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16 <!--
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18
19 <book id="index" lang="en">
20 <bookinfo>
21 <title>Free Culture</title>
22
23 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24
25 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
26 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
27
28 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
29
30 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
31
32 <authorgroup>
33 <author>
34 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
35 <surname>Lessig</surname>
36 </author>
37 </authorgroup>
38
39 <copyright>
40 <year>2004</year>
41 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
42 </copyright>
43
44 <legalnotice>
45 <para>
46 <inlinemediaobject>
47 <imageobject>
48 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.png" width="100%" align="center"/>
49 </imageobject>
50 <imageobject>
51 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.svg" width="100%" align="center"/>
52 </imageobject>
53 <textobject>
54 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
55 </textobject>
56 </inlinemediaobject>
57 </para>
58
59 <para>
60 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
61 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
62 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
63 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
64 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
65 </para>
66 </legalnotice>
67
68 <abstract>
69 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
70 <para>
71 LAWRENCE LESSIG
72 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
73 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
74 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
75 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
76 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
77 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
78 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
79 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
80 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
81 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
82 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
83 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
84 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
85 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
86 Appeals.
87 </para>
88 </abstract>
89 </bookinfo>
90
91 <colophon>
92 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
93
94 <para>
95 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
96 </para>
97 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
98 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
99 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
100 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
101 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
102 </itemizedlist>
103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
104
105 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
106 <para>
107 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
108 </para>
109 <para>
110 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
111 </para>
112 <para>
113 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
114 </para>
115
116 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
117 <para>
118 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
119 </para>
120
121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
122 <para>
123 FREE CULTURE
124 </para>
125
126 <para>
127 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
128 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
129 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
130 </para>
131
132 <para>
133 LAWRENCE LESSIG
134 </para>
135
136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
137 <para>
138 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
139 York, New York
140 </para>
141 <para>
142 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
143 </para>
144 <para>
145 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
146 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
147 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
148 </para>
149 <para>
150 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
151 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
152 </para>
153 <para>
154 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
155 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
156 </para>
157 <para>
158 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
159 </para>
160 <para>
161 Lessig, Lawrence.
162 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
163 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
164 </para>
165 <para>
166 p. cm.
167 </para>
168 <para>
169 Includes index.
170 </para>
171 <para>
172 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
173 </para>
174 <para>
175 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
176 </para>
177 <para>
178 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
179 </para>
180 <para>
181 KF2979.L47
182 </para>
183 <para>
184 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
185 </para>
186 <para>
187 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
188 </para>
189 <para>
190 Printed in the United States of America
191 </para>
192 <para>
193 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
194 </para>
195 <para>
196 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
197 </para>
198
199 <para>
200 &translationblock;
201 </para>
202
203 <para>
204 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
205 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
206 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
207 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
208 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
209 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
210 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
211 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
212 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
213 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
214 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
215 </para>
216 </colophon>
217
218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
219 <dedication>
220 <para>
221 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
222 it continues still.
223 </para>
224 </dedication>
225
226 <toc id="toc"></toc>
227
228 <lot>
229 <title>List of figures</title>
230 </lot>
231
232 <!--
233 c PREFACE xiii
234 c INTRODUCTION
235 c "PIRACY"
236 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
237 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
238 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
239 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
240 2 Film
241 2 Recorded Music
242 2 Radio
243 2 Cable TV
244 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
245 2 Piracy I
246 2 Piracy II
247 c "PROPERTY"
248 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
249 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
250 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
251 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
252 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
253 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
254 2 Beginnings
255 2 Law: Duration
256 2 Law: Scope
257 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
258 2 Architecture and Law: Force
259 2 Market: Concentration
260 2 Together
261 c PUZZLES
262 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
263 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
264 2 Constraining Creators
265 2 Constraining Innovators
266 2 Corrupting Citizens
267 c BALANCES
268 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
269 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
270 c CONCLUSION
271 c AFTERWORD
272 1 Us, Now
273 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
274 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
275 1 Them, Soon
276 2 1. More Formalities
277 3 Registration and Renewal
278 3 Marking
279 2 2. Shorter Terms
280 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
281 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
282 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
283 c NOTES
284 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
285 c INDEX
286 -->
287
288 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
289
290 <preface id="preface">
291 <title>PREFACE</title>
292 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
293 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
294 </indexterm>
295 <para>
296 At the end of his review of my first book, <citetitle>Code: And Other
297 Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
298 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
299 </para>
300 <blockquote>
301 <para>
302 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
303 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
304 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
305 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
306 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
307 </para></footnote>
308 </para>
309 </blockquote>
310 <para>
311 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
312 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
313 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
314 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
315 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
316 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
317 "affect" us anymore.
318 </para>
319 <para>
320 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
321 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
322 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
323 causes even after the modem is turned
324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
325 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
326 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
327 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
328 </para>
329 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
330 <para>
331 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
332 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
333 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
334 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
335 important.
336 </para>
337 <para>
338 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
339 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
340 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
341 free software movement<footnote>
342 <para>
343 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
344 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
345 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
346 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
347 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
348 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
349 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
350 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
351 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
352 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
353 "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
354 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
355 past.
356 </para>
357 <para>
358 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
359 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
360 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
361 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
362 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
363 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
364 culture deem fundamental.
365 </para>
366 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
367 <para>
368 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
369 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
370 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
371 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
372 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
373 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
374 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
375 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
376 he asked,
377 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
378 </para>
379 <blockquote>
380 <para>
381 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
382 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
383 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
384 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
385 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
386 "The Great Media Gulp," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
387 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
388 </para></footnote>
389 </para>
390 </blockquote>
391 <para>
392 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
393 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
394 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
395 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
396 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
397 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
398 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
399 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
400 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
401 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
402 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
403 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
404 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
405 that this work is "merely" derivative.
406 </para>
407 <para>
408 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
409 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
410 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
411 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
412 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
413 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
414 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
415 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
416
417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
418 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
419 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
420 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
421 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
422 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
423 what I advance here.
424 </para>
425 <para>
426 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
427 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
428 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
429 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
430 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
431 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
432 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
433 book is written.
434 </para>
435
436 </preface>
437 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
438
439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
440 <chapter id="c-introduction">
441 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
442 <para>
443 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
444 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
445 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
446 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
447 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
448 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
449 </para>
450 <para>
451 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
452 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
453 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
454 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
455 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
456 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
457 </para></footnote>
458 For many
459 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
460 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
461 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
462 </para>
463 <para>
464 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
465 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
466 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
467 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
468 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
469 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
470 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
471 </para>
472 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
473 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
474 <para>
475 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
476 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
477 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
478 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
479 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
480 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
481 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
482 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
483 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
484 </para>
485 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
486 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
487 <para>
488 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
489 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
490 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
491 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
492 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
493 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
494 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
495 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
496 </para>
497 <blockquote>
498 <para>
499 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
500 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
501 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
502 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
503 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
504 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
505 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
506 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
507 <para>
508 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
509 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
510 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
511 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
512 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
513 Authorship," <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
514 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
515 1112&ndash;13.
516 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
517 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
518 </para></footnote>
519 </para>
520 </blockquote>
521 <para>
522 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
523 </para>
524 <para>
525 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
526 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
527 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
529 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
530 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
531 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
532 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
533 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
534 </para>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
536 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
537 <para>
538 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
539 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
540 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
541 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
542 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
543 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
544 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
545 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
546 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
547 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
548 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
549 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
550 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
551 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
552 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
553 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
554 </para>
555 <para>
556 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
557 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
558 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
559 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
560 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
561 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
562 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
563 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
564 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
565 understanding of radio.
566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
567 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
568 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
569 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
570 </para>
571 <para>
572 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
573 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
574 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
575 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
576 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
577 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
578 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
579 much less transmitter power and static.
580 </para>
581 <para>
582 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
583 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
584 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
585 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
586 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
587 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
588 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
589 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
590 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
591 </para>
592 <para>
593 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
594 </para>
595 <blockquote>
596 <para>
597 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
598 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
599 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
600 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
601 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
602 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
603 box."<footnote><para>
604 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
605 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
606 </para></footnote>
607 </para>
608 </blockquote>
609 <para>
610 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
611 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
612 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
613 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
614 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
615 a handful of networks.
616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
617 </para>
618 <para>
619 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
620 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
621 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
622 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
623 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
624 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
625 </para>
626 <blockquote>
627 <para>
628 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
629 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
630 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
631 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
632 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
633 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
634
635 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
636 </para></footnote>
637 </para>
638 </blockquote>
639 <para>
640 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
641 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
642 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
643 described,
644 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
645 </para>
646 <blockquote>
647 <para>
648 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
649 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
650 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
651 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
652 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
653 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
654 </para></footnote>
655 </para>
656 </blockquote>
657 <para>
658 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
659 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
660 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
661 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
662 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
663 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
664 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
665 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
666 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
667 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
668 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
669 </para>
670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
671 <blockquote>
672 <para>
673 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
674 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
675 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
676 deviousness.<footnote><para>
677 Lessing, 256.
678 </para></footnote>
679 </para>
680 </blockquote>
681 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
682 <para>
683 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
684 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
685 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
686 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
687 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
688 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
689 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
690 least temporarily.
691 </para>
692 <para>
693 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
694 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
695 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
696 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
697 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
698 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
699 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
700 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
701 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
702 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
703 </para>
704 <para>
705 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
706 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
707 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
708 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
709 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
710 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
711 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
712 course always public spirited; the reality is something
713 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
714 to themselves, would crumble in
715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
716 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
717 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
718 effect of technological change.
719 </para>
720 <para>
721 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
722 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
723 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
724 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
725 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
726 before.<footnote><para>
727 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
728 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
729 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
730 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
731 </para></footnote>
732 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
733 of 2004.
734 </para>
735 <para>
736 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
737 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
738 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
739 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
740 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
741 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
742 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
743 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
744 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
745 </para>
746 <para>
747 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
748 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
749 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
750 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
751 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
752 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
753 has introduced.
754 </para>
755 <para>
756 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
757 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
758 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
759 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
760 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
761 parks or on
762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
763 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
764 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
765 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
766 </para>
767 <para>
768 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
769 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
770 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
771 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
772 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
773 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
774 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
775 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
776 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
777 </para>
778 <para>
779 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
780 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
781 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
782 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
783 marketplace.<footnote>
784 <para>
785 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
786 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
787 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
788 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
789 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
790 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
791 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
792 198&ndash;200.
793 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
794 </para></footnote>
795 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
796 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
797 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
798 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
799 </para>
800 <para>
801 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
802 been erased.<footnote><para>
803 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
804 2001), ch. 13.
805 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
806 </para></footnote>
807 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
808 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
809 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
810 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
811 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
812 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
813 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
814 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
815 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
816 culture, more and more a permission culture.
817 </para>
818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
819 <para>
820 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
821 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
822 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
823 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
824 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
825 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
826 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
827 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
828 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
829 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
830 Causbys.
831 </para>
832 <para>
833 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
834 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
835 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
836 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
837 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
838 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
839 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
840 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
841 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
842 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
843 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
844 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
845 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
846 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
847 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
848 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
849 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
850 </para>
851 <para>
852 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
853 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
854 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
855 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
856 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
857 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
858 remakes them.
859 </para>
860 <para>
861 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
863 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
864 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
865 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
866 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
867 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
868 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
869 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
870 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <citetitle>New York
871 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
872 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
873 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
874 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
875 against it.
876 </para>
877 <para>
878 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
879 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
880 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
881 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
882 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
883 Internet.
884 </para>
885 <para>
886 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
887 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
888 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
889 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
890 </para>
891 <para>
892 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
893 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
894 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
895 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
896 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
897 <para>
898 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <citetitle>Yale Law
899 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
900 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
901 </para></footnote>
902 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
903 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
904 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
905 could cultivate and extend our culture.
906 </para>
907 <para>
908 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
909 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
910 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
911 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
912 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
913 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
914 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
915 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
916 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
917 </para>
918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
919 <para>
920 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
921 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
922 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
923 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
924 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
925 against an industry.
926 </para>
927 <para>
928 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
929 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
930 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
931 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
932 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
933 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
934 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
935 </para>
936 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
937 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
938 <para>
939 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
940 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
941 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
942 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
943 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
944 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
945 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
946 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
947 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
948 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
949 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
950 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
951 trespass.
952 </para>
953 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
954 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
955 <para>
956 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
957 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
958 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
959 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
960 war. Unlike
961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
962 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
963 on its side.
964 </para>
965 <para>
966 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
967 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
968 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
969 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
970 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
971 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
972 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
973 accepted as it is now.
974 </para>
975 <para>
976 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
977 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
978 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
979 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
980 </para>
981 <para>
982 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
983 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
984 </para>
985 <para>
986 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
987 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
988 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
989 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
990 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
991 </para>
992 <para>
993 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
994 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
995 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
996 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
997 view?
998 </para>
999 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1000 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1001 <para>
1002 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1003 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1004 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1005 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1006 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1007 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1008 this silliness will be much more profound.
1009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1010 </para>
1011 <para>
1012 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1013 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1014 ideas.
1015 </para>
1016 <para>
1017 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1018 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1019 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1020 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1021 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1022 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1023 </para>
1024 <para>
1025 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1026 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1027 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1028 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1029 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1030 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1031 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1032 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1033 fundamental about who we have always been.
1034 </para>
1035 <para>
1036 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1037 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1038 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1039 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1040 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1041 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1042 </para>
1043 </chapter>
1044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1045 <part id="c-piracy">
1046 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1047 <partintro>
1048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1049 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1050 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1051 </indexterm>
1052 <para>
1053 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1054 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1055 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1056 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1057 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1058 </para>
1059 <blockquote>
1060 <para>
1061 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1062 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1063 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1064 <!-- f1 -->
1065 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1066 </para></footnote>
1067 </para>
1068 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1069 </blockquote>
1070 <para>
1071 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1072 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1073 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1074 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1075 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1076 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1077 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1078 </para>
1079 <para>
1080 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1081 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1082 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1083 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1084 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1085 profit."
1086 </para>
1087 <para>
1088 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1089 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1090 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1091 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1092 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1093 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1094 </para>
1095 <para>
1096 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1097 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1098 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1099 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1100 </para>
1101 <para>
1102 The idea goes something like this:
1103 </para>
1104 <blockquote>
1105 <para>
1106 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1107 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1108 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1109 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1110 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1111 piracy.
1112 </para>
1113 </blockquote>
1114 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1115 <para>
1116 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1117 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1118 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1119 <!-- f2 -->
1120 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1121 in the Pepsi Generation," <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1122 </para></footnote>
1123 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1124 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1125 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1126 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1127 <!-- f3 -->
1128 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1129 Up," <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1130 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1131 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1132 Speech, No One Wins," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1133 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1134 </para></footnote>
1135 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1136 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1137 </para>
1138 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1139 <para>
1140 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1141 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1143 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1144 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1145 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1146 </para>
1147 <para>
1148 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1149 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1150 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1151 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1152 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1153 </para>
1154 <para>
1155 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1156 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1157 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1158 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1159 copyright law today regulates both.
1160 </para>
1161 <para>
1162 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1163 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1164 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1165 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1166 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1167 more expense of doing business.
1168 </para>
1169 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1170 <para>
1171 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1172 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1173 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1174 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1175 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1176 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1177 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1178 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1179 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1180 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1181 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1182 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1183 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1184 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1185 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1187 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1188 <para>
1189 <!-- f4 -->
1190 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1191 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1192 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1193 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1194 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1195 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1196 enabled are much more tenuous.
1197 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1198 </para></footnote>
1199 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1200 this creative class.
1201 </para>
1202 <para>
1203 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1204 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1205 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1206 </para>
1207 </partintro>
1208
1209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1210 <chapter id="creators">
1211 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1212 <para>
1213 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1214 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1215 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1216 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1217 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1218 </para>
1219 <para>
1220 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1221 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1222 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1223 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1224 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1225 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1226 </para>
1227 <blockquote>
1228 <para>
1229 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1230 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1231 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1232 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1234 </para>
1235 <para>
1236 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1237 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1238 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1239 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1240 synchronization was pretty close.
1241 </para>
1242 <para>
1243 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1244 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1245 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1246 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1247 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1248 <!-- f1 -->
1249 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1250 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1251 </para></footnote>
1252 </para>
1253 </blockquote>
1254 <para>
1255 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1256 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1257 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1258 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1259 </para>
1260 <para>
1261 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1262 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1263 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1264 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1265 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1266 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1267 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1268 </para>
1269 <para>
1270 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1271 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1272 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1273 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1274 </para>
1275 <para>
1276 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1277 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1278 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1279 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1280 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1281 and among the best of its genre.
1282 </para>
1283 <para>
1284 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1285 Willie.
1286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1287 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1288 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1289 <!-- f2 -->
1290 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1291 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1292 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1293 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1294 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1295 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1296 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1297 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1298 </para></footnote>
1299 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1300 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1301 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1302 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1303 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1304 Mouse.
1305 </para>
1306 <para>
1307 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1308 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1309 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1310 <!-- f3 -->
1311 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1312 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1313 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1314 </para></footnote>
1315 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1316 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1317 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1318 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1319 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1320 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1321 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1322 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1323 old.
1324 </para>
1325 <para>
1326 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1327 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1328 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1329 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1330 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1331 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1332 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1333 </para>
1334 <para>
1335 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1336 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1337 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1338 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1339 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1340 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1341 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1342 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1343 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1344 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1345 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1347 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1348 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1349 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1350 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1351 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1352 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1353 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1354 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1355 </para>
1356 <para>
1357 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1358 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1359 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1360 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1361 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1362 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1363 culture around us and makes it something different.
1364 </para>
1365 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1366 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1367 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1368 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1369 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1370 <!-- f4 -->
1371 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1372 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1373 determining
1374 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1375 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1376 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1377 average
1378 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1379 Web site associated with this book, available at
1380 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1381 </para></footnote>
1382 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1383 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1384 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1385 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1386 </para>
1387 <para>
1388 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1389 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1390 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1391 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1392 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1393 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1394 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1395 </para>
1396 <para>
1397 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1398 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1399 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1400 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1401
1402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1403 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1404 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1405 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1406 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1407 content from before the Great Depression.
1408 </para>
1409 <para>
1410 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1411 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1412 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1413 universal.
1414 </para>
1415 <para>
1416 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1417 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1418 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1419 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1420 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1421 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1422 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1423 </para>
1424 <para>
1425 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1426 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1427 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1428 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1429 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1430 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1431 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1432 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1433 interestingly different way.
1434 </para>
1435 <para>
1436 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1437 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1438 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1439 </para>
1440 <para>
1441 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1442 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1443 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1444 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1445 transforming it either subtly or
1446 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1447 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1448 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1449 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1450 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1451 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1452 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1453 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1454 </para>
1455 <para>
1456 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1457 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1458 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1459 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1460 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1461 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1462 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1463 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1464 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1465 </para>
1466 <para>
1467 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1468 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1469 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1470 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1471 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1472 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1473 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1474 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1475 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1476 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1477 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1478 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1479 </para>
1480 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1481 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1482 </indexterm>
1483 <para>
1484 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1485 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1486 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1487 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1488 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1490 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1491 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1492 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1493 <!-- f5 -->
1494 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1495 York: Perennial, 2000).
1496 </para></footnote>
1497 </para>
1498 <para>
1499 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1500 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1501 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1502 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1503 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1504 which are fifty years old."
1505 </para>
1506 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1507 <para>
1508 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1509 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1510 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1511 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1512 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1513 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1514 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1515 <!-- f6 -->
1516 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1517 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1518 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1519 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1520 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1521 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1522 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1523 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1524 </para></footnote>
1525 </para>
1526 <para>
1527 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1528 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1529 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1530 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1531 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1532 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1533 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1534 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1535 culture?
