"citetitle">Vanderbilt Law Review
</em> 40 (
1987):
28. For en
3771 fantastisk overbevisende fortelling, se Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
3772 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2624608"></a>
3773 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625044" href=
"#id2625044" class=
"para">104</a>]
</sup>
3776 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<em class=
"citetitle">Authorship and
3777 Copyright
</em> (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
3778 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625067" href=
"#id2625067" class=
"para">105</a>]
</sup>
3781 Mark Rose,
<em class=
"citetitle">Authors and Owners
</em> (Cambridge: Harvard
3782 University Press,
1993),
92.
3783 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625086" href=
"#id2625086" class=
"para">106</a>]
</sup>
3787 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625112" href=
"#id2625112" class=
"para">107</a>]
</sup>
3790 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright in Historical
3791 Perspective
</em>,
167 (quoting Borwell).
3792 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625158" href=
"#id2625158" class=
"para">108</a>]
</sup>
3795 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
3796 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Wayne Law
3797 Review
</em> 29 (
1983):
1152.
3798 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625253" href=
"#id2625253" class=
"para">109</a>]
</sup>
3802 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625403" href=
"#id2625403" class=
"para">110</a>]
</sup>
3806 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625020" href=
"#id2625020" class=
"para">111</a>]
</sup>
3810 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"recorders"></a>Kapittel
8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</h2></div></div></div><p>
3811 Jon Else er en filmskaper. Han er mest kjent for sine dokumentarer og har på
3812 ypperlig vis klart å spre sin kunst. Han er også en lærer, som meg selv, og
3813 jeg misunner den lojaliteten og beundringen hans studenter har for ham. (Ved
3814 et uhell møtte jeg to av hans studenter i et middagsselskap og han var deres
3817 Else arbeidet med en dokumentarfilm hvor også jeg var involvert. I en pause
3818 så fortalte han meg om hvordan det kunne være å skape film i dagens Amerika.
3820 I
1990 arbeidet Else med en dokumentar om Wagners Ring Cycle. Fokuset var på
3821 *stagehands* på San Francisco Opera. Stagehands er spesielt morsomt og
3822 fargerikt innslag i en opera. I løpet av forestillingen oppholder de seg
3823 blant publikum og på lysloftet. De er en perfekt kontrast til kunsten på
3824 scenen.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625552"></a>
3827 Under en forestilling, filmet Else noen stagehands som spilte *checkers*. I
3828 et hjørne av rommet stod det et fjernsynsapparat. På fjernsynet, mens
3829 forestillingen pågikk og operakompaniet spilte Wagner, gikk
<em class=
"citetitle">The
3830 Simpsons
</em>. Slik Else så det, så hjalp dette tegnefilm-innslaget
3831 med å fange det spesielle med scenen.
3833 Så noen år senere, da han endelig hadde fått ordnet den siste
3834 finansieringen, ville Else skaffe rettigheter til å bruke disse få sekundene
3835 med
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpson
</em>. For disse få sekundene var selvsagt
3836 beskyttet av opphavsretten, og for å bruke beskyttet materiale må man ha
3837 tillatelse fra eieren, dersom det ikke er "rimelig bruk" eller det
3838 foreligger spesielle avtaler.
3840 Else kontaktet
<em class=
"citetitle">Simpson
</em>-skaper Matt Groenings kontor
3841 for å få tillatelse. Og Groening gav ham det. Det var tross alt kun snakk om
3842 fire og et halvt sekund på et lite fjernsyn, bakerst i et hjørne av
3843 rommet. Hvordan kunne det skade? Groening var glad for å få ha det med i
3844 filmen, men han ba Else om å kontakte Gracie Films, firmaet som produserer
3845 programmet.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625614"></a>
3847 Gracie Films sa også at det var greit, men de, slik som Groening, ønsket å
3848 være forsiktige, og ba Else om å kontakte Fox, konsernet som eide Gracie. Og
3849 Else kontaktet Fox og forklarte situasjonen; at det var snakk om et klipp i
3850 hjørnet i bakgrunnen i ett rom i filmen. Matt Groening hadde allerede gitt
3851 sin tillatelse, sa Else. Han ville bare få det avklart med Fox.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625634"></a>
3853 Deretter, fortalte Else: "skjedde to ting. Først oppdaget vi
… at
3854 Matt Groening ikke eide sitt eget verk
— ihvertfall at noen [hos Fox]
3855 trodde at han ikke eide sitt eget verk." Som det andre krevde Fox "ti tusen
3856 dollar i lisensavgift for disse fire og et halvt sekundene med
…
3857 fullstendig tilfeldig
<em class=
"citetitle">Simpson
</em> som var i et hjørne i
3860 Ellers var sikker på at det var en feil. Han fikk tak i noen som han trodde
3861 var nestleder for lisensiering, Rebecca Herrera. Han forklarte for henne at
3862 "det må være en feil her
… Vi ber deg om en utdanningssats på dette."
3863 Og de hadde fått utdanningssats, fortalte Herrera. Kort tid etter ringte
3864 Else igjen for å få dette bekreftet.
3867 "Jeg måtte være sikker på at jeg hadde riktige opplysninger foran meg," sa
3868 han. "Ja, du har riktige opplysninger," sa hun. Det ville koste $
10 000 å
3869 bruke dette lille klippet av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpson
</em>, plassert
3870 bakerst i et hjørne i en scene i en dokumentar om Wagners Ring Cycle. Som om
3871 det ikke var nok, forbløffet Herrera Else med å si "Og om du siterer meg,
3872 vil du høre fra våre advokater." En av Herreras assistenter fortalte Else at
3873 "De bryr seg ikke i det heletatt. Alt de vil ha er pengene."
3875 Men Else hadde ikke penger til å kjøpe lisens for klippet. Så å gjenskape
3876 denne delen av virkeligheten, lå langt utenfor hans budsjett. Like før
3877 dokumentaren skulle slippes, redigerte Else inn et annet klipp på
3878 fjernsynet, et klipp fra en av hans andre filmer
<em class=
"citetitle">The Day After
3879 Trinity
</em> fra ti år tidligere.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625712"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625718"></a>
3881 Det er ingen tvil om at noen, enten det er er Matt Groening eller Fox, eier
3882 rettighetene til
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em>. Rettighetene er deres
3883 eiendom. For å bruke beskyttet mteriale, kreves det ofte at men får
3884 tillatelse fra eieren eller eierne. Dersom Else ønsket å bruke
3885 <em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em> til noe hvor loven gir verket
3886 beskyttelse, så må han innhente tillatelse fra eieren før han kan bruke
3887 det. Og i et fritt markes er det eieren som bestemmer hvor mye han/hun vil
3888 ta for hvilken som helst bruk (hvor loven krever tillatelse fra eier).
3890 For eksempel "offentlig fremvisning"* av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpson
</em>
3891 er en form for bruk hvor loven gir eieren kontroll. Dersom du velger ut dine
3892 favorittepisoder, leier en kinosal og selger billetter til "Mine
3893 <em class=
"citetitle">Simpson
</em>-favoritter", så må du ha tillatelse fra
3894 rettighetsinnhaveren (eieren). Og eieren kan (med rette, slik jeg ser det)
3895 kreve hvor mye han vil; $
10ellr $
1 000 000. Det er hans rett ifølge loven.
3897 Men når jurister hører denne historien om Jon Else og Fox, så er deres
3898 første tanke "rimelig bruk".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2625775" href=
"#ftn.id2625775" class=
"footnote">112</a>]
</sup> Elses bruk
3899 av
4,
5 sekunder med et indirekte klipp av en
3900 <em class=
"citetitle">Simpsons
</em>-episode er et klart eksempel på "rimelig
3901 bruk" av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em>— og "rimelig bruk" krever
3902 ingen tillatelse fra noen.
3906 Så jeg spurte Else om hvorfor han ikke bare stolte på "fair use". Og her er
3908 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
3909 <em class=
"citetitle">Simpsons
</em>-fiaskoen lærte meg om hvor stor avstand det
3910 var mellom det jurister finner urelevant på en abstrakt måte, og hva som er
3911 knusende relevant på en konkret måte for oss som prøver å lage og kringkaste
3912 dokumentarer. Jeg tvilte aldri på at dette helt klart var "rimelig bruk",
3913 men jeg kunne ikke stole på konseptet på noen konkret måte. Og dette er
3915 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"1"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
3918 Før våre filmer kan kringkastes, krever nettverket at vi kjøper en "Errors
3919 and Omissions"-forsikring. Den krever en detailjert "visual cue sheet" med
3920 alle kilder og lisens-status på alle scener i filmen. De har et smalt syn på
3921 "fair use", og å påstå at noe er nettopp det kan forsinke, og i verste fall
3923 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
3925 Jeg skulle nok aldri ha bedt om Matt Groenings tillatelse. Men jeg visste
3926 (ihvertfall fra rykter) at Fox tidligere hadde brukt å jakte på og stoppe
3927 ulisensiert bruk av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em>, på samme måte som
3928 George Lucas var veldig ivrig på å forfølge bruken av
<em class=
"citetitle">Star
3929 Wars
</em>. Så jeg bestemte meg for å følge boka, og trodde at vi
3930 kulle få til en gratis, i alle fall rimelig, avtale for fire sekunders bruk
3931 av
<em class=
"citetitle">The Simpsons
</em>. Som en dokumentarskaper, arbeidende
3932 på randen av utryddelse, var det siste jeg ønsket en juridisk strid, selv
3933 for å forsvare et prinsipp.
3934 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
3938 Jeg snakket faktisk med en av dine kolleger på Stanford Law School
…
3939 som bekreftet at dette var rimelig bruk. Han bekreftet også at Fox ville
3940 "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your life", uavhengig av
3941 sannheten i mine krav. Han gjorde det klart at alt ville koke ned til hvem
3942 som hadde flest jurister og dypest lommer, jeg eller dem.
3944 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
3947 Spørsmålet om "fair use" dukker om regel opp helt mot slutten av prosjektet,
3948 når vi nærmer oss siste frist og er tomme for penger.
3949 </p></li></ol></div></blockquote></div><p>
3950 I teorien betyr "fair use" at du ikke trenger tillatelse. Teorien støtter
3951 derfor den frie kultur og arbeider mot tillatelseskulturen. Men i praksis
3952 fungerer "fair use" helt annerledes. Men de uklare linjene i lovverket, samt
3953 de fryktelige konsekvensene dersom man tar feil, gjør at mange kunstnere
3954 ikke stoler på "fair use". Loven har en svært god hensikt, men praksisen har
3957 Dette eksempelet viser hvor langt denne loven har kommet fra sine
3958 syttenhundretalls røtter. Loven som skulle beskytte utgiverne mot
3959 urettferdig piratkonkurranse, hadde utviklet seg til et sverd som slo ned på
3960 _all_ bruk, transformativ* eller ikke.
3961 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2625775" href=
"#id2625775" class=
"para">112</a>]
</sup>
3964 Ønsker du å lese en flott redegjørelse om hvordan dette er "fair use", og
3965 hvordan advokatene ikke anerkjenner det, så les Richard A. Posner og William
3966 F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of
3967 <em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> " (utkast arkivert hos forfatteren),
3968 University of Chicago Law School, 5. august 2003.
3969 </p></div></div></div><div class="chapter
" title="Kapittel
9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere
"><div class="titlepage
"><div><div><h2 class="title
"><a name="transformers
"></a>Kapittel 9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere</h2></div></div></div><a class="indexterm
" name="id2625963
"></a><a class="indexterm
" name="id2625969
"></a><p>
3970 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave was an
3971 innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop
3972 digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave
3973 began investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
3974 anticipation of the power of networks.
3975 </p><a class="indexterm
" name="id2625984
"></a><p>
3976 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by the
3977 emerging market for CD-ROM technology—not to distribute film, but to
3978 do things with film that otherwise would be very difficult. In 1993, he
3979 launched an initiative to develop a product to build retrospectives on the
3980 work of particular actors. The first actor chosen was Clint Eastwood. The
3981 idea was to showcase all of the work of Eastwood, with clips from his films
3982 and interviews with figures important to his career.
3983 </p><a class="indexterm
" name="id2625992
"></a><p>
3984 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and as a
3985 director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood, asking him
3986 about his career. Because Starwave produced those interviews, it was free to
3987 include them on the CD.
3991 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so Starwave
3992 wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career: posters,
3993 scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood made. Most of his
3994 career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was relatively easy to get
3995 permission for that content.
3996 </p><a class="indexterm
" name="id2626026
"></a><p>
3997 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our goal was
3998 that we were going to have a clip from every one of Eastwood's films," Alben
3999 told me. It was here that the problem arose. "No one had ever really done
4000 this before," Alben explained. "No one had ever tried to do this in the
4001 context of an artistic look at an actor's career."
4002 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626042"></a><p>
4003 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave. Slade asked,
4004 "Well, what will it take?"
4005 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626053"></a><p>
4006 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from everyone who
4007 appears in these films, and the music and everything else that we want to
4008 use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go for it."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2626065" href=
"#ftn.id2626065" class=
"footnote">113</a>]
</sup>
4010 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what clearing
4011 those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films could have a claim
4012 to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD- ROMs had not been specified
4013 in the contracts for the actors, so there was no clear way to know just what
4016 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious pride in his
4017 resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his tale, Alben
4018 recounted just what they did:
4019 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4020 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made some
4021 artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of course we were
4022 going to use the "Make my day" clip from
<em class=
"citetitle">Dirty
4023 Harry
</em>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's
4024 wiggling under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you
4025 have to decide what you are going to pay him.
4029 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate for
4030 the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of less than
4031 a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the rate at the time
4032 was about $
600. So we had to identify the people
—some of them were
4033 hard to identify because in Eastwood movies you can't tell who's the guy
4034 crashing through the glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And
4035 then we just, we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we
4036 just started calling people.
4037 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626126"></a><p>
4038 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example, followed
4039 up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared. Others were
4040 dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask, "Hey, can I pay you $
600
4041 or maybe if you were in two films, you know, $
1,
200?" And they would say,
4042 "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a
4043 bit difficult (estranged ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and
4044 his team had cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint
4047 It was one
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>year
</em></span> later
—"and even then we weren't
4048 sure whether we were totally in the clear."
4049 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626163"></a><p>
4050 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and the
4051 only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive project for
4052 the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
4053 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4054 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their hands
4055 and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's the music,
4056 there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the actors." But we
4057 just broke it down. We just put it into its constituent parts and said,
4058 "Okay, there's this many actors, this many directors,
… this many
4059 musicians," and we just went at it very systematically and cleared the
4061 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4065 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood loved it,
4066 and it sold very well.
4067 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626199"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626204"></a><p>
4068 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to take a
4069 year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done this
4070 efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is nothing so
4071 useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done at
4072 all."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2626217" href=
"#ftn.id2626217" class=
"footnote">114</a>]
</sup> Did it make sense, I asked Alben,
4073 that this is the way a new work has to be made?
4075 For, as he acknowledged, "very few
… have the time and resources, and
4076 the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be made. Does
4077 it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what anybody really
4078 thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that you would have to
4079 go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
4080 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4081 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie, he or she
4082 gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of that performance
4083 is used in a new product that is a retrospective of somebody's career, I
4084 don't think that that person
… should be compensated for that.
4085 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4086 Or at least, is this
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>how
</em></span> the artist should be
4087 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind of
4088 statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make derivative use
4089 of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a follow-on creator would
4090 have to track down every artist, actor, director, musician, and get explicit
4091 permission from each? Wouldn't a lot more be created if the legal part of
4092 the creative process could be made to be more clean?
4093 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4095 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
4096 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
4097 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this work,
4098 because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a retrospective of
4099 someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with lots of media from that
4100 person's career. You'd build in a cost as the producer of one of these
4101 things. You'd build in a cost of paying X dollars to the talent that
4102 performed. But it would be a known cost. That's the thing that trips
4103 everybody up and makes this kind of product hard to get off the ground. If
4104 you knew I have a hundred minutes of film in this product and it's going to
4105 cost me X, then you build your budget around it, and you can get investments
4106 and everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I want
4107 a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going to cost
4108 me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for money," then
4109 it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
4110 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626299"></a><p>
4111 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
4112 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access that
4113 the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a year, how long
4114 would it take someone else? And how much creativity is never made just
4115 because the costs of clearing the rights are so high? These costs are the
4116 burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a Republican hat for a moment, and
4117 get angry for a bit. The government defines the scope of these rights, and
4118 the scope defined determines how much it's going to cost to negotiate
4119 them. (Remember the idea that land runs to the heavens, and imagine the
4120 pilot purchasing flythrough rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles
4121 to San Francisco.) These rights might well have once made sense; but as
4122 circumstances change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a
4123 well-trained, regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and
4124 ask, "Does this still make sense?"
4127 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only a
4128 few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
4129 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I was
4130 asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer from an
4131 L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a friend, Robert
4132 Fairbank, had produced.
4134 Videoen var en glimrende sammenstilling av filmer fra hver periode i det
4135 tjuende århundret, rammet inn rundt idéen om en episode i TV-serien
4136 <em class=
"citetitle">60 Minutes
</em>. Utførelsen var perfekt, ned til seksti
4137 minutter stoppeklokken. Dommerne elsket enhver minutt av den.
4138 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626352"></a><p>
4139 Da lysene kom på, kikket jeg over til min medpaneldeltager, David Nimmer,
4140 kanskje den ledende opphavsrettakademiker og utøver i nasjonen. Han hadde en
4141 forbauset uttrykk i ansiktet sitt, mens han tittet ut over rommet med over
4142 250 godt underholdte dommere. Med en en illevarslende tone, begynte han sin
4143 tale med et spørsmål: "Vet dere hvor mange føderale lover som nettopp brutt
4145 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626373"></a><p>
4146 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this film
4147 hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the rights to
4148 these clips; technically, what they had done violated the law. Of course,
4149 it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be prosecuted for this
4150 violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle of federal marshals
4151 notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an important point: A year before
4152 anyone would have heard of the word Napster, and two years before another
4153 member of our panel, David Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth
4154 Circuit Court of Appeals, Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that
4155 the law would not be friendly to the capacities that this technology would
4156 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
4157 couldn't easily do them legally.
4159 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone building
4160 a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut and paste
4161 architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can find just
4162 about any image you want; in another second, you can have it planted in your
4165 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and its
4166 archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound never before
4167 imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of clips on computers
4168 around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden takes images of
4169 politicians and blends them with music to create biting political
4170 commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced some of the most biting
4171 criticism of the record industry that there is through the mixing of Flash!
4172 and music.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626400"></a>
4174 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators wanted
4175 to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
4176 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is never
4177 made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the clearance
4178 rules, it doesn't get released.
4180 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of rights so
4181 that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add or mix as they
4182 see fit. We could even make this change without necessarily requiring that
4183 the "free" use be free as in "free beer." Instead, the system could simply
4184 make it easy for follow-on creators to compensate artists without requiring
4185 an army of lawyers to come along: a rule, for example, that says "the
4186 royalty owed the copyright owner of an unregistered work for the derivative
4187 reuse of his work will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in
4188 escrow for the copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could
4189 benefit from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
4190 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he registers
4193 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be for
4194 objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made; which if
4195 made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists. What reason
4196 would anyone have to oppose it?
4199 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers,
4200 the comic genius of
<em class=
"citetitle">Saturday Night Live
</em> and Austin
4201 Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works would work
4202 together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the agreement, DreamWorks
4203 "will acquire the rights to existing motion picture hits and classics, write
4204 new storylines and
—with the use of stateof-the-art digital
4205 technology
—insert Myers and other actors into the film, thereby
4206 creating an entirely new piece of entertainment."
4208 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained, "Film
4209 Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing films and
4210 allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap artists have been
4211 doing this for years with music and now we are able to take that same
4212 concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is quoted as saying, "If
4213 anyone can create a way to bring old films to new audiences, it is Mike."
4215 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if you
4216 don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point about this
4217 announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage remains under
4218 copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks announcement is just this: It
4219 is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is free to sample. Any general freedom
4220 to build upon the film archive of our culture, a freedom in other contexts
4221 presumed for us all, is now a privilege reserved for the funny and
4222 famous
—and presumably rich.
4224 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
4225 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use." Much
4226 of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would rely upon so
4227 weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason that the
4228 privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the legal rights
4229 for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high. These costs
4230 mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to defend your fair
4231 use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions so you don't have to
4232 rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative process is a process of
4233 paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a curse, reserved for the
4235 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2626065" href=
"#id2626065" class=
"para">113</a>]
</sup>
4237 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
4238 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial exploitation
4239 of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix, Burn" creativity, as
4240 this chapter evinces.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2625994"></a>
4241 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2626217" href=
"#id2626217" class=
"para">114</a>]
</sup>
4244 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
4245 <em class=
"citetitle">Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services
4246 Acquisition
</em>, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
22</a>.
4247 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 10. Kapittel ni: Samlere"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"collectors"></a>Kapittel
10. Kapittel ni: Samlere
</h2></div></div></div><p>
4248 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to "spider,"
4249 or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began running
4250 across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based information
4251 onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San Francisco's
4252 Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet, they started
4253 again. Over and over again, once every two months, these bits of code took
4254 copies of the Internet and stored them.
4256 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of copies. And
4257 at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the archive that these
4258 copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to the world. Using a
4259 technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could enter a Web page, and
4260 see all of its copies going back to
1996, as well as when those pages
4263 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have appreciated. In
4264 the dystopia described in
<em class=
"citetitle">1984</em>, old newspapers were
4265 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world, approved of
4266 by the government, was not contradicted by previous news reports.
4270 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was no way
4271 ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the story that was
4272 printed on the date published on the paper.
4274 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today, there's no
4275 way for you to know whether the content you are reading is the same as the
4276 content you read before. The page may seem the same, but the content could
4277 easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's library
—constantly
4278 updated, without any reliable memory.
4280 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and the
4281 Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet was. You have
4282 the power to see what you remember. More importantly, perhaps, you also have
4283 the power to find what you don't remember and what others might prefer you
4284 forget.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2626571" href=
"#ftn.id2626571" class=
"footnote">115</a>]
</sup>
4286 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
4287 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction of your
4288 hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to Bull Connor's
4289 water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public library and look at the
4290 newspapers. Those papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they
4291 exist in paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back
4292 and remember
—not just what it is convenient to remember, but remember
4293 something close to the truth.
4295 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to repeat
4296 it. That's not quite correct. We
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>all
</em></span> forget
4297 history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to rediscover what we
4298 forget. More directly, the key is whether an objective past can keep us
4299 honest. Libraries help do that, by collecting content and keeping it, for
4300 schoolchildren, for researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this
4304 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
4305 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the quintessentially
4306 transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more important in forming and
4307 reforming society, it becomes more and more important to maintain in some
4308 historical form. It's just bizarre to think that we have scads of archives
4309 of newspapers from tiny towns around the world, yet there is but one copy of
4310 the Internet
—the one kept by the Internet Archive.
4312 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
4313 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
4314 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
4315 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he launched
4316 a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The Internet
4317 Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew Carnegie of the
4318 Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10 billion pages, and it
4319 was growing at about a billion pages a month.
4321 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in human
4322 history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty terabytes of
4323 material"
—and was "ten times larger than the Library of Congress." And
4324 this was just the first of the archives that Kahle set out to build. In
4325 addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has been constructing the Television
4326 Archive. Television, it turns out, is even more ephemeral than the
4327 Internet. While much of twentieth-century culture was constructed through
4328 television, only a tiny proportion of that culture is available for anyone
4329 to see today. Three hours of news are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt
4330 University
—thanks to a specific exemption in the copyright law. That
4331 content is indexed, and is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But
4332 other than that, [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you
4333 were Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
4334 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
4335 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4337 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown? Remember
4338 that back and forth surreal experience of a politician interacting with a
4339 fictional television character? If you were a graduate student wanting to
4340 study that, and you wanted to get those original back and forth exchanges
4341 between the two, the
<em class=
"citetitle">60 Minutes
</em> episode that came out
4342 after it
… it would be almost impossible.
… Those materials
4343 are almost unfindable.
…
4344 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4345 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded in
4346 newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is recorded
4347 on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world where researchers
4348 trying to understand the effect of media on nineteenthcentury America will
4349 have an easier time than researchers trying to understand the effect of
4350 media on twentieth-century America?
4352 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
4353 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
4354 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread of
4355 knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around once the
4356 copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the work.
4358 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library of Congress
4359 made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so long as such
4360 deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to borrow back the
4361 deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
1915 alone, there were
4362 more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed back." Thus, when the
4363 copyrights to films expire, there is no copy held by any library. The copy
4364 exists
—if it exists at all
—in the library archive of the film
4365 company.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2626636" href=
"#ftn.id2626636" class=
"footnote">116</a>]
</sup>
4367 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts were
4368 originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the broadcasts,
4369 so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled capturing,
4370 broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law required they make a
4371 copy of each broadcast for the work to be "copyrighted." But those copies
4372 were simply kept by the broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the
4373 government didn't demand them. The content of this part of American culture
4374 is practically invisible to anyone who would look.
4377 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and his
4378 allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty stations from
4379 around the world and hit the Record button. After September
11, Kahle,
4380 working with dozens of others, selected twenty stations from around the
4381 world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made their coverage during the week
4382 of September
11 available free on-line. Anyone could see how news reports
4383 from around the world covered the events of that day.
4385 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
4386 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning films
4387 other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted), Kahle
4388 established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
1,
300 films in
4389 this archive and post those films on the Internet to be downloaded for
4390 free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells copies of these films as
4391 stock footage. What he has discovered is that after he made a significant
4392 chunk available for free, his stock footage sales went up
4393 dramatically. People could easily find the material they wanted to use. Some
4394 downloaded that material and made films on their own. Others purchased
4395 copies to enable other films to be made. Either way, the archive enabled
4396 access to this important part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
4397 "Duck and Cover" film that instructed children how to save themselves in the
4398 middle of nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film
4399 in a few minutes
—for free.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626742"></a>
4401 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
4402 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of what
4403 defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The law doesn't
4404 require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be deposited in an archive
4405 by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way to find them.
4407 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access to this
4408 content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to it. His aim is
4409 to ensure competition in access to this important part of our culture. Not
4410 during the commercial life of a bit of creative property, but during a
4411 second life that all creative property has
—a noncommercial life.
4414 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit of
4415 creative property goes through different "lives." In its first life, if the
4416 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial market
4417 is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative property
4418 doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that content,
4419 commercial life is extremely important. Without this commercial market,
4420 there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
4422 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our tradition has
4423 always supported a second life as well. A newspaper delivers the news every
4424 day to the doorsteps of America. The very next day, it is used to wrap fish
4425 or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to build an archive of knowledge
4426 about our history. In this second life, the content can continue to inform
4427 even if that information is no longer sold.
4429 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print very
4430 quickly (the average today is after about a year
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2626842" href=
"#ftn.id2626842" class=
"footnote">117</a>]
</sup>). After it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores
4431 without the copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where
4432 many get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries are
4433 thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely important to
4434 the spread and stability of culture.
4436 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for creative
4437 property does not hold true with the most important components of popular
4438 culture in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For
4439 these
—television, movies, music, radio, the Internet
—there is no
4440 guarantee of a second life. For these sorts of culture, it is as if we've
4441 replaced libraries with Barnes
& Noble superstores. With this culture,
4442 what's accessible is nothing but what a certain limited market demands.
4443 Beyond that, culture disappears.
4446 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this so. It
4447 would have been insanely expensive to collect and make accessible all
4448 television and film and music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily
4449 high. So even though the law in principle would have restricted the ability
4450 of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the real restriction was
4451 economics. The market made it impossibly difficult to do anything about this
4452 ephemeral culture; the law had little practical effect.
4454 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is that
4455 for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is feasible to
4456 imagine constructing archives that hold all culture produced or distributed
4457 publicly. Technology makes it possible to imagine an archive of all books
4458 published, and increasingly makes it possible to imagine an archive of all
4459 moving images and sound.
4461 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
4462 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but we are
4463 for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As Kahle
4465 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4466 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
4467 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of movies,
4468 … and about one to two million movies [distributed] during the
4469 twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different titles of
4470 books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in this room and
4471 be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at a turning point in
4472 our history. Universal access is the goal. And the opportunity of leading a
4473 different life, based on this, is
… thrilling. It could be one of the
4474 things humankind would be most proud of. Up there with the Library of
4475 Alexandria, putting a man on the moon, and the invention of the printing
4477 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4479 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
4480 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
4481 libraries or archives could be.
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>When
</em></span> the commercial
4482 life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it does. And whenever it
4483 does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world where this knowledge, and
4484 culture, remains perpetually available. Some will draw upon it to understand
4485 it; some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to re-create
4486 the past for the future. These technologies promise something that had
4487 become unimaginable for much of our past
—a future
4488 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>for
</em></span> our past. The technology of digital arts could make
4489 the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
4491 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
4492 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to call
4493 these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem, the
4494 "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also someone's
4495 "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms that Kahle and
4496 others would exercise.
4497 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2626571" href=
"#id2626571" class=
"para">115</a>]
</sup>
4500 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White House
4501 changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003, press release
4502 stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was later changed,
4503 without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." E-mail from
4504 Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
4505 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2626636" href=
"#id2626636" class=
"para">116</a>]
</sup>
4508 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at the
4509 Library of Congress,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Film Library Quarterly
</em> 13
4510 nos.
2–3 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<em class=
"citetitle">Nitrate Won't Wait: A
4511 History of Film Preservation in the United States
</em> ( Jefferson,
4512 N.C.: McFarland
& Co.,
1992),
36.
4513 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2626842" href=
"#id2626842" class=
"para">117</a>]
</sup>
4516 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord, Bar
4517 Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Chicago
4518 Tribune
</em>,
5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published
4519 between
1927 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony
4520 Reese, "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
4521 <em class=
"citetitle">Boston College Law Review
</em> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
4522 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"property-i"></a>Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</h2></div></div></div><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#beginnings">Opphav
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawduration">Loven: Varighet
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawreach">Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#together">Sammen
</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
4523 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association of
4524 America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
4525 administration
—literally. The famous picture of Johnson's swearing-in
4526 on Air Force One after the assassination of President Kennedy has Valenti in
4527 the background. In his almost forty years of running the MPAA, Valenti has
4528 established himself as perhaps the most prominent and effective lobbyist in
4529 Washington.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2626951"></a>
4531 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
4532 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal was to
4533 defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism. The
4534 organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
4535 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its board is
4536 made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major producers and
4537 distributors of motion picture and television programs in the United States:
4538 Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth
4539 Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Warner Brothers.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627009"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627014"></a>
4540 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627021"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627027"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627033"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627039"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627046"></a>
4544 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before him has
4545 had as much influence over that organization, or over Washington. As a
4546 Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important political skill of a
4547 Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and slow while hiding a
4548 lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti plays the simple, humble
4549 man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four books, who finished high
4550 school at the age of fifteen and flew more than fifty combat missions in
4551 World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When Valenti went to Washington, he mastered
4552 the city in a quintessentially Washingtonian way.
4554 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our culture
4555 depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting the MPAA rating
4556 system, it has probably avoided a great deal of speech-regulating harm. But
4557 there is an aspect to the organization's mission that is both the most
4558 radical and the most important. This is the organization's effort,
4559 epitomized in Valenti's every act, to redefine the meaning of "creative
4562 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy perfectly:
4563 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
4564 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
4565 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men and
4566 women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central theme which
4567 animates this entire debate:
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Creative property owners must be
4568 accorded the same rights and protection resident in all other property
4569 owners in the nation
</em></span>. That is the issue. That is the
4570 question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire hearing and the
4571 debates to follow must rest.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2627102" href=
"#ftn.id2627102" class=
"footnote">118</a>]
</sup>
4572 </p></blockquote></div><p>
4574 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
4575 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The "central
4576 theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is this: "Creative
4577 property owners must be accorded the same rights and protections resident in
4578 all other property owners in the nation." There are no second-class
4579 citizens, Valenti might have continued. There should be no second-class
4582 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated with
4583 such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we use
4584 elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more extreme a claim
4585 made by
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>anyone
</em></span> who is serious in this debate than this
4586 claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet and however brilliant, is
4587 perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when it comes to the nature and
4588 scope of "creative property." His views have
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>no
</em></span>
4589 reasonable connection to our actual legal tradition, even if the subtle pull
4590 of his Texan charm has slowly redefined that tradition, at least in
4593 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and precise
4594 sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2627154" href=
"#ftn.id2627154" class=
"footnote">119</a>]
</sup> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that "creative
4595 property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and protection resident
4596 in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative property owners were
4597 given the same rights as all other property owners, that would effect a
4598 radical, and radically undesirable, change in our tradition.
4600 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for our
4601 tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry that is
4602 instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British overturned in
4603 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create, a powerful few would
4604 exercise powerful control over how our creative culture would develop.
4607 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you that,
4608 historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is to convince
4609 you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our history. We have
4610 always treated rights in creative property differently from the rights
4611 resident in all other property owners. They have never been the same. And
4612 they should never be the same, because, however counterintuitive this may
4613 seem, to make them the same would be to fundamentally weaken the opportunity
4614 for new creators to create. Creativity depends upon the owners of
4615 creativity having less than perfect control.
4617 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful of
4618 the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric notwithstanding, in
4619 assuring that the new can displace them. No organization does. No person
4620 does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.) But what's good for the MPAA is
4621 not necessarily good for America. A society that defends the ideals of free
4622 culture must preserve precisely the opportunity for new creativity to
4623 threaten the old. To get just a hint that there is something fundamentally
4624 wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
4625 Constitution itself.
4627 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly did
4628 they love property that they built into the Constitution an important
4629 requirement. If the government takes your property
—if it condemns your
4630 house, or acquires a slice of land from your farm
—it is required,
4631 under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings Clause," to pay you "just compensation"
4632 for that taking. The Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a
4633 certain sense, sacred. It cannot
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>ever
</em></span> be taken from the
4634 property owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
4637 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what Valenti
4638 calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the power to
4639 create "creative property," the Constitution
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>requires
</em></span>
4640 that after a "limited time," Congress take back the rights that it has
4641 granted and set the "creative property" free to the public domain. Yet when
4642 Congress does this, when the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your
4643 copyright and turns it over to the public domain, Congress does not have any
4644 obligation to pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
4645 Constitution that requires compensation for your land requires that you lose
4646 your "creative property" right without any compensation at all.
4648 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of property
4649 are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to be treated
4650 differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a change in our
4651 tradition when he argues that creative-property owners should be accorded
4652 the same rights as every other property-right owner. He is effectively
4653 arguing for a change in our Constitution itself.
4655 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong. There
4656 was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong. The
4657 Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be appointed
4658 rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral college to
4659 produce a tie between the president and his own vice president (as it did in
4660 1800). The framers were no doubt extraordinary, but I would be the first to
4661 admit that they made big mistakes. We have since rejected some of those
4662 mistakes; no doubt there could be others that we should reject as well. So
4663 my argument is not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
4665 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at least
4666 try to understand
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>why
</em></span>. Why did the framers, fanatical
4667 property types that they were, reject the claim that creative property be
4668 given the same rights as all other property? Why did they require that for
4669 creative property there must be a public domain?
4671 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the history of
4672 these "creative property" rights, and the control that they enabled. Once
4673 we see clearly how differently these rights have been defined, we will be in
4674 a better position to ask the question that should be at the core of this
4675 war: Not
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>whether
</em></span> creative property should be protected,
4676 but how. Not
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>whether
</em></span> we will enforce the rights the law
4677 gives to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
4678 ought to be. Not
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>whether
</em></span> artists should be paid, but
4679 whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need also
4680 control how culture develops.
4685 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about how
4686 property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way than the
4687 narrow language of the law allows. In
<em class=
"citetitle">Code and Other Laws of
4688 Cyberspace
</em>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
4689 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks how
4690 four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the
4691 right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
4692 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1331"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.1. How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken
4693 the right or regulation.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1331.png" alt=
"How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
4694 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or group
4695 that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In each case
4696 throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as a right. For
4697 simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.) The ovals represent
4698 four ways in which the individual or group might be regulated
— either
4699 constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law is the most obvious constraint
4700 (to lawyers, at least). It constrains by threatening punishments after the
4701 fact if the rules set in advance are violated. So if, for example, you
4702 willfully infringe Madonna's copyright by copying a song from her latest CD
4703 and posting it on the Web, you can be punished with a $
150,
000 fine. The
4704 fine is an ex post punishment for violating an ex ante rule. It is imposed
4705 by the state.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627060"></a>
4707 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an individual
4708 for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is imposed by a
4709 community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be no law against
4710 spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished if you spit on the
4711 ground while standing in line at a movie. The punishment might not be harsh,
4712 though depending upon the community, it could easily be more harsh than many
4713 of the punishments imposed by the state. The mark of the difference is not
4714 the severity of the rule, but the source of the enforcement.
4716 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected through
4717 conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you do N. These
4718 constraints are obviously not independent of law or norms
—it is
4719 property law that defines what must be bought if it is to be taken legally;
4720 it is norms that say what is appropriately sold. But given a set of norms,
4721 and a background of property and contract law, the market imposes a
4722 simultaneous constraint upon how an individual or group might behave.
4724 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
4725 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
4726 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability to get
4727 across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of a community
4728 to integrate its social life. As with the market, architecture does not
4729 effect its constraint through ex post punishments. Instead, also as with the
4730 market, architecture effects its constraint through simultaneous
4731 conditions. These conditions are imposed not by courts enforcing contracts,
4732 or by police punishing theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
4733 500-pound boulder blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces
4734 this constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
4735 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
4740 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is obvious:
4741 They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be reinforced by
4742 another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be undermined by another.
4744 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the effective
4745 freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any particular thing, we
4746 have to consider how these four modalities interact. Whether or not there
4747 are other constraints (there may well be; my claim is not about
4748 comprehensiveness), these four are among the most significant, and any
4749 regulator (whether controlling or freeing) must consider how these four in
4750 particular interact.
