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15 <book id=
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17 <title>Free Culture
</title>
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
24 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
26 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
30 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
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38 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
67 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.png" contentdepth=
"3em" width=
"100%" align=
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70 <imagedata fileref=
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73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
79 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
91 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's
<quote>e.biz
25,
</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's
<quote>50 visionaries.
</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
109 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
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127 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
130 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
132 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
136 <dedication id=
"salespoints">
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
141 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
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&N
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144 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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145 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id=
"alsobylessig">
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
167 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
171 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
174 Excerpt from an editorial titled
<quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,
</quote>
175 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
176 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
179 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
180 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
183 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
184 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
187 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
191 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
192 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
201 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
205 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
208 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
214 343.7309'
9—dc22
217 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
220 Printed in the United States of America
226 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
234 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
235 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
236 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
237 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
238 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
239 the above publisher of this book.
242 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
243 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
244 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
245 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
246 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
247 author's rights is appreciated.
251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
252 <dedication><title></title>
254 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
262 <title>List of figures
</title>
269 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
270 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
271 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
272 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
277 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
281 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
282 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
283 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
284 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
285 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
286 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
290 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
291 2 Architecture and Law: Force
292 2 Market: Concentration
295 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
296 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
297 2 Constraining Creators
298 2 Constraining Innovators
299 2 Corrupting Citizens
301 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
302 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
306 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
307 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
309 2 1. More Formalities
310 3 Registration and Renewal
313 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
314 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
315 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
323 <preface id=
"preface">
324 <title>PREFACE
</title>
325 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
326 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
329 <emphasis role=
"bold">At the end
</emphasis> of his review of my first
330 book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David
331 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
332 computer-related texts, wrote this:
336 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
337 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
338 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
339 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
340 David Pogue,
<quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
345 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
346 software, or
<quote>code,
</quote> functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
347 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
348 could always
<quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome
</quote>-like simply flip a
349 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
350 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
351 <quote>affect
</quote> us anymore.
354 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
355 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
356 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
357 causes even after the modem is turned
359 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
360 on-line have fundamentally affected
<quote>people who aren't online.
</quote> There
361 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
363 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
365 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
366 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
367 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
368 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
372 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
373 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of
<quote>free culture
</quote>—not
374 <quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free beer
</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
375 free software movement
<footnote>
377 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
378 </para></footnote>), but
<quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free speech,
</quote> <quote>free markets,
</quote>
379 <quote>free trade,
</quote> <quote>free enterprise,
</quote> <quote>free will,
</quote> and
<quote>free elections.
</quote> A
380 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
381 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
382 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
383 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
384 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
385 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
386 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
387 <quote>permission culture
</quote>—a culture in which creators get to create
388 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
392 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not
<quote>we
</quote>
393 on the Left or
<quote>you
</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
394 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
395 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
396 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
397 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
398 culture deem fundamental.
400 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
401 <indexterm><primary>Stevens, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
403 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
404 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
405 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
406 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
407 As William Safire described marching
<quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
408 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
409 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,
</quote> he formulated perhaps
410 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
412 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
416 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
417 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
418 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
419 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
420 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
421 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
422 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
427 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
428 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
429 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
430 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
431 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
432 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
433 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
434 Safire's left or on his right.
437 <emphasis role=
"strong">The inspiration
</emphasis> for the title and for
438 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
439 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
440 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
441 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
442 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
443 that this work is
<quote>merely
</quote> derivative.
446 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
447 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
448 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
449 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
450 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
451 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
452 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
453 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
456 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
457 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
458 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
459 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
460 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
464 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
465 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
466 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
467 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
468 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
469 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
470 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
478 <chapter label=
"0" id=
"c-introduction">
479 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
480 <indexterm id='idxairtraffic' class='startofrange'
>
481 <primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.
</primary>
483 <indexterm id='idxlandownership' class='startofrange'
>
484 <primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary>
486 <indexterm id='idxproprigtair' class='startofrange'
>
487 <primary>property rights
</primary>
488 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
490 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
492 <emphasis role=
"strong">On December
17</emphasis>,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
493 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
494 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
495 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
496 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
497 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
500 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
501 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
502 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
503 and all the space above, to
<quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.
</quote><footnote><para>
504 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
505 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
508 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
509 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
510 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
513 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
514 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
515 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
516 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
517 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
518 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
519 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
522 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
524 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
525 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
526 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
527 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
528 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
529 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
530 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to
<quote>an indefinite
531 extent, upwards,
</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
532 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
537 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
538 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
539 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
540 <quote>taking
</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
541 that
<quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
542 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.
</quote> But Justice Douglas
543 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
544 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
548 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
549 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
550 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
551 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
552 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
553 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
554 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
555 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
557 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
558 that there could be a
<quote>taking
</quote> if the government's use of its land
559 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
560 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece,
<quote>(Intellectual)
561 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
562 Authorship,
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
563 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
565 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
566 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
571 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.
</quote>
574 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
575 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
576 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
578 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line:
<quote>Common sense revolts
579 at the idea.
</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
580 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
581 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
582 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
584 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
585 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
586 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
588 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
589 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
590 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
591 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
592 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
593 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
594 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
595 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
596 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by
<quote>what
597 seemed reasonable
</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
598 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
599 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
600 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
601 end, the force of what seems
<quote>obvious
</quote> to everyone else
—the power of
602 <quote>common sense
</quote>—would prevail. Their
<quote>private interest
</quote> would not be
603 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
605 <indexterm startref='idxproprigtair' class='endofrange'
/>
606 <indexterm startref='idxlandownership' class='endofrange'
/>
607 <indexterm startref='idxairtraffic' class='endofrange'
/>
608 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwin' class='startofrange'
>
609 <primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary>
611 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
612 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
613 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
615 <emphasis role='strong'
>Edwin Howard Armstrong
</emphasis> is one of
616 America's forgotten inventor geniuses. He came to the great American
617 inventor scene just after the titans Thomas Edison and Alexander
618 Graham Bell. But his work in the area of radio technology was perhaps
619 the most important of any single inventor in the first fifty years of
620 radio. He was better educated than Michael Faraday, who as a
621 bookbinder's apprentice had discovered electric induction in
1831. But
622 he had the same intuition about how the world of radio worked, and on
623 at least three occasions, Armstrong invented profoundly important
624 technologies that advanced our understanding of radio.
625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
628 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
629 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
630 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
631 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
632 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
633 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
634 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
635 much less transmitter power and static.
638 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
639 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
640 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
641 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
642 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
643 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
644 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
645 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
646 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.
</quote>
649 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
653 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
654 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
655 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
656 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
657 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
658 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
<quote>music
659 box.
</quote><footnote><para>
660 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
661 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
666 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
667 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
668 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
669 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
670 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
671 a handful of networks.
675 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
676 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
677 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
678 that removed static from
<quote>radio.
</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
679 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
680 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
684 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
685 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
686 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
687 RCA.
<footnote><para> See
<quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
688 Electronic Era,
</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
689 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
691 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
695 <indexterm id='idxlessing' class='startofrange'
>
696 <primary>Lessing, Lawrence
</primary>
699 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
700 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
701 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
703 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
707 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
708 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
709 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
710 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
711 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
712 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
717 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
718 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
719 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
720 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
721 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
722 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
723 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
724 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
725 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
726 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
727 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
732 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
733 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
734 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
735 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
740 <indexterm startref='idxlessing' class='endofrange'
/>
741 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
743 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
744 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
745 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
746 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
747 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
748 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
749 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
753 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
754 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
755 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
756 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
757 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
758 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
759 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
760 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
761 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
762 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
764 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwin' class='endofrange'
/>
766 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
767 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
768 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
769 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
770 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
771 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
772 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
773 course always public spirited; the reality is something
774 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
775 to themselves, would crumble in
777 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
778 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
779 effect of technological change.
782 <emphasis role=
"strong">There's no
</emphasis> single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
783 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
784 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
785 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
786 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
787 before.
<footnote><para>
788 Amanda Lenhart,
<quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
789 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,
</quote> Pew Internet and American
790 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
791 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
793 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
797 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
798 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
799 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
800 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
801 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
802 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
803 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
804 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
805 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
808 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
809 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
810 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
811 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
812 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
813 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
817 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
818 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
819 regulation of each. By
<quote>commercial culture
</quote> I mean that part of our
820 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
821 <quote>noncommercial culture
</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
824 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
825 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his
<quote>Reader,
</quote> or
826 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
827 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
828 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
831 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
832 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
833 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
834 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
835 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
836 left this culture
<quote>free.
</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
837 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
838 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
839 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
842 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
843 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
844 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
845 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
846 marketplace.
<footnote>
848 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
849 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
850 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
851 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
852 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
853 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
854 D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote> Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
856 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
858 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
859 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
860 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
861 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
864 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
865 been erased.
<footnote><para>
866 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
868 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
870 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
871 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
872 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
873 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
874 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
875 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
876 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
877 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
878 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
879 culture, more and more a permission culture.
881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
883 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
884 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
885 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
886 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
887 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
888 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
889 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
890 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
891 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
892 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
896 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
897 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
898 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
899 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
900 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
901 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
902 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
903 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
904 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
905 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
906 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
907 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
908 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
909 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
910 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
911 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
912 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
915 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
916 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
917 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
918 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
919 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
920 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
924 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
926 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
927 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether
<quote>piracy
</quote> will
928 be permitted, and whether
<quote>property
</quote> will be protected. The
<quote>war
</quote> that
929 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
930 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
931 calls his
<quote>own terrorist war
</quote><footnote><para>
932 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
933 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,
</quote> <citetitle>New York
934 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
935 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
936 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
937 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
941 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
942 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
943 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
944 <quote>creative property.
</quote> I believe that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that the
945 law, properly tuned, should punish
<quote>piracy,
</quote> whether on or off the
949 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
950 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
951 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet
<quote>pirates
</quote> will also rid our
952 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
955 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
956 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
957 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
958 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
959 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
961 Neil W. Netanel,
<quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
962 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
963 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
965 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
966 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
967 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
968 could cultivate and extend our culture.
971 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
972 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
973 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
974 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
975 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
976 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
977 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
978 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
979 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
983 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
984 <quote>centrality of technology
</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
985 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
986 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
987 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
991 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
992 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
993 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
994 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
995 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
996 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
997 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
999 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1000 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1002 <emphasis role=
"strong">Like the Causbys'
</emphasis> battle, this war is, in part, about
<quote>property.
</quote> The
1003 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1004 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1005 this
<quote>property
</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1006 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1007 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1008 of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1009 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1010 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1011 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1012 <quote>trespassing
</quote> upon legitimate claims of
<quote>property.
</quote> It is as plain to
1013 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1016 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1017 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1018 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
1020 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1021 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1022 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1023 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1025 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1026 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1030 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1031 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1032 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1033 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1034 our
<quote>culture
</quote> was as
<quote>owned
</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1035 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1036 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1037 accepted as it is now.
1040 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1041 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1042 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1043 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1046 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1047 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1050 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1051 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1052 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1053 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1054 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1057 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1058 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1059 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1060 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1063 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1064 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1066 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1067 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1068 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1069 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of
<quote>intellectual
1070 property.
</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1071 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1072 this silliness will be much more profound.
1073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1076 <emphasis role=
"strong">The struggle
</emphasis> that rages just now centers on two ideas:
<quote>piracy
</quote> and
1077 <quote>property.
</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1081 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1082 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1083 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1084 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1085 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1086 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1089 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1090 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1091 government, pushed by big media to respond to this
<quote>something new,
</quote> is
1092 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1093 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let
<quote>common
1094 sense
</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1095 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1096 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1097 fundamental about who we have always been.
1100 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1101 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1102 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1103 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1104 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1105 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1109 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1110 <title><quote>PIRACY
</quote></title>
1112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1113 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1114 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1117 <emphasis role=
"strong">Since the inception
</emphasis> of the law regulating creative property, there has
1118 been a war against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1119 <quote>piracy,
</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1120 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1121 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1125 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1126 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1127 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1129 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1132 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1135 Today we are in the middle of another
<quote>war
</quote> against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The
1136 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1137 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1138 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1139 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1140 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1144 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1145 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1146 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1147 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1148 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will
<quote>rob the author of the
1152 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1153 increasingly to technology to defend their
<quote>property
</quote> against this
1154 <quote>piracy.
</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1155 raised to believe that
<quote>property
</quote> should be
<quote>free.
</quote> Forget tattoos,
1156 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1157 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1160 There's no doubt that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1161 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1162 notion of
<quote>piracy
</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1163 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1166 The idea goes something like this:
1170 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1171 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1172 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1173 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1174 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1178 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1179 <indexterm><primary>Girl Schouts
</primary></indexterm>
1180 <indexterm id='idxifvalue' class='startofrange'
>
1181 <primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary>
1184 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1185 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1186 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1188 See Rochelle Dreyfuss,
<quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1189 in the Pepsi Generation,
</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1191 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1192 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1193 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1194 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1196 Lisa Bannon,
<quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1197 Up,
</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1198 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1199 Zittrain,
<quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1200 Speech, No One Wins,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1201 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1203 There was
<quote>value
</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1204 <quote>right
</quote>—even against the Girl Scouts.
1206 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1208 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1209 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1211 of law protecting creative property. But the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1212 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1213 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1215 <indexterm startref='idxifvalue' class='endofrange'
/>
1217 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1218 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1219 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1220 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1221 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1224 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1225 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1226 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1227 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1228 copyright law today regulates both.
1231 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1232 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1233 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1234 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1235 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1236 more expense of doing business.
1238 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1239 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1241 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1242 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1243 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1244 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1245 <quote>copying,
</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1246 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1247 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1248 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1249 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1250 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1251 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1252 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1253 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1254 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1255 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1257 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the
<quote>Rise of the Creative
1258 Class.
</quote><footnote>
1261 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York:
1262 Basic Books,
2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1263 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1264 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1265 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1266 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1267 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1269 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1270 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1272 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1273 this creative class.
1276 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1277 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1278 context the current battles about behavior labeled
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
1282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1283 <chapter label=
"1" id=
"creators">
1284 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1285 <indexterm id=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'
>
1286 <primary>animated cartoons
</primary>
1289 <emphasis role=
"strong">In
1928</emphasis>, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1290 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1291 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1292 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1293 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1296 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1297 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1298 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1299 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1300 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1301 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1305 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1306 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1307 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1308 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1312 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1313 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1314 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1315 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1316 synchronization was pretty close.
1319 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1320 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1321 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1322 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1323 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1325 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1326 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1331 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1332 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly:
<quote>I have never been so thrilled
1333 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.
</quote>
1334 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1337 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1338 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1339 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1340 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1341 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1342 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1343 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1346 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1347 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1348 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1349 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1352 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1353 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1354 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1355 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1356 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1357 and among the best of its genre.
1360 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1363 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1364 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1366 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1367 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1368 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1369 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>:
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote> <quote>The
1370 Simpleton
</quote> (Delille),
<quote>Mischief Makers
</quote> (Carbonara),
<quote>Joyful Hurry No.
1</quote>
1371 (Baron), and
<quote>Gawky Rube
</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song,
<quote>The Turkey in the
1372 Straw,
</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1373 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1375 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1376 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1377 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1378 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote>
1379 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1383 This
<quote>borrowing
</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1384 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1385 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1387 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman,
<quote>The Mouse
1388 that Ate the Public Domain,
</quote> Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1389 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1391 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1392 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1393 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1394 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1395 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1396 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1397 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1398 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1402 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1403 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1404 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1405 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1406 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1407 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1408 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1411 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1412 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1413 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1414 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1415 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1416 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1417 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1418 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1419 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1420 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1421 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1423 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1424 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1425 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1426 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1427 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1428 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1429 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1430 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1432 <indexterm startref=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'
/>
1434 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1435 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1436 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1437 its importance. We could call this
<quote>Disney creativity,
</quote> though that
1438 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely,
<quote>Walt Disney
1439 creativity
</quote>—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1440 culture around us and makes it something different.
1442 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1443 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1444 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1445 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1446 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1448 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1449 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the
<quote>average
</quote> term by
1451 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1452 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1453 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1455 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1456 Web site associated with this book, available at
1457 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1459 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1460 copyright holders of a creative work had an
<quote>exclusive right
</quote> to control
1461 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1462 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1465 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1466 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1467 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a
<quote>lawyer-free
1468 zone.
</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1469 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1470 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1471 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1474 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1475 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1476 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1477 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1480 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1481 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1482 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1483 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1484 content from before the Great Depression.
1487 <emphasis role=
"strong">Of course
</emphasis>, Walt Disney had no monopoly on
<quote>Walt Disney creativity.
</quote>
1488 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1489 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1493 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1494 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1495 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1496 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1497 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1498 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1499 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1502 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1503 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1504 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1505 the stories that these
<quote>graphic novels
</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1506 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are
<quote>men in tights.
</quote>
1507 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1508 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1509 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1510 interestingly different way.
1513 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1514 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1515 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1518 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1519 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1520 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1521 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1522 transforming it either subtly or
1523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1524 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1525 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1526 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1527 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently
<quote>different.
</quote> But they
1528 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1529 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1530 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1533 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1534 huge. More than
33,
000 <quote>circles
</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1535 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1536 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1537 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1538 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1539 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1540 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1541 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1544 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1545 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1546 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1547 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1548 one. Doujinshi are plainly
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> There is no general
1549 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1550 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1551 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1552 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that
<quote>taking
</quote> without
1553 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1554 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1555 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1557 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1558 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1561 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1562 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1563 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me,
<quote>The
1564 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1565 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1567 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1568 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them
</quote>
1569 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1571 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1572 York: Perennial,
2000).
1575 <indexterm><primary>Superman comics
</primary></indexterm>
1577 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1578 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1579 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me,
<quote>there are these rules
1580 and you have to stick to them.
</quote> There are things Superman
<quote>cannot
</quote>
1581 do.
<quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1582 which are fifty years old.
</quote>
1584 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1586 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1587 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1588 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1589 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1590 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1591 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1592 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1594 See Salil K. Mehra,
<quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1595 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?
</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1596 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
<quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1597 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1598 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1599 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1600 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1601 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.
</quote>
1605 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1606 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1607 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1608 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1609 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1610 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1611 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1612 a more general pattern of blocking this
<quote>free taking
</quote> by the doujinshi
1616 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1617 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1618 a friend from a major Japanese law firm.
<quote>We don't have enough
1619 lawyers,
</quote> he told me one afternoon. There
<quote>just aren't enough resources
1620 to prosecute cases like this.
</quote>
1623 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1624 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1625 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1626 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1628 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1629 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1630 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1631 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1632 their clients or hurt them?
1635 <emphasis role='strong'
>Let's pause
</emphasis> for a moment.
1638 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1639 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1640 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1643 We live in a world that celebrates
<quote>property.
</quote> I am one of those
1644 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1645 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1646 <quote>intellectual property.
</quote><footnote><para>
1648 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1649 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1650 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1651 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1652 describes a set of
<quote>property
</quote> rights
—copyright, patents,
1653 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1655 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1657 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1658 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1662 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1663 plenty of value out there that
<quote>property
</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1664 mean
<quote>money can't buy you love,
</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1665 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1666 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1667 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1668 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1669 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1670 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1671 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1672 Disney's use would have been considered
<quote>fair.
</quote> There was nothing
1673 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1677 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1678 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1679 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1681 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1682 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1686 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1687 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1688 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1689 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1690 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1691 form, whether large or small.
1694 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1695 say that the copycat comic artists are
<quote>stealing.
</quote> This form of Walt
1696 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1697 particular find it hard to say why.
1700 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1701 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1702 without asking or paying for the privilege. (
<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1703 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1704 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?
</quote>) Acting companies
1705 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1706 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1707 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1708 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1709 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1710 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1711 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1714 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1715 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1716 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1717 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1718 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1719 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1720 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1721 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1725 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1726 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1727 question instead is
<quote><emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?
</quote>
1728 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1729 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1730 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1731 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1732 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1733 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1737 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1738 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1739 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1744 <chapter label=
"2" id=
"mere-copyists">
1745 <title>CHAPTER TWO:
<quote>Mere Copyists
</quote></title>
1746 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1747 <primary>photography
</primary>
1749 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1751 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1839</emphasis>, Louis Daguerre invented
1752 the first practical technology for producing what we would call
1753 <quote>photographs.
</quote> Appropriately enough, they were called
1754 <quote>daguerreotypes.
</quote> The process was complicated and
1755 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1756 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1757 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1758 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1761 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1762 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1763 <quote>automatic pictures.
</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1764 making
<quote>negatives.
</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1765 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1766 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1767 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1768 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1770 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1772 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1773 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1776 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1777 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1779 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1780 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1781 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1782 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1783 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1784 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1785 population of photographers.
1788 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1789 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1790 marketed on the basis of its simplicity.
<quote>You press the button and we
1791 do the rest.
</quote><footnote><para>
1793 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1794 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1795 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1799 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1800 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1801 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1802 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1803 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1804 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1805 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1806 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1807 chemicals.
<footnote>
1810 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1812 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1817 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1818 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1819 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1820 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1821 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1822 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1823 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1824 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1825 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1826 percent.
<footnote><para>
1829 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1830 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1832 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1835 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1839 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1840 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1841 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1842 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1843 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes,
<quote>For the
1844 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1845 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1846 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1847 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1848 interpretation or bias.
</quote><footnote><para>
1854 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1855 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1856 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1857 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1858 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1859 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its
<quote>quality
</quote>;
1860 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1861 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1862 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1863 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1867 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1868 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1869 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1870 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1871 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1872 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1873 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1874 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1876 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1877 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1878 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1879 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1884 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1885 familiar. The photographer was
<quote>taking
</quote> something from the person or
1886 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1887 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1888 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1891 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1892 that they thought valuable.
1894 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1896 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1897 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1898 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1899 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1900 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1903 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote>
1904 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1905 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1906 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1907 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1908 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1909 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1910 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1912 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
1914 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1915 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1916 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1917 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1918 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1919 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1920 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1921 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1922 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1924 See Melville B. Nimmer,
<quote>The Right of Publicity,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1925 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
<quote>Privacy,
</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1926 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1927 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1932 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1933 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1934 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1935 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1936 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1937 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1938 Kodak would be benefiting from the
<quote>theft
</quote> committed by the
1939 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1940 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1941 from the
<quote>image-right
</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1942 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1943 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1944 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1949 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1950 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1951 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1952 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1953 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1954 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1955 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1956 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1957 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1958 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1962 <emphasis role='strong'
>If you drive
</emphasis> through San
1963 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses
1964 painted over with colorful and striking images, and the logo
1965 <quote>Just Think!