1536 </para>
1537 <para>
1538 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1539 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1540 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1541 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1542 to prosecute cases like this."
1543 </para>
1544 <para>
1545 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1546 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1547 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1548 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1550 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1551 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1552 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1553 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1554 their clients or hurt them?
1555 Let's pause for a moment.
1556 </para>
1557 <para>
1558 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1559 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1560 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1561 </para>
1562 <para>
1563 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1564 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1565 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1566 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1567 <!-- f7 -->
1568 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1569 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1570 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1571 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1572 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1573 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1574 very different.
1575 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1576 </para></footnote>
1577 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1578 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1579 property.
1580 </para>
1581 <para>
1582 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1583 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1584 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1585 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1586 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1587 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1588 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1589 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1590 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1591 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1592 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1593 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1594 the public domain.
1595 </para>
1596 <para>
1597 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1598 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1599 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1600
1601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1602 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1603 freedom is good.
1604 </para>
1605 <para>
1606 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1607 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1608 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1609 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1610 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1611 form, whether large or small.
1612 </para>
1613 <para>
1614 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1615 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1616 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1617 particular find it hard to say why.
1618 </para>
1619 <para>
1620 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1621 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1622 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1623 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1624 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1625 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1626 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1627 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1628 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1629 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1630 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1631 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1632 </para>
1633 <para>
1634 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1635 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1636 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1637 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1638 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1639 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1640 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1641 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1643 </para>
1644 <para>
1645 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1646 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1647 question instead is "<emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1648 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1649 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1650 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1651 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1652 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1653 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1654 a studio or not?
1655 </para>
1656 <para>
1657 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1658 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1659 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1660 </para>
1661
1662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1663 </chapter>
1664 <chapter id="mere-copyists">
1665 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1666 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1667 <primary>photography</primary>
1668 </indexterm>
1669 <para>
1670 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1671 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1672 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1673 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1674 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1675 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1676 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1677 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1678 </para>
1679 <para>
1680 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1681 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1682 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1683 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1684 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1685 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1686 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1687 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1688 amateurs.
1689 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1690 </para>
1691 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1692 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1693 </indexterm>
1694 <para>
1695 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1696 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1698 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1699 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1700 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1701 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1702 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1703 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1704 population of photographers.
1705 </para>
1706 <para>
1707 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1708 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1709 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1710 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1711 <!-- f1 -->
1712 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1713 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1714 </para>
1715 <blockquote>
1716 <para>
1717 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1718 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1719 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1720 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1721 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1722 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1723 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1724 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1725 chemicals.<footnote>
1726 <para>
1727 <!-- f2 -->
1728 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1729 1977), 53.
1730 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1731 </para></footnote>
1732 </para>
1733 </blockquote>
1734 <para>
1735 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1736 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1737 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1738 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1739 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1740 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1741 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1742 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1743 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1744 percent.<footnote><para>
1745 <!-- f3 -->
1746 Jenkins, 177.
1747 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1748 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1749 <!-- f4 -->
1750 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1751 </para></footnote>
1752 </para>
1753 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1754 <para>
1755
1756 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1757 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1758 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1759 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1760 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1761 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1762 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1763 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1764 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1765 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1766 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1767 <!-- f5 -->
1768 Coe, 58.
1769 </para></footnote>
1770 </para>
1771 <para>
1772 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1773 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1774 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1775 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1776 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1777 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1778 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1779 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1780 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1781 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1782 have before.
1783 </para>
1784 <para>
1785 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1786 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1787 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1788 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1789 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1790 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1791 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1792 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1793 <!-- f6 -->
1794 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1795 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1796 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1797 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1798 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1799 </para></footnote>
1800 </para>
1801 <para>
1802 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1803 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1804 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1805 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1806 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1807 draw
1808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1809 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1810 that they thought valuable.
1811 </para>
1812 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1813 <para>
1814 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1815 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1816 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1817 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1818 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1819 <para>
1820 <!-- f7 -->
1821 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1822 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1823 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1824 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1825 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1826 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1827 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1828 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1829 </para>
1830 <para>
1831 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1832 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1833 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1834 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1835 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1836 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1837 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1838 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1839 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1840 <!-- f8 -->
1841 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1842 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1843 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1844 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1845 (1993).
1846 </para></footnote>)
1847 </para>
1848 <para>
1849 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1850 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1851 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1852 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1853 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1854 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1855 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1856 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1857 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1858 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1859 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1860 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1861 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1862 </para>
1863 <para>
1864
1865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1866 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1867 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1868 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1869 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1870 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1871 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1872 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1873 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1874 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1875 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1876 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1877 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1878 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1879 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1880 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1881 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1882 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1883 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1884 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1885 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1886 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1887 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1888 learn.
1889 </para>
1890 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1891 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1892 <para>
1893 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1894 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1895 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1896 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1897 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1898 <!-- f9 -->
1899 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1900 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1901 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1902 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1903 </para></footnote>
1904 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1905 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1906 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1907 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1908 </para>
1909 <para>
1910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1911 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1912 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1913 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1914 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1915 the way people access it."
1916 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1917 </para>
1918 <para>
1919 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1920 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1921 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1922 about.
1923 </para>
1924 <para>
1925 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1926 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1927 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1928 <!-- f10 -->
1929 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1930 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1931 Study," <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
1932 </para></footnote>
1933 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1934 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1935 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1936 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1937 (at least at first) terrible media.
1938 </para>
1939 <para>
1940 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1941 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1942 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
1943 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1944 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
1945 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1946 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1947 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1948 </para>
1949 <para>
1950 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1951 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1952 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1953 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1954 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1955 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1956 </para>
1957 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1958 <para>
1959 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1960 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1961 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1962
1963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1964 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1965 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1966 texture."<footnote>
1967 <para>
1968 <!-- f11 -->
1969 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1970 2002.
1971 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1972 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1973 </para></footnote>
1974 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1975 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1976 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1977 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1978 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1979 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1980 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1981 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1982 <!-- f12 -->
1983 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1984 November 2000, available at
1985 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1986 available at
1987 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1988 </para></footnote>
1989 </para>
1990 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1991 <para>
1992 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1993 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1994 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1995 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1996 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1997 </para>
1998 <para>
1999 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
2000 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2001 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2002 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2003 </para>
2004 <blockquote>
2005 <para>
2006 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2007 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2008 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2009 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2010 being read-only.
2011 </para>
2012 </blockquote>
2013 <para>
2014 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2015 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2016 twentieth century.
2017 </para>
2018 <para>
2019 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2020 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2021 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2022 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2023 literacy,
2024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2025 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2026 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2027 express."<footnote>
2028 <para>
2029 <!-- f13 -->
2030 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2031 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2032 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2033 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2034 <!-- f14 -->
2035 Ibid.
2036 </para></footnote>
2037 </para>
2038 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2039 <para>
2040 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2041 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2042 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2043 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2044 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2045 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2046 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2047 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2048 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2049 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2050 </para>
2051 <para>
2052 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2053 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2054 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2055 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2056 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2057 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2058 </para>
2059 <para>
2060 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2061 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2062 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2063 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2064 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2065 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2066 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2067 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2068 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2069 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2070 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2071 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2072 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2073 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2074 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2075 </para>
2076 <para>
2077
2078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2079 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2080 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2081 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2082 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2083 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2084 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2085 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2086 our interview,
2087 </para>
2088 <blockquote>
2089 <para>
2090 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2091 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2092 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2093 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2094 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2095 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2096 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2097 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2098 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2099 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2100 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2101 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2102 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2103 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2104 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2105 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2106 about the topic. . . .
2107 </para>
2108 <para>
2109 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2110 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2111 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2112 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2113 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2114 </para>
2115 <para>
2116 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2117 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2118 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2119 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2120 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2121 had a lot of power with this language."
2122 </para>
2123 </blockquote>
2124 <para>
2125 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2126 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2127 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2128 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2129 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2130 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2131 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2132 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2133 world would be watching.
2134 </para>
2135 <para>
2136 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2137 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2138 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2139 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2140 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2141 entertainment is tragedy.
2142 </para>
2143 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2144 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2145 <para>
2146 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2147 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2148 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2149 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2150 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2151 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2152 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2153 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2154 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2155 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2156 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2157 was also the Internet.
2158 </para>
2159 <para>
2160 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2161 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2162 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2163 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2164 movie
2165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2166 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2167 with sound or text.
2168 </para>
2169 <para>
2170 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2171 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2172 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2173 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2174 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2175 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2176 spread practically instantaneously.
2177 </para>
2178 <para>
2179 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2180 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2181 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2182 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2183 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2184 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2185 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2186 </para>
2187 <para>
2188 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2189 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2190 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2191 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2192 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2193 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2194 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2195 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2196 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2197 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2198 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2199 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2200 </para>
2201 <para>
2202 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2203 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2204 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2205 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2206 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2207 people vote
2208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2209 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2210 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2211 </para>
2212 <para>
2213 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2214 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2215 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2216 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2217 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2218 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2219 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2220 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2221 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2222 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2223 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2224 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2225 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2226 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2227 <!-- f15 -->
2228 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2229 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2230 </para></footnote>
2231 </para>
2232 <para>
2233 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2234 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2235 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2236 <!-- f16 -->
2237 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <citetitle>Journal of
2238 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2239 </para></footnote>
2240 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2241 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2242 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2243 </para>
2244 <para>
2245 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2246 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2247 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2248 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2249 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2250 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2251 <!-- f17 -->
2252 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2253 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2254 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2255 little beyond what our friends say.
2256 </para>
2257 <para>
2258 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2259 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2260 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2261 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2262 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2263
2264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2265 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2266 place.
2267 </para>
2268 <para>
2269 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2270 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2271 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2272 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2273 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2274 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2275 </para>
2276 <para>
2277 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2278 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2279 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2280 is having an effect.
2281 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2282 </para>
2283 <para>
2284 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2285 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2286 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2287 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2288 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2289 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2290 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2291 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2292 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2293 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2294 <!-- f18 -->
2295 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2296 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2297 </para></footnote>
2298 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2299 </para>
2300 <para>
2301 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2302 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2303 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2304 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2305 on.
2306 </para>
2307 <para>
2308 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2309 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2310 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2311 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2312 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2313 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2314 peer-generated rankings.
2315 </para>
2316 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2317 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2318 </indexterm>
2319 <para>
2320 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2322 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2323 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2324 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2325 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2326 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2327 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2328 get it out of the way."
2329 </para>
2330 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2331 <para>
2332 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2333 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2334 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2335 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2336 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2337 <!-- f19 -->
2338 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2339 </para></footnote>
2340 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2341 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2342 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2343 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2344 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2345 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2346 told her <emphasis>that</emphasis> they were writing "the story.")
2347 </para>
2348 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2349 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2350 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2351 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2352 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2353 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2354 had seen.<footnote><para>
2355 <!-- f20 -->
2356 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2357 Information Online," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2358 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2359 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2360 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2361 </para></footnote>
2362 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2363 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2364 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2365 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2366 </para>
2367 <para>
2368 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2369 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2370 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2371 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2372 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2373 <para>
2374 <!-- f21 -->
2375 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" <citetitle>New
2376 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2377 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2378 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2379 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2380 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2381 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2382 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2383 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2384 </para></footnote>
2385 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2386
2387 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2388 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2389 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2390 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2391 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2392 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2393 </para>
2394 <para>
2395 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2396 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2397 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2398 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2399 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2400 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2401 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2402 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2403 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2404 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2405 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2406 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2407 extraordinary to report.
2408 </para>
2409 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2410 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2411 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2412 </indexterm>
2413 <para>
2414 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2415 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2416 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2417 </para>
2418 <para>
2419 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2420 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2421 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2422 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2423 affect learning.
2424 </para>
2425 <para>
2426 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2427 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2428 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2429 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2430 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2431 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2433 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2434 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2435 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2436 the tinkering of many others.
2437 </para>
2438 <para>
2439 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2440 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2441 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2442 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2443 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2444 </para>
2445 <para>
2446 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2447 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2448 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2449 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2450 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2451 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2452 </para>
2453 <para>
2454 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2455 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2456 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2457 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2458 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2459 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2460 learn.
2461 </para>
2462 <para>
2463 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2464 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2465 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2466 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2467 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2468 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2469 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2470 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2471 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2472 </para>
2473 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2474 <para>
2475 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2476 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2477
2478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2479 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2480 kind of recognition.
2481 </para>
2482 <para>
2483 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2484 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2485 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2486 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2487 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2488 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2489 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2490 </para>
2491 <para>
2492 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2493 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2494 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2495 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2496 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2497 general.<footnote><para>
2498 <!-- f22 -->
2499 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2500 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," <citetitle>Communications
2501 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2502 </para></footnote>
2503 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2504 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2505 </para>
2506 <para>
2507 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2508 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2509 and want to learn."
2510 </para>
2511 <para>
2512 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2513 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2514 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2515 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2516 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2517 </para>
2518 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2519 <para>
2520 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2521 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2522 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2523 the law to close down that technology.
2524 </para>
2525 <para>
2526 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2527 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2528 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2529 </para>
2530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2531 </chapter>
2532 <chapter id="catalogs">
2533 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2534 <para>
2535 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2536 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2537 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2538 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2539 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2540 </para>
2541 <para>
2542 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2543 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2544 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2545 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2546 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2547 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2548 </para>
2549 <para>
2550 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2551 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2552 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2553 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2554 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2555 </para>
2556 <para>
2557 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2559 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2560 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2561 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2562 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2563 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2564 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2565 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2566 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2567 </para>
2568 <para>
2569 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2570 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2571 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2572 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2573 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2574 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2575 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2576 </para>
2577 <para>
2578 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2579 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2580 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2581 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2582 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2583 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2584 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2585 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2586 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2587 on-line.
2588 </para>
2589 <para>
2590 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2591 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2592 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2593 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2594 be on users' computers.
2595 </para>
2596 <para>
2597 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2598 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2599 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2600 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2602 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2603 computer.
2604 </para>
2605 <para>
2606 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2607 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2608 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2609 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2610 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2611 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2612 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2613 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2614 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2615 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2616 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2617 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2618 supposed to do.
2619 </para>
2620 <para>
2621 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2622 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2623 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2624 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2625 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2626 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2627 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2628 </para>
2629 <para>
2630 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2631 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2632 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2633 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2634 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2635 easier to use"&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2636 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2637 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2638 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2639 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2640 with music.
2641 </para>
2642 <para>
2643 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2644 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2646 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2647 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2648 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2649 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2650 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2651 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2652 </para>
2653 <para>
2654 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2655 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2656 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2657 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2658 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2659 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2660 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2661 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2662 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2663 2001.<footnote><para>
2664
2665 <!-- f1 -->
2666 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2667 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2668 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2669 </para></footnote>
2670 </para>
2671 <para>
2672 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2673 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2674 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2675 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2676 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2677 </para>
2678 <para>
2679 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2680 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2681 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2682 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2683 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2684 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2685 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2686 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2687 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2688 </para>
2689 <para>
2690 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2691 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2692 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2693 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2694 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2695 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2696 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2697 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2698 </para>
2699 <para>
2700 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2701 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2702 </para>
2703 <para>
2704 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2705 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2706 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2707 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2708 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2709 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2710 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2711 <!-- f2 -->
2712 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2713 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2714 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2715 </para></footnote>
2716 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2717 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2718 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2719 <!-- f3 -->
2720 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2721 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2722 </para></footnote>
2723 </para>
2724 <para>
2725 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2726 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2727 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2728 activist:
2729 </para>
2730 <blockquote>
2731 <para>
2732 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2733 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2734 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2735 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2736 </para>
2737 </blockquote>
2738 <para>
2739 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2740 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2741 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2742 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2743 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2744 </para>
2745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2746 </chapter>
2747 <chapter id="pirates">
2748 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2749 <para>
2750 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2751 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2752 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2753 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2754 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2755 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2756 </para>
2757 <section id="film">
2758 <title>Film</title>
2759 <para>
2760 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2761 <!-- f1 -->
2762 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2763 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2764 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2765 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2766 </para></footnote>
2767 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2768 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2769 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2770 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2771 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2772 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2773 this creative property
2774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2775 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2776 </para>
2777 <para>
2778 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2779 </para>
2780 <blockquote>
2781 <para>
2782 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2783 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2784 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2785 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2786 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2787 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2788 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2789 </para>
2790 <para>
2791 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2792 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2793 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2794 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2795 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2796 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2797 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2798 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2799 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2800 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2801 <!-- f2 -->
2802 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2803 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2804 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2805 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2806 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2807 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2808 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2809 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2810 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2811 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2812 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2813 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2814 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2815 </para>
2816 </blockquote>
2817 <para>
2818 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2819 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2820 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2821 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2822 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2823 <!-- f3 -->
2824 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2825 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2826 </para></footnote>
2827 That led the independents to flee the East
2828 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2829 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2830 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2831 did just that.
2832 </para>
2833 <para>
2834 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2835 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2836 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2837
2838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2839 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2840 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2841 Edison's creative property.
2842 </para>
2843 </section>
2844 <section id="recordedmusic">
2845 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2846 <para>
2847 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2848 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2849 </para>
2850 <para>
2851 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2852 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2853 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2854 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2855 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2856 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2857 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2858 right to perform it publicly.
2859 </para>
2860 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2861 <para>
2862 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2863 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2864 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2865 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2866 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2867 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2868 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2869 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2870 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2871 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2872 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2873 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2874 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2875 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2876 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2877 its composer anything.
2878 </para>
2879 <para>
2880 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2882 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2883 put it,
2884 </para>
2885 <blockquote>
2886 <para>
2887 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2888 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2889 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2890 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2891 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2892 rights.<footnote><para>
2893 <!-- f4 -->
2894 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2895 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2896 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2897 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
2898 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2899 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2900 </para></footnote>
2901 </para>
2902 </blockquote>
2903 <para>
2904 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2905 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2906 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2907 <!-- f5 -->
2908 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2909 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2910 </para></footnote>
2911 and the "music publishing industry"
2912 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2913 <!-- f6 -->
2914 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2915 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2916 </para></footnote>
2917 As John Philip
2918 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2919 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2920 <!-- f7 -->
2921 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2922 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2923 </para></footnote>
2924 </para>
2925 <para>
2926 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2927 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2928 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2929 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2930 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2931 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2932 <!-- f8 -->
2933
2934 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2935 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2936 Perforating Company of New York).
2937 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2938 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2939 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2940 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2941 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2942 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2943 statute."<footnote><para>
2944 <!-- f9 -->
2945 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2946 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2947 Graphophone Company Association).
2948 </para></footnote>
2949 </para>
2950 <para>
2951 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2952 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
2953 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
2954 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
2955 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
2956 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
2957 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
2958 recorded once. This is the part of
2959
2960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2961 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2962 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2963 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2964 </para>
2965 <para>
2966 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2967 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2968 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2969 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2970 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2971 the fee set by the statute.
2972 </para>
2973 <para>
2974 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2975 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2976 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2977 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2978 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2979 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2980 Grisham.