4751 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxdrivespeed"></a><p>
4752 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high speed. That
4753 freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that say how fast you
4754 can drive in particular places at particular times. It is in part restricted
4755 by architecture: speed bumps, for example, slow most rational drivers;
4756 governors in buses, as another example, set the maximum rate at which the
4757 driver can drive. The freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel
4758 efficiency drops as speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly
4759 constrains speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not
4760 constrain the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
4761 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The same
4762 norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
4765 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear: While
4766 these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a special role
4767 in affecting the three.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2627489" href=
"#ftn.id2627489" class=
"footnote">120</a>]
</sup> The law, in
4768 other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease the constraint of a
4769 particular modality. Thus, the law might be used to increase taxes on
4770 gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to drive more slowly. The law
4771 might be used to mandate more speed bumps, so as to increase the difficulty
4772 of driving rapidly. The law might be used to fund ads that stigmatize
4773 reckless driving. Or the law might be used to require that other laws be
4774 more strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
4775 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
4777 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627509"></a><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1361"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.2. Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1361.png" alt=
"Law has a special role in affecting the three."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
4778 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To understand
4779 the effective protection of liberty or protection of property at any
4780 particular moment, we must track these changes over time. A restriction
4781 imposed by one modality might be erased by another. A freedom enabled by one
4782 modality might be displaced by another.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2627554" href=
"#ftn.id2627554" class=
"footnote">121</a>]
</sup>
4783 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"Hvorfor Hollywood har rett"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"hollywood"></a>Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</h2></div></div></div><p>
4784 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just how,
4785 Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress and the
4786 courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that rallying makes
4789 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the Internet:
4790 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1371"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.3. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1331.png" alt=
"Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
4793 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
4794 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on those
4795 who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by technologies
4796 that make it hard to copy and share content (architecture) and expensive to
4797 copy and share content (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by
4798 norms we all recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids'
4799 records. These uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but
4800 the norms of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
4801 this form of infringement.
4803 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and p2p
4804 sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically, as does
4805 the constraint of the market. And as both the market and architecture relax
4806 the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The happy balance (for the
4807 warriors, at least) of life before the Internet becomes an effective state
4808 of anarchy after the Internet.
4811 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
4812 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this change,
4813 when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance of protection
4814 for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is Iraq after the fall
4815 of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the looting that
4817 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1381"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.4. effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1381.png" alt=
"effective state of anarchy after the Internet."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
4818 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
4819 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce Department
4820 (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995, this mix of
4821 regulatory modalities had already been identified and the strategy to
4822 respond already mapped. In response to the changes the Internet had
4823 effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should strengthen intellectual
4824 property law, (
2) businesses should adopt innovative marketing techniques,
4825 (
3) technologists should push to develop code to protect copyrighted
4826 material, and (
4) educators should educate kids to better protect copyright.
4829 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
4830 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced by
4831 the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content industry to
4832 push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life you have
4833 as an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if something comes
4834 along to change that happy life. Homeowners living in a flood plain have no
4835 hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild (and rebuild again) when a
4836 flood (architecture) wipes away their property (law). Farmers have no
4837 hesitation appealing to the government to bail them out when a virus
4838 (architecture) devastates their crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to
4839 the government to bail them out when imports (market) wipe out the
4840 U.S. steel industry.
4842 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's campaign
4843 to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a technological
4844 innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that the changing
4845 technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect on the content
4846 industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely Brown describes it, its
4847 "architecture of revenue."
4849 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
4850 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because technology
4851 has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't follow that the
4852 government should intervene to support that old way of doing
4853 business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20 percent of
4854 their traditional film market to the emerging technologies of digital
4855 cameras.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2627755" href=
"#ftn.id2627755" class=
"footnote">122</a>]
</sup> Does anyone believe the
4856 government should ban digital cameras just to support Kodak? Highways have
4857 weakened the freight business for railroads. Does anyone think we should ban
4858 trucks from roads
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>for the purpose of
</em></span> protecting the
4859 railroads? Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
4860 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring commercial
4861 comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it may well be that
4862 this change has weakened the television advertising market. But does anyone
4863 believe we should regulate remotes to reinforce commercial television?
4864 (Maybe by limiting them to function only once a second, or to switch to only
4865 ten channels within an hour?)
4867 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no. In a free
4868 society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and free trade,
4869 the government's role is not to support one way of doing business against
4870 others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect them against loss. If
4871 the government did this generally, then we would never have any progress. As
4872 Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
1991, in a memo criticizing software
4873 patents, "established companies have an interest in excluding future
4874 competitors."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2627804" href=
"#ftn.id2627804" class=
"footnote">123</a>]
</sup> And relative to a
4875 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and FM
4876 radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight not only the
4877 market but also the government is a world in which competitors with new
4878 ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and increasingly
4879 concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.
4880 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627823"></a>
4882 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
4883 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the government
4884 for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to guarantee that
4885 that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It is the duty of policy
4886 makers, in other words, to assure that the changes they create, in response
4887 to the request of those hurt by changing technology, are changes that
4888 preserve the incentives and opportunities for innovation and change.
4890 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include, obviously,
4891 copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the industry
4892 complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to respond in a
4893 way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers should be especially
4894 wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the government to get into
4895 the business of regulating speech markets. The risks and dangers of that
4896 game are precisely why our framers created the First Amendment to our
4897 Constitution: "Congress shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of
4898 speech." So when Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge"
4899 the freedom of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
4900 regulation is justified.
4903 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether the changes
4904 that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are "justified." My argument
4905 is about their effect. For before we get to the question of justification, a
4906 hard question that depends a great deal upon your values, we should first
4907 ask whether we understand the effect of the changes the content industry
4910 Her kommer metaforen som vil forklare argumentet.
4911 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxddt"></a><p>
4912 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss chemist Paul
4913 Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work demonstrating the
4914 insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the insecticide was widely
4915 used around the world to kill disease-carrying pests. It was also used to
4916 increase farm production.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627900"></a>
4918 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
4919 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
4920 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
4921 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627918"></a><p>
4922 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<em class=
"citetitle">Silent Spring
</em>,
4923 which argued that DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having
4924 unintended environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
4925 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627934"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627940"></a>
4927 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did not aim
4928 to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems produced
4929 another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than the problems that
4930 were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the problems DDT caused were
4931 worse than the problems it solved, at least when considering the other, more
4932 environmentally friendly ways to solve the problems that DDT was meant to
4936 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James Boyle
4937 appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
4938 culture.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2627970" href=
"#ftn.id2627970" class=
"footnote">124</a>]
</sup> His point, and the point I
4939 want to develop in the balance of this chapter, is not that the aims of
4940 copyright are flawed. Or that authors should not be paid for their work. Or
4941 that music should be given away "for free." The point is that some of the
4942 ways in which we might protect authors will have unintended consequences for
4943 the cultural environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And
4944 just as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
4945 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
4946 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on authors.
4947 It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we should be aware of
4948 our actions' effects on the environment.
4950 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly this
4951 effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic effect on
4952 the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But there should
4953 also be little doubt that when you add together the changes in copyright law
4954 over time, plus the change in technology that the Internet is undergoing
4955 just now, the net effect of these changes will not be only that copyrighted
4956 work is effectively protected. Also, and generally missed, the net effect of
4957 this massive increase in protection will be devastating to the environment
4960 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences for free
4961 culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will be lost.
4962 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2628026"></a></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Opphav"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"beginnings"></a>Opphav
</h2></div></div></div><p>
4963 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
4964 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
4965 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English aim to
4966 avoid overly powerful publishers.
4968 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to Congress in
4969 a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very odd. Article I, section
4970 8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
4973 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
4974 by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
4975 to their respective Writings and Discoveries. We can call this the
4976 "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause does not say. It does not say
4977 Congress has the power to grant "creative property rights." It says that
4978 Congress has the power
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>to promote progress
</em></span>. The grant
4979 of power is its purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of
4980 enriching publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
4982 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw in
4983 chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#founders" title=
"Kapittel 7. Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne">7</a>, the
4984 English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few would not
4985 exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
4986 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers followed
4987 the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the English, the framers
4988 reinforced that objective, by requiring that copyrights extend "to Authors"
4991 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
4992 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers built
4993 structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they built a
4994 structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept them short. To
4995 prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned the federal
4996 government from establishing a church. To prevent concentrating power in the
4997 federal government, they built structures to reinforce the power of the
4998 states
—including the Senate, whose members were at the time selected
4999 by the states, and an electoral college, also selected by the states, to
5000 select the president. In each case, a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>structure
</em></span> built
5001 checks and balances into the constitutional frame, structured to prevent
5002 otherwise inevitable concentrations of power.
5004 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
5005 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
5006 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
5007 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210 years
5008 since they first struck its design.
5011 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes in
5012 technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a particular
5013 concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we started here:
5014 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1441"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.5. Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1331.png" alt=
"Copyright's regulation before the Internet."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5015 Vi kommer til å ende opp her:
5016 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1442"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.6. "Opphavsrett" i dag.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1442.png" alt='
"Opphavsrett" i dag.'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5018 La meg forklare hvordan.
5020 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Loven: Varighet"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"lawduration"></a>Loven: Varighet
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5021 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it faced
5022 the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that the English
5023 had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws protecting creative
5024 property, and some believed that these laws simply supplemented common law
5025 rights that already protected creative authorship.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628184" href=
"#ftn.id2628184" class=
"footnote">125</a>]
</sup> This meant that there was no guaranteed public
5026 domain in the United States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the
5027 common law, then there was no simple way to know whether a work published in
5028 the United States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
5029 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public domain
5030 to reprint and distribute works.
5032 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
5033 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law, federal
5034 protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law protections. Just
5035 as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant that the copyrights for
5036 all English works expired, a federal statute meant that any state copyrights
5039 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a federal
5040 copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If the author was
5041 alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could opt to renew the
5042 copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not renew the copyright, his
5043 work passed into the public domain.
5045 Selv om det ble skapt mange verker i USA i de første
10 årene til
5046 republikken, så ble kun
5 prosent av verkene registrert under det føderale
5047 opphavsrettsregimet. Av alle verker skapt i USA både før
1790 og fra
1790
5048 fram til
1800, så ble
95 prosent øyeblikkelig allemannseie (public
5049 domain). Resten ble allemannseie etter maksimalt
20 år, og som oftest etter
5050 14 år.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628250" href=
"#ftn.id2628250" class=
"footnote">126</a>]
</sup>
5053 Dette fornyelsessystemet var en avgjørende del av det amerikanske systemet
5054 for opphavsrett. Det sikret at maksimal vernetid i opphavsretten bare ble
5055 gitt til verker der det var ønsket. Etter den første perioden på fjorten år,
5056 hvis forfatteren ikke så verdien av å fornye sin opphavsrett, var det heller
5057 ikke verdt det for samfunnet å håndheve opphavsretten.
5059 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
5060 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small minority of
5061 them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the balance allowed their
5062 work to pass into the public domain.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628317" href=
"#ftn.id2628317" class=
"footnote">127</a>]
</sup>
5064 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work has an
5065 actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall out of
5066 print after one year.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628345" href=
"#ftn.id2628345" class=
"footnote">128</a>]
</sup> When that
5067 happens, the used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the
5068 books are no longer
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>effectively
</em></span> controlled by
5069 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time is to
5070 sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not involve
5071 publication
—is effectively free.
5073 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
5074 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28 years to
5075 a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright from
14 years to
5076 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic, the term increased once
5077 again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal term of
14 years to
28 years,
5078 setting a maximum term of
56 years.
5080 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
5081 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress has
5082 extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty years,
5083 Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the extensions
5084 of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years. In
1976,
5085 Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years. And in
1998,
5086 in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress extended the term
5087 of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
5090 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing of
5091 works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the public
5092 domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five years, or
70
5093 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years after the Sonny
5094 Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the public domain, zero
5095 copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue of the expiration of a
5098 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
5099 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the framers
5100 established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright owner to
5101 renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of renewal meant
5102 that works that no longer needed copyright protection would pass more
5103 quickly into the public domain. The works remaining under protection would
5104 be those that had some continuing commercial value.
5106 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For all works
5107 created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the maximum
5108 term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty years. For
5109 corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992, Congress
5110 abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created before
1978. All
5111 works still under copyright would be accorded the maximum term then
5112 available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term was ninety-five years.
5114 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to assure
5115 that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public domain. And
5116 indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is even possible to
5117 put works into the public domain. The public domain is orphaned by these
5118 changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement that terms be "limited,"
5119 we have no evidence that anything will limit them.
5121 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
5122 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to renew
5123 their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright in
1973 was
5124 just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal requirement, the
5125 average term of copyright is now the maximum term. In thirty years, then,
5126 the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95 years.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628449" href=
"#ftn.id2628449" class=
"footnote">129</a>]
</sup>
5127 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Loven: Virkeområde"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"lawscope"></a>Loven: Virkeområde
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5128 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law. The
5129 scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those changes are not
5130 necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent of the changes if we're
5131 to keep this debate in context.
5133 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps, charts,
5134 and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
5135 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave the
5136 author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That means
5137 someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the work without
5138 the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted by a copyright
5139 was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right did not extend to
5140 what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not, therefore, interfere
5141 with the right of someone other than the author to translate a copyrighted
5142 book, or to adapt the story to a different form (such as a drama based on a
5145 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright today
5146 are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the right covers
5147 practically any creative work that is reduced to a tangible form. It covers
5148 music as well as architecture, drama as well as computer programs. It gives
5149 the copyright owner of that creative work not only the exclusive right to
5150 "publish" the work, but also the exclusive right of control over any
5151 "copies" of that work. And most significant for our purposes here, the right
5152 gives the copyright owner control over not only his or her particular work,
5153 but also any "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In
5154 this way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
5155 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way on the
5156 initial creative work.
5159 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
5160 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
5161 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition to the
5162 renewal requirement, for most of the history of American copyright law,
5163 there was a requirement that a work be registered before it could receive
5164 the protection of a copyright. There was also a requirement that any
5165 copyrighted work be marked either with that famous © or the word
5166 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright
</em></span>. And for most of the history of American
5167 copyright law, there was a requirement that works be deposited with the
5168 government before a copyright could be secured.
5170 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible understanding
5171 that for most works, no copyright was required. Again, in the first ten
5172 years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible for copyright were never
5173 copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the norm: Most works apparently didn't
5174 need copyright, so registration narrowed the regulation of the law to the
5175 few that did. The same reasoning justified the requirement that a work be
5176 marked as copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright
5177 was being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
5178 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
5179 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the original
5182 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when we
5183 decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement that you
5184 register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is automatic; the
5185 copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with a ©; and the
5186 copyright exists whether or not you actually make a copy available for
5189 Vurder et praktisk eksempel for å forstå omfanget av disse forskjellene.
5191 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who actually
5192 copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you against another
5193 publisher's taking your book and republishing it without your
5194 permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers so as to prevent
5195 that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
174 publishers in the
5196 United States.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628573" href=
"#ftn.id2628573" class=
"footnote">130</a>]
</sup> The Copyright Act was
5197 thus a tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative
5198 market in the United States
—publishers.
5202 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem by
5203 hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act was totally
5204 unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made a play based upon
5205 it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of those activities were
5206 regulated by the original copyright act. These creative activities remained
5207 free, while the activities of publishers were restrained.
5209 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
5210 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail, every
5211 note to your spouse, every doodle,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>every
</em></span> creative act
5212 that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is automatically
5213 copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your work. The protection
5214 follows the creation, not the steps you take to protect it.
5216 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of fair use
5217 exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they copy it to
5218 republish it or to share an excerpt.
5220 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would control
5221 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of today
5222 that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative rights."
5223 If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your book without
5224 permission. No one can translate it without permission. CliffsNotes can't
5225 make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All of these derivative
5226 uses of your original work are controlled by the copyright holder. The
5227 copyright, in other words, is now not just an exclusive right to your
5228 writings, but an exclusive right to your writings and a large proportion of
5229 the writings inspired by them.
5231 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our framers,
5232 though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this expansion was
5233 created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower copyright. If I write a
5234 book, can you change one word and then claim a copyright in a new and
5235 different book? Obviously that would make a joke of the copyright, so the
5236 law was properly expanded to include those slight modifications as well as
5237 the verbatim original work.
5240 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power within a free
5241 culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you understand that the law
5242 applies not just to the commercial publisher but to anyone with a
5243 computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating and selling someone else's
5244 work. But whatever
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>that
</em></span> wrong is, transforming someone
5245 else's work is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
5246 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should not
5247 protect derivative rights at all.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628654" href=
"#ftn.id2628654" class=
"footnote">131</a>]
</sup>
5248 Whether or not you go that far, it seems plain that whatever wrong is
5249 involved is fundamentally different from the wrong of direct piracy.
5251 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I can
5252 go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I can go to
5253 court and get an injunction against your transformative use of my
5254 book.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628700" href=
"#ftn.id2628700" class=
"footnote">132</a>]
</sup> These two different uses of my
5255 creative work are treated the same.
5257 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should you be
5258 able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from it without
5259 paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature called "Mickey
5260 Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to
5261 trade on the value that Disney originally created?
5263 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
5264 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower: simply to
5265 make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the rights
5267 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"lawreach"></a>Lov og arkitektur: Rekkevidde
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5268 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
5269 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users, and
5270 authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making copies,
5271 and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628751" href=
"#ftn.id2628751" class=
"footnote">133</a>]
</sup>
5275 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
5276 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>copy
</em></span>right law to regulate. But as with Jack Valenti's
5277 argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative property" deserves the
5278 "same rights" as all other property, it is the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>obvious
</em></span>
5279 that we need to be most careful about. For while it may be obvious that in
5280 the world before the Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright
5281 law, upon reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the
5282 Internet, copies should
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>not
</em></span> be the trigger for
5283 copyright law. More precisely, they should not
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>always
</em></span>
5284 be the trigger for copyright law.
5286 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this very
5287 slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the Internet
5288 should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which the law of
5289 copyright automatically applies,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628812" href=
"#ftn.id2628812" class=
"footnote">134</a>]
</sup>
5290 because it is clear that the current reach of copyright was never
5291 contemplated, much less chosen, by the legislators who enacted copyright
5294 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely empty
5296 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1521"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.7. Alle potensielle bruk av en bok.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1521.png" alt=
"Alle potensielle bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5299 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent all
5300 its potential
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>uses
</em></span>. Most of these uses are unregulated
5301 by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If you read a book,
5302 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you give someone the book,
5303 that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you resell a book, that act
5304 is not regulated (copyright law expressly states that after the first sale
5305 of a book, the copyright owner can impose no further conditions on the
5306 disposition of the book). If you sleep on the book or use it to hold up a
5307 lamp or let your puppy chew it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright
5308 law, because those acts do not make a copy.
5309 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1531"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.8. Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1531.png" alt=
"Eksempler på uregulert bruk av en bok."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5310 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated by
5311 copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It is
5312 therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands at
5313 the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
5314 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
5315 diagram on next page).
5317 Til slutt er det en tynn skive av ellers regulert kopierings-bruk som
5318 forblir uregluert på grunn av at loven anser dette som "rimelig bruk".
5319 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1541"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.9. Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a
5320 copyrighted work.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1541.png" alt=
"Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5321 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats as
5322 unregulated because public policy demands that they remain unregulated. You
5323 are free to quote from this book, even in a review that is quite negative,
5324 without my permission, even though that quoting makes a copy. That copy
5325 would ordinarily give the copyright owner the exclusive right to say whether
5326 the copy is allowed or not, but the law denies the owner any exclusive right
5327 over such "fair uses" for public policy (and possibly First Amendment)
5329 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1542"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.10. Uregulert kopiering anses som "rimelig bruk".
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1542.png" alt='Uregulert kopiering anses som
"rimelig bruk".'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p> </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1551"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.11. Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
5330 regulated.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1551.png" alt=
"Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5333 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
5334 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
5335 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
5337 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use of a
5338 copyrighted work produces a copy.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2628758" href=
"#ftn.id2628758" class=
"footnote">135</a>]
</sup> And
5339 because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a digital
5340 network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were
5341 presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated. No longer is
5342 there a set of presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom
5343 associated with a copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the
5344 copyright, because each use also makes a copy
—category
1 gets sucked
5345 into category
2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
5346 copyrighted work must look exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the
5347 burden of this shift.
5350 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
5351 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would be no
5352 plausible
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright
</em></span>-related argument that the copyright
5353 owner could make to control that use of her book. Copyright law would have
5354 nothing to say about whether you read the book once, ten times, or every
5355 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
5356 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because none of
5357 those uses produced a copy.
5359 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different set of
5360 rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book only once or
5361 only once a month, then
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright law
</em></span> would aid the
5362 copyright owner in exercising this degree of control, because of the
5363 accidental feature of copyright law that triggers its application upon there
5364 being a copy. Now if you read the book ten times and the license says you
5365 may read it only five times, then whenever you read the book (or any portion
5366 of it) beyond the fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to
5367 the copyright owner's wish.
5369 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim just now is
5370 not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim is only to make
5371 clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other points also become
5374 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker ever
5375 intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the presumptively
5376 unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no evidence at all that
5377 policy makers had this idea in mind when they allowed our policy here to
5378 shift. Unregulated uses were an important part of free culture before the
5381 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of transformative
5382 uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand the wrong in
5383 commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
5384 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>any
</em></span> transformation you make of creative work using a
5385 machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become crimes. Tinkering with
5386 a story and releasing it to others exposes the tinkerer to at least a
5387 requirement of justification. However troubling the expansion with respect
5388 to copying a particular work, it is extraordinarily troubling with respect
5389 to transformative uses of creative work.
5392 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary burden
5393 on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear. If a
5394 copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read a book
5395 on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a violation of
5396 my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation about whether I
5397 have a fair use right to read, because before the Internet, reading did not
5398 trigger the application of copyright law and hence the need for a fair use
5399 defense. The right to read was effectively protected before because reading
5402 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for free
5403 culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights depend upon fair
5404 use
—never even addressing the earlier question about the expansion in
5405 effective regulation. A thin protection grounded in fair use makes sense
5406 when the vast majority of uses are
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>unregulated
</em></span>. But
5407 when everything becomes presumptively regulated, then the protections of
5408 fair use are not enough.
5410 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was in the
5411 business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available to video
5412 stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
5413 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put the
5414 trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
5416 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began to
5417 think about the Internet as another way to distribute these previews. The
5418 idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by giving on-line
5419 stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can
5420 read a few pages of a book before you buy the book, so, too, you would be
5421 able to sample a bit from the movie on-line before you bought it.
5424 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors that it
5425 intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet (rather than
5426 sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two years later, Disney
5427 told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video Pipeline asked Disney to
5428 talk about the matter
—he had built a business on distributing this
5429 content as a way to help sell Disney films; he had customers who depended
5430 upon his delivering this content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video
5431 Pipeline stopped the distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it
5432 was within their "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So
5433 they filed a lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in
5436 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages were
5437 predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully infringed" on
5438 Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of willful infringement, it
5439 can award damages not on the basis of the actual harm to the copyright
5440 owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the statute. Because Video
5441 Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of Disney movies to enable
5442 video stores to sell copies of those movies, Disney was now suing Video
5443 Pipeline for $
100 million.
5445 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
5446 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
5447 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim in
5448 court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
5449 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
5450 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
5451 Disney's permission.
5453 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts would
5454 consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change that gives
5455 Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't really control how
5456 people got access to their content. Once a video was in the marketplace, the
5457 "first-sale doctrine" would free the seller to use the video as he wished,
5458 including showing portions of it in order to engender sales of the entire
5459 movie video. But with the Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to
5460 centralize control over access to this content. Because each use of the
5461 Internet produces a copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the
5462 copyright owner's control. The technology expands the scope of effective
5463 control, because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
5467 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for control
5468 is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the right to say you
5469 can't touch a book in their store; property law gives them that right. But
5470 the market effectively protects against that abuse. If Barnes
& Noble
5471 banned browsing, then consumers would choose other bookstores. Competition
5472 protects against the extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does
5473 not even question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger
5474 when it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
5475 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you read
5476 a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But in a
5477 competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this happening
5480 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
5481 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
5482 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
5483 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private owners
5484 choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But in some
5485 contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
5486 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Arkitektur og lov: Makt"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"lawforce"></a>Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5487 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a second
5488 important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
5489 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
5490 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
5492 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
5493 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law. The law,
5494 meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human, trained in the
5495 tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that tradition embraced,
5496 who said whether and how the law would restrict your freedom.
5497 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629260"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxmarxbrothers"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxwarnerbrothers"></a><p>
5498 Det er en berømt historie om en kamp mellom Marx-brødrene (the Marx
5499 Brothers) og Warner Brothers. Marx-brødrene planla å lage en parodi av
5500 <em class=
"citetitle">Casablanca
</em>. Warner Brothers protesterte. De skrev et
5501 ufint brev til Marx-brødrene og advarte dem om at det ville få seriøse
5502 juridiske konsekvenser hvis de gikk videre med sin plan.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2629307" href=
"#ftn.id2629307" class=
"footnote">136</a>]
</sup>
5504 Dette fikk Marx-brødrene til å svare tilbake med samme mynt. De advarte
5505 Warner Brothers om at Marx-brødrene "var brødre lenge før dere var
5506 det".
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2629328" href=
"#ftn.id2629328" class=
"footnote">137</a>]
</sup> Marx-brødrene eide derfor ordet
5507 <em class=
"citetitle">Brothers
</em>, og hvis Warner Brothers insisterte på å
5508 forsøke å kontrollere
<em class=
"citetitle">Casablanca
</em>, så ville
5509 Marx-brødrene insistere på kontroll over
<em class=
"citetitle">Brothers
</em>.
5511 Det var en absurd og hul trussel, selvfølgelig, fordi Warner Brothers, på
5512 samme måte som Marx-brødrene, visste at ingen domstol noensinne ville
5513 håndheve et slikt dumt krav. Denne ekstremismen var irrelevant for de ekte
5514 friheter som alle (inkludert Warner Brothers) nøt godt av.
5516 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on the
5517 Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a machine:
5518 Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by the copyright
5519 owner, get built into the technology that delivers copyrighted content. It
5520 is code, rather than law, that rules. And the problem with code regulations
5521 is that, unlike law, code has no shame. Code would not get the humor of the
5522 Marx Brothers. The consequence of that is not at all funny.
5523 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629387"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629395"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxadobeebookreader"></a><p>
5524 La oss se på livet til min Adobe eBook Reader.
5526 En ebok er en bok levert i elektronisk form. En Adobe eBook er ikke en bok
5527 som Adobe har publisert. Adobe produserer kun programvaren som utgivere
5528 bruker å levere e-bøker. Den bidrar med teknologien, og utgiveren leverer
5529 innholdet ved hjelp av teknologien.
5531 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook Reader.
5534 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this e-book
5535 library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the public domain:
5536 <em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em>, for example, is in the public domain.
5537 Some of them reproduce content that is not in the public domain: My own book
5538 <em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em> is not yet within the public
5539 domain. Consider
<em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em> first. If you click on
5540 my e-book copy of
<em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em>, you'll see a fancy
5541 cover, and then a button at the bottom called Permissions.
5542 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1611"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.12. Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1611.png" alt=
"Bilde av en gammel versjon av Adobe eBook Reader."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5543 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the permissions
5544 that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
5545 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1612"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.13. List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1612.png" alt=
"List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5548 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the clipboard
5549 of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far, I've copied no
5550 text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to print ten pages from
5551 the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the permission to use the Read Aloud
5552 button to hear
<em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em> read aloud through the
5555 Her er e-boken for et annet allemannseid verk (inkludert oversettelsen):
5556 Aristoteles
<em class=
"citetitle">Politikk
</em> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629519"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629525"></a>
5557 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1621"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.14. E-bok av Aristoteles "Politikk"
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1621.png" alt='E-bok av Aristoteles
"Politikk"'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5558 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted at
5559 all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear the book.
5560 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1622"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.15. Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles "Politikk".
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1622.png" alt='Liste med tillatelser for Aristotles
"Politikk".'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5561 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the original
5562 e-book version of my last book,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em>:
5563 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1631"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.16. List of the permissions for "The Future of Ideas".
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1631.png" alt='List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas".'
></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5564 Ingen kopiering, ingen utskrift, og våg ikke å prøve å lytte til denne
5567 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls "permissions"
— as if
5568 the publisher has the power to control how you use these works. For works
5569 under copyright, the copyright owner certainly does have the power
—up
5570 to the limits of the copyright law. But for work not under copyright, there
5571 is no such copyright power.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2629604" href=
"#ftn.id2629604" class=
"footnote">138</a>]
</sup> When my
5572 e-book of
<em class=
"citetitle">Middlemarch
</em> says I have the permission to
5573 copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten days, what that
5574 really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the publisher to control
5575 how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the control that the law would
5578 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology within
5579 which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are permissions,
5580 they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us deal with. When a
5581 teenager gets "permission" to stay out till midnight, she knows (unless
5582 she's Cinderella) that she can stay out till
2 A.M., but will suffer a
5583 punishment if she's caught. But when the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the
5584 permission to make ten copies of the text into the computer's memory, that
5585 means that after I've made ten copies, the computer will not make any
5586 more. The same with the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook
5587 Reader will not print any more pages. It's the same with the silly
5588 restriction that says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my
5589 book aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
5590 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply won't
5594 These are
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>controls
</em></span>, not permissions. Imagine a world
5595 where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when you tried
5596 to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the sentence.
5597 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629660"></a>
5599 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
5600 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>law
</em></span> as copyright
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>code
</em></span>. The
5601 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified by
5602 courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that are coded
5603 by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into the law are
5604 always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are built into the
5605 technology have no similar built-in check.
5607 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the controls
5608 built into the technology? Software used to be sold with technologies that
5609 limited the ability of users to copy the software, but those were trivial
5610 protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial to defeat these protections
5613 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe eBook
5616 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
5617 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free on the
5618 Adobe site was a copy of
<em class=
"citetitle">Alice's Adventures in
5619 Wonderland
</em>. This wonderful book is in the public domain. Yet
5620 when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the following report:
5621 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629711"></a>
5622 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1641"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.17. List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland".
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1641.png" alt=
"List of the permissions for "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland"."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5625 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to copy,
5626 not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the "permissions"
5627 indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
5629 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission. For the
5630 text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read Aloud button;
5631 it said you did not have the permission to read the book aloud. That led
5632 some people to think that Adobe was restricting the right of parents, for
5633 example, to read the book to their children, which seemed, to say the least,
5636 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying to
5637 restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only restricting
5638 the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book read aloud. But
5639 the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would Adobe thus agree that a
5640 consumer was free to use software to hack around the restrictions built into
5641 the eBook Reader? If some company (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to
5642 disable the technological protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a
5643 blind person, say, could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe
5644 agree that such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer
5645 because the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
5647 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most innovative
5648 companies developing strategies to balance open access to content with
5649 incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's technology enables
5650 control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this control. That incentive
5651 is understandable, yet what it creates is often crazy.
5652 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629778"></a><p>
5653 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite story
5654 of mine that makes the same point.
5655 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxaibo"></a><p>
5656 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo learns tricks,
5657 cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity and that doesn't
5658 leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
5661 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world have set up
5662 clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web site to enable
5663 information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set up aibopet.com
5664 (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site), and on that site he
5665 provided information about how to teach an Aibo to do tricks in addition to
5666 the ones Sony had taught it.
5668 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers. You
5669 teach a computer how to do something by programming it differently. So to
5670 say that aibopet.com was giving information about how to teach the dog to do
5671 new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com was giving information to users
5672 of the Aibo pet about how to hack their computer "dog" to make it do new
5673 tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
5675 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
5676 <em class=
"citetitle">hack
</em> has a particularly unfriendly
5677 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror
5678 movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them,
5679 <em class=
"citetitle">hack
</em> is a much more positive
5680 term.
<em class=
"citetitle">Hack
</em> just means code that enables the program
5681 to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy a
5682 new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer doesn't
5683 run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be happy
5684 to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a driver to enable
5685 the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
5687 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a community like
5688 to challenge themselves and others with increasingly difficult
5689 tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
5690 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
5693 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program and
5694 offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to dance
5695 jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever bit of
5696 tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature than Sony had
5698 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629873"></a><p>
5700 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the United
5701 States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience, is it
5702 permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We forget that
5703 stories about the backcountry still flow across much of the world. So let's
5704 just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime anywhere (anymore) to
5705 dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog to dance jazz. Nor should it
5706 be a crime (though we don't have a lot to go on here) to teach your robot
5707 dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a completely legal activity. One imagines
5708 that the owner of aibopet.com thought,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>What possible problem could
5709 there be with teaching a robot dog to dance?
</em></span>
5711 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
— not
5712 literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic named Ed
5713 Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic is well known and
5714 respected. He was hired by the government in the Microsoft case to test
5715 Microsoft's claims about what could and could not be done with its own
5716 code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his brilliance and his
5717 coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft lawyers, Ed Felten stood his
5718 ground. He was not about to be bullied into being silent about something he
5721 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2629919" href=
"#ftn.id2629919" class=
"footnote">139</a>]
</sup> He and a group of colleagues were working on a
5722 paper to be submitted at conference. The paper was intended to describe the
5723 weakness in an encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
5724 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
5726 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content owners to
5727 exercise much better control over their content than the Internet, as it
5728 originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI hoped to develop a
5729 standard that would allow the content owner to say "this music cannot be
5730 copied," and have a computer respect that command. The technology was to be
5731 part of a "trusted system" of control that would get content owners to trust
5732 the system of the Internet much more.
5734 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition. In
5735 exchange for providing contestants with the code to an SDMI-encrypted bit of
5736 content, contestants were to try to crack it and, if they did, report the
5737 problems to the consortium.
5741 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and the
5742 team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption systems
5743 would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team thought it
5744 worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
5746 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
5747 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not just
5748 because it is the law, but also because it is a really great idea. A
5749 strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to encourage a wide
5750 range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in turn, to improve the
5751 systems or people or ideas criticized.
5753 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper describing
5754 the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free music, or
5755 building and deploying this technology. The paper was an academic essay,
5756 unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the weakness in the
5757 SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently constituted, succeed.
5759 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they then
5760 received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the aibopet.com
5761 hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony wrote:
5762 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
5763 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent AIBO-ware's
5764 copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the anti-circumvention
5765 provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
5766 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5767 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system of
5768 encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter from an
5769 RIAA lawyer that read:
5770 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
5772 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the Public
5773 Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by the
5774 Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions under the
5775 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
5776 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5777 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the spread
5778 of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made spreading such
5779 information an offense.
5781 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear about
5782 cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively dead; the
5783 response was to find technologies that might compensate. These new
5784 technologies would be copyright protection technologies
— technologies
5785 to control the replication and distribution of copyrighted material. They
5786 were designed as
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>code
</em></span> to modify the original
5787 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>code
</em></span> of the Internet, to reestablish some protection
5788 for copyright owners.
5790 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this code
5791 designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
5792 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>legal code
</em></span> intended to buttress
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>software
5793 code
</em></span> which itself was intended to support the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>legal
5794 code of copyright
</em></span>.
5796 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to the
5797 extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did not end at
5798 the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated devices that were
5799 designed to circumvent copyright protection measures. It was designed to ban
5800 those devices, whether or not the use of the copyrighted material made
5801 possible by that circumvention would have been a copyright violation.
5804 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
5805 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to dance
5806 jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted material. But
5807 as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did not enable
5808 subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that aibopet.com's hack
5809 was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet fair use is not a defense
5810 to the DMCA. The question is not whether the use of the copyrighted material
5811 was a copyright violation. The question is whether a copyright protection
5812 system was circumvented.
5814 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the same line
5815 of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a copyright protection
5816 system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer suggested, Felten himself was
5817 distributing a circumvention technology. Thus, even though he was not
5818 himself infringing anyone's copyright, his academic paper was enabling
5819 others to infringe others' copyright.
5821 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
1981 by
5822 Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that the VCR could
5823 be banned because it was a copyright-infringing technology: It enabled
5824 consumers to copy films without the permission of the copyright owner. No
5825 doubt there were uses of the technology that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
5826 "
<em class=
"citetitle">Mr. Rogers
</em>," for example, had testified in that case
5827 that he wanted people to feel free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
5828 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630154"></a>
5829 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
5830 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
5831 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that it's
5832 a real service to families to be able to record such programs and show them
5833 at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the advent of all of this
5834 new technology that allows people to tape the "Neighborhood" off-the-air,
5835 and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood" because that's what I produce, that
5836 they then become much more active in the programming of their family's
5837 television life. Very frankly, I am opposed to people being programmed by
5838 others. My whole approach in broadcasting has always been "You are an
5839 important person just the way you are. You can make healthy decisions."
5840 Maybe I'm going on too long, but I just feel that anything that allows a
5841 person to be more active in the control of his or her life, in a healthy
5842 way, is important.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630181" href=
"#ftn.id2630181" class=
"footnote">140</a>]
</sup>
5843 </p></blockquote></div><p>
5846 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were some uses
5847 that were illegal, the court held the companies producing the VCR
5850 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to the DMCA.
5851 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630214"></a>
5853 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
5855 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright circumvention
5856 technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for different
5857 ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive pirating of
5858 copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used to enable the use
5859 of particular copyrighted materials in ways that would be considered fair
5860 use
—a good end.
5863 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most would agree
5864 such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target practice or to
5865 protect against an intruder. At least some would say that such a use would
5866 be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good and bad uses.