</quote> in place of the name of a school. But
1966 there's little that's
<quote>just
</quote> cerebral in the projects
1967 that these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies
1968 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even
1969 the film of your VCR. Rather the
<quote>film
</quote> of digital
1970 cameras. Just Think! is a project that enables kids to make films, as
1971 a way to understand and critique the filmed culture that they find all
1972 around them. Each year, these busses travel to more than thirty
1973 schools and enable three hundred to five hundred children to learn
1974 something about media by doing something with media. By doing, they
1975 think. By tinkering, they learn.
1977 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1978 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1980 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1981 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1982 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it,
<quote>Five years ago, a good
1983 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1984 professional quality for $
595.
</quote><footnote><para>
1986 H. Edward Goldberg,
<quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1987 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,
</quote>
1988 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1989 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1991 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1992 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1993 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1994 learning more and more of something teachers call
<quote>media literacy.
</quote>
1997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1998 <quote>Media literacy,
</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1999 Think!, puts it,
<quote>is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
2000 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
2001 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
2002 the way people access it.
</quote>
2003 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
2006 This may seem like an odd way to think about
<quote>literacy.
</quote> For most
2007 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
2008 and noticing split infinitives are the things that
<quote>literate
</quote> people know
2011 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
2013 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
2014 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
2015 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
2017 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2018 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990);
<quote>Findings on Family and TV
2019 Study,
</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
2021 it is increasingly important to understand the
<quote>grammar
</quote> of media. For
2022 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2023 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2024 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2025 (at least at first) terrible media.
2028 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2029 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2030 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
2031 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2032 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2033 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2034 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2035 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2038 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2039 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2040 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2041 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2042 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2043 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2045 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2047 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2048 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2049 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2052 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2053 about
<quote>the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2054 texture.
</quote><footnote>
2057 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2059 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2060 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2062 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2063 <quote>played
</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2064 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2065 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2066 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2067 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2068 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2069 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2071 See Scott Steinberg,
<quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,
</quote> E!online,
4
2072 November
2000, available at
2073 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>;
<quote>Timeline,
</quote> 22 November
2000,
2075 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2078 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2080 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2081 describes,
<quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2082 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2083 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2084 led.
</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2087 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2088 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2089 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2090 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2094 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2095 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2096 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2097 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2102 <quote>Read-only.
</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2103 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2107 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2108 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2109 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2110 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2113 and this literacy in particular, is to
<quote>empower people to choose the
2114 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2115 express.
</quote><footnote>
2118 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2119 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2120 </para></footnote> It is to enable students
<quote>to communicate in the
2121 language of the twenty-first century.
</quote><footnote><para>
2126 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2128 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2129 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2130 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2131 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2132 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2133 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2134 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2135 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2136 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2137 students know something about
—gun violence.
2140 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2141 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2142 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2143 away. The
<quote>kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,
</quote>
2144 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2145 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2148 Using whatever
<quote>free web stuff they could find,
</quote> and relatively simple
2149 tools to enable the kids to mix
<quote>image, sound, and text,
</quote> Barish said
2150 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2151 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2152 close to the lives of these students. The project
<quote>gave them a tool
2153 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2154 it,
</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2155 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2156 been created using only text.
<quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2157 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2158 gone and done something else,
</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2159 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2160 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2161 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2162 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2167 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?
</quote> I asked. In part,
2168 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2169 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of
<quote>constructing
2170 meaning.
</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2171 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2172 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2173 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2178 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2179 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2180 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2181 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2182 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2183 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2184 you say,
<quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.
</quote>
2185 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2186 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2187 you. [But i]nstead, if you say,
<quote>Well, with all these things that you
2188 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2189 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2190 for me something that reflects that.
</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2191 camera and
… saying,
<quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2192 make a little movie.
</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2193 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2194 about the topic.
…
2197 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2198 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2199 bump up against the fact,
<quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2200 to write something.
</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2201 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2204 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2205 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2206 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2208 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2209 had a lot of power with this language.
2211 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2212 not match with any start quote. -->
2214 <indexterm><primary>World Trade Center
</primary></indexterm>
2216 <emphasis role='strong'
>When two planes
</emphasis> crashed into the
2217 World Trade Center, another into the Pentagon, and a fourth into a
2218 Pennsylvania field, all media around the world shifted to this
2219 news. Every moment of just about every day for that week, and for
2220 weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold the
2221 story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a
2222 retelling, because we had seen the events that were described. The
2223 genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the delayed second
2224 attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole world would be
2228 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2229 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2230 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was
<quote>balance,
</quote>
2231 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2232 increasingly come to expect it,
<quote>news as entertainment,
</quote> even if the
2233 entertainment is tragedy.
2235 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2236 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2238 But in addition to this produced news about the
<quote>tragedy of September
2239 11,
</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2240 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2241 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2242 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2243 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2244 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2245 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2246 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2247 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2248 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2249 was also the Internet.
2252 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2253 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2254 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2255 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2258 by a student on the
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2262 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2263 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2264 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2265 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2266 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2267 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2268 spread practically instantaneously.
2271 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2272 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2273 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2274 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2275 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2276 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2277 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2280 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2281 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2282 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2283 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2284 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2285 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2286 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2287 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2288 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2289 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2290 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2291 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2294 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2295 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2296 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2297 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2298 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2301 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2302 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2304 <indexterm><primary>Tocqueville, Alexis de
</primary></indexterm>
2306 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2307 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2308 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2309 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2310 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2311 most important account of early
<quote>Democracy in America.
</quote> It wasn't
2312 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2313 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2314 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2315 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2316 deliberated. Members argued about the
<quote>right
</quote> result; they tried to
2317 persuade each other of the
<quote>right
</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2318 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2319 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2321 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2322 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2326 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2327 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2328 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2330 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin,
<quote>Deliberation Day,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2331 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2333 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2334 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2335 place for
<quote>democratic deliberation
</quote> to occur.
2338 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2339 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2340 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2341 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2342 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2343 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2345 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2346 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2347 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2348 little beyond what our friends say.
2351 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2352 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2353 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2354 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2355 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2358 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2362 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2363 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2364 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2365 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2366 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2367 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2370 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2371 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2372 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2373 is having an effect.
2374 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2376 <indexterm><primary>Thurmond, Strom
</primary></indexterm>
2378 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2379 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2380 <quote>misspoke
</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2381 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2382 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2383 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2384 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2385 more instances of the same
<quote>misspeaking
</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2386 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2387 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2389 Noah Shachtman,
<quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,
</quote> New
2390 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2392 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2395 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2396 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2397 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2398 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2402 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2403 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2404 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2405 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2406 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2407 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2408 peer-generated rankings.
2410 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2411 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2414 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2416 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2417 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2418 difference is the absence of a financial
<quote>conflict of interest.
</quote> <quote>I think you
2419 have to take the conflict of interest
</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2420 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2421 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2422 get it out of the way.
</quote>
2424 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2425 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2427 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2428 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2429 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2430 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2431 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2433 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2435 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2436 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2437 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2438 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2439 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2440 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2441 told her that
<emphasis>they
</emphasis> were writing
<quote>the story.
</quote>)
2443 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2444 debate
—<quote>amateur
</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2445 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2446 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2447 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2448 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2449 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2451 John Schwartz,
<quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2452 Information Online,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2453 D. Kramer,
<quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,
</quote>
2454 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2455 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2457 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2458 <quote>triangulate,
</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2459 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2460 out of it
</quote>—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2463 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2464 with blogs.
<quote>It's going to become an essential skill,
</quote> Winer predicts,
2465 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2466 not clear that
<quote>journalism
</quote> is happy about this
—some journalists
2467 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2470 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2471 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2472 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
2473 See Michael Falcone,
<quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?
</quote> <citetitle>New
2474 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. (
<quote>Not all news organizations have
2475 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2476 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2477 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2478 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2479 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2480 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.
</quote>)
2482 But it is clear that we are still in transition.
<quote>A
2484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2485 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,
</quote> Winer told me.
2486 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2487 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2488 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said,
<quote>we will
2489 be the last thing that gets shut down.
</quote>
2492 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
<quote>you
2493 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.
</quote>
2494 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2495 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2496 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2497 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2498 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2499 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2500 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2501 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2502 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2503 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2504 extraordinary to report.
2506 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2507 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2508 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2510 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'
>
2511 <primary>advertising
</primary>
2514 <emphasis role='strong'
>John Seely Brown
</emphasis> is the chief
2515 scientist of the Xerox Corporation. His work, as his Web site
2516 describes it, is
<quote>human learning and
… the creation of
2517 knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation.
</quote>
2520 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2521 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2522 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2523 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2527 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When
<quote>a lot of us grew up,
</quote>
2528 he explains, that tinkering was done
<quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2529 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.
</quote> But digital technologies
2530 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2531 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2532 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2534 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2535 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2536 or
<quote>free collage,
</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2537 the tinkering of many others.
2540 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2541 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2542 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2543 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2544 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2547 This opportunity creates a
<quote>completely new kind of learning platform,
</quote>
2548 as Brown describes.
<quote>As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2549 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2550 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2551 if they can improve it.
</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2552 apprenticeship.
<quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.
</quote>
2555 In this process,
<quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2556 They are code.
</quote> Kids are
<quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2557 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2558 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2559 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2560 you tinker the more you improve.
</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2564 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2565 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2566 it,
<quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2567 intelligence.
</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2568 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2569 text.
<quote>The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2570 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2571 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2572 these multiple forms of intelligence.
</quote>
2574 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'
/>
2575 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2577 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2578 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2581 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2582 kind of recognition.
2585 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2586 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2587 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2588 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2589 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2590 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2591 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2594 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2595 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2596 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2597 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the
<quote>right to
2598 tinker
</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2599 general.
<footnote><para>
2601 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel,
<quote>Technological Access
2602 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,
</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2603 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2605 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2606 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2609 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,
</quote> Brown
2610 explains. We need to
<quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2611 and want to learn.
</quote>
2614 <quote>Yet,
</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2615 evince,
<quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2616 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2617 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2618 system that closes down that part of the brain.
</quote>
2620 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2622 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2623 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2624 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2625 the law to close down that technology.
2628 <quote>No way to run a culture,
</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2629 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2630 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2634 <chapter label=
"3" id=
"catalogs">
2635 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2636 <indexterm><primary>RPI
</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</see></indexterm>
2637 <indexterm id=
"idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'
>
2638 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</primary>
2641 <emphasis role='strong'
>In the fall
</emphasis> of
2002, Jesse Jordan
2642 of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as a freshman at Rensselaer
2643 Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York. His major at RPI was
2644 information technology. Though he is not a programmer, in October
2645 Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search engine technology that
2646 was available on the RPI network.
2649 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2650 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2651 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2652 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2653 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2654 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2657 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2658 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2659 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2660 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2661 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2664 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2665 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2666 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2667 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2668 engines can do this even better. The idea of
<quote>intranet
</quote> search
2669 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2670 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2671 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2672 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2673 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2676 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2677 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2678 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2679 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2680 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2681 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2682 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2685 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2686 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2687 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2688 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2689 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2690 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2691 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2692 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2693 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2697 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2698 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2699 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2700 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2701 be on users' computers.
2704 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2705 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2706 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2707 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2709 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2713 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2714 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2715 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2716 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2717 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2718 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2719 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2720 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2721 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2722 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2723 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2724 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2728 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2729 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2730 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2731 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2732 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2733 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2734 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2737 <quote>It was absurd,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>I don't think I did anything
2738 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2739 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2740 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2741 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2742 easier to use
</quote>—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2743 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2744 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2745 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2746 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2749 <indexterm><primary>statutory damages
</primary></indexterm>
2751 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2752 network and had therefore
<quote>willfully
</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2754 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2755 <quote>willful infringement,
</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2756 call
<quote>statutory damages.
</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2757 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2758 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2759 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2761 <indexterm><primary>Princeton University
</primary></indexterm>
2762 <indexterm><primary>Michigan Technical University
</primary></indexterm>
2764 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2765 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2766 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2767 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2768 huge demands for
<quote>damages
</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2769 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2770 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2771 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2772 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2773 2001.
<footnote><para>
2776 Tim Goral,
<quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2777 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,
</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2778 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2781 <indexterm startref=
"idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'
/>
2783 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2784 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2785 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2786 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2787 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2789 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt
</primary></indexterm>
2791 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2792 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2793 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2794 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2795 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2796 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2797 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse,
<quote>You don't want to pay another
2798 visit to a dentist like me.
</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2799 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2802 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2803 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2804 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2805 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2806 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2808 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2809 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2812 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2813 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2816 <primary>artists
</primary>
2817 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
2820 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2821 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2822 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2823 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2824 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2825 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2826 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2828 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2829 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2830 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2832 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2833 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2834 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2836 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in
<quote>KaZaA and Punishment,
</quote>
2837 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2841 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2842 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2843 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2848 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2849 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2850 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2851 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2855 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2856 his father told me, Jesse
<quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2857 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2858 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2859 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.
</quote>
2861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2863 <chapter label=
"4" id=
"pirates">
2864 <title>CHAPTER FOUR:
<quote>Pirates
</quote></title>
2865 <indexterm><primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary></indexterm>
2867 <emphasis role='strong'
>If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
</emphasis>
2868 using the creative property of others without their
2869 permission
—if
<quote>if value, then right
</quote> is
2870 true
—then the history of the content industry is a history of
2871 piracy. Every important sector of
<quote>big media
</quote>
2872 today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2873 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last
2874 generation's pirates join this generation's country club
—until
2880 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2882 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2883 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2884 which details Edison's
<quote>adventures
</quote> with copyright and patent.
2885 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2887 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2888 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2889 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2890 exercised through a monopoly
<quote>trust,
</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2891 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2892 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2893 this creative property
2894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2895 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2898 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2902 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2903 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2904 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2905 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2906 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2907 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2908 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2911 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2912 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2913 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2914 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2915 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2916 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2917 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2918 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2919 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2920 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2922 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2923 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2924 posted at
<quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2925 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,
</quote> available at
2926 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2927 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2928 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From
2929 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2930 the Propertization of Copyright
</quote> (September
2002), University of
2931 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2932 Working Paper No.
159.
2933 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
2935 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2936 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2937 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2941 The Napsters of those days, the
<quote>independents,
</quote> were companies like
2942 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2943 resisted.
<quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2944 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2945 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.
</quote><footnote><para>
2947 Marc Wanamaker,
<quote>The First Studios,
</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2948 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2950 That led the independents to flee the East
2951 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2952 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2953 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2957 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2958 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2959 patent holder a truly
<quote>limited
</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2962 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2963 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2964 Edison's creative property.
2967 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2968 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2970 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2971 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2973 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2974 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2976 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil
</primary></indexterm>
2978 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2979 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2980 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2981 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2982 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2983 1899 hit
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2984 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2985 right to perform it publicly.
2987 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2989 But what if I wanted to record
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> using Edison's phonograph
2990 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2991 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2992 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2993 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2994 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2995 <quote>public performance
</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2996 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2997 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2998 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2999 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
3000 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
3001 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
3002 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
3003 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
3004 its composer anything.
3006 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
3008 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
3009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
3010 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
3012 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3016 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3017 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3018 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3019 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3020 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3021 rights.
<footnote><para>
3023 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3024 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
3025 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3026 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
3027 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3028 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3029 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3033 <indexterm><primary>Sousa, John Philip
</primary></indexterm>
3035 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3036 people's works were
<quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3037 genius of American composers,
</quote><footnote><para>
3039 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
3040 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3042 and the
<quote>music publishing industry
</quote>
3043 was thereby
<quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.
</quote><footnote><para>
3045 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
3046 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3049 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible,
<quote>When they make money
3050 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3052 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3053 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3057 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3058 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3059 player piano argued that
<quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3060 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3061 of anything he had before their introduction.
</quote> Rather, the machines
3062 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3065 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
3066 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3067 Perforating Company of New York).
3068 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3069 Congress was
<quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3070 they represent, and whose servants they are.
</quote> <quote>All talk about
3071 `theft,'
</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3072 wrote,
<quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3073 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3074 statute.
</quote><footnote><para>
3076 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3077 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3078 Graphophone Company Association).
3080 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3083 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3084 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3085 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the
<quote>mechanical
3086 reproductions
</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3087 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3088 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3089 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3090 recorded once. This is the part of
3092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3093 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3094 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3095 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3098 American law ordinarily calls this a
<quote>compulsory license,
</quote> but I will
3099 refer to it as a
<quote>statutory license.
</quote> A statutory license is a license
3100 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3101 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3102 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3103 the fee set by the statute.
3106 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3107 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3108 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3109 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3110 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3111 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3113 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3116 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3117 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3118 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3119 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3120 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3121 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3122 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3123 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3124 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3125 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3126 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3127 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3130 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3131 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3132 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3133 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3134 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3136 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3139 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3140 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3141 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3146 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3148 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3149 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3150 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3151 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3152 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3153 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3154 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3155 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3156 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3157 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3158 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3159 choice.
<footnote><para>
3161 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3162 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3163 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3164 this report.
</para></footnote>
3168 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3169 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3172 <section id=
"radio">
3173 <title>Radio
</title>
3174 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'
>
3175 <primary>artists
</primary>
3176 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
3179 Radio was also born of piracy.
3182 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3183 <quote>public performance
</quote> of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3185 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3186 record companies printed
<quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast
</quote> and other
3187 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3188 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3189 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3190 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3191 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3192 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3193 Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3194 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3195 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3197 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3198 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3199 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3202 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3203 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3204 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3205 work. It's one thing to have
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> sung on the radio by the
3206 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3207 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3208 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3209 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3210 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3212 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3217 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3218 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3219 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3220 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3221 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3222 of playing the song.
3224 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3225 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3228 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3229 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3230 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3231 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3234 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3235 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3236 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3237 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3238 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3239 <quote>protected
</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3240 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3243 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3245 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3246 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3247 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3248 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3249 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3250 to take something for nothing.
3252 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'
/>
3254 <section id=
"cabletv">
3255 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3258 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3261 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3262 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3263 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3264 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3266 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3267 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3268 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3271 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3272 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3273 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3275 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3276 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3277 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.
</quote><footnote><para>
3279 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3280 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3281 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3282 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3284 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3286 There may have been a
<quote>public interest
</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3287 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3288 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony,
<quote>Does public
3289 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?
</quote><footnote><para>
3291 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3292 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3294 As another broadcaster put it,
3298 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3299 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3300 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3302 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3303 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3308 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3312 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3313 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3314 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3315 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3317 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3318 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3319 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3323 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3325 These were
<quote>free-ride[rs],
</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3326 Heston said, who were
<quote>depriving actors of
3327 compensation.
</quote><footnote><para>
3329 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3330 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3331 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3336 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3337 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3341 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3342 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3343 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3344 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3347 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3348 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3350 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3351 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3352 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3354 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3358 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3359 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3362 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3363 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they
<quote>pirated.
</quote>
3364 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3365 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3366 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3367 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3368 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3369 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3370 companies thus built their empire in part upon a
<quote>piracy
</quote> of the value
3371 created by broadcasters' content.
3374 <emphasis role='strong'
>These separate stories
</emphasis> sing a
3375 common theme. If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means using value from someone
3376 else's creative property without permission from that creator
—as
3377 it is increasingly described today
<footnote><para>
3379 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3380 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3381 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3382 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>.
<quote>The
3383 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3384 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet.
</quote>
3386 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3387 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3388 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3389 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3390 last. Every generation
—until now.
3392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3395 <chapter label=
"5" id=
"piracy">
3396 <title>CHAPTER FIVE:
<quote>Piracy
</quote></title>
3398 <emphasis role='strong'
>There is piracy
</emphasis> of copyrighted
3399 material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in many forms. The most
3400 significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized taking of other
3401 people's content within a commercial context. Despite the many
3402 justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
3403 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
3406 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of
<quote>taking
</quote>
3407 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3408 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3409 taking
<quote>piracy,
</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3410 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3411 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3412 has so often done in the past.
3413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3415 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3416 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3417 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3419 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3420 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3421 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3422 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3423 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3425 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3426 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3427 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3428 also Ben Hunt,
<quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3429 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3431 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3432 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3435 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3436 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3437 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3438 This piracy is wrong.
3441 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3442 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3443 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3444 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3445 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3446 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3447 of our existence, treated as right.
3450 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3451 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3452 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3453 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3454 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3455 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3456 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3457 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3458 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3461 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3462 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3463 <beginpage pagenum=
"77"/>
3464 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3465 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3469 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3470 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3471 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3472 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3474 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3475 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The
3476 New Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3477 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3478 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3479 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3480 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3481 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3482 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3483 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3484 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3485 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3486 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3487 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3489 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents
</primary></indexterm>
3490 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3491 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3492 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3493 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3496 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3498 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3499 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3500 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3501 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3502 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3504 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3505 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3506 144–90.
<quote>In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3507 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3508 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3509 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3510 pirating were not an option.
</quote> Ibid.,
149.
3511 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3515 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3516 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3517 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3518 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3519 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3520 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?
</quote>
3521 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3522 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3523 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3524 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3525 piracy of the tangible.
3528 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3529 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3530 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3531 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3532 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3533 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3534 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3535 give people the right to
<quote>take
</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3536 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3538 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3539 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3540 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3541 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3542 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3543 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what
<quote>property
</quote> means.
3545 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3547 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3548 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
<quote>steal
</quote>
3549 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3550 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3551 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3552 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3553 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3554 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3555 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3556 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3557 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3558 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3559 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3561 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3562 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3564 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3567 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3568 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3569 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3570 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3571 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3572 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3575 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3576 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3577 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3578 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3579 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3580 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3581 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3582 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3583 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3584 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3585 violating the law is still wrong.
3586 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3587 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3588 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3589 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3593 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3594 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3595 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3596 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3597 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3598 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3599 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3603 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3604 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is. Or
3605 at least, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3606 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of
<quote>piracy
</quote> are useful
3607 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3608 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3609 <quote>piracy
</quote> in that sense of the term.
3612 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3613 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3614 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3615 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3618 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3619 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3620 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3621 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3624 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3625 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3629 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3630 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3632 The key to the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that
<quote>rob[s]
3633 the author of [his] profit.
</quote><footnote><para>
3635 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3637 This means we must determine whether
3638 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3640 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3641 author of his profit.