2981 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2982 </para>
2983 <para>
2984 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2985 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
2986 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
2987 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
2988 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
2989 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
2990 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
2991 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
2992 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
2993 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
2994 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2995 creativity.<footnote><para>
2996
2997 <!-- f10 -->
2998 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2999 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3000 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3001 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3002 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3003 </para></footnote>
3004 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3005 </para>
3006 <para>
3007 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3008 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3009 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3010 relates,
3011 </para>
3012 <blockquote>
3013 <para>
3014 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3016 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3017 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3018 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3019 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3020 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3021 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3022 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3023 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3024 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3025 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3026 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3027 choice.<footnote><para>
3028 <!-- f11 -->
3029 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3030 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3031 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3032 this report.</para></footnote>
3033 </para>
3034 </blockquote>
3035 <para>
3036 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3037 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3038 </para>
3039 </section>
3040 <section id="radio">
3041 <title>Radio</title>
3042 <para>
3043 Radio was also born of piracy.
3044 </para>
3045 <para>
3046 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3047 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3048 <!-- f12 -->
3049 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3050 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3051 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3052 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3053 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3054 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3055 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3056 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3057 Copyright," <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3058 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3059 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3060 </para></footnote>
3061 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3062 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3063 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3064 </para>
3065 <para>
3066 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3067 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3068 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3069 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3070 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3071 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3072 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3073 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3074 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3075 music for his work.
3076 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3077
3078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3079 </para>
3080 <para>
3081 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3082 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3083 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3084 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3085 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3086 of playing the song.
3087 </para>
3088 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3089 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3090 </indexterm>
3091 <para>
3092 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3093 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3094 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3095 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3096 </para>
3097 <para>
3098 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3099 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3100 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3101 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3102 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3103 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3104 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3105 her anything.
3106 </para>
3107 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3108 <para>
3109 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3110 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3111 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3112 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3113 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3114 to take something for nothing.
3115 </para>
3116 </section>
3117 <section id="cabletv">
3118 <title>Cable TV</title>
3119 <para>
3120
3121 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3122 </para>
3123 <para>
3124 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3125 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3126 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3127 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3129 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3130 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3131 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3132 give away.
3133 </para>
3134 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3135 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3136 <para>
3137 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3138 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3139 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3140 <!-- f13 -->
3141 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3142 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3143 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3144 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3145 Commission).
3146 </para></footnote>
3147 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3148 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3149 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3150 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3151 <!-- f14 -->
3152 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3153 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3154 </para></footnote>
3155 As another broadcaster put it,
3156 </para>
3157 <blockquote>
3158 <para>
3159 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3160 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3161 paid for.<footnote><para>
3162 <!-- f15 -->
3163 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3164 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3165 </para></footnote>
3166 </para>
3167 </blockquote>
3168 <para>
3169 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3170 </para>
3171 <blockquote>
3172 <para>
3173 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3174 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3175 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3176 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3177 <!-- f16 -->
3178 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3179 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3180 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3181 </para></footnote>
3182 </para>
3183 </blockquote>
3184 <para>
3185 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3186 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3187 compensation."<footnote><para>
3188 <!-- f17 -->
3189 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3190 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3191 </para></footnote>
3192 </para>
3193 <para>
3194 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3195 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3196 </para>
3197 <blockquote>
3198 <para>
3199 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3200 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3201 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3202 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3203
3204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3205 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3206 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3207 <!-- f18 -->
3208 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3209 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3210 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3211 </para></footnote>
3212 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3213 </para>
3214 </blockquote>
3215 <para>
3216 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3217 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3218 </para>
3219 <para>
3220 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3221 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3222 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3223 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3224 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3225 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3226 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3227 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3228 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3229 created by broadcasters' content.
3230 </para>
3231 <para>
3232 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3233 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3234 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3235 today<footnote><para>
3236 <!-- f19 -->
3237 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3238 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3239 Information</citetitle>, available at
3240 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3241 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3242 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3243 </para></footnote>
3244 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3245 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3246 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. . . . The list is long and
3247 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3248 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3249 </para>
3250 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3251 </section>
3252 </chapter>
3253 <chapter id="piracy">
3254 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3255 <para>
3256 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3257 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3258 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3259 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3260 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3261 should stop it.
3262 </para>
3263 <para>
3264 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3265 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3266 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3267 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3268 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3269 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3270 has so often done in the past.
3271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3272 </para>
3273 <section id="piracy-i">
3274 <title>Piracy I</title>
3275 <para>
3276 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3277 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3278 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3279 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3280 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3281 <!-- f1 -->
3282 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3283 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3284 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3285 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," <citetitle>Financial
3286 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3287 </para></footnote>
3288 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3289 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3290 </para>
3291 <para>
3292 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3293 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3294 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3295 This piracy is wrong.
3296 </para>
3297 <para>
3298 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3299 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3300 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3301 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3302 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3303 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3304 of our existence, treated as right.
3305 </para>
3306 <para>
3307 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3308 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3309 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3310 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3311 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3312 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3313 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3314 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3315 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3316 </para>
3317 <para>
3318 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3319 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3320 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3321 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3322 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3323 similar childhood.
3324 </para>
3325 <para>
3326 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3327 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3328 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3329 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3330 <!-- f2 -->
3331 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: <citetitle>Who
3332 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3333 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3334 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3335 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3336 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3337 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3338 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3339 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3340 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3341 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3342 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3343 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3344 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3345 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3346 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3347 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3348 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3349 is wrong.
3350 </para>
3351 <para>
3352 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3353 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3354 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3355 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3356 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3357 <!-- f3 -->
3358 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3359 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3360 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the
3361 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3362 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3363 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3364 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3365 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3366 </para></footnote>
3367 </para>
3368 <para>
3369 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3370 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3371 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3372 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3373 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3374 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3375 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3376 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3377 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3378 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3379 piracy of the tangible.
3380 </para>
3381 <para>
3382 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3383 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3384 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3385 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3386 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3387 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3388 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3389 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3390 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3391
3392 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3393 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3394 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3395 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3396 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3397 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3398 </para>
3399 <para>
3400 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3401 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3402 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3403 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3404 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3405 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3406 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3407 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3408 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3409 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3410 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3411 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3412 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3413 <indexterm>
3414 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3415 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3416 </indexterm>
3417 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3418 </para>
3419 <para>
3420 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3421 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3422 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3423 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3424 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3425 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3426 </para>
3427 <para>
3428 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3429 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3430 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3431 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3432 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3433 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3434 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3435 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3436 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3437 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3438 violating the law is still wrong.
3439 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3440 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3441 </para>
3442 <para>
3443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3444 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3445 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3446 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3447 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3448 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3449 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3450 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3451 is flat out wrong.
3452 </para>
3453 <para>
3454 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3455 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3456 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3457 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3458 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3459 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3460 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3461 </para>
3462 <para>
3463 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3464 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3465 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3466 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3467 </para>
3468 <para>
3469 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3470 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3471 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3472 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3473 </para>
3474 <para>
3475 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3476 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3477 sharing to survive.
3478 </para>
3479 </section>
3480 <section id="piracy-ii">
3481 <title>Piracy II</title>
3482 <para>
3483 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3484 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3485 <!-- f4 -->
3486 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3487 </para></footnote>
3488 This means we must determine whether
3489 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3491 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3492 author of his profit.
3493 </para>
3494 <para>
3495 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3496 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3497 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3498 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3499 <!-- f5 -->
3500 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3501 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3502 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3503 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3504 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3505 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3506 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3507 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3508
3509 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3510 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3511 put together components that had been developed independently.
3512 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3513 </para>
3514 <para>
3515 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3516 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3517 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3518 system.<footnote><para>
3519 <!-- f6 -->
3520 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," <citetitle>San
3521 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3522 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3523 Secures New Financing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3524 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3525 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3526 </para></footnote>
3527 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3528 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3529 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3530 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3531 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3532 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3533 or your 20,000 best friends.
3534 </para>
3535 <para>
3536 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3537 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3538 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3539 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3540
3541 <!-- f7 -->
3542 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3543 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3544 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3545 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3546 </para></footnote>
3547 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3548 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3549 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3550 <!-- f8 -->
3551 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <citetitle>New
3552 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3553 </para></footnote>
3554 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3555 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3556 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3557 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3558 </para>
3559 <para>
3560 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3561 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3562 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3563 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3564 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3565 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3566 of harm it entails.
3567 </para>
3568 <para>
3569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3570 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3571 different kinds into four types.
3572 </para>
3573 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3574 <listitem><para>
3575 <!-- A. -->
3576 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3577 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3578 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3579 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3580 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3581 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3582 users who download instead of purchasing.
3583 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3584 </para></listitem>
3585 <listitem><para>
3586 <!-- B. -->
3587 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3588 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3589 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3590 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3591 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3592 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3593 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3594 music purchased.
3595 </para></listitem>
3596 <listitem><para>
3597 <!-- C. -->
3598 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3599 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3600 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3601 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3602 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3603 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3604 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3605 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3606 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3607 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3608 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3609 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3610 a local collector.
3611 </para></listitem>
3612 <listitem><para>
3613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3614 <!-- D. -->
3615 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3616 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3617 wants to give away.
3618 </para></listitem>
3619 </orderedlist>
3620 <para>
3621 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3622 </para>
3623 <para>
3624 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3625 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3626 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3627 harmful.<footnote><para>
3628 <!-- f9 -->
3629 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3630 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3631 </para></footnote>
3632 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3633 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3634 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3635 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3636 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3637 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3638 </para>
3639 <para>
3640 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3641 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3642 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3643 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3644 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3645 "devastating" the industry.
3646 </para>
3647 <para>
3648 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3649 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3650 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3651 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3652 &amp; Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3653 technology, the labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3654 <!-- f10 -->
3655 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3656 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3657 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3658 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3659 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3660 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3661 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3662 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3663 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3664 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3665 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3666 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3667 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3668 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3669 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3670 regulating technology was the answer.
3671 </para>
3672 <para>
3673 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3674 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3675 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3676 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3678 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3679 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3680 <!-- f11 -->
3681 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3682 </para></footnote>
3683 </para>
3684 <para>
3685 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3686 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3687 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3688 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3689 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3690 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3691 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3692 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3693 </para>
3694 <para>
3695 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3696 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3697 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3698 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3699 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3700 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3701 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3702 them.
3703
3704 </para>
3705 <para>
3706 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3707 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3708 actually suggest it might be close.
3709 </para>
3710 <para>
3711 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3712 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3713 percent.<footnote><para>
3714 <!-- f12 -->
3715 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3716 available at
3717 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3718 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3719 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3720 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3721 #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3722 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3723 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3724 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3725 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3726 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3727 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3728 shipments)."
3729 </para></footnote>
3730 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3731 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3732 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3733 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3734 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3735 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3736 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3737 <!-- f13 -->
3738 <para>
3739 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3740 February 2003, available at
3741 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3742 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3743 </para>
3744 </footnote>
3745 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3746 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, "The
3747 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3748 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3749 $19.99."<footnote><para>
3750 <!-- f14 -->
3751 Ibid.
3752 </para></footnote>
3753 </para>
3754 <para>
3755
3756 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3757 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3758 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3759 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3760 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3761 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3762 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3763 </para>
3764 <para>
3765 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3766 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3767 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3768 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own numbers
3769 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3770 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3771 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3772 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3773 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry
3774 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3775 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3776 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3777 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3778 </para>
3779 <para>
3780 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3781 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3782 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3783 these costs?
3784 </para>
3785 <para>
3786 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3787 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3788 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3789 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3790 available.<footnote><para>
3791 <!-- f15 -->
3792 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3793 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3794 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3795 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3796 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3797 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3798 </para></footnote>
3799 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3800 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3801 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3802 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3803 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3804 </para>
3805 <para>
3806 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3808 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3809 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3810 today.<footnote><para>
3811 <!-- f16 -->
3812 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3813 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3814 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3815 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3816 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3817 National
3818 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3819 Results,"
3820 available at
3821 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3822 </para></footnote>
3823 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3824 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3825 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3826 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3827 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3828 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3829 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3830 the content they sell.
3831 </para>
3832 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3833 <para>
3834 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3835 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3836 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3837 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3838 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3839 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3840 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3841 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3842 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3843 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3844 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3845 </para>
3846 <para>
3847 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3848 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3849 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3850 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3851 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3852 shut as well?
3853 </para>
3854 <para>
3855 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3856 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3857 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3858 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3859 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
3860 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3861
3862 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3863 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3864 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3865 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3866 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3867 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3868 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3869 great book!)
3870 </para>
3871 <para>
3872 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3873 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3874 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3875 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3876 </para>
3877 <para>
3878 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3879 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3880 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3881 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3882 unavailable?"
3883 </para>
3884 <para>
3885 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3886 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3887 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3888 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
3889 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3890 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3891 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3892 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3893 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3894 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3895 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3896 found only with time.
3897 </para>
3898 <para>
3899 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3900 just what you call type A sharing?"
3901 </para>
3902 <para>
3903 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3904 effect
3905 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3906 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3907 Napster
3908 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3909 developed
3910 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3912 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3913 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3914 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3915 <!-- f17 -->
3916 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3917 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3918 MHP, available at
3919
3920 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
3921 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
3922 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
3923 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3924 </para></footnote>
3925 </para>
3926 <para>
3927 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3928 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3929 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3930 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3931 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3932 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3933 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3934 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3935 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3936 </para>
3937 <para>
3938 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3939 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3940 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
3941 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3942 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
3943 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
3944 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3945 </para>
3946 <para>
3947 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3948 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3949 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3950 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
3951 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
3952 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
3953 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
3954 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
3955 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
3956 benefit was enough.
3957 </para>
3958 <para>
3959 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3960 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3961 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3962 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3963 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
3964 price.
3965 </para>
3966 <para>
3967
3968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3969 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3970 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
3971 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
3972 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
3973 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
3974 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
3975 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
3976 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
3977 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
3978 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
3979 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
3980 Congress chose a path that would assure
3981 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
3982 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
3983 </para>
3984 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3985 <para>
3986 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3987 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3988 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3989 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3990 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3991 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3992 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3993 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3994 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3995 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3996 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3997 </para>
3998 <para>
3999 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4000 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4001 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4002 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4003 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4004 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4005 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4006 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4008 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4009 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4010 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4011 for the architecture it chose.
4012 </para>
4013 <para>
4014 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4015 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4016 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4017 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4018 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4019 copyright."<footnote><para>
4020 <!-- f18 -->
4021 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4022 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4023 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4024 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4025 </para></footnote>
4026 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4027 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4028 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4029 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4030 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4031 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4032 <!-- f19 -->
4033 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4034 </para></footnote>
4035 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4036 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4037 <!-- f20 -->
4038 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4039 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4040 </para></footnote>
4041 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4042 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4043 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4044 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4045 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4046 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4047 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4048 <!-- f21 -->
4049 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4050 of Jack Valenti).
4051 </para></footnote>
4052 </para>
4053 <para>
4054 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4055 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4056 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4057 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4058 Circuit"&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4059 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4060 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4061 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4062 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4063 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4064 technology.<footnote><para>
4065 <!-- f22 -->
4066 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4067 1981).
4068 </para></footnote>
4069 </para>
4070 <para>
4071 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4072
4073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4074 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4075 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4076 Court wrote,
4077 </para>
4078 <blockquote>
4079 <para>
4080 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4081 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4082 market
4083 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4084 authority
4085 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4086 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4087 implicated
4088 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4089 <!-- f23 -->
4090 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4091 </para></footnote>
4092 </para>
4093 </blockquote>
4094 <para>
4095 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4096 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4097 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4098 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4099 together, a pattern is clear:
4100 </para>
4101
4102 <table id="t1">
4103 <title>Pattern of Court and Congress response</title>
4104 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4105 <thead>
4106 <row>
4107 <entry>CASE</entry>
4108 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4109 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4110 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4111 </row>
4112 </thead>
4113 <tbody>
4114 <row>
4115 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4116 <entry>Composers</entry>
4117 <entry>No protection</entry>
4118 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4119 </row>
4120 <row>
4121 <entry>Radio</entry>
4122 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4123 <entry>N/A</entry>
4124 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4125 </row>
4126 <row>
4127 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4128 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4129 <entry>No protection</entry>
4130 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4131 </row>
4132 <row>
4133 <entry>VCR</entry>
4134 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4135 <entry>No protection</entry>
4136 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4137 </row>
4138 </tbody>
4139 </tgroup>
4140 </table>
4141
4142 <para>
4143 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4144 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4145 <!-- f24 -->
4146 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4147 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4148 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4149 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4150 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4151 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4152 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4153 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4154 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4155 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4156 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4157 </para></footnote>
4158 In each case, throughout our history,
4159 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4160 work.
4161 </para>
4162 <para>
4163 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4164 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4165 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4166 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4167 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4168 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4169 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4170 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4171 interests at stake.
4172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4173 </para>
4174 <para>
4175 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4176 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4177 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4178 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4179 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4180 regulated?
4181 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4182 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4183 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4184 permission to record a song?
4185 </para>
4186 <para>
4187 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4188 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4189 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4190 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4191 <!-- f25 -->
4192 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4193 (1984).
4194 </para></footnote>
4195 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4196 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4197 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4198 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4199 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4200 facilitate the distribution of content.
4201 </para>
4202 <para>
4203 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4204 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4205 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4206 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4207 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4208 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4209 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4210 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4211 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4212 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4213 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4214 public interest that innovation continue.
4215 </para>
4216 <para>
4217
4218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4219 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4220 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4221 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4222 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4223 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4224 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4225 fight."<footnote><para>
4226 <!-- f26 -->
4227 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4228 Echoes Past Efforts," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4229 </para></footnote>
4230 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4231 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4232 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4233 warriors insist, "is our <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we
4234 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4235 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4236 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4237 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4238 arrest him?"
4239 </para>
4240 <para>
4241 "It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4242 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4243 </para>
4244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4245 </section>
4246 </chapter>
4247 </part>
4248 <part id="c-property">
4249 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4250 <partintro>
4251 <para>
4252
4253 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4254 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4255 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4256 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4257 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4258 the price she can get.
4259 </para>
4260 <para>
4261 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4262 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4263 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4264 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4265 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4266 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4267 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4268 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4269 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4270 then?
4271 </para>
4272 <para>
4273 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4274 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4276 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4277 narrow
4278 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4279 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4280 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4281 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4282 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4283 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4284 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4285 <!-- f1 -->
4286 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4287 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4288 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4289 </para></footnote>
4290 </para>
4291 <para>
4292 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4293 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4294 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4295 expression
4296 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4297 property.
4298 </para>
4299 <para>
4300 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4301 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4302 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4303 "property" in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4304 <!-- f2 -->
4305 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4306 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4307 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4308 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4309 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4310 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4311 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4312 </para></footnote>
4313 </para>
4314 <para>
4315 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4316 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4317 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4318 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4319 these stories, the significance of this true
4320 statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash; will be a bit
4321 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4322 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4323 </para>
4324 </partintro>
4325
4326 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4327 <chapter id="founders">
4328 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4329 <para>
4330 William Shakespeare wrote <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play
4331 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4332 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4333 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4334 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4335 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4336 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4337 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4338 is so full of clichés."
4339 </para>
4340 <para>
4341 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4342 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4343 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4344 <!-- f1 -->
4345 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4346 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4347 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4348 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4349 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4350 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4351 Bookseller," <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4352 </para></footnote>
4353 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4354 the Conger<footnote><para>
4355 <!-- f2 -->
4356 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4357 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4358 </para></footnote>
4359 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4360 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4361 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4362 that no
4363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4364 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4365 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4366 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4367 </para>
4368 <para>
4369 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4370 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4371 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4372 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4373 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4374 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4375 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4376 additional years.<footnote><para>
4377 <!-- f3 -->
4378 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4379 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4380 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4381 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4382 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4383 Tonson's control in 1774?
4384 </para>
4385 <para>
4386 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4387 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4388 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4389 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4390 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4391 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4392 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4393 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4394 books.