5867 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1711"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.18. VCR/handgun cartoon.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1711.png" alt=
"VCR/handgun cartoon."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
5868 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world where guns
5869 are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and circumvention
5870 technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>No one ever died from copyright
5871 circumvention
</em></span>. Yet the law bans circumvention technologies
5872 absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some good, but permits
5873 guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630273"></a>
5875 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are changing the
5876 balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright owners restrict
5877 fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would attempt to evade the
5878 restrictions on fair use that they impose through code. Technology becomes a
5879 means by which fair use can be erased; the law of the DMCA backs up that
5882 This is how
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>code
</em></span> becomes
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>law
</em></span>. The
5883 controls built into the technology of copy and access protection become
5884 rules the violation of which is also a violation of the law. In this way,
5885 the code extends the law
—increasing its regulation, even if the
5886 subject it regulates (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute
5887 fair use) is beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the
5888 law; code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
5889 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the nasty
5890 letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
5892 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and law
5893 that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is the ease
5894 with which infringements of the law can be detected. For contrary to the
5895 rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the Internet, no one
5896 knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing technologies deployed on
5897 the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who committed a legal wrong. The
5898 technologies of the Internet are open to snoops as well as sharers, and the
5899 snoops are increasingly good at tracking down the identity of those who
5904 For example, imagine you were part of a
<em class=
"citetitle">Star Trek
</em> fan
5905 club. You gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of
5906 fan fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
5907 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then simply
5908 continue it.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630333" href=
"#ftn.id2630333" class=
"footnote">141</a>]
</sup>
5910 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated activity.
5911 No matter what happened inside your club room, you would never be interfered
5912 with by the copyright police. You were free in that space to do as you
5913 wished with this part of our culture. You were allowed to build on it as you
5914 wished without fear of legal control.
5916 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
5917 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
5918 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would quickly find
5919 your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon the ownership of the
5920 series that you're depicting, could well inspire a lawyer's threat. And
5921 ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely costly indeed. The law of
5922 copyright is extremely efficient. The penalties are severe, and the process
5925 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change in the
5926 ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts the law's
5927 balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at which you
5928 traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just one step before
5929 the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you transmitted. That
5930 is, in effect, what is happening here.
5931 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Marked: Konsentrasjon"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"marketconcentration"></a>Marked: Konsentrasjon
</h2></div></div></div><p>
5933 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in the past
5934 thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as well
—from
5935 regulating only publishers to now regulating just about everyone. And
5936 copyright's reach has changed, as every action becomes a copy and hence
5937 presumptively regulated. And as technologists find better ways to control
5938 the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly enforced through
5939 technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is easier to find and
5940 easier to control. This regulation of the creative process, which began as a
5941 tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the market for creative work, has
5942 become the single most important regulator of creativity there is. It is a
5943 massive expansion in the scope of the government's control over innovation
5944 and creativity; it would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth
5945 to copyright's control.
5947 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it weren't
5948 for one more change that we must also consider. This is a change that is in
5949 some sense the most familiar, though its significance and scope are not well
5950 understood. It is the one that creates precisely the reason to be concerned
5951 about all the other changes I have described.
5953 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media. In
5954 the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone a radical
5955 alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the media. Before
5956 this change happened, the different forms of media were owned by separate
5957 media companies. Now, the media is increasingly owned by only a few
5958 companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC announced in June
2003,
5959 most expect that within a few years, we will live in a world where just
5960 three companies control more than percent of the media.
5962 Det er her to sorter endringer: omfanget av konsentrasjon, og dens natur.
5963 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630445"></a><p>
5964 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John McCain
5965 summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media ownership, "five
5966 companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630456" href=
"#ftn.id2630456" class=
"footnote">142</a>]
</sup> The five recording labels of Universal Music Group,
5967 BMG, Sony Music Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8
5968 percent of the U.S. music market.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630468" href=
"#ftn.id2630468" class=
"footnote">143</a>]
</sup> The
5969 "five largest cable companies pipe programming to
74 percent of the cable
5970 subscribers nationwide."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630481" href=
"#ftn.id2630481" class=
"footnote">144</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630492"></a>
5973 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation, the
5974 nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
5975 seventy-five stations. Today
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>one
</em></span> company owns more than
5976 1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the total number of
5977 radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most markets, the two largest
5978 broadcasters control
74 percent of that market's revenues. Overall, just
5979 four companies control
90 percent of the nation's radio advertising
5982 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today, there are
5983 six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than there were
5984 eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the nation's
5985 circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in the United
5986 States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all film revenue. The
5987 ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent of all cable
5988 revenue. This is a market far from the free press the framers sought to
5989 protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well protected
— by the
5992 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious change is in
5993 the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows put it in a recent
5994 article about Rupert Murdoch,
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630524"></a>
5995 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
5996 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system unmatched in its
5997 integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
… Fox TV shows
5998 … Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus newspapers and books. They
5999 sell the content to the public and to advertisers
—in newspapers, on
6000 the broadcast network, on the cable channels. And they operate the physical
6001 distribution system through which the content reaches the
6002 customers. Murdoch's satellite systems now distribute News Corp. content in
6003 Europe and Asia; if Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that
6004 system will serve the same function in the United States.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630548" href=
"#ftn.id2630548" class=
"footnote">145</a>]
</sup>
6005 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6006 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not just large
6007 companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies owning as many
6008 outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this pattern better than a
6009 thousand words could do:
6010 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-1761"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
11.19. Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap.
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/1761.png" alt=
"Mønster for moderne mediaeierskap."></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
6013 Betyr denne konsentrasjonen noe? Påvirker det hva som blir laget, eller hva
6014 som blir distribuert? Eller er det bare en mer effektiv måte å produsere og
6015 distribuere innhold?
6017 Mitt syn var at konsentrasjonen ikke betød noe. Jeg tenkte det ikke var noe
6018 mer enn en mer effektiv finansiell struktur. Men nå, etter å ha lest og
6019 hørt på en haug av skapere prøve å overbevise meg om det motsatte, har jeg
6020 begynt å endre mening.
6022 Her er en representativ historie som kan foreslå hvorfor denne integreringen
6024 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630627"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630634"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630640"></a><p>
6025 I
1969 laget Norman Lear en polit for
<em class=
"citetitle">All in the
6026 Family
</em>. Han tok piloten til ABC, og nettverket likte det ikke.
6027 Da sa til Lear at det var for på kanten. Gjør det om igjen. Lear lagde
6028 piloten på nytt, mer på kanten enn den første. ABC ble fra seg. Du får
6029 ikke med deg poenget, fortalte de Lear. Vi vil ha det mindre på kanten,
6032 I stedet for å føye seg, to Lear ganske enkelt serien sin til noen andre.
6033 CBS var glad for å ha seriene, og ABC kunne ikke stoppe Lear fra å gå til
6034 andre. Opphavsretten som Lear hadde sikret uavhengighet fra
6035 nettverk-kontroll.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630673" href=
"#ftn.id2630673" class=
"footnote">146</a>]
</sup>
6040 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade the
6041 networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law required a
6042 separation between the networks and the content producers; that separation
6043 would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992, because of these rules,
6044 the vast majority of prime time television
—75 percent of it
—was
6045 "independent" of the networks.
6047 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence. After
6048 that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985, there were
6049 twenty-five independent television production studios; in
2002, only five
6050 independent television studios remained. "In
1992, only
15 percent of new
6051 series were produced for a network by a company it controlled. Last year,
6052 the percentage of shows produced by controlled companies more than
6053 quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16 new series were produced
6054 independently of conglomerate control, last year there was one."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630704" href=
"#ftn.id2630704" class=
"footnote">147</a>]
</sup> In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was
6055 owned by the networks that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
6056 2002, the number of prime time television hours per week produced by network
6057 studios increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television
6058 hours per week produced by independent studios decreased
63%."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630747" href=
"#ftn.id2630747" class=
"footnote">148</a>]
</sup>
6059 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630754"></a><p>
6060 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<em class=
"citetitle">All in the
6061 Family
</em> would find that he had the choice either to make the show
6062 less edgy or to be fired: The content of any show developed for a network is
6063 increasingly owned by the network.
6065 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership of
6066 those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As Barry
6067 Diller said to Bill Moyers,
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630776"></a>
6068 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630782"></a>
6069 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
6070 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on their
6071 channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes through their
6072 controlled distribution system, then what you get is fewer and fewer actual
6073 voices participating in the process. [We u]sed to have dozens and dozens of
6074 thriving independent production companies producing television programs. Now
6075 you have less than a handful.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630801" href=
"#ftn.id2630801" class=
"footnote">149</a>]
</sup>
6076 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6077 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such large
6078 and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous. Increasingly
6079 safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows from networks like
6080 this is increasingly tailored to the message the network wants to
6081 convey. This is not the communist party, though from the inside, it must
6082 feel a bit like the communist party. No one can question without risk of
6083 consequence
—not necessarily banishment to Siberia, but punishment
6084 nonetheless. Independent, critical, different views are quashed. This is not
6085 the environment for a democracy.
6086 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630825"></a><p>
6087 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
6088 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
6089 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
6090 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business. The
6091 same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media companies
6092 would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630853" href=
"#ftn.id2630853" class=
"footnote">150</a>]
</sup> Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not,
6093 sprint. Yet if the field is only open to the giants, there will be far too
6094 little sprinting.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630881"></a>
6096 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media market to say
6097 with certainty what concentration and integration will do. The efficiencies
6098 are important, and the effect on culture is hard to measure.
6100 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly suggest
6103 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
6104 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
6105 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
6108 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to any
6109 position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound mistake. I
6110 am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once wrecked by
6111 drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were all quite legal. I
6112 believe this war is a profound mistake because the collateral damage from it
6113 is so great as to make waging the war insane. When you add together the
6114 burdens on the criminal justice system, the desperation of generations of
6115 kids whose only real economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the
6116 queering of constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance
6117 this war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
6118 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the local
6119 drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal benefit in
6120 reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly outweigh these costs.
6122 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it is
6123 through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we depend
6124 fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about these issues.
6126 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched a
6127 media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced scores
6128 of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In one series
6129 (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing the idea of
6130 legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral damage from the
6131 war. One advances an argument in favor of drug legalization. The other
6132 responds in a powerful and effective way against the argument of the
6133 first. In the end, the first guy changes his mind (hey, it's
6134 television). The plug at the end is a damning attack on the pro-legalization
6137 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
6138 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
6140 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
6141 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
6142 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
6146 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
6147 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in the
6148 world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your message will be
6151 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
6152 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
6153 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are controversial.
6154 This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with the First Amendment, but
6155 the Supreme Court has held that stations have the right to choose what they
6156 run. Thus, the major channels of commercial media will refuse one side of a
6157 crucial debate the opportunity to present its case. And the courts will
6158 defend the rights of the stations to be this biased.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2630995" href=
"#ftn.id2630995" class=
"footnote">151</a>]
</sup>
6160 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived in a
6161 media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the media throws
6162 that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies control access to the
6163 media, and that handful of companies gets to decide which political
6164 positions it will allow to be promoted on its channels, then in an obvious
6165 and important way, concentration matters. You might like the positions the
6166 handful of companies selects. But you should not like a world in which a
6167 mere few get to decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
6168 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Sammen"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"together"></a>Sammen
</h2></div></div></div><p>
6169 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the copyright
6170 warriors that the government should "protect my property." In the abstract,
6171 it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally harmless. No sane sort who is
6172 not an anarchist could disagree.
6175 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
— when we
6176 recognize how it might now interact with both technology and markets to mean
6177 that the effective constraint on the liberty to cultivate our culture is
6178 dramatically different
—the claim begins to seem less innocent and
6179 obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to supplement the law's control,
6180 and (
2) the power of concentrated markets to weaken the opportunity for
6181 dissent, if strictly enforcing the massively expanded "property" rights
6182 granted by copyright fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture
6183 to cultivate and build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this
6184 property should be redefined.
6186 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish copyright
6187 or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total mistake,
6188 disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within our culture
6191 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
6192 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
6193 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
6194 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
6195 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider whether
6196 another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that increases
6197 copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its term. Rather, an
6198 adjustment to restore the balance that has traditionally defined copyright's
6199 regulation
—a weakening of that regulation, to strengthen creativity.
6201 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of constant
6202 commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and geeks now
6203 flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a short period of
6204 time, as the technologies of distribution and creation have changed and as
6205 lobbyists have pushed for more control by copyright holders. Changes in the
6206 past in response to changes in technology suggest that we may well need
6207 similar changes in the future. And these changes have to be
6208 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>reductions
</em></span> in the scope of copyright, in response to
6209 the extraordinary increase in control that technology and the market enable.
6212 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that we
6213 see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add together
6214 the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and changing technology,
6215 together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Never in our
6216 history have fewer had a legal right to control more of the development of
6217 our culture than now
</em></span>.
6219 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were perpetual, they
6220 affected only that precise creative work. Not when only publishers had the
6221 tools to publish, for the market then was much more diverse. Not when there
6222 were only three television networks, for even then, newspapers, film
6223 studios, radio stations, and publishers were independent of the
6224 networks.
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Never
</em></span> has copyright protected such a wide
6225 range of rights, against as broad a range of actors, for a term that was
6226 remotely as long. This form of regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny
6227 part of the creative energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a
6228 massive regulation of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus
6229 the market now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the
6230 most significant regulation of culture that our free society has
6231 known.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2631198" href=
"#ftn.id2631198" class=
"footnote">152</a>]
</sup>
6233 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
6235 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
6236 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have distinguished
6237 between copying a work and transforming it. We can now combine these two
6238 distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes that copyright law has
6239 undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
6240 </p><div class=
"table"><a name=
"t2"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Tabell
11.1. Law status in
1790</b></p><div class=
"table-contents"><table summary=
"Law status in 1790" border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char"> </th><th align=
"char">Publiser
</th><th align=
"char">TRANSFORM
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Ikke-kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class=
"table-break"><p>
6242 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by copyright
6243 law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as copyright attached
6244 only with registration, and only those who intended to benefit commercially
6245 would register, copying through publishing of noncommercial work was also
6248 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
6249 </p><div class=
"table"><a name=
"t3"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Tabell
11.2. Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory
</b></p><div class=
"table-contents"><table summary=
"Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory" border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char"> </th><th align=
"char">Publiser
</th><th align=
"char">TRANSFORM
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Ikke-kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class=
"table-break"><p>
6250 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if published,
6251 which again, given the economics of publishing at the time, means if offered
6252 commercially. But noncommercial publishing and transformation were still
6255 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after this
6256 change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the technology of
6257 copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law expanded. Thus by
1975,
6258 as photocopying machines became more common, we could say the law began to
6260 </p><div class=
"table"><a name=
"t4"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Tabell
11.3. Law status in
1975</b></p><div class=
"table-contents"><table summary=
"Law status in 1975" border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char"> </th><th align=
"char">Kopier
</th><th align=
"char">TRANSFORM
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Ikke-kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©/Fri
</td><td align=
"char">Fri
</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class=
"table-break"><p>
6261 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say, copy
6262 machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial market
6263 remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital technologies,
6264 especially in the context of a digital network, means that the law now looks
6266 </p><div class=
"table"><a name=
"t5"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Tabell
11.4. Law status now
</b></p><div class=
"table-contents"><table summary=
"Law status now" border=
"1"><colgroup><col><col><col></colgroup><thead><tr><th align=
"char"> </th><th align=
"char">Kopier
</th><th align=
"char">TRANSFORM
</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td align=
"char">Kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td></tr><tr><td align=
"char">Ikke-kommersiell
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td><td align=
"char">©
</td></tr></tbody></table></div></div><br class=
"table-break"><p>
6268 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most creativity was
6269 not. The law now regulates the full range of creativity
— commercial or
6270 not, transformative or not
—with the same rules designed to regulate
6271 commercial publishers.
6273 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation that does
6274 no good. So the question that we should be asking just now is whether
6275 extending the regulations of copyright law into each of these domains
6276 actually does any good.
6278 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying. But I
6279 also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when regulating (as it
6280 regulates just now) noncommercial copying and, especially, noncommercial
6281 transformation. And increasingly, for the reasons sketched especially in
6282 chapters
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#recorders" title=
"Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne">8</a> and
6283 <a class=
"xref" href=
"#transformers" title=
"Kapittel 9. Kapittel åtte: Omformere">9</a>, one might
6284 well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
6285 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created if
6286 derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
6288 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of course
6289 copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any property, the
6290 state ought to protect it. But first impressions notwithstanding,
6291 historically, this property right (as with all property rights
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2631561" href=
"#ftn.id2631561" class=
"footnote">153</a>]
</sup>) has been crafted to balance the important need to
6292 give authors and artists incentives with the equally important need to
6293 assure access to creative work. This balance has always been struck in light
6294 of new technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
6295 did not control
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>at all
</em></span> the freedom of others to build
6296 upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born free, and for
6297 almost
180 years our country consistently protected a vibrant and rich free
6301 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important limits on
6302 the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very birth of
6303 "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by granting
6304 copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the story of chapter
6305 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a similar concern that is
6306 increasingly under strain as the costs of exercising any fair use right
6307 become unavoidably high (the story of chapter
7). Adding statutory rights
6308 where markets might stifle innovation is another familiar limit on the
6309 property right that copyright is (chapter
8). And granting archives and
6310 libraries a broad freedom to collect, claims of property notwithstanding, is
6311 a crucial part of guaranteeing the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free
6312 cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But the nature of the
6313 property that builds a free culture is very different from the extremist
6314 vision that dominates the debate today.
6316 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In response
6317 to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
6318 Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing and
6319 distributing culture, the law and technology are being transformed in a way
6320 that will undermine our tradition of free culture. The property right that
6321 is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it was, or was intended to
6322 be. The property right that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted
6323 toward an extreme. The opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened
6324 in a world in which creation requires permission and creativity must check
6326 </p></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2627102" href=
"#id2627102" class=
"para">118</a>]
</sup>
6329 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
4794,
6330 H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the Subcommittee on
6331 Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee
6332 on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd
6333 sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
6334 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2627154" href=
"#id2627154" class=
"para">119</a>]
</sup>
6337 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle of
6338 rights that are sometimes associated with a particular object. Thus, my
6339 "property right" to my car gives me the right to exclusive use, but not the
6340 right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For the best effort to connect the
6341 ordinary meaning of "property" to "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
6342 <em class=
"citetitle">Private Property and the Constitution
</em> (New Haven:
6343 Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
6344 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2627489" href=
"#id2627489" class=
"para">120</a>]
</sup>
6347 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't mean
6348 to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they do. Law's
6349 only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a right
6350 self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the other three is
6351 more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<em class=
"citetitle">Code: And Other
6352 Laws of Cyberspace
</em> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6353 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Journal of Legal
6354 Studies
</em>, June
1998.
6355 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2627554" href=
"#id2627554" class=
"para">121</a>]
</sup>
6357 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6358 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6359 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the government. For
6360 instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people think it is meaningless
6361 to say that one's liberty has been restrained. A bridge has washed out, and
6362 it's harder to get from one place to another. To talk about this as a loss
6363 of freedom, they say, is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries
6364 of ordinary life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view,
6365 which depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6366 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view of
6367 liberty. As I argued in
<em class=
"citetitle">Code
</em>, we come from a long
6368 tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question
6369 of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6370 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the fear of
6371 government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
<em class=
"citetitle">On Liberty
</em>
6372 (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously
6373 defended the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the
6374 market; John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and
6375 Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
<em class=
"citetitle">John R. Commons: Selected
6376 Essays
</em> (London: Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with
6377 Disabilities Act increases the liberty of people with physical disabilities
6378 by changing the architecture of certain public places, thereby making access
6379 to those places easier;
42 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>,
6380 section
12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6381 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of those
6382 interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the effective
6383 liberty that each of these groups might face.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2627606"></a>
6384 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2627755" href=
"#id2627755" class=
"para">122</a>]
</sup>
6387 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6388 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
23</a>. For a more recent
6389 analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana R. Schoenberger, "Can
6390 Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6 October
2003, available at
6391 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
24</a>.
6392 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2627804" href=
"#id2627804" class=
"para">123</a>]
</sup>
6395 Fred Warshofsky,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Patent Wars
</em> (New York: Wiley,
6396 1994),
170–71.
6397 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2627970" href=
"#id2627970" class=
"para">124</a>]
</sup>
6400 Se for eksempel James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6401 Environmentalism for the Net?"
<em class=
"citetitle">Duke Law Journal
</em> 47
6403 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628184" href=
"#id2628184" class=
"para">125</a>]
</sup>
6405 William W. Crosskey,
<em class=
"citetitle">Politics and the Constitution in the History
6406 of the United States
</em> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953),
6407 vol.
1,
485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6408 Law of the Land,'
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>the perpetual rights which authors had, or were
6409 supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</em></span>" (emphasis
6410 added). <a class="indexterm
" name="id2628200
"></a>
6411 </p></div><div class="footnote
"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2628250
" href="#id2628250
" class="para
">126</a>] </sup>
6414 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790 to
6415 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <em class="citetitle
">A
6416 History of Book Publishing in the United States</em>, vol. 1,
6417 <em class="citetitle
">The Creation of an Industry, 1630–1865</em> (New
6418 York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000 imprints recorded before 1790, only
6419 twelve were copyrighted under the 1790 act; William J. Maher,
6420 <em class="citetitle
">Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension and the Copyright Law of
6421 1790 in Historical Context</em>, 7–10 (2002), available at
6422 <a class="ulink
" href="http://free-culture.cc/notes/
" target="_top
">link #25</a>. Thus, the
6423 overwhelming majority of works fell immediately into the public domain. Even
6424 those works that were copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly,
6425 because the term of copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was
6426 fourteen years, with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen
6427 years. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </p></div><div class="footnote
"><p><sup>[<a id="ftn.id2628317
" href="#id2628317
" class="para
">127</a>] </sup>
6430 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For instance, of
6431 the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were renewed in 1910. For
6432 a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
6433 "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Studies on
6434 Copyright
</em>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
1963),
6435 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William M. Landes and
6436 Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6437 <em class=
"citetitle">University of Chicago Law Review
</em> 70 (
2003):
471,
6438 498–501, and accompanying figures.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628345" href=
"#id2628345" class=
"para">128</a>]
</sup>
6441 Se Ringer, kap.
9, n.
2.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628449" href=
"#id2628449" class=
"para">129</a>]
</sup>
6444 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the first
6445 year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never more than
6446 thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and Posner,
6447 "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6448 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628573" href=
"#id2628573" class=
"para">130</a>]
</sup>
6451 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of
6452 American Literature,"
29 <em class=
"citetitle">New York University Journal of
6453 International Law and Politics
</em> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth,
6454 ed., Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6456 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628654" href=
"#id2628654" class=
"para">131</a>]
</sup>
6458 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Legal
6459 Affairs
</em>, julu/august
2003,tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
26</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2628681"></a>
6460 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628700" href=
"#id2628700" class=
"para">132</a>]
</sup>
6463 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument about
6464 the difference that copyright law should draw (from the perspective of the
6465 First Amendment) between mere "copies" and derivative works. See Jed
6466 Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,"
6467 <em class=
"citetitle">Yale Law Journal
</em> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see
6468 especially pp.
53–59).
6469 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628751" href=
"#id2628751" class=
"para">133</a>]
</sup>
6472 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law certainly
6473 regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a copyrighted
6474 song, for example, is regulated even though performance per se doesn't make
6475 a copy;
17 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>, section
106(
4). And it
6476 certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy";
17 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
6477 Code
</em>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the existing law
6478 (which regulates "copies;"
17 <em class=
"citetitle">United States Code
</em>,
6479 section
102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6480 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628812" href=
"#id2628812" class=
"para">134</a>]
</sup>
6483 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends, we
6484 should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for its
6485 extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the basis of
6486 arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6487 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2628758" href=
"#id2628758" class=
"para">135</a>]
</sup>
6490 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather
6491 that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not
6492 make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be
6493 designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies
6495 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2629307" href=
"#id2629307" class=
"para">136</a>]
</sup>
6498 Se David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Law and
6499 Contemporary Problems
</em> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
6500 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2629328" href=
"#id2629328" class=
"para">137</a>]
</sup>
6502 Ibid. Se også Vaidhyanathan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyrights and
6503 Copywrongs
</em>,
1–3.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629319"></a>
6504 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2629604" href=
"#id2629604" class=
"para">138</a>]
</sup>
6507 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might, for
6508 example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I will read
6509 it only three times, or that I promise to read it three times. But that
6510 obligation (and the limits for creating that obligation) would come from the
6511 contract, not from copyright law, and the obligations of contract would not
6512 necessarily pass to anyone who subsequently acquired the book.
6513 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2629919" href=
"#id2629919" class=
"para">139</a>]
</sup>
6515 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
6516 <em class=
"citetitle">Science
</em> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
"Play
6517 Dead: Sony Muzzles the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,"
6518 <em class=
"citetitle">American Prospect
</em>, January
2002; "Court Dismisses
6519 Computer Scientists' Challenge to DMCA,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Intellectual Property
6520 Litigation Reporter
</em>,
11 December
2001; Bill Holland, "Copyright
6521 Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Billboard
</em>, May
6522 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com, April
2001;
6523 Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked Questions about
6524 <em class=
"citetitle">Felten and USENIX
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">RIAA
</em>
6525 Legal Case," available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
6526 #
27</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2629956"></a>
6527 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630181" href=
"#id2630181" class=
"para">140</a>]
</sup>
6530 <em class=
"citetitle">Sony Corporation of America
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Universal
6531 City Studios, Inc
</em>.,
464 U.S.
417,
455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers
6532 never changed his view about the VCR. See James Lardner,
<em class=
"citetitle">Fast
6533 Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of the VCR
</em>
6534 (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
6535 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630333" href=
"#id2630333" class=
"para">141</a>]
</sup>
6538 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
6539 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Loyola of Los
6540 Angeles Entertainment Law Journal
</em> 17 (
1997):
651.
6541 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630456" href=
"#id2630456" class=
"para">142</a>]
</sup>
6544 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
6545 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003) (statement
6546 of Senator John McCain).
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630468" href=
"#id2630468" class=
"para">143</a>]
</sup>
6549 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to Slide,"
6550 <em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
23 December
2002.
6551 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630481" href=
"#id2630481" class=
"para">144</a>]
</sup>
6554 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Charleston
6555 Gazette
</em>,
31 May
2003.
6556 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630548" href=
"#id2630548" class=
"para">145</a>]
</sup>
6558 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Atlantic Monthly
</em>
6559 (September
2003):
89.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2630564"></a>
6560 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630673" href=
"#id2630673" class=
"para">146</a>]
</sup>
6563 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center Forum,
6564 "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis, Missouri,
3 April
6565 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
28</a>; for the Lear story,
6566 not included in the prepared remarks, see
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
29</a>).
6567 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630704" href=
"#id2630704" class=
"para">147</a>]
</sup>
6570 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
6571 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
6572 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union and
6573 the Consumer Federation of America), available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
30</a>. Kimmelman quotes
6574 Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West, in her Remarks
6575 at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
2003.
6576 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630747" href=
"#id2630747" class=
"para">148</a>]
</sup>
6580 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630801" href=
"#id2630801" class=
"para">149</a>]
</sup>
6583 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Now with Bill
6584 Moyers
</em>, Bill Moyers,
25 April
2003, redigert avskrift
6585 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
6587 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630853" href=
"#id2630853" class=
"para">150</a>]
</sup>
6590 Clayton M. Christensen,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Innovator's Dilemma: The
6591 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do
6592 Business
</em> (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
6593 1997). Christensen acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean
6594 Kim Clark. See Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and
6595 Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Research
6596 Policy
</em> 14 (
1985):
235–51. For a more recent study, see
6597 Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan,
<em class=
"citetitle">Creative Destruction: Why
6598 Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform the Market
—and How to
6599 Successfully Transform Them
</em> (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
6600 2001).
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2630995" href=
"#id2630995" class=
"para">151</a>]
</sup>
6602 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads that
6603 directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within the
6604 Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against [their]
6605 policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads without reviewing
6606 them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally agreed to run the ads and
6607 accepted payment to do so, but later decided not to run the ads and returned
6608 the collected fees. Interview with Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These
6609 restrictions are, of course, not limited to drug policy. See, for example,
6610 Nat Ives, "On the Issue of an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection
6611 from TV Networks,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
13 March
2003,
6612 C4. Outside of election-related air time there is very little that the FCC
6613 or the courts are willing to do to even the playing field. For a general
6614 overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial
6615 Advertising on Television and Radio,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Yale Law and Policy
6616 Review
</em> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a more recent summary of
6617 the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
<em class=
"citetitle">Radio-Television News
6618 Directors Association
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">FCC
</em>,
184 F.
3d
6619 872 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
6620 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San Francisco
6621 transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni diesel
6622 buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming After Muni
6623 Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
32</a>. The ground was that
6624 the criticism was "too controversial."
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631042"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631051"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631057"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631063"></a>
6625 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631070"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631076"></a>
6626 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2631198" href=
"#id2631198" class=
"para">152</a>]
</sup>
6628 Siva Vaidhyanathan fanger et lignende poeng i hans "fire kapitulasjoner" for
6629 opphavsrettsloven i den digitale tidsalder. Se Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
6630 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631020"></a>
6631 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2631561" href=
"#id2631561" class=
"para">153</a>]
</sup>
6634 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist movement
6635 to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to balance public
6636 and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The Disintegration of Property,"
6637 in
<em class=
"citetitle">Nomos XXII: Property
</em>, J. Roland Pennock and John
6638 W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University Press,
1980).
6639 </p></div></div></div></div><div class=
"part" title=
"Del III. Nøtter"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-puzzles"></a>Del III. Nøtter
</h1></div></div></div><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#chimera">12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#harms">13. Kapittel tolv: Skader
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#constrain">Constraining Creators
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"chimera"></a>Kapittel
12. Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</h2></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxchimera"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxwells"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxtcotb"></a><p>
6640 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez
6641 trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in
6642 the Peruvian Andes.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2631691" href=
"#ftn.id2631691" class=
"footnote">154</a>]
</sup> The valley is
6643 extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture, an even climate,
6644 slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub that bore an excellent
6645 fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez takes this as an
6646 opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells himself, "the One-Eyed
6647 Man is King." So he resolves to live with the villagers to explore life as a
6650 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of sight
6651 to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are "blind."
6652 They don't have the word
<em class=
"citetitle">blind
</em>. They think he's just
6653 thick. Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
6654 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try to
6655 control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You don't
6656 understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and resolute,
6657 and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me alone!'"
6661 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
6662 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his affection,
6663 a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in the whole of
6664 creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's description of what he
6665 sees "seemed to her the most poetical of fancies, and she listened to his
6666 description of the stars and the mountains and her own sweet white-lit
6667 beauty as though it was a guilty indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells
6668 tells us, and "she could only half understand, but she was mysteriously
6671 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted" love,
6672 the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her father instructs,
6673 "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do anything right." They take
6674 Nunez to the village doctor.
6676 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain is
6677 affected," he reports.
6679 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are called the
6680 eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect his brain."
6682 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty that in
6683 order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a simple and easy
6684 surgical operation
—namely, to remove these irritant bodies [the
6688 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform Nunez
6689 of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride. (You'll have
6690 to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I believe in free
6691 culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.) It sometimes happens
6692 that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
6693 "chimera." A chimera is a single creature with two sets of DNA. The DNA in
6694 the blood, for example, might be different from the DNA of the skin. This
6695 possibility is an underused plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows
6696 with
100 percent certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at
6698 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631787"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631795"></a><p>
6699 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were impossible. A
6700 single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea of DNA is that it is
6701 the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only can two individuals have
6702 the same set of DNA (identical twins), but one person can have two different
6703 sets of DNA (a chimera). Our understanding of a "person" should reflect this
6706 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
6707 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not unfairly
6708 enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing with a
6709 chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is p2p file
6710 sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it wrong. One side
6711 says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each others'
6712 records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last thirty years
6713 without any question at all." That's true, at least in part. When I tell my
6714 best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought, but rather than just send
6715 the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that is, in all relevant respects,
6716 just like what every executive in every recording company no doubt did as a
6719 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is on a
6720 p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then sure, my
6721 friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of "friends" beyond
6722 recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can get access. Whether or
6723 not sharing my music with my best friend is what "we have always been
6724 allowed to do," we have not always been allowed to share music with "our ten
6725 thousand best friends."
6727 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking into
6728 a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out with it,"
6729 that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett (finally) releases a
6730 new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa and find a free copy to
6731 take, that is very much like stealing a copy from Tower.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631820"></a>
6736 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD from
6737 Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a CD from
6738 Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and something to show on
6739 my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could also note that when I take a
6740 CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine that might be imposed on me, under
6741 California law, at least, is $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if
6742 I download a ten-song CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
6744 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is that it
6745 is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa describes it. It is
6746 a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the other side asserts, we
6747 need to begin to think about how we should respond to this chimera. What
6748 rules should govern it?
6750 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We could,
6751 with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be a felony. We
6752 could prosecute families for millions of dollars in damages just because
6753 file sharing occurred on a family computer. And we can get universities to
6754 monitor all computer traffic to make sure that no computer is used to commit
6755 this crime. These responses might be extreme, but each of them has either
6756 been proposed or actually implemented.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2631890" href=
"#ftn.id2631890" class=
"footnote">155</a>]
</sup>
6758 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631974"></a><p>
6759 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act as
6760 though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be no
6761 copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making copyrighted
6762 content available on the Net. Make file sharing like gossip: regulated, if
6763 at all, by social norms but not by law.
6765 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake. Rather than
6766 embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace something that
6767 recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book with a sketch of a
6768 system that does just that, my aim in the next chapter is to show just how
6769 awful it would be for us to adopt the zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
6770 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>either
</em></span> extreme would be worse than a reasonable
6771 alternative. But I believe the zero-tolerance solution would be the worse
6772 of the two extremes.
6777 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the middle of
6778 the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary land grab is
6779 occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to give content holders
6780 a kind of control over our culture that they have never had before. And in
6781 this extremism, many an opportunity for new innovation and new creativity
6784 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My focus
6785 instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war will also
6786 kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so broadly among our
6787 citizens, and we have just begun to see the innovation that this power will
6788 unleash. Yet the Internet has already seen the passing of one cycle of
6789 innovation around technologies to distribute content. The law is responsible
6790 for this passing. As the vice president for global public policy at one of
6791 these new innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
6792 protection for copyrighted material,
6793 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
6794 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted material,
6795 and we want to protect those rights.
6797 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the major
6798 labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright interests, nor is it
6799 necessarily the best. It is simply too early to answer that question. Market
6800 forces operating naturally may very well produce a totally different
6803 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make with
6804 respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the market for
6805 digital media and the manner in which digital media are distributed. This in
6806 turn will directly influence the options that are available to consumers,
6807 both in terms of the ease with which they will be able to access digital
6808 media and the equipment that they will require to do so. Poor choices made
6809 this early in the game will retard the growth of this market, hurting
6810 everyone's interests.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632064" href=
"#ftn.id2632064" class=
"footnote">156</a>]
</sup>
6811 </p></blockquote></div><p>
6812 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal, one of "the
6813 major labels." Its position on these matters has now changed.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632087"></a>
6815 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash piracy. It
6816 will sacrifice values that are important to this culture, and will kill
6817 opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
6818 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2631691" href=
"#id2631691" class=
"para">154</a>]
</sup>
6821 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
6822 <em class=
"citetitle">The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</em>, Michael
6823 Sherborne, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
6824 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2631890" href=
"#id2631890" class=
"para">155</a>]
</sup>
6826 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
6827 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, "Copyright
6828 and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003, available at
6829 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
33</a>. Reps. John
6830 Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill
6831 that would treat unauthorized on-line copying as a felony offense with
6832 punishments ranging as high as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
6833 "House Bill Aims to Up Stakes on Piracy,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Los Angeles
6834 Times
</em>,
17 July
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
34</a>. Civil penalties are
6835 currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent (and unsuccessful)
6836 legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP reveal the identity of a
6837 user accused of sharing more than
600 songs through a family computer, see
6838 <em class=
"citetitle">RIAA
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Verizon Internet Services (In
6839 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</em>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
6840 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
6841 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful arsenal
6842 in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from $
12,
000 to
6843 $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on university
6844 networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98 billion the RIAA
6845 could seek should the matter proceed to court. See Elizabeth Young,
6846 "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com, August
2003, available
6847 at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
35</a>. For an
6848 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
6849 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer identities,
6850 see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to Name Students,"
6851 <em class=
"citetitle">Boston Globe
</em>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
36</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631957"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2631965"></a>
6852 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632064" href=
"#id2632064" class=
"para">156</a>]
</sup>
6855 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
6856 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
6857 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, House
6858 Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter Harter,
6859 vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards, EMusic.com), available
6860 in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony File.
</p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 13. Kapittel tolv: Skader"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"harms"></a>Kapittel
13. Kapittel tolv: Skader
</h2></div></div></div><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#constrain">Constraining Creators
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></span></dt></dl></div><p>
6862 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has launched
6863 a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
6864 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both direct
6865 and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these damages will be
6866 suffered most by our own people.
6868 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
6869 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to extend
6870 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war justified?
6872 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the first
6873 time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the power of
6874 the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in our
6876 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632134"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632141"></a><p>
6877 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on the
6878 side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims of control
6879 in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical rejection of "piracy"
6884 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to describe
6885 just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite confident
6886 the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The first two
6887 protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in the wings to fight
6888 today's monopolists of culture.
6889 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"Constraining Creators"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"constrain"></a>Constraining Creators
</h2></div></div></div><p>
6890 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital technologies.
6891 These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture and share
6892 content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what humans have done
6893 since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and communicate. But capturing and
6894 sharing through digital technology is different. The fidelity and power are
6895 different. You could send an e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on
6896 Comedy Central, or you could send the clip. You could write an essay about
6897 the inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
6898 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
6899 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could weave
6900 together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your favorite artists
6901 in a collage and make it available on the Net.