3643 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3645 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3646 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3647 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3648 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3650 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3651 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3652 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3653 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3654 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3655 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3656 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3657 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3658 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3660 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3661 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3662 put together components that had been developed independently.
3663 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3666 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3667 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3668 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3669 system.
<footnote><para>
3671 See Carolyn Lochhead,
<quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,
</quote> <citetitle>San
3672 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1;
<quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,
</quote>
3673 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Napster Names CEO,
3674 Secures New Financing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3675 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3676 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet
</quote> (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3678 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3679 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3680 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3681 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3682 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3683 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3684 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3687 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3688 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3689 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3690 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3693 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3694 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3695 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3696 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3698 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3699 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3700 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3702 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,
</quote> <citetitle>New
3703 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3705 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3706 massive quantity of content is being
<quote>taken
</quote> on these networks. The
3707 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3708 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3711 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3712 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3713 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3714 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3715 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3716 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3721 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3722 different kinds into four types.
3724 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3727 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3728 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3729 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3730 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3731 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3732 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3733 users who download instead of purchasing.
3734 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3738 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3739 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3740 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3741 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3742 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3743 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3744 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3749 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3750 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3751 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3752 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3753 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3754 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3755 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend
<quote>recalling
</quote> old
3756 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3757 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3758 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3759 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3760 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3766 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3767 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3772 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3775 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3776 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3777 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3778 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3780 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3781 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3783 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3784 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3785 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3786 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3787 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3788 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3791 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3792 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3793 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3794 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3795 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of
<quote>theft
</quote> that is
3796 <quote>devastating
</quote> the industry.
3799 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3800 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3801 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3802 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3803 & Young put it,
<quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3804 technology, the labels fought it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3806 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3807 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3808 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3809 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3810 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption
<quote>Home taping
3811 is killing music.
</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3812 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3813 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3814 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3815 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3816 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3817 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3818 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3819 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3820 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3821 regulating technology was the answer.
3824 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3825 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3826 turnaround.
<quote>In the end,
</quote> Cap Gemini concludes,
<quote>the `crisis'
… was
3827 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3829 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3830 innovation at the major labels.
</quote><footnote><para>
3832 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3836 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3837 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3838 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3839 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3840 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3841 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3842 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3843 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3846 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3847 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3848 The
<quote>net harm
</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3849 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3850 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3851 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3852 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3857 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3858 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3859 actually suggest it might be close.
3862 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3863 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3864 percent.
<footnote><para>
3866 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3868 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3869 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3870 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3871 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3872 #
16</ulink>:
<quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3873 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3874 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3875 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3876 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3877 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3878 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3881 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3882 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3883 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3884 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3885 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3886 account for at least some of the loss.
<quote>From
1999 to
2001, the average
3887 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19.
</quote><footnote>
3890 Jane Black,
<quote>Big Music's Broken Record,
</quote> BusinessWeek online,
13
3891 February
2003, available at
3892 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3893 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3896 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3897 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes,
<quote>The
3898 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3899 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3900 $
19.99.
</quote><footnote><para>
3907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3908 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3909 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3910 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3911 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3912 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3913 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3916 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3917 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3918 The recording industry constantly asks,
<quote>What's the difference between
3919 downloading a song and stealing a CD?
</quote>—but their own numbers
3920 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3921 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3922 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3923 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3924 Kazaa
<quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit
</quote>—then the industry
3925 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3926 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3927 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3928 a huge difference between
<quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.
</quote>
3931 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3932 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3933 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3937 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3938 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3939 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3940 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3941 available.
<footnote><para>
3943 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3944 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3945 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3946 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3947 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3948 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3950 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3951 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3952 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3953 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3954 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3957 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3959 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3960 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3961 today.
<footnote><para>
3963 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3964 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3965 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3966 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3967 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3969 Association of Recording Merchandisers,
<quote>2002 Annual Survey
3972 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3974 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3975 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3976 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3977 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3978 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3979 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3980 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3981 the content they sell.
3983 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3985 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3986 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3987 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3988 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3989 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3990 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's
<quote>Two Love Songs,
</quote>
3991 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3992 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3993 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3994 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3995 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3998 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3999 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
4000 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
4001 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
4002 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
4006 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
4007 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
4008 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
4009 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
4010 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
4011 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
4013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
4014 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
4015 would be a great advertisement for the
<quote>real
</quote> book. People would read
4016 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
4017 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4018 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4019 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4023 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4024 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4025 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4026 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4029 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4030 understandably says,
<quote>This is how much we've lost,
</quote> we must also ask,
4031 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4032 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4033 unavailable?
</quote>
4036 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4037 chapter, much of the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4038 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4039 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
4040 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4041 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4042 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4043 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4044 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4045 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4046 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4047 found only with time.
4050 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4051 just what you call type A sharing?
</quote>
4054 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4056 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4057 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4059 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4061 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4062 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4063 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4064 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4065 <quote>down to zero.
</quote><footnote><para>
4067 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4068 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4071 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
4072 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4073 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
4074 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
4078 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4079 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4080 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4081 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4082 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4083 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4084 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4085 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4086 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4089 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4090 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4091 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4092 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4093 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4094 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4095 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4098 <primary>artists
</primary>
4099 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
4102 So, as we've seen, when
<quote>mechanical reproduction
</quote> threatened the
4103 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4104 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4105 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4106 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4107 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4108 complained to Congress that their
<quote>creative property
</quote> was not being
4109 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4110 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4114 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4115 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4116 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4117 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4118 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4123 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4124 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4125 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4126 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4127 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4128 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4129 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4130 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4131 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4132 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4133 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4134 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4135 Congress chose a path that would assure
4136 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4137 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4139 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4141 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4142 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4143 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4144 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4145 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4146 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4147 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4148 <quote>record
</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4149 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4150 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4151 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4154 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4155 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4156 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4157 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4158 machine to copy only if there were a special
<quote>copy me
</quote> signal on the
4159 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4160 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4161 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4163 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4164 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4165 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4166 for the architecture it chose.
4169 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4170 champion. Valenti called VCRs
<quote>tapeworms.
</quote> He warned,
<quote>When there are
4171 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4172 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4173 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4174 copyright.
</quote><footnote><para>
4176 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4177 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4178 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4179 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4181 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4182 creative judgment,
</quote> he told Congress,
<quote>to understand the devastation
4183 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4184 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4185 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4186 and plain common sense.
</quote><footnote><para>
4188 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4190 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4191 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4193 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4196 — a use the Court would later hold was not
<quote>fair.
</quote> By
4197 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4198 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4199 copyrightowners,
</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would
<quote>take from the
4200 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4201 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4202 profit from its reproduction.
</quote><footnote><para>
4204 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4209 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4210 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4211 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4212 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the
<quote>Hollywood
4213 Circuit
</quote>—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4214 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4215 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4216 called
<quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry
</quote> (worse
4217 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4218 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4219 technology.
<footnote><para>
4221 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4224 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4227 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4230 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4231 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4236 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4237 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4239 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4241 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4242 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4244 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4246 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4251 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4252 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4253 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4254 enough, this
<quote>taking
</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4255 together, a pattern is clear:
4258 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4259 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4263 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS
<quote>PIRATED
</quote></entry>
4264 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4265 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4270 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4271 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4272 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4273 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4276 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4277 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4279 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4282 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4283 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4284 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4285 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4289 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4290 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4291 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4298 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4299 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4301 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4302 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4303 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4304 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4305 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4306 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4307 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4308 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4309 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,
</quote>
4310 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4311 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
4312 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4314 In each case, throughout our history,
4315 that change meant that someone got a
<quote>free ride
</quote> on someone else's
4319 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4320 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4321 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4322 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4323 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
4324 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4325 the behavior of the
<quote>pirates.
</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4326 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4331 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4332 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4333 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4334 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4335 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4337 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4338 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4339 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4340 permission to record a song?
4343 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4344 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4345 copyright
<quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4346 over all possible uses of his work.
</quote><footnote><para>
4348 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4351 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4352 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4353 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4354 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4355 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4356 facilitate the distribution of content.
4359 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4360 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4361 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4362 should not become a tool for
<quote>stealing
</quote> from artists. But neither
4363 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4364 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4365 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4366 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4367 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4368 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4369 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4370 public interest that innovation continue.
4374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4375 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4376 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4377 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4378 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4379 efficient. Yet these
<quote>potential public benefits,
</quote> as John Schwartz
4380 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
<quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4381 fight.
</quote><footnote><para>
4383 John Schwartz,
<quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4384 Echoes Past Efforts,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4388 <emphasis role='strong'
>Yet when anyone
</emphasis> begins to talk
4389 about
<quote>balance,
</quote> the copyright warriors raise a different
4390 argument.
<quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4391 incentives,
</quote> they say,
<quote>misses a fundamental point. Our
4392 content,
</quote> the warriors insist,
<quote>is our
4393 <emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we wait for Congress to
4394 `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4395 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4396 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether
4397 the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?
</quote>
4400 <quote>It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>,
</quote> the warriors
4401 insist.
<quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4402 is protected.
</quote>
4404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4408 <part id=
"c-property">
4409 <title><quote>PROPERTY
</quote></title>
4413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4414 <emphasis role='strong'
>The copyright warriors
</emphasis> are right: A
4415 copyright is a kind of property. It can be owned and sold, and the law
4416 protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to
4417 hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand
4418 that partially determine the price she can get.
4421 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a
<quote>property
</quote> right is a
4422 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4423 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4424 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4425 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4426 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4427 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4428 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4429 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4433 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4434 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4436 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4438 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4439 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4440 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4441 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4442 when I copy the way someone else dresses),
<quote>He who receives an idea
4443 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4444 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
</quote><footnote><para>
4446 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4447 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4448 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4452 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4453 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4454 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4456 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4460 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4461 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4462 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4463 <quote>property
</quote> in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4465 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4466 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4467 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4468 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4469 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4470 Adam Mossoff,
<quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,
</quote>
4471 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4475 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4476 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4477 <quote>copyright material is property
</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4478 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4479 these stories, the significance of this true
4480 statement
—<quote>copyright material is property
</quote>— will be a bit
4481 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4482 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4486 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4487 <chapter label=
"6" id=
"founders">
4488 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4489 <indexterm><primary>Henry V
</primary></indexterm>
4490 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4492 <emphasis role='strong'
>William Shakespeare
</emphasis> wrote
4493 <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play was first
4494 published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that Shakespeare had
4495 written. He would continue to write plays through
1613, and the plays
4496 that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American culture ever
4497 since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer seeped
4498 into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source. I
4499 once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of
4500 Henry V:
<quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of
4504 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4505 <quote>copy-right
</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4506 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4508 <indexterm><primary>Jonson, Ben
</primary></indexterm>
4509 <indexterm><primary>Dryden, John
</primary></indexterm>
4510 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4511 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4512 handsome
<quote>definitive editions
</quote> of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4513 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4514 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4515 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker,
<quote>Jacob Tonson,
4516 Bookseller,
</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4518 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4519 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4521 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4522 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4524 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4525 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the
<quote>copy
</quote> of
4526 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4529 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4530 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4531 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4534 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4535 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4536 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4537 adopted the first
<quote>copyright
</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4538 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4539 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4540 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4541 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4543 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4544 <quote>copyright law.
</quote> See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4545 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4546 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4547 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4548 Tonson's control in
1774?
4551 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
<quote>copyright
</quote>
4552 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4553 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4554 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4555 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4556 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4557 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4558 that the publishers, or
<quote>Stationers,
</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4560 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4563 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4564 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4565 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4566 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4567 from legislatures
<quote>positive law.
</quote> We call the words from judges
4568 <quote>common law.
</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4569 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4570 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4571 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4572 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4575 This question was important to the publishers, or
<quote>booksellers,
</quote> as
4576 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4577 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4578 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4581 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4582 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4584 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4587 The Statute of Anne granted the author or
<quote>proprietor
</quote> of a book an
4588 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4589 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4590 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4591 copyright
<quote>expired,
</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4592 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4596 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4597 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4598 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4599 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4602 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4603 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4604 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4605 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4606 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4607 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4608 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4609 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4610 reason is there to allow someone else to
<quote>steal
</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4613 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4614 about the notion of
<quote>copyright
</quote> that existed at the time of the
4615 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4616 <quote>booksellers.
</quote>
4619 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4620 to apply the concept of
<quote>copyright
</quote> ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4621 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4622 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4623 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was a right
4624 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4625 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4628 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4629 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4630 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4631 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4633 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4635 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4636 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4637 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4638 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4639 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4640 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4641 allowed to make his films. The
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was only an exclusive
4642 right to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4644 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England
</primary></indexterm>
4645 <indexterm><primary>Statute of Monopolies (
1656)
</primary></indexterm>
4647 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4648 They had had a long and ugly experience with
<quote>exclusive rights,
</quote>
4649 especially
<quote>exclusive rights
</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4650 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4651 monopolies
—especially monopolies for works that already
4652 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4653 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4654 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the
4655 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4656 inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4657 monopoly in publishing.
4660 Thus the
<quote>copy-right,
</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4661 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4662 claim that
<quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,
</quote> try
4663 sounding convincing when uttering,
<quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4664 have it forever.
</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4665 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4666 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4669 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4670 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4671 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4672 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4675 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4676 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4677 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4678 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as
<quote>old patentees
4679 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling
</quote>; they were
<quote>men who do
4680 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4681 indetted.
</quote><footnote><para>
4684 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4685 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4689 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4690 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4691 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4692 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4693 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4697 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4698 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4699 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4700 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4701 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4702 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4704 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4705 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4706 construction and spread of culture.
4709 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4710 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4711 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4712 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4713 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4714 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4715 they said; they needed more time.
4718 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4719 words that echo today,
4723 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4724 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4726 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4727 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4728 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4729 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4730 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4731 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4733 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4734 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4735 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4736 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4737 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4738 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4739 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4744 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4745 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4746 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4747 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4748 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4749 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4750 creative
<quote>property
</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4751 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4752 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4753 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4754 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4755 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4756 way to protect authors.
4759 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4760 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4761 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4762 <quote>The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4763 rancher has for cattle.
</quote><footnote><para>
4765 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4766 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4767 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4768 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4770 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4771 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4774 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4775 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4776 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4778 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4779 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4783 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4784 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4785 reprints
<quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,
</quote> at least
4786 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4788 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4790 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
4792 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4793 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4794 and became
<quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.
</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4795 them,
</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was
<quote>the young James Boswell
4796 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4797 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.
</quote><footnote><para>
4801 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4802 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4805 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4806 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4807 inexpensive editions
<quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4808 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4809 Property.
</quote><footnote><para>
4811 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4814 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4815 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4816 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4819 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block
<quote>piracy
</quote> like
4820 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the
<quote>pirates,
</quote>
4821 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4823 <indexterm><primary>Taylor, Robert
</primary></indexterm>
4825 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4826 Thomson's poem
<quote>The Seasons.
</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4827 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4828 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4829 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4830 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4832 Howard B. Abrams,
<quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4833 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4837 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4838 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4841 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4842 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4843 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4844 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4845 law would protect the author against subsequent
<quote>pirates.
</quote>
4846 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4847 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4848 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4849 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4852 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4853 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4854 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4855 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4856 with in
1710: How best to limit
4857 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4858 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4859 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4860 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4861 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4862 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4863 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4865 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4867 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4868 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4870 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4872 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4873 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4874 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4878 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4879 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4880 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4881 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4882 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4883 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4886 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4887 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4888 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4889 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4890 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4891 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4892 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4893 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4896 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4897 presented to the House and voted upon first by the
<quote>law lords,
</quote>
4898 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4899 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4900 House of Lords generally voted.
4903 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4904 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4906 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4907 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4908 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4909 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4910 passed into the public domain.
4913 <quote>The public domain.
</quote> Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4914 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4915 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4916 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4917 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4918 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4919 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4920 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4921 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4922 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4923 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4924 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4925 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4928 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4929 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4930 where most of the
<quote>pirate publishers
</quote> did their work, people
4931 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4932 reported,
<quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4933 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4934 decision of which so many individuals were interested.
</quote> <quote>Great
4935 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4936 and illuminations.
</quote><footnote><para>
4942 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4943 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4948 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4949 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4950 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4951 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4952 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4953 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4954 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4955 successors.
<footnote><para>
4962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4963 <quote>Ruined
</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4964 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4965 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4966 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4967 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4968 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4969 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4970 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4971 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4972 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4973 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4974 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4975 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4976 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4977 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4978 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4979 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4980 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4981 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4984 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4985 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4986 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4991 <chapter label=
"7" id=
"recorders">
4992 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4994 <emphasis role='strong'
>Jon Else
</emphasis> is a filmmaker. He is best
4995 known for his documentaries and has been very successful in spreading
4996 his art. He is also a teacher, and as a teacher myself, I envy the
4997 loyalty and admiration that his students feel for him. (I met, by
4998 accident, two of his students at a dinner party. He was their god.)
5001 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
5002 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
5006 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
5007 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
5008 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
5009 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
5010 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
5012 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5015 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
5016 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
5017 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
5018 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
5019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5020 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5024 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5025 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
5026 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5027 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5028 unless
<quote>fair use
</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5031 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5032 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5033 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5034 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5035 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5036 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5039 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5040 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5041 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5042 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5043 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5044 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5047 Then, as Else told me,
<quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5048 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
5049 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.
</quote>
5050 And second, Fox
<quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5051 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
5052 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.
</quote>
5054 <indexterm><primary>Herrera, Rebecca
</primary></indexterm>
5056 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5057 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5058 explained to her,
<quote>There must be some mistake here.
… We're
5059 asking for your educational rate on this.
</quote> That was the educational
5060 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5061 confirm what he had been told.
5064 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>Yes, you
5065 have your facts straight,
</quote> she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
5066 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5070 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
<quote>And
5071 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.
</quote> As an assistant
5072 to Herrera told Else later on,
<quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5076 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5077 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5078 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5079 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5080 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5081 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5082 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5083 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
5086 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5087 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5088 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5089 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5090 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5091 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5092 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5093 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5094 says the owner gets to control.
5097 For example,
<quote>public performance
</quote> is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
5098 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5099 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see
<quote>My
5100 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>,
</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5101 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5102 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5106 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5107 thought is
<quote>fair use.
</quote><footnote><para>
5109 For an excellent argument that such use is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> but that
5110 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> see Richard
5111 A. Posner with William F. Patry,
<quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5112 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5113 Law School,
5 August
2003.
5115 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>
5116 episode is clearly a fair use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>—and fair use does
5117 not require the permission of anyone.
5120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5121 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon
<quote>fair use.
</quote> Here's his reply:
5125 The
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5126 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5127 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5128 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was
<quote>clearly
5129 fair use
</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5130 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5132 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5135 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5136 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5137 <quote>visual cue sheet
</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5138 shot in the film. They take a dim view of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and a claim of
5139 <quote>fair use
</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5142 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle></primary></indexterm>
5145 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5146 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5147 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5148 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5149 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5150 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5151 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5152 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5154 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5158 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5159 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5160 that Fox would
<quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5161 life,
</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5162 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5163 pockets, me or them.
5164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5168 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5169 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5175 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5176 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5177 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5178 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5179 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5180 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5183 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5184 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5185 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5186 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5191 <chapter label=
"8" id=
"transformers">
5192 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5193 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5194 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'
>
5195 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
5197 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary></indexterm>
5199 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1993</emphasis>, Alex Alben was a lawyer
5200 working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave was an innovative company founded
5201 by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop digital
5202 entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave began
5203 investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
5204 anticipation of the power of networks.
5206 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'
>
5207 <primary>artists
</primary>
5208 <secondary>retrospective compilations on
</secondary>
5211 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5212 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5213 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5214 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5215 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5216 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5217 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5218 important to his career.
5221 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5222 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5223 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5224 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5228 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5229 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5230 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5231 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5232 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5235 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips.
<quote>Our
5236 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5237 Eastwood's films,
</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5238 arose.
<quote>No one had ever really done this before,
</quote> Alben explained.
<quote>No
5239 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5240 actor's career.
</quote>
5243 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5244 Slade asked,
<quote>Well, what will it take?
</quote>
5247 Alben replied,
<quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5248 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5249 else that we want to use in these film clips.
</quote> Slade said,
<quote>Great! Go
5250 for it.
</quote><footnote>
5253 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5254 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5255 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden
<quote>Rip, Mix,
5256 Burn
</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5258 <primary>artists
</primary>
5259 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5261 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5265 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5266 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5267 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5268 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5269 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5272 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5273 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5274 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5278 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5279 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5280 course we were going to use the
<quote>Make my day
</quote> clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5281 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5282 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5283 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5287 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5288 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5289 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5290 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5291 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5292 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5293 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5294 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5295 started calling people.
5298 <indexterm><primary>Sutherland, Donald
</primary></indexterm>
5300 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5301 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5302 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5303 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5304 know, $
1,
200?
</quote> And they would say,
<quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5305 to get $
1,
200.
</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5306 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5307 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5311 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—<quote>and even then we
5312 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.
</quote>
5315 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5316 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5317 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5321 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5322 hands and said,
<quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5323 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5324 actors.
</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5325 constituent parts and said,
<quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5326 directors,
… this many musicians,
</quote> and we just went at it very
5327 systematically and cleared the rights.
5332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5333 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5334 loved it, and it sold very well.
5336 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5338 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5339 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5340 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped,
<quote>There is
5341 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5342 at all.
</quote><footnote><para>
5344 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5345 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5346 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5348 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5352 For, as he acknowledged,
<quote>very few
… have the time and resources,
5353 and the will to do this,
</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5354 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5355 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5356 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5360 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5361 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5362 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5363 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5364 compensated for that.
5368 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5369 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5370 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5371 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5372 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5373 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5374 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5375 made to be more clean?
5379 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5380 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5381 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5382 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5384 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5385 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5386 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5387 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5388 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5389 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5390 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5391 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5392 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say,
<quote>Oh, I
5393 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5394 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5395 money,
</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5399 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5400 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5401 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5402 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5403 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5405 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'
/>
5407 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5408 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5409 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5410 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5411 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5412 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5413 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5414 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5415 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5416 <quote>Does this still make sense?
</quote>
5418 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'
/>
5420 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5421 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5422 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5423 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5426 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5427 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5430 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5431 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5432 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5433 judges loved every minute of it.
5435 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5437 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5438 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5439 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5440 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5441 began his talk with a question:
<quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5442 were just violated in this room?