4395 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4396 </para>
4397 <para>
4398 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4399 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4400 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4401 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4402 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4403 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4404 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4405 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4406 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4407 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4408 </para>
4409 <para>
4410 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4411 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4412 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4413 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4414
4415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4416 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4417 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4418 ultimately
4419 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4420 </para>
4421 <para>
4422 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4423 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4424 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4425 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4426 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4427 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4428 believed.
4429 </para>
4430 <para>
4431 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4432 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4433 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4434 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4435 </para>
4436 <para>
4437 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4438 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4439 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4440 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4441 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4442 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4443 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4444 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4445 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4446 </para>
4447 <para>
4448 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4449 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4450 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4451 "booksellers."
4452 </para>
4453 <para>
4454 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4455 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4456 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4457 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4458 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4459 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4460 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4461 generally how
4462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4463 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4464 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4465 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4466 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4467 </para>
4468 <para>
4469 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4470 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4471 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4472 permission
4473 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4474 anything,
4475 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4476 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4477 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4478 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4479 </para>
4480 <para>
4481 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4482 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4483 especially
4484 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4485 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4486 monopolies&mdash;especially
4487 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4488 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4489 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4490 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4491 Monopolies,
4492 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4493 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4494 publishing.
4495 </para>
4496 <para>
4497 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4498 naturally
4499 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4500 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4501 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4502 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4503 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4504 specialinterest
4505 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4506 </para>
4507 <para>
4508 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4509 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4510 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4511 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4513
4514 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4515 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4516 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4517 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4518 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4519 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4520 indetted."<footnote><para>
4521
4522 <!-- f4 -->
4523 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4524 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4525 </para></footnote>
4526 </para>
4527 <para>
4528 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4529 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4530 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4531 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4532 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4533 with that idea.
4534 </para>
4535 <para>
4536 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4537 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4538 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4539 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4540 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4541 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4542 compromise
4543 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4544 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4545 construction and spread of culture.
4546 </para>
4547 <para>
4548 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4549 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4550 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4551 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4552 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4553 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4554 they said; they needed more time.
4555 </para>
4556 <para>
4557 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4558 words that echo today,
4559 </para>
4560 <blockquote>
4561 <para>
4562 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4563 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4565 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4566 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4567 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4568 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4569 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4570 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4571 <!-- f5 -->
4572 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4573 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4574 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4575 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4576 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4577 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4578 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4579 </para></footnote>
4580 </para>
4581 </blockquote>
4582 <para>
4583 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4584 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4585 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4586 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4587 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4588 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4589 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4590 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4591 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4592 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4593 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4594 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4595 way to protect authors.
4596 </para>
4597 <para>
4598 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4599 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4600 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4601 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4602 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4603 <!-- f6 -->
4604 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4605 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4606 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4607 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4608 </para></footnote>
4609 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4610 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4611 </para>
4612 <para>
4613 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4614 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4615 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4616 <!-- f7 -->
4617 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4618 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4619 </para></footnote>
4620 </para>
4621 <para>
4622 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4623 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4624 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4625 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4626 <!-- f8 -->
4627 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4628 1993), 92.
4629 </para></footnote>
4630 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4632 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4633 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4634 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4635 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4636 <!-- f9 -->
4637 Ibid., 93.
4638 </para></footnote>
4639 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4640 </para>
4641 <para>
4642 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4643 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4644 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4645 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4646 Property."<footnote><para>
4647 <!-- f10 -->
4648 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4649 Borwell).
4650 </para></footnote>
4651 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4652 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4653 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4654 </para>
4655 <para>
4656 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4657 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4658 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4659 </para>
4660 <para>
4661 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4662 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4663 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4664 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4665 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4666 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4667 <!-- f11 -->
4668 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4669 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4670 (1983): 1152.
4671 </para></footnote>
4672 </para>
4673 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4674 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4675 </indexterm>
4676 <para>
4677 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4678 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4679 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4680 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4681 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4682 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4683 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4684 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4685 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4686 </para>
4687 <para>
4688 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4689 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4690 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4691 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4692 with in 1710: How best to limit
4693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4694 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4695 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4696 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4697 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4698 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4699 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4700 </para>
4701 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4702 <para>
4703 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4704 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4705 </para>
4706 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4707 <para>
4708 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4709 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4710 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4711 <!-- f12 -->
4712 Ibid., 1156.
4713 </para></footnote>
4714 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4715 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4716 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4717 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4718 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4719 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4720 </para>
4721 <para>
4722 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4723 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4724 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4725 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4726 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4727 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4728 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4729 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4730 </para>
4731 <para>
4732 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4733 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4734 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4735 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4736 House of Lords generally voted.
4737 </para>
4738 <para>
4739 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4740 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4742 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4743 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4744 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4745 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4746 passed into the public domain.
4747 </para>
4748 <para>
4749 "The public domain." Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4750 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4751 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4752 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4753 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4754 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4755 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4756 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4757 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4758 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4759 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4760 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4761 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4762 </para>
4763 <para>
4764 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4765 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4766 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4767 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4768 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4769 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4770 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4771 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4772 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4773 <!-- f13 -->
4774 Rose, 97.
4775 </para></footnote>
4776 </para>
4777 <para>
4778 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4779 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4780 reported:
4781 </para>
4782 <blockquote>
4783 <para>
4784 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4785 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4786 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4787 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4788 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4789 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4790 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4791 successors.<footnote><para>
4792 <!-- f14 -->
4793 Ibid.
4794 </para></footnote>
4795 </para>
4796 </blockquote>
4797 <para>
4798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4799 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4800 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4801 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4802 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4803 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4804 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4805 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4806 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4807 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4808 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4809 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4810 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4811 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4812 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4813 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4814 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4815 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4816 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4817 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4818 </para>
4819 <para>
4820 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4821 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4822 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4823 protected.
4824 </para>
4825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4826 </chapter>
4827 <chapter id="recorders">
4828 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4829 <para>
4830 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4831 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4832 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4833 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4834 He was their god.)
4835 </para>
4836 <para>
4837 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4838 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4839 today.
4840 </para>
4841 <para>
4842 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4843 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4844 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4845 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4846 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4847 stage.
4848 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4849 </para>
4850 <para>
4851 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4852 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4853 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4854 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
4855 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4856 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4857 about the scene.
4858 </para>
4859 <para>
4860 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4861 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
4862 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4863 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4864 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4865 </para>
4866 <para>
4867 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4868 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4869 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4870 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4871 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4872 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4873 </para>
4874 <para>
4875 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4876 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4877 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4878 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4879 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4880 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4881 </para>
4882 <para>
4883 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4884 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4885 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4886 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4887 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4888 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4889 </para>
4890 <para>
4891 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4892 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4893 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4894 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4895 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4896 confirm what he had been told.
4897 </para>
4898 <para>
4899 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4900 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4901 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4902 about
4903
4904 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4905 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4906 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4907 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4908 the money."
4909 </para>
4910 <para>
4911 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4912 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4913 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4914 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4915 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4916 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
4917 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4918 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
4919 </para>
4920 <para>
4921 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4922 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
4923 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4924 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4925 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4926 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4927 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4928 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4929 says the owner gets to control.
4930 </para>
4931 <para>
4932 For example, "public performance" is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
4933 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4934 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4935 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4936 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4937 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4938 by the law.
4939 </para>
4940 <para>
4941 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4942 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4943 <!-- f1 -->
4944 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4945 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4946 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4947 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4948 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4949 </para></footnote>
4950 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
4951 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
4952 not require the permission of anyone.
4953 </para>
4954 <para>
4955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4956 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4957 </para>
4958 <blockquote>
4959 <para>
4960 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4961 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4962 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4963 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4964 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4965 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4966 </para>
4967 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4968 <listitem><para>
4969 <!-- 1. -->
4970 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4971 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4972 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4973 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4974 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4975 </para></listitem>
4976 <listitem><para>
4977 <!-- 2. -->
4978 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4979 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4980 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
4981 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
4982 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4983 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
4984 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4985 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4986 principle.
4987 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
4988 </para></listitem>
4989 <listitem><para>
4990 <!-- 3. -->
4991 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4992 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4993 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4994 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4995 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4996 pockets, me or them.
4997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4998 </para></listitem>
4999 <listitem><para>
5000 <!-- 4. -->
5001 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5002 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5003 money.
5004 </para></listitem>
5005 </orderedlist>
5006 </blockquote>
5007 <para>
5008 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5009 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5010 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5011 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5012 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5013 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5014 </para>
5015 <para>
5016 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5017 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5018 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5019 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5020 not.
5021 </para>
5022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5023 </chapter>
5024 <chapter id="transformers">
5025 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5026 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5027 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5028 <para>
5029 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5030 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5031 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5032 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5033 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5034 </para>
5035 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5036 <para>
5037 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5038 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5039 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5040 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5041 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5042 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5043 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5044 important to his career.
5045 </para>
5046 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5047 <para>
5048 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5049 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5050 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5051 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5052 </para>
5053 <para>
5054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5055 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5056 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5057 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5058 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5059 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5060 </para>
5061 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5062 <para>
5063 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5064 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5065 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5066 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5067 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5068 actor's career."
5069 </para>
5070 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5071 <para>
5072 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5073 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5074 </para>
5075 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5076 <para>
5077 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5078 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5079 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5080 for it."<footnote>
5081 <para>
5082 <!-- f1 -->
5083 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5084 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5085 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5086 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5087 <indexterm>
5088 <primary>artists</primary>
5089 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5090 </indexterm>
5091 </para></footnote>
5092 </para>
5093 <para>
5094 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5095 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5096 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5097 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5098 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5099 </para>
5100 <para>
5101 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5102 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5103 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5104 </para>
5105 <blockquote>
5106 <para>
5107 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5108 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5109 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5110 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5111 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5112 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5113 </para>
5114 <para>
5115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5116 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5117 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5118 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5119 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5120 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5121 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5122 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5123 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5124 started calling people.
5125 </para>
5126 </blockquote>
5127 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5128 <para>
5129 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5130 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5131 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5132 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5133 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5134 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5135 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5136 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5137 career.
5138 </para>
5139 <para>
5140 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;"and even then we
5141 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5142 </para>
5143 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5144 <para>
5145 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5146 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5147 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5148 </para>
5149 <blockquote>
5150 <para>
5151 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5152 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5153 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5154 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5155 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5156 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5157 systematically and cleared the rights.
5158 </para>
5159 </blockquote>
5160 <para>
5161
5162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5163 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5164 loved it, and it sold very well.
5165 </para>
5166 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5167 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5168 <para>
5169 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5170 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5171 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5172 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5173 at all."<footnote><para>
5174 <!-- f2 -->
5175 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5176 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5177 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5178 </para></footnote>
5179 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5180 has to be made?
5181 </para>
5182 <para>
5183 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5184 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5185 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5186 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5187 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5188 </para>
5189 <blockquote>
5190 <para>
5191 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5192 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5193 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5194 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5195 compensated for that.
5196 </para>
5197 </blockquote>
5198 <para>
5199 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5200 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5201 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5202 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5203 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5204 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5205 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5206 made to be more clean?
5207 </para>
5208 <blockquote>
5209 <para>
5210 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5211 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5212 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5213 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5215 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5216 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5217 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5218 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5219 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5220 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5221 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5222 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5223 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5224 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5225 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5226 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5227 </para>
5228 </blockquote>
5229 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5230 <para>
5231 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5232 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5233 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5234 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5235 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5236 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5237 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5238 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5239 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5240 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5241 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5242 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5243 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5244 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5245 "Does this still make sense?"
5246 </para>
5247 <para>
5248 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5249 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5250 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5251 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5252
5253 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5254 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5255 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5256 </para>
5257 <para>
5258 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5259 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5260 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5261 judges loved every minute of it.
5262 </para>
5263 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5264 <para>
5265 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5266 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5267 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5268 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5269 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5270 were just violated in this room?"
5271 </para>
5272 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5273 <para>
5274 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5275 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5276 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5277 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5278 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5279 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5280 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5281 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5282 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5283 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5284 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5285 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5286 couldn't easily do them legally.
5287 </para>
5288 <para>
5289 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5290 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5291 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5292 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5293 planted in your presentation.
5294 </para>
5295 <para>
5296 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5298 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5299 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5300 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5301 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5302 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5303 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5304 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5305 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5306 </para>
5307 <para>
5308 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5309 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5310 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5311 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5312 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5313 </para>
5314 <para>
5315 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5316 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5317 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5318 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5319 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5320 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5321 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5322 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5323 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5324 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5325 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5326 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5327 registers the work.
5328 </para>
5329 <para>
5330 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5331 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5332 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5333 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5334 </para>
5335 <para>
5336 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5337 Myers, the comic genius of <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5339 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5340 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5341 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5342 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5343 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5344 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5345 entertainment."
5346 </para>
5347 <para>
5348 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5349 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5350 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5351 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5352 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5353 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5354 new audiences, it is Mike."
5355 </para>
5356 <para>
5357 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5358 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5359 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5360 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5361 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5362 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5363 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5364 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5365 </para>
5366 <para>
5367 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5368 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5369 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5370 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5371 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5372 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5373 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5374 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5375 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5376 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5377 curse, reserved for the few.
5378 </para>
5379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5380 </chapter>
5381 <chapter id="collectors">
5382 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5383 <para>
5384 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5385 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5386 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5387 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5388 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5389 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5390 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5391 </para>
5392 <para>
5393 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5394 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5395 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5396 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5397 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5398 well as when those pages changed.
5399 </para>
5400 <para>
5401 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5402 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5403 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5404 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5405 reports.
5406 </para>
5407 <para>
5408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5409 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5410 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5411 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5412 </para>
5413 <para>
5414 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5415 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5416 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5417 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5418 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5419 </para>
5420 <para>
5421 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5422 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5423 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5424 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5425 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5426 <!-- f1 -->
5427 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5428 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5429 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5430 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5431 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5432 </para></footnote>
5433 </para>
5434 <para>
5435 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5436 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5437 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5438 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5439 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5440 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5441 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5442 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5443 truth.
5444 </para>
5445 <para>
5446 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5447 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5448 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5449 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5450 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5451 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5452 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5453 </para>
5454 <para>
5455 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5456 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5457 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5458 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5460 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5461 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5462 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5463 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5464 </para>
5465 <para>
5466 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5467 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5468 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5469 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5470 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5471 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5472 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5473 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5474 </para>
5475 <para>
5476 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5477 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5478 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5479 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5480 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5481 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5482 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5483 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5484 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5485 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5486 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5487 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5488 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5489 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5490 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5491 </para>
5492 <blockquote>
5493 <para>
5494 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5495 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5496 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5497 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5498 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5499
5500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5501 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5502 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5503 </para>
5504 </blockquote>
5505 <para>
5506 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5507 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5508 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5509 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5510 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5511 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5512 </para>
5513 <para>
5514 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5515 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5516 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5517 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5518 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5519 work.
5520 </para>
5521 <para>
5522 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5523 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5524 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5525 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5526 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5527 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5528 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5529 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5530 <!-- f2 -->
5531 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5532 the Library of Congress," <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5533 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5534 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5535 Co., 1992), 36.
5536 </para></footnote>
5537 </para>
5538 <para>
5539 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5540 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5541 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5542 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5543 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5544 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5545 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5546 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5547 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5548 </para>
5549 <para>
5550 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5551 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5552 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5553 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5554 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5555 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5556 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5557 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5558 events of that day.
5559 </para>
5560 <para>
5561 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5562 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5563 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5564 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5565 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5566 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5567 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5568 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5569 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5570 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5571 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5572 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5573 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5574 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5575 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5576 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5577 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5578 </para>
5579 <para>
5580 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5581 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5582 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5583 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5584 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5585 to find them.
5586 </para>
5587 <para>
5588 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5589 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5590 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5591 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5592 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5593 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5594 </para>
5595 <para>
5596 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5597 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5598 life, if the
5599
5600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5601 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5602 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5603 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5604 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5605 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5606 </para>
5607 <para>
5608 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5609 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5610 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5611 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5612 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5613 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5614 longer sold.
5615 </para>
5616 <para>
5617 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5618 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5619 <!-- f3 -->
5620 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5621 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5622 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5623 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5624 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," <citetitle>Boston
5625 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5626 </para></footnote>). After
5627 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5628 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5629 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5630 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5631 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5632 </para>
5633 <para>
5634 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5635 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5636 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5637 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5638 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5639 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5640 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5641 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5642 disappears.
5643 </para>
5644 <para>
5645 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5646 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5647 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5648 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5649 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5650 generally, the
5651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5652 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5653 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5654 little practical effect.
5655 </para>
5656 <para>
5657 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5658 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5659 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5660 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5661 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5662 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5663 </para>
5664 <para>
5665 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5666 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5667 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5668 Kahle describes,
5669 </para>
5670 <blockquote>
5671 <para>
5672 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5673 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5674 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5675 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5676 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5677 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5678 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5679 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5680 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5681 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5682 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5683 </para>
5684 </blockquote>
5685 <para>
5686 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5687 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5688 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5689 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5690 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5691 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5692 will draw upon it to understand it;
5693 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5694 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5695 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5696 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5697 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5698 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5699 </para>
5700 <para>
5701 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5702 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5703 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5704 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5705 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5706 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5707 </para>
5708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5709 </chapter>
5710 <chapter id="property-i">
5711 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5712 <para>
5713 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5714 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5715 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5716 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5717 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5718 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5719 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5720 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5721 </para>
5722 <para>
5723 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5724 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5725 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5726 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5727 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5728 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5729 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5730 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5731 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5732 Warner Brothers.
5733 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5734 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5735 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5736 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5737 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5738 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5739 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5740 </para>
5741 <para>
5742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5743 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5744 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5745 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5746 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5747 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5748 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5749 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5750 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5751 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5752 Washingtonian way.
5753 </para>
5754 <para>
5755 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5756 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5757 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5758 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5759 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5760 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5761 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5762 </para>
5763 <para>
5764 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5765 perfectly:
5766 </para>
5767 <blockquote>
5768 <para>
5769 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5770 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5771 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5772 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5773 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5774 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5775 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5776 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5777 <!-- f1 -->
5778 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5779 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5780 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5781 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5782 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5783 Valenti).
5784 </para></footnote>
5785 </para>
5786 </blockquote>
5787 <para>
5788 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5789 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5790 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5791 this:
5792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5793 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5794 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5795 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5796 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5797 </para>
5798 <para>
5799 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5800 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5801 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5802 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
5803 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5804 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5805 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5806 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5807 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5808 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5809 </para>
5810 <para>
5811 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5812 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5813 <!-- f2 -->
5814 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5815 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5816 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5817 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5818 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5819 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
5820 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5821 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5822 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5823 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5824 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5825 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5826 in our tradition.
5827 </para>
5828 <para>
5829 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5830 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5831 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5832 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5833 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5834 culture would develop.
5835 </para>
5836 <para>
5837 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5838 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5839 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5840 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5841 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5842 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5843 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5844 the same would be to
5845
5846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5847 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5848 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5849 perfect control.
5850 </para>
5851 <para>
5852 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5853 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5854 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5855 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5856 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5857 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5858 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5859 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5860 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5861 Constitution itself.
5862 </para>
5863 <para>
5864 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5865 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5866 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5867 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5868 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5869 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5870 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5871 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
5872 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5873 </para>
5874 <para>
5875 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5876 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5877 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5878 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5879 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5880 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5881 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5882 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5883 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5884 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5886 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5887 compensation at all.
5888 </para>
5889 <para>
5890 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5891 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5892 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5893 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5894 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5895 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5896 itself.
5897 </para>
5898 <para>
5899 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5900 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5901 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5902 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5903 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5904 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5905 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5906 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5907 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5908 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5909 </para>
5910 <para>
5911 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5912 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
5913 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
5914 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
5915 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
5916 domain?