6903 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
6904 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture, and in
6905 part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but it explodes
6906 the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology of digital
6907 "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily diverse
6908 creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that creativity is
6909 applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of citizens to use
6910 technology to express and criticize and contribute to the culture all
6914 Teknologien har dermed gitt oss en mulighet til å gjøre noe med kultur som
6915 bare har vært mulig for enkeltpersoner i små grupper, isolert fra andre
6916 grupper. Forestill deg en gammel mann som forteller en historie til en
6917 samling med naboer i en liten landsby. Forestill deg så den samme
6918 historiefortellingen utvidet til å nå over hele verden.
6920 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In the
6921 current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for a
6922 moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web sites that
6923 offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites that catalog
6924 cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound to criticize
6925 politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles on remote
6926 topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative work spread
6927 across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this work is
6928 presumptively illegal.
6930 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the examples of
6931 extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to proliferate. It is
6932 impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed and what's not, and at the
6933 same time, the penalties for crossing the line are astonishingly harsh. The
6934 four students who were threatened by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3
6935 was just one) were threatened with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search
6936 engines that permitted songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which
6937 defrauded investors of $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in
6938 market capitalization of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere
6939 $
750 million.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632247" href=
"#ftn.id2632247" class=
"footnote">157</a>]
</sup> And under legislation
6940 being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who negligently removes the
6941 wrong leg in an operation would be liable for no more than $
250,
000 in
6942 damages for pain and suffering.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632283" href=
"#ftn.id2632283" class=
"footnote">158</a>]
</sup> Can
6943 common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where the maximum fine for
6944 downloading two songs off the Internet is more than the fine for a doctor's
6945 negligently butchering a patient?
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632319"></a>
6947 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely high
6948 penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will either never
6949 be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive this creative
6950 process underground by branding the modern-day Walt Disneys "pirates." We
6951 make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a public domain, because the
6952 boundaries of the public domain are designed to be unclear. It never pays to
6953 do anything except pay for the right to create, and hence only those who can
6954 pay are allowed to create. As was the case in the Soviet Union, though for
6955 very different reasons, we will begin to see a world of underground
6956 art
—not because the message is necessarily political, or because the
6957 subject is controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is
6958 legally fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
6959 States.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2631874" href=
"#ftn.id2631874" class=
"footnote">159</a>]
</sup> In what does their "illegality"
6960 consist? In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that
6961 is critical or reflective.
6963 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the changing
6964 law. I described that change in detail in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
>11</a>. But an even bigger part has to do with
6965 the increasing ease with which infractions can be tracked. As users of
6966 file-sharing systems discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for
6967 copyright owners to get courts to order Internet service providers to reveal
6968 who has what content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a
6969 list of the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that
6970 anyone could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
6972 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether his painting
6973 infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day painter, using the
6974 tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web, must worry all the
6975 time. Images are all around, but the only safe images to use in the act of
6976 creation are those purchased from Corbis or another image farm. And in
6977 purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free market in pencils; we needn't
6978 worry about its effect on creativity. But there is a highly regulated,
6979 monopolized market in cultural icons; the right to cultivate and transform
6980 them is not similarly free.
6982 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I described
6983 in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#recorders" title=
"Kapittel 8. Kapittel sju: Innspillerne">8</a>, in
6984 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have been
6985 lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was fair use, and
6986 hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a use.
6991 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend
6992 your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system for
6993 defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in practically
6994 every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers too
6995 slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the justice
6996 underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable for the very rich.
6997 For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a tradition that prides itself
7000 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
7001 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law should
7002 allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system has become
7003 that anyone actually believes this. The rules that publishers impose upon
7004 writers, the rules that film distributors impose upon filmmakers, the rules
7005 that newspapers impose upon journalists
— these are the real laws
7006 governing creativity. And these rules have little relationship to the "law"
7007 with which judges comfort themselves.
7009 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful infringement of
7010 a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of dollars to even defend
7011 against a copyright infringement claim, and which would never return to the
7012 wrongfully accused defendant anything of the costs she suffered to defend
7013 her right to speak
—in that world, the astonishingly broad regulations
7014 that pass under the name "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in
7015 that world, it takes a studied blindness for people to continue to believe
7016 they live in a culture that is free.
7018 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
7019 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7021 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people are
7022 being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
7023 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still won't
7024 get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not going to
7025 get it distributed in the mainstream media unless you've got a little note
7026 from a lawyer saying, "This has been cleared." You're not even going to get
7027 it on PBS without that kind of permission. That's the point at which they
7029 </p></blockquote></div></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Constraining Innovators"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"innovators"></a>Constraining Innovators
</h2></div></div></div><p>
7030 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty story
—creativity
7031 quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada yada. Maybe that doesn't get you
7032 going. Maybe you think there's enough weird art out there, and enough
7033 expression that is critical of what seems to be just about everything. And
7034 if you think that, you might think there's little in this story to worry
7037 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense. Indeed,
7038 it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme promarket
7039 ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special one at that,
188
7040 pages into a book like this), then you can see this other aspect by
7041 substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of "free culture." The
7042 point is the same, even if the interests affecting culture are more
7045 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the same
7046 charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of course,
7047 concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at a minimum, we
7048 need rules of property and contract, and courts to enforce both. Likewise,
7049 in this culture debate, everyone concedes that at least some framework of
7050 copyright is also required. But both perspectives vehemently insist that
7051 just because some regulation is good, it doesn't follow that more regulation
7052 is better. And both perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which
7053 regulation simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect
7054 themselves against the competitors of tomorrow.
7055 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632514"></a><p>
7057 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory strategy
7058 that I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
>11</a>. The consequence of this massive threat of liability
7059 tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is that innovators who want to
7060 innovate in this space can safely innovate only if they have the sign-off
7061 from last generation's dominant industries. That lesson has been taught
7062 through a series of cases that were designed and executed to teach venture
7063 capitalists a lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry
7064 calls a "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been
7067 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning I told in
7068 <em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em> and which has progressed in a way
7069 that even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
7071 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com was
7072 keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to facilitate new
7073 ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to facilitate new ways to
7074 create content. Unlike the major labels, MP3.com offered creators a venue to
7075 distribute their creativity, without demanding an exclusive engagement from
7078 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
7079 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
7080 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
7081 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie Raitt. And
7082 so on.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632584"></a>
7084 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
7085 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this preference
7086 data. In January
2000, the company launched a service called
7087 my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would sign into an
7088 account and then insert into her computer a CD. The software would identify
7089 the CD, and then give the user access to that content. So, for example, if
7090 you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then wherever you were
—at work or at
7091 home
—you could get access to that music once you signed into your
7092 account. The system was therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
7095 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But that
7096 opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the my.mp3.com
7097 service was to give users access to their own content, and as a by-product,
7098 by seeing the content they already owned, to discover the kind of content
7101 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000 CDs to
7102 a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who uploaded the music,
7103 but that would have taken a great deal of time, and would have produced a
7104 product of questionable quality.) It therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a
7105 store, and started the process of making copies of those CDs. Again, it
7106 would not serve the content from those copies to anyone except those who
7107 authenticated that they had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while
7108 this was
50,
000 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers
7109 something they had already bought.
7110 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxvivendiuniversal"></a><p>
7111 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels, headed
7112 by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled with four of
7113 the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found MP3.com to have been
7114 guilty of willful infringement with respect to the fifth. Applying the law
7115 as it is, the judge imposed a fine against MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com
7116 then settled with the remaining plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over
7117 $
54 million. Vivendi purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
7119 Den delen av historien har jeg fortalt før. Nå kommer konklusjonen.
7121 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
7122 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they had a
7123 good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be considered
7124 legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it should have been
7125 obvious that the courts would find this behavior illegal; therefore, this
7126 lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had dared to suggest that the law
7127 was less restrictive than the labels demanded.
7130 Den åpenbare hensikten med dette søksmålet (som ble avsluttet med et forlik
7131 for et uspesifisert beløp like etter at saken ikke lenger fikk
7132 pressedekning), var å sende en melding som ikke kan misforstås til advokater
7133 som gir råd til klienter på dette området: Det er ikke bare dine klienter
7134 som får lide hvis innholdsindustrien retter sine våpen mot dem. Det får
7135 også du. Så de av dere som tror loven burde være mindre restriktiv bør
7136 innse at et slikt syn på loven vil koste deg og ditt firma dyrt.
7137 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632687"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632696"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632702"></a><p>
7138 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003, Universal
7139 and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the venture capital firm
7140 (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of its development, its
7141 cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner (Hank Barry).
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632715" href=
"#ftn.id2632715" class=
"footnote">160</a>]
</sup> The claim here, as well, was that the VC should
7142 have recognized the right of the content industry to control how the
7143 industry should develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a
7144 company whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim
7145 of the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
7146 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at risk
7147 not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your investment
7148 buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit. So extreme has the
7149 environment become that even car manufacturers are afraid of technologies
7150 that touch content. In an article in
<em class=
"citetitle">Business
2.0</em>,
7151 Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
7152 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632758"></a><p>
7153 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in the car,
7154 there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW engineers in Germany
7155 had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via the car's built-in sound system,
7156 but that the company's marketing and legal departments weren't comfortable
7157 with pushing this forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are
7158 sold in the United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <sup>[
<a name=
"id2632478" href=
"#ftn.id2632478" class=
"footnote">161</a>]
</sup>
7159 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7160 Dette er verden til mafiaen
—fylt med "penger eller livet"-trusler, som
7161 ikke er regulert av domstolene men av trusler som loven gir
7162 rettighetsinnehaver mulighet til å komme med. Det er et system som åpenbart
7163 og nødvendigvis vil kvele ny innovasjon. Det er vanskelig nok å starte et
7164 selskap. Det blir helt umulig hvis selskapet er stadig truet av søksmål.
7169 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
7170 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
7171 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
7172 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and by
7173 embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law imposes, that
7174 uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more conservative than is
7175 right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking tickets, we'd not
7176 only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much less driving. The same
7177 principle applies to innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this
7178 uncertain and unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation
7179 and much less creativity.
7181 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
7182 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in both
7183 contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation will
7184 systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect some
7185 industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and creativity
7186 generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant competition.
7187 Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this kind of competition.
7188 The effect is to produce an overregulated culture, just as the effect of too
7189 much control in the market is to produce an overregulatedregulated market.
7192 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is the
7193 first important way in which the changes I have described will burden
7194 innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's culture
—a culture in
7195 which the ability to create requires a call to your lawyer. Again, I am not
7196 antilawyer, at least when they're kept in their proper place. I am certainly
7197 not antilaw. But our profession has lost the sense of its limits. And
7198 leaders in our profession have lost an appreciation of the high costs that
7199 our profession imposes upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an
7200 embarrassment to our tradition. And while I believe our profession should
7201 therefore do everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at
7202 least do everything it can to limit the reach of the law where the law is
7203 not doing any good. The transaction costs buried within a permission culture
7204 are enough to bury a wide range of creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of
7205 justifying to justify that result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden
7206 on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more directly. This is
7207 the effort by many in the content industry to use the law to directly
7208 regulate the technology of the Internet so that it better protects their
7211 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
7212 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the Internet's
7213 design. But from the perspective of the content industry, this feature is a
7214 "bug." The efficient spread of content means that content distributors have
7215 a harder time controlling the distribution of content. One obvious response
7216 to this efficiency is thus to make the Internet less efficient. If the
7217 Internet enables "piracy," then, this response says, we should break the
7218 kneecaps of the Internet.
7220 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of the
7221 content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that would
7222 require computers to determine whether the content they access is protected
7223 or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632909" href=
"#ftn.id2632909" class=
"footnote">162</a>]
</sup> Congress has already launched proceedings to
7224 explore a mandatory "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device
7225 capable of transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would
7226 disable the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast
7227 flag. Other members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers
7228 from liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
7229 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632932" href=
"#ftn.id2632932" class=
"footnote">163</a>]
</sup>
7233 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the code, why
7234 not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any regulation of technical
7235 infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular technology of the
7236 day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on the technology, but
7237 will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly those requirements.
7239 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by Intel,
7240 tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
7241 impose.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632956" href=
"#ftn.id2632956" class=
"footnote">164</a>]
</sup> Their argument was obviously
7242 not that copyright should not be protected. Instead, they argued, any
7243 protection should not do more harm than good.
7245 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
7246 innovation
—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the free
7249 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form of
7250 regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others. When
7251 done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done wrong, it is
7252 regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
7254 As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
>11</a>, despite this feature of copyright as regulation, and
7255 subject to important qualifications outlined by Jessica Litman in her book
7256 <em class=
"citetitle">Digital Copyright
</em>,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632995" href=
"#ftn.id2632995" class=
"footnote">165</a>]
</sup> overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10
7257 details, when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a
7258 balance to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
7259 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as in the
7260 case of the VCR) has been another.
7262 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed with the
7263 rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between the claims of a
7264 new technology and the legitimate rights of content creators, both the
7265 courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions that will have the
7266 effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
7268 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633031" href=
"#ftn.id2633031" class=
"footnote">166</a>]
</sup> It has been mirrored in the responses threatened
7269 and actually implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
7270 here.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633066" href=
"#ftn.id2633066" class=
"footnote">167</a>]
</sup> But there is one example that
7271 captures the flavor of them all. This is the story of the demise of Internet
7277 As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#pirates" title='Kapittel
5. Kapittel fire:
"Pirater"'
>5</a>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording artist
7278 doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she is also the
7279 composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a version of "Happy
7280 Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous performance before President
7281 Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
— then whenever that recording was
7282 played on the radio, the current copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would
7283 get some money, whereas Marilyn Monroe would not.
7285 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some sense. The
7286 justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The recording artist
7287 thus benefited because by playing her music, the radio station was making it
7288 more likely that her records would be purchased. Thus, the recording artist
7289 got something, even if only indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to
7290 do with the result than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists
7291 were quite good at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require
7292 compensation to the recording artists.
7294 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a technology to
7295 stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The broadcast travels
7296 across the Internet, not across the ether of radio spectrum. Thus, I can
7297 "tune in" to an Internet radio station in Berlin while sitting in San
7298 Francisco, even though there's no way for me to tune in to a regular radio
7299 station much beyond the San Francisco metropolitan area.
7301 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there are
7302 potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user could tune in
7303 to using her computer, whereas under the existing architecture for broadcast
7304 radio, there is an obvious limit to the number of broadcasters and clear
7305 broadcast frequencies. Internet radio could therefore be more competitive
7306 than regular radio; it could provide a wider range of selections. And
7307 because the potential audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche
7308 stations could easily develop and market their content to a relatively large
7309 number of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
7310 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
7315 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an improvement
7316 potentially vastly more significant than the FM improvement over AM, since
7317 not only is the technology better, so, too, is the competition. Indeed,
7318 there is a direct parallel between the fight to establish FM radio and the
7319 fight to protect Internet radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's
7320 struggle to enable FM radio,
7321 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7322 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the shortwaves,
7323 thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in the crowded
7324 longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of stations would be
7325 limited only by economics and competition rather than by technical
7326 restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation that had grown up in
7327 radio to that following the invention of the printing press, when
7328 governments and ruling interests attempted to control this new instrument of
7329 mass communications by imposing restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was
7330 broken only when it became possible for men freely to acquire printing
7331 presses and freely to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention
7332 as the printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
7333 shackles.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632773" href=
"#ftn.id2632773" class=
"footnote">168</a>]
</sup>
7334 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7335 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not because Armstrong
7336 was wrong about the technology, but because he underestimated the power of
7337 "vested interests, habits, customs and legislation"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2632971" href=
"#ftn.id2632971" class=
"footnote">169</a>]
</sup> to retard the growth of this competing technology.
7339 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For again, there
7340 is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of Internet radio
7341 stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are those imposed by the
7342 law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first question we should ask is,
7343 what copyright rules would govern Internet radio?
7346 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a new
7347 industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very powerful
7348 lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon of Internet
7349 radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt a different rule
7350 for Internet radio than the rule that applies to terrestrial radio. While
7351 terrestrial radio does not have to pay our hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when
7352 it plays her hypothetical recording of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
7353 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Internet radio does
</em></span>. Not only is the law not neutral
7354 toward Internet radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more
7355 than it burdens terrestrial radio.
7357 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor William Fisher
7358 estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree popular music to
7359 (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four hours a day, the total
7360 artist fees that radio station would owe would be over $
1 million a
7361 year.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633265" href=
"#ftn.id2633265" class=
"footnote">170</a>]
</sup> A regular radio station
7362 broadcasting the same content would pay no equivalent fee.
7364 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
7365 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio station)
7366 would have to collect the following data from
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>every listening
7367 transaction
</em></span>:
7368 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"1"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7369 name of the service;
7370 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7371 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
7372 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7373 type of program (archived/looped/live);
7374 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7375 date of transmission;
7376 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7377 time of transmission;
7378 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7379 time zone of origination of transmission;
7380 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7381 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
7382 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7383 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
7384 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7385 sound recording title;
7386 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7387 ISRC code of the recording;
7388 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7389 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of
7390 compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of
7392 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7393 featured recording artist;
7394 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7396 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7398 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7399 UPC code of the retail album;
7400 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7402 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7403 copyright owner information;
7404 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7405 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
7406 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7407 name of the service or entity;
7408 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7410 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7411 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
7412 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7413 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
7414 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7415 time zone where the signal was received (user);
7416 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7417 Unique User identifier;
7418 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
7419 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
7420 </p></li></ol></div><p>
7421 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting requirements,
7422 pending further study. And he also changed the original rates set by the
7423 arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the basic difference
7424 between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains: Internet radio has to
7425 pay a
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>type of copyright fee
</em></span> that terrestrial radio does
7428 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the economic
7429 consequences from Internet radio that would justify these differences? Was
7430 the motive to protect artists against piracy?
7431 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633477"></a><p>
7432 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious to
7433 everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public Policy at
7434 Real Networks, told me,
7435 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7437 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented some testimony
7438 about what they thought a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, and
7439 it was much higher. It was ten times higher than what radio stations pay to
7440 perform the same songs for the same period of time. And so the attorneys
7441 representing the webcasters asked the RIAA,
… "How do you come up
7442 with a rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
7443 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and that
7444 should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so high, you're
7445 going to drive the small webcasters out of business.
…"
7447 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an industry
7448 with thousands of webcasters,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>we think it should be an industry
7449 with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a high rate and it's a
7450 stable, predictable market
</em></span>." (Emphasis added.)
7451 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7452 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so that
7453 this platform of potentially immense competition, which would cause the
7454 diversity and range of content available to explode, would not cause pain to
7455 the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right or the left, who
7456 should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is practically no one, on
7457 either the right or the left, who is doing anything effective to prevent it.
7458 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Corrupting Citizens"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"corruptingcitizens"></a>Corrupting Citizens
</h2></div></div></div><p>
7459 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
7460 dinosaurs a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
7461 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
7463 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was important
7464 to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation corrupts
7465 citizens and weakens the rule of law.
7468 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with every war
7469 of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very large number
7470 of citizens. According to
<em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em>,
43
7471 million Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633564" href=
"#ftn.id2633564" class=
"footnote">171</a>]
</sup> According to the RIAA, the behavior of those
43 million Americans
7472 is a felony. We thus have a set of rules that transform
20 percent of
7473 America into criminals. As the RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the
7474 Napsters and Kazaas of the world, but against students building search
7475 engines, and increasingly against ordinary users downloading content, the
7476 technologies for sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal
7477 use. It is an arms race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side
7478 inviting a more extreme response by the other.
7480 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American legal
7481 system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it knew that in
7482 Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The threat of having to
7483 pay either all the money in the world in damages ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all
7484 the money in the world to defend against paying all the money in the world
7485 in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees) led Jordan to choose to pay all the
7486 money he had in the world ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same
7487 strategy animates the RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
7488 2003, the RIAA sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl
7489 living in public housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what
7490 file sharing was.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633256" href=
"#ftn.id2633256" class=
"footnote">172</a>]
</sup> As these scapegoats
7491 discovered, it will always cost more to defend against these suits than it
7492 would cost to simply settle. (The twelve year old, for example, like Jesse
7493 Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000 to settle the case.) Our law is an
7494 awful system for defending rights. It is an embarrassment to our
7495 tradition. And the consequence of our law as it is, is that those with the
7496 power can use the law to quash any rights they oppose.
7498 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just something
7499 more extreme than anything we've seen before. We experimented with alcohol
7500 prohibition, at a time when the per capita consumption of alcohol was
1.5
7501 gallons per capita per year. The war against drinking initially reduced that
7502 consumption to just
30 percent of its preprohibition levels, but by the end
7503 of prohibition, consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
7504 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast number
7505 were criminals.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633639" href=
"#ftn.id2633639" class=
"footnote">173</a>]
</sup> We have launched a war
7506 on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated narcotics that
7
7507 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633652" href=
"#ftn.id2633652" class=
"footnote">174</a>]
</sup> That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
7508 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast majority
7509 of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex tax system
7510 that a majority of cash businesses regularly cheat.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633669" href=
"#ftn.id2633669" class=
"footnote">175</a>]
</sup> We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an
7511 endless array of ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a
7512 result, a huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
7513 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633685"></a>
7515 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
7516 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law students
7517 about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie Nesson told a
7518 class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands of students who
7519 have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed alcohol and sometimes
7520 drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes, illegally driven cars. These
7521 are kids for whom behaving illegally is increasingly the norm. And then we,
7522 as law professors, are supposed to teach them how to behave
7523 ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or keep client funds separate, or
7524 honor a demand to disclose a document that will mean that your case is
7525 over. Generations of Americans
—more significantly in some parts of
7526 America than in others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't
7527 live their lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a
7528 certain degree of illegality.
7530 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law more
7531 severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn how to make
7532 that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense depends, in part, at
7533 least, upon whether the costs of the law, both intended and collateral,
7534 outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended and collateral, do outweigh
7535 the benefits, then the law ought to be changed. Alternatively, if the costs
7536 of the existing system are much greater than the costs of an alternative,
7537 then we have a good reason to consider the alternative.
7542 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
7543 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
7544 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But that
7545 wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the week. A
7546 society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
7548 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations, but
7549 that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends upon people
7550 obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we as citizens
7551 experience violating the law, the less we respect the law. Obviously, in
7552 most cases, the important issue is the law, not respect for the law. I don't
7553 care whether the rapist respects the law or not; I want to catch and
7554 incarcerate the rapist. But I do care whether my students respect the
7555 law. And I do care if the rules of law sow increasing disrespect because of
7556 the extreme of regulation they impose. Twenty million Americans have come
7557 of age since the Internet introduced this different idea of "sharing." We
7558 need to be able to call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not
7561 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
7562 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
7563 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be asking is
7564 not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should be whether this
7565 particular prohibition is really necessary in order to achieve the proper
7566 ends that copyright law serves. Is there another way to assure that artists
7567 get paid without transforming forty-three million Americans into felons?
7568 Does it make sense if there are other ways to assure that artists get paid
7569 without transforming America into a nation of felons?
7571 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
7574 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces of
7575 plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The law
7576 protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a copyright
7577 infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a used record store
7578 and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the recordings is free.
7580 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of phonograph
7581 records that is effectively free. Because these recordings were made without
7582 copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy, or "rip," music from my
7583 records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed, Apple Corporation went so far as
7584 to suggest that "freedom" was a right: In a series of commercials, Apple
7585 endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn" capacities of digital technologies.
7586 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633795"></a><p>
7587 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large process
7588 at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing them in one
7589 archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful program called
7590 Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our music: Bach, Baroque,
7591 Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant Others
—the potential is
7592 endless. And by reducing the costs of mixing play lists, these technologies
7593 help build a creativity with play lists that is itself independently
7594 valuable. Compilations of songs are creative and meaningful in their own
7597 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records. But
7598 unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens (or so
7599 the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn a fair return
7600 from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to experiment with
7601 technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These technologies, for
7602 example, would enable CDs that could not be ripped. Or they might enable spy
7603 programs to identify ripped content on people's machines.
7606 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of your
7607 own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker circles,
7608 and get technology to disable the technologies that protect the
7609 content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that doesn't
7610 bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people, these
7611 protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving use of
7612 CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to the world
7613 where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of plastic or were
7614 part of a massively complex "digital rights management" system.
7616 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination of the
7617 ability to freely move content, then these technologies to interfere with
7618 the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But what if there were
7619 another way to assure that artists are paid, without locking down any
7620 content? What if, in other words, a different system could assure
7621 compensation to artists while also preserving the freedom to move content
7624 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer a
7625 version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now, the only
7626 point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different system achieved
7627 the same legitimate objectives that the existing copyright system achieved,
7628 but left consumers and creators much more free, then we'd have a very good
7629 reason to pursue this alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in
7630 other words, would not be between property and piracy; the choice would be
7631 between different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
7633 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without turning
7634 forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient feature of this
7635 alternative is that it would lead to a very different market for producing
7636 and distributing creativity. The dominant few, who today control the vast
7637 majority of the distribution of content in the world, would no longer
7638 exercise this extreme of control. Rather, they would go the way of the
7641 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
7642 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this new form
7643 of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree million Americans
7644 as criminals and their own survival.
7646 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not understandable
7647 why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack Valenti is charming;
7648 but not so charming as to justify giving up a tradition as deep and
7649 important as our tradition of free culture. There's one more aspect to this
7650 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and follows
7651 directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation
7652 attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that
7653 "arises whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
7654 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
7655 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633900"></a>
7657 "Hvis du kan behandle noen som en antatt lovbryter," forklarer von Lohmann,
7658 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633913"></a>
7659 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7660 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections evaporate to
7661 one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright infringer, how can you
7662 hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a copyright infringer, how can
7663 you hope to be secure against seizures of your computer? How can you hope to
7664 continue to receive Internet access?
… Our sensibilities change as
7665 soon as we think, "Oh, well, but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker."
7666 Well, what this campaign against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable
7667 percentage of the American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
7668 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7669 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public into
7670 criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
7671 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
7673 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
7674 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over the
7675 names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
7676 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a judge,
7677 and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of an Internet
7681 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy to
7682 sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have downloaded
7683 copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've seen, the
7684 potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a family's computer
7685 is used to download a single CD's worth of music, the family could be liable
7686 for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop the RIAA from suing a number of
7687 these families, just as they had sued Jesse Jordan.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633964" href=
"#ftn.id2633964" class=
"footnote">176</a>]
</sup>
7690 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the RIAA. A
7691 report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the RIAA had adopted
7692 to track Napster users.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634005" href=
"#ftn.id2634005" class=
"footnote">177</a>]
</sup> Using a
7693 sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in effect a
7694 fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of one of those
7695 MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
7697 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a friend gives a
7698 CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just like the cassettes you
7699 used to make as a kid. You don't know, and neither does your daughter, where
7700 these songs came from. But she copies these songs onto her computer. She
7701 then takes her computer to college and connects it to a college network, and
7702 if the college network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she
7703 hasn't properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to
7704 do that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter as
7705 a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning to
7706 deploy,
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2633869" href=
"#ftn.id2633869" class=
"footnote">178</a>]
</sup> your daughter can lose the
7707 right to use the university's computer network. She can, in some cases, be
7710 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire a
7711 lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can plead that
7712 she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or that they came
7713 from Napster. And it may well be that the university believes her. But the
7714 university might not believe her. It might treat this "contraband" as
7715 presumptive of guilt. And as any number of college students have already
7716 learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in the middle of wars of
7717 prohibition. This war is no different. Says von Lohmann,
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2634099"></a>
7718 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
7719 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million Americans
7720 that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a situation where the
7721 civil liberties of those people are very much in peril in a general
7722 matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where you could randomly
7723 choose any person off the street and be confident that they were committing
7724 an unlawful act that could put them on the hook for potential felony
7725 liability or hundreds of millions of dollars of civil liability. Certainly
7726 we all speed, but speeding isn't the kind of an act for which we routinely
7727 forfeit civil liberties. Some people use drugs, and I think that's the
7728 closest analog, [but] many have noted that the war against drugs has eroded
7729 all of our civil liberties because it's treated so many Americans as
7730 criminals. Well, I think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of
7731 magnitude larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to
7732 sixty million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
7733 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
7735 </p></blockquote></div><p>
7736 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under the
7737 law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
— securing
7738 rights to authors
—without these millions being considered "criminals,"
7739 who is the villain? Americans or the law? Which is American, a constant war
7740 on our own people or a concerted effort through our democracy to change our
7742 </p></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632247" href=
"#id2632247" class=
"para">157</a>]
</sup>
7744 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<em class=
"citetitle">Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at
7745 WorldCom
</em> (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204;
7746 for details of the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins
7747 U.S. District Court Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
7748 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
37</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632270"></a>
7749 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632283" href=
"#id2632283" class=
"para">158</a>]
</sup>
7750 The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
7751 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For an
7752 overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,' Say
7753 Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
38</a>, and "Senate Turns Back
7754 Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
39</a>. President Bush has
7755 continued to urge tort reform in recent months.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632306"></a>
7756 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2631874" href=
"#id2631874" class=
"para">159</a>]
</sup>
7760 Se Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Wired
</em>,
7761 7. juli
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
40</a>. For en oversikt over
7762 utstillingen, se
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
7764 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632715" href=
"#id2632715" class=
"para">160</a>]
</sup>
7767 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Los
7768 Angeles Times
</em>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the
7769 effects on innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The
7770 Music Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
7771 at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
42</a>. See also
7772 Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Los Angeles
7773 Times
</em>,
28 May
2001.
7774 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632478" href=
"#id2632478" class=
"para">161</a>]
</sup>
7776 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Business
7777 2.0</em>,
16. juni
2003, tilgjengelig via
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
43</a>. Jeg er Dr. Mohammad
7778 Al-Ubaydli takknemlig mot for dette eksemplet.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2632790"></a>
7779 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632909" href=
"#id2632909" class=
"para">162</a>]
</sup>
7781 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and the
7782 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (
2003),
7783 33–35, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
7785 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632932" href=
"#id2632932" class=
"para">163</a>]
</sup>
7787 GartnerG2,
26–27.
7788 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632956" href=
"#id2632956" class=
"para">164</a>]
</sup>
7790 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes, February
7791 2002 (Entertainment).
7792 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632995" href=
"#id2632995" class=
"para">165</a>]
</sup>
7794 Jessica Litman,
<em class=
"citetitle">Digital Copyright
</em> (Amherst, N.Y.:
7795 Prometheus Books,
2001).
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633002"></a>
7796 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633031" href=
"#id2633031" class=
"para">166</a>]
</sup>
7799 The only circuit court exception is found in
<em class=
"citetitle">Recording Industry
7800 Association of America (RIAA)
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Diamond Multimedia
7801 Systems
</em>,
180 F.
3d
1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of
7802 appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player
7803 were not liable for contributory copyright infringement for a device that is
7804 unable to record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function
7805 is to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard drive).
7806 At the district court level, the only exception is found in
7807 <em class=
"citetitle">Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
7808 Inc
</em>. v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Grokster, Ltd
</em>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
7809 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
7810 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
7811 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement liability.
7812 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633066" href=
"#id2633066" class=
"para">167</a>]
</sup>
7814 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
7815 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
7816 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
7817 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In August
7818 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate that
7819 technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films broadcast on
7820 TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that would disable copying
7821 of that content. And in March of the same year, Senator Fritz Hollings
7822 introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act,
7823 which mandated copyright protection technology in all digital media
7824 devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster
7825 World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
44</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633088"></a>
7826 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632773" href=
"#id2632773" class=
"para">168</a>]
</sup>
7830 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2632971" href=
"#id2632971" class=
"para">169</a>]
</sup>
7834 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633265" href=
"#id2633265" class=
"para">170</a>]
</sup>
7836 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright Arbitration
7837 Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an example offered by
7838 Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings, iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
7839 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher and Zittrain submitted
7840 testimony in the CARP proceeding that was ultimately rejected. See Jonathan
7841 Zittrain, Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
7842 Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP DTRA
1 and
2, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
45</a>. For an excellent
7843 analysis making a similar point, see Randal C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry
7844 Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Antitrust
7845 Bulletin
</em> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was not confusion, these
7846 are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog radio stations are protected
7847 from digital entrants, reducing entry in radio and diversity. Yes, this is
7848 done in the name of getting royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the
7849 play of powerful interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral
7850 way."
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633295"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2633304"></a>
7851 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633564" href=
"#id2633564" class=
"para">171</a>]
</sup>
7853 Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew Internet
7854 and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
46</a>. The Pew Internet and
7855 American Life Project reported that
37 million Americans had downloaded
7856 music files from the Internet by early
2001.
7857 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633256" href=
"#id2633256" class=
"para">172</a>]
</sup>
7860 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
7861 <em class=
"citetitle">Los Angeles Times
</em>,
10 September
2003, Business.
7862 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633639" href=
"#id2633639" class=
"para">173</a>]
</sup>
7865 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
7866 Prohibition,"
<em class=
"citetitle">American Economic Review
</em> 81, no.
2
7868 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633652" href=
"#id2633652" class=
"para">174</a>]
</sup>
7871 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government Reform
7872 Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of John
7873 P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
7874 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633669" href=
"#id2633669" class=
"para">175</a>]
</sup>
7877 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax Compliance,"
7878 <em class=
"citetitle">Journal of Economic Literature
</em> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey
7879 of compliance literature).
7880 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633964" href=
"#id2633964" class=
"para">176</a>]
</sup>
7883 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in
7884 Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington
7885 Post
</em>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents Pull
7886 Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on File
7887 Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid Being Sued,"
7888 <em class=
"citetitle">Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</em>,
30 August
2003, C1;
7889 Jefferson Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents,"
<em class=
"citetitle">USA
7890 Today
</em>,
15 September
2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No
7891 Music Pirate. No Snoop Fan, Either,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
7892 25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is Brianna a Criminal?"
7893 <em class=
"citetitle">Toronto Star
</em>,
18 September
2003, P7.
7894 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634005" href=
"#id2634005" class=
"para">177</a>]
</sup>
7897 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses Some
7898 Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
47</a>.
7899 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2633869" href=
"#id2633869" class=
"para">178</a>]
</sup>
7902 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
7903 <em class=
"citetitle">Boston Globe
</em>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank
7904 Ahrens, "Four Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File
7905 Sharing at Colleges,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington Post
</em>,
4 April
2003,
7906 E1; Elizabeth Armstrong, "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
7907 <em class=
"citetitle">Christian Science Monitor
</em>,
2 September
2003,
20;
7908 Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two
7909 Students Names Are Handed Over; Lawsuit Possible,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Chicago
7910 Tribune
</em>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA Trains Antipiracy
7911 Guns on Universities,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Internet News
</em>,
30 January
7912 2003, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
7913 #
48</a>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman Orientation
7914 This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File Sharing,"
7915 <em class=
"citetitle">San Francisco Chronicle
</em>,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid,
7916 Letters Are Weapons at Universities,"
<em class=
"citetitle">USA Today
</em>,
26
7918 </p></div></div></div></div><div class=
"part" title=
"Del IV. Maktfordeling"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h1 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-balances"></a>Del IV. Maktfordeling
</h1></div></div></div><div class=
"partintro" title=
"Maktfordeling"><div></div><p>
7919 Så her er bildet: Du står på siden av veien. Bilen din er på brann. Du er
7920 sint og opprørt fordi du delvis bidro til å starte brannen. Nå vet du ikke
7921 hvordan du slokker den. Ved siden av deg er en bøtte, fylt med
7922 bensin. Bensin vil åpenbart ikke slukke brannen.
7924 Mens du tenker over situasjonen, kommer noen andre forbi. I panikk griper
7925 hun bøtta, og før du har hatt sjansen til å be henne stoppe
—eller før
7926 hun forstår hvorfor hun bør stoppe
—er bøtten i svevet. Bensinen er på
7927 tur mot den brennende bilen. Og brannen som bensinen kommer til å fyre opp
7928 vil straks sette fyr på alt i omgivelsene.
7930 En krig om opphavsrett pågår over alt
— og vi fokuserer alle på feil
7931 ting. Det er ingen tvil om at dagens teknologier truer eksisterende
7932 virksomheter. Uten tvil kan de true artister. Men teknologier endrer seg.
7933 Industrien og teknologer har en rekke måter å bruke teknologi til å beskytte
7934 dem selv mot dagens trusler på Internet. Dette er en brann som overlatt til
7935 seg selv vil brenne ut.
7939 Likevel er ikke besluttningstagere villig til å la denne brannen i fred.
7940 Ladet med masse penger fra lobbyister er de lystne på å gå i mellom for å
7941 fjerne problemet slik de oppfatter det. Men problemet slik de oppfatter det
7942 er ikke den reelle trusselen som denne kulturen står med ansiktet mot. For
7943 mens vi ser på denne lille brannen i hjørnet er det en massiv endring i
7944 hvordan kultur blir skapt som pågår over alt.
7946 På en eller annen måte må vi klare å snu oppmerksomheten mot dette mer
7947 viktige og fundametale problemet. Vi må finne en måte å unngå å helle
7948 bensin på denne brannen.
7950 Vi har ikke funne denne måten ennå. Istedet synes vi å være fanget i en
7951 enklere og sort-hvit tenkning. Uansett hvor mange folk som presser på for å
7952 gjøre rammen for debatten litt bredere, er det dette enkle sort-hvit-synet
7953 som består. Vi kjører sakte forbi og stirrer på brannen når vi i stedet
7954 burde holde øynene på veien.
7956 Denne utfordringen har vært livet mitt de siste årene. Det har også vært
7957 min falitt. I de to neste kapittlene, beskriver jeg en liten innsats, så
7958 langt uten suksess, på å finne en måte å endre fokus på denne debatten. Vi
7959 må forstå disse mislyktede forsøkene hvis vi skal forstå hva som kreves for
7961 </p><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#eldred">14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"chapter"><a href=
"#eldred-ii">15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></span></dt></dl></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"eldred"></a>Kapittel
14. Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</h2></div></div></div><p>
7962 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to like
7963 Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at least one
7964 did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in
7965 New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
7966 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would make this
7967 nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
7969 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find Hawthorne
7970 any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment gave birth to a
7971 hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build a library of public
7972 domain works by scanning these works and making them available for free.