</quote>
5444 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5445 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5447 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5448 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5449 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5450 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5451 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5452 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5453 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5454 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5455 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5456 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5457 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5458 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5459 couldn't easily do them legally.
5462 We live in a
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5463 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5464 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5465 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5466 planted in your presentation.
5468 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5470 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5471 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5472 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5473 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5474 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5475 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5476 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5477 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5478 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5481 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5482 wanted to be
<quote>legal,
</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5483 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5484 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5485 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5488 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5489 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5490 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5491 necessarily requiring that the
<quote>free
</quote> use be free as in
<quote>free beer.
</quote>
5492 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5493 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5494 along: a rule, for example, that says
<quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5495 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5496 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5497 copyright owner.
</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5498 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5499 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5503 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5504 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5505 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5506 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5509 <emphasis role='strong'
>In February
2003</emphasis>, DreamWorks
5510 studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers, the comic genius of
5511 <citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5513 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5514 would work together to form a
<quote>unique filmmaking pact.
</quote> Under the
5515 agreement, DreamWorks
<quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5516 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5517 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5518 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5519 entertainment.
</quote>
5522 The announcement called this
<quote>film sampling.
</quote> As Myers explained,
5523 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5524 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5525 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5526 to take that same concept and apply it to film.
</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5527 quoted as saying,
<quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5528 new audiences, it is Mike.
</quote>
5531 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5532 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5533 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5534 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5535 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5536 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5537 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5538 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5541 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5542 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of
<quote>fair use.
</quote>
5543 Much of
<quote>sampling
</quote> should be considered
<quote>fair use.
</quote> But few would
5544 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5545 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5546 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5547 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5548 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5549 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5550 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5551 curse, reserved for the few.
5553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5555 <chapter label=
"9" id=
"collectors">
5556 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5557 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'
>
5558 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
5561 <emphasis role='strong'
>In April
1996</emphasis>, millions of
5562 <quote>bots
</quote>—computer codes designed to
5563 <quote>spider,
</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy
5564 content
—began running across the Net. Page by page, these bots
5565 copied Internet-based information onto a small set of computers
5566 located in a basement in San Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots
5567 finished the whole of the Internet, they started again. Over and over
5568 again, once every two months, these bits of code took copies of the
5569 Internet and stored them.
5572 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5573 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5574 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5575 the world. Using a technology called
<quote>the Way Back Machine,
</quote> you could
5576 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5577 well as when those pages changed.
5579 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'
>
5580 <primary>Orwell, George
</primary>
5583 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5584 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5585 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5586 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5591 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5592 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5593 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5596 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5597 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5598 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5599 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5600 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5602 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'
/>
5604 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5605 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5606 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5607 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5608 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5610 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
5611 <indexterm><primary>White House press releases
</primary></indexterm>
5612 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5613 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5614 press release stated,
<quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.
</quote> That was
5615 later changed, without notice, to
<quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5616 Have Ended.
</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5619 <indexterm><primary>history, records of
</primary></indexterm>
5621 <emphasis role='strong'
>We take it
</emphasis> for granted that we can
5622 go back to see what we remember reading. Think about newspapers. If
5623 you wanted to study the reaction of your hometown newspaper to the
5624 race riots in Watts in
1965, or to Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963,
5625 you could go to your public library and look at the newspapers. Those
5626 papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in
5627 paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back and
5628 remember
—not just what it is convenient to remember, but
5629 remember something close to the truth.
5632 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5633 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5634 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5635 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5636 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5637 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5638 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5641 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5642 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5643 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5644 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5646 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5647 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5648 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5649 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5652 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5653 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5654 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5655 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5656 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5657 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5658 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5659 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5661 <indexterm><primary>Vanderbilt University
</primary></indexterm>
5663 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5664 human history. At the end of
2002, it held
<quote>two hundred and thirty
5665 terabytes of material
</quote>—and was
<quote>ten times larger than the
5666 Library of Congress.
</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5667 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5668 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5669 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5670 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5671 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5672 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5673 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5674 is available to scholars for a very low fee.
<quote>But other than that,
5675 [television] is almost unavailable,
</quote> Kahle told me.
<quote>If you were
5676 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5677 just a graduate student?
</quote> As Kahle put it,
5680 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
5682 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5683 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5684 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5685 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5686 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5688 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5689 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5690 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5694 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5695 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5696 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5697 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5698 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5699 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5702 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5703 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5704 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5705 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5706 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5710 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5711 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5712 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5713 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5714 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and
<quote>borrowed
5715 back.
</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5716 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5717 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5719 Doug Herrick,
<quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5720 the Library of Congress,
</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5721 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5722 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5727 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5728 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5729 broadcasts, so there was no fear of
<quote>theft.
</quote> But as technology enabled
5730 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5731 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5732 <quote>copyrighted.
</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5733 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5734 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5735 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5738 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5740 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5741 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5742 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5743 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5744 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5745 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5748 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5750 <primary>archive.org
</primary>
5751 <seealso>Internet Archive
</seealso>
5754 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5755 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 <quote>ephemeral films
</quote> (meaning
5756 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5757 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5758 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5759 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5760 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5761 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5762 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5763 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5764 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5765 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5766 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
<quote>Duck and Cover
</quote> film
5767 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5768 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5769 few minutes
—for free.
5772 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5773 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5774 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5775 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5776 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5780 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5781 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5782 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5783 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5784 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5785 has
—a noncommercial life.
5788 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5789 of creative property goes through different
<quote>lives.
</quote> In its first
5792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5793 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5794 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5795 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5796 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5797 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5800 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5801 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5802 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5803 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5804 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5805 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5809 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5810 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5812 Dave Barns,
<quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5813 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5814 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5815 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5816 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5817 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5818 </para></footnote>). After
5819 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5820 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5821 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5822 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5823 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5826 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5827 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5828 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5829 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5830 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5831 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5832 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5833 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5837 <emphasis role='strong'
>For most of
</emphasis> the twentieth century,
5838 it was economics that made this so. It would have been insanely
5839 expensive to collect and make accessible all television and film and
5840 music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily high. So even
5841 though the law in principle would have restricted the ability of a
5842 Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5844 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5845 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5846 little practical effect.
5849 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5850 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5851 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5852 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5853 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5854 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5857 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5858 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5859 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5864 <primary>books
</primary>
5865 <secondary>total number of
</secondary>
5868 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5869 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5870 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5871 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5872 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5873 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5874 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5875 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5876 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5877 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5878 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5882 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5883 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5884 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5885 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5886 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5887 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5888 will draw upon it to understand it;
5889 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5890 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5891 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5892 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5893 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5894 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5897 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5898 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5899 call these
<quote>archives,
</quote> as warm as the idea of a
<quote>library
</quote> might seem,
5900 the
<quote>content
</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5901 someone's
<quote>property.
</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5902 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5904 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'
/>
5905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5907 <chapter label=
"10" id=
"property-i">
5908 <title>CHAPTER TEN:
<quote>Property
</quote></title>
5909 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5910 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5912 <emphasis role='strong'
>Jack Valenti
</emphasis> has been the president
5913 of the Motion Picture Association of America since
1966. He first came
5914 to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
5915 administration
—literally. The famous picture of Johnson's
5916 swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of President
5917 Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty years of
5918 running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps the most
5919 prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5922 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5923 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5924 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5925 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5926 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5927 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5928 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5929 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5930 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5932 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5933 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5934 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5935 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5936 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5937 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5938 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5942 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5943 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5944 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5945 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5946 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5947 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5948 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5949 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5950 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5954 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5955 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5956 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5957 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5958 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5959 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5960 redefine the meaning of
<quote>creative property.
</quote>
5963 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5968 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5969 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5970 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5971 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5972 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5973 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5974 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5975 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5977 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5978 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5979 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5980 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5981 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5987 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5988 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5989 <quote>central theme
</quote> to which
<quote>reasonable men and women
</quote> will return is
5991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5992 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5993 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.
</quote>
5994 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5995 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5998 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5999 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
6000 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
6001 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
6002 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
6003 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
6004 it comes to the nature and scope of
<quote>creative property.
</quote> His views
6005 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
6006 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
6007 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
6010 While
<quote>creative property
</quote> is certainly
<quote>property
</quote> in a nerdy and
6011 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
6013 Lawyers speak of
<quote>property
</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
6014 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
6015 object. Thus, my
<quote>property right
</quote> to my car gives me the right to
6016 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
6017 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of
<quote>property
</quote> to
6018 <quote>lawyer talk,
</quote> see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
6019 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
6020 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
6021 <quote>creative property owners
</quote> have been
<quote>accorded the same rights and
6022 protection resident in all other property owners.
</quote> Indeed, if creative
6023 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
6024 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
6028 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
6029 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6030 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6031 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
6032 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6033 culture would develop.
6036 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6037 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
6038 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6039 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
6040 differently from the rights resident in all other property
6041 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
6042 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
6043 the same would be to
6045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6046 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6047 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6051 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6052 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6053 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6054 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6055 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6056 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6057 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old.
6060 <emphasis role='strong'
>To get
</emphasis> just a hint that there is
6061 something fundamentally wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no
6062 further than the United States Constitution itself.
6065 The framers of our Constitution loved
<quote>property.
</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6066 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6067 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
6068 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6069 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's
<quote>Takings
6070 Clause,
</quote> to pay you
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for that taking. The
6071 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6072 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
6073 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6076 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6077 Valenti calls
<quote>creative property.
</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6078 power to create
<quote>creative property,
</quote> the Constitution
6079 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a
<quote>limited time,
</quote> Congress
6080 take back the rights that it has granted and set the
<quote>creative
6081 property
</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6082 the expiration of a copyright term
<quote>takes
</quote> your copyright and turns it
6083 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6084 pay
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for this
<quote>taking.
</quote> Instead, the same
6085 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6087 requires that you lose your
<quote>creative property
</quote> right without any
6088 compensation at all.
6091 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6092 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6093 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6094 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6095 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6096 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6100 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6101 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6102 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6103 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6104 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6105 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
6106 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6107 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6108 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6109 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6112 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6113 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6114 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6115 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6116 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6120 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6121 history of these
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights, and the control that they
6122 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6123 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6124 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
6125 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6126 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6127 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6128 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6129 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6130 also control how culture develops.
6134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6135 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6136 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6137 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6138 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6139 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6140 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6141 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6143 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6144 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6145 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6148 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6149 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6150 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6151 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6152 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6153 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6154 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6155 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6156 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6157 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6158 Web, you can be punished
6159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6160 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6161 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6162 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6164 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6166 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6167 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6168 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6169 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6170 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6171 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6172 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6173 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6174 the source of the enforcement.
6176 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6178 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6179 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6180 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6181 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6182 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6183 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6184 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6185 individual or group might behave.
6187 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6189 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6190 <quote>architecture
</quote>—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6191 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6192 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6193 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6194 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6195 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6196 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6197 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6198 theft, but by nature, by
<quote>architecture.
</quote> If a
500-pound boulder
6199 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6200 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6201 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6205 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6206 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6207 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6208 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6209 undermined by another.
6212 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6213 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6214 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6215 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6216 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6217 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6218 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6220 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6221 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6223 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6224 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6225 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6227 So, for example, consider the
<quote>freedom
</quote> to drive a car at a high
6228 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6229 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6230 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6231 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6232 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6233 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6234 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6235 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6236 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6237 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6238 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6241 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6242 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6243 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6245 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6246 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6247 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6248 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6249 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6250 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6251 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>The New Chicago School,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6254 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6255 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6256 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6257 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6258 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6259 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6260 used to require that other laws be more
6261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6262 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6263 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6266 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6268 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6269 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6270 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6272 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6274 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6275 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6276 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6277 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6278 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6282 Some people object to this way of talking about
<quote>liberty.
</quote> They object
6283 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6284 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6285 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6286 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6287 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6288 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6289 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6290 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6291 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6292 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6293 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a
6294 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6295 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6296 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6297 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6298 <citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6299 1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6300 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons,
<quote>The
6301 Right to Work,
</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6302 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6303 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6304 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6305 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6306 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6307 12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6308 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6309 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6310 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6311 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990)
</primary></indexterm>
6312 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6313 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6314 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6317 <section id=
"hollywood">
6318 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6320 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6321 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6322 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6323 rallying makes sense.
6326 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6329 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6330 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6331 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6333 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6334 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6337 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6338 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6339 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6340 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6341 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6342 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6343 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6344 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6345 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6346 this form of infringement.
6349 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6350 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6351 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6352 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6353 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6354 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6357 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6358 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6359 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6360 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6363 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6364 looting that results.
6366 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6367 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6368 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6371 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6372 warriors. Indeed, in a
<quote>White Paper
</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6373 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6374 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6375 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6376 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6377 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6378 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6379 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6380 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6382 <indexterm><primary>steel industry
</primary></indexterm>
6384 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6385 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6386 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6387 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6388 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6389 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6390 life. Homeowners living in a
6392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6393 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6394 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6395 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6396 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6397 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6398 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6401 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6402 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6403 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6404 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6405 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6406 Brown describes it, its
<quote>architecture of revenue.
</quote>
6408 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry
</primary></indexterm>
6409 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
6411 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6412 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6413 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6414 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6415 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6416 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6417 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6419 See Geoffrey Smith,
<quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?
</quote>
6420 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6421 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6422 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6423 R. Schoenberger,
<quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?
</quote> Forbes.com,
6
6424 October
2003, available at
6425 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6428 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6429 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6430 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6431 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6432 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6433 weakened the
<quote>stickiness
</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6434 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6435 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6436 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6437 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6438 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6440 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
6441 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6443 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6444 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6445 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6447 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6448 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6449 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6450 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents,
<quote>established companies
6451 have an interest in excluding future competitors.
</quote><footnote><para>
6453 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6456 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6457 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6458 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6459 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6460 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6464 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6465 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6466 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6467 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6468 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6469 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6470 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6471 opportunities for innovation and change.
6474 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6475 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6476 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6477 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6478 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6479 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6480 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6481 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution:
<quote>Congress
6482 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech.
</quote> So when
6483 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would
<quote>abridge
</quote> the freedom
6484 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6485 regulation is justified.
6488 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6490 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6491 <quote>justified.
</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6492 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6493 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6494 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6497 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6499 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6500 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6503 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6504 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6505 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6506 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6507 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6508 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6511 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6512 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6513 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6515 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6516 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6518 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6519 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6520 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6521 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6524 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6525 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6526 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6527 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6528 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6529 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6530 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6532 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James
</primary></indexterm>
6534 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6535 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an
<quote>environmentalism
</quote> for
6536 culture.
<footnote><para>
6538 See, for example, James Boyle,
<quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6539 Environmentalism for the Net?
</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6541 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6542 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6543 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6544 <quote>for free.
</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6545 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6546 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6548 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6549 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6550 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6551 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6552 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6555 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6556 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6557 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6558 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6559 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6560 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6561 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6562 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6563 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6566 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6567 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6570 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6572 <section id=
"beginnings">
6573 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6575 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6576 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
<quote>creative
6577 property
</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6578 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6581 The power to establish
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights is granted to
6582 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6583 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6586 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6587 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6588 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6591 We can call this the
<quote>Progress Clause,
</quote> for notice what this clause
6592 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6593 <quote>creative property rights.
</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6594 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6595 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6596 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6599 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6600 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6601 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6602 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6603 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6604 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6605 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6606 copyrights extend
<quote>to Authors
</quote> only.
6609 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6610 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6611 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6612 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6613 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6614 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6615 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6616 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6617 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6618 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6619 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6620 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6621 concentrations of power.
6624 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
<quote>copyright
</quote>
6625 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6626 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6627 <quote>copyright
</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6628 years since they first struck its design.
6631 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6632 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6634 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6637 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6638 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6639 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6644 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6645 <title><quote>Copyright
</quote> today.
</title>
6646 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6653 <section id=
"lawduration">
6654 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6656 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6657 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6658 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6659 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6660 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6661 authorship.
<footnote>
6664 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6665 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6666 485–86:
<quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6667 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6668 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis></quote>
6670 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6672 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6673 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6674 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6675 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6676 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6677 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6680 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6681 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6682 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6683 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6684 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6685 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6688 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6689 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6690 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6691 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6692 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6695 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6696 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6697 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6698 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6699 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6700 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6701 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6703 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6704 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel,
<citetitle>A
6705 History of Book Publishing in the United States
</citetitle>, vol.
1,
<citetitle>The Creation
6706 of an Industry,
1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6707 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6708 1790 act; William J. Maher,
<citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6709 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context
</citetitle>,
7–10 (
2002),
6710 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6711 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6712 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6713 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6714 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6715 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6716 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6719 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6720 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6722 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6723 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6724 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6728 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6729 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6730 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6731 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6732 domain.
<footnote><para>
6734 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6735 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6736 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6737 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
<quote>Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
</quote>
6738 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright
</citetitle>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6739 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6740 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote>
6741 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6742 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6745 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6746 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6747 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6749 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6750 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6751 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6752 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6753 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6754 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6757 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6758 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6759 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6760 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6761 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6762 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6765 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6766 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6767 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6768 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6769 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6770 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6771 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6772 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6775 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6776 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6777 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6778 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6781 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6782 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6783 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6786 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6787 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6788 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6789 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6790 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6791 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6792 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6796 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6797 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6798 maximum term. For
<quote>natural
</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6799 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6800 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6801 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6802 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6803 was ninety-five years.
6806 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6807 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6808 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6809 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6810 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6811 that terms be
<quote>limited,
</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6815 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6816 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6817 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6818 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6819 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6820 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6821 years.
<footnote><para>
6823 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6824 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6825 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6826 Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote> loc. cit.
6829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6831 <section id=
"lawscope">
6832 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6834 The
<quote>scope
</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6835 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6836 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6837 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6840 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only
<quote>maps,
6841 charts, and books.
</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6842 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6843 the author the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> copyrighted works. That
6844 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6845 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6846 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6847 did not extend to what lawyers call
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> It would not,
6848 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6849 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6850 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6853 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6854 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6855 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6856 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6857 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6858 work not only the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> the work, but also the
6859 exclusive right of control over any
<quote>copies
</quote> of that work. And most
6860 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6861 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6862 <quote>derivative work
</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6863 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6864 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6865 on the initial creative work.
6868 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6869 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6870 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6872 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6873 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6874 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6875 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6876 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6877 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6878 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6882 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6883 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6884 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6885 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6886 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6887 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6888 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6889 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6890 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6891 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6892 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6896 All of these
<quote>formalities
</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6897 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6898 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6899 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6900 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6901 copy available for others to copy.
6904 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6908 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6909 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6910 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6911 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6912 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6913 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6915 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner,
<quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6916 Creation of American Literature,
</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6917 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6918 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6921 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6922 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6923 the United States
—publishers.
6926 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6927 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6928 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6929 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6930 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6931 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6932 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6936 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6937 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6938 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6939 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6940 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6941 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6945 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6946 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6947 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6950 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6952 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6953 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of
<quote>derivative
6954 rights.
</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6955 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6956 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6957 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6958 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6960 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6961 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6964 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6965 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6967 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6969 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6970 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6971 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6972 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6975 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6976 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6977 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6978 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6979 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6980 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6981 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6982 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6983 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6984 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6986 Jonathan Zittrain,
<quote>The Copyright Cage,
</quote> <citetitle>Legal
6987 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
6988 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6989 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6991 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6992 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6993 the wrong of direct piracy.
6996 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6997 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6998 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6999 of my book.
<footnote><para>
7001 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
7002 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
7003 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere
<quote>copies
</quote> and
7004 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld,
<quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
7005 Copyright's Constitutionality,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
7006 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
7008 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb
</primary></indexterm>
7010 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
7013 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
7014 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
7015 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
7016 called
<quote>Mickey Mouse,
</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
7017 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
7021 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
7022 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
7023 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
7024 the rights originally granted.
7027 <section id=
"lawreach">
7028 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
7030 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7031 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7032 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7033 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
7035 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
7036 certainly regulates more than
<quote>copies
</quote>—a public performance of a
7037 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
7038 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7039 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a
<quote>copy
</quote>;
17
7040 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
7041 existing law (which regulates
<quote>copies;
</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7042 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7046 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7047 <quote>Copies.
</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
7048 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
7049 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that
<quote>creative
7050 property
</quote> deserves the
<quote>same rights
</quote> as all other property, it is the
7051 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7052 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7053 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7054 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7055 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7056 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
7057 the trigger for copyright law.
7060 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7061 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7062 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7063 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
7065 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7066 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7067 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7068 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7071 because it is clear that the
7072 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7073 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7076 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7079 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
7080 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
7081 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
7084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7085 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7086 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7087 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7088 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7089 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7090 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7091 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7092 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7093 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7094 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7095 acts do not make a copy.
7097 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
7098 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
7099 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
7102 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7103 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7104 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7105 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7106 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7107 diagram on next page).
7110 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7111 that remain unregulated because the law considers these
<quote>fair uses.
</quote>
7113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7114 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
7115 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
7116 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
7119 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7120 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7121 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7122 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7123 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7124 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7125 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such
<quote>fair uses
</quote>
7126 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7128 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7129 <title>Unregulated copying considered
<quote>fair uses.
</quote></title>
7130 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7133 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7134 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7135 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7139 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7140 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7141 are nonetheless deemed
<quote>fair
</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7144 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7145 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7147 I don't mean
<quote>nature
</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7148 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7149 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7150 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7153 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7154 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7155 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7156 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7157 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7158 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7159 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7160 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7161 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7165 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7166 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7167 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7168 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7169 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7170 the book once, ten times, or every
7171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7172 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7173 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7174 none of those uses produced a copy.
7177 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7178 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7179 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7180 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7181 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7182 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7183 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7184 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7185 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7186 copyright owner's wish.
7189 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7190 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7191 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7192 points also become clear:
7195 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7196 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7197 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7198 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7199 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7200 part of free culture before the Internet.
7203 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7204 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7205 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7206 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7207 using a machine.
<quote>Copy and paste
</quote> and
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> become
7208 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7209 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7210 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7211 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7215 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7218 burden on category
3 (
<quote>fair use
</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7219 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7220 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7221 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7222 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7223 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7224 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7225 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7229 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7230 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7231 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7232 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7233 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7234 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7235 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7238 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'
>
7239 <primary>advertising
</primary>
7242 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7243 in the business of making
<quote>trailer
</quote> advertisements for movies available
7244 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7245 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7246 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7249 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7250 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7251 previews. The idea was to expand their
<quote>selling by sampling
</quote>
7252 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7253 <quote>browsing.