5917 </para>
5918 <para>
5919 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5920 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5921 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5922 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5923 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
5924 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
5925 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
5926 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
5927 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
5928 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
5929 also control how culture develops.
5930 </para>
5931 <para>
5932
5933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5934 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5935 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5936 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
5937 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5938 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5939 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5940 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5941 </para>
5942 <figure id="fig-1331">
5943 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5944 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5945 </figure>
5946 <para>
5947 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5948 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5949 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5950 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5951 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5952 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5953 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5954 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5955 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5956 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5957 Web, you can be punished
5958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5959 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5960 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5961 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
5962 </para>
5963 <para>
5964 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5965 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5966 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5967 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5968 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5969 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5970 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5971 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5972 the source of the enforcement.
5973 </para>
5974 <para>
5975 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5976 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5977 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5978 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5979 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5980 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5981 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5982 individual or group might behave.
5983 </para>
5984 <para>
5985 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5986 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5987 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5988 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5989 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5990 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5991 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5992 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5993 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5994 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
5995 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5996 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5997 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5998 </para>
5999 <para>
6000
6001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6002 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6003 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6004 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6005 undermined by another.
6006 </para>
6007 <para>
6008 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6009 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6010 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6011 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6012 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6013 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6014 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6015 </para>
6016 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6017 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6018 </indexterm>
6019 <para>
6020 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6021 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6022 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6023 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6024 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6025 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6026 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6027 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6028 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6029 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6030 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6031 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6032 </para>
6033 <para>
6034 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6035 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6036 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6037 <!-- f3 -->
6038 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6039 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6040 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6041 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6042 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6043 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6044 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6045 June 1998.
6046 </para></footnote>
6047 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6048 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6049 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6050 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6051 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6052 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6053 used to require that other laws be more
6054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6055 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6056 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6057 driving.
6058 </para>
6059 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6060
6061 <figure id="fig-1361">
6062 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6063 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6064 </figure>
6065 <para>
6066 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6067 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6068 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6069 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6070 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6071 another.<footnote>
6072 <para>
6073 <!-- f4 -->
6074 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6075 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6076 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6077 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6078 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6079 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6080 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6081 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6082 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6083 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6084 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6085 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a long tradition of
6086 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6087 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6088 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6089 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana:
6090 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6091 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6092 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6093 J. Samuels, eds., <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6094 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6095 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6096 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6097 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6098 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6099 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6100 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6101 of these groups might face.
6102 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6103 </para></footnote>
6104 </para>
6105 <section id="hollywood">
6106 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6107 <para>
6108 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6109 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6110 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6111 rallying makes sense.
6112 </para>
6113 <para>
6114 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6115 Internet:
6116 </para>
6117 <figure id="fig-1371">
6118 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6119 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6120 </figure>
6121 <para>
6122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6123 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6124 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6125 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6126 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6127 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6128 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6129 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6130 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6131 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6132 this form of infringement.
6133 </para>
6134 <para>
6135 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6136 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6137 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6138 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6139 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6140 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6141 </para>
6142 <para>
6143 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6144 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6145 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6146 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6147 Iraq
6148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6149 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6150 looting that results.
6151 </para>
6152 <figure id="fig-1381">
6153 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6154 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6155 </figure>
6156 <para>
6157 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6158 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6159 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6160 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6161 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6162 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6163 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6164 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6165 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6166 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6167 </para>
6168 <para>
6169 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6170 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6171 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6172 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6173 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6174 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6175 life. Homeowners living in a
6176
6177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6178 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6179 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6180 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6181 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6182 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6183 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6184 </para>
6185 <para>
6186 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6187 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6188 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6189 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6190 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6191 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6192 </para>
6193 <para>
6194 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6195 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6196 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6197 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6198 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6199 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6200 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6201 <!-- f5 -->
6202 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6203 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6204 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6205 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6206 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6207 October 2003, available at
6208 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6209 </para></footnote>
6210
6211 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6212 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6213 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6214 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6215 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6216 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6217 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6218 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6219 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6220 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6221 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6222 </para>
6223 <para>
6224 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6225 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6226 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6228 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6229 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6230 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6231 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6232 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6233 <!-- f6 -->
6234 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6235 </para></footnote>
6236 And relative to a
6237 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6238 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6239 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6240 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6241 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6242 Brezhnev.
6243 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6244 </para>
6245 <para>
6246 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6247 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6248 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6249 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6250 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6251 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6252 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6253 opportunities for innovation and change.
6254 </para>
6255 <para>
6256 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6257 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6258 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6259 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6260 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6261 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6262 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6263 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6264 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6265 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6266 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6267 regulation is justified.
6268 </para>
6269 <para>
6270 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6272 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6273 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6274 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6275 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6276 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6277 </para>
6278 <para>
6279 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6280 </para>
6281 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6282 <primary>DDT</primary>
6283 </indexterm>
6284 <para>
6285 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6286 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6287 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6288 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6289 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6290 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6291 </para>
6292 <para>
6293 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6294 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6295 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6296 </para>
6297 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6298 <para>
6299 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6300 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6301 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6302 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6303 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6304 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6305 </para>
6306 <para>
6307 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6308 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6309 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6310 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6311 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6312 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6313 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6314 </para>
6315 <para>
6316 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6317 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6318 culture.<footnote><para>
6319 <!-- f7 -->
6320 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6321 Environmentalism for the Net?" <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6322 </para></footnote>
6323 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6324 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6325 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6326 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6327 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6328 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6330 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6331 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6332 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6333 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6334 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6335 </para>
6336 <para>
6337 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6338 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6339 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6340 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6341 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6342 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6343 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6344 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6345 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6346 </para>
6347 <para>
6348 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6349 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6350 be lost.
6351 </para>
6352 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6353 </section>
6354 <section id="beginnings">
6355 <title>Beginnings</title>
6356 <para>
6357 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6358 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6359 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6360 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6361 </para>
6362 <para>
6363 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6364 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6365 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6366 </para>
6367 <para>
6368 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6369 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6370 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6371
6372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6373 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6374 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6375 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6376 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6377 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6378 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6379 </para>
6380 <para>
6381 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6382 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6383 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6384 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6385 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6386 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6387 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6388 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6389 </para>
6390 <para>
6391 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6392 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6393 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6394 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6395 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6396 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6397 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6398 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6399 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6400 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6401 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6402 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6403 concentrations of power.
6404 </para>
6405 <para>
6406 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6407 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6408 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6409 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6410 years since they first struck its design.
6411 </para>
6412 <para>
6413 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6414 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6415 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6416 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6417 started here:
6418 </para>
6419 <figure id="fig-1441">
6420 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6421 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6422 </figure>
6423 <para>
6424 We will end here:
6425 </para>
6426 <figure id="fig-1442">
6427 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6428 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6429 </figure>
6430 <para>
6431 Let me explain how.
6432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6433 </para>
6434 </section>
6435 <section id="lawduration">
6436 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6437 <para>
6438 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6439 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6440 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6441 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6442 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6443 authorship.<footnote>
6444 <para>
6445 <!-- f8 -->
6446 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6447 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6448 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6449 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6450 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis>"
6451 (emphasis added).
6452 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6453 </para></footnote>
6454 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6455 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6456 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6457 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6458 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6459 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6460 </para>
6461 <para>
6462 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6463 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6464 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6465 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6466 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6467 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6468 </para>
6469 <para>
6470 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6471 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6472 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6473 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6474 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6475 </para>
6476 <para>
6477 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6478 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6479 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6480 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6481 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6482 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6483 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6484 <!-- f9 -->
6485 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6486 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6487 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6488 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6489 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6490 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6491 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6492 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6493 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6494 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6495 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6496 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6497 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6498 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6499 </para>
6500 <para>
6501 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6502 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6503 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6504 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6505 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6506 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6507 copyright, either.
6508 </para>
6509 <para>
6510 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6511 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6512 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6513 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6514 domain.<footnote><para>
6515 <!-- f10 -->
6516 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6517 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6518 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6519 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6520 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6521 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6522 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6523 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6524 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6525 </para>
6526 <para>
6527 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6528 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6529 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6530 <!-- f11 -->
6531 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6532 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6533 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6534 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6535 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6536 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6537 </para>
6538 <para>
6539 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6540 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6541 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6542 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6543 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6544 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6545 </para>
6546 <para>
6547 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6548 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6549 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6550 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6551 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6552 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6553 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6554 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6555 </para>
6556 <para>
6557 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6558 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6559 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6560 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6561
6562 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6563 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6564 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6565 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6566 </para>
6567 <para>
6568 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6569 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6570 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6571 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6572 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6573 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6574 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6575 value.
6576 </para>
6577 <para>
6578 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6579 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6580 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6581 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6582 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6583 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6584 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6585 was ninety-five years.
6586 </para>
6587 <para>
6588 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6589 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6590 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6591 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6592 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6593 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6594 them.
6595 </para>
6596 <para>
6597 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6598 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6599 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6600 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6601 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6602 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6603 years.<footnote><para>
6604 <!-- f12 -->
6605 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6606 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6607 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6608 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6609 </para></footnote>
6610 </para>
6611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6612 </section>
6613 <section id="lawscope">
6614 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6615 <para>
6616 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6617 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6618 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6619 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6620 </para>
6621 <para>
6622 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6623 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6624 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6625 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6626 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6627 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6628 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6629 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6630 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6631 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6632 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6633 </para>
6634 <para>
6635 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6636 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6637 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6638 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6639 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6640 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6641 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6642 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6643 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6644 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6645 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6646 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6647 on the initial creative work.
6648 </para>
6649 <para>
6650 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6651 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6652 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6654 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6655 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6656 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6657 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6658 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6659 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6660 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6661 secured.
6662 </para>
6663 <para>
6664 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6665 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6666 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6667 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6668 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6669 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6670 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6671 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6672 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6673 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6674 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6675 original author.
6676 </para>
6677 <para>
6678 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6679 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6680 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6681 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6682 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6683 copy available for others to copy.
6684 </para>
6685 <para>
6686 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6687 differences.
6688 </para>
6689 <para>
6690 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6691 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6692 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6693 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6694 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6695 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6696 <!-- f13 -->
6697 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6698 Creation of American Literature," 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6699 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6700 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6701
6702 </para></footnote>
6703 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6704 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6705 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6706 </para>
6707 <para>
6708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6709 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6710 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6711 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6712 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6713 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6714 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6715 were restrained.
6716 </para>
6717 <para>
6718 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6719 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6720 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6721 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6722 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6723 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6724 protect it.
6725 </para>
6726 <para>
6727 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6728 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6729 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6730 </para>
6731 <para>
6732 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6733 control
6734 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6735 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6736 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6737 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6738 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6739 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6740 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6741 exclusive
6742 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6743 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6744 </para>
6745 <para>
6746 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6747 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6748 expansion
6749 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6750 copyright.
6751 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6752 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6753 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6754 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6755 </para>
6756 <para>
6757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6758 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6759 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6760 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6761 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6762 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6763 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6764 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6765 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6766 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6767 <!-- f14 -->
6768 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <citetitle>Legal Affairs</citetitle>, July/August
6769 2003, available at
6770 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6771 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6772 </para></footnote>
6773 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6774 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6775 the wrong of direct piracy.
6776 </para>
6777 <para>
6778 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6779 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6780 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6781 of my book.<footnote><para>
6782 <!-- f15 -->
6783 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6784 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6785 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6786 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6787 Copyright's Constitutionality," <citetitle>Yale Law Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002):
6788 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6789 </para></footnote>
6790 These two different uses of my creative work are
6791 treated the same.
6792 </para>
6793 <para>
6794 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6795 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6796 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6797 creates
6798 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6799 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6800 originally created?
6801 </para>
6802 <para>
6803 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6804 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6805 simply
6806 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6807 rights originally granted.
6808 </para>
6809 </section>
6810 <section id="lawreach">
6811 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6812 <para>
6813 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6814 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6815 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6816 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6817 <!-- f16 -->
6818 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6819 certainly regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a
6820 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6821 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6822 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17
6823 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
6824 existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6825 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6826 </para></footnote>
6827 </para>
6828 <para>
6829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6830 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6831 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6832 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6833 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6834 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6835 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6836 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6837 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6838 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6839 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
6840 the trigger for copyright law.
6841 </para>
6842 <para>
6843 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6844 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6845 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6846 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6847 <!-- f17 -->
6848 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6849 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6850 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6851 basis
6852 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6853 </para></footnote>
6854 because it is clear that the
6855 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6856 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6857 </para>
6858 <para>
6859 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6860 empty circle.
6861 </para>
6862 <figure id="fig-1521">
6863 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6864 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6865 </figure>
6866 <para>
6867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6868 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6869 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6870 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6871 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6872 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6873 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6874 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6875 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6876 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6877 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6878 acts do not make a copy.
6879 </para>
6880 <figure id="fig-1531">
6881 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6882 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6883 </figure>
6884 <para>
6885 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6886 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6887 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6888 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6889 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6890 diagram on next page).
6891 </para>
6892 <para>
6893 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6894 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6895 </para>
6896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6897 <figure id="fig-1541">
6898 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6899 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6900 </figure>
6901 <para>
6902 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6903 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6904 unregulated.
6905 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6906 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6907 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6908 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6909 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6910 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6911 </para>
6912 <figure id="fig-1542">
6913 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6914 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6915 </figure>
6916 <para> </para>
6917 <figure id="fig-1551">
6918 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6919 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6920 </figure>
6921 <para>
6922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6923 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6924 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6925 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6926 </para>
6927 <para>
6928 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6929 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6930 <!-- f18 -->
6931 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6932 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6933 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6934 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6935 </para></footnote>
6936 And because of this single,
6937 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6938 category
6939 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6940 unregulated
6941 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6942 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6943 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6944 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6945 category
6946 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6947 copyrighted
6948 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6949 burden of this shift.
6950 </para>
6951 <para>
6952 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6953 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
6954 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
6955 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
6956 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
6957 the book once, ten times, or every
6958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6959 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6960 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6961 produced
6962 a copy.
6963 </para>
6964 <para>
6965 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
6966 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6967 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
6968 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
6969 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
6970 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
6971 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
6972 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
6973 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
6974 copyright owner's wish.
6975 </para>
6976 <para>
6977 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6978 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6979 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6980 points also become clear:
6981 </para>
6982 <para>
6983 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6984 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6985 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6986 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
6987 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
6988 part of free culture before the Internet.
6989 </para>
6990 <para>
6991 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6992 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
6993 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
6994 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
6995 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
6996 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
6997 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
6998 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
6999 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7000 creative work.
7001 </para>
7002 <para>
7003 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7004
7005 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7006 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7007 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7008 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7009 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7010 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7011 Internet,
7012 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7013 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7014 protected
7015 before because reading was not regulated.
7016 </para>
7017 <para>
7018 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7019 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7020 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7021 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7022 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7023 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7024 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7025 enough.
7026 </para>
7027 <para>
7028 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7029 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7030 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7031 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7032 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7033 </para>
7034 <para>
7035 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7036 began
7037 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7038 previews.
7039 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7040 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7041 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7042 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7043 before
7044 you bought it.
7045 </para>
7046 <para>
7047 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7048 distributors
7049 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7050 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7051 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7053 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7054 business
7055 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7056 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7057 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7058 immediately.
7059 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7060 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7061 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7062 </para>
7063 <para>
7064 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7065 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7066 infringed"
7067 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7068 willful
7069 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7070 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7071 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7072 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7073 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7074 </para>
7075 <para>
7076 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7077 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7078 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7079 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7080 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7081 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7082 Disney's permission.
7083 </para>
7084 <para>
7085 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7086 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7087 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7088 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7089 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7090 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7091 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7092 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7093 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7094 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7095 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7096 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7097 </para>
7098 <para>
7099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7100 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7101 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7102 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7103 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7104 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7105 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7106 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7107 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7108 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7109 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7110 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7111 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7112 happening are quite slight.
7113 </para>
7114 <para>
7115 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7116 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7117 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7118 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7119 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7120 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7121 </para>
7122 </section>
7123 <section id="lawforce">
7124 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7125 <para>
7126 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7127 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7128 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7129 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7130 </para>
7131 <para>
7132 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7133 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7134 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7135 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7136 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7137 your freedom.
7138 </para>
7139 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7140 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7141 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7142 </indexterm>
7143 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7144 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7145 </indexterm>
7146 <para>
7147 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7148 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7150 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7151 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7152 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7153 plan.<footnote><para>
7154 <!-- f19 -->
7155 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <citetitle>Law and
7156 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7157 </para></footnote>
7158 </para>
7159 <para>
7160 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7161 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7162 you were."<footnote><para>
7163 <!-- f20 -->
7164 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7165 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7166 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7167 </para></footnote>
7168 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7169 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7170 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7171 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7172 </para>
7173 <para>
7174 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7175 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7176 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7177 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7178 </para>
7179 <para>
7180 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7181 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7182 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7183 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7184 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7185 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7186 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7187 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7188 </para>
7189 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7190 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7191
7192 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7193 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7194 </indexterm>
7195 <para>
7196 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7197 </para>
7198 <para>
7199 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7200 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7201 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7202 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7203 technology.
7204 </para>
7205 <para>
7206 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7207 Reader.
7208 </para>
7209 <para>
7210 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7211 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7212 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7213 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7214 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7215 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7216 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7217 copy of
7218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7219 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7220 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7221 </para>
7222 <figure id="fig-1611">
7223 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7224 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7225 </figure>
7226 <para>
7227 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7228 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7229 </para>
7230 <figure id="fig-1612">
7231 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7232 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7233 </figure>
7234 <para>
7235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7236 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7237 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7238 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7239 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7240 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7241 read aloud through the computer.
7242 </para>
7243 <para>
7244 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7245 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7246 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7247 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7248 </para>
7249 <figure id="fig-1621">
7250 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7251 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7252 </figure>
7253 <para>
7254 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7255 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7256 the book.
7257 </para>
7258 <figure id="fig-1622">
7259 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7260 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7261 </figure>
7262 <para>
7263 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7264 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7265 Ideas</citetitle>:
7266 </para>
7267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7268 <figure id="fig-1631">
7269 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7270 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7271 </figure>
7272 <para>
7273 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7274 </para>
7275 <para>
7276 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7277 "permissions"&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7278 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7279 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7280 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7281 power.<footnote><para>
7282 <!-- f21 -->
7283 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7284 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7285 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7286 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7287 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7288 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7289 subsequently acquired the book.
7290 </para></footnote>
7291 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7292 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7293 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7294 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7295 control that the law would enable.
7296 </para>
7297 <para>
7298 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7299 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7300 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7301 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7302 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7303 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7304 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7305 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7306 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7307 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7308 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7309 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7310 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7311 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7312 won't read aloud.
7313 </para>
7314 <para>
7315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7316 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7317 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7318 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7319 sentence.
7320 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7321 </para>
7322 <para>
7323 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7324 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7325 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7326 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7327 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7328 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7329 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7330 </para>
7331 <para>
7332 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7333 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7334 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7335 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7336 to defeat these protections as well?
7337 </para>
7338 <para>
7339 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7340 eBook Reader.
7341 </para>
7342 <para>
7343 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7344 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7345 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7346 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7347 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7348 following report:
7349 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7350 </para>
7351 <figure id="fig-1641">
7352 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7353 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7354 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7355 </figure>
7356 <para>
7357 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7358 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7359 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7360 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7361 </para>
7362 <para>
7363 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7364 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7365 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7366 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7367 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7368 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7369 </para>
7370 <para>
7371 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7372 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7373 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7374 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7375 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7376 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7377 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7378 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7379 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7380 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7381 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7382 </para>
7383 <para>
7384 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7385 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7386 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7387 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7388 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7389 often crazy.