7975 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain works,
7976 though even a copy would have been of great value to people across the world
7977 who can't get access to printed versions of these works. Instead, Eldred was
7978 producing derivative works from these public domain works. Just as Disney
7979 turned Grimm into stories more accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred
7980 transformed Hawthorne, and many others, into a form more
7981 accessible
—technically accessible
—today.
7983 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same source
7984 as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<em class=
"citetitle">Scarlet Letter
</em> had passed
7985 into the public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
7986 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover Press
7987 and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and produce printed
7988 editions, which they sell in bookstores across the country. Others, such as
7989 Disney, take these stories and turn them into animated cartoons, sometimes
7990 successfully (
<em class=
"citetitle">Cinderella
</em>), sometimes not
7991 (
<em class=
"citetitle">The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</em>,
<em class=
"citetitle">Treasure
7992 Planet
</em>). These are all commercial publications of public domain
7995 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of public
7996 domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally thousands of
7997 others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have discovered this
7998 platform of expression and now use it to share works that are, by law, free
7999 for the taking. This has produced what we might call the "noncommercial
8000 publishing industry," which before the Internet was limited to people with
8001 large egos or with political or social causes. But with the Internet, it
8002 includes a wide range of individuals and groups dedicated to spreading
8003 culture generally.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634343" href=
"#ftn.id2634343" class=
"footnote">179</a>]
</sup>
8005 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's collection
8006 of poems
<em class=
"citetitle">New Hampshire
</em> was slated to pass into the
8007 public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in his free public
8008 library. But Congress got in the way. As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
>11</a>, in
1998, for the
8009 eleventh time in forty years, Congress extended the terms of existing
8010 copyrights
—this time by twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add
8011 any works more recent than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no
8012 copyrighted work would pass into the public domain until that year (and not
8013 even then, if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same
8014 period, more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
8018 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), enacted in
8019 memory of the congressman and former musician Sonny Bono, who, his widow,
8020 Mary Bono, says, believed that "copyrights should be forever."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634397" href=
"#ftn.id2634397" class=
"footnote">180</a>]
</sup>
8023 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
8024 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
8025 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a second law
8026 passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act of publishing
8027 would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone complained. This was a
8028 dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer to undertake.
8030 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
8031 constitutional scholar whose first passion was constitutional
8032 interpretation. And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
8033 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as importantly
8034 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
8035 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8036 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
… by
8037 securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to their
8038 … Writings.
…
8039 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8040 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting clause of
8041 Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause granting power
8042 to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do something
—for
8043 example, to regulate "commerce among the several states" or "declare War."
8044 But here, the "something" is something quite specific
—to "promote
8045 … Progress"
—through means that are also specific
— by
8046 "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e., copyrights) "for limited Times."
8048 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of extending
8049 existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me about this was, if
8050 Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then the Constitution's
8051 requirement that terms be "limited" will have no practical effect. If every
8052 time a copyright is about to expire, Congress has the power to extend its
8053 term, then Congress can achieve what the Constitution plainly
8054 forbids
—perpetual terms "on the installment plan," as Professor Peter
8055 Jaszi so nicely put it.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2634422"></a>
8057 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember sitting
8058 late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious consideration
8059 of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's practice of extending
8060 existing terms. That failure may in part be why Congress seemed so
8061 untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that the practice had become so
8062 lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that copyright owners will be willing
8063 to pay a great deal of money to see their copyright terms extended. And so
8064 Congress is quite happy to keep this gravy train going.
8066 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
8067 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are bribed.
8068 Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the beneficiaries
8069 of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress to induce it to
8070 act. There's only so much time; there's only so much Congress can do. Why
8071 not limit its actions to those things it must do
—and those things that
8072 pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
8074 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one of the
8075 very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to make money one
8076 hundred years after it was created. The Estate of Robert Frost is a good
8077 example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry continues to be extraordinarily
8078 valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate benefits greatly from any extension
8079 of copyright, since no publisher would pay the estate any money if the poems
8080 Frost wrote could be published by anyone for free.
8082 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from three of
8083 Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems is about to
8084 expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate. Your financial
8085 adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim report:
8088 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B, and C
8089 will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be receiving
8090 the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of those works.
8092 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that could change
8093 this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the terms of copyright
8094 by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily valuable to us. So we
8095 should hope this bill passes."
8097 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something about it?"
8099 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute to the
8100 campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that they support
8103 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want to know
8104 whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much would we get if this
8105 extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How much is it worth?"
8107 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue to get
8108 at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the `discount
8109 rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent), then this law
8110 would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
8112 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the correct
8115 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than $
1,
000,
000 in
8116 campaign contributions if we were confident those contributions would assure
8117 that the bill was passed?"
8119 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to contribute up
8120 to the `present value' of the income you expect from these copyrights. Which
8121 for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
8124 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I trust,
8125 you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every beneficiary
8126 in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same choice: If they
8127 can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights, they will benefit
8128 greatly from that extension. And so each time copyrights are about to
8129 expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get the copyright term
8132 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation can be
8133 bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in the world to
8134 buy further extensions of copyright.
8136 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
8137 Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved real. Ten of the
8138 thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House received the maximum
8139 contribution from Disney's political action committee; in the Senate, eight
8140 of the twelve sponsors received contributions.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634617" href=
"#ftn.id2634617" class=
"footnote">181</a>]
</sup> The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over $
1.5 million
8141 lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more than $
200,
000 in
8142 campaign contributions.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634632" href=
"#ftn.id2634632" class=
"footnote">182</a>]
</sup> Disney is
8143 estimated to have contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in
8144 the cycle.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634647" href=
"#ftn.id2634647" class=
"footnote">183</a>]
</sup>
8147 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least, it need not
8148 be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this reality about the
8149 never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term was central to my
8150 thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed to interpreting and
8151 applying the Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the
8152 power to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
8153 constitutional requirement that terms be "limited." If they could extend it
8154 once, they would extend it again and again and again.
8157 It was also my judgment that
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>this
</em></span> Supreme Court would
8158 not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to the Supreme
8159 Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted the power of
8160 Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as exceeding the power
8161 granted to it by the Constitution. Among constitutional scholars, the most
8162 famous example of this trend was the Supreme Court's decision in
1995 to
8163 strike down a law that banned the possession of guns near schools.
8165 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted powers very
8166 broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate
8167 only "commerce among the several states" (aka "interstate commerce"), the
8168 Supreme Court had interpreted that power to include the power to regulate
8169 any activity that merely affected interstate commerce.
8171 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was no
8172 limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every activity, when
8173 considered on a national scale, affects interstate commerce. A Constitution
8174 designed to limit Congress's power was instead interpreted to impose no
8177 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed that in
8178 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>. The
8179 government had argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
8180 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property values,
8181 and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the government
8182 whether there was any activity that would not affect interstate commerce
8183 under the reasoning the government advanced. The government said there was
8184 not; if Congress says an activity affects interstate commerce, then that
8185 activity affects interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, the government
8186 said, was not in the position to second-guess Congress.
8188 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments," the
8189 Chief Justice wrote.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634737" href=
"#ftn.id2634737" class=
"footnote">184</a>]
</sup> If anything
8190 Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be considered interstate
8191 commerce, then there would be no limit to Congress's power. The decision in
8192 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> was reaffirmed five years later in
8193 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
</em>
8194 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Morrison
</em>.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634763" href=
"#ftn.id2634763" class=
"footnote">185</a>]
</sup>
8197 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
8198 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634784" href=
"#ftn.id2634784" class=
"footnote">186</a>]
</sup>
8199 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should yield the
8200 conclusion that Congress can't extend an existing term. If Congress could
8201 extend an existing term, then there would be no "stopping point" to
8202 Congress's power over terms, though the Constitution expressly states that
8203 there is such a limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to
8204 grant copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
8205 term of existing copyrights.
8207 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>If
</em></span>, that is, the principle announced in
8208 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> stood for a principle. Many believed the
8209 decision in
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> stood for politics
—a
8210 conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states' rights, using its
8211 power over Congress to advance its own personal political preferences. But I
8212 rejected that view of the Supreme Court's decision. Indeed, shortly after
8213 the decision, I wrote an article demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an
8214 interpretation of the Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides
8215 cases based upon its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was
8216 not going to devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine
8217 Justices were going to be petty politicians.
8219 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the argument in
8220 <em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> was not about. By insisting on the
8221 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
8222 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
8223 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his work
8224 and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright term was
8225 just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and Disney had
8226 already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their work. They had gotten
8227 the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution envisions: In exchange for
8228 a monopoly protected for fifty-six years, they created new work. But now
8229 these entities were using their power
—expressed through the power of
8230 lobbyists' money
—to get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That
8231 twenty-year dollop would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was
8232 fighting a piracy that affects us all.
8234 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief before the
8235 Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association wrote that the public
8236 domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634863" href=
"#ftn.id2634863" class=
"footnote">187</a>]
</sup> But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our
8237 constitutional system, our law requires it. Some may not like the
8238 Constitution's requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a
8239 pirate's charter.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2634888"></a>
8241 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on copyright as a
8242 way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily influence the
8243 development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric Eldred discovered,
8244 we have set up a system that assures that copyright terms will be repeatedly
8245 extended, and extended, and extended. We have created the perfect storm for
8246 the public domain. Copyrights have not expired, and will not expire, so long
8247 as Congress is free to be bought to extend them again.
8249 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being extended.
8250 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too valuable for
8251 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from copyright
8252 extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's. Forget Mickey
8253 Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from the
1920s and
1930s
8254 that have continuing commercial value. The real harm of term extension comes
8255 not from these famous works. The real harm is to the works that are not
8256 famous, not commercially exploited, and no longer available as a result.
8258 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
1942)
8259 affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
2 percent of that
8260 work has any continuing commercial value. It was the copyright holders for
8261 that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through. But the law and its effect were
8262 not limited to that
2 percent. The law extended the terms of copyright
8263 generally.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634929" href=
"#ftn.id2634929" class=
"footnote">188</a>]
</sup>
8267 Think practically about the consequence of this extension
—practically,
8268 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal work. In
1930,
8269 10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those books were still in
8270 print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you wanted to make available
8271 to the world in your iArchive project the remaining
9,
873. What would you
8274 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were still
8275 under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are not
8276 on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the titles and
8277 authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration and renewal
8278 records for works published in
1930. That will produce a list of books still
8281 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate the
8282 current copyright owners. How would you do that?
8284 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright owners
8285 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be thousands and
8286 thousands of government monopolies without there being at least a list?
8288 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
1959, of
8289 the person who registered the copyright. But just think practically about
8290 how impossibly difficult it would be to track down thousands of such
8291 records
—especially since the person who registered is not necessarily
8292 the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
8294 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the apologists for
8295 the system respond. "Why should there be a list of copyright owners?"
8297 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>are
</em></span> plenty
8298 of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on houses, or titles
8299 to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of real space is pretty
8300 good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of property is. (A swing set in
8301 your backyard is probably yours.) So formally or informally, we have a
8302 pretty good way to know who owns what tangible property.
8305 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who owns the house
8306 by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see a car, there is
8307 ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the car. If you see a
8308 bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a house, it's fairly
8309 easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you happen to see a baseball
8310 lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look around for a second for some
8311 kids playing ball. If you don't see any kids, then okay: Here's a bit of
8312 property whose owner we can't easily determine. It is the exception that
8313 proves the rule: that we ordinarily know quite well who owns what property.
8315 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library. The
8316 library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've already
8317 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors' names, of
8318 course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or passed down in an
8319 estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who owns what, you would have to
8320 hire a private detective. The bottom line: The owner cannot easily be
8321 located. And in a regime like ours, in which it is a felony to use such
8322 property without the property owner's permission, the property isn't going
8325 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be digitized,
8326 and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the consequence for other
8327 creative works is much more dire.
8328 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635051"></a><p>
8329 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios, which
8330 owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a direct
8331 beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were made between
8332 1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Lucky
8333 Dog
</em>, is currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made
8334 after
1923 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee
8335 controls the exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal
8336 of money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
8337 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent films."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2635073" href=
"#ftn.id2635073" class=
"footnote">189</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635090"></a>
8339 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in this
8340 culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme Court that
8341 the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left standing, destroy
8342 a whole generation of American film.
8345 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has any
8346 continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it survives at
8347 all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that some of this work
8348 not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be valuable by the owners of
8349 the vaults. For this to occur, however, the commercial benefit from the work
8350 must exceed the costs of making the work available for distribution.
8352 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs. For most
8353 of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very high; digital
8354 technology has lowered these costs substantially. While it cost more than
8355 $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white film in
1993, it can now
8356 cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of mm film.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2635133" href=
"#ftn.id2635133" class=
"footnote">190</a>]
</sup>
8359 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most important.
8360 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
8361 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
8362 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
8363 locate the copyright owner.
8365 Or more accurately,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>owners
</em></span>. As we've seen, there isn't
8366 only a single copyright associated with a film; there are many. There isn't
8367 a single person whom you can contact about those copyrights; there are as
8368 many as can hold the rights, which turns out to be an extremely large
8369 number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights to these films is
8372 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
8373 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
8374 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when she
8375 does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you have
8376 made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
8377 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
8378 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way, you
8379 have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have to
8380 talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
8383 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed these
8384 costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the benefit would
8385 outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old films, Agee
8386 argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until the copyright
8389 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will have
8390 expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and nitrate stock
8391 dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal canisters in which
8392 they are now stored will be filled with nothing more than dust.
8394 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has
8395 continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a
8396 crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright
8397 creates incentives to produce and distribute the creative work. For that
8398 tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of free expression."
8400 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the creative
8401 work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've indicated, most books
8402 go out of print within one year. The same is true of music and
8403 film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving. And when a
8404 creative work falls out of favor with the commercial distributors, the
8405 commercial life ends.
8407 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't keep
8408 libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and we don't
8409 have archives of films because we expect people to choose between spending
8410 Friday night watching new movies and spending Friday night watching a
1930
8411 news documentary. The noncommercial life of culture is important and
8412 valuable
—for entertainment but also, and more importantly, for
8413 knowledge. To understand who we are, and where we came from, and how we have
8414 made the mistakes that we have, we need to have access to this history.
8417 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression. In
8418 this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in this
8421 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of our
8422 history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
8423 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright-related use
</em></span> that would be inhibited by an
8424 exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy it from a
8425 publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book store, and when a
8426 used book store sells it, in America, at least, there is no need to pay the
8427 copyright owner anything. Thus, the ordinary use of a book after its
8428 commercial life ended was a use that was independent of copyright law.
8430 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring a
8431 film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were so high,
8432 it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore film. Like the remains
8433 of a great dinner, when it's over, it's over. Once a film passed out of its
8434 commercial life, it may have been archived for a bit, but that was the end
8435 of its life so long as the market didn't have more to offer.
8437 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most of our
8438 history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works that lost
8439 their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works would not have
8440 interfered with anything.
8442 But this situation has now changed.
8444 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital technologies
8445 is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of. Digital
8446 technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access to all sorts
8447 of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now imagine digitizing
8448 it and making it available to everyone, forever. Once a film goes out of
8449 distribution, we could digitize it and make it available to everyone,
8450 forever. Digital technologies give new life to copyrighted material after it
8451 passes out of its commercial life. It is now possible to preserve and assure
8452 universal access to this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
8456 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing this
8457 digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right of
8458 copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires permission
8459 of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any other aspect of
8460 our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make these things
8461 available to history, or to researchers, or to those who just want to
8462 explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were written for a
8463 radically different context.
8465 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
8466 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law gets in
8467 the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
8468 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>copyright
</em></span> purpose, for the purpose of copyright is to
8469 enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are talking about
8470 culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this context, copyright
8471 is serving no purpose
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>at all
</em></span> related to the spread of
8472 knowledge. In this context, copyright is not an engine of free
8473 expression. Copyright is a brake.
8475 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for Brewster
8476 Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too. So won't
8477 Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading culture widely?"
8479 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
8480 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble offered
8481 to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that eliminate the need
8482 for libraries? Only if you think that the only role of a library is to serve
8483 what "the market" would demand. But if you think the role of a library is
8484 bigger than this
—if you think its role is to archive culture, whether
8485 there's a demand for any particular bit of that culture or not
—then we
8486 can't count on the commercial market to do our library work for us.
8488 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We should
8489 rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable culture. My
8490 message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the market is not
8491 doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the freedom to fill the
8492 gaps. As one researcher calculated for American culture,
94 percent of the
8493 films, books, and music produced between and
1946 is not commercially
8494 available. However much you love the commercial market, if access is a
8495 value, then
6 percent is a failure to provide that value.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2635363" href=
"#ftn.id2635363" class=
"footnote">191</a>]
</sup>
8498 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
8499 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the Sonny
8500 Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two central claims
8501 that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms violated the
8502 Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that extending terms by
8503 another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
8505 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an argument. A
8506 panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also dismissed our
8507 claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But that decision at
8508 least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative judges on that
8509 court. That dissent gave our claims life.
8511 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that copyrights
8512 be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as it was simple:
8513 If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no "stopping point" to
8514 Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The power to extend existing
8515 terms means Congress is not required to grant terms that are "limited."
8516 Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had to interpret the term "limited
8517 Times" to give it meaning. And the best interpretation, Judge Sentelle
8518 argued, would be to deny Congress the power to extend existing terms.
8520 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to hear the
8521 case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for important
8522 cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a whole, where
8523 the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
8526 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc. This
8527 time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
8528 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the most
8529 liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had overstepped its
8532 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the Supreme
8533 Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It hears about one
8534 hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand appeals.) And it
8535 practically never reviews a decision that upholds a statute when no other
8536 court has yet reviewed the statute.
8538 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by granting our
8539 petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument was set for October of
8540 2002. The summer would be spent writing briefs and preparing for argument.
8542 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still astonishingly
8543 hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you know that we lost
8544 the appeal. And if you know something more than just the minimum, you
8545 probably think there was no way this case could have been won. After our
8546 defeat, I received literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and
8547 supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed
8548 cause. And none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail
8549 from my client, Eric Eldred.
8551 Men min klient og disse vennene tok feil. Denne saken kunne vært vunnet. Det
8552 burde ha vært vunnet. Og uansett hvor hardt jeg prøver å fortelle den
8553 historien til meg selv, kan jeg aldri unnslippe troen på at det er min feil
8555 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635491"></a><p>
8557 Feil ble gjort tidlig, skjønt den ble først åpenbart på slutten. Vår sak
8558 hadde støtte hos en ekstraordinær advokat, Geoffrey Stewart, helt fra
8559 starten, og hos advokatfirmaet hadde han flyttet til, Jones, Day, Reavis og
8560 Pogue. Jones Day mottok mye press fra sine opphavsrettsbeskyttende klienter
8561 på grunn av sin støtte til oss. De ignorert dette presset (noe veldig få
8562 advokatfirmaer noen sinne ville gjøre), og ga alt de hadde gjennom hele
8564 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635514"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635520"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635526"></a><p>
8565 Det var tre viktige advokater på saken fra Jones DaY. Geoff Stewart var den
8566 først, men siden ble Dan Bromberg og Don Ayer ganske involvert. Bromberg og
8567 Ayer spesielt hadde en felles oppfatning om hvordan denne saken ville bli
8568 vunnet: vi ville bare vinne, fortalte de gjentatte ganger til meg, hvis vi
8569 få problemet til å virke "viktig" for Høyesterett. Det måtte synes som om
8570 dramatisk skade ble gjort til ytringsfriheten og fri kultur, ellers ville de
8571 aldri stemt mot "de mektigste mediaselskapene i verden".
8573 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act was a
8574 dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still think it
8575 is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based on how
8576 important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be "right" as
8577 in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be that
8578 way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the framers of
8579 our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the CTEA was
8580 unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful interpretation of what
8581 the First Amendment means would yield the conclusion that the power to
8582 extend existing copyright terms is unconstitutional, I was not persuaded
8583 that we had to sell our case like soap. Just as a law that bans the
8584 swastika is unconstitutional not because the Court likes Nazis but because
8585 such a law would violate the Constitution, so too, in my view, would the
8586 Court decide whether Congress's law was constitutional based on the
8587 Constitution, not based on whether they liked the values that the framers
8588 put in the Constitution.
8590 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and the harm
8591 caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review? There was no
8592 reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they weren't convinced that
8593 this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we didn't need to persuade them
8594 that this law was bad, we needed to show why it was unconstitutional.
8597 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter and in
8598 which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced that the Court
8599 would not hear our arguments if it thought these were just the arguments of
8600 a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was not about to launch into a
8601 new field of judicial review if it seemed that this field of review was
8602 simply the preference of a small political minority. Although my focus in
8603 the case was not to demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to
8604 demonstrate that it was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument
8605 against a background of briefs that covered the full range of political
8606 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
8607 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>law
</em></span> and not politics, then, we tried to gather the
8608 widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they were rich
8609 and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated that this law
8610 was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
8612 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's organization,
8613 Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the very beginning.
8614 Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by Congress. In November
1998,
8615 she wrote a stinging editorial attacking the Republican Congress for
8616 allowing the law to pass. As she wrote, "Do you sometimes wonder why bills
8617 that create a financial windfall to narrow special interests slide easily
8618 through the intricate legislative process, while bills that benefit the
8619 general public seem to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial
8620 documented, was the power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's
8621 contributions to the key players on the committees. It was money, not
8622 justice, that gave Mickey Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control,
8623 Schlafly argued.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635620"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635626"></a>
8625 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief supporting
8626 our position. Their brief made the argument that became the core claim in
8627 the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of existing copyrights,
8628 there is no limit to Congress's power to set terms. That strong
8629 conservative argument persuaded a strong conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
8631 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as it
8632 gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free Software
8633 Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux possible). They
8634 included a powerful brief about the costs of uncertainty by Intel. There
8635 were two law professors' briefs, one by copyright scholars and one by First
8636 Amendment scholars. There was an exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the
8637 world's experts in the history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there
8638 was a new brief by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
8639 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635655"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635663"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635670"></a>
8641 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal argument,
8642 there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and archives, including
8643 the Internet Archive, the American Association of Law Libraries, and the
8644 National Writers Union.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635683"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635690"></a>
8646 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the argument I've
8647 already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that unless the law
8648 was struck, a whole generation of American film would disappear. The other
8649 made the economic argument absolutely clear.
8650 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635706"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635712"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635718"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635724"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635731"></a><p>
8651 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including five
8652 Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Milton
8653 Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as the list of
8654 Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political spectrum. Their
8655 conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible claim that extending the
8656 terms of existing copyrights would do anything to increase incentives to
8657 create. Such extensions were nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the
8658 fancy term economists use to describe special-interest legislation gone
8661 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered to
8662 write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with us from
8663 the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we added three
8664 lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan Morrison, a
8665 lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had made constitutional
8666 history with a series of seminal victories in the Supreme Court defending
8667 individual rights; my colleague and dean, Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued
8668 many cases in the Court, and who had advised us early on about a First
8669 Amendment strategy; and finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
8670 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635741"></a>
8672 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
8673 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give media
8674 companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried was the only
8675 one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up for something he
8676 believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer in the Supreme
8677 Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that limited Congress's power
8678 in the context of the Commerce Clause. And while he had argued many
8679 positions in the Supreme Court that I personally disagreed with, his joining
8680 the cause was a vote of confidence in our argument.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635787"></a>
8682 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of friends, as
8683 well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included historians or
8684 economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were written
8685 exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and copyright holders.
8687 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain from the
8688 law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they were defending
8689 their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of contributions such power
8690 induced. And of course it was not surprising that the copyright holders
8691 would defend the idea that they should continue to have the right to control
8692 who did what with content they wanted to control.
8694 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was better for the
8695 Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to Dr. Seuss's work
— better
8696 than allowing it to fall into the public domain
—because if this
8697 creativity were in the public domain, then people could use it to "glorify
8698 drugs or to create pornography."
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2635817" href=
"#ftn.id2635817" class=
"footnote">192</a>]
</sup> That
8699 was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its "protection"
8700 of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example, to license
8701 <em class=
"citetitle">Porgy and Bess
</em> to anyone who refuses to use African
8702 Americans in the cast.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2635842" href=
"#ftn.id2635842" class=
"footnote">193</a>]
</sup> That's their
8703 view of how this part of American culture should be controlled, and they
8704 wanted this law to help them effect that control.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635856"></a>
8706 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this debate.
8707 When Congress decides to extend the term of existing copyrights, Congress is
8708 making a choice about which speakers it will favor. Famous and beloved
8709 copyright owners, such as the Gershwin estate and Dr. Seuss, come to
8710 Congress and say, "Give us twenty years to control the speech about these
8711 icons of American culture. We'll do better with them than anyone else."
8712 Congress of course likes to reward the popular and famous by giving them
8713 what they want. But when Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak
8714 in a certain way, that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally
8717 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA mean
8718 that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
8719 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market; it
8720 would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
8721 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak. Between
8722 February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing for this
8723 case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
8725 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we called
8726 "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The Conservatives
8727 included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice
8728 Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had been the most consistent in
8729 limiting Congress's power. They were the five who had supported the
8730 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez/Morrison
</em> line of cases that said that an
8731 enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's powers had
8733 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635917"></a><p>
8735 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
8736 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice
8737 Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that the
8738 Constitution gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement
8739 its powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
8740 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four justices
8741 were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed with, they
8742 were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
8744 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to her
8745 general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of gender are
8746 involved), she had been particularly deferential in the context of
8747 intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an excellent and
8748 well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from the same
8749 intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with the writings
8750 of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this context to do as it
8751 wished, even if what Congress wished made little sense.
8752 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2635951"></a><p>
8753 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
8754 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly favored
8755 deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were also very
8756 sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly believed, there was a
8757 very important free speech argument against these retrospective extensions.
8759 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
8760 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest judges
8761 on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just means that no
8762 simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he had consistently argued
8763 for limits in the context of intellectual property generally. We were fairly
8764 confident he would recognize limits here.
8766 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to be:
8767 on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these five and
8768 get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single overriding argument
8769 that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives' most important
8770 jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge Sentelle had relied
8771 upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power must be interpreted so
8772 that its enumerated powers have limits.
8775 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
8776 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
8777 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> case, under the government's argument here,
8778 Congress would always have unlimited power to extend existing terms. If
8779 anything was plain about Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was
8780 that this power was supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the
8781 Court to reconcile
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> with
8782 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce was
8783 limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright be
8786 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has done
8787 it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government claimed that
8788 from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
8789 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say that
8790 practice is unconstitutional.
8792 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We certainly
8793 agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in and in
1909. And of
8794 course, in
1962, Congress began extending existing terms
8795 regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
8798 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress extended
8799 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic. It then
8800 extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare extensions
8801 are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending existing
8802 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that restraint was
8803 now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there was no reason to
8804 expect that cycle would end. This Court had not hesitated to intervene where
8805 Congress was in a similar cycle of extension. There was no reason it
8806 couldn't intervene here. Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in
8807 October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
8808 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to help in
8809 the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where wannabe justices
8810 fire questions at wannabe winners.
8812 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a single
8813 point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to the
8814 power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that terms would be
8815 effectively unlimited; going with us would give Congress a clear line to
8816 follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots were an effective practice; I
8817 found ways to take every question back to this central idea.
8818 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636064"></a><p>
8819 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the skeptic. He
8820 had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor General Charles
8821 Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme Court. And in his review
8822 of the moot, he let his concern speak:
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636076"></a>
8824 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be willing
8825 to upset this practice that the government says has been a consistent
8826 practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see the
8827 harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they don't see
8828 that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
8829 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636086"></a><p>
8831 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but he didn't
8832 understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the right
8833 thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
8834 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court does the
8835 right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As I
8836 listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood his
8837 point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough. Let the
8838 politicians learn to see that it was also good. The night before the
8839 argument, a line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The
8840 case had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
8841 culture. Hundreds stood in line for the chance to see the
8842 proceedings. Scores spent the night on the Supreme Court steps so that they
8843 would be assured a seat.
8845 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can ask for
8846 seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for my
8847 parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get a seat in a
8848 special section reserved for them. And senators and congressmen have a
8849 special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of course, the press
8850 has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on the Court. As we
8851 entered that morning, there was no place that was not taken. This was an
8852 argument about intellectual property law, yet the halls were filled. As I
8853 walked in to take my seat at the front of the Court, I saw my parents
8854 sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table, I saw Jack Valenti sitting
8855 in the special section ordinarily reserved for family of the Justices.
8857 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began where I
8858 intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's power. This
8859 was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether those enumerated
8860 powers had any limit.
8862 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening. The history
8864 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8865 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often through the years,
8866 and if you are right, don't we run the risk of upsetting previous extensions
8867 of time? I mean, this seems to be a practice that began with the very first
8869 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8870 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face of
8871 what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again was to
8872 emphasize limits on Congress's power.
8873 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8875 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in mind,
8876 then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their words that gives
8877 effect to what they had in mind, and the answer is yes.
8878 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8879 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen where the
8880 Court was going. The first was a question by Justice Kennedy, who observed,
8881 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8882 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that the '
76 act,
8883 too, should have been declared void, and that we might leave it alone
8884 because of the disruption, is that for all these years the act has impeded
8885 progress in science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical
8887 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8888 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a student, I
8890 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8891 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all. Nothing
8892 in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical assertion about
8893 impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a structural limit necessary
8894 to assure that what would be an effectively perpetual term not be permitted
8895 under the copyright laws.
8896 </p></blockquote></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636227"></a><p>
8897 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right answer
8898 was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any number of
8899 briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And here was the
8900 place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a softball; my answer
8901 was a swing and a miss.
8903 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
8904 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>
8905 ruling, and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
8908 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all sympathetic.
8909 To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
8912 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8913 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the right to copy
8914 verbatim other people's books, don't you?
8916 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that should be in the
8917 public domain and would be in the public domain but for a statute that
8918 cannot be justified under ordinary First Amendment analysis or under a
8919 proper reading of the limits built into the Copyright Clause.
8920 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8921 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument; for now the
8922 Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia asked Solicitor
8924 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
8925 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited time
8926 would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely the
8927 argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited time which is
8928 extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited time.
8929 </p></blockquote></div><p>
8930 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal. Olson's
8931 flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed to the
8932 academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if this were the
8933 first case ever to consider limits on Congress's Copyright and Patent Clause
8934 power. Ever the professor and not the advocate, I closed by pointing out the
8935 long history of the Court imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of
8936 the Copyright and Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking
8937 a law of Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon
8938 the Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
8942 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I wished I
8943 could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had answered
8944 differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me optimistic.
8946 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit? Over
8947 and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was precisely the
8948 answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not imagine how the Court
8949 could understand that the government believed Congress's power was unlimited
8950 under the terms of the Copyright Clause, and sustain the government's
8951 argument. The solicitor general had made my argument for me. No matter how
8952 often I tried, I could not understand how the Court could find that
8953 Congress's power under the Commerce Clause was limited, but under the
8954 Copyright Clause, unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe
8955 that we may have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in
8956 particular, the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the
8957 rule of law that it had established elsewhere.
8959 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office and
8960 missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the
8961 message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
8962 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
8963 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
8965 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the phone off
8966 the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat down to see where I
8967 had been wrong in my reasoning.
8969 My
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>reasoning
</em></span>. Here was a case that pitted all the money
8970 in the world against
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>reasoning
</em></span>. And here was the last
8971 naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for reasoning.
8973 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would distinguish the
8974 principle in this case from the principle in
8975 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case
8976 was not even cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did
8977 not even appear in the Court's opinion.
8982 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument. Consistent
8983 with her view that Congress's power was not limited generally, she had found
8984 Congress's power not limited here.
8986 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
8987 Souter. Neither believes in
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>. It would be too
8988 much to expect them to write an opinion that recognized, much less
8989 explained, the doctrine they had worked so hard to defeat.
8991 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I was
8992 reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile limited
8993 powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the Progress
8994 Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could reconcile the two
8995 simply
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>by not addressing the argument
</em></span>. There was no
8996 inconsistency because they would not talk about the two together. There was
8997 therefore no principle that followed from the
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>
8998 case: In that context, Congress's power would be limited, but in this
8999 context it would not.
9001 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values they
9002 would respect? By what right did they
—the silent five
—get to
9003 select the part of the Constitution they would enforce based on the values
9004 they thought important? We were right back to the argument that I said I
9005 hated at the start: I had failed to convince them that the issue here was
9006 important, and I had failed to recognize that however much I might hate a
9007 system in which the Court gets to pick the constitutional values that it
9008 will respect, that is the system we have.
9009 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636418"></a><p>
9010 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's opinion
9011 was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition of
9012 intellectual property law should not support this unjustified extension of
9013 terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that had governed in the
9014 context of patents (so had we). But the rest of the Court discounted the
9015 parallel
—without explaining how the very same words in the Progress
9016 Clause could come to mean totally different things depending upon whether
9017 the words were about patents or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's
9018 charge go unanswered.
9019 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636436"></a><p>
9022 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever written, was
9023 external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of copyrights has
9024 become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had said that under the
9025 current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8 percent of the value of a
9026 perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong, that the actual number was
9027 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either way, the point was clear: If the
9028 Constitution said a term had to be "limited," and the existing term was so
9029 long as to be effectively unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
9031 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But because
9032 neither believed in the
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> case, neither was
9033 willing to push it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was
9034 decided without anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried
9035 from Judge Sentelle. It was
<em class=
"citetitle">Hamlet
</em> without the
9038 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when depression
9039 gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure the
9040 depression. This anger was of two sorts.
9042 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been one
9043 thing for them to have explained why the principle of
9044 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> didn't apply in this case. That wouldn't have
9045 been a very convincing argument, I don't believe, having read it made by
9046 others, and having tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been
9047 an act of integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that
9048 the proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
9049 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in light
9050 of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
9051 <em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was
9052 their "originalism" now?
9055 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain what the
9056 framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they did; they joined
9057 an opinion that never once tried to explain how the structure of that clause
9058 would affect the interpretation of Congress's power. And they joined an
9059 opinion that didn't even try to explain why this grant of power could be
9060 unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause would be limited. In short, they had
9061 joined an opinion that did not apply to, and was inconsistent with, their
9062 own method for interpreting the Constitution. This opinion may well have
9063 yielded a result that they liked. It did not produce a reason that was
9064 consistent with their own principles.
9066 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with myself. For I
9067 had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of the law as
9069 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636536"></a><p>
9070 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for idealism
9071 about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular. Most have a
9072 much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this case would be won
9073 based on whether I could convince the Justices that the framers' values were
9074 important, I fought the idea, because I didn't want to believe that that is
9075 how this Court decides. I insisted on arguing this case as if it were a
9076 simple application of a set of principles. I had an argument that followed
9077 in logic. I didn't need to waste my time showing it should also follow in
9081 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I can see
9082 a hundred places where the answers could have taken the conversation in
9083 different directions, where the truth about the harm that this unchecked
9084 power will cause could have been made clear to this Court. Justice Kennedy
9085 in good faith wanted to be shown. I, idiotically, corrected his
9086 question. Justice Souter in good faith wanted to be shown the First
9087 Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher, reframed the question to make the
9088 logical point. I had shown them how they could strike this law of Congress
9089 if they wanted to. There were a hundred places where I could have helped
9090 them want to, yet my stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have
9091 stood before hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion
9092 in that effort to persuade; but I refused to stand before this audience and
9093 try to persuade with the passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis
9094 on which a court should decide the issue.
9095 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636578"></a><p>
9096 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it have
9097 been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or Kathleen
9098 Sullivan?
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636589"></a>
9100 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court was not
9101 ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It would take
9102 a great deal more to show our society why our framers were right. And when
9103 we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
9105 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in doing
9106 anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have little
9107 reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had stepped
9108 down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could have
9111 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
9112 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
9113 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this case
9114 was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this issue should
9115 not be raised until it is.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636620"></a>
9118 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and publicly,
9119 that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have been persuaded,
9120 then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that here again Peter
9121 was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in a way that would do
9122 some good or they were not ready to hear this case in a way that would do
9123 some good. Either way, the decision to bring this case
—a decision I
9124 had made four years before
—was wrong. While the reaction to the Sonny
9125 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's
9126 decision was mixed. No one, at least in the press, tried to say that
9127 extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over
9128 ideas. Where the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had
9129 been skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
9130 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision was
9131 attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and harmful
9132 law.
<em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em> wrote in its editorial,
9133 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
9134 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are seeing
9135 the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of copyright
9136 perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment, one that should
9137 not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on the entire creative
9138 output of humanity is one of the reasons we live in a time of such fruitful
9140 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9141 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of hilarious
9142 images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from my view of the
9143 case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page (
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#fig-18" title=
"Figur 14.1. Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon">Figur
14.1,
“Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
”</a>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But
9144 the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636680"></a>
9145 </p><div class=
"figure"><a name=
"fig-18"></a><p class=
"title"><b>Figur
14.1. Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</b></p><div class=
"figure-contents"><div><img src=
"images/18.png" alt=
"Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon"></div></div></div><br class=
"figure-break"><p>
9146 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the quote from
9147 <em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em>. That "grand experiment" we call
9148 the "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey, I
9149 shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in our
9150 Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I fathered, the
9151 Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A better lawyer would
9152 have made them see differently.