</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7254 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7255 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7258 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7259 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7260 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7261 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7262 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7263 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7264 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7265 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7266 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7267 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7268 <quote>fair use
</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7269 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7273 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7274 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had
<quote>willfully
7275 infringed
</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7276 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7277 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7278 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7279 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7280 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7283 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7284 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7285 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7286 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7287 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7288 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7289 Disney's permission.
7291 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'
/>
7293 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7294 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7295 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7296 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7297 was in the marketplace, the
<quote>first-sale doctrine
</quote> would free the
7298 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7299 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7300 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7301 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7302 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7303 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7304 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7306 <indexterm><primary>Barnes
& Noble
</primary></indexterm>
7308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7309 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7310 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7311 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7312 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7313 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7314 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7315 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7316 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7317 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7318 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7319 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7320 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7321 happening are quite slight.
7324 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7325 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7326 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7327 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7328 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7329 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7332 <section id=
"lawforce">
7333 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7335 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7336 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7337 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7338 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7341 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7342 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7343 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7344 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7345 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7348 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7349 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7350 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7352 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7353 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7356 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7357 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7359 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7360 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7361 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7362 plan.
<footnote><para>
7364 See David Lange,
<quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7365 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7369 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7370 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers
<quote>were brothers long before
7371 you were.
</quote><footnote><para>
7373 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7374 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7375 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7377 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7378 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7379 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7380 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7383 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7384 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7385 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7386 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7389 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7390 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7391 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7392 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7393 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7394 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7395 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7396 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7398 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7399 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7401 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7402 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7405 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7408 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7409 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7410 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7411 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7415 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7419 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7420 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7421 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7422 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7423 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7424 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7425 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7428 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7429 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7431 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7432 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7433 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7436 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7437 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7439 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7440 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7441 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7445 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7446 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7447 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7448 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7449 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7450 read aloud through the computer.
7453 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7454 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7455 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7456 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7458 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7459 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote></title>
7460 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7463 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7464 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7467 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7468 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote>.
</title>
7469 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7472 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7473 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7477 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7478 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>The Future of Ideas
</quote>.
</title>
7479 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7482 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7485 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7486 <quote>permissions
</quote>— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7487 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7488 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7489 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7490 power.
<footnote><para>
7492 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7493 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7494 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7495 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7496 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7497 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7498 subsequently acquired the book.
7500 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7501 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7502 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7503 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7504 control that the law would enable.
7507 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7508 within which the e-book
<quote>lives.
</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7509 permissions, they are not the sort of
<quote>permissions
</quote> that most of us
7510 deal with. When a teenager gets
<quote>permission
</quote> to stay out till
7511 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7512 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7513 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7514 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7515 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7516 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7517 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7518 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7519 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7520 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7525 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7526 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7527 you tried to type
<quote>Warner Brothers,
</quote> erased
<quote>Brothers
</quote> from the
7529 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7532 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7533 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7534 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7535 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7536 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7537 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7538 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7541 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7542 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7543 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7544 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7545 to defeat these protections as well?
7548 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7552 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7553 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7554 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7555 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7556 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7558 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7560 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7561 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>Alice's Adventures in
7562 Wonderland
</quote>.
</title>
7563 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7565 <beginpage pagenum=
"164"/>
7567 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7568 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7569 <quote>permissions
</quote> indicated, not allowed to
<quote>read aloud
</quote>!
7572 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7573 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7574 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7575 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7576 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7577 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7580 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7581 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7582 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7583 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7584 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7585 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7586 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7587 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7588 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7589 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7590 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7593 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7594 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7595 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7596 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7597 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7600 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7602 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7603 story of mine that makes the same point.
7605 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7606 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7608 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'
>
7609 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7611 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7612 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7613 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7616 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named
<quote>Aibo.
</quote> The Aibo
7617 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7618 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7621 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7622 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7623 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7624 <beginpage pagenum=
"165"/>
7625 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7626 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7627 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7630 <quote>Teach
</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7631 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7632 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7633 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7634 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7635 their computer
<quote>dog
</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7637 <indexterm><primary>hacks
</primary></indexterm>
7639 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7640 <citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7641 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7642 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7643 them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much more positive
7644 term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7645 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7646 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7647 old computer doesn't run, or
<quote>drive,
</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7648 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7649 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7653 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7654 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7655 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7656 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7660 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7661 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7662 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7663 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7664 than Sony had built.
7666 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7667 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'
/>
7668 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7670 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7671 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7672 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7673 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7677 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7678 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7679 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7680 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7681 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7682 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7683 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7686 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7687 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7688 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7689 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7690 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7691 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7692 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7693 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7694 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7697 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7699 See Pamela Samuelson,
<quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,
</quote>
7700 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
<quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7701 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,
</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7702 January
2002;
<quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7703 DMCA,
</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7704 Holland,
<quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,
</quote> <citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7705 May
2001; Janelle Brown,
<quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?
</quote> Salon.com,
7706 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<quote>Frequently Asked
7707 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case,
</quote> available at
7708 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7709 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7711 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7712 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7713 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7714 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7717 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7718 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7719 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7720 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7721 <quote>this music cannot be copied,
</quote> and have a computer respect that
7722 command. The technology was to be part of a
<quote>trusted system
</quote> of
7723 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7727 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7728 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7729 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7730 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7734 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7735 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7736 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7737 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7740 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7741 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7742 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7743 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7744 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7745 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7748 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7749 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7750 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7751 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7752 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7753 constituted, succeed.
7755 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7756 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7758 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'
>
7759 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7761 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7762 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7763 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7766 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7767 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7768 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7773 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7774 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7775 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7778 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7779 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'
/>
7780 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7782 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7783 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7784 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7788 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7790 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7791 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7792 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (
<quote>DMCA
</quote>).
7796 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7797 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7798 spreading such information an offense.
7801 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7802 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7803 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7804 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7805 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7806 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7807 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7808 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7809 protection for copyright owners.
7812 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7813 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7814 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7815 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7816 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7819 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7820 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7821 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7822 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7823 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7824 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7825 have been a copyright violation.
7827 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7828 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7830 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7831 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7834 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7835 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7836 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7837 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7838 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7839 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7840 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7841 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7842 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7843 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7846 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7847 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7848 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7849 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7850 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7851 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7853 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7855 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7856 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7857 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7858 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7859 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7860 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
<quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,
</quote>
7861 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7862 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7863 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7867 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7868 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7869 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7870 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7871 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7872 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the
<quote>Neighborhood
</quote>
7873 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7874 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7875 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7876 broadcasting has always been
<quote>You are an important person just the way
7877 you are. You can make healthy decisions.
</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7878 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7879 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7880 important.
<footnote><para>
7882 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7883 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7884 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7885 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7886 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7892 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7893 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7894 the VCR responsible.
7897 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7899 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7902 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7905 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7906 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7907 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7908 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7909 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7910 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7912 <indexterm id='idxhandguns' class='startofrange'
>
7913 <primary>handguns
</primary>
7916 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7918 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7919 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7920 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7923 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7924 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7925 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7927 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7929 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7930 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7931 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7932 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7933 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7934 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7936 <indexterm startref='idxhandguns' class='endofrange'
/>
7937 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7938 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7940 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7941 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7944 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7945 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7946 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7947 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7948 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7949 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7952 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7953 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7954 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7955 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7956 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7957 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7958 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7959 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7960 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7961 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7964 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7965 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7966 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7967 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7968 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7969 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7970 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7971 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7972 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7977 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7978 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7979 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7980 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7981 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7983 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet,
<quote>Legal Fictions,
7984 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7985 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7989 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7990 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7991 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7992 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7993 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7996 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7997 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7998 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7999 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
8000 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
8001 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
8002 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
8003 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
8006 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
8007 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
8008 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
8009 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
8010 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
8011 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
8014 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
8015 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
8017 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
8018 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
8019 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
8020 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
8021 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
8023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
8024 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
8025 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
8026 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
8027 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
8028 market for creative work, has become the single most important
8029 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
8030 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
8031 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
8035 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8036 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8037 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8038 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8039 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8042 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8043 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8044 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8045 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8046 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8047 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8048 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8049 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8053 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8057 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8058 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8059 ownership,
<quote>five companies control
85 percent of our media sources.
</quote><footnote><para>
8061 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8062 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
8063 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
8064 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8065 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
8066 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
8068 Lynette Holloway,
<quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8069 Slide,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
8071 The
<quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8072 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.
</quote><footnote><para>
8074 Molly Ivins,
<quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,
</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
8077 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
8078 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
8079 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
8080 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8081 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8084 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8085 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8087 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
8088 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8089 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
8090 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
8091 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
8092 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8095 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8096 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8097 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8098 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8099 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
8100 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
8101 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8102 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8103 protected
— by the market.
8106 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8107 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8108 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8109 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8113 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8114 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
8115 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8116 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8117 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8118 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8119 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8120 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8121 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8122 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
8124 James Fallows,
<quote>The Age of Murdoch,
</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
8126 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8131 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8132 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8133 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8134 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8136 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8137 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8138 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8142 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8143 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8147 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8148 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8149 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8150 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8153 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8154 integration may matter.
8156 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8157 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8158 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8160 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
8161 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8162 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8163 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8164 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8167 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8168 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8169 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8170 control.
<footnote><para>
8172 Leonard Hill,
<quote>The Axis of Access,
</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8173 Forum,
<quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,
</quote> St. Louis,
8174 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8175 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8176 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8177 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8183 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8184 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8185 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8186 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
8187 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8188 television
—75 percent of it
—was
<quote>independent
</quote> of the
8192 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8193 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8194 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8195 2002, only five independent television studios remained.
<quote>In
1992,
8196 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8197 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8198 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent.
</quote> <quote>In
1992,
16
8199 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8200 year there was one.
</quote><footnote><para>
8202 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8203 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8204 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8205 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8206 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8207 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8208 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8211 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8212 that ran it.
<quote>In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8213 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8214 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8215 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8216 63%.
</quote><footnote><para>
8221 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8223 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8224 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8225 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8226 owned by the network.
8229 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8230 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8231 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8232 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8233 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8237 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8238 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8239 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8240 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8242 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8243 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8244 handful.
<footnote><para>
8246 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,
</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8247 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8248 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8253 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8254 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8255 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8256 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8257 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8258 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8259 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8260 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8261 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8264 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8266 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8267 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the
<quote>Innovator's
8268 Dilemma
</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8269 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8270 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8271 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8273 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8274 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8275 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8276 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8277 Kim B. Clark,
<quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8278 Concepts in Technological Evolution,
</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8279 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8280 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8281 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8282 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8284 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8285 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8287 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8290 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8291 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8292 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8296 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8297 suggest the concern.
8300 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8301 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8302 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8305 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8306 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8307 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8310 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8311 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8312 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8313 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8314 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8315 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8316 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8317 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8318 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8319 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8320 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8321 outweigh these costs.
8324 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8325 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8326 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8329 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'
>
8330 <primary>advertising
</primary>
8333 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8334 a media campaign as part of the
<quote>war on drugs.
</quote> The campaign produced
8335 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8336 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8337 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8338 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8339 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8340 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8341 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8342 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8345 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8346 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8349 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8350 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8351 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8355 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8357 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8358 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8359 message will be heard then?
8362 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8363 <quote>controversial
</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8364 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8365 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8366 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8367 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8368 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8369 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8370 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8372 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8373 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8374 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as
<quote>against
8375 [their] policy.
</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8376 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8377 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8378 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8379 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8380 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives,
<quote>On the Issue of
8381 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>New
8382 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8383 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8384 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown,
<quote>Ad
8385 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8386 Radio,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8387 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8388 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8389 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8390 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8391 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8392 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross,
<quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8393 After Muni Rejects Ad,
</quote> SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8394 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8395 was that the criticism was
<quote>too controversial.
</quote>
8396 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8397 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8398 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8399 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8400 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8401 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8402 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
8406 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8407 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8408 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8409 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8410 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8411 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8412 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8413 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8414 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8416 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'
/>
8418 <section id=
"together">
8419 <title>Together
</title>
8421 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8422 copyright warriors that the government should
<quote>protect my property.
</quote>
8423 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8424 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8427 But when we see how dramatically this
<quote>property
</quote> has changed
—
8428 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8429 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8430 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8434 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8435 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8436 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8437 the massively expanded
<quote>property
</quote> rights granted by copyright
8438 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8439 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8443 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8444 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8445 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8449 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8450 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8451 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8452 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8453 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8454 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8455 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8456 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8457 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8458 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8461 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8462 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8463 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8464 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8465 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8466 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8467 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8468 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8469 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8470 in control that technology and the market enable.
8473 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8474 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8476 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8477 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8478 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8479 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8482 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8483 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8484 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8485 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8486 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8487 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8488 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8489 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8490 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8491 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8492 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8493 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8494 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8495 known.
<footnote><para>
8497 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his
<quote>four surrenders
</quote> of
8498 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8499 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8503 <emphasis role='strong'
>This has been
</emphasis> a long chapter. Its
8504 point can now be briefly stated.
8507 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8508 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8509 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8510 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8511 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8514 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8515 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8519 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8520 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8525 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8526 <entry>©</entry>
8530 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8539 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8540 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8541 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8544 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8545 noncommercial work was also free.
8548 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8551 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8552 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8556 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8557 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8562 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8563 <entry>©</entry>
8564 <entry>©</entry>
8567 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8576 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8577 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8578 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8579 transformation were still essentially free.
8582 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8583 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8584 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8585 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8586 we could say the law began to look like this:
8589 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8590 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8595 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8600 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8601 <entry>©</entry>
8602 <entry>©</entry>
8605 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8606 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8614 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8615 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8616 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8617 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8618 that the law now looks like this:
8621 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8622 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8627 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8632 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8633 <entry>©</entry>
8634 <entry>©</entry>
8637 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8638 <entry>©</entry>
8639 <entry>©</entry>
8646 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8647 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8649 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8650 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8651 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8654 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8655 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8656 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8657 these domains actually does any good.
8660 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8661 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8662 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8663 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8664 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8665 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8666 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8667 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8668 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8669 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8672 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8673 course copyright is a kind of
<quote>property,
</quote> and of course, as with any
8674 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8675 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8676 property rights
<footnote><para>
8678 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8679 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8680 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey,
<quote>The
8681 Disintegration of Property,
</quote> in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8682 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8684 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8686 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8687 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8688 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8689 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the
<quote>copyright
</quote>
8690 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8691 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8692 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8693 vibrant and rich free culture.
8695 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
8697 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8698 limits on the scope of the interests protected by
<quote>property.
</quote> The very
8699 birth of
<quote>copyright
</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8700 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8701 story of chapter
6). The tradition of
<quote>fair use
</quote> is animated by a
8702 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8703 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8706 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8707 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8708 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8709 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8710 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8711 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8712 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8713 dominates the debate today.
8716 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8717 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8718 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8719 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8720 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8721 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8722 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8723 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8724 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8725 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8732 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8733 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8735 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8736 <chapter label=
"11" id=
"chimera">
8737 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8738 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8739 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8741 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8742 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8744 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8745 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The
</quote> (Wells)
</primary>
8749 <emphasis role='strong'
>In a well-known
</emphasis> short story by
8750 H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez trips (literally, down an
8751 ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in the Peruvian
8752 Andes.
<footnote><para>
8754 H. G. Wells,
<quote>The Country of the Blind
</quote> (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8755 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8756 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8758 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with
<quote>sweet water, pasture,
8759 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8760 that bore an excellent fruit.
</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8761 takes this as an opportunity.
<quote>In the Country of the Blind,
</quote> he tells
8762 himself,
<quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.
</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8763 villagers to explore life as a king.
8766 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8767 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8768 <quote>blind.
</quote> They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8769 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8770 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8771 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated.
<quote>`You
8772 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8773 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8777 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8778 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8779 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8780 affection, a young woman who to him seems
<quote>the most beautiful thing in
8781 the whole of creation,
</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8782 description of what he sees
<quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8783 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8784 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8785 indulgence.
</quote> <quote>She did not believe,
</quote> Wells tells us, and
<quote>she could
8786 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.
</quote>
8789 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his
<quote>mysteriously delighted
</quote>
8790 love, the father and the village object.
<quote>You see, my dear,
</quote> her
8791 father instructs,
<quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8792 anything right.
</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8795 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion.
<quote>His brain
8796 is affected,
</quote> he reports.
8799 <quote>What affects it?
</quote> the father asks.
<quote>Those queer things that are
8800 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8804 The doctor continues:
<quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8805 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8806 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8807 irritant bodies [the eyes].
</quote>
8810 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!
</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8811 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8812 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8813 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8816 <emphasis role='strong'
>It sometimes
</emphasis> happens that the eggs
8817 of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
8818 <quote>chimera.
</quote> A chimera is a single creature with two sets
8819 of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be different from the
8820 DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8823 plot for murder mysteries.
<quote>But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8824 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8825 scene.
…</quote>
8827 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8828 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8830 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8831 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8832 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8833 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8834 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8835 understanding of a
<quote>person
</quote> should reflect this reality.
8838 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8839 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8840 unfairly enough,
<quote>the copyright wars,
</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8841 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question
<quote>What is
8842 p2p file sharing?
</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8843 wrong. One side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8844 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8845 thirty years without any question at all.
</quote> That's true, at least in
8846 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8847 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8848 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8849 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8852 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8853 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8854 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8855 <quote>friends
</quote> beyond recognition to say
<quote>my ten thousand best friends
</quote> can
8856 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8857 what
<quote>we have always been allowed to do,
</quote> we have not always been
8858 allowed to share music with
<quote>our ten thousand best friends.
</quote>
8861 Likewise, when the other side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like walking
8862 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8863 with it,
</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8864 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8865 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8867 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8872 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8873 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8874 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8875 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8876 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8877 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8878 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8879 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8882 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8883 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8884 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8885 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8886 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8889 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8890 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8891 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8892 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8893 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8894 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8895 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8896 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8898 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
8899 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8900 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8901 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
8903 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8904 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8905 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8906 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8907 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
<quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8908 Stakes on Piracy,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8909 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8910 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8911 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8912 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8913 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8914 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8915 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8916 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8917 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8918 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8919 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8920 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8921 Elizabeth Young,
<quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,
</quote> redandblack.com,
8922 August
2003, available at
8923 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8924 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8925 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8926 identities, see James Collins,
<quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8927 Name Students,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8928 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8929 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
8930 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8934 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8936 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8937 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8938 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8939 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8940 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8943 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8944 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8945 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8946 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8947 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8948 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8949 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8950 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8955 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8956 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8957 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8958 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8959 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8960 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8963 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to
<quote>steal
</quote> music. My
8964 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8965 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8966 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8967 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8968 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8969 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8970 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8971 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8972 protection for copyrighted material,
8976 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8977 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8980 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8981 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8982 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8983 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8984 produce a totally different industry model.
8987 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8988 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8989 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8990 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8991 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8992 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8993 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8994 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8995 interests.
<footnote><para>
8997 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8998 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8999 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
9000 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
9001 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
9002 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
9003 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
9006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
9008 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
9009 one of
<quote>the major labels.
</quote> Its position on these matters has now
9011 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
9014 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
9015 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
9016 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
9019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
9021 <chapter label=
"12" id=
"harms">
9022 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
9024 <emphasis role='strong'
>To fight
</emphasis> <quote>piracy,
</quote> to
9025 protect
<quote>property,
</quote> the content industry has launched a
9026 war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
9027 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both
9028 direct and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these
9029 damages will be suffered most by our own people.
9032 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
9033 particular, the consequences for
<quote>free culture.
</quote> But my aim now is to
9034 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9038 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9039 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9040 power of the property called
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> is at its greatest in
9043 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
9044 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
9046 Yet
<quote>common sense
</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
9047 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
9048 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9049 rejection of
<quote>piracy
</quote> still has play.
9051 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9054 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9055 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9056 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9057 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9058 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9060 <section id=
"constrain">
9061 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
9063 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9064 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9065 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9066 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9067 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9068 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9069 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9070 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9071 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9072 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9073 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9074 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
9075 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9078 This digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> is in part an extension of the
9079 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9080 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9081 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9082 of digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9083 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9084 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9085 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9086 the culture all around.
9089 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9090 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9094 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9095 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9096 storytelling extended across the globe.
9099 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9100 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9101 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9102 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9103 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9104 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9105 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9106 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9107 work is presumptively illegal.
9110 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9111 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9112 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9113 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9114 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9115 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
9116 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9117 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
9118 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9119 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
9120 million.
<footnote><para>
9122 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
9123 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
9124 the settlement, see MCI press release,
<quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9125 Approval for SEC Settlement
</quote> (
7 July
2003), available at
9126 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
9127 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9129 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9130 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9131 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
9132 suffering.
<footnote>
9134 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9135 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
9136 an overview, see Tanya Albert,
<quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9137 Say Tort Reformers,
</quote> amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
9138 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
9139 and
<quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,
</quote> CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
9141 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9143 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
9145 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9146 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9147 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9148 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9150 <indexterm><primary>art, underground
</primary></indexterm>
9152 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9153 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9154 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9155 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9156 Disneys
<quote>pirates.
</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9157 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9161 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9162 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9163 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9164 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
9165 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9166 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9167 fraught. Already, exhibits of
<quote>illegal art
</quote> tour the United
9168 States.
<footnote><para>
9171 See Danit Lidor,
<quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
9173 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9174 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9176 In what does their
<quote>illegality
</quote> consist?
9177 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9178 critical or reflective.
9180 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
9182 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9183 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9184 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
9185 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9186 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9187 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9188 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9189 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9190 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9191 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9193 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
9195 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9196 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9197 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9198 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9199 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9200 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9201 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9202 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9203 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9206 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9207 described in chapter
9208 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9209 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9210 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9211 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9217 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9218 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9219 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9220 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9221 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9222 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9223 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9224 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9227 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9228 <quote>breathing room
</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9229 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9230 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9231 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9232 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9233 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9234 these rules have little relationship to the
<quote>law
</quote> with which judges
9238 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9239 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9240 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9241 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9242 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9243 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9244 <quote>copyright
</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9245 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9246 culture that is free.
9249 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9253 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9254 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9255 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9256 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9257 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9259 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying,
<quote>This has been
9260 cleared.
</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9261 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9265 <section id=
"innovators">
9266 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9268 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9269 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9270 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9271 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9272 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9273 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9276 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9277 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9278 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9279 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9280 other aspect by substituting
<quote>free market
</quote> every place I've spoken of
9281 <quote>free culture.