7390 </para>
7391 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7392 <para>
7393 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7394 story of mine that makes the same point.
7395 </para>
7396 <indexterm id="idxaibo" class='startofrange'>
7397 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7398 </indexterm>
7399 <para>
7400 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7401 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7402 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7403 </para>
7404 <para>
7405 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7406 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7407 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7409 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7410 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7411 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7412 </para>
7413 <para>
7414 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7415 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7416 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7417 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7418 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7419 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7420 </para>
7421 <para>
7422 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7423 word <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7424 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7425 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much
7426 more positive term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the program to
7427 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7428 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7429 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7430 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7431 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7432 </para>
7433 <para>
7434 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7435 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7436 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7437 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7438 ethically.
7439 </para>
7440 <para>
7441 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7442 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7443 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7444 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7445 than Sony had built.
7446 </para>
7447 <indexterm startref="idxaibo" class='endofrange'/>
7448 <para>
7449 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7450 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7451 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7452 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7453 the
7454
7455 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7456 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7457 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7458 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7459 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7460 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7461 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7462 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7463 </para>
7464 <para>
7465 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7466 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7467 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7468 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7469 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7470 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7471 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7472 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7473 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7474 </para>
7475 <para>
7476 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7477 <!-- f22 -->
7478 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7479 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7480 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7481 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7482 DMCA," <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7483 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7484 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7485 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7486 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7487 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7488 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7489 </para></footnote>
7490 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7491 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7492 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7493 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7494 </para>
7495 <para>
7496 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7497 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7498 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7499 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7500 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7501 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7502 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7503 Internet much more.
7504 </para>
7505 <para>
7506 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7507 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7508 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7509 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7510 </para>
7511 <para>
7512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7513 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7514 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7515 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7516 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7517 </para>
7518 <para>
7519 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7520 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7521 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7522 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7523 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7524 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7525 </para>
7526 <para>
7527 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7528 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7529 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7530 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7531 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7532 constituted, succeed.
7533 </para>
7534 <para>
7535 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7536 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7537 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7538 wrote:
7539 </para>
7540 <blockquote>
7541 <para>
7542 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7543 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7544 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7545 </para>
7546 </blockquote>
7547 <para>
7548 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7549 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7550 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7551 </para>
7552 <blockquote>
7553 <para>
7554 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7556 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7557 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7558 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7559 </para>
7560 </blockquote>
7561 <para>
7562 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7563 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7564 spreading such information an offense.
7565 </para>
7566 <para>
7567 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7568 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7569 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7570 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7571 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7572 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7573 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7574 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7575 protection for copyright owners.
7576 </para>
7577 <para>
7578 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7579 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7580 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7581 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7582 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7583 </para>
7584 <para>
7585 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7586 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7587 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7588 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7589 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7590 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7591 have been a copyright violation.
7592 </para>
7593 <para>
7594 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7595 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7596 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7597 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7598 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7599 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7600 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7602 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7603 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7604 </para>
7605 <para>
7606 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7607 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7608 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7609 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7610 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7611 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7612 </para>
7613 <para>
7614 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7615 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7616 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7617 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7618 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7619 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "<citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>,"
7620 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7621 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7622 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7623 </para>
7624 <blockquote>
7625 <para>
7626 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7627 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7628 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7629 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7630 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7631 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7632 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7633 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7634 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7635 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7636 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7637 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7638 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7639 important.<footnote><para>
7640 <!-- f23 -->
7641 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7642 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7643 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7644 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7645 </para></footnote>
7646 </para>
7647 </blockquote>
7648 <para>
7649 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7650 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7651 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7652 the VCR responsible.
7653 </para>
7654 <para>
7655 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7656 the DMCA.
7657 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7658 </para>
7659 <para>
7660 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7661 </para>
7662 <para>
7663 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7664 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7665 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7666 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7667 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7668 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7669 </para>
7670 <para>
7671 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7673 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7674 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7675 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7676 and bad uses.
7677 </para>
7678 <figure id="fig-1711">
7679 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7680 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7681 </figure>
7682 <para>
7683 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7684 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7685 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7686 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7687 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7688 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7689 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7690 </para>
7691 <para>
7692 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7693 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7694 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7695 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7696 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7697 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7698 </para>
7699 <para>
7700 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7701 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7702 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7703 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7704 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7705 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7706 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7707 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7708 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7709 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7710 </para>
7711 <para>
7712 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7713 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7714 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7715 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7716 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7717 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7718 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7719 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7720 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7721 </para>
7722 <para>
7723
7724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7725 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7726 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7727 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7728 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7729 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7730 <!-- f24 -->
7731 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7732 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7733 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7734 </para></footnote>
7735 </para>
7736 <para>
7737 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7738 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7739 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7740 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7741 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7742 </para>
7743 <para>
7744 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7745 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7746 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7747 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7748 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7749 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7750 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7751 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7752 </para>
7753 <para>
7754 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7755 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7756 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7757 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7758 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7759 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7760 </para>
7761 </section>
7762 <section id="marketconcentration">
7763 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7764 <para>
7765 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7766 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7767 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7768 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7769 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7770 find better ways
7771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7772 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7773 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7774 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7775 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7776 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7777 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7778 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7779 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7780 control.
7781 </para>
7782 <para>
7783 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7784 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7785 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7786 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7787 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7788 </para>
7789 <para>
7790 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7791 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7792 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7793 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7794 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7795 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7796 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7797 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7798 of the media.
7799 </para>
7800 <para>
7801 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7802 nature.
7803 </para>
7804 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7805 <para>
7806 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7807 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7808 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7809 <!-- f25 -->
7810 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7811 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7812 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7813 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7814 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7815 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7816 <!-- f26 -->
7817 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7818 Slide," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
7819 </para></footnote>
7820 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7821 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7822 <!-- f27 -->
7823 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
7824 31 May 2003.
7825 </para></footnote>
7826 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
7827 </para>
7828 <para>
7829 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7830 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7832 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
7833 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7834 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
7835 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
7836 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
7837 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7838 </para>
7839 <para>
7840 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7841 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7842 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7843 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7844 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7845 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7846 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7847 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7848 protected&mdash; by the market.
7849 </para>
7850 <para>
7851 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7852 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7853 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7854 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7855 </para>
7856 <blockquote>
7857 <para>
7858 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7859 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7860 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7861 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7862 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7863 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7864 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7865 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7866 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7867 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7868 <!-- f28 -->
7869 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
7870 2003): 89.
7871 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7872 </para></footnote>
7873 </para>
7874 </blockquote>
7875 <para>
7876 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7877 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7878 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7879 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7880 </para>
7881 <figure id="fig-1761">
7882 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7883 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7884 </figure>
7885 <para>
7886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7887 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7888 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7889 distribute content?
7890 </para>
7891 <para>
7892 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7893 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7894 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7895 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7896 </para>
7897 <para>
7898 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7899 integration may matter.
7900 </para>
7901 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7902 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7903 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7904 <para>
7905 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
7906 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7907 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7908 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7909 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7910 </para>
7911 <para>
7912 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7913 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7914 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7915 control.<footnote><para>
7916 <!-- f29 -->
7917 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7918 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7919 Missouri,
7920 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7921 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7922 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7923 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7924 </para></footnote>
7925 </para>
7926 <para>
7927
7928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7929 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7930 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7931 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7932 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7933 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7934 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7935 networks.
7936 </para>
7937 <para>
7938 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7939 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7940 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7941 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7942 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7943 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7944 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7945 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7946 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7947 <!-- f30 -->
7948 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7949 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7950 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7951 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7952 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7953 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7954 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7955 2003.
7956 </para></footnote>
7957 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7958 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7959 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7960 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7961 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7962 63%."<footnote><para>
7963 <!-- f31 -->
7964 Ibid.
7965 </para></footnote>
7966 </para>
7967 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7968 <para>
7969 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
7970 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7971 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7972 owned by the network.
7973 </para>
7974 <para>
7975 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7976 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7977 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7978 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
7979 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
7980 </para>
7981 <blockquote>
7982 <para>
7983 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7984 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7985 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7986 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7988 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7989 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7990 handful.<footnote><para>
7991 <!-- f32 -->
7992 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
7993 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7994 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7995 </para></footnote>
7996 </para>
7997 </blockquote>
7998 <para>
7999 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8000 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8001 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8002 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8003 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8004 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8005 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8006 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8007 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8008 democracy.
8009 </para>
8010 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8011 <para>
8012 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8013 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8014 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8015 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8016 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8017 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8018 <!-- f33 -->
8019 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8020 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8021 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8022 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8023 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8024 Concepts in Technological Evolution," <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8025 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8026 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8027 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8028 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8029
8030 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8031 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8032 sprinting.
8033 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8034 </para>
8035 <para>
8036 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8037 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8038 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8039 measure.
8040 </para>
8041 <para>
8042 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8043 suggest the concern.
8044 </para>
8045 <para>
8046 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8047 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8048 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8049 </para>
8050 <para>
8051 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8052 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8053 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8054
8055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8056 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8057 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8058 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8059 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8060 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8061 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8062 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8063 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8064 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8065 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8066 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8067 outweigh these costs.
8068 </para>
8069 <para>
8070 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8071 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8072 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8073 these issues.
8074 </para>
8075 <para>
8076 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8077 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8078 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8079 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8080 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8081 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8082 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8083 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8084 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8085 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8086 </para>
8087 <para>
8088 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8089 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8090 </para>
8091 <para>
8092 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8093 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8094 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8095 war. Can you do it?
8096 </para>
8097 <para>
8098 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8100 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8101 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8102 message will be heard then?
8103 </para>
8104 <para>
8105 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8106 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8107 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8108 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8109 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8110 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8111 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8112 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8113 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8114 <!-- f34 -->
8115 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8116 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8117 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8118 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8119 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8120 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8121 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8122 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8123 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8124 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," <citetitle>New
8125 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8126 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8127 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8128 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8129 Radio," <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8130 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8131 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8132 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8133 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8134 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8135 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8136 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8137 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8138 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8139 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8140 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8141 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8142 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8143 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8144 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8145 </para></footnote>
8146 </para>
8147 <para>
8148 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8149 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8150 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8151 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8152 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8153 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8154 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8155 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8156 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8157 </para>
8158 </section>
8159 <section id="together">
8160 <title>Together</title>
8161 <para>
8162 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8163 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8164 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8165 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8166 </para>
8167 <para>
8168 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8169 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8170 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8171 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8172 to seem
8173
8174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8175 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8176 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8177 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8178 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8179 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8180 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8181 be redefined.
8182 </para>
8183 <para>
8184 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8185 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8186 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8187 our culture today.
8188 </para>
8189 <para>
8190 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8191 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8192 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8193 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8194 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8195 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8196 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8197 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8198 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8199 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8200 </para>
8201 <para>
8202 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8203 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8204 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8205 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8206 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8207 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8208 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8209 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8210 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8211 in control that technology and the market enable.
8212 </para>
8213 <para>
8214 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8215 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8217 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8218 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8219 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8220 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8221 </para>
8222 <para>
8223 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8224 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8225 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8226 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8227 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8228 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8229 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8230 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8231 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8232 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8233 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8234 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8235 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8236 known.<footnote><para>
8237 <!-- f35 -->
8238 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8239 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8240 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8241 </para></footnote>
8242 </para>
8243 <para>
8244 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8245 </para>
8246 <para>
8247 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8248 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8249 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8250 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8251 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8252 </para>
8253
8254 <table id="t2">
8255 <title>Law status in 1790</title>
8256 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8257 <thead>
8258 <row>
8259 <entry></entry>
8260 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8261 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8262 </row>
8263 </thead>
8264 <tbody>
8265 <row>
8266 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8267 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8268 <entry>Free</entry>
8269 </row>
8270 <row>
8271 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8272 <entry>Free</entry>
8273 <entry>Free</entry>
8274 </row>
8275 </tbody>
8276 </tgroup>
8277 </table>
8278
8279 <para>
8280 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8281 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8282 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8283
8284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8285 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8286 noncommercial work was also free.
8287 </para>
8288 <para>
8289 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8290 </para>
8291
8292 <table id="t3">
8293 <title>Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory</title>
8294 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8295 <thead>
8296 <row>
8297 <entry></entry>
8298 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8299 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8300 </row>
8301 </thead>
8302 <tbody>
8303 <row>
8304 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8305 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8306 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8307 </row>
8308 <row>
8309 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8310 <entry>Free</entry>
8311 <entry>Free</entry>
8312 </row>
8313 </tbody>
8314 </tgroup>
8315 </table>
8316
8317 <para>
8318 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8319 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8320 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8321 transformation were still essentially free.
8322 </para>
8323 <para>
8324 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8325 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8326 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8327 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8328 we could say the law began to look like this:
8329 </para>
8330
8331 <table id="t4">
8332 <title>Law status in 1975</title>
8333 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8334 <thead>
8335 <row>
8336 <entry></entry>
8337 <entry>COPY</entry>
8338 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8339 </row>
8340 </thead>
8341 <tbody>
8342 <row>
8343 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8344 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8345 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8346 </row>
8347 <row>
8348 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8349 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8350 <entry>Free</entry>
8351 </row>
8352 </tbody>
8353 </tgroup>
8354 </table>
8355
8356 <para>
8357 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8358 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8359 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8360 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8361 that the law now looks like this:
8362 </para>
8363
8364 <table id="t5">
8365 <title>Law status now</title>
8366 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8367 <thead>
8368 <row>
8369 <entry></entry>
8370 <entry>COPY</entry>
8371 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8372 </row>
8373 </thead>
8374 <tbody>
8375 <row>
8376 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8377 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8378 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8379 </row>
8380 <row>
8381 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8382 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8383 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8384 </row>
8385 </tbody>
8386 </tgroup>
8387 </table>
8388
8389 <para>
8390 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8391 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8392 creativity&mdash;
8393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8394 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8395 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8396 </para>
8397 <para>
8398 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8399 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8400 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8401 these domains actually does any good.
8402 </para>
8403 <para>
8404 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8405 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8406 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8407 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8408 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8409 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8410 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8411 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8412 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8413 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8414 </para>
8415 <para>
8416 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8417 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8418 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8419 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8420 property rights<footnote><para>
8421 <!-- f36 -->
8422 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8423 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8424 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8425 Disintegration of Property," in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8426 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8427 Press, 1980).
8428 </para></footnote>)
8429 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8430 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8431 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8432 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8433 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8434 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8435 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8436 vibrant and rich free culture.
8437 </para>
8438 <para>
8439 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8440 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8441 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8442 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8443 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8444 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8445 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8446 chapter 7). Adding
8447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8448 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8449 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8450 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8451 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8452 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8453 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8454 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8455 dominates the debate today.
8456 </para>
8457 <para>
8458 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8459 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8460 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8461 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8462 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8463 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8464 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8465 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8466 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8467 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8468 lawyer.
8469 </para>
8470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8471 </section>
8472 </chapter>
8473 </part>
8474 <part id="c-puzzles">
8475 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8476
8477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8478 <chapter id="chimera">
8479 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8480 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8481 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8482 </indexterm>
8483 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8484 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8485 </indexterm>
8486 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8487 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8488 </indexterm>
8489
8490 <para>
8491 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8492 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8493 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8494 <!-- f1. -->
8495 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8496 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8497 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8498 </para></footnote>
8499 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8500 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8501 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8502 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8503 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8504 villagers to explore life as a king.
8505 </para>
8506 <para>
8507 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8508 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8509 "blind." They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8510 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8511 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8512 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8513 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8514 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8515 alone!'"
8516 </para>
8517 <para>
8518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8519 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8520 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8521 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8522 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8523 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8524 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8525 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8526 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8527 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8528 </para>
8529 <para>
8530 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8531 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8532 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8533 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8534 </para>
8535 <para>
8536 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8537 is affected," he reports.
8538 </para>
8539 <para>
8540 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8541 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8542 his brain."
8543 </para>
8544 <para>
8545 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8546 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8547 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8548 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8549 </para>
8550 <para>
8551 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8552 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8553 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8554 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8555 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8556 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8557 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8558 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8559
8560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8561 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8562 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8563 scene. . . ."
8564 </para>
8565 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8566 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8567 <para>
8568 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8569 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8570 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8571 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8572 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8573 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8574 </para>
8575 <para>
8576 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8577 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8578 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8579 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8580 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8581 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8582 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8583 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8584 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8585 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8586 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8587 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8588 </para>
8589 <para>
8590 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8591 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8592 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8593 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8594 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8595 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8596 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8597 </para>
8598 <para>
8599 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8600 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8601 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8602 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8603 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8604 from Tower.
8605 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8606 </para>
8607 <para>
8608
8609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8610 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8611 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8612 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8613 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8614 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8615 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8616 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8617 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8618 </para>
8619 <para>
8620 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8621 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8622 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8623 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8624 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8625 </para>
8626 <para>
8627 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8628 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8629 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8630 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8631 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8632 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8633 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8634 implemented.<footnote><para>
8635 <!-- f2. -->
8636 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8637 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8638 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003,
8639 available at
8640 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8641 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8642 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8643 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8644 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8645 Stakes on Piracy," <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8646 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8647 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8648 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8649 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8650 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8651 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8652 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8653 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8654 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8655 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8656 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8657 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8658 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8659 August 2003, available at
8660 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8661 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8662 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8663 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8664 Name Students," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8665 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8666 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.</primary></indexterm>
8667 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8668 </para></footnote>
8669
8670 </para>
8671 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8672 <para>
8673 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8674 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8675 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8676 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8677 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8678 </para>
8679 <para>
8680 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8681 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8682 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8683 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8684 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8685 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8686 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8687 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8688 </para>
8689 <para>
8690
8691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8692 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8693 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8694 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8695 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8696 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8697 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8698 </para>
8699 <para>
8700 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8701 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8702 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8703 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8704 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8705 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8706 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8707 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8708 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8709 protection for copyrighted material,
8710 </para>
8711 <blockquote>
8712 <para>
8713 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8714 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8715 </para>
8716 <para>
8717 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8718 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8719 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8720 answer
8721 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8722 well produce a totally different industry model.
8723 </para>
8724 <para>
8725 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8726 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8727 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8728 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8729 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8730 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8731 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8732 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8733 interests.<footnote><para>
8734 <!-- f3. -->
8735 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8736 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8737 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8738 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
8739 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8740 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8741 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
8742 </para>
8743 </blockquote>
8744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8745 <para>
8746 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8747 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8748 changed.
8749 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
8750 </para>
8751 <para>
8752 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8753 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8754 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8755 </para>
8756
8757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8758 </chapter>
8759 <chapter id="harms">
8760 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8761 <para>
8762
8763 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8764 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8765 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8766 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8767 prohibition,
8768 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8769 </para>
8770 <para>
8771 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8772 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8773 extend
8774 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8775 justified?
8776 </para>
8777 <para>
8778 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8779 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8780 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8781 our history.
8782 </para>
8783 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8784 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8785 <para>
8786 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8787 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8788 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8789 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8790 </para>
8791 <para>
8792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8793 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8794 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8795 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8796 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8797 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8798 </para>
8799 <section id="constrain">
8800 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8801 <para>
8802 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8803 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8804 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8805 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8806 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8807 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8808 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8809 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8810 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8811 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8812 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8813 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8814 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8815 </para>
8816 <para>
8817 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8818 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8819 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8820 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8821 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8822 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8823 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8824 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8825 the culture all around.
8826 </para>
8827 <para>
8828 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8829 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8830
8831 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8832
8833 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8834 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8835 storytelling extended across the globe.