9153 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634343" href=
"#id2634343" class=
"para">179</a>]
</sup>
9156 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to describe, but
9157 it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet created was a world of
9158 noncommercial pornographers
—people who were distributing porn but were
9159 not making money directly or indirectly from that distribution. Such a
9160 class didn't exist before the Internet came into being because the costs of
9161 distributing porn were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got
9162 special attention in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the
9163 Communications Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
9164 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
9165 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial publishers
9166 after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the world before the
9167 Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it at least as important to
9168 protect the Eldreds of the world as to protect noncommercial pornographers.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634397" href=
"#id2634397" class=
"para">180</a>]
</sup>
9171 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to
9172 last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
9173 Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our
9174 copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is
9175 also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one
9176 day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress,"
144
9177 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
9178 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634617" href=
"#id2634617" class=
"para">181</a>]
</sup>
9180 Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse
9181 Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
9182 <em class=
"citetitle">Chicago Tribune
</em>,
17. oktober
1998,
22.
9183 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634632" href=
"#id2634632" class=
"para">182</a>]
</sup>
9185 Se Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information Age,"
9186 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
9188 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634647" href=
"#id2634647" class=
"para">183</a>]
</sup>
9191 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
9192 <em class=
"citetitle">Congressional Quarterly This Week
</em>,
8. august
1990,
9193 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
9195 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634737" href=
"#id2634737" class=
"para">184</a>]
</sup>
9197 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Lopez
</em>,
514
9198 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
9199 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634763" href=
"#id2634763" class=
"para">185</a>]
</sup>
9202 <em class=
"citetitle">United States
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Morrison
</em>,
529
9204 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634784" href=
"#id2634784" class=
"para">186</a>]
</sup>
9207 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle carries
9208 from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in the context of
9209 the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered by the government
9210 would allow the government unending power to regulate commerce
—the
9211 limitation to interstate commerce notwithstanding. The same point is true in
9212 the context of the Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's
9213 interpretation would allow the government unending power to regulate
9214 copyrights
—the limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
9215 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634863" href=
"#id2634863" class=
"para">187</a>]
</sup>
9218 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
9219 <em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
537 U.S.
9220 186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
51</a>.
9221 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634929" href=
"#id2634929" class=
"para">188</a>]
</sup>
9223 The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
9224 Congressional Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal
9225 ranges. See Brief of Petitioners,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
9226 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
7, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
52</a>.
9227 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2635073" href=
"#id2635073" class=
"para">189</a>]
</sup>
9230 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
9231 <em class=
"citetitle">Los Angeles Times
</em>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
9232 "Classic Movies, Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today
9233 on Striking Down Copyright Extension,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Orlando Sentinel
9234 Tribune
</em>,
9 October
2002.
9235 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2635133" href=
"#id2635133" class=
"para">190</a>]
</sup>
9238 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
9239 Petitoners,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
9240 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
9241 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of Petitioners by the
9242 Internet Archive,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
9243 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
53</a>.
9244 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2635363" href=
"#id2635363" class=
"para">191</a>]
</sup>
9247 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20 December
9248 2002, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
9250 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2635817" href=
"#id2635817" class=
"para">192</a>]
</sup>
9253 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
9254 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>,
537 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
9255 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2635842" href=
"#id2635842" class=
"para">193</a>]
</sup>
9258 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins
9259 the Fray,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Times
</em>,
28 March
1998, B7.
9260 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"eldred-ii"></a>Kapittel
15. Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</h2></div></div></div><p>
9261 The day
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> was decided, fate would have it that I
9262 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
9263 <em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em> was denied
—meaning the case was really
9264 finally over
—fate would have it that I was giving a speech to
9265 technologists at Disney World.) This was a particularly long flight to my
9266 least favorite city. The drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because
9267 of traffic, so I opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
9268 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636736"></a><p>
9269 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
9270 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head the same
9271 advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is important. And
9272 alternating with that command was the question of Justice Kennedy: "For all
9273 these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts. I
9274 just don't see any empirical evidence for that." And so, having failed in
9275 the argument of constitutional principle, finally, I turned to an argument
9279 <em class=
"citetitle">The New York Times
</em> published the piece. In it, I
9280 proposed a simple fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the
9281 copyright owner would be required to register the work and pay a small
9282 fee. If he paid the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of
9283 copyright. If he did not, the work passed into the public domain.
9285 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name. Eric
9286 Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as he said
9287 early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
9289 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this is either
9290 the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright Term Deregulation
9291 Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear and obvious: Remove
9292 copyright where it is doing nothing except blocking access and the spread of
9293 knowledge. Leave it for as long as Congress allows for those works where its
9294 worth is at least $
1. But for everything else, let the content go.
9295 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636792"></a><p>
9296 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed it in
9297 an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters expressing
9298 support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity, people can see the
9299 copyright system makes no sense. As a good Republican might say, here
9300 government regulation is simply getting in the way of innovation and
9301 creativity. And as a good Democrat might say, here the government is
9302 blocking access and the spread of knowledge for no good reason. Indeed,
9303 there is no real difference between Democrats and Republicans on this
9304 issue. Anyone can recognize the stupid harm of the present system.
9306 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
9307 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system for
9308 people who want to license content is that there is no obvious place to look
9309 for the current copyright owners. Since registration is not required, since
9310 marking content is not required, since no formality at all is required, it
9311 is often impossibly hard to locate copyright owners to ask permission to use
9312 or license their work. This system would lower these costs, by establishing
9313 at least one registry where copyright owners could be identified.
9314 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636825"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636832"></a><p>
9316 As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
>11</a>, formalities in copyright law were removed in
1976,
9317 when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning any formal requirement
9318 before a copyright is granted.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2636849" href=
"#ftn.id2636849" class=
"footnote">194</a>]
</sup> The
9319 Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural rights
9320 don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American tradition
9321 that required copyright owners to follow form if their rights were to be
9322 protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly respect the dignity of
9323 the author. My right as a creator turns on my creativity, not upon the
9324 special favor of the government.
9326 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is absurd
9327 copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because a world
9328 without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread "Walt Disney
9329 creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to know what's
9330 protected and what's not.
9331 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636897"></a><p>
9332 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in Berlin in
9333 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne Convention in
1908,
9334 to require copyright terms of life plus fifty years, as well as the
9335 abolition of copyright formalities. The formalities were hated because the
9336 stories of inadvertent loss were increasingly common. It was as if a Charles
9337 Dickens character ran all copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
9338 <em class=
"citetitle">i
</em> or cross a
<em class=
"citetitle">t
</em> resulted in the
9339 loss of widows' only income.
9341 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
9342 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law should
9343 always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no reason
9344 copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning formalities totally,
9345 the response in Berlin should have been to embrace a more equitable system
9348 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration in the
9349 nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was also a
9350 hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save the
9351 starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory burden
9352 imposed upon creators.
9355 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was a moral
9356 claim as well. There was no reason that creative property should be a
9357 second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a table, his rights
9358 over the table don't depend upon filing a form with the government. He has
9359 a property right over the table "naturally," and he can assert that right
9360 against anyone who would steal the table, whether or not he has informed the
9361 government of his ownership of the table.
9363 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
9364 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative property
9365 being second-class property. The argument in favor of formalities turns upon
9366 the special problems that creative property presents. The law of
9367 formalities responds to the special physics of creative property, to assure
9368 that it can be efficiently and fairly spread.
9370 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just because
9371 you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land is to be
9372 effective. And few would think a car is second-class property just because
9373 you must register the car with the state and tag it with a license. In both
9374 of those cases, everyone sees that there is an important reason to secure
9375 registration
—both because it makes the markets more efficient and
9376 because it better secures the rights of the owner. Without a registration
9377 system for land, landowners would perpetually have to guard their
9378 property. With registration, they can simply point the police to a
9379 deed. Without a registration system for cars, auto theft would be much
9380 easier. With a registration system, the thief has a high burden to sell a
9381 stolen car. A slight burden is placed on the property owner, but those
9382 burdens produce a much better system of protection for property generally.
9384 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
9385 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
9386 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
9387 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
9388 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
9389 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property with
9390 confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is the author
9391 and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in a world without
9392 formalities. Complex, expensive,
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>lawyer
</em></span> transactions
9393 take their place.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2636999"></a>
9395 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono Act that we
9396 tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it didn't "get."
9397 Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no way easily to
9398 build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright terms were, as Justice
9399 Story said they would be, "short," then this wouldn't matter much. For
9400 fourteen years, under the framers' system, a work would be presumptively
9401 controlled. After fourteen years, it would be presumptively uncontrolled.
9403 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the inability to
9404 know what is protected and what is not protected becomes a huge and obvious
9405 burden on the creative process. If the only way a library can offer an
9406 Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a lawyer to clear the rights
9407 to every image and sound, then the copyright system is burdening creativity
9408 in a way that has never been seen before
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>because there are no
9409 formalities
</em></span>.
9411 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If it is
9412 worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the longer
9413 term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how to get your
9414 permission if they want to use your work. And you will get the benefit of an
9415 extended copyright term.
9417 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
9418 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
9419 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public domain
9420 where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a movie based
9421 on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
9423 Noen bekymrer seg over byrden på forfattere. Gjør ikke byrden med å
9424 registrere verket at beløpet $
1 egentlig er misvisende? Er ikke
9425 ekstraarbeidet verdt mer enn $
1? Er ikke dette det virkelige problemet med
9429 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
9430 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no doubt
9431 because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
9432 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must address
9433 the real problem of
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>governments
</em></span> standing at the core of
9434 any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a solution. That
9435 solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For now, assume it was
9436 Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it was one-click
9437 registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple, one-click registration
9438 fifty years after a work was published. Based upon historical data, that
9439 system would move up to
98 percent of commercial work, commercial work that
9440 no longer had a commercial life, into the public domain within fifty
9441 years. What do you think?
9442 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637086"></a><p>
9443 Da Steve Forbes støttet idéen, begynte enkelte i Washington å følge
9444 med. Mange kontaktet meg med tips til representanter som kan være villig til
9445 å introdusere en Eldred-lov. og jeg hadde noen få som foreslo direkte at de
9446 kan være villige til å ta det første skrittet.
9448 En representant, Zoe Lofgren fra California, gikk så langt som å få
9449 lovforslaget utarbeidet. Utkastet løste noen problemer med internasjonal
9450 lov. Det påla de enklest mulige forutsetninger på innehaverne av
9451 opphavsretter. I mai
2003 så det ut som om loven skulle være introdusert.
9452 16. mai, postet jeg på Eldred Act-bloggen, "vi er nære". Det oppstod en
9453 generell reaksjon i blogg-samfunnet om at noe godt kunne skje her.
9454 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637119"></a>
9456 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and the
9457 MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give the view of
9458 the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti informed the
9459 congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred Act. The reasons are
9460 embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their thinness shows something clear
9461 about what this debate is really about.
9464 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central concept
9465 in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That was true, but
9466 irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred long before the
9467 Internet made subsequent uses much more likely. Second, they argued that
9468 the proposal would harm poor copyright owners
—apparently those who
9469 could not afford the $
1 fee. Third, they argued that Congress had determined
9470 that extending a copyright term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in
9471 the case of the small percentage of work covered by copyright law that is
9472 still commercially valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal
9473 would not cut off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth,
9474 the MPAA argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
9475 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are certainly
9476 less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright whose owner is
9477 not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the copyright to a story
9478 underlying a film were to pass into the public domain. But what risk is
9479 that? If it is in the public domain, then the film is a valid derivative
9482 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to do
9483 this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are thousands of
9484 copyright owners who don't even know they have a copyright to give. Whether
9485 they are free to give away their copyright or not
—a controversial
9486 claim in any case
—unless they know about a copyright, they're not
9489 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law reacting to
9490 changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed. In the other,
9491 common sense was delayed. The difference between the two stories was the
9492 power of the opposition
—the power of the side that fought to defend
9493 the status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
9494 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
9495 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
9497 Jeg brukte disse to tilfellene som en måte å ramme inn krigen som denne
9498 boken har handlet om. For her er det også en ny teknologi som tvinger loven
9499 til å reagere. Og her bør vi også spørre, er loven i tråd med eller i strid
9500 med sunn fornuft. Hvis sunn fornuft støtter loven, hva forklarer denne
9506 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the copyright
9507 owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and harmful, and the
9508 law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is p2p sharing, it is easy
9509 to understand why the law backs the owners still: Much of this sharing is
9510 wrong, even if much is harmless. When the issue is copyright terms for the
9511 Mickey Mouses of the world, it is possible still to understand why the law
9512 favors Hollywood: Most people don't recognize the reasons for limiting
9513 copyright terms; it is thus still possible to see good faith within the
9516 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred Act,
9517 then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked selfinterest
9518 driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary range of content that
9519 is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with any copyright owner's desire
9520 to exercise continued control over his content. It would simply liberate
9521 what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark Content" that fills archives around the
9522 world. So when the warriors oppose a change like this, we should ask one
9525 Hva ønsker denne industrien egentlig?
9527 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So the
9528 effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about protecting
9529 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>their
</em></span> content. The effort to block the Eldred Act is an
9530 effort to assure that nothing more passes into the public domain. It is
9531 another step to assure that the public domain will never compete, that there
9532 will be no use of content that is not commercially controlled, and that
9533 there will be no commercial use of content that doesn't require
9534 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>their
</em></span> permission first.
9536 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side is. The
9537 most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as its aim not
9538 the protection of "property" but the rejection of a tradition. Their aim is
9539 not simply to protect what is theirs.
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>Their aim is to assure that
9540 all there is is what is theirs
</em></span>.
9543 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not hard
9544 to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public domain
9545 tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA feared the
9546 competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public domain connected to
9547 a public that now has the means to create with it and to share its own
9549 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637272"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637279"></a><p>
9550 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is as if
9551 the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the Causbys and
9552 demands that their remote and useless property rights be respected, so that
9553 these remote and forgotten copyright holders might block the progress of
9556 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
9557 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so long
9558 as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of the
9559 Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission society." The
9560 past can be cultivated only if you can identify the owner and gain
9561 permission to build upon his work. The future will be controlled by this
9562 dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
9563 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2636849" href=
"#id2636849" class=
"para">194</a>]
</sup>
9566 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
9567 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
9568 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of the
9569 author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act, every text
9570 of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the exercise" of
9571 rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject to any formality."
9572 The prohibition against formalities is presently embodied in Article
5(
2) of
9573 the Paris Text of the Berne Convention. Many countries continue to impose
9574 some form of deposit or registration requirement, albeit not as a condition
9575 of copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
9576 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum. Copies of
9577 books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in the British
9578 Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar of Authors where
9579 the author's true name can be filed in the case of anonymous or pseudonymous
9580 works. Paul Goldstein,
<em class=
"citetitle">International Intellectual Property Law,
9581 Cases and Materials
</em> (New York: Foundation Press,
2001),
9582 153–54.
</p></div></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 16. Konklusjon"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-conclusion"></a>Kapittel
16. Konklusjon
</h2></div></div></div><p>
9583 Det er mer enn trettifem millioner mennesker over hele verden med
9584 AIDS-viruset. Tjuefem millioner av dem bor i Afrika sør for Sahara. Sytten
9585 millioner har allerede dødd. Sytten millioner afrikanere er prosentvis
9586 proporsjonalt med syv millioner amerikanere. Viktigere er det at dette er
9587 17 millioner afrikanere.
9589 Det finnes ingen kur for AIDS, men det finnes medisiner som kan hemme
9590 sykdommens utvikling. Disse antiretrovirale terapiene er fortsatt
9591 eksperimentelle, men de har hatt en dramatisk effekt allerede. I USA øker
9592 AIDS-pasienter som regelmessig tar en cocktail av disse medisinene sin
9593 levealder med ti til tjue år. For noen gjøre medisinene sykdommen nesten
9596 Disse medisinene er dyre. Da de ble først introdusert i USA, kostet de
9597 mellom $
10 000 og $
15 000 pr. person hvert år. I dag koster noen av dem $
25
9598 000 pr. år. Med disse prisene har, selvfølgelig, ingen afrikansk stat råd
9599 til medisinen for det store flertall av sine innbyggere: $
15 000 er tredve
9600 ganger brutto nasjonalprodukt pr. innbygger i Zimbabwe. Med slike priser er
9601 disse medisinene fullstendig utilgjengelig.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637359" href=
"#ftn.id2637359" class=
"footnote">195</a>]
</sup>
9605 Disse prisene er ikke høye fordi ingrediensene til medisinene er dyre.
9606 Disse prisene er høye fordi medisinene er beskyttet av patenter.
9607 Farmasiselskapene som produserer disse livreddende blandingene nyter minst
9608 tjue års monopol på sine oppfinnelser. De bruker denne monopolmakten til å
9609 hente ut så mye de kan fra markedet. Ved hjelp av denne makten holder de
9612 Det er mange som er skeptiske til patenter, spesielt patenter på
9613 medisiner. Det er ikke jeg. Faktisk av alle forskningsområder som kan være
9614 støttet av patenter, er forskning på medisiner, etter min mening, det
9615 klareste tilfelle der patenter er nødvendig. Patenter gir et farmasøytiske
9616 firma en viss forsikring om at hvis det lykkes i å finne opp et nytt
9617 medikament som kan behandle en sykdom, vil det kunne tjene tilbake
9618 investeringen og mer til. Dette ber sosialt et ekstremt verdifullt
9619 insentiv. Jeg er den siste personen som vil argumentere for at loven skal
9620 avskaffe dette, i det minste uten andre endringer.
9622 Men det er én ting å støtte patenter, selv patenter på medisiner. Det er en
9623 annen ting å avgjøre hvordan en best skal håndtere en krise. Og i det
9624 afrikanske ledere begynte å erkjenne ødeleggelsen AIDS brakte, begynte de å
9625 se etter måter å importere HIV-medisiner til kostnader betydelig under
9628 I
1997 forsøkte Sør-Afrika seg på en tilnærming. Landet vedtok en lov som
9629 tillot import av patenterte medisiner som hadde blitt produsert og solgt i
9630 en annen nasjons marked med godkjenning fra patenteieren. For eksempel,
9631 hvis medisinen var solgt i India, så kunne den bli importert inn til Afrika
9632 fra India. Dette kalles "parallellimport" og er generelt tillatt i
9633 internasjonal handelslovgivning, og spesifikt tillatt i den europeiske
9634 union.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637437" href=
"#ftn.id2637437" class=
"footnote">196</a>]
</sup>
9636 Men USA var imot lovendringen. Og de nøyde seg ikke med å være imot. Som
9637 International Intellectual Property Association karakteriserte det,
9638 "Myndighetene i USA presset Sør-Afrika
… til å ikke tillate tvungen
9639 lisensiering eller parallellimport"
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2634448" href=
"#ftn.id2634448" class=
"footnote">197</a>]
</sup>
9640 Gjennom kontoret til USAs handelsrepresentant (USTR), ba myndighetene
9641 Sør-Afrika om å endre loven
—og for å legge press bak den
9642 forespørselen, listet USTR i
1998 opp Sør-Afrika som et land som burde
9643 vurderes for handelsrestriksjoner. Samme år gikk mer enn førti
9644 farmasiselskaper til retten for å utfordre myndighetenes handlinger. USA
9645 fikk selskap av andre myndigheter fra EU. Deres påstand, og påstanden til
9646 farmasiselskapene, var at Sør-Afrika brøt sine internasjonale forpliktelser
9647 ved å distriminere mot en bestemt type patenter
—farmasøytiske
9648 patenter. Kravet fra disse myndighetene, med USA i spissen, var at
9649 Sør-Afrika skulle respektere disse patentene på samme måte som alle andre
9650 patenter, uavhengig av eventuell effekt på behandlingen av AIDS i
9651 Sør-Afrika.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637502" href=
"#ftn.id2637502" class=
"footnote">198</a>]
</sup>
9653 Vi bør sette intervensjonen til USA i sammenheng. Det er ingen tvil om at
9654 patenter ikke er den viktigste årsaken til at Afrikanere ikke har tilgang
9655 til medisiner. Fattigdom og den totale mangel på effektivt helsevesen betyr
9656 mer. Men uansett om patenter er en viktigste grunnen eller ikke, så har
9657 prisen på medisiner en effekt på etterspørselen, og patenter påvirker
9658 prisen. Så uansett, massiv eller marginal, så var det en effekt av våre
9659 myndigheters intervensjon for å stoppe flyten av medisiner inn til Afrika.
9661 Ved å stoppe flyten av HIV-behandling til Afrika, sikret ikke myndighetene i
9662 USA medisiner til USA borgere. Dette er ikke som hvete (hvis de spise det så
9663 kan ikke vi spise det). Det som USA i effekt intervenerte for å stoppe, var
9664 flyten av kunnskap: Informasjon om hvordan en kan ta kjemikalier som finnes
9665 i Afrika og gjøre disse kjemikaliene om til medisiner som kan redde
15 til
9668 Intervensjonen fra USA ville heller ikke beskytte fortjenesten til
9669 medisinselskapene i USA
— i hvert fall ikke betydelig. Det var jo ikke
9670 slik at disse landene hadde mulighet til å kjøpe medisinene til de prisene
9671 som medisinselskapene forlangte. Igjen var afrikanerne for fattige til å ha
9672 råd til disse medisinene til de tilbudte prisene. Å blokkere for
9673 parallellimport av disse medisinene ville ikke øke salget til de amerikanske
9674 selskapene betydelig.
9676 I stedet var argumentet til fordel for restriksjoner på denne flyten av
9677 informasjon, som var nødvendig for å redde millioner av liv, et argument om
9678 eiendoms ukrenkelighet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637596" href=
"#ftn.id2637596" class=
"footnote">199</a>]
</sup> Det var på
9679 grunn av at "intellektuell eiendom" ville bli krenket at disse medisinene
9680 ikke skulle flomme inn til Afrika. Det var prinsippet om viktigheten av
9681 "intellektuell eiendom" som fikk disse myndighetsaktørene til å intervenere
9682 mot Sør-Afrikas mottiltak mot AIDS.
9684 La oss ta et skritt tilbake for et øyeblikk. En gang om tredve år vil våre
9685 barn se tilbake på oss og spørre, hvordan kunne vi la dette skje? Hvordan
9686 kunne vi tillate å gjennomføre en politikk hvis direkte kostnad var få
15
9687 til
30 millioner afrikanere til å dø raskere, og hvis eneste virkelige
9688 fordel var å opprettholde "ukrenkeligheten" til en idé? Hva slags
9689 berettigelse kan noen sinne eksistere for en politikk som resulterer i så
9690 mange døde? Hva slags galskap er det egentlig som tillater at så mange dør
9691 for slik en abstraksjon?
9693 Noen skylder på farmasiselskapene. Det gjør ikke jeg. De er selskaper, og
9694 deres ledere er lovpålagt å tjene penger for selskapene. De presser på for
9695 en bestemt patentpolitikk, ikke på grunn av idealer, men fordi det er dette
9696 som gjør at de tjener mest penger. Og dette gjør kun at de tjener mest
9697 penger på grunn av en slags korrupsjon i vårt politiske system
— en
9698 korrupsjon som farmasiselskapene helt klart ikke er ansvarlige for.
9700 Denne korrupsjonen er våre egne politikeres manglende integritet. For
9701 medisinprodusentene ville elske
—sier de selv, og jeg tror dem
—
9702 å selge sine medisiner så billig som de kan til land i Afrika og andre
9703 steder. Det er utfordringer de må løse å sikre at medisinene ikke kommer
9704 tilbake til USA, men dette er bare teknologiske utfordring. De kan bli
9708 Et annet problem kan derimot ikke løses. Det er frykten for at en politiker
9709 som skal vise seg og kaller inn lederne hos medisinprodusentene til høring i
9710 senatet eller representantenes hus og spør, "hvordan har det seg at du kan
9711 selge HIV-medisinen i Afrika for bare $
1 pr. pille, mens samme pille koster
9712 en amerikansker $
1500?" Da det ikke finnes et "kjapt svar" på det
9713 spørsmålet, ville effekten bli regulering av priser i Amerika.
9714 Medisinprodusentene unngård dermed denne spiralen ved å sikre at det første
9715 steget ikke tas. De forsterker idéen om at eierrettigheter skal være
9716 ukrenkelige. De legger seg på en rasjonell strategi i en irrasjonell
9717 omgivelse, med den utilsiktede konsekvens at kanskje millioner dør. Og den
9718 rasjonelle strategien rammes dermed inn ved hjel av dette
9719 ideal
—helligheten til en idé som kalles "immaterielle rettigheter".
9721 Så når du konfronteres av ditt barns sunne fornuft, hva vil du si? Når den
9722 sunne fornuften hos en generasjon endelig gjør opprør mot hva vi har gjort,
9723 hvordan vil vi rettferdiggjøre det? Hva er argumentet?
9725 En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk støtte til
9726 patentsystemet uten å måtte nå alle overalt på nøyaktig samme måte. På samme
9727 måte som en fornuftig opphavsrettspolitikk kunne gå god for og gi sterk
9728 støtte til et opphavsretts-system uten å måtte regulere spredningen av
9729 kultur perfekt og for alltid. En fornuftig patentpolitikk kunne gå god for
9730 og gi sterk støtte til et patentsystem uten å måtte blokkere spredning av
9731 medisiner til et land som uansett ikke er rikt nok til å ha råd til
9732 markedsprisen. En fornuftig politikk kan en dermed si kunne være en
9733 balansert politikk. For det meste av vår historie har både opphavsrett- og
9734 patentpolitikken i denne forstand vært balansert.
9737 Men vi som kultur har mistet denne følelsen for balanse. Vi har mistet det
9738 kritiske blikket som hjelper oss til å se forkjellen mellom sannhet og
9739 ekstremisme. En slags eiendomsfundamentalisme, uten grunnlag i vår
9740 tradisjon, hersker nå i vår kultur
—sært, og med konsekvenser mer
9741 alvorlig for spredningen av idéer og kultur enn nesten enhver annen politisk
9742 enkeltavgjørelse vi som demokrati kan fatte. En enkel idé blender oss, og
9743 under dekke av mørket skjer mye som de fleste av oss ville avvist hvis vi
9744 hadde fulgt med. Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om eierskap til idéer at
9745 vi ikke engang legger merke til hvor uhyrlig det er å nekte tilgang til
9746 idéer for et folk som dør uten dem. Så ukritisk aksepterer vi idéen om
9747 eiendom til kulturen at vi ikke engang stiller spørsmål ved når kontrollen
9748 over denne eiendommen fjerner vår evne, som folk, til å utvikle vår kultur
9749 demokratisk. Blindhet blir vår sunne fornuft, og utfordringen for enhver
9750 som vil gjenvinne retten til å dyrke vår kultur er å finne en måte å få
9751 denne sunne fornuften til å åpne sine øyne.
9753 Så langt sover sunn fornuft. Det er intet opprør. Sunn fornuft ser ennå
9754 ikke hva det er å gjøre opprør mot. Ekstremismen som nå domunerer denne
9755 debatten resonerer med idéer som virker naturlige, og resonansen er
9756 forsterket av våre moderne RCA-ene. De fører en frenetisk krig for å
9757 bekjempe "piratvirksomhet" og knuser kreativitetskultur. De forsvarer idéen
9758 om "kreativt eierskap", mens de endrer ekte skapere til moderne
9759 leilendinger. De blir fornermet av idéen om at rettigheter skulle være
9760 balanserte, selv om hver av hovedaktørene i denne innholdskrigen selv hadde
9761 fordeler av et mer balansert ideal. Hykleriet rår. Men i en by som
9762 Washington blir ikke hykleriet en gang lakt merke til. Mektige lobbyister,
9763 kompliserte problemer og MTV-oppmerksomhetsspenn gir en "perfekt storm" for
9766 I august
2003 brøt en kamp ut i USA om en avgjørelse fra World Intellectual
9767 Property Organiation om å avlyse et møte.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637721" href=
"#ftn.id2637721" class=
"footnote">200</a>]
</sup> På forespørsel fra en lang rekke med interresenter hadde WIPO
9768 bestemt å avholde et møte for å diskutere "åpne og sammarbeidende prosjekter
9769 for å skape goder for felleskapet". Disse prosjektene som hadde lyktes i å
9770 produsere goder for fellesskapet uten å basere seg eksklusivt på bruken av
9771 proprietære immaterielle rettigheter. Eksempler inkluderer internettet og
9772 verdensveven, begge som ble utviklet på grunnlag av protokoller i
9773 allemannseie. Det hadde med en begynnende trend for å støtte åpne
9774 akademiske tidsskrifter, og inkluderte Public Library of Science-prosjektet
9775 som jeg beskriver i etterordet. Det inkluderte et prosjekt for a utvikle
9776 enkeltnukleotidforskjeller (SNPs), som er antatt å få stor betydning i
9777 biomedisinsk forskning. (Dette ideelle prosjektet besto av et konsortium av
9778 Wellcome Trust og farmasøytiske og teknologiske selskaper, inkludert
9779 Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca, Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
9780 Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, og
9781 Searle.) Det inkluderte Globalt posisjonssystem (GPS) som Ronald Reagen
9782 frigjorde tidlig på
1980-tallet. Og det inkluderte "åpen kildekode og fri
9783 programvare".
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637899"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637907"></a>
9785 Formålet med møtet var å vurdere denne rekken av prosjekter fra et felles
9786 perspektiv: at ingen av disse prosjektene hadde som grunnlag immateriell
9787 ekstremisme. I stedet, hos alle disse, ble immaterielle rettigheter
9788 balansert med avtaler om å holde tilgang åpen, eller for å legge
9789 begrensninger på hvordan proprietære krav kan bli brukt.
9791 Dermed var, fra perspektivet i denne boken, denne konferansen
9792 ideell.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637932" href=
"#ftn.id2637932" class=
"footnote">201</a>]
</sup> Prosjektene innenfor temaet var
9793 både kommersielle og ikkekommersielle verker. De involverte i hovedsak
9794 vitenskapet, men fra mange perspektiver. Og WIPO var et ideelt sted for
9795 denne diskusjonen, siden WIPO var den fremstående internasjonale aktør som
9796 drev med immaterielle rettighetsspørsmål.
9799 Faktisk fikk jeg en gang offentlig kjeft for å ikke anerkjenne dette faktum
9800 om WIPO. I februar
2003 leverte jeg et hovedinnlegg på en forberedende
9801 konferanse for World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). På en
9802 pressekonferanse før innlegget, ble jeg spurt hva jeg skulle snakke om. Jeg
9803 svarte at jeg skulle snakke litt om viktigheten av balanse rundt
9804 immaterielle verdier for utviklingen av informasjonssamfunnet. Ordstyreren
9805 på arrangementet avbrøt meg da brått for å informere meg og journalistene
9806 tilstede at ingen spørsmål rundt immaterielle verdier ville bli diskutert av
9807 WSIS, da slike spørsmål kun skulle diskuteres i WIPO. I innlegget jeg hadde
9808 forberedt var temaet om immaterielle verdier en forholdvis liten del av det
9809 hele. Men etter denne forbløffende uttalelsen, gjorde jeg immaterielle
9810 verdier til hovedfokus for mitt innlegg. Det var ikke mulig å snakke om et
9811 "informasjonssamfunn" uten at en også snakket om andelen av informasjon og
9812 kultur som ikke er vernet av opphavsretten. Mitt innlegg gjorde ikke min
9813 overivrige moderator veldig glad. Og hun hadde uten tvil rett i at omfanget
9814 til vern av immaterielle rettigheter normalt hørte inn under WIPO. Men
9815 etter mitt syn, kunne det ikke bli for mye diskusjon om hvor mye
9816 immaterielle rettigheter som trengs, siden etter mitt syn, hadde selve ideen
9817 om en balanse rundt immaterielle rettigheter hadde gått tapt.
9819 Så uansett om WSIS kan diskutere balanse i intellektuell eiendom eller ikke,
9820 så hadde jeg trodd det var tatt for gitt at WIPO kunne og burde. Og dermed
9821 møtet om "åpne og samarbeidende prosjekter for å skape fellesgoder" virker å
9822 passe perfekt for WIPOs agenda.
9824 Men det er ett prosjekt i listen som er svært kontroversielt, i hvert fall
9825 blant lobbyister. Dette prosjektet er "åpen kildekode og fri
9826 programvare". Microsoft spesielt er skeptisk til diskusjon om emnet. Fra
9827 deres perspektiv, ville en konferanse for å diskutere åpen kildekode og fri
9828 programvare være som en konferanse for å diskutere Apples operativsystem.
9829 Både åpen kildekode og fri programvare konkurrerer med Microsofts
9830 programvare. Og internasjonalt har mange myndigheter begynt å utforske krav
9831 om at de skal bruke åpen kildekode eller fri programvare, i stedet for
9832 "proprietær programvare," til sine egne interne behov.
9834 Jeg mener ikke å gå inn i den debatten her. Det er viktig kun for å gjøre
9835 det klart at skillet ikke er mellom kommersiell og ikke-kommersiell
9836 programvare. Det er mange viktige selskaper som er fundamentalt avhengig av
9837 fri programvare, der IBM er den mest fremtredende. IBM har i stadig større
9838 grad skiftet sitt fokus til GNU/Linux-operativsystemet, det mest berømte
9839 biten av "fri programvare"
—og IBM er helt klart en kommernsiell
9840 aktør. Dermed er det å støtte "fri programvare" ikke å motsette seg
9841 kommersielle aktører. Det er i stedet å støtte en måte å drive
9842 programvareutvikling som er forskjellig fra Microsofts.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2637780" href=
"#ftn.id2637780" class=
"footnote">202</a>]
</sup> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638086"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638092"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638098"></a>
9845 Mer viktig for våre formål, er at å støtte "åpen kildekode og fri
9846 programvare" ikke er å motsette seg opphasvrett. "Åpen kildekode og fri
9847 programvare" er ikke programvare uten opphavsrettslig vern. Istedet, på
9848 samme måte som programvare fra Microsoft, insisterer opphavsrettsinnehaverne
9849 av fri programvare ganske sterkt at vilkårene i deres programvarelisens blir
9850 respektert av de som tar i bruk fri programvare. Vilkårene i den lisensen
9851 er uten tvil forskjellig fra vilkårene i en proprietær programvarelisens.
9852 For eksempel krever fri programvare lisensiert med den generelle offentlige
9853 lisensen (GPL), at kildekoden for programvare gjøres tilgjengelig for alle
9854 som endrer og redistribuerer programvaren. Men dette kravet er kun
9855 effektivt hvis opphavsrett råder over programvare. Hvis opphavsretten ikke
9856 råder over programvare, så kunne ikke fri programvare pålegge slike krav på
9857 de som tar i bruk programvaren. Den er dermed like avhengig av
9858 opphavsrettsloven som Microsoft.
9860 Det er dermed forståelig at Microsoft, som utviklere av proprietær
9861 programvare, gikk imot et slikt WIPO-møte, og like fullt forståelig at de
9862 bruker sine lobbyister til å få USAs myndigheter til å gå imot møtet. Og
9863 ganske riktig, det er akkurat dette som i følge rapporter hadde skjedd. I
9864 følge Jonathan Krim i
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington Post
</em>, lyktes
9865 Microsofts lobbyister i å få USAs myndigheter til å legge ned veto mot et
9866 slikt møte.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638162" href=
"#ftn.id2638162" class=
"footnote">203</a>]
</sup> Og uten støtte fra USA ble
9869 Jeg klandrer ikke Microsoft for å gjøre det de kan for å fremme sine egne
9870 interesser i samsvar med loven. Og lobbyvirksomhet mot myndighetene er
9871 åpenbart i samsvar med loven. Det er ikke noe overraskende her med deres
9872 lobbyvirksomhet, og ikke veldig overraskende at den mektigste
9873 programvareprodusenten i USA har lyktes med sin lobbyvirksomhet.
9875 Det som var overraskende var USAs regjerings begrunnelse for å være imot
9876 møtet. Igjen, siterert av krim, forklarte Lois Boland, direktør for
9877 internasjonale forbindelser ved USAs patent og varemerkekontor, at
9878 "programvare med åpen kildekode går imot til formålet til WIPO, som er å
9879 fremme immatterielle rettigheter.". Hun skal i følge sitatet ha sagt, "Å
9880 holde et møte som har som formål å fraskrive seg eller frafalle slike
9881 rettigheter synes for oss å være i strid med formålene til WIPO."
9883 Disse utsagnene er forbløffende på flere nivåer.
9885 For det første er de ganske enkelt enkelt ikke riktige. Som jeg beskrev, er
9886 det meste av åpen kildekode og fri programvare fundamentalt avhengig av den
9887 immaterielle retten kalt "opphavsrett". Uten den vil begresningene definert
9888 av disse lisensene ikke fungere. Dermed er det å si at de "går imot"
9889 formålet om å fremme immaterielle rettigheter å avsløre en ekstraordinær
9890 mangel på forståelse
—den type feil som er tilgivelig hos en førsteårs
9891 jusstudent, men pinlig fra en høyt plassert statstjenestemann som håndterer
9892 utfordringer rundt immaterielle rettigheter.
9894 For det andre, hvem har noen gang hevdet at WIPOs eksklusive mål var å
9895 "fremme" immaterielle rettigheter maksimalt? Som jeg fikk kjeft om på den
9896 forberedende konferansen til WSIS, skal WIPO vurdere ikke bare hvordan best
9897 beskytte immaterielle rettigheter, men også hva som er den beste balansen
9898 rundt immaterielle rettigheter. Som enhver økonom og advokat vet, er det
9899 vanskelige spørsmålet i immaterielle rettighetsjuss å finne den balansen.
9900 Men at det skulle være en grense, trodde jeg, var ubestridt. Man ønsker å
9901 spørre Ms. boland om generelle medisiner (medisiner basert på medisiner med
9902 patenter som er utløpt) i strid med WIPOs oppdrag? Svekker allemannseie
9903 immaterielle rettigheter? Ville det vært bedre om internettets protokoller
9904 hadde vært patentert?