</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9282 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9284 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9286 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9287 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9288 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9289 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9290 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9291 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9292 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9293 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9294 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9295 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9296 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9298 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9300 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9302 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9303 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9304 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9305 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9306 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9307 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9308 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9309 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9310 <quote>nuclear pall
</quote> that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9313 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9314 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9315 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9317 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
9319 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9320 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9321 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9322 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9323 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9324 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9327 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9328 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9329 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9330 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9332 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9335 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9336 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9337 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9338 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9339 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9340 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9341 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9342 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9343 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9344 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9347 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9348 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9350 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9351 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9352 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9353 the kind of content the users liked.
9356 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9357 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9358 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9359 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9360 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9361 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9362 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9363 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9364 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9365 they had already bought.
9367 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9368 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9371 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9372 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9373 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9374 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9375 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9376 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9377 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9378 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9381 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9384 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9385 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9386 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9387 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9388 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9389 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9390 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9394 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9395 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9396 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9399 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9400 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9401 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9402 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9404 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9405 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9406 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9407 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad
</primary></indexterm>
9409 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9410 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9411 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9412 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9413 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9415 See Joseph Menn,
<quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9416 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9417 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown,
<quote>The Music
9418 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,
</quote> Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9419 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9420 See also Jon Healey,
<quote>Online Music Services Besieged,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9421 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9423 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9424 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9425 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9426 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9427 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9428 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9429 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9430 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9431 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9432 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9433 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9434 discussion with BMW:
9435 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9436 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9439 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9441 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9442 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9443 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9444 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9445 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9446 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9447 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9450 Rafe Needleman,
<quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,
</quote> <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9452 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9453 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9454 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9459 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with
<quote>your money or your
9460 life
</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9461 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9462 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9463 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9464 constantly threatened by litigation.
9468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9469 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9470 enterprises. The point is the definition of
<quote>illegal.
</quote> The law is a
9471 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9472 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9473 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9474 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9475 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9476 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9477 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9478 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9479 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9480 much less creativity.
9482 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9484 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9485 use. Whatever the
<quote>real
</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9486 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9487 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9488 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9489 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9490 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9491 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9492 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9493 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9496 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9497 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9498 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9499 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9500 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9501 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9502 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9503 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9504 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9505 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9506 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9507 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9509 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9510 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9511 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9515 <emphasis role='strong'
>The uncertainty
</emphasis> of the law is one
9516 burden on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more
9517 directly. This is the effort by many in the content industry to use
9518 the law to directly regulate the technology of the Internet so that it
9519 better protects their content.
9522 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9523 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9524 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9525 this feature is a
<quote>bug.
</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9526 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9527 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9528 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables
<quote>piracy,
</quote> then,
9529 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9531 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9533 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9534 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9535 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9536 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9537 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> GartnerG2 and
9538 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9539 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9540 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9542 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9543 <quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9544 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9545 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9546 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9547 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9548 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9550 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9554 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9555 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9556 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9557 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9560 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9564 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9565 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9566 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9568 See David McGuire,
<quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,
</quote> Newsbytes,
9569 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9571 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9572 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9574 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9577 <emphasis role='strong'
>There is one
</emphasis> more obvious way in
9578 which this war has harmed innovation
—again, a story that will be
9579 quite familiar to the free market crowd.
9582 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9583 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9584 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9585 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9588 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9589 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9590 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9591 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9592 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9594 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9595 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9596 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9598 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9599 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9600 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9601 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9602 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9605 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9606 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9607 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9608 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9609 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9612 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9614 <indexterm><primary>Grokster, Ltd.
</primary></indexterm>
9615 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9616 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9617 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9618 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9619 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9620 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9621 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9622 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9623 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9624 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9625 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9626 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9629 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9630 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9631 here.
<footnote><para>
9633 <indexterm><primary>Tauzin, Billy
</primary></indexterm>
9634 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9635 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9636 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9637 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9638 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9639 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9640 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a
<quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that
9641 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9642 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9643 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9644 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2,
<quote>Copyright and
9645 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
33–34,
9647 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9648 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9649 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz
</primary></indexterm>
9650 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9652 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9653 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9656 <primary>artists
</primary>
9657 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9662 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9663 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9664 artist doesn't get paid for that
<quote>radio performance
</quote> unless he or she
9665 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9666 version of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote>—to memorialize her famous
9667 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9668 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9669 copyright owners of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> would get some money, whereas
9670 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9671 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9674 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9675 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9676 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9677 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9678 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9679 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9680 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9681 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9685 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9686 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9687 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9688 spectrum. Thus, I can
<quote>tune in
</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9689 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9690 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9694 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9695 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9696 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9697 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9698 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9699 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9700 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9701 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9702 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9703 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9704 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9706 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9710 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9711 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9712 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9713 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9714 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9715 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9720 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9721 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9722 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9723 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9724 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9725 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9726 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9727 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9728 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9729 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9730 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9731 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9732 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9739 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9740 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9741 underestimated the power of
<quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9742 legislation
</quote><footnote><para>
9746 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9749 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9750 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9751 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9752 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9753 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9756 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'
>
9757 <primary>artists
</primary>
9758 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9761 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9762 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9765 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9766 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9767 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9768 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9769 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9770 of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9771 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9772 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9773 burdens terrestrial radio.
9776 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9777 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9778 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9779 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9780 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9783 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9784 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9785 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9786 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9787 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9788 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9789 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9790 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9791 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9792 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9793 C. Picker,
<quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9794 Distribution,
</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461:
<quote>This was
9795 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9796 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9797 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9798 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9799 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.
</quote>
9800 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9801 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9803 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9806 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'
/>
9808 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9809 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9810 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9811 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9813 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9814 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9816 name of the service;
9819 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9822 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9825 date of transmission;
9828 time of transmission;
9831 time zone of origination of transmission;
9834 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9837 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9840 sound recording title;
9843 ISRC code of the recording;
9846 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9849 featured recording artist;
9858 UPC code of the retail album;
9864 copyright owner information;
9867 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9870 name of the service or entity;
9876 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9879 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9882 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9885 unique user identifier;
9888 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9893 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9894 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9895 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9896 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9897 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9898 that terrestrial radio does not.
9901 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9902 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9903 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9905 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
9906 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'
>
9907 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
9910 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9911 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9912 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9916 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9917 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9918 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9919 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9920 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9921 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… <quote>How do you come up with a
9923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9924 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9925 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9926 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9927 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9928 business.
…</quote>
9931 <primary>artists
</primary>
9932 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9935 And the RIAA experts said,
<quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
9936 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9937 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9938 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>.
</quote> (Emphasis
9942 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'
/>
9944 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9945 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9946 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9947 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9948 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9949 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9950 effective to prevent it.
9953 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9954 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9956 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9958 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9959 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9962 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9963 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9964 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9967 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9968 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9969 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9970 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9971 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie,
<quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,
</quote> Pew
9972 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9973 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9974 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9975 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9977 According to the RIAA,
9978 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9979 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9982 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9983 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9985 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9986 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9987 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9989 response by the other.
9992 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9993 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9994 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9995 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9996 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9997 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9998 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9999 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
10000 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
10001 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
10002 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
10003 was.
<footnote><para>
10005 Alex Pham,
<quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,
</quote> <citetitle>Los
10006 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
10008 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
10009 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
10010 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
10011 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
10012 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
10013 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
10017 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
10018 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
10019 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
10020 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
10021 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
10022 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
10023 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
10024 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
10025 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
10027 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel,
<quote>Alcohol Consumption During
10028 Prohibition,
</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
10031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
10032 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
10033 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
10035 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
10036 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
10037 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
10039 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
10040 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
10041 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
10042 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
10043 cheat.
<footnote><para>
10045 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein,
<quote>Tax
10046 Compliance,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
10047 compliance literature).
10049 We pride ourselves on our
<quote>free society,
</quote> but an endless array of
10050 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
10051 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10052 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
10055 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10056 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
10057 students about the importance of
<quote>ethics.
</quote> As my colleague Charlie
10058 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
10059 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
10060 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
10061 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
10062 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
10063 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
10064 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
10065 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
10066 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
10067 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
10068 lives both normally and legally, since
<quote>normally
</quote> entails a certain
10069 degree of illegality.
10070 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
10073 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10074 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10075 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10076 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10077 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10078 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10079 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10080 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10081 to consider the alternative.
10085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10086 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10087 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10088 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10089 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10090 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10093 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10094 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10095 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10096 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10097 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10098 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10099 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10100 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10101 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10102 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10103 introduced this different idea of
<quote>sharing.
</quote> We need to be able to
10104 call these twenty million Americans
<quote>citizens,
</quote> not
<quote>felons.
</quote>
10107 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10108 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10109 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10110 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10111 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10112 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10113 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10114 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10115 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10116 a nation of felons?
10119 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10122 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10123 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10124 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10125 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10129 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That
<quote>use
</quote> of the
10130 recordings is free.
10133 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10134 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10135 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am
<quote>free
</quote> to copy,
10136 or
<quote>rip,
</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10137 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that
<quote>freedom
</quote> was a
10138 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the
<quote>Rip, Mix, Burn
</quote>
10139 capacities of digital technologies.
10141 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
10143 This
<quote>use
</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10144 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10145 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10146 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10147 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10148 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10149 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10150 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10151 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10154 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
10155 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10156 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10157 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10158 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10159 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10160 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10161 on people's machines.
10164 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10165 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10166 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10167 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10168 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10169 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10172 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10173 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10174 plastic or were part of a massively complex
<quote>digital rights
10175 management
</quote> system.
10178 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10179 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10180 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10181 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10182 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10183 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10184 freedom to move content easily?
10187 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10188 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10189 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10190 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10191 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10192 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10193 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10194 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10195 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10198 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10199 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10200 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10201 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10202 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10203 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10204 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10207 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10208 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10209 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10210 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10213 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10214 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10218 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10219 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10221 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
10222 <indexterm id='idxisps' class='startofrange'
>
10223 <primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary>
10226 <emphasis role='strong'
>There's one more
</emphasis> aspect to this
10227 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and
10228 follows directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier
10229 Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the
10230 <quote>collateral damage
</quote> that
<quote>arises whenever you turn
10231 a very large percentage of the population into criminals.
</quote> This
10232 is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10235 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,
</quote> von Lohmann
10237 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10241 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10242 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10243 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10244 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10245 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10246 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think,
<quote>Oh, well,
10247 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.
</quote> Well, what this campaign
10248 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10249 American Internet-using population into
<quote>lawbreakers.
</quote>
10253 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10254 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10255 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10258 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10259 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10260 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10261 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10262 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10263 an Internet user is revealed.
10266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10267 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10268 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10269 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10270 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10271 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10272 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10273 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10274 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10276 See Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10277 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,
</quote>
10278 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs,
<quote>Worried Parents
10279 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10280 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10281 Being Sued,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10282 Graham,
<quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10283 2003,
4D; John Schwartz,
<quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10284 Fan, Either,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi,
<quote>Is
10285 Brianna a Criminal?
</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10290 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10291 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10292 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10294 See
<quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10295 Some Methods Used,
</quote> CNN.com, available at
10296 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10298 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10299 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10300 one of those MP3s will have the same
<quote>fingerprint.
</quote>
10303 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10304 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10305 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10306 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10307 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10308 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10309 network is
<quote>cooperating
</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10310 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10311 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10312 as a
<quote>criminal.
</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10313 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10315 See Jeff Adler,
<quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,
</quote>
10316 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>Four
10317 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10318 Colleges,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10319 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10320 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas,
<quote>Music
10321 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10322 Lawsuit Possible,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox,
<quote>RIAA
10323 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10324 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10325 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Download Warning
101: Freshman
10326 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10327 Sharing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11;
<quote>Raid, Letters
10328 Are Weapons at Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10330 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10331 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10333 <indexterm startref='idxisps' class='endofrange'
/>
10335 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10336 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10337 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10338 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10339 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10340 this
<quote>contraband
</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10344 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10345 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10347 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10351 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10352 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10353 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10354 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10355 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10356 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10357 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10358 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10359 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10360 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10361 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10362 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10363 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10364 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10365 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10366 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10371 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered
<quote>criminals
</quote> under
10372 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10373 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10374 considered
<quote>criminals,
</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10375 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10376 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10383 <part id=
"c-balances">
10384 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10389 <emphasis role='strong'
>So here's
</emphasis> the picture: You're
10390 standing at the side of the road. Your car is on fire. You are angry
10391 and upset because in part you helped start the fire. Now you don't
10392 know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket, filled with
10393 gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10396 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10397 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10398 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10399 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10400 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10404 <emphasis role='strong'
>A war
</emphasis> about copyright rages all
10405 around
—and we're all focusing on the wrong thing. No doubt,
10406 current technologies threaten existing businesses. No doubt they may
10407 threaten artists. But technologies change. The industry and
10408 technologists have plenty of ways to use technology to protect
10409 themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This is a fire
10410 that if let alone would burn itself out.
10413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10414 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10415 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10416 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10417 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10418 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10419 made that is happening all around.
10422 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10423 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10424 gasoline onto this fire.
10427 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10428 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10429 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10430 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10433 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10434 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10435 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10436 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10437 success will require.
10441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10442 <chapter label=
"13" id=
"eldred">
10443 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10444 <indexterm id=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'
>
10445 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel
</primary>
10448 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1995</emphasis>, a father was frustrated
10449 that his daughters didn't seem to like Hawthorne. No doubt there was
10450 more than one such father, but at least one did something about
10451 it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in New
10452 Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
10453 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would
10454 make this nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
10457 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10458 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10459 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10460 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10461 them available for free.
10464 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10465 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10466 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10467 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10468 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10470 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10471 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10472 accessible
—today.
10475 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10476 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10477 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10478 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10479 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10480 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10481 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10482 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10483 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10484 commercial publications of public domain works.
10486 <indexterm startref=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'
/>
10488 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10489 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10490 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10491 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10492 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10493 call the
<quote>noncommercial publishing industry,
</quote> which before the
10494 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10495 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10496 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10497 generally.
<footnote><para>
10499 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10500 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10501 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10502 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10503 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10504 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10505 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10506 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10507 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10508 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10509 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10510 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10511 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10512 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10513 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10516 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10517 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10518 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10519 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10520 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10521 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10522 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10523 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10524 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10525 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10526 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10527 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10529 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10530 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10534 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10535 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10536 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10537 <quote>copyrights should be forever.
</quote><footnote><para>
10539 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10540 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10541 The full text is:
<quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10542 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10543 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10544 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10545 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10546 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10547 Congress,
</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10552 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10553 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10554 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10555 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10556 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10557 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10561 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10563 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10565 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10566 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10568 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10572 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10573 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10574 their
… Writings.
…
10578 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10579 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10580 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10581 something
—for example, to regulate
<quote>commerce among the several
10582 states
</quote> or
<quote>declare War.
</quote> But here, the
<quote>something
</quote> is something quite
10583 specific
—to
<quote>promote
… Progress
</quote>—through means that
10584 are also specific
— by
<quote>securing
</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights
</quote> (i.e.,
10585 copyrights)
<quote>for limited Times.
</quote>
10588 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10589 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10590 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10591 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be
<quote>limited
</quote> will have
10592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10593 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10594 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10595 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms
<quote>on the
10596 installment plan,
</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10597 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10600 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10601 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10602 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10603 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10604 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10605 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10606 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10607 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10608 this gravy train going.
10611 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10612 government.
<quote>Corruption
</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10613 bribed. Rather,
<quote>corruption
</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10614 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10615 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10616 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10617 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10620 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10621 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10622 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10623 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10624 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10625 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10626 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10627 published by anyone for free.
10630 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10631 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10632 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10633 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10637 <quote>Next year,
</quote> the adviser announces,
<quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10640 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10641 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10642 those works.
</quote>
10645 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,
</quote> she continues,
<quote>that
10646 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10647 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10648 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.
</quote>
10651 <quote>Hope?
</quote> a fellow board member says.
<quote>Can't we be doing something
10655 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>We could contribute
10656 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10657 they support the bill.
</quote>
10660 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10661 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it.
<quote>How much
10662 would we get if this extension were passed?
</quote> you ask the adviser.
<quote>How
10663 much is it worth?
</quote>
10666 <quote>Well,
</quote> the adviser says,
<quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10667 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10668 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10669 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate.
</quote>
10672 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10673 correct conclusion:
10676 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10677 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10679 would assure that the bill was passed?
</quote>
10682 <quote>Absolutely,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>It is worth it to you to
10684 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10685 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000.
</quote>
10688 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10689 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10690 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10691 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10693 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10695 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10696 the copyright term extended.
10699 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10700 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10701 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10704 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10706 Term Extension Act, this
<quote>theory
</quote> about incentives was proved
10707 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10708 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10709 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10710 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10711 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press,
<quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10712 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,
</quote>
10713 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10715 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10716 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10717 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10718 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown,
<quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10719 Age,
</quote> available at
10720 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10722 Disney is estimated to have
10723 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10724 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10726 Alan K. Ota,
<quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,
</quote>
10727 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10728 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10733 <emphasis role='strong'
>Constitutional law
</emphasis> is not oblivious
10734 to the obvious. Or at least, it need not be. So when I was considering
10735 Eldred's complaint, this reality about the never-ending incentives to
10736 increase the copyright term was central to my thinking. In my view, a
10737 pragmatic court committed to interpreting and applying the
10738 Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the power
10739 to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
10740 constitutional requirement that terms be
<quote>limited.
</quote> If
10741 they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again and
10745 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10746 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10747 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10748 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10749 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10750 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10754 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10758 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10759 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10760 power to regulate only
<quote>commerce among the several states
</quote> (aka
10762 commerce
</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10763 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10768 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10769 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10770 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10771 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10772 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10774 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
10776 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10777 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10778 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10779 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10780 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10781 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10782 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10783 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10784 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10785 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10786 position to second-guess Congress.
10789 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,
</quote>
10790 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10791 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10793 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10794 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10795 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10796 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10798 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10802 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10803 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10805 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10806 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10807 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10808 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10809 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10810 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10811 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10812 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10813 limitation to
<quote>limited times
</quote> notwithstanding.
10815 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10816 yield the conclusion that Congress
10817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10818 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10819 term, then there would be no
<quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power over
10820 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10821 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10822 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10823 term of existing copyrights.
10826 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10827 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10828 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10829 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10830 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10831 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10832 demonstrating the
<quote>fidelity
</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10833 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10834 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10835 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10836 were going to be petty politicians.
10839 <emphasis role='strong'
>Now let's pause
</emphasis> for a moment to
10840 make sure we understand what the argument in
10841 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10842 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10843 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10844 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10845 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10846 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10847 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10848 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10849 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10850 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10851 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10852 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10853 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10854 piracy that affects us all.
10857 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10860 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10861 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than
<quote>legal piracy.
</quote><footnote><para>
10863 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10864 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10865 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10867 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10868 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10869 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10871 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10874 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10876 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10878 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10879 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10880 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10881 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10882 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10883 bought to extend them again.
10886 <emphasis role='strong'
>It is valuable
</emphasis> copyrights that are
10887 responsible for terms being extended. Mickey Mouse and
10888 <quote>Rhapsody in Blue.
</quote> These works are too valuable for
10889 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from
10890 copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.
10891 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from
10892 the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The real
10893 harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The real
10894 harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially exploited,
10895 and no longer available as a result.
10898 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10899 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10900 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10901 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10902 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10903 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10904 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10906 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10907 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10908 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10913 Think practically about the consequence of this
10914 extension
—practically,
10915 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10918 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10919 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10920 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10922 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10924 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
10926 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10927 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10928 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10929 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10930 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10931 list of books still under copyright.
10934 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10935 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10938 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10940 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10941 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10942 being at least a list?
10945 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10946 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10948 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10950 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10951 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10954 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,
</quote> the
10955 apologists for the system respond.
<quote>Why should there be a list of
10956 copyright owners?
</quote>
10959 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10960 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10961 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10962 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10963 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10964 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10965 what tangible property.
10968 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10969 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10970 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10973 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10974 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10976 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10977 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10978 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10979 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10980 know quite well who owns what property.
10983 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10984 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10986 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10987 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10988 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10989 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10990 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10991 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10992 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10995 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10996 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10998 for other creative works is much more dire.
11000 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'
>
11001 <primary>Agee, Michael
</primary>
11003 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11004 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
11006 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
11007 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
11008 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
11009 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
11010 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
11011 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
11012 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
11013 money. According to one estimate,
<quote>Roach has sold about
60,
000
11014 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
11015 films.
</quote><footnote><para>
11017 See David G. Savage,
<quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,
</quote>
11018 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
<quote>Classic Movies,
11019 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
11020 Down Copyright Extension,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
11023 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
11026 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
11027 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
11028 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
11029 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
11032 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
11034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
11035 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
11036 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
11037 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
11038 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
11039 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
11040 work available for distribution.
11043 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11044 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11045 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11046 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11047 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
11048 mm film.
<footnote><para>
11050 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11051 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11052 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
11053 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
11054 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
11055 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
11060 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11062 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11063 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11064 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11065 locate the copyright owner.
11068 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
11069 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
11070 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
11071 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
11072 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
11073 to these films is exceptionally high.
11076 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11077 copyright owner when she shows up?
</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11078 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11079 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11080 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11081 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11082 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11083 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11084 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11087 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11090 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11092 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11093 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11094 the copyright expires.
11096 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'
/>
11098 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11099 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11100 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11102 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11106 <emphasis role='strong'
>Of all the
</emphasis> creative work produced
11107 by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has continuing commercial
11108 value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a crucially important
11109 legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright creates incentives
11110 to produce and distribute the creative work. For that tiny fraction,
11111 the copyright acts as an
<quote>engine of free expression.
</quote>
11114 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11115 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11117 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11118 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11119 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11121 the commercial life ends.
11124 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11125 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
11126 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11128 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11130 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11131 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
11132 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11133 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11134 have, we need to have access to this history.
11137 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11140 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11141 this context do no good.
11144 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11145 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11146 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11147 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11148 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11149 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11150 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11151 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11152 was independent of copyright law.
11155 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11156 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
11157 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11158 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11159 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11160 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11161 market didn't have more to offer.
11164 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11165 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11166 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11167 would not have interfered with anything.