8836 </para>
8837 <para>
8838 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8839 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8840 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8841 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8842 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8843 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8844 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8845 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8846 work is presumptively illegal.
8847 </para>
8848 <para>
8849 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8850 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8851 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8852 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8853 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8854 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8855 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8856 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8857 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8858 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8859 million.<footnote><para>
8860 <!-- f1. -->
8861 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
8862 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8863 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8864 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8865 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8866 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8867 </para></footnote>
8868 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8869 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8870 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8871 suffering.<footnote>
8872 <para>
8873 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8874 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8875 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8876 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8877 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8878 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8879 available at
8880 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8881 recent months.
8882 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8883 </para></footnote>
8884 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8885 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8886 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8887 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8888 </para>
8889 <para>
8890 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8891 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
8892 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
8893 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
8894 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
8895 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
8896 designed to
8897
8898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8899 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
8900 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
8901 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
8902 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
8903 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
8904 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
8905 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
8906 States.<footnote><para>
8907 <!-- f3. -->
8908
8909 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
8910 2003, available at
8911 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8912 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8913 </para></footnote>
8914 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8915 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8916 critical or reflective.
8917 </para>
8918 <para>
8919 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8920 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
8921 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
8922 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8923 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8924 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8925 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8926 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8927 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8928 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8929 </para>
8930 <para>
8931 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8932 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8933 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8934 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8935 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8936 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8937 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8938 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8939 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8940 </para>
8941 <para>
8942 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8943 described in chapter
8944 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
8945 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
8946 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
8947 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
8948 use.
8949 </para>
8950 <para>
8951
8952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8953 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8954 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8955 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8956 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8957 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8958 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8959 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8960 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8961 </para>
8962 <para>
8963 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8964 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8965 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8966 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8967 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8968 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8969 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8970 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8971 comfort themselves.
8972 </para>
8973 <para>
8974 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8975 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8976 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8977 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8978 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8979 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8980 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8981 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8982 culture that is free.
8983 </para>
8984 <para>
8985 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8986 </para>
8987 <blockquote>
8988 <para>
8989 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8990 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8991 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8992 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8993 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8995 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8996 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8997 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8998 </para>
8999 </blockquote>
9000 </section>
9001 <section id="innovators">
9002 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9003 <para>
9004 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9005 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9006 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9007 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9008 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9009 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9010 </para>
9011 <para>
9012 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9013 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9014 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9015 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9016 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9017 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9018 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9019 </para>
9020 <para>
9021 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9022 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9023 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9024 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9025 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9026 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9027 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9028 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9029 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9030 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9031 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9032 </para>
9033 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9034 <para>
9035 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9036 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9037 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9038 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9039 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9040 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9041 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9042 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9043 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9044 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9045 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9046 </para>
9047 <para>
9048 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9049 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9050 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9051 </para>
9052 <para>
9053 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9054 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9055 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9056 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9057 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9058 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9059 </para>
9060 <para>
9061 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9062 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9063 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9064 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9065 Raitt. And so on.
9066 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9067 </para>
9068 <para>
9069 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9070 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9071 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9072 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9073 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9074 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9075 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9076 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9077 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9078 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9079 </para>
9080 <para>
9081 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9082 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9083
9084 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9085 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9086 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9087 the kind of content the users liked.
9088 </para>
9089 <para>
9090 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9091 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9092 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9093 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9094 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9095 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9096 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9097 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9098 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9099 they had already bought.
9100 </para>
9101 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9102 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9103 </indexterm>
9104 <para>
9105 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9106 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9107 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9108 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9109 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9110 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9111 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9112 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9113 </para>
9114 <para>
9115 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9116 </para>
9117 <para>
9118 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9119 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9120 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9121 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9122 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9123 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9124 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9125 demanded.
9126 </para>
9127 <para>
9128 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9129 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9130 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9131 clients in this
9132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9133 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9134 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9135 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9136 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9137 </para>
9138 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9139 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9140 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9141 <para>
9142 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9143 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9144 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9145 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9146 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9147 <!-- f4. -->
9148 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9149 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9150 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9151 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9152 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9153 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9154 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9155 </para></footnote>
9156 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9157 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9158 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9159 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9160 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9161 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9162 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9163 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9164 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9165 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in <citetitle>Business
9166 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9167 </para>
9168 <blockquote>
9169 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9170 <para>
9171 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9172 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9173 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9174 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9175 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9176 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9177 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9178 <para>
9179 <!-- f5. -->
9180 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9181 2003, available at
9182 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9183 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9184 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9185 </para></footnote>
9186 </para>
9187 </blockquote>
9188 <para>
9189 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9190 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9191 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9192 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9193 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9194 constantly threatened by litigation.
9195 </para>
9196 <para>
9197
9198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9199 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9200 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9201 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9202 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9203 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9204 imposes,
9205 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9206 conservative
9207 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9208 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9209 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9210 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9211 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9212 </para>
9213 <para>
9214 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9215 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9216 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9217 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9218 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9219 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9220 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9221 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9222 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9223 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9224 </para>
9225 <para>
9226 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9227 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9228 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9229 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9230 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9231 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9232 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9233 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9234 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9235 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9236 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9237 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9238 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9239 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9240 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9241 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9242 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9243 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9244 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9245 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9246 </para>
9247 <para>
9248 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9249 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9250 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9251 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9252 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9253 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9254 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9255 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9256 </para>
9257 <para>
9258 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9259 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9260 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9261 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9262 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9263 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9264 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9265 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9266 </para></footnote>
9267
9268 Congress
9269 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9270 "broadcast
9271 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9272 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9273 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9274 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9275 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9276 violators
9277 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9278 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9279 </para></footnote>
9280
9281 </para>
9282 <para>
9283 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9284 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9285 regulation
9286 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9287 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9288
9289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9290 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9291 those requirements.
9292 </para>
9293 <para>
9294 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9295 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9296 impose.<footnote><para>
9297 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9298 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9299 </para></footnote>
9300 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9301 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9302 harm than good.
9303 </para>
9304 <para>
9305 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9306 innovation&mdash;again,
9307 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9308 crowd.
9309 </para>
9310 <para>
9311 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9312 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9313 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9314 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9315 </para>
9316 <para>
9317 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9318 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9319 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9320 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9321 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9322 <!-- f9. -->
9323 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9324 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9325 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9326 </para></footnote>
9327 overall this history of copyright
9328 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9329 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9330 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9331 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9332 </para>
9333 <para>
9334 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9335 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9336 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9337 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9338 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9339 </para>
9340 <para>
9341 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9342 <!-- f10. -->
9343 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9344 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9345 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9346 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9347 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9348 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9349 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9350 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9351 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9352 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9353 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9354 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9355 liability.
9356 </para></footnote>
9357 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9358 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9359 here.<footnote><para>
9360 <!-- f11. -->
9361 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9362 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9363 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9364 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9365 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9366 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9367 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9368 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9369 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9370 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9371 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9372 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9373 available at
9374 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9375 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9376 </para></footnote>
9377 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9378 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9379 </para>
9380 <para>
9381
9382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9383 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9384 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9385 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9386 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9387 version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9388 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9389 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9390 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9391 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9392 </para>
9393 <para>
9394 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9395 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9396 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9397 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9398 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9399 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9400 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9401 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9402 recording artists.
9403 </para>
9404 <para>
9405 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9406 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9407 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9408 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9409 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9410 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9411 metropolitan area.
9412 </para>
9413 <para>
9414 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9415 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9416 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9417 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9418 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9419 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9420 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9421 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9422 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9423 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9424 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9425 </para>
9426 <para>
9427
9428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9429 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9430 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9431 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9432 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9433 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9434 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9435 FM radio,
9436 </para>
9437 <blockquote>
9438 <para>
9439 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9440 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9441 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9442 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9443 than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation
9444 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9445 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9446 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9447 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9448 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9449 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9450 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9451 shackles.<footnote><para>
9452 <!-- f12. -->
9453 Lessing, 239.
9454 </para></footnote>
9455 </para>
9456 </blockquote>
9457 <para>
9458 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9459 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9460 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9461 legislation"<footnote><para>
9462 <!-- f13. -->
9463 Ibid., 229.
9464 </para></footnote>
9465 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9466 </para>
9467 <para>
9468 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9469 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9470 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9471 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9472 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9473 radio?
9474 </para>
9475 <para>
9476 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9477 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9478
9479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9480 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9481 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9482 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9483 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9484 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9485 of "Happy Birthday" on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9486 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9487 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9488 burdens terrestrial radio.
9489 </para>
9490 <para>
9491 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9492 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9493 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9494 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9495 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9496 <para>
9497 <!-- f14. -->
9498 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9499 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9500 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9501 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9502 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9503 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9504 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9505 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9506 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9507 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9508 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9509 Distribution," <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9510 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9511 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9512 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9513 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9514 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9515 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9516 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9517 </para></footnote>
9518 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9519 equivalent fee.
9520 </para>
9521 <para>
9522 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9523 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9524 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9525 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9526 </para>
9527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9528 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9529 <listitem><para>
9530 name of the service;
9531 </para></listitem>
9532 <listitem><para>
9533 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9534 </para></listitem>
9535 <listitem><para>
9536 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9537 </para></listitem>
9538 <listitem><para>
9539 date of transmission;
9540 </para></listitem>
9541 <listitem><para>
9542 time of transmission;
9543 </para></listitem>
9544 <listitem><para>
9545 time zone of origination of transmission;
9546 </para></listitem>
9547 <listitem><para>
9548 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9549 </para></listitem>
9550 <listitem><para>
9551 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9552 </para></listitem>
9553 <listitem><para>
9554 sound recording title;
9555 </para></listitem>
9556 <listitem><para>
9557 ISRC code of the recording;
9558 </para></listitem>
9559 <listitem><para>
9560 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9561 </para></listitem>
9562 <listitem><para>
9563 featured recording artist;
9564 </para></listitem>
9565 <listitem><para>
9566 retail album title;
9567 </para></listitem>
9568 <listitem><para>
9569 recording label;
9570 </para></listitem>
9571 <listitem><para>
9572 UPC code of the retail album;
9573 </para></listitem>
9574 <listitem><para>
9575 catalog number;
9576 </para></listitem>
9577 <listitem><para>
9578 copyright owner information;
9579 </para></listitem>
9580 <listitem><para>
9581 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9582 </para></listitem>
9583 <listitem><para>
9584 name of the service or entity;
9585 </para></listitem>
9586 <listitem><para>
9587 channel or program;
9588 </para></listitem>
9589 <listitem><para>
9590 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9591 </para></listitem>
9592 <listitem><para>
9593 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9594 </para></listitem>
9595 <listitem><para>
9596 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9597 </para></listitem>
9598 <listitem><para>
9599 Unique User identifier;
9600 </para></listitem>
9601 <listitem><para>
9602 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9603 </para></listitem>
9604 </orderedlist>
9605
9606 <para>
9607 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9608 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9609 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9610 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9611 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9612 that terrestrial radio does not.
9613 </para>
9614 <para>
9615 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9616 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9617 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9618 </para>
9619 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9620 <para>
9621 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9622 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9623 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9624 </para>
9625 <blockquote>
9626 <para>
9627 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9628 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9629 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9630 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9631 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9632 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9633
9634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9635 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9636 Because
9637 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9638 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9639 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9640 of business. . . ."
9641 </para>
9642 <para>
9643 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9644 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9645 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9646 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9647 added.)
9648 </para>
9649 </blockquote>
9650 <para>
9651 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9652 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9653 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9654 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9655 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9656 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9657 effective to prevent it.
9658 </para>
9659 </section>
9660 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9661 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9662 <para>
9663 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9664 dinosaurs
9665 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9666 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9667 </para>
9668 <para>
9669 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9670 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9671 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9672 </para>
9673 <para>
9674 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9675 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9676 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9677 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9678 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9679 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9680 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9681 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9682 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9683 </para></footnote>
9684 According to the RIAA,
9685 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9686 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9687
9688 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9689 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9690 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9691 increasingly
9692 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9693 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9694 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9695 extreme
9696 response by the other.
9697 </para>
9698 <para>
9699 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9700 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9701 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9702 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9703 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9704 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9705 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9706 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9707 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9708 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9709 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9710 was.<footnote><para>
9711 <!-- f16. -->
9712 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," <citetitle>Los
9713 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
9714 </para></footnote>
9715 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9716 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9717 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9718 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9719 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9720 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9721 they oppose.
9722 </para>
9723 <para>
9724 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9725 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9726 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9727 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9728 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9729 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9730 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9731 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9732 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9733 <!-- f17. -->
9734 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9735 Prohibition," <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9736 </para></footnote>
9737 We have
9738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9739 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9740 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9741 <!-- f18. -->
9742 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9743 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9744 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9745 </para></footnote>
9746 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9747 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9748 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9749 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9750 cheat.<footnote><para>
9751 <!-- f19. -->
9752 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9753 Compliance," <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9754 compliance literature).
9755 </para></footnote>
9756 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9757 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9758 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9759 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
9760 </para>
9761 <para>
9762 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9763 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9764 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9765 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9766 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9767 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9768 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9769 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9770 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9771 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9772 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9773 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9774 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9775 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9776 degree of illegality.
9777 </para>
9778 <para>
9779 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9780 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9781 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9782 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9783 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9784 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9785 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9786 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9787 to consider the alternative.
9788 </para>
9789 <para>
9790
9791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9792 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9793 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9794 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9795 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9796 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9797 </para>
9798 <para>
9799 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9800 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9801 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9802 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9803 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9804 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9805 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9806 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9807 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9808 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9809 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9810 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9811 </para>
9812 <para>
9813 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9814 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9815 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9816 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9817 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9818 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9819 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9820 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9821 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9822 a nation of felons?
9823 </para>
9824 <para>
9825 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9826 </para>
9827 <para>
9828 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9829 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9830 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9831 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9832 used
9833
9834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9835 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9836 recordings is free.
9837 </para>
9838 <para>
9839 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9840 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9841 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9842 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9843 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9844 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9845 capacities of digital technologies.
9846 </para>
9847 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9848 <para>
9849 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9850 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9851 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9852 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9853 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9854 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9855 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9856 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9857 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9858 </para>
9859 <para>
9860 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9861 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9862 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9863 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9864 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9865 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9866 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9867 on people's machines.
9868 </para>
9869 <para>
9870 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9871 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9872 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9873 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9874 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9875 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9876
9877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9878 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9879 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9880 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9881 management" system.
9882 </para>
9883 <para>
9884 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9885 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9886 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9887 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9888 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9889 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9890 freedom to move content easily?
9891 </para>
9892 <para>
9893 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9894 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9895 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9896 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9897 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9898 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9899 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9900 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9901 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9902 </para>
9903 <para>
9904 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9905 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9906 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9907 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9908 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9909 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9910 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9911 </para>
9912 <para>
9913 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9914 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9915 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9916 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9917 </para>
9918 <para>
9919 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9920 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9921
9922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9923
9924 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9925 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9926 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9927 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9928 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9929 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9930 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9931 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9932 generally.
9933 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9934 </para>
9935 <para>
9936 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9937 explains,
9938 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
9939 </para>
9940 <blockquote>
9941 <para>
9942 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9943 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9944 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9945 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9946 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9947 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9948 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9949 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9950 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9951 </para>
9952 </blockquote>
9953 <para>
9954 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9955 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9956 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9957 </para>
9958 <para>
9959 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9960 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9961 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9962 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9963 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9964 an Internet user is revealed.
9965 </para>
9966 <para>
9967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9968 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9969 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9970 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9971 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9972 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9973 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9974 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9975 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9976 <!-- f20. -->
9977 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9978 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9979 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9980 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9981 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9982 Being Sued," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9983 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
9984 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9985 Fan, Either," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9986 Brianna a Criminal?" <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
9987 </para></footnote>
9988
9989 </para>
9990 <para>
9991 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9992 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9993 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9994 <!-- f21. -->
9995 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9996 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9997 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9998 </para></footnote>
9999 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10000 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10001 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10002 </para>
10003 <para>
10004 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10005 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10006 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10007 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10008 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10009 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10010 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10011 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10012 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10013 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10014 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10015 <!-- f22. -->
10016 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10017 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10018 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10019 Colleges," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10020 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," <citetitle>Christian Science
10021 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10022 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10023 Lawsuit Possible," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10024 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10025 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10026 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10027 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10028 Sharing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10029 Are Weapons at Universities," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10030 </para></footnote>
10031 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10032 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10033 </para>
10034 <para>
10035 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10036 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10037 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10038 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10039 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10040 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10041 college students
10042
10043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10044 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10045 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10046 Says von Lohmann,
10047 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10048 </para>
10049 <blockquote>
10050 <para>
10051 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10052 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10053 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10054 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10055 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10056 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10057 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10058 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10059 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10060 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10061 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10062 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10063 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10064 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10065 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10066 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10067 million of them.
10068 </para>
10069 </blockquote>
10070 <para>
10071 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10072 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10073 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10074 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10075 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10076 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10077 </para>
10078
10079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10080 </section>
10081 </chapter>
10082 </part>
10083 <part id="c-balances">
10084 <title>BALANCES</title>
10085 <partintro>
10086
10087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10088 <para>
10089 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10090 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10091 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10092 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10093 </para>
10094 <para>
10095 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10096 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10097 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10098 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10099 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10100 everything around.
10101 </para>
10102 <para>
10103 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10104 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10105 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10106 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10107 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10108 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10109 </para>
10110 <para>
10111 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10112 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10113 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10114 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10115 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10116 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10117 made that is happening all around.
10118 </para>
10119 <para>
10120 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10121 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10122 gasoline onto this fire.
10123 </para>
10124 <para>
10125 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10126 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10127 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10128 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10129 </para>
10130 <para>
10131 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10132 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10133 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10134 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10135 success will require.
10136 </para>
10137 </partintro>
10138
10139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10140 <chapter id="eldred">
10141 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10142 <para>
10143 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10144 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10145 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10146 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10147 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10148 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10149 come alive.
10150 </para>
10151 <para>
10152 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10153 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10154 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10155 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10156 them available for free.
10157 </para>
10158 <para>
10159 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10160 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10161 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10162 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10163 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10165 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10166 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10167 accessible&mdash;today.
10168 </para>
10169 <para>
10170 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10171 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10172 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10173 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10174 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10175 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10176 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10177 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10178 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10179 commercial publications of public domain works.
10180 </para>
10181 <para>
10182 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10183 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10184 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10185 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10186 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10187 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10188 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10189 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10190 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10191 generally.<footnote><para>
10192 <!-- f1. -->
10193 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10194 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10195 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10196 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10197 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10198 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10199 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10200 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10201 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10202 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10203 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10204 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10205 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10206 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10207 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10208 </para>
10209 <para>
10210 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10211 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10212 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10213 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10214 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10215 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10216 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10217 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10218 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10219 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10220 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10221 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10222 </para>
10223 <para>
10224
10225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10226 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10227 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10228 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10229 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10230 <!-- f2. -->
10231 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10232 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10233 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10234 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10235 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10236 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10237 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10238 </para></footnote>
10239
10240 </para>
10241 <para>
10242 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10243 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10244 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10245 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10246 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10247 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10248 to undertake.
10249 </para>
10250 <para>
10251 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10252 constitutional
10253 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10254 interpretation.
10255 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10256 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10257 importantly
10258 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10259 </para>
10260 <blockquote>
10261 <para>
10262 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10263 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10264 their . . . Writings. . . .
10265 </para>
10266 </blockquote>
10267 <para>
10268 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10269 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10270 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10271 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10272 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10273 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10274 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10275 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10276 </para>
10277 <para>
10278 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10279 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10280 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10281 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10283 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10284 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10285 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10286 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10287 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10288 </para>
10289 <para>
10290 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10291 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10292 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10293 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10294 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10295 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10296 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10297 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10298 this gravy train going.