9906 For det tredje, selv om en tror at formålet med WIPO var å maksimere
9907 immaterielle rettigheter, så innehas immaterielle rettigheter, i vår
9908 tradisjon, av individer og selskaper. De får bestemme hva som skal gjøres
9909 med disse rettighetene, igjen fordi det er
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>de
</em></span> som eier
9910 rettigetene. Hvis de ønsker å "frafalle" eller "frasi" seg sine rettigheter,
9911 så er det helt etter boka i vår tradisjon. Når Bill Gates gir bort mer enn
9912 $
20 milliarder til gode formål, så er ikke det uforenelig med målene til
9913 eiendomssystemet. Det er heller tvert i mot, akkurat hva eiendomssysstemet
9914 er ment å oppnå, at individer har retten til å bestemme hva de vil gjøre med
9915 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>sin
</em></span> eiendom.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638300"></a>
9918 Når Ms. Boland sier at det er noe galt med et møte "som har som sitt formål
9919 å fraskrive eller frafalle slike rettigheter", så sier hun at WIPO har en
9920 interesse i å påvirke valgene til enkeltpersoner som eier immaterielle
9921 rettigheter. At på en eller annen WIPOs oppdrag bør være å stoppe individer
9922 fra å "frakrive" eller "frafalle" seg sine immaterielle rettigheter. At
9923 interessen til WIPO ikke bare er maksimale immaterielle rettigheter, men
9924 også at de skal utøves på den mest ekstreme og restriktive mulig måten.
9926 Det er en historie om akkurat et slikt eierskapssystem som er velkjent i den
9927 anglo-amerikansk tradisjon. Det kalles "føydalisme". Under føydalismen var
9928 eiendommer ikke bare kontrollert av et relativt lite antall individer og
9929 aktører. Men det føydale systemet hadde en sterk interesse i å sikre at
9930 landeier i systemet ikke svekke føydalismen ved å frigjøre folkene og
9931 eiendomene som de kontrollerte til det frie markedet. Føydalismen var
9932 avhengig av maksimal kontroll og konsentrasjon. Det sloss mot enhver frihet
9933 som kunne forstyrre denne kontrollen.
9934 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638340"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638346"></a><p>
9935 Som Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite beskriver, dette er nøyaktig det valget
9936 vi nå gjør om immaterielle rettigheter.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638359" href=
"#ftn.id2638359" class=
"footnote">204</a>]
</sup>
9937 Vi kommer til å få et informasjonssamfunn. Så mye er sikkert. Vårt eneste
9938 valg nå er hvorvidt dette informasjonssamfunnet skal være
9939 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>fritt
</em></span> eller
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>føydalt
</em></span>. Trenden er
9942 Da denne bataljen brøt ut, blogget jeg om dette. En heftig debatt brøt ut i
9943 kommentarfeltet. Ms. Boland hadde en rekke støttespillere som forsøkte å
9944 vise hvorfor hennes kommentarer ga mening. Men det var spesielt en
9945 kommentar som gjorde meg trist. En anonym kommentator skrev,
9946 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
9948 George, du misforstår Lessig: Han snakker bare om verden slik den burde være
9949 ("målet til WIPO, og målet til enhver regjering, bør være å fremme den
9950 riktige balansen for immaterielle rettigheter, ikke bare å fremme
9951 immaterielle rettigheter"), ikke som den er. Hvis vi snakket om verden slik
9952 den er, så har naturligvis Boland ikke sagt noe galt. Men i verden slik
9953 Lessig vil at den skal være, er det åpenbart at hun har sagt noe galt. En
9954 må alltid være oppmerksom på forskjellen mellom Lessigs og vår verden.
9955 </p></blockquote></div><p>
9956 Jeg gikk glipp av ironien først gangen jeg leste den. Jeg lese den raskt og
9957 trodde forfatteren støttet idéen om at det våre myndigheter burde gjøre var
9958 å søke balanse. (Min kritikk av Ms Boland, selvfølgelig, var ikke om
9959 hvorvidt hun søkte balanse eller ikke; min kritikk var at hennes kommentarer
9960 avslørte en feil kun en førsteårs jussstudent burde kunne gjøre. Jeg har
9961 noen illusjon om ekstremismen hos våre myndigheter, uansett om de er
9962 republikanere eller demokrater. Min eneste tilsynelatende illusjon er
9963 hvorvidt våre myndigheter bør snakke sant eller ikke.)
9965 Det var dermot åpenbart at den som postet meldingen ikke støttet idéen. I
9966 stedet latterliggjorde forfatteren selve idéen om at i den virkelig verden
9967 skulle "målet" til myndighetene være "å fremme den riktige balanse" for
9968 immaterielle rettigheter. Det var åpenbart tåpelig for ham. Og det
9969 avslørte åpenbart, trodde han, min egen tåpelige utopisme. "Typisk for en
9970 akademiker", kunne forfatteren like gjerne ha fortsatt.
9972 Jeg forstår kritikken av akademisk utopisme. Jeg mener også at utopisme er
9973 tåpelig, og jeg vil være blant de første til å gjøre narr av de aburde
9974 urealisistiske idealer til akademikere gjennom historien (og ikke bare i
9975 vårt eget lands historie).
9977 Men når det har blitt dumt å anta at rollen til våre myndigheter bør være å
9978 "oppnå balanse", da kan du regne meg blant de dumme, for det betyr at dette
9979 faktisk har blitt ganske seriøst. Hvis det bør være åpenbart for alle at
9980 myndighetene ikke søker å oppnå balanse, at myndighetene ganske enkelt et
9981 verktøy for de mektigste lobbyistene, at ideen om å forvente bedre av
9982 myndighetene er absurd, at ideen om å kreve at myndighetene snakker sant og
9983 ikke lyver bare er naiv, hva har da vi, det mektigste demokratiet i verden,
9987 Det kan være galskap å forvente at en mektig myndigshetsperson skal si
9988 sannheten. Det kan være galskap å tro at myndighetenes politikk skal gjøre
9989 mer enn å tjene de mektigste interesser. Det kan være galskap å argumentere
9990 for å bevare en tradisjon som har vært en del av vår tradisjon for
9991 mesteparten av vår historie
—fri kultur.
9992 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638484"></a><p>
9993 Hvis dette er galskap, så la det være mer gærninger. Snart. Det finnes
9994 øyeblikk av håp i denne kampen. Og øyeblikk som overrasker. Da FCC vurderte
9995 mindre strenge eierskapregler, som ville ytterligere konsentrere
9996 mediaeierskap, dannet det seg en en ekstraordinær koalisjon på tvers av
9997 partiene for å bekjempe endringen. For kanskje første gang i historien
9998 organiserte interesser så forskjellige som NRA, ACLU, moveon.org, William
9999 Safire, Ted Turner og Codepink Women for Piece seg for å protestere på denne
10000 endringen i FCC-reglene. Så mange som
700 000 brev ble sendt til FCC med
10001 krav om flere høringer og et annet resultat.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638505"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638511"></a>
10003 Disse protestene stoppet ikke FCC, men like etter stemte en bred koalisjon i
10004 senatet for å reversere avgjørelsen i FCC. De fientlige høringene som ledet
10005 til avstemmingen avslørte hvor mektig denne bevegelsen hadde blitt. Det var
10006 ingen betydnigsfull støtte for FCCs avgjørelse, mens det var bred og
10007 vedvarende støtte for å bekjempe ytterligere konsentrasjon i media.
10009 Men selv denne bevegelsen går glipp av en viktig brikke i puslespillet. Å
10010 være stor er ikke ille i seg selv. Frihet er ikke truet bare på grunn av at
10011 noen blir veldig rik, eller på grunn av at det bare er en håndfull store
10012 aktører. Den dårlige kvaliteten til Big Macs eller Quartar Punders betyr
10013 ikke at du ikke kan få en god hamburger andre steder.
10015 Faren med mediekonsentrasjon kommer ikke fra selve konsentrasjonen, men
10016 kommer fra føydalismen som denne konsentrasjonen fører til når den kobles
10017 til endringer i opphavsretten. Det er ikke kun at det er noen mektige
10018 selskaper som styrer en stadig voksende andel av mediene. Det er at denne
10019 konsentrasjonen kan påkalle en like oppsvulmet rekke
10020 rettigheter
—eiendomsrettigheter i en historisk ekstrem form
—som
10021 gjør størrelsen ille.
10023 Det er derfor betydningsfullt at så mange vil kjempe for å kreve konkurranse
10024 og økt mangfold. Likevel, hvis kampanjen blir forstått til å kun gjelde
10025 størrelse, så er ikke det veldig overraskende. Vi amerikanere har en lang
10026 historie med å slåss mot "stort", klokt eller ikke. At vi kan være motivert
10027 til å slåss mot "store" igjen ikke noe nytt.
10029 Det ville vært noe nytt, og noe veldig viktig, hvis like mange kan være med
10030 på en kampanje for å bekjempe økende ekstremisme bygget inn i idéen om
10031 "intellektuell eiendom". Ikke fordi balanse er fremmed for vår
10032 tradisjon. Jeg agumenterer for at balanse er vår tradisjon. Men fordi evnen
10033 til å tenke kritisk på omfanget av alt som kalles "eiendom" ikke er lenger
10034 er godt trent i denne tradisjonen.
10036 Hvis vi var Akilles, så ville dette være vår hæl. Dette ville være stedet
10038 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638604"></a><p>
10039 Mens jeg skriver disse avsluttende ordene, er nyhetene fylt med historier om
10040 at RIAA saksøker nesten tre hundre individer.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638617" href=
"#ftn.id2638617" class=
"footnote">205</a>]
</sup> Eminem har nettopp blitt saksøkt for å ha "samplet" noen andres
10041 musikk.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638663" href=
"#ftn.id2638663" class=
"footnote">206</a>]
</sup> Historien om hvordan Bob Dylan
10042 har "stjålet" fra en japansk forfatter har nettopp gått verden
10043 over.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638680" href=
"#ftn.id2638680" class=
"footnote">207</a>]
</sup> En på innsiden i
10044 Hollywood
—som insisterer på at han må forbli anonym
—rapporterer
10045 "en utrolig samtale med disse studiofolkene. De har fantastisk [gammelt]
10046 innhold som de ville elske å bruke, men det kan de ikke på grunn av at de
10047 først må klarere rettighetene. De har hauger med ungdommer som kunne gjøre
10048 fantastiske ting med innholdet, men det vil først kreve hauger med advokater
10049 for å klarere det først". Kongressrepresentanter snakker om å gi datavirus
10050 politimyndighet for å ta ned datamaskiner som antas å bryte loven.
10051 Universiteter truer med å utvise ungdommer som bruker en datamaskin for å
10053 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638716"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638722"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638728"></a><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638735"></a><p>
10055 I mens på andre siden av atlanteren har BBC nettopp annonsert at de vil
10056 bygge opp et "kreativt arkiv" som britiske borgere kan laste ned BBC-innhold
10057 fra, og rippe, mikse og brenne det ut.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638752" href=
"#ftn.id2638752" class=
"footnote">208</a>]
</sup>
10058 Og i Brasil har kulturministeren, Gilberto Gil, i seg selv en folkehelt i
10059 brasiliansk musikk, slått seg sammen med Creative Commons for å gi ut
10060 innhold og frie lisenser i dette latinamerikanske landet.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2638772" href=
"#ftn.id2638772" class=
"footnote">209</a>]
</sup> Jeg har fortalt en mørk historie. Sannheten mer
10061 mer blandet. En teknologi har gitt oss mer frihet. Sakte begynner noen å
10062 forstå at denne friheten trenger ikke å bety anarki. Vi kan få med oss fri
10063 kultur inn i det tjueførste århundre, uten at artister taper og uten at
10064 potensialet for digital teknologi blir knust. Det vil kreve omtanke, og
10065 viktigere, det vil kreve at noen omforme RCAene av i dag til Causbyere.
10068 Sunn fornuft må gjøre opprør. Den må handle for å frigjøre kulturen. Og
10069 snart, hvis dette potensialet skal noen gang bli realisert.
10073 </p><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637359" href=
"#id2637359" class=
"para">195</a>]
</sup>
10075 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
10076 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
10077 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
10078 #
55</a>. I følge en pressemelding fra verdens helseorganisasjon sendt ut
10079 9. juli
2002, mottar kun
320 000 av de
6 millioner som trenger medisiner i
10080 utviklingsland dem de trenger
—og halvparten av dem er i Brasil.
10081 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637437" href=
"#id2637437" class=
"para">196</a>]
</sup>
10083 Se Peter Drahos og John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
<em class=
"citetitle">Who
10084 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</em> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10085 37.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637445"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637454"></a>
10086 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2634448" href=
"#id2634448" class=
"para">197</a>]
</sup>
10089 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<em class=
"citetitle">Patent
10090 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, a
10091 Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property Organization
</em>
10092 (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
56</a>. For a firsthand
10093 account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing Before the
10094 Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House
10095 Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess., Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22
10096 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James Love).
10097 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637502" href=
"#id2637502" class=
"para">198</a>]
</sup>
10100 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<em class=
"citetitle">Patent
10101 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, en
10102 rapport forberedt for the World Intellectual Property
10103 Organization
</em> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637596" href=
"#id2637596" class=
"para">199</a>]
</sup>
10107 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's Needs at
10108 Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,"
<em class=
"citetitle">San Francisco
10109 Chronicle
</em>,
24 May
1999, A1, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
57</a> ("compulsory licenses
10110 and gray markets pose a threat to the entire system of intellectual property
10111 protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing
10112 Access to Essential Medicines,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Foreign Policy in
10113 Focus
</em> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
58</a> (describing
10114 U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the
10115 HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property
10116 Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Widener Law Symposium
10117 Journal
</em> (Spring
2001):
175.
10119 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637721" href=
"#id2637721" class=
"para">200</a>]
</sup>
10121 Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington
10122 Post
</em>, august
2003, E1, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
59</a>; William New, "Global
10123 Group's Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,"
<em class=
"citetitle">National
10124 Journal's Technology Daily
</em>,
19. august
2003, tilgjengelig fra
10125 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
60</a>; William New,
10126 "U.S. Official Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,"
<em class=
"citetitle">National
10127 Journal's Technology Daily
</em>,
19. august
2003, tilgjengelig fra
10128 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
61</a>.
10129 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637932" href=
"#id2637932" class=
"para">201</a>]
</sup>
10131 Jeg bør nevne at jeg var en av folkene som ba WIPO om dette møtet.
10132 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2637780" href=
"#id2637780" class=
"para">202</a>]
</sup>
10135 Microsofts posisjon om åpen kildekode og fri programvare er mer
10136 sofistikert. De har flere ganger forklart at de har ikke noe problem med
10137 programvare som er "åpen kildekode" eller programvare som er allemannseie.
10138 Microsofts prinsipielle motstand er mot "fri programvare" lisensiert med en
10139 "copyleft"-lisens, som betyr at lisensen krever at de som lisensierer skal
10140 adoptere same vilkår for ethvert avledet verk. Se Bradford L. Smith, "The
10141 Future of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,"
10142 <em class=
"citetitle">Government Policy Toward Open Source Software
</em>
10143 (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies,
10144 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
2002),
69,
10145 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
10146 #
62</a>. Se også Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
10147 <em class=
"citetitle">The Commercial Software Model
</em>, diskusjon ved New York
10148 University Stern School of Business (
3. mai
2001), tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
63</a>.
10149 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638162" href=
"#id2638162" class=
"para">203</a>]
</sup>
10152 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
64</a>.
10153 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638359" href=
"#id2638359" class=
"para">204</a>]
</sup>
10155 Se Drahos with Braithwaite,
<em class=
"citetitle">Information Feudalism
</em>,
10156 210–20.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2637496"></a>
10157 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638617" href=
"#id2638617" class=
"para">205</a>]
</sup>
10160 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, september
2003,
10161 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
10162 #
65</a>; Paul R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8
10163 september
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
66</a>; Soni Sangha og Phyllis
10164 Furman sammen med Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song, N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
10165 261 Cited as Sharers,"
<em class=
"citetitle">New York Daily News
</em>,
10166 9. september
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets;
10167 Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10168 <em class=
"citetitle">Washington Post
</em>,
10. september
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
10169 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Wired News
</em>,
10170 10. september
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
67</a>.
10171 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638663" href=
"#id2638663" class=
"para">206</a>]
</sup>
10174 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady," mtv.com,
10175 17. september
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
68</a>.
10176 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638680" href=
"#id2638680" class=
"para">207</a>]
</sup>
10180 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for Dylan
10181 Songs," Kansascity.com,
9. juli
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
69</a>.
10183 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638752" href=
"#id2638752" class=
"para">208</a>]
</sup>
10185 "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," pressemelding fra BBC,
10186 24. august
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
70</a>.
10187 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2638772" href=
"#id2638772" class=
"para">209</a>]
</sup>
10190 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6. august
2003,
10191 tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
10193 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 17. Etterord"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-afterword"></a>Kapittel
17. Etterord
</h2></div></div></div><div class=
"toc"><p><b>Innholdsfortegnelse
</b></p><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#usnow">Oss, nå
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#themsoon">Dem, snart
</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#formalities">1. Flere formaliteter
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></span></dt><dt><span class=
"section"><a href=
"#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater
</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><p>
10197 I hvert fall noen av de som har lest helt hit vil være enig med meg om at
10198 noe må gjøres for å endre retningen vi holder. Balansen i denne boken
10199 kartlegger hva som kan gjøres.
10201 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now, and that
10202 which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson that we can
10203 draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that it requires
10204 remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
10206 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
10207 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators, authors,
10208 musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this story in their own
10209 words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle is so important.
10211 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of having
10212 an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people think
10213 matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands opposed, but
10214 still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I sketch changes that
10215 Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
10216 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"Oss, nå"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"usnow"></a>Oss, nå
</h2></div></div></div><p>
10217 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far has
10218 been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either property or
10219 anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is
10220 the choice, then the warriors should win.
10222 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are extremes in
10223 this debate, but the extremes are not all that there is. There are those who
10224 believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights Reserved"
— and those
10225 who reject copyright
—"No Rights Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved"
10226 sorts believe that you should ask permission before you "use" a copyrighted
10227 work in any way. The "No Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able
10228 to do with content as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or
10232 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
10233 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
10234 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
10235 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under the
10236 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
10237 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively unprotected.
10239 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite equal)
10240 by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this book. Through
10241 legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's design, copyright
10242 holders have been able to change the essential character of the environment
10243 of the original Internet. If the original architecture made the effective
10244 default "no rights reserved," the future architecture will make the
10245 effective default "all rights reserved." The architecture and law that
10246 surround the Internet's design will increasingly produce an environment
10247 where all use of content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world
10248 that defines the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and
10249 paste" world that is a creator's nightmare.
10251 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither "all
10252 rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights reserved"
—
10253 and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable creators to free content as
10254 they see fit. In other words, we need a way to restore a set of freedoms
10255 that we could just take for granted before.
10256 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"examples"></a>Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10257 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
10258 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about privacy. Before the
10259 Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much about data about our lives
10260 that we broadcast to the world. If you walked into a bookstore and browsed
10261 through some of the works of Karl Marx, you didn't need to worry about
10262 explaining your browsing habits to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of
10263 your browsing habits was assured.
10265 Hva gjorde at det var sikret?
10267 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
>11</a>, your privacy was
10268 assured because of an inefficient architecture for gathering data and hence
10269 a market constraint (cost) on anyone who wanted to gather that data. If you
10270 were a suspected spy for North Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your
10271 privacy would not be assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope)
10272 find it valuable enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But
10273 for most of us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly
10274 inefficient architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust
10275 amount of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
10276 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many places,
10277 not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead, by the costs
10278 that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
10279 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638971"></a><p>
10280 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular has
10281 become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you browse the
10282 pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked at. You know this
10283 because at the side of the page, there's a list of "recently viewed"
10284 pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net and the function of
10285 cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the data than not. The friction
10286 has disappeared, and hence any "privacy" protected by the friction
10287 disappears, too.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2638988"></a>
10289 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry about
10290 libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that people
10291 should have the "right" to browse in a library without the government
10292 knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties, too), then this
10293 change in the technology of monitoring might concern you. If it becomes
10294 simple to gather and sort who does what in electronic spaces, then the
10295 friction-induced privacy of yesterday disappears.
10298 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy" on the
10299 Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what friction
10300 before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what friction
10301 did.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639015" href=
"#ftn.id2639015" class=
"footnote">210</a>]
</sup> And whether you're in favor of
10302 those laws or not, it is the pattern that is important here. We must take
10303 affirmative steps to secure a kind of freedom that was passively provided
10304 before. A change in technology now forces those who believe in privacy to
10305 affirmatively act where, before, privacy was given by default.
10307 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
10308 movement. When computers with software were first made available
10309 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
10310 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a Data
10311 General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't care much
10312 about controlling their software.
10313 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639050"></a><p>
10314 Dette var verden Richard Stallman ble født inn i, og mens han var forsker
10315 ved MIT, lærte han til å elske samfunnet som utviklet seg når en var fri til
10316 å utforske og fikle med programvaren som kjørte på datamaskiner. Av den
10317 smarte sorten selv, og en talentfull programmerer, begynte Stallman å basere
10318 seg frihet til å legge til eller endre på andre personers arbeid.
10320 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical idea. In a
10321 math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a proof that someone
10322 offered. If you thought you had a better way to prove a theorem, you could
10323 take what someone else did and change it. In a classics department, if you
10324 believed a colleague's translation of a recently discovered text was flawed,
10325 you were free to improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you
10326 should be free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
10327 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like anything
10330 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue for
10331 computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from one system
10332 to another, it became economically attractive (at least in the view of some)
10333 to hide the code of your program. So, too, as companies started selling
10334 peripherals for mainframe systems. If I could just take your printer driver
10335 and copy it, then that would make it easier for me to sell a printer to the
10336 market than it was for you.
10339 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the early
10340 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code. The world of
10341 free software had been erased by a change in the economics of computing. And
10342 as he believed, if he did nothing about it, then the freedom to change and
10343 share software would be fundamentally weakened.
10345 Derfor, i
1984, startet Stallmann på et prosjekt for å bygge et fritt
10346 operativsystem, slik i hvert fall en flik av fri programvare skulle
10347 overleve. Dette var starten på GNU-prosjektet, som "Linux"-kjernen til
10348 Linus Torvalds senere ble lagt til i for å produsere
10349 GNU/Linux-operativsystemet.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639128"></a>
10350 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639134"></a>
10352 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of software
10353 that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free Software
10354 Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless the source code
10355 for that software is made available as well. Thus, anyone building upon
10356 GPL'd software would have to make their buildings free as well. This would
10357 assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of code would develop that
10358 remained free for others to build upon. His fundamental goal was freedom;
10359 innovative creative code was a byproduct.
10361 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now do for
10362 privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that was taken
10363 for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses that bind
10364 copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a space where free
10365 software would survive. He was actively protecting what before had been
10366 passively guaranteed.
10368 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates with
10369 the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and scientific
10370 journals are produced.
10371 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxacademocjournals"></a><p>
10373 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
10374 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them to
10375 libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
10376 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
10377 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic journals
10378 through password-protected sites. Something similar to this has been
10379 happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw have had
10380 electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers to their
10381 service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not copyrighted, and anyone is
10382 free to go to a library and read it, Lexis and Westlaw are also free to
10383 charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme Court
10384 opinion through their respective services.
10386 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
10387 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive for
10388 people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge. The law has
10389 agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed to flourish. And if
10390 there's nothing wrong with selling the public domain, then there could be
10391 nothing wrong, in principle, with selling access to material that is not in
10394 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data was
10395 through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to browse this
10396 data except by paying for a subscription?
10398 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
10399 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper form,
10400 libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had access to the
10401 library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer experts because the
10402 library gave them access. Or patients trying to understand the risks of a
10403 certain treatment could research those risks by reading all available
10404 articles about that treatment. This freedom was therefore a function of the
10405 institution of libraries (norms) and the technology of paper journals
10406 (architecture)
—namely, that it was very hard to control access to a
10409 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding that
10410 libraries not give the general public access to the journals. This means
10411 that the freedoms provided by print journals in public libraries begin to
10412 disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with software, a changing technology
10413 and market shrink a freedom taken for granted before.
10415 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to restore the
10416 freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science (PLoS), for
10417 example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making scientific research
10418 available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors of scientific work submit
10419 that work to the Public Library of Science. That work is then subject to
10420 peer review. If accepted, the work is then deposited in a public, electronic
10421 archive and made permanently available for free. PLoS also sells a print
10422 version of its work, but the copyright for the print journal does not
10423 inhibit the right of anyone to redistribute the work for free.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639277"></a>
10425 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for granted
10426 before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets. There's no
10427 doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional publishers and
10428 their efforts to make money from the exclusive distribution of content. But
10429 competition in our tradition is presumptively a good
—especially when
10430 it helps spread knowledge and science.
10431 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639288"></a></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"oneidea"></a>Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</h3></div></div></div><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"idxcc"></a><p>
10432 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
10433 increasing control effected through law and technology.
10435 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit corporation
10436 established in Massachusetts, but with its home at Stanford University. Its
10437 aim is to build a layer of
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>reasonable
</em></span> copyright on top
10438 of the extremes that now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to
10439 build upon other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express
10440 the freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags, tied
10441 to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses, make this
10445 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Simple
</em></span>—which means without a middleman, or
10446 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people can
10447 attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of content
10448 that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are then linked to
10449 machine-readable versions of the license that enable computers automatically
10450 to identify content that can easily be shared. These three expressions
10451 together
—a legal license, a human-readable description, and
10452 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
10453 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
10454 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal that
10455 the person associated with the license believes in something different than
10456 the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the CC mark, which does
10457 not mean that copyright is waived, but that certain freedoms are given.
10459 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their precise
10460 contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The creator can choose a
10461 license that permits any use, so long as attribution is given. She can
10462 choose a license that permits only noncommercial use. She can choose a
10463 license that permits any use so long as the same freedoms are given to other
10464 uses ("share and share alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is
10465 made. Or any use at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so
10466 long as full copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
10468 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
10469 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional fair
10470 use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way that
10471 subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
10472 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content, governed by
10473 a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build upon. Voluntary
10474 choice of individuals and creators will make this content available. And
10475 that content will in turn enable us to rebuild a public domain.
10477 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And of
10478 course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
10479 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from many is
10480 that we are not interested only in talking about a public domain or in
10481 getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our aim is to build a
10482 movement of consumers and producers of content ("content conducers," as
10483 attorney Mia Garlick calls them) who help build the public domain and, by
10484 their work, demonstrate the importance of the public domain to other
10485 creativity.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639412"></a>
10487 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
10488 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture are
10489 produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written centuries
10490 ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have imagined. The
10491 rules may well have made sense against a background of technologies from
10492 centuries ago, but they do not make sense against the background of digital
10493 technologies. New rules
—with different freedoms, expressed in ways so
10494 that humans without lawyers can use them
—are needed. Creative Commons
10495 gives people a way effectively to begin to build those rules.
10497 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some participate
10498 to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for example, is a science
10499 fiction author. His first novel,
<em class=
"citetitle">Down and Out in the Magic
10500 Kingdom
</em>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
10501 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
10503 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher reasoned
10504 like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1) those who will buy
10505 Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet, and (
2) those who may never
10506 hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made available for free on the
10507 Internet. Some part of (
1) will download Cory's book instead of buying
10508 it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2) will download Cory's book, like
10509 it, and then decide to buy it. Call them (
2)-goods. If there are more
10510 (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line
10511 will probably
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>increase
</em></span> sales of Cory's book.
10513 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that conclusion.
10514 The book's first printing was exhausted months before the publisher had
10515 expected. This first novel of a science fiction author was a total success.
10518 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content was
10519 confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner, who wrote a
10520 book about the free software movement titled
<em class=
"citetitle">Free for
10521 All
</em>, made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a
10522 Creative Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
10523 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
10524 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as well.
10526 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
10527 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the Commons. There
10528 are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other reasons. Many who use
10529 the "sampling license" do so because anything else would be
10530 hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are free, for commercial
10531 or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from the licensed work; they
10532 are just not free to make full copies of the licensed work available to
10533 others. This is consistent with their own art
—they, too, sample from
10534 others. Because the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>legal
</em></span> costs of sampling are so high
10535 (Walter Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
10536 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow" Public
10537 Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so high
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639497" href=
"#ftn.id2639497" class=
"footnote">211</a>]
</sup>), these artists release into the creative
10538 environment content that others can build upon, so that their form of
10539 creativity might grow.
10541 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
10542 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
10543 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is, you
10544 are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved" model. Good
10545 for you, but many do not. Many believe that however appropriate that rule is
10546 for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an appropriate description of how most
10547 creators view the rights associated with their content. The Creative Commons
10548 license expresses this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the
10549 chance to say it to others.
10552 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
1 million
10553 objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next step is
10554 partnerships with middleware content providers to help them build into their
10555 technologies simple ways for users to mark their content with Creative
10556 Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and celebrate creators who
10557 build content based upon content set free.
10559 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not mere
10560 arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first step to
10561 showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
10562 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve this
10563 rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary steps are
10566 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by individuals and
10567 creators to change the mix of rights that now govern the creative field. The
10568 project does not compete with copyright; it complements it. Its aim is not
10569 to defeat the rights of authors, but to make it easier for authors and
10570 creators to exercise their rights more flexibly and cheaply. That
10571 difference, we believe, will enable creativity to spread more easily.
10572 </p><a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639576"></a></div></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Dem, snart"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title" style=
"clear: both"><a name=
"themsoon"></a>Dem, snart
</h2></div></div></div><p>
10573 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will also
10574 take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before the
10575 politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms. But
10576 that also means that we have time to build awareness around the changes that
10579 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general, and
10580 one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each is a
10581 step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way to our
10583 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"1. Flere formaliteter"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"formalities"></a>1. Flere formaliteter
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10584 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
10585 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed. If
10586 you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
10587 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
10591 These are all formalities associated with property. They are requirements
10592 that we all must bear if we want our property to be protected.
10594 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a copyright,
10595 regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You don't have to
10596 register. You don't even have to mark your content. The default is control,
10597 and "formalities" are banished.
10601 As I suggested in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#property-i" title='Kapittel
11. Kapittel ti:
"Eiendom"'
>11</a>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a good
10602 one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities imposed a burden
10603 on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it was progress when the
10604 law relaxed the formal requirements that a copyright owner must bear to
10605 protect and secure his work. Those formalities were getting in the way.
10607 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
10608 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that burdens
10609 creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns what, or with
10610 whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the creative work of
10611 others. There are no records, there is no system to trace
— there is no
10612 simple way to know how to get permission. Yet given the massive increase in
10613 the scope of copyright's rule, getting permission is a necessary step for
10614 any work that builds upon our past. And thus, the
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>lack
</em></span>
10615 of formalities forces many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
10617 The law should therefore change this requirement
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639680" href=
"#ftn.id2639680" class=
"footnote">212</a>]
</sup>—but it should not change it by going back to the old, broken
10618 system. We should require formalities, but we should establish a system that
10619 will create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
10621 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work, registering
10622 copyrights, and renewing the claim to copyright. Traditionally, the first of
10623 these three was something the copyright owner did; the second two were
10624 something the government did. But a revised system of formalities would
10625 banish the government from the process, except for the sole purpose of
10626 approving standards developed by others.
10627 </p><div class=
"section" title=
"Registrering og fornying"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h4 class=
"title"><a name=
"registration"></a>Registrering og fornying
</h4></div></div></div><p>
10628 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration with the
10629 Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When filing that
10630 registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most government
10631 agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to minimize the burden
10632 of registration; it also had little incentive to minimize the fee. And as
10633 the Copyright Office is not a main target of government policymaking, the
10634 office has historically been terribly underfunded. Thus, when people who
10635 know something about the process hear this idea about formalities, their
10636 first reaction is panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to
10637 deal with the mess that is the Copyright Office.
10639 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition of
10640 extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer think
10641 innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed. Just because
10642 there is a public purpose to a government role, it doesn't follow that the
10643 government must actually administer the role. Instead, we should be creating
10644 incentives for private parties to serve the public, subject to standards
10645 that the government sets.
10647 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet. There
10648 are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world. Domain name
10649 owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their registration
10650 alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net), there is a central
10651 registry. The actual registrations are, however, performed by many competing
10652 registrars. That competition drives the cost of registering down, and more
10653 importantly, it drives the ease with which registration occurs up.
10656 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
10657 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry, but
10658 it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should establish a
10659 database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
10660 registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then compete with
10661 one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest systems for registering and
10662 renewing copyrights. That competition would substantially lower the burden
10663 of this formality
—while producing a database of registrations that
10664 would facilitate the licensing of content.
10665 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"Merking"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h4 class=
"title"><a name=
"marking"></a>Merking
</h4></div></div></div><p>
10666 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a creative
10667 work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh punishment for
10668 failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to imposing the death
10669 penalty for a parking ticket in the world of creative rights. Here again,
10670 there is no reason that a marking requirement needs to be enforced in this
10671 way. And more importantly, there is no reason a marking requirement needs to
10672 be enforced uniformly across all media.
10674 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is copyrighted
10675 and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark also makes it easy
10676 to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to use the work.
10678 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was that
10679 different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't clear
10680 how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A new
10681 marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing the
10682 differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to evolve as
10683 technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special signal from the
10684 failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the loss of the
10685 right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
10688 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work to be
10689 published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that failure need
10690 not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could instead be that
10691 anyone has the right to use this work, until the copyright owner complains
10692 and demonstrates that it is his work and he doesn't give
10693 permission.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639805" href=
"#ftn.id2639805" class=
"footnote">213</a>]
</sup> The meaning of an unmarked
10694 work would therefore be "use unless someone complains." If someone does
10695 complain, then the obligation would be to stop using the work in any new
10696 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses. This
10697 would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark their work.
10699 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be marked. Here
10700 again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies evolve. The best way
10701 to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the Copyright Office's role to
10702 that of approving standards for marking content that have been crafted
10705 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
10706 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The Copyright
10707 Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could be made. The
10708 Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it judged preferable,
10709 and it would base that choice
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>solely
</em></span> upon the
10710 consideration of which method could best be integrated into the registration
10711 and renewal system. We would not count on the government to innovate; but we
10712 would count on the government to keep the product of innovation in line with
10713 its other important functions.
10715 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration requirements.
10716 If photographs were marked by author and year, there would be little reason
10717 not to allow a photographer to reregister, for example, all photographs
10718 taken in a particular year in one quick step. The aim of the formality is
10719 not to burden the creator; the system itself should be kept as simple as
10722 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing system
10723 does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to make things
10726 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
10727 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed. It
10728 would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it would be
10729 simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular kind of content;
10730 it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew that assertion at
10731 the appropriate time.
10732 </p></div></div><div class=
"section" title=
"2. Kortere vernetid"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"shortterms"></a>2. Kortere vernetid
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10733 Vernetiden i opphavsretten har gått fra fjorten år til nittifem år der
10734 selskap har forfatterskapet , og livstiden til forfatteren pluss sytti år
10735 for individuelle forfattere.
10737 In
<em class=
"citetitle">The Future of Ideas
</em>, I proposed a
10738 seventy-five-year term, granted in five-year increments with a requirement
10739 of renewal every five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But
10740 after we lost
<em class=
"citetitle">Eldred
</em>
10741 v.
<em class=
"citetitle">Ashcroft
</em>, the proposals became even more
10742 radical.
<em class=
"citetitle">The Economist
</em> endorsed a proposal for a
10743 fourteen-year copyright term.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2639935" href=
"#ftn.id2639935" class=
"footnote">214</a>]
</sup> Others
10744 have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
10746 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in copyright's
10747 term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there are four principles
10748 that are important to keep in mind about copyright terms.
10749 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"1"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10752 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Keep it short:
</em></span> The term should be as long as necessary
10753 to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied to very strong
10754 protections for authors (so authors were able to reclaim rights from
10755 publishers), rights to the same work (not derivative works) might be
10756 extended further. The key is not to tie the work up with legal regulations
10757 when it no longer benefits an author.
10758 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10762 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Gjør det enkelt:
</em></span> Skillelinjen mellom verker uten
10763 opphavsrettslig vern og innhold som er beskyttet må forbli klart. Advokater
10764 liker uklarheten som "rimelig bruk" og forskjellen mellom "idéer" og
10765 "uttrykk" har. Denne type lovverk gir dem en masse arbeid. Men de som
10766 skrev grunnloven hadde en enklere idé: vernet versus ikke vernet. Verdien av
10767 korte vernetider er at det er lite behov for å bygge inn unntak i
10768 opphavsretten når vernetiden holdes kort. En klar og aktiv "advokat-fri
10769 sone" gjør komplesiteten av "rimelig bruk" og "idé/uttrykk" mindre nødvendig
10772 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10774 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Keep it alive:
</em></span> Copyright should have to be renewed.
10775 Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner should be
10776 required to signal periodically that he wants the protection continued. This
10777 need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason this monopoly
10778 protection has to be granted for free. On average, it takes ninety minutes
10779 for a veteran to apply for a pension.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640023" href=
"#ftn.id2640023" class=
"footnote">215</a>]
</sup>
10780 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't require
10781 authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a single form.
10782 <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640042"></a>
10783 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10786 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Keep it prospective:
</em></span> Whatever the term of copyright
10787 should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that a term once
10788 given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake in
1923 for the
10789 law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I don't think so, but it's
10790 possible. If it was a mistake, then the consequence was that we got fewer
10791 authors to create in
1923 than we otherwise would have. But we can't correct
10792 that mistake today by increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we
10793 will not increase the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can
10794 increase the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
10795 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today invisible). But
10796 increasing their reward will not increase their creativity in
1923. What's
10797 not done is not done, and there's nothing we can do about that now.
</p></li></ol></div><p>
10798 Disse endringene vil sammen gi en
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>gjennomsnittlig
</em></span>
10799 opphavsrettslig vernetid som er mye kortere enn den gjeldende vernetiden.
10800 Frem til
1976 var gjennomsnittelig vernetid kun
32.2 år. Vårt mål bør være
10803 Uten tvil vil ekstremistene kalle disse idéene "radikale". (Tross alt, så
10804 kaller jeg dem "ekstremister".) Men igjen, vernetiden jeg anbefalte var
10805 lengre enn vernetiden under Richard Nixon. hvor "radikalt" kan det være å be
10806 om en mer sjenerøs opphavsrettighet enn da Richard Nixon var president?