11170 But this situation has now changed.
11172 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'
>
11173 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
11176 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11177 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11178 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11179 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11180 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11181 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11182 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11183 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11184 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11185 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11189 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11190 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11191 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11192 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11193 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11194 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11195 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11196 written for a radically different context.
11199 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11200 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11201 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11202 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11203 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11204 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11205 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
11206 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11207 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11210 You may well ask,
<quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11211 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11212 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11213 culture widely?
</quote>
11216 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11217 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11218 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11219 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11220 of a library is to serve what
<quote>the market
</quote> would demand. But if you
11221 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11222 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11223 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11224 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11226 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'
/>
11228 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11229 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11230 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11231 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11234 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11235 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11236 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11237 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11238 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11240 Jason Schultz,
<quote>The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,
</quote> 20
11241 December
2002, available at
11242 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11247 <emphasis role='strong'
>In January
1999</emphasis>, we filed a lawsuit
11248 on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
11249 asking the court to declare the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
11250 Act unconstitutional. The two central claims that we made were (
1)
11251 that extending existing terms violated the Constitution's
11252 <quote>limited Times
</quote> requirement, and (
2) that extending terms
11253 by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11256 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11257 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11258 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11259 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11260 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11263 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11264 copyrights be for
<quote>limited Times
</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11265 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11266 <quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11267 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11268 terms that are
<quote>limited.
</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11269 to interpret the term
<quote>limited Times
</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11270 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11271 power to extend existing terms.
11274 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11275 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11276 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11277 whole, where the court will sit
<quote>en banc
</quote> to hear the case.
11279 <indexterm><primary>Tatel, David
</primary></indexterm>
11281 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11282 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11285 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11286 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11287 overstepped its bounds.
11290 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11291 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11292 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11293 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11294 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11297 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11298 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11299 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11300 briefs and preparing for argument.
11303 <emphasis role='strong'
>It is over
</emphasis> a year later as I write
11304 these words. It is still astonishingly hard. If you know anything at
11305 all about this story, you know that we lost the appeal. And if you
11306 know something more than just the minimum, you probably think there
11307 was no way this case could have been won. After our defeat, I received
11308 literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and supporters,
11309 thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed cause. And
11310 none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail from my
11311 client, Eric Eldred.
11314 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11315 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11316 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11319 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11321 <emphasis role='strong'
>The mistake
</emphasis> was made early, though
11322 it became obvious only at the very end. Our case had been supported
11323 from the very beginning by an extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart,
11324 and by the law firm he had moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and
11325 Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11327 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11328 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11329 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11331 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11332 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11333 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11335 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11336 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11337 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11338 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11339 told me, if we could make the issue seem
<quote>important
</quote> to the Supreme
11340 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11341 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against
<quote>the
11342 most powerful media companies in the world.
</quote>
11345 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11346 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11347 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11348 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11349 <quote>right
</quote> as in
<quote>true,
</quote> I thought, but it is
<quote>wrong
</quote> as in
<quote>it just shouldn't be
11350 that way.
</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11351 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11352 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11354 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11355 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11357 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11358 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11359 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11361 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11362 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11363 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11366 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11367 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11368 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11369 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11370 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11371 why it was unconstitutional.
11374 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11377 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11378 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11379 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11380 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11381 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11382 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11383 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11384 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11385 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11386 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11387 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11388 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11389 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11390 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11393 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11394 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11395 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11396 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11397 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11398 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11399 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11400 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11401 to get bogged down?
</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11402 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11403 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11404 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11405 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11406 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11409 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11410 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11411 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11412 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11413 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11414 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11417 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11418 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11421 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11422 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11423 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11424 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11425 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11426 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11427 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11428 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11429 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11430 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11431 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11434 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11435 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11436 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11437 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11438 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11439 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11441 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11443 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11444 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11445 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11446 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11449 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11450 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11451 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11452 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11453 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11455 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11456 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11457 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11458 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11459 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11460 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11461 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11462 nothing more than
<quote>rent-seeking
</quote>—the fancy term economists use
11463 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11466 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11467 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11468 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11469 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11470 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11471 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11472 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11473 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11476 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11477 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11478 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11479 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan
</primary></indexterm>
11480 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen
</primary></indexterm>
11481 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11484 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11485 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11486 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11487 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11488 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11489 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11490 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11491 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11492 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11493 confidence in our argument.
11494 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11497 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11498 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these
<quote>friends
</quote> included
11499 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11500 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11504 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11505 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11506 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11507 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11508 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11509 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11513 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11514 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11515 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11516 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11517 domain, then people could use it to
<quote>glorify drugs or to create
11518 pornography.
</quote><footnote><para>
11520 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11521 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11523 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11524 <quote>protection
</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11525 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11526 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11528 Dinitia Smith,
<quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11529 Mouse Joins the Fray,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11533 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11534 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11535 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11538 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11539 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11540 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11541 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11542 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say,
<quote>Give us twenty years
11543 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11544 better with them than anyone else.
</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11545 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11546 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11547 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11550 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11551 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11552 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11553 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11554 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11557 <emphasis role='strong'
>Between February
</emphasis> and October, there
11558 was little I did beyond preparing for this case. Early on, as I said,
11559 I set the strategy.
11561 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
11562 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11564 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11565 called
<quote>the Conservatives.
</quote> The other we called
<quote>the Rest.
</quote> The
11566 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11567 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11568 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11569 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line
11570 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11571 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11573 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11574 <indexterm id='idxginsburg' class='startofrange'
>
11575 <primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
</primary>
11578 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11579 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11580 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11583 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11584 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11585 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11586 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11587 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11590 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11591 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11592 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11593 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11594 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11595 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11596 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11597 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11600 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11602 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11603 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11604 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11605 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11606 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11607 these retrospective extensions.
11609 <indexterm startref='idxginsburg' class='endofrange'
/>
11611 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11612 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11613 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11614 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11615 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11616 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11619 This analysis of
<quote>the Rest
</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11620 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11621 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11622 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11623 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation
—the
11624 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11625 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11626 powers have limits.
11629 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11630 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11631 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11632 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11633 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11634 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11635 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11636 supposed to be
<quote>limited.
</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11637 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
11638 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11639 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11643 <emphasis role='strong'
>The argument
</emphasis> on the government's
11644 side came down to this: Congress has done it before. It should be
11645 allowed to do it again. The government claimed that from the very
11646 beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
11647 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say
11648 that practice is unconstitutional.
11651 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11652 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831
11653 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11655 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11658 But this
<quote>consistency
</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11660 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11661 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11662 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11664 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11666 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11667 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11669 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11670 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11673 <emphasis role='strong'
>Oral argument
</emphasis> was scheduled for the
11674 first week in October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the
11675 argument. During those two weeks, I was repeatedly
11676 <quote>mooted
</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11679 help in the case. Such
<quote>moots
</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11680 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11683 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11684 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11685 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11686 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11688 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11689 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11692 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11693 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11695 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11696 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11697 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11698 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11699 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11702 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11703 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11704 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11705 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11706 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.
</quote>
11708 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11710 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11711 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11712 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11713 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11714 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11715 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11716 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11717 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11720 <emphasis role='strong'
>The night before
</emphasis> the argument, a
11721 line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The case
11722 had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
11723 culture. Hundreds stood in line
11725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11726 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11727 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11730 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11731 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11732 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11733 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11735 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11736 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11737 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11738 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11739 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11740 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11741 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11742 family of the Justices.
11745 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11746 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11747 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11748 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11750 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11752 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11753 The history was bothering her.
11757 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11758 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11759 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11760 practice that began with the very first act.
11764 She was quite willing to concede
<quote>that this flies directly in the face
11765 of what the framers had in mind.
</quote> But my response again and again
11766 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11770 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11771 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11772 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11773 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11778 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11779 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11780 Kennedy, who observed,
11784 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11785 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11786 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11787 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11788 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11792 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11798 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11799 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11800 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11801 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11802 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11805 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11807 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11808 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11809 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11810 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11811 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11814 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11815 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11816 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11819 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11820 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11822 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11826 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11827 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11830 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11831 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11833 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11834 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11835 into the Copyright Clause.
11838 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.
</primary></indexterm>
11840 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11841 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11842 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11846 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11847 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11848 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11849 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11854 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11855 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11856 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11857 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11858 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11859 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11860 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11861 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11862 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11863 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11867 <emphasis role='strong'
>As I left
</emphasis> the court that day, I
11868 knew there were a hundred points I wished I could remake. There were a
11869 hundred questions I wished I had
11871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11872 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11876 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11877 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11878 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11879 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11880 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11881 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11882 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11883 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11884 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11885 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11886 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11887 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11888 law that it had established elsewhere.
11891 <emphasis role='strong'
>The morning
</emphasis> of January
15,
2003, I
11892 was five minutes late to the office and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from
11893 the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the message, I could tell in an
11894 instant that she had bad news to report.The Supreme Court had affirmed
11895 the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven justices had voted in the
11896 majority. There were two dissents.
11899 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11900 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11901 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11904 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11905 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11906 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11910 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11911 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11912 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11913 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11914 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11916 <indexterm><primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
</primary></indexterm>
11919 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11920 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11921 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11922 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11925 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11926 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11927 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11928 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11931 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11932 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11933 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11934 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11935 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11936 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11937 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11938 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11939 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11942 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11943 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11944 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11945 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11946 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11947 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11948 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11949 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11950 the system we have.
11952 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11954 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11955 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11956 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11957 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11958 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11959 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11960 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11961 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11962 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11964 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11966 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11967 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11968 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11969 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11970 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11971 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11972 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11973 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11974 <quote>limited,
</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11975 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11978 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11979 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11980 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11981 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11982 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11985 <emphasis role='strong'
>Defeat brings depression
</emphasis>. They say
11986 it is a sign of health when depression gives way to anger. My anger
11987 came quickly, but it didn't cure the depression. This anger was of two
11990 <indexterm><primary>originalism
</primary></indexterm>
11992 It was first anger with the five
<quote>Conservatives.
</quote> It would have been
11993 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11994 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11995 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11996 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11997 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11998 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is
<quote>originalism
</quote>—to
11999 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
12000 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
12001 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other
<quote>originalist
</quote> rulings. Where was their
12002 <quote>originalism
</quote> now?
12005 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
12006 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
12007 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
12008 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
12010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
12011 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
12012 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
12013 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
12014 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
12015 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
12016 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
12020 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
12022 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
12025 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12027 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
12028 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
12029 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
12030 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
12031 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
12032 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
12033 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
12034 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
12035 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
12038 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
12039 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
12040 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
12041 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
12042 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
12043 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
12044 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
12045 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
12046 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
12047 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
12048 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
12049 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
12050 effort to persuade; but I
12051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
12052 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
12053 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
12054 should decide the issue.
12056 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12058 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
12059 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12061 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
12064 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12065 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12066 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12067 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12070 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12071 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12072 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12073 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12077 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12078 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12079 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
12080 case was a mistake.
<quote>The Court is not ready,
</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
12081 issue should not be raised until it is.
12082 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12085 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12086 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12087 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12088 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12089 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12090 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12091 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
12094 <emphasis role='strong'
>While the reaction
</emphasis> to the Sonny
12095 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the
12096 Court's decision was mixed. No one, at least in the press, tried to
12097 say that extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won
12098 that battle over ideas. Where
12100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12101 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12102 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12103 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12104 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12105 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12109 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12110 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12111 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12112 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12113 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12114 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12118 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12119 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12120 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12121 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The
<quote>powerful and wealthy
</quote> line is a bit
12122 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12123 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12125 <figure id=
"fig-18">
12126 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
12127 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
12128 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12131 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12132 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That
<quote>grand experiment
</quote> we call the
12133 <quote>public domain
</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think,
<quote>Honey,
12134 I shrunk the Constitution.
</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12135 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12136 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12137 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12141 <chapter label=
"14" id=
"eldred-ii">
12142 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
12144 <emphasis role='strong'
>The day
</emphasis>
12145 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I
12146 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
12147 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was denied
—meaning the case was
12148 really finally over
—fate would have it that I was giving a
12149 speech to technologists at Disney World.) This was a particularly
12150 long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city from
12151 Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my computer and
12152 wrote an op-ed piece.
12154 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12156 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12157 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12158 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12159 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12160 Justice Kennedy:
<quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12161 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12162 that.
</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12163 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12166 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12167 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12169 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12170 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12171 the work passed into the public domain.
12174 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12175 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12176 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12179 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12180 is either the
<quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act
</quote> or the
<quote>Copyright
12181 Term Deregulation Act.
</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12182 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12183 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12184 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
12185 everything else, let the content go.
12187 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12189 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12190 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12191 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12192 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12193 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12194 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12195 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12196 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12197 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12198 the stupid harm of the present system.
12201 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12202 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12203 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12204 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12205 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12206 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12207 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12208 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12209 where copyright owners could be identified.
12211 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12212 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12215 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
12216 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12217 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12218 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12220 <indexterm><primary>German copyright law
</primary></indexterm>
12221 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12222 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12223 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12224 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
12225 every text of the Convention has provided that
<quote>the enjoyment and the
12226 exercise
</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention
<quote>shall not be subject
12227 to any formality.
</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12228 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12229 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12230 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12231 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12232 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12233 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12234 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12235 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12236 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
12237 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12238 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
12239 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a
<quote>natural right.
</quote> Natural
12240 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12241 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12242 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12243 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12244 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12247 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12248 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12249 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12250 <quote>Walt Disney creativity
</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12251 know what's protected and what's not.
12253 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12255 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12256 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12257 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12258 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12259 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12260 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12261 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
12262 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12265 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12266 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12267 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12268 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12269 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12270 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12273 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12274 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12275 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12276 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12278 imposed upon creators.
12281 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12282 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12285 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12286 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12287 the government. He has a property right over the table
<quote>naturally,
</quote>
12288 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12289 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12293 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12294 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12295 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12296 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12297 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12298 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12302 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12303 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12304 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12305 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12306 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12307 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12308 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12309 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12310 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12311 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12312 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12313 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12314 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12315 system of protection for property generally.
12318 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12319 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12320 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12321 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12322 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12323 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12324 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12325 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12327 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12328 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12329 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12330 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12333 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12334 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12335 didn't
<quote>get.
</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12336 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12337 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be,
<quote>short,
</quote> then this
12338 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12339 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12340 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12343 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12344 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12345 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12346 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12347 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12348 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12349 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12352 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12353 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12354 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12355 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12356 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12359 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12360 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12361 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12362 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12363 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12366 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12367 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12368 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12372 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12373 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12374 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12377 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12378 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12379 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12380 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12381 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12382 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12383 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12384 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12385 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12386 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12388 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12390 <emphasis role='strong'
>When Steve Forbes
</emphasis> endorsed the
12391 idea, some in Washington began to pay attention. Many people contacted
12392 me pointing to representatives who might be willing to introduce the
12393 Eldred Act. And I had a few who directly suggested that they might be
12394 willing to take the first step.
12397 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12398 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12399 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12400 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12401 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog,
<quote>we are
12402 close.
</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12403 something good might happen here.
12404 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12407 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12408 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12409 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12410 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12411 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12412 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12415 The MPAA argued first that Congress had
<quote>firmly rejected the central
12416 concept in the proposed bill
</quote>—that copyrights be renewed. That
12417 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's
<quote>firm rejection
</quote> had occurred
12418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12419 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12420 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12421 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12422 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12423 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12424 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12425 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12426 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12427 argued that the bill would impose
<quote>enormous
</quote> costs, since a
12428 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12429 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12430 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12431 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12432 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12433 film is a valid derivative use.
12436 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12437 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12438 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12439 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12440 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12441 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12444 <emphasis role='strong'
>At the beginning
</emphasis> of this book, I
12445 told two stories about the law reacting to changes in technology. In
12446 the one, common sense prevailed. In the other, common sense was
12447 delayed. The difference between the two stories was the power of the
12448 opposition
—the power of the side that fought to defend the
12449 status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
12450 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
12451 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
12454 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12455 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12456 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12457 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12463 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12464 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12465 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12466 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12467 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12468 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12469 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12470 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12471 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12473 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12475 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12476 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12477 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12478 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12479 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12480 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the
<quote>Dark
12481 Content
</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12482 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12485 What does this industry really want?
12488 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12489 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12490 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12491 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12492 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12493 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12494 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12495 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12499 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12500 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12501 its aim not the protection of
<quote>property
</quote> but the rejection of a
12502 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12503 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12507 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12508 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12511 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12512 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12513 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12514 and to share its own creation.
12516 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12517 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12519 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12520 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12521 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12522 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12523 block the progress of others.
12526 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12527 <quote>property
</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12528 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12529 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing
<quote>permission
12530 society.
</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12531 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12532 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12537 <chapter label=
"15" id=
"c-conclusion">
12538 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12539 <indexterm id=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'
>
12540 <primary>antiretroviral drugs
</primary>
12542 <indexterm id=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'
>
12543 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies
</primary>
12545 <indexterm id=
"idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'
>
12546 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in
</primary>
12549 <emphasis role='strong'
>There are more
</emphasis> than
35 million
12550 people with the AIDS virus worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live
12551 in sub-Saharan Africa. Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen
12552 million Africans is proportional percentage-wise to seven million
12553 Americans. More importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12556 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12557 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12558 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12559 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12560 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12561 the disease almost invisible.
12564 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12565 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12566 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12567 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12569 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12570 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12571 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
<quote>Final Report: Integrating
12572 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy
</quote> (London,
2002),
12574 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12576 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12577 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12581 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12582 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12583 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12584 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12585 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12586 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12587 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12590 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12591 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12592 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12593 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12594 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12595 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12596 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12597 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12601 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12602 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12603 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12604 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12605 costs significantly below the market price.
12608 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12609 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12610 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12611 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12612 Africa from India. This is called
<quote>parallel importation,
</quote> and it is
12613 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12614 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12617 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12618 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12619 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12620 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12624 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12625 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12626 characterized it,
<quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12627 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12628 imports.
</quote><footnote><para>
12630 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12631 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12632 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12633 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12634 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12635 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12636 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12637 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12638 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12641 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12642 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12643 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12644 possible trade sanctions.
12645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12646 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12647 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12648 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12649 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12650 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12651 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12652 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12653 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12654 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12655 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12657 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12658 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12659 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12660 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12663 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12664 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12665 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12666 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12667 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12668 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12669 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12670 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12673 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12674 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12675 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12676 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12677 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12678 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12681 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12682 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12683 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12684 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12685 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12686 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12690 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12691 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12694 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12696 See Sabin Russell,
<quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12697 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12698 May
1999, A1, available at
12699 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12700 (
<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12701 system of intellectual property protection
</quote>); Robert Weissman,
<quote>AIDS
12702 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12703 Medicines,
</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12704 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12705 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson,
<quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12706 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12707 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,
</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12708 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12709 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12711 It was because
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> would be violated that these
12712 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12713 importance of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> that led these government actors
12714 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12717 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12718 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12719 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12720 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12721 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the
<quote>sanctity
</quote> of an
12722 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12723 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12724 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12727 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12728 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12729 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12730 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12731 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12732 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12735 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12736 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12737 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12738 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12739 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12740 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12743 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12744 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12745 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask,
<quote>How
12746 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12747 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?
</quote> Because there is no
<quote>sound
12748 bite
</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12749 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12750 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12752 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12753 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12754 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12755 idea called
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote>
12758 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12759 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12760 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12761 What is the argument?
12764 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12765 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12766 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12767 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12768 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12769 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12770 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12771 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12772 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12773 were balanced in just this sense.
12776 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12777 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12778 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12779 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12780 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12781 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12783 <indexterm startref=
"idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'
/>
12784 <indexterm startref=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'
/>
12785 <indexterm startref=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'
/>
12787 <emphasis role='strong'
>A simple idea
</emphasis> blinds us, and under
12788 the cover of darkness, much happens that most of us would reject if
12789 any of us looked. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in
12790 ideas that we don't even notice how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a
12791 people who are dying without them. So uncritically do we accept the
12792 idea of property in culture that we don't even question when the
12793 control of that property removes our
12794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12795 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12796 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12797 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12798 this common sense open its eyes.
12801 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12802 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12803 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12804 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12805 to fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12806 the idea of
<quote>creative property,
</quote> while transforming real creators into
12807 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12808 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12809 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12810 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12811 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12812 produce the
<quote>perfect storm
</quote> for free culture.
12814 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
12815 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'
>
12816 <primary>biomedical research
</primary>
12818 <indexterm><primary>Wellcome Trust
</primary></indexterm>
12820 <emphasis role='strong'
>In August
2003</emphasis>, a fight broke out
12821 in the United States about a decision by the World Intellectual
12822 Property Organization to cancel a meeting.
<footnote><para>
12823 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12824 August
2003, E1, available at
12825 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New,
<quote>Global Group's
12826 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12827 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12828 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New,
<quote>U.S. Official
12829 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12830 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12831 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12833 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12834 a meeting to discuss
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12835 goods.
</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12836 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12837 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12838 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12839 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12840 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12841 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12842 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12843 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12844 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12845 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12847 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12848 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12849 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12850 in the early
1980s. And it included
<quote>open source and free software.
</quote>
12851 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12852 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12853 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12855 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'
/>
12857 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12858 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12859 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12860 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12861 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12864 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12865 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12868 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12869 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12870 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12871 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12875 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12876 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12877 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12878 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12879 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12880 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12881 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12882 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12883 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12884 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12885 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12886 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12887 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12888 talk about an
<quote>Information Society
</quote> unless one also talked about the
12889 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12890 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12891 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12894 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12895 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12896 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12899 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12900 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12901 thus the meeting about
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12902 public goods
</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12905 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12906 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is
<quote>open source
12907 and free software.
</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12908 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12909 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12910 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12911 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12912 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12913 rather than
<quote>proprietary software,
</quote> for their own internal uses.
12916 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12917 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12918 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12919 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12920 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12921 operating system, the most famous bit of
<quote>free software
</quote>—and IBM
12922 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support
<quote>open source and
12923 free software
</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12924 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12925 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12927 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12928 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12929 <quote>open source
</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12930 principal opposition is to
<quote>free software
</quote> licensed under a
<quote>copyleft
</quote>
12931 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12932 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith,
<quote>The Future
12933 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,
</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
12934 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12935 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12936 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12937 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12938 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12939 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12940 May
2001), available at
12941 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12943 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12944 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft
</quote> licenses
</primary></indexterm>
12945 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12946 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12949 More important for our purposes, to support
<quote>open source and free
12950 software
</quote> is not to oppose copyright.