10807 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"freefairuse"></a>3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10808 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally granted
10809 property owners the right to control their property from the ground to the
10810 heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property rights quickly
10811 changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional challenge. It made no sense
10812 anymore to grant that much control, given the emergence of that new
10815 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive right"
10816 to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive right to "their
10817 writings" plus any derivative writings (made by others) that are
10818 sufficiently close to the author's original work. Thus, if I write a book,
10819 and you base a movie on that book, I have the power to deny you the right to
10820 release that movie, even though that movie is not "my writing."
10822 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it expanded the
10823 exclusive right of copyright to include a right to control translations and
10824 dramatizations of a work.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640137" href=
"#ftn.id2640137" class=
"footnote">216</a>]
</sup> The courts
10825 have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation ever since. This
10826 expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's greatest judges, Judge
10828 </p><div class=
"blockquote"><blockquote class=
"blockquote"><p>
10829 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a large range
10830 of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense the oddity of
10831 accepting such an enlargement of copyright while yet intoning the
10832 abracadabra of idea and expression.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640161" href=
"#ftn.id2640161" class=
"footnote">217</a>]
</sup>
10833 </p></blockquote></div><p>
10834 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
10835 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
10836 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that a
10837 copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant. Consider
10838 each limitation in turn.
10840 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Term:
</em></span> If Congress wants to grant a derivative right,
10841 then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes sense to protect
10842 John Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at
10843 least I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that
10844 right to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
10845 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
10846 after the creative work is done.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640192"></a>
10848 <span class=
"emphasis"><em>Scope:
</em></span> Likewise should the scope of derivative rights
10849 be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative rights are
10850 important. Those should be specified. But the law should draw clear lines
10851 around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted material. When all
10852 "reuse" of creative material was within the control of businesses, perhaps
10853 it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate the lines. It no longer makes
10854 sense for lawyers to negotiate the lines. Think about all the creative
10855 possibilities that digital technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses
10856 into the machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does
10857 to the creative process. Smothers it.
10859 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the Clint
10860 Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for foreseeable
10861 derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a poem into a
10862 musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require negotiation for the
10863 unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make much more sense.
10865 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are protected, and
10866 the presumption should be that other uses are not protected. This is the
10867 reverse of the recommendation of my colleague Paul Goldstein.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640235" href=
"#ftn.id2640235" class=
"footnote">218</a>]
</sup> His view is that the law should be written so that
10868 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
10870 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
10871 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of the
10872 Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the incentives
10873 to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with a strong
10874 copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
10877 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection beyond the
10878 part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon certain statutory
10879 conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free a great deal of culture
10880 to others to cultivate. And under a statutory rights regime, that reuse
10881 would earn artists more income.
10882 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"4. Frigjør musikken—igjen"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"liberatemusic"></a>4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</h3></div></div></div><p>
10883 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it wouldn't be
10884 fair to end this book without addressing the issue that is, to most people,
10885 most pressing
—music. There is no other policy issue that better
10886 teaches the lessons of this book than the battles around the sharing of
10889 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the Internet's
10890 growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more powerfully than any
10891 other single application. It was the Internet's killer app
—possibly in
10892 two senses of that word. It no doubt was the application that drove demand
10893 for bandwidth. It may well be the application that drives demand for
10894 regulations that in the end kill innovation on the network.
10896 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
10897 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed, performed,
10898 and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving an exclusive
10899 right to a composer to control public performances of his work, and to a
10900 performing artist to control copies of her performance.
10902 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
10903 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course, that's not
10904 all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#piracy" title='Kapittel
6. Kapittel fem:
"Piratvirksomhet"'
>6</a>, they enable four
10905 different kinds of sharing:
10906 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"A"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10909 Det er noen som bruker delingsnettverk som erstatninger for å kjøpe CDer.
10910 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10913 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample, on the way to
10915 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10920 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk til å få tilgang til innhold som
10921 ikke lenger er i salg, men fortsatt er vernet av opphavsrett eller som ville
10922 ha vært altfor vanskelig å få kjøpt via nettet.
10923 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
10926 Det er mange som bruker fildelingsnettverk for å få tilgang til innhold som
10927 ikke er opphavsrettsbeskyttet, eller for å få tilgang som
10928 opphavsrettsinnehaveren åpenbart går god for.
10929 </p></li></ol></div><p>
10930 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It must
10931 avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The eagerness
10932 with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover, should depend upon
10933 the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net effect of sharing is
10934 actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is significantly
10937 As I said in chapter
<a class=
"xref" href=
"#piracy" title='Kapittel
6. Kapittel fem:
"Piratvirksomhet"'
>6</a>, the actual harm caused by sharing is controversial. For
10938 the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume the harm is real. I assume,
10939 in other words, that type A sharing is significantly greater than type B,
10940 and is the dominant use of sharing networks.
10942 Uansett, det er et avgjørende faktum om den gjeldende teknologiske
10943 omgivelsen som vi må huske på hvis vi skal forstå hvordan loven bør reagere.
10945 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is addictive
10946 today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a broad range of
10947 content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to a broad range of
10948 content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet is cumbersome and
10949 slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have broadband service at
10950 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at that speed both up and
10951 down. Although wireless access is growing, most of us still get access
10952 across wires. Most only gain access through a machine with a keyboard. The
10953 idea of the always on, always connected Internet is mainly just an idea.
10956 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to the
10957 Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should not make
10958 policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should make policy on
10959 the basis of where the technology is going. The question should not be, how
10960 should the law regulate sharing in this world? The question should be, what
10961 law will we require when the network becomes the network it is clearly
10962 becoming? That network is one in which every machine with electricity is
10963 essentially on the Net; where everywhere you are
—except maybe the
10964 desert or the Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
10965 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone service,
10966 where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
10968 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that give
10969 you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio, content that
10970 is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here, then, is the critical
10971 point: When it is
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>extremely
</em></span> easy to connect to services
10972 that give access to content, it will be
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>easier
</em></span> to
10973 connect to services that give you access to content than it will be to
10974 download and store content
<span class=
"emphasis"><em>on the many devices you will have for
10975 playing content
</em></span>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
10976 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
10977 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially is. Content
10978 services will compete with content sharing, even if the services charge
10979 money for the content they give access to. Already cell-phone services in
10980 Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over cell phones (enhanced with plugs
10981 for headphones). The Japanese are paying for this content even though "free"
10982 content is available in the form of MP3s across the Web.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640479" href=
"#ftn.id2640479" class=
"footnote">219</a>]
</sup>
10986 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
10987 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
10988 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem that
10989 will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to the
10990 Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy makers today
10991 to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology that will be gone
10992 tomorrow. The question should not be how to regulate the Internet to
10993 eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve that problem away). The question
10994 instead should be how to assure that artists get paid, during this
10995 transition between twentieth-century models for doing business and
10996 twenty-first-century technologies.
10998 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems" here
10999 to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted content or
11000 copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The "problem" with this
11001 content is to make sure that the technology that would enable this kind of
11002 sharing is not rendered illegal. You can think of it this way: Pay phones
11003 are used to deliver ransom demands, no doubt. But there are many who need
11004 to use pay phones who have nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to
11005 ban pay phones in order to eliminate kidnapping.
11007 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was, at
11008 one time, published and is no longer available. It may be unavailable
11009 because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the record label he
11010 signed with to carry his work. Or it may be unavailable because the work is
11011 forgotten. Either way, the aim of the law should be to facilitate the access
11012 to this content, ideally in a way that returns something to the artist.
11014 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of print,
11015 it may still be available in libraries and used book stores. But libraries
11016 and used book stores don't pay the copyright owner when someone reads or
11017 buys an out-of-print book. That makes total sense, of course, since any
11018 other system would be so burdensome as to eliminate the possibility of used
11019 book stores' existing. But from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of
11020 his content without his being compensated is less than ideal.
11022 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
11023 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of the
11024 music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial providers would
11025 be free, under this rule, to "share" that content, even though the sharing
11026 involved making a copy. The copy here would be incidental to the trade; in a
11027 context where commercial publishing has ended, trading music should be as
11028 free as trading books.
11033 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would ensure
11034 that artists get something from the trade of their work. For example, if the
11035 law set a low statutory rate for the commercial sharing of content that was
11036 not offered for sale by a commercial publisher, and if that rate were
11037 automatically transferred to a trust for the benefit of the artist, then
11038 businesses could develop around the idea of trading this content, and
11039 artists would benefit from this trade.
11041 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep works
11042 available commercially. Works that are available commercially would not be
11043 subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect the right to charge
11044 whatever they want for content if they kept the work commercially
11045 available. But if they don't keep it available, and instead, the computer
11046 hard disks of fans around the world keep it alive, then any royalty owed for
11047 such copying should be much less than the amount owed a commercial
11050 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is hard only
11051 because the extent of the problem will change over time, as the technologies
11052 for gaining access to content change. The law's solution should be as
11053 flexible as the problem is, understanding that we are in the middle of a
11054 radical transformation in the technology for delivering and accessing
11057 Så her er en løsning som i første omgang kan virke veldig undelig for begge
11058 sider i denne krigen, men som jeg tror vil gi mer mening når en får tenkt
11061 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic claim of
11062 the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet) has harmed a
11063 set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to be protected,
11064 then the content industry should be compensated for that harm. Just as the
11065 technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions of Americans, or the
11066 technology of asbestos caused grave illness to thousands of miners, so, too,
11067 has the technology of digital networks harmed the interests of the content
11072 Jeg elsker internett, så jeg liker ikke å sammenligne det med tobakk eller
11073 asbest. Men analogien er rimelig når en ser det fra lovens perspektiv. Og
11074 det foreslår en rimelig respons: I stedet for å forsøke å ødelegge internett
11075 eller p2p-teknologien som i dag skader innholdsleverandører på internett, så
11076 bør vi finne en relativt enkel måte å kompensere de som blir skadelidende.
11078 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been floated by
11079 Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2640642" href=
"#ftn.id2640642" class=
"footnote">220</a>]
</sup>
11080 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
11081 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission would
11082 (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how easy it is to
11083 evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive to evade them). Once
11084 the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would develop (
2) systems to
11085 monitor how many items of each content were distributed. On the basis of
11086 those numbers, then (
3) artists would be compensated. The compensation would
11087 be paid for by (
4) an appropriate tax.
11089 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
11090 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
11091 <em class=
"citetitle">Promises to Keep
</em>. The modification that I would make
11092 is relatively simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing
11093 copyright system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim
11094 of the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that harm
11095 could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at facilitating
11096 a transition between regimes. And it would require renewal after a period of
11097 years. If it continues to make sense to facilitate free exchange of content,
11098 supported through a taxation system, then it can be continued. If this form
11099 of protection is no longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the
11100 old system of controlling access.
11103 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim is
11104 not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that the system
11105 supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy" possible. But the aims of
11106 semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the other changes I described were
11107 accomplished
—in particular, the limits on derivative uses. A system
11108 that simply charges for access would not greatly burden semiotic democracy
11109 if there were few limitations on what one was allowed to do with the content
11112 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of "harm" to
11113 an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation would be
11114 outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This background system
11115 to compensate would also not need to interfere with innovative proposals
11116 such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted when Apple launched the
11117 MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being easier than free is. This has
11118 proven correct: Apple has sold millions of songs at even the very high price
11119 of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents, the cost is the equivalent of a per-song
11120 CD price, though the labels have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's
11121 move was countered by Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a
11122 song. And no doubt there will be a great deal of competition to offer and
11123 sell music on-line.
11125 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free" music
11126 from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known for thirty
11127 years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than that, there is
11128 nothing impossible at all about "competing with free." Indeed, if anything,
11129 the competition spurs the competitors to offer new and better products. This
11130 is precisely what the competitive market was to be about. Thus in Singapore,
11131 though piracy is rampant, movie theaters are often luxurious
—with
11132 "first class" seats, and meals served while you watch a movie
—as they
11133 struggle and succeed in finding ways to compete with "free."
11135 Dette konkurranseregimet, med en sikringsmekanisme å sikre at kunstnere ikke
11136 taper, ville bidra mye til nyskapning innen levering av
11137 innhold. Konkurransen ville fortsette å redusere type-A-deling. Det ville
11138 inspirere en ekstraordinær rekke av nye innovatører
—som ville ha
11139 retten til a bruke innhold, og ikke lenger frykte usikre og barbarisk
11140 strenge straffer fra loven.
11142 Oppsummert, så er dette mitt forslag:
11147 Internett er i endring. Vi bør ikke regulere en teknologi i endring. Vi bør
11148 i stedet regulere for å minimere skaden påført interesser som er berørt av
11149 denne teknologiske endringen, samtidig vi muliggjør, og oppmuntrer, den mest
11150 effektive teknologien vi kan lage.
11152 Vi kan minimere skaden og samtidig maksimere fordelen med innovasjon ved å
11153 </p><div class=
"orderedlist"><ol class=
"orderedlist" type=
"1"><li class=
"listitem"><p>
11156 garantere retten til å engasjere seg i type-D-deling;
11157 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
11160 tillate ikke-kommersiell type-C-deling uten erstatningsansvar, og
11161 kommersiell type-C-deling med en lav og fast rate fastsatt ved lov.
11162 </p></li><li class=
"listitem"><p>
11165 mens denne overgangen pågår, skattlegge og kompensere for type-A-deling, i
11166 den grad faktiske skade kan påvises.
11167 </p></li></ol></div><p>
11168 Men hva om "piratvirksomheten" ikke forsvinner? Hva om det finnes et
11169 konkurranseutsatt marked som tilbyr innhold til en lav kostnad, men et
11170 signifikant antall av forbrukere fortsetter å "ta" innhold uten å betale?
11171 Burde loven gjøre noe da?
11173 Ja, det bør den. Men, nok en gang, hva den bør gjøre avhenger hvordan
11174 realitetene utvikler seg. Disse endringene fjerner kanskje ikke all
11175 type-A-deling. Men det virkelige spørmålet er ikke om de eliminerer deling i
11176 abstrakt betydning. Det virkelige spørsmålet er hvilken effekt det har på
11177 markedet. Er det bedre (a) å ha en teknologi som er
95 prosent sikker og
11178 gir et marked av størrelse
<em class=
"citetitle">x
</em>, eller (b) å ha en
11179 teknologi som er
50 prosent sikker, og som gir et marked som er fem ganger
11180 større enn
<em class=
"citetitle">x
</em>? Mindre sikker kan gi mer uautorisert
11181 deling, men det vil sannsynligvis også gi et mye større marked for
11182 autorisert deling. Det viktigste er å sikre kunstneres kompensasjon uten å
11183 ødelegge internettet. Når det er på plass, kan det hende det er riktig å
11184 finne måter å spore opp de smålige piratene.
11187 Men vi er langt unna å spikke problemet ned til dette delsettet av
11188 type-A-delere. Og vårt fokus inntil er der bør ikke være å finne måter å
11189 ødelegge internettet. Var fokus inntil vi er der bør være hvordan sikre at
11190 artister får betalt, mens vi beskytter rommet for nyskapning og kreativitet
11191 som internettet er.
11192 </p></div><div class=
"section" title=
"5. Spark en masse advokater"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h3 class=
"title"><a name=
"firelawyers"></a>5. Spark en masse advokater
</h3></div></div></div><p>
11193 Jeg er en advokat. Jeg lever av å utdanne advokater. Jeg tror på loven. Jeg
11194 tror på opphavsrettsloven. Jeg har faktisk viet livet til å jobbe med loven,
11195 ikke fordi det er mye penger å tjene, men fordi det innebærer idealer som
11196 jeg elsker å leve opp til.
11198 Likevel har mye av denne boken vært kritikk av advokater, eller rollen
11199 advokater har spilt i denne debatten. Loven taler om idealer, mens det er
11200 min oppfatning av vår yrkesgruppe er blitt for knyttet til klienten. Og i
11201 en verden der rike klienter har sterke synspunkter vil uviljen hos vår
11202 yrkesgruppe til å stille spørsmål med eller protestere mot dette sterke
11203 synet ødelegge loven.
11205 Indisiene for slik bøyning er overbevisene. Jeg er angrepet som en
11206 "radikal" av mange innenfor yrket, og likevel er meningene jeg argumenterer
11207 for nøyaktig de meningene til mange av de mest moderate og betydningsfulle
11208 personene i historien til denne delen av loven. Mange trodde for eksempel at
11209 vår utfordring til lovforslaget om å utvide opphavsrettens vernetid var
11210 galskap. Mens bare tredve år siden mente den dominerende foreleser og
11211 utøver i opphavsrettsfeltet, Melville Nimmer, at den var
11212 åpenbar.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641016" href=
"#ftn.id2641016" class=
"footnote">221</a>]
</sup>
11215 Min kritikk av rollen som advokater har spilt i denne debatten handler
11216 imidlertid ikke bare om en profesjonell skjevhet. Det handler enda viktigere
11217 om vår manglende evne til å faktisk ta inn over oss hva loven koster.
11219 Økonomer er forventet å være gode til å forstå utgifter og inntekter. Men
11220 som oftest antar økonomene uten peiling på hvordan det juridiske systemet
11221 egentlig fungerer, at transaksjonskostnaden i det juridiske systemet er
11222 lav.
<sup>[
<a name=
"id2641049" href=
"#ftn.id2641049" class=
"footnote">222</a>]
</sup> De ser et system som har
11223 eksistert i hundrevis av år, og de antar at det fungerer slik grunnskolens
11224 samfunnsfagsundervisning lærte dem at det fungerer.
11228 Men det juridiske systemet fungerer ikke. Eller for å være mer nøyaktig, det
11229 fungerer kun for de med mest ressurser. Det er ikke fordi systemet er
11230 korrupt. Jeg tror overhodet ikke vårt juridisk system (på føderalt nivå, i
11231 hvert fall) er korrupt. Jeg mener ganske enkelt at på grunn av at kostnadene
11232 med vårt juridiske systemet er så hårreisende høyt vil en praktisk talt
11233 aldri oppnå rettferdighet.
11235 Disse kostnadene forstyrrer fri kultur på mange vis. En advokats tid
11236 faktureres hos de største firmaene for mer enn $
400 pr. time. Hvor mye tid
11237 bør en slik advokat bruke på å lese sakene nøye, eller undersøke obskure
11238 rettskilder. Svaret er i økende grad: svært lite. Jussen er avhengig av
11239 nøye formulering og utvikling av doktrine, men nøye formulering og utvikling
11240 av doktrine er avhengig av nøyaktig arbeid. Men nøyaktig arbeid koster for
11241 mye, bortsett fra i de mest høyprofilerte og kostbare sakene.
11243 Kostbarheten, klomsetheten og tilfeldigheten til dette systemet håner vår
11244 tradisjon. Og advokater, såvel som akademikere, bør se det som sin plikt å
11245 endre hvordan loven praktiseres
— eller bedre, endre loven slik at den
11246 fungerer. Det er galt at systemet fungerer godt bare for den øverste
11247 1-prosenten av klientene. Det kan gjøres radikalt mer effektivt, og billig,
11248 og dermed radikalt mer rettferdig.
11250 Men inntil en slik reform er gjennomført, bør vi som samfunn holde lover
11251 unna områder der vi vet den bare vil skade. Og det er nettopp det loven
11252 altfor ofte vil gjøre hvis for mye av vår kultur er lovregulert.
11254 Tenk på de fantastiske tingene ditt barn kan gjøre eller lage med digital
11255 teknologi
—filmen, musikken, web-siden, bloggen. Eller tenk på de
11256 fantastiske tingene ditt fellesskap kunne få til med digital
11257 teknologi
—en wiki, oppsetting av låve, kampanje til å endre noe. Tenk
11258 på alle de kreative tingene, og tenk deretter på kald sirup helt inn i
11259 maskinene. Dette er hva et hvert regime som krever tillatelser fører
11260 til. Dette er virkeligheten slik den var i Brezhnevs Russland.
11263 Loven bør regulere i visse områder av kulturen
—men det bør regulere
11264 kultur bare der reguleringen bidrar positivt. Likevel tester advokater
11265 sjeldent sin kraft, eller kraften som de fremmer, mot dette enkle pragmatisk
11266 spørsmålet: "vil det bidra positivt?". Når de blir utfordret om det
11267 utvidede rekkevidden til loven, er advokat-svaret, "Hvorfor ikke?"
11269 Vi burde spørre: "Hvorfor?". Vis meg hvorfor din regulering av kultur er
11270 nødvendig og vis meg hvordan reguleringen bidrar positivt. Før du kan vise
11271 meg begge, holde advokatene din unna.
11272 </p></div></div><div class=
"footnotes"><br><hr width=
"100" align=
"left"><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639015" href=
"#id2639015" class=
"para">210</a>]
</sup>
11276 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
11277 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),"
<em class=
"citetitle">Stanford
11278 Technology Law Review
</em> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
11279 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
72</a> (describing
11280 examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See also Jeffrey
11281 Rosen,
<em class=
"citetitle">The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an
11282 Anxious Age
</em> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
11283 between technology and privacy).
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639497" href=
"#id2639497" class=
"para">211</a>]
</sup>
11287 <em class=
"citetitle">Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
11288 Culture Wars
</em> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
11289 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
72</a>.
11290 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639680" href=
"#id2639680" class=
"para">212</a>]
</sup>
11293 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
11294 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be adopted
11295 by other countries as well.
</p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639805" href=
"#id2639805" class=
"para">213</a>]
</sup>
11298 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not solved
11299 here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated system
11300 than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
11301 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2639935" href=
"#id2639935" class=
"para">214</a>]
</sup>
11305 "A Radical Rethink,"
<em class=
"citetitle">Economist
</em>,
366:
8308 (
25. januar
11306 2003):
15, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
11308 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640023" href=
"#id2640023" class=
"para">215</a>]
</sup>
11311 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
11312 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001), tilgjengelig
11313 fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
75</a>.
11314 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640137" href=
"#id2640137" class=
"para">216</a>]
</sup>
11317 Benjamin Kaplan,
<em class=
"citetitle">An Unhurried View of Copyright
</em> (New
11318 York: Columbia University Press,
1967),
32.
11319 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640161" href=
"#id2640161" class=
"para">217</a>]
</sup>
11322 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640235" href=
"#id2640235" class=
"para">218</a>]
</sup>
11324 Paul Goldstein,
<em class=
"citetitle">Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the
11325 Celestial Jukebox
</em> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
11326 187–216.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2639026"></a>
11327 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640479" href=
"#id2640479" class=
"para">219</a>]
</sup>
11330 For eksempel, se, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3 April
11331 2002, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link
11333 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2640642" href=
"#id2640642" class=
"para">220</a>]
</sup>
11335 William Fisher,
<em class=
"citetitle">Digital Music: Problems and
11336 Possibilities
</em> (last revised:
10 October
2000), available at
11337 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
77</a>; William Fisher,
11338 <em class=
"citetitle">Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
11339 Entertainment
</em> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University
11340 Press,
2004), ch.
6, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
78</a>. Professor Netanel has
11341 proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial sharing from the
11342 reach of copyright and would establish compensation to artists to balance
11343 any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
11344 Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
79</a>. For other proposals,
11345 see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back Broadband?"
<em class=
"citetitle">Washington
11346 Post
</em>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on behalf of Sharman
11347 Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman of the Senate
11348 Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
80</a>; Serguei Osokine,
11349 <em class=
"citetitle">A Quick Case for Intellectual Property Use Fee
11350 (IPUF)
</em>,
3 March
2002, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
81</a>; Jefferson Graham,
11351 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,"
<em class=
"citetitle">USA
11352 Today
</em>,
13 May
2002, available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
82</a>; Steven M. Cherry,
11353 "Getting Copyright Right," IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
11354 <a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
83</a>; Declan
11355 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
2002,
11356 available at
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
84</a>.
11357 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
11358 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
11359 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
11360 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
11361 debate by about a decade. See
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
85</a>.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640742"></a> <a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2640750"></a>
11362 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641016" href=
"#id2641016" class=
"para">221</a>]
</sup>
11365 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer Memorial
11366 Lecture),
<em class=
"citetitle">UCLA law Review
</em> 48 (
2001):
1057,
11368 </p></div><div class=
"footnote"><p><sup>[
<a id=
"ftn.id2641049" href=
"#id2641049" class=
"para">222</a>]
</sup>
11370 Et godt eksempel er arbeidet til professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz bør få
11371 ros for sin nøye gjennomgang av data om opphavsrettsbrudd, som fikk ham til
11372 å stille spørsmål med sin egen uttalte posisjon
—to ganger. I starten
11373 predicated han at nedlasting ville påføre industrien vesentlig skade. Han
11374 endret så sitt syn etter i lys av dataene, og han har siden endret sitt syn
11375 på nytt. Sammenlign Stan J. Liebowitz,
<em class=
"citetitle">Rethinking the Network
11376 Economy: The True Forces That Drive the Digital Marketplace
</em> (New
11377 York: Amacom,
2002), (gikk igjennom hans originale syn men uttrykte skepsis)
11378 med Stan J. Liebowitz, "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?"
11379 artikkelutkast, juni
2003, tilgjengelig fra
<a class=
"ulink" href=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/" target=
"_top">link #
86</a>. Den nøye analysen til
11380 Liebowitz er ekstremt verdifull i sin estimering av effekten av
11381 fildelingsteknologi. Etter mitt syn underestimerer han forøvrig kostnaden
11382 til det juridiske system. Se, for eksempel,
11383 <em class=
"citetitle">Rethinking
</em>,
174–76.
<a class=
"indexterm" name=
"id2641026"></a>
11384 </p></div></div></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 18. Notater"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-notes"></a>Kapittel
18. Notater
</h2></div></div></div><p>
11385 I denne teksten er det referanser til lenker på verdensveven. Og som alle
11386 som har forsøkt å bruke nettet vet, så vil disse lenkene være svært
11387 ustabile. Jeg har forsøkt å motvirke denne ustabiliteten ved å omdirigere
11388 lesere til den originale kilden gjennom en nettside som hører til denne
11389 boken. For hver lenke under, så kan du gå til http://free-culture.cc/notes
11390 og finne den originale kilden ved å klikke på nummeret etter #-tegnet. Hvis
11391 den originale lenken fortsatt er i live, så vil du bli omdirigert til den
11392 lenken. Hvis den originale lenken har forsvunnet, så vil du bli omdirigert
11393 til en passende referanse til materialet.
11394 </p></div><div class=
"chapter" title=
"Kapittel 19. Takk til"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"c-acknowledgments"></a>Kapittel
19. Takk til
</h2></div></div></div><p>
11395 Denne boken er produktet av en lang og så langt mislykket kamp som begynte
11396 da jeg leste om Eric Eldreds krig for å sørge for at bøker forble
11397 frie. Eldreds innsats bidro til å lansere en bevegelse, fri
11398 kultur-bevegelsen, og denne boken er tilegnet ham.
11400 Jeg fikk veiledning på ulike steder fra venner og akademikere, inkludert
11401 Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner, Mark Rose og
11402 Kathleen Sullivan. Og jeg fikk korreksjoner og veiledning fra mange
11403 fantastiske studenter ved Stanford Law School og Stanford University. Det
11404 inkluderer Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James P. Fellers, Christopher
11405 Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman, Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn,
11406 Brian-Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng og Erica Platt. Jeg er særlig takknemlig
11407 overfor Catherine Crump og Harry Surden, som hjalp til med å styre deres
11408 forskning og til Laura Lynch, som briljant håndterte hæren de samlet, samt
11409 bidro med sitt egen kritisk blikk på mye av dette.
11412 Yuko Noguchi hjalp meg å forstå lovene i Japan, så vel som Japans
11413 kultur. Jeg er henne takknemlig, og til de mange i Japan som hjalp meg med
11414 forundersøkelsene til denne boken: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto
11415 Misaki, Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata og Yoshihiro
11416 Yonezawa. Jeg er også takknemlig til professor Nobuhiro Nakayama og Tokyo
11417 University Business Law Center, som ga meg muligheten til å bruke tid i
11418 Japan, og Tadashi Shiraishi og Kiyokazu Yamagami for deres generøse hjelp
11421 Dette er de tradisjonelle former for hjelp som akademikere regelmessig
11422 trekker på. Men i tillegg til dem, har Internett gjort det mulig å motta råd
11423 og korrigering fra mange som jeg har aldri møtt. Blant de som har svart med
11424 svært nyttig råd etter forespørsler om boken på bloggen min er Dr. Muhammed
11425 Al-Ubaydli, David Gerstein og Peter Dimauro, I tillegg en lang liste med de
11426 som hadde spesifikke ideer om måter å utvikle mine argumenter på. De
11427 inkluderte Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob
11428 Devine, Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
11429 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
11430 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan McMullen, Fred
11431 Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir Safdar, Saul Schleimer,
11432 Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker, Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg,
11433 Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink,"
11434 Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz," og Richard Yanco. (jeg beklager hvis jeg gikk
11435 glipp av noen, med datamaskiner kommer feil og en krasj i e-postsystemet
11436 mitt gjorde at jeg mistet en haug med flotte svar.)
11438 Richard Stallman og Michael Carroll har begge lest hele boken i utkast, og
11439 hver av dem har bidratt med svært nyttige korreksjoner og råd. Michael hjalp
11440 meg å se mer tydelig betydningen av regulering for avledede verker . Og
11441 Richard korrigerte en pinlig stor mengde feil. Selv om mitt arbeid er
11442 delvis inspirert av Stallmans, er han ikke enig med meg på vesentlige steder
11445 Til slutt, og for evig, er jeg Bettina takknemlig, som alltid har insistert
11446 på at det ville være endeløs lykke utenfor disse kampene, og som alltid har
11447 hatt rett. Denne trege eleven er som alltid takknemlig for hennes
11448 evigvarende tålmodighet og kjærlighet.
11449 </p></div><div class=
"index" title=
"Indeks"><div class=
"titlepage"><div><div><h2 class=
"title"><a name=
"id2641381"></a>Indeks
</h2></div></div></div><div class=
"index"><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>Symboler
</h3><dl><dt>"copyleft" licenses,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>"Country of the Blind, The" (Wells),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>A
</h3><dl><dt>ABC,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Adobe eBook Reader,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Adromeda,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt><dt>Agee, Michael,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Aibo robothund,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>akademiske tidsskrifter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Akerlof, George,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Alben, Alex,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>alcohol prohibition,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt><dt>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>All in the Family,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Allen, Paul,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt><dt>Amazon,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>American Association of Law Libraries,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>American Graphophone Company,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></dt><dt>Anello, Douglas,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></dt><dt>Aristoteles,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Arrow, Kenneth,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>artister
</dt><dd><dl><dt>publicity rights on images of,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>ASCAP,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2618521">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>AT
&T,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Ayer, Don,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>B
</h3><dl><dt>Bacon, Francis,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Barish, Stephanie,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Barry, Hank,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Beatles,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></dt><dt>Beckett, Thomas,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Bell, Alexander Graham,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Berlin Act (
1908),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Berman, Howard L.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Bern-konvensjonen (
1908),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Bernstein, Leonard,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>Betamax,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>Black, Jane,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>BMG,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>BMW,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Boies, David,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt><dt>Bolling, Ruben,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Braithwaite, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Brandeis, Louis D.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Breyer, Stephen,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Bromberg, Dan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Brown, John Seely,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Buchanan, James,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Bunyan, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Burdick, Quentin,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></dt><dt>Bush, George W.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#constrain">Constraining Creators
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>C
</h3><dl><dt>Camp Chaos,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt><dt>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Carson, Rachel,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt><dt>Casablanca,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Causby, Thomas Lee,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Causby, Tinie,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#harms">Kapittel tolv: Skader
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>CBS,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>chimeras,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></dt><dt>Christensen, Clayton M.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Clark, Kim B.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>CNN,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Coase, Ronald,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>CodePink Women in Peace,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#preface">Forord
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Coe, Brian,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Comcast,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Commons, John R.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt><dt>Conrad, Paul,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Conyers, John, Jr.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></dt><dt>cookies, Internet,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Creative Commons,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt><dt>Crichton, Michael,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Crosskey, William W.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawduration">Loven: Varighet
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>D
</h3><dl><dt>Daguerre, Louis,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Daley, Elizabeth,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>dataspill,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Day After Trinity, The,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></dt><dt>DDT,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt><dt>Dean, Howard,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Diller, Barry,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Disney, Inc.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt><dt>Drahos, Peter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Dreyfuss, Rochelle,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2618521">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>Drucker, Peter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt><dt>Dylan, Bob,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>E
</h3><dl><dt>Eagle Forum,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Eastman, George,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Edison, Thomas,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Elektronisk forpost-stiftelsen (EFF),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt><dt>Erskine, Andrew,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>F
</h3><dl><dt>Fallows, James,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Fanning, Shawn,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a></dt><dt>Faraday, Michael,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Fisher, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></dt><dt>Florida, Richard,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2618521">"Piratvirksomhet"</a></dt><dt>Forbes, Steve,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>fotografering,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Fourneaux, Henri,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a></dt><dt>Fox, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#film">Film
</a></dt><dt>Fried, Charles,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Friedman, Milton,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>G
</h3><dl><dt>Garlick, Mia,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#oneidea">Gjenoppbygging av fri kultur: En idé
</a></dt><dt>Gates, Bill,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>General Film Company,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#film">Film
</a></dt><dt>Gershwin, George,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Gil, Gilberto,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>GNU/Linux-operativsystemet,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Goldstein, Paul,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</a></dt><dt>Gracie Films,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></dt><dt>Grisham, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recordedmusic">Innspilt musikk
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#freefairuse">3. Fri Bruk vs. rimelig bruk
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>H
</h3><dl><dt>Hand, Learned,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a></dt><dt>Hummer, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>I
</h3><dl><dt>Iwerks, Ub,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>J
</h3><dl><dt>Jaszi, Peter,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Johnson, Lyndon,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt><dt>Johnson, Samuel,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>K
</h3><dl><dt>kjørehastighet, begrensninger på,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>L
</h3><dl><dt>Lear, Norman,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Licensing Act (
1662),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Liebowitz, Stan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#firelawyers">5. Spark en masse advokater
</a></dt><dt>Linux-operativsystemet,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Litman, Jessica,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Lofgren, Zoe,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Lott, Trent,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Lovett, Lyle,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred-ii">Kapittel fjorten: Eldred II
</a></dt><dt>Lucky Dog, The,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>M
</h3><dl><dt>Madonna,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt><dt>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2618521">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2618521">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Marijuana Policy Project,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Marx Brothers,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>McCain, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>MGM,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt><dt>Microsoft
</dt><dd><dl><dt>Windows operating system of,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></dt></dl></dd><dt>Milton, John,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Movie Archive,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#collectors">Kapittel ni: Samlere
</a></dt><dt>Moyers, Bill,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Müller, Paul Hermann,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>N
</h3><dl><dt>Nashville Songwriters Association,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>National Writers Union,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>NBC,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Needleman, Rafe,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>Netanel, Neil Weinstock,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#liberatemusic">4. Frigjør musikken
—igjen
</a></dt><dt>Nimmer, David,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#transformers">Kapittel åtte: Omformere
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>P
</h3><dl><dt>Paramount Pictures,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt><dt>Picker, Randal C.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#film">Film
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#radio">Radio
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-ii">Piracy II
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>PLoS (Public Library of Science),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Pogue, David,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#preface">Forord
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#preface">Forord
</a></dt><dt>Politikk, (Aristotles),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>S
</h3><dl><dt>Safire, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#preface">Forord
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>San Francisco Opera,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#recorders">Kapittel sju: Innspillerne
</a></dt><dt>Sarnoff, David,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-introduction">Introduksjon
</a></dt><dt>Schlafly, Phyllis,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt><dt>Shakespeare, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a></dt><dt>Silent Sprint (Carson),
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#hollywood">Hvorfor Hollywood har rett
</a></dt><dt>Sony Pictures Entertainment,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt><dt>Stallman, Richard,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#examples">Gjenoppbygging av friheter som tidligere var antatt: Eksempler
</a></dt><dt>Steward, Geoffrey,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#eldred">Kapittel tretten: Eldred
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>T
</h3><dl><dt>Talbot, William,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Turner, Ted,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#c-conclusion">Konklusjon
</a></dt><dt>Twentieth Century Fox,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>U
</h3><dl><dt>Universal Pictures,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>V
</h3><dl><dt>Vaidhyanathan, Siva,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#film">Film
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#founders">Kapittel seks: Grunnleggerne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#together">Sammen
</a></dt><dt>veterans' pensions,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#shortterms">2. Kortere vernetid
</a></dt><dt>Vivendi Universal,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#innovators">Constraining Innovators
</a></dt><dt>von Lohmann, Fred,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#corruptingcitizens">Corrupting Citizens
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>W
</h3><dl><dt>Warner Brothers,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#property-i">Kapittel ti: "Eiendom"
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawforce">Arkitektur og lov: Makt
</a></dt><dt>Warren, Samuel D.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Wells, H. G.,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#chimera">Kapittel elleve: Chimera
</a></dt><dt>Windows,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#piracy-i">Piracy I
</a></dt><dt>Winer, Dave,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt><dt>Winick, Judd,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#creators">Kapittel en: Skaperne
</a></dt><dt>WJOA,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt><dt>Worldcom,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#constrain">Constraining Creators
</a></dt><dt>WRC,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#marketconcentration">Marked: Konsentrasjon
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>Y
</h3><dl><dt>Yanofsky, Dave,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#mere-copyists">Kapittel to: "Kun etter-apere"
</a></dt></dl></div><div class=
"indexdiv"><h3>Z
</h3><dl><dt>Zimmerman, Edwin,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#cabletv">Kabel-TV
</a></dt><dt>Zittrain, Jonathan,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#id2618521">"Piratvirksomhet"</a>,
<a class=
"indexterm" href=
"#lawscope">Loven: Virkeområde
</a></dt></dl></div></div></div></div></body></html>