<quote>Open source and free software
</quote>
12951 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12952 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12953 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12956 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12957 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12958 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12959 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12960 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12961 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12962 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12963 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12964 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12967 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12968 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12969 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12970 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12971 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12972 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12973 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12975 Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> available at
<ulink
12976 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12978 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12979 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
12982 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12983 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12984 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12985 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12986 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12987 its lobbying efforts.
12990 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12991 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12992 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12993 Office, explained that
<quote>open-source software runs counter to the
12994 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.
</quote>
12995 She is quoted as saying,
<quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12996 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12997 goals of WIPO.
</quote>
13000 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
13002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
13004 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
13005 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
13006 right called
<quote>copyright
</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
13007 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it
<quote>runs counter
</quote> to the mission
13008 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
13009 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
13010 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
13011 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
13013 <indexterm><primary>generic drugs
</primary></indexterm>
13015 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to
<quote>promote
</quote>
13016 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
13017 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
13018 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
13019 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
13020 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
13021 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
13022 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
13023 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
13024 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
13025 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
13027 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
13029 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
13030 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
13031 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
13032 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
13033 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to
<quote>waive
</quote> or
13034 <quote>disclaim
</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
13035 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
13036 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
13037 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
13038 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
13039 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
13042 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
13043 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,
</quote> she's
13044 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
13045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
13046 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
13047 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from
<quote>waiving
</quote> or
13048 <quote>disclaiming
</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
13049 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
13050 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
13054 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
13055 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called
<quote>feudalism.
</quote> Under
13056 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
13057 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
13058 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
13059 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
13060 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
13061 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
13062 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
13065 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13066 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
13068 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13069 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
13071 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
13072 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13074 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13075 choice now is whether that information society will be
13076 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
13080 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13081 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13082 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13083 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13087 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13088 it should be (
<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13089 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
13090 not simply to promote intellectual property rights
</quote>), not as it is. If
13091 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13092 say anything wrong. But in the world
13093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13094 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13095 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13099 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13100 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13101 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13102 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13103 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13104 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13105 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13106 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13109 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13110 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13111 <quote>goal
</quote> of a government should be
<quote>to promote the right balance
</quote> of
13112 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13113 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism.
<quote>Typical for
13114 an academic,
</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13117 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13118 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13119 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13120 our own country's history).
13123 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13124 government should be to
<quote>seek balance,
</quote> then count me with the silly,
13125 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13126 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13127 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13128 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13129 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13130 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
13131 democracy in the world, become?
13134 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13135 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13136 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13138 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13139 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
13141 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
13142 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
13143 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
13145 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13148 <emphasis role='strong'
>There are moments
</emphasis> of hope in this
13149 struggle. And moments that surprise. When the FCC was considering
13150 relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby further increase the
13151 concentration in media ownership, an extraordinary bipartisan
13152 coalition formed to fight this change. For perhaps the first time in
13153 history, interests as diverse as the NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org,
13154 William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women for Peace organized to
13155 oppose this change in FCC policy. An astonishing
700,
000 letters were
13156 sent to the FCC, demanding more hearings and a different result.
13159 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13160 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13161 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13162 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13163 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13164 concentration in the media.
13167 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13168 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13169 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13170 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13171 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13174 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13175 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13176 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13177 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13178 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13179 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
13180 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
13182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13184 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13185 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13186 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13187 Americans have a long history of fighting
<quote>big,
</quote> wisely or not. That
13188 we could be motivated to fight
<quote>big
</quote> again is not something new.
13191 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13192 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13193 the idea of
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13194 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13195 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13196 called
<quote>property
</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13199 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13202 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
13204 <emphasis role='strong'
>As I write
</emphasis> these final words, the
13205 news is filled with stories about the RIAA lawsuits against almost
13206 three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
13208 John Borland,
<quote>RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers,
</quote> CNET News.com, September
13210 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
13211 R. La Monica,
<quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,
</quote> CNN/Money,
8 September
13213 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
13214 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty,
<quote>Sued for a Song,
13215 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
13216 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13217 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13218 Defendants,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13219 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
13221 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
13223 Eminem has just been sued for
<quote>sampling
</quote> someone else's
13224 music.
<footnote><para>
13226 Jon Wiederhorn,
<quote>Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,
</quote>
13227 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
13228 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
13230 The story about Bob Dylan
<quote>stealing
</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13231 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
13233 Kenji Hall, Associated Press,
<quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13234 Dylan Songs,
</quote> Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
13235 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
13236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13238 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
13239 anonymous
—reports
<quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13240 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13241 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13242 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13243 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.
</quote> Congressmen are
13244 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13245 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13246 kids who use a computer to share content.
13248 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
13249 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
13250 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13251 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
13252 <indexterm><primary>BBC
</primary></indexterm>
13253 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in
</primary></indexterm>
13255 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13256 that it will build a
<quote>Creative Archive,
</quote> from which British citizens can
13257 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13258 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,
</quote> BBC press release,
13259 24 August
2003, available at
13260 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13262 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13263 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13264 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13265 country.
<footnote><para>
13267 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,
</quote> Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
13269 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13272 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13273 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13274 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13275 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13276 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13277 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13278 day into the Causbys.
13281 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13282 potential is ever to be realized.
13284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13288 <chapter label=
"16" id=
"c-afterword">
13289 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13293 <emphasis role='strong'
>At least some
</emphasis> who have read this
13294 far will agree with me that something must be done to change where we
13295 are heading. The balance of this book maps what might be done.
13298 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13299 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13300 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13301 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13304 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13305 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13306 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13307 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13311 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13312 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13313 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13314 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13315 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13319 <section id=
"usnow">
13320 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13322 <emphasis role='strong'
>Common sense
</emphasis> is with the copyright
13323 warriors because the debate so far has been framed at the
13324 extremes
—as a grand either/or: either property or anarchy,
13325 either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is the
13326 choice, then the warriors should win.
13329 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13330 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13331 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—<quote>All Rights
13332 Reserved
</quote>— and those who reject copyright
—<quote>No Rights
13333 Reserved.
</quote> The
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13334 permission before you
<quote>use
</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The
<quote>No
13335 Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13336 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13339 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13340 tilted in the
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13341 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13342 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13346 original design of the Internet was
<quote>no rights reserved.
</quote> Content was
13347 <quote>taken
</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13351 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13352 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13353 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13354 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13355 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13356 architecture made the effective default
<quote>no rights reserved,
</quote> the
13357 future architecture will make the effective default
<quote>all rights
13358 reserved.
</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13359 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13360 content requires permission. The
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> world that defines
13361 the Internet today will become a
<quote>get permission to cut and paste
</quote>
13362 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13365 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13366 <quote>all rights reserved
</quote> nor
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> but
<quote>some rights
13367 reserved
</quote>— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13368 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13369 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13373 <section id=
"examples">
13374 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13376 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13377 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13378 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13379 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13380 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13381 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13382 to your neighbors or boss. The
<quote>privacy
</quote> of your browsing habits was
13386 What made it assured?
13388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13390 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13391 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13392 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13393 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13394 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13395 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13396 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13397 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13398 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13399 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13400 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13401 (there is no law protecting
<quote>privacy
</quote> in public places), and in many
13402 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13403 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13405 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13407 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13408 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13409 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13410 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13411 <quote>recently viewed
</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13412 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13413 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13414 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13415 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13418 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13419 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13420 people should have the
<quote>right
</quote> to browse in a library without the
13421 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13422 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13423 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13424 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13428 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13429 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13430 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13431 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13434 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg,
<quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13435 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13436 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13438 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13439 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13440 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13441 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13442 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13443 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13444 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13447 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13448 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13449 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13452 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13453 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13454 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13455 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13456 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13457 care much about controlling their software.
13458 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13460 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13462 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13463 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13464 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13465 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13466 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13470 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13471 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13472 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13473 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13474 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13475 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13476 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13477 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13478 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13482 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13483 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13484 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13485 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13486 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13487 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13488 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13491 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13492 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13494 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13495 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13496 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13497 fundamentally weakened.
13499 <indexterm><primary>Torvalds, Linus
</primary></indexterm>
13501 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13502 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13503 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's
<quote>Linux
</quote>
13504 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13505 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13506 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13509 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13510 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13511 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13512 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13513 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13514 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13515 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13516 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13520 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13521 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13522 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13523 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13524 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13525 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13528 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13529 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13530 scientific journals are produced.
13532 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13533 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13536 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13537 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13538 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13539 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13540 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13541 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13542 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13543 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13544 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13545 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13546 and Westlaw are also free
13547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13548 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13549 Court opinion through their respective services.
13552 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13553 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13554 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13555 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13556 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13557 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13558 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13561 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13562 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13563 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13566 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13567 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13568 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13569 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13570 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13571 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13572 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13573 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13574 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13575 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13578 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13579 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13580 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13581 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13582 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13586 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13587 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13588 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13589 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13591 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13592 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13593 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13594 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13595 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13596 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13597 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13600 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13601 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13602 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13603 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13604 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13605 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13608 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13611 <section id=
"oneidea">
13612 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13613 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13614 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13617 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13618 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13620 <indexterm><primary>Stanford University
</primary></indexterm>
13622 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13623 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13624 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13625 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13626 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13627 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13628 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13629 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13630 make this possible.
13633 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13634 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13635 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13636 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13637 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13638 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13639 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13640 human-readable description, and
13641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13642 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13643 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13644 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13645 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13646 different than the
<quote>All
</quote> or
<quote>No
</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13647 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13648 certain freedoms are given.
13651 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13652 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13653 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13654 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13655 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13656 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (
<quote>share and share
13657 alike
</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13658 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13659 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13662 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13663 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13664 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13665 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13666 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13667 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13668 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13669 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13673 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13674 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13675 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13676 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13677 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13678 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13680 of content (
<quote>content conducers,
</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13681 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13682 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13683 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13686 The aim is not to fight the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13687 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13688 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13689 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13690 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13691 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13692 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13693 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13694 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13695 to begin to build those rules.
13698 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13699 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13700 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13701 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13702 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13705 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13706 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13707 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13708 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13709 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13710 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13711 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13712 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13713 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13714 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13717 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13718 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13719 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13720 was a total success.
13723 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13724 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13726 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13727 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13728 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13729 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13730 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13732 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13733 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13735 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy
</primary></indexterm>
13736 <indexterm><primary>rap music
</primary></indexterm>
13737 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13739 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13740 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13741 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13742 reasons. Many who use the
<quote>sampling license
</quote> do so because anything
13743 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13744 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13745 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13746 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13747 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13748 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13749 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13750 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not
<quote>allow
</quote>
13751 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13752 high
<footnote><para>
13754 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13755 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13756 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13757 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13758 </para></footnote>),
13759 these artists release into the creative environment content
13760 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13763 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13764 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13765 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13766 you are effectively saying you believe in the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote>
13767 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13768 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13769 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13770 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13771 this notion of
<quote>Some Rights Reserved,
</quote> and gives many the chance to
13775 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13776 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13777 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13778 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13780 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13781 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13782 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13785 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13786 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13787 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13788 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13789 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13790 steps are possible.
13793 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13794 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13795 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13796 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13797 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13798 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13799 creativity to spread more easily.
13801 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13806 <section id=
"themsoon">
13807 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13809 <emphasis role='strong'
>We will
</emphasis> not reclaim a free culture
13810 by individual action alone. It will also take important reforms of
13811 laws. We have a long way to go before the politicians will listen to
13812 these ideas and implement these reforms. But that also means that we
13813 have time to build awareness around the changes that we need.
13816 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13817 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13818 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13822 <section id=
"formalities">
13823 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13825 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13826 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13827 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13828 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13832 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13833 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13837 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13838 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13839 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13840 default is control, and
<quote>formalities
</quote> are banished.
13846 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13847 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13848 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13849 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13850 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13851 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13852 formalities were getting in the way.
13855 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13856 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13857 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13858 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13859 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13860 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13861 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13862 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13863 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13864 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13867 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13869 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13870 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13871 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13872 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13873 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13874 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13877 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13878 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13879 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13880 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13881 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13882 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13883 developed by others.
13886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13888 <section id=
"registration">
13889 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13891 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13892 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13893 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13894 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13895 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13896 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13897 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13898 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13899 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13900 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13901 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13904 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13905 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13906 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13907 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13908 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13909 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13910 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13913 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13914 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13915 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13916 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13917 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13918 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13919 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13920 with which registration occurs up.
13923 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13924 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13925 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13926 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13927 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13928 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13929 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13930 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13931 formality
—while producing a database
13932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13933 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13937 <section id=
"marking">
13938 <title>MARKING
</title>
13940 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13941 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13942 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13943 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13944 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13945 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13946 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13947 uniformly across all media.
13950 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13951 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13952 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13956 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13957 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13958 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13959 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13960 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13961 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13962 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13963 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13966 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13967 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13968 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13969 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13970 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13971 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13973 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13974 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13975 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13977 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be
<quote>use unless someone
13978 complains.
</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13979 stop using the work in any new
13980 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13981 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13982 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13986 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13987 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13988 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13989 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13990 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13993 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13994 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13995 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13996 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13997 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13998 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13999 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
14000 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
14001 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
14002 other important functions.
14005 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
14006 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
14007 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
14008 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
14009 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
14010 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
14013 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
14014 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
14015 make things unclear.
14018 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
14019 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
14020 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
14021 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
14022 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
14023 that assertion at the appropriate time.
14026 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
14029 <section id=
"shortterms">
14030 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
14032 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
14033 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
14037 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
14038 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
14039 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
14040 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
14041 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
14042 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
14045 <quote>A Radical Rethink,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
14047 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
14049 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14052 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14053 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
14054 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
14057 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14060 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
14061 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
14062 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
14063 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14064 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14065 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
14069 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
14070 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14071 fuzziness of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and the distinction between
<quote>ideas
</quote> and
14072 <quote>expression.
</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14073 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
14074 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
14075 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
14076 <quote>lawyer-free zone
</quote> makes the complexities of
<quote>fair use
</quote> and
14077 <quote>idea/expression
</quote> less necessary to navigate.
14078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14082 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
14083 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14084 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
14085 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
14086 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
14087 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
14088 pension.
<footnote><para>
14090 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14091 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
14093 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
14095 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
14096 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
14098 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
14102 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
14103 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
14104 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
14105 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
14106 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
14107 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
14108 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
14109 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
14110 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
14111 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14112 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14113 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14114 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14115 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
14118 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
14119 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
14120 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14124 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas
<quote>radical.
</quote> (After all, I
14125 call them
<quote>extremists.
</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14126 than the term under Richard Nixon. How
<quote>radical
</quote> can it be to ask for
14127 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14130 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14133 <section id=
"freefairuse">
14134 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
14135 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary></indexterm>
14137 <primary>property rights
</primary>
14138 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
14141 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14142 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14143 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14144 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14145 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14146 the emergence of that new technology.
14149 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
<quote>exclusive
14150 right
</quote> to
<quote>their writings.
</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14151 right to
<quote>their writings
</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14152 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14153 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14154 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14155 though that movie is not
<quote>my writing.
</quote>
14158 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
14159 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14160 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
14162 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14163 University Press,
1967),
32.
14165 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14166 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14167 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14168 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
14172 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14173 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14174 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14175 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
14176 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
14181 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14182 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14183 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14184 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14185 Consider each limitation in turn.
14188 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14189 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14190 sense to protect John
14192 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14193 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14194 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14195 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14196 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14197 after the creative work is done.
14198 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
14201 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14202 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14203 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14204 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14205 material. When all
<quote>reuse
</quote> of creative material was within the control
14206 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14207 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14208 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14209 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14210 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14211 the creative process. Smothers it.
14213 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
14215 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14216 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14217 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
14218 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
14219 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14223 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14224 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14225 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14226 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
14229 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14230 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
14231 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
14233 His view is that the law should be written so that
14234 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14237 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14238 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14239 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14240 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14241 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14244 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14245 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14246 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14247 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14248 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14249 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14253 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
14254 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
14256 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14257 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14258 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
14259 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14260 battles around the sharing of music.
14263 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14264 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14265 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14266 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14267 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14268 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14269 innovation on the network.
14272 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14273 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14274 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14275 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14276 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14279 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14280 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14281 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14282 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
14283 four different kinds of sharing:
14285 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14288 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14289 for purchasing CDs.
14293 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14294 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14299 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14300 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14301 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14305 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14306 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14307 owner plainly endorses.
14311 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14312 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14313 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14314 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14315 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14316 significantly weakened.
14319 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14320 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14321 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14322 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14323 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14327 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14328 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14332 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14333 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14334 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14335 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14336 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14337 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14338 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14339 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14340 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14341 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14344 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14345 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14346 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14348 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14349 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14350 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14351 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14352 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14353 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14354 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14355 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14356 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14358 <indexterm><primary>cell phones, music streamed over
</primary></indexterm>
14360 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14361 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14362 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14363 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14364 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14365 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14366 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14367 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14368 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14369 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14370 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14371 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14372 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14373 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14374 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14375 paying for this content even though
<quote>free
</quote> content is available in the
14376 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14378 See, for example,
<quote>Music Media Watch,
</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14379 April
2002, available at
14380 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14385 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14386 present: It is emphatically temporary. The
<quote>problem
</quote> with file
14387 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14388 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14389 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14390 makers today to be
<quote>solving
</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14391 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14392 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14393 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14394 artists get paid, during
14396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14397 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14398 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14401 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different
<quote>problems
</quote>
14402 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14403 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14404 <quote>problem
</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14405 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14406 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14407 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14408 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14409 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14412 Type C content raises a different
<quote>problem.
</quote> This is content that was,
14413 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14414 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14415 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14416 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14417 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14418 way that returns something to the artist.
14421 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14422 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14423 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14424 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14425 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14426 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14427 from the author's perspective, this
<quote>sharing
</quote> of his content without
14428 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14431 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14432 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14433 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14434 providers would be free, under this rule, to
<quote>share
</quote> that content,
14435 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14436 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14437 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14442 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14443 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14444 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14445 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14446 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14447 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14448 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14452 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14453 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14454 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14455 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14456 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14457 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14458 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14459 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14462 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14463 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14464 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14465 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14466 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14467 delivering and accessing content.
14470 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14471 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14474 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14475 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14476 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14477 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14478 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14479 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14480 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14481 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14484 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14485 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14486 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14487 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14488 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14489 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14490 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14493 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14494 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14497 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'
>
14498 <primary>artists
</primary>
14499 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14501 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14502 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14503 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14504 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14505 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14506 2004), ch.
6, available at
14507 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14508 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14509 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14510 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
<quote>Impose a
14511 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,
</quote> available at
14512 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Who's Holding Back
14513 Broadband?
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14514 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14515 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14517 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14518 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14519 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14520 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14522 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry,
<quote>Getting Copyright Right,
</quote>
14523 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14524 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14525 McCullagh,
<quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,
</quote> CNET News.com,
27 August
14527 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14528 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14529 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14530 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14531 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14532 debate by about a decade. See
14533 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14534 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14535 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14536 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14537 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'
/>
14539 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14540 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14541 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14542 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14543 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14544 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14545 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14546 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14549 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14551 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14552 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14553 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14554 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14555 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14556 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14557 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14558 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14559 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14560 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14561 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14562 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14563 controlling access.
14566 <primary>artists
</primary>
14567 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14570 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14571 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14572 the system supports the widest range of
<quote>semiotic democracy
</quote>
14573 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14574 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14575 limits on derivative
14577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14578 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14579 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14580 allowed to do with the content itself.
14582 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
14584 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14585 <quote>harm
</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14586 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14587 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14588 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14589 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat
<quote>free
</quote> by being
14590 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14591 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14592 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14593 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14594 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14595 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14598 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
14600 This competition has already occurred against the background of
<quote>free
</quote>
14601 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14602 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14603 that, there is nothing impossible at all about
<quote>competing with free.
</quote>
14604 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14605 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14606 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14607 theaters are often luxurious
—with
<quote>first class
</quote> seats, and meals
14608 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14609 finding ways to compete with
<quote>free.
</quote>
14612 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14613 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14614 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14615 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14616 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14617 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14621 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14626 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14627 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14628 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14629 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14633 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14636 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14639 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14643 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14644 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14649 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14650 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14654 But what if
<quote>piracy
</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14655 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14656 consumers continue to
<quote>take
</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14660 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14661 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14662 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14663 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14664 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14665 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14666 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14667 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14668 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14669 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14670 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14674 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14675 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14676 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14679 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14680 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14684 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14685 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14687 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14688 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14689 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14690 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14693 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14694 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14695 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14696 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14697 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14698 strong view queers the law.
14701 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14702 <quote>radical
</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14703 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14704 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14705 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14706 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14707 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14708 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14710 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Copyright's First Amendment
</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14711 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14716 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14717 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14718 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14721 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14722 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14723 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14724 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14726 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14727 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14728 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14729 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14730 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14731 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14732 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14733 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14734 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14735 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?
</quote> working paper, June
2003,
14737 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14738 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14739 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14740 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14741 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14742 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14744 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14745 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14750 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14751 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14752 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14753 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14754 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14755 practically never be done.
14758 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14759 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14760 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14761 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14762 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14763 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14764 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14765 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14768 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14769 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14770 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14771 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14772 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14773 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14776 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14777 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14778 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14781 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
14783 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14784 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14785 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14786 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14787 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14788 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14789 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14792 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14793 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14795 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14796 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14797 simple pragmatic question:
<quote>Will it do good?
</quote> When challenged about
14798 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers,
<quote>Why not?
</quote>
14801 We should ask,
<quote>Why?
</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14802 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14803 keep your lawyers away.
14805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14809 <chapter label=
"17" id=
"c-notes">
14810 <title>NOTES
</title>
14812 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14813 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14814 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14815 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14816 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14817 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14818 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14819 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14820 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14823 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14826 <chapter label=
"18" id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14827 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14829 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14830 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14831 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14832 to him that this book is dedicated.
14834 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
14836 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14837 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14838 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14839 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14840 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14841 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14842 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14843 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14844 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14845 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14846 critical eye on much of this.
14849 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14850 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14851 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14852 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14853 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14854 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14855 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14856 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14857 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14860 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14861 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14862 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14863 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14864 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14865 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14866 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14867 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14868 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14869 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14870 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14871 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14872 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14873 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14874 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams,
<quote>Wink,
</quote> Roger Wood,
<quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,
</quote>
14875 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14876 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14877 a bunch of great replies.)
14880 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14881 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14882 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14883 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14884 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14885 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14886 throughout this book.
14889 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14890 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14891 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14892 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14894 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->