10299 </para>
10300 <para>
10301 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10302 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10303 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10304 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10305 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10306 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10307 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10308 </para>
10309 <para>
10310 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10311 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10312 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10313 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10314 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10315 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10316 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10317 published by anyone for free.
10318 </para>
10319 <para>
10320 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10321 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10322 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10323 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10324 report:
10325 </para>
10326 <para>
10327 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10328
10329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10330 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10331 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10332 those works.
10333 </para>
10334 <para>
10335 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10336 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10337 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10338 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10339 </para>
10340 <para>
10341 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10342 about it?"
10343 </para>
10344 <para>
10345 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10346 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10347 they support the bill."
10348 </para>
10349 <para>
10350 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10351 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10352 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10353 much is it worth?"
10354 </para>
10355 <para>
10356 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10357 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10358 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10359 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10360 </para>
10361 <para>
10362 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10363 correct conclusion:
10364 </para>
10365 <para>
10366 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10367 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10368 contributions
10369 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10370 </para>
10371 <para>
10372 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10373 contribute
10374 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10375 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10376 </para>
10377 <para>
10378 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10379 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10380 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10381 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10383 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10384 copyrights
10385 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10386 the copyright term extended.
10387 </para>
10388 <para>
10389 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10390 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10391 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10392 </para>
10393 <para>
10394 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10395 Copyright
10396 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10397 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10398 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10399 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10400 contributions.<footnote><para>
10401 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10402 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10403 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10404 </para></footnote>
10405 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10406 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10407 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10408 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10409 Age," available at
10410 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10411 </para></footnote>
10412 Disney is estimated to have
10413 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10414 cycle.<footnote><para>
10415 <!-- f5. -->
10416 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10417 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10418 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10419 </para></footnote>
10420
10421 </para>
10422 <para>
10423 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10424 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10425 reality
10426 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10427 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10428 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10429 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10430 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10431 "limited."
10432 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10433 and again.
10434 </para>
10435 <para>
10436 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10437 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10438 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10439 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10440 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10441 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10442 Supreme Court's
10443
10444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10445 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10446 guns near schools.
10447 </para>
10448 <para>
10449 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10450 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10451 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10452 "interstate
10453 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10454 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10455 interstate
10456 commerce.
10457 </para>
10458 <para>
10459 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10460 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10461 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10462 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10463 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10464 </para>
10465 <para>
10466 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10467 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10468 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10469 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10470 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10471 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10472 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10473 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10474 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10475 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10476 position to second-guess Congress.
10477 </para>
10478 <para>
10479 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10480 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10481 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10482 </para></footnote>
10483 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10484 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10485 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10486 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10487 <!-- f7. -->
10488 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10489 </para></footnote>
10490 </para>
10491 <para>
10492 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10493 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10494 <!-- f8. -->
10495 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10496 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10497 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10498 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10499 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10500 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10501 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10502 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10503 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10504 </para></footnote>
10505 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10506 yield the conclusion that Congress
10507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10508 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10509 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10510 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10511 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10512 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10513 term of existing copyrights.
10514 </para>
10515 <para>
10516 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10517 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10518 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10519 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10520 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10521 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10522 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10523 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10524 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10525 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10526 were going to be petty politicians.
10527 </para>
10528 <para>
10529 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10530 argument in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10531 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10532 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10533 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10534 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10535 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10536 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10537 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10538 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10539 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10540 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10541 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10542 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10543 piracy that affects us all.
10544 </para>
10545 <para>
10546 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10547
10548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10549 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10550 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10551 <!-- f9. -->
10552 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10553 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10554 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10555 </para></footnote>
10556 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10557 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10558 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10559 charter.
10560 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10561 </para>
10562 <para>
10563 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10564 copyright
10565 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10566 influence
10567 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10568 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10569 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10570 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10571 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10572 bought to extend them again.
10573 </para>
10574 <para>
10575 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10576 extended.
10577 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10578 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10579 society
10580 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10581 Disney's.
10582 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10583 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10584 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10585 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10586 exploited,
10587 and no longer available as a result.
10588 </para>
10589 <para>
10590 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10591 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10592 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10593 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10594 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10595 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10596 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10597 Congressional
10598 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10599 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10600 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10601 </para></footnote>
10602
10603 </para>
10604 <para>
10605 Think practically about the consequence of this
10606 extension&mdash;practically,
10607 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10608
10609 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10610 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10611 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10612 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10613 remaining
10614 9,873. What would you have to do?
10615 </para>
10616 <para>
10617 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10618 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10619 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10620 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10621 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10622 list of books still under copyright.
10623 </para>
10624 <para>
10625 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10626 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10627 </para>
10628 <para>
10629 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10630 owners
10631 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10632 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10633 being at least a list?
10634 </para>
10635 <para>
10636 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10637 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10638 practically
10639 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10640 thousands
10641 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10642 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10643 </para>
10644 <para>
10645 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10646 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10647 copyright owners?"
10648 </para>
10649 <para>
10650 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10651 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10652 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10653 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10654 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10655 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10656 what tangible property.
10657 </para>
10658 <para>
10659 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10660 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10661 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10662
10663 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10664 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10665 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10666 happen
10667 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10668 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10669 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10670 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10671 know quite well who owns what property.
10672 </para>
10673 <para>
10674 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10675 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10676 already
10677 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10678 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10679 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10680 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10681 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10682 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10683 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10684 </para>
10685 <para>
10686 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10687 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10688 consequence
10689 for other creative works is much more dire.
10690 </para>
10691 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10692 <para>
10693 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10694 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10695 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10696 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
10697 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10698 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10699 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10700 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10701 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10702 films."<footnote><para>
10703 <!-- f11. -->
10704 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10705 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10706 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10707 Down Copyright Extension," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
10708 </para></footnote>
10709
10710 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
10711 </para>
10712 <para>
10713 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10714 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10715 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10716 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10717 </para>
10718 <para>
10719 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10720
10721 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10722 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10723 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10724 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10725 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10726 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10727 work available for distribution.
10728 </para>
10729 <para>
10730 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10731 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10732 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10733 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10734 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10735 mm film.<footnote><para>
10736 <!-- f12. -->
10737 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10738 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
10739 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10740 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10741 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
10742 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10743 </para></footnote>
10744
10745 </para>
10746 <para>
10747 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10748 important.
10749 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10750 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10751 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10752 locate the copyright owner.
10753 </para>
10754 <para>
10755 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10756 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10757 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10758 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10759 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10760 to these films is exceptionally high.
10761 </para>
10762 <para>
10763 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10764 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10765 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10766 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10767 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10768 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10769 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10770 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10771 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10772 </para>
10773 <para>
10774 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10775
10776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10777 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10778 benefit
10779 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10780 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10781 the copyright expires.
10782 </para>
10783 <para>
10784 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10785 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10786 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10787 canisters
10788 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10789 than dust.
10790 </para>
10791 <para>
10792 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10793 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10794 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10795 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10796 creative
10797 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10798 free expression."
10799 </para>
10800 <para>
10801 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10802 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10803 indicated,
10804 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10805 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10806 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10807 distributors,
10808 the commercial life ends.
10809 </para>
10810 <para>
10811 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10812 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10813 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10814 between
10815 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10816 Friday
10817 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10818 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10819 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10820 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10821 have, we need to have access to this history.
10822 </para>
10823 <para>
10824 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10825
10826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10827 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10828 this context do no good.
10829 </para>
10830 <para>
10831 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10832 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10833 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10834 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10835 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10836 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10837 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10838 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10839 was independent of copyright law.
10840 </para>
10841 <para>
10842 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10843 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10844 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10845 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10846 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10847 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10848 market didn't have more to offer.
10849 </para>
10850 <para>
10851 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10852 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10853 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10854 would not have interfered with anything.
10855 </para>
10856 <para>
10857 But this situation has now changed.
10858 </para>
10859 <para>
10860 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10861 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10862 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10863 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10864 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10865 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10866 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10867 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10868 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10869 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10870 </para>
10871 <para>
10872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10873 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10874 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10875 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10876 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10877 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10878 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10879 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10880 written for a radically different context.
10881 </para>
10882 <para>
10883 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10884 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10885 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10886 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
10887 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
10888 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
10889 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
10890 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
10891 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
10892 </para>
10893 <para>
10894 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10895 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10896 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10897 culture widely?"
10898 </para>
10899 <para>
10900 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10901 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10902 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10903 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10904 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10905 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10906 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10907 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10908 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10909 </para>
10910 <para>
10911 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10912 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10913 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10914 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10915
10916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10917 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10918 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10919 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10920 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10921 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10922 <!-- f13. -->
10923 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10924 December 2002, available at
10925 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10926 </para></footnote>
10927
10928 </para>
10929 <para>
10930 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10931 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10932 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10933 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10934 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10935 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10936 </para>
10937 <para>
10938 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10939 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10940 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10941 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10942 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10943 </para>
10944 <para>
10945 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10946 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10947 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10948 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10949 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10950 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10951 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10952 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10953 power to extend existing terms.
10954 </para>
10955 <para>
10956 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10957 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10958 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10959 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10960 </para>
10961 <para>
10962 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10963 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10964
10965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10966 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10967 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10968 overstepped its bounds.
10969 </para>
10970 <para>
10971 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10972 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10973 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10974 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10975 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10976 </para>
10977 <para>
10978 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10979 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10980 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10981 briefs and preparing for argument.
10982 </para>
10983 <para>
10984 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10985 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10986 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10987 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10988 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10989 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10990 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10991 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10992 </para>
10993 <para>
10994 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10995 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10996 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10997 mistake lost it.
10998 </para>
10999 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11000 <para>
11001 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11002 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11003 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11004 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11005 heat
11006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11007 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11008 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11009 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11010 </para>
11011 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11012 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11013 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11014 <para>
11015 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11016 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11017 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11018 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11019 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11020 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11021 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11022 most powerful media companies in the world."
11023 </para>
11024 <para>
11025 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11026 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11027 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11028 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11029 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11030 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11031 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11032 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11033 interpretation
11034 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11035 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11036 unconstitutional,
11037 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11038 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11039 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11040 Constitution,
11041 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11042 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11043 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11044 </para>
11045 <para>
11046 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11047 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11048 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11049 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11050 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11051 why it was unconstitutional.
11052 </para>
11053 <para>
11054 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11055
11056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11057 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11058 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11059 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11060 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11061 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11062 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11063 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11064 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11065 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11066 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11067 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11068 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11069 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11070 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11071 </para>
11072 <para>
11073 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11074 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11075 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11076 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11077 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11078 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11079 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11080 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11081 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11082 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11083 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11084 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11085 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11086 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11087 </para>
11088 <para>
11089 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11090 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11091 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11092 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11093 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11094 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11095 </para>
11096 <para>
11097 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11098 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11099
11100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11101 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11102 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11103 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11104 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11105 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11106 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11107 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11108 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11109 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11110 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11111 </para>
11112 <para>
11113 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11114 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11115 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11116 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11117 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11118 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11119 </para>
11120 <para>
11121 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11122 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11123 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11124 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11125 clear.
11126 </para>
11127 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11128 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11129 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11130 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11131 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11132 <para>
11133 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11134 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11135 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11136 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11137 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11138 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11139 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11140 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11141 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11142 </para>
11143 <para>
11144 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11145 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11146 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11147 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11148 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11149 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11150 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11151 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11152
11153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11154 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11155 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11156 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11157 </para>
11158 <para>
11159 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11160 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11161 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11162 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11163 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11164 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11165 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11166 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11167 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11168 confidence in our argument.
11169 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11170 </para>
11171 <para>
11172 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11173 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11174 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11175 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11176 copyright holders.
11177 </para>
11178 <para>
11179 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11180 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11181 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11182 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11183 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11184 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11185 wanted to control.
11186 </para>
11187 <para>
11188 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11189 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11190 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11191 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11192 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11193 pornography."<footnote><para>
11194 <!-- f14. -->
11195 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11196 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11197 </para></footnote>
11198 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11199 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11200 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11201 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11202 <!-- f15. -->
11203 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11204 Mouse Joins the Fray," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11205 </para></footnote>
11206 That's
11207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11208 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11209 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11210 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11211 </para>
11212 <para>
11213 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11214 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11215 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11216 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11217 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11218 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11219 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11220 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11221 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11222 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11223 </para>
11224 <para>
11225 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11226 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11227 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11228 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11229 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11230 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11231 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11232 </para>
11233 <para>
11234 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11235 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11236 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11237 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11238 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11239 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line of cases that said that
11240 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11241 powers had limits.
11242 </para>
11243 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11244 <para>
11245 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11246 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11247 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11248 the Constitution
11249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11250 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11251 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11252 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11253 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11254 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11255 </para>
11256 <para>
11257 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11258 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11259 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11260 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11261 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11262 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11263 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11264 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11265 sense.
11266 </para>
11267 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11268 <para>
11269 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11270 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11271 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11272 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11273 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11274 these retrospective extensions.
11275 </para>
11276 <para>
11277 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11278 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11279 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11280 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11281 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11282 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11283 </para>
11284 <para>
11285 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11286 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11287 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11288 overriding
11289 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11290 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11291 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11292 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11293 </para>
11294 <para>
11295 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11296 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11297 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11298
11299 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11300 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11301 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11302 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11303 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11304 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to
11305 regulate commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to
11306 regulate copyright be limited.
11307 </para>
11308 <para>
11309 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11310 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11311 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11312 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11313 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11314 </para>
11315 <para>
11316 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11317 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11318 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11319 existing
11320 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11321 </para>
11322 <para>
11323 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11324 extended
11325 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11326 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11327 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11328 existing
11329 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11330 restraint
11331 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11332 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11333 hesitated
11334 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11335 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11336 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11337 arrived
11338 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11339 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11340
11341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11342 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11343 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11344 </para>
11345 <para>
11346 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11347 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11348 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11349 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11350 Congress
11351 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11352 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11353 this central idea.
11354 </para>
11355 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11356 <para>
11357 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11358 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11359 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11360 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11361 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11362 </para>
11363 <para>
11364 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11365 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11366 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11367 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11368 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11369 </para>
11370 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11371 <para>
11372 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11373 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11374 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11375 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11376 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11377 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11378 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11379 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11380 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11381 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11382 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11383
11384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11385 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11386 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11387 </para>
11388 <para>
11389 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11390 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11391 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11392 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11393 congressmen
11394 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11395 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11396 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11397 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11398 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11399 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11400 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11401 family of the Justices.
11402 </para>
11403 <para>
11404 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11405 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11406 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11407 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11408 </para>
11409 <para>
11410 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11411 The history was bothering her.
11412 </para>
11413 <blockquote>
11414 <para>
11415 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11416 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11417 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11418 practice that began with the very first act.
11419 </para>
11420 </blockquote>
11421 <para>
11422 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11423 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11424 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11425 </para>
11426 <blockquote>
11427 <para>
11428 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11429 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11430 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11431 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11432 is yes.
11433 </para>
11434 </blockquote>
11435 <para>
11436 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11437 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11438 Kennedy, who observed,
11439 </para>
11440 <blockquote>
11441 <para>
11442 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11443 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11444 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11445 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11446 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11447 </para>
11448 </blockquote>
11449 <para>
11450 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11451 student,
11452 I answered,
11453 </para>
11454 <blockquote>
11455 <para>
11456 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11457 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11458 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11459 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11460 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11461 </para>
11462 </blockquote>
11463 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11464 <para>
11465 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11466 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11467 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11468 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11469 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11470 </para>
11471 <para>
11472 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11473 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11474 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11475 </para>
11476 <para>
11477 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11478 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11479
11480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11481 </para>
11482 <blockquote>
11483 <para>
11484 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11485 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11486 </para>
11487 <para>
11488 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11489 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11490 domain
11491 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11492 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11493 into the Copyright Clause.
11494 </para>
11495 </blockquote>
11496 <para>
11497 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11498 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11499 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11500 </para>
11501 <blockquote>
11502 <para>
11503 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11504 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11505 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11506 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11507 time.
11508 </para>
11509 </blockquote>
11510 <para>
11511 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11512 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11513 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11514 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11515 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11516 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11517 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11518 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11519 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11520 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11521 Court to my side.
11522 </para>
11523 <para>
11524 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11525 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11526
11527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11528 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11529 optimistic.
11530 </para>
11531 <para>
11532 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11533 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11534 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11535 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11536 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11537 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11538 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11539 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11540 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11541 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11542 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11543 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11544 law that it had established elsewhere.
11545 </para>
11546 <para>
11547 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11548 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11549 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11550 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11551 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11552 </para>
11553 <para>
11554 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11555 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11556 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11557 </para>
11558 <para>
11559 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11560 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11561 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11562 reasoning.
11563 </para>
11564 <para>
11565 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11566 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11567 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11568 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11569 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11570 </para>
11571 <para>
11572
11573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11574 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11575 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11576 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11577 </para>
11578 <para>
11579 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11580 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11581 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11582 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11583 </para>
11584 <para>
11585 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11586 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11587 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11588 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11589 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11590 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11591 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11592 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11593 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11594 </para>
11595 <para>
11596 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11597 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11598 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11599 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11600 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11601 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11602 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11603 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11604 the system we have.
11605 </para>
11606 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11607 <para>
11608 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11609 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11610 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11611 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11612 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11613 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11614 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11615 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11616 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11617 </para>
11618 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11619 <para>
11620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11621 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11622 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11623 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11624 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11625 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11626 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11627 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11628 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11629 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11630 </para>
11631 <para>
11632 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11633 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11634 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11635 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11636 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11637 </para>
11638 <para>
11639 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11640 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11641 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11642 </para>
11643 <para>
11644 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11645 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
11646 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11647 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11648 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11649 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11650 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11651 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11652 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11653 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11654 "originalism" now?
11655 </para>
11656 <para>
11657 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11658 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11659 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11660 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11661
11662 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11663 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11664 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11665 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11666 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11667 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11668 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11669 own principles.
11670 </para>
11671 <para>
11672 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11673 myself.
11674 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11675 the law as it is.
11676 </para>
11677 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11678 <para>
11679 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11680 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11681 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11682 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11683 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11684 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11685 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11686 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11687 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11688 </para>
11689 <para>
11690 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11691 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11692 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11693 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11694 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11695 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11696 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11697 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11698 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11699 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11700 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11701 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11702 effort to persuade; but I
11703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11704 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11705 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11706 should decide the issue.
11707 </para>
11708 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11709 <para>
11710 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11711 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11712 Kathleen Sullivan?
11713 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11714 </para>
11715 <para>
11716 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11717 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11718 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11719 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11720 </para>
11721 <para>
11722 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11723 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11724 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11725 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11726 have persuaded.
11727 </para>
11728 <para>
11729 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11730 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11731 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11732 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11733 issue should not be raised until it is.
11734 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11735 </para>
11736 <para>
11737 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11738 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11739 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11740 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11741 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11742 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11743 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11744 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11745 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11746 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11747 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11748
11749 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11750 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11751 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11752 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11753 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11754 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11755 </para>
11756 <blockquote>
11757 <para>
11758 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11759 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11760 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11761 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11762 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11763 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11764 </para>
11765 </blockquote>
11766 <para>
11767 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11768 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11769 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11770 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11771 in the face felt exactly like that.
11772 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11773 </para>
11774 <para>
11775 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11776 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11777 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11778 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11779 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11780 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11781 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11782 </para>
11783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11784 </chapter>
11785 <chapter id="eldred-ii">
11786 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11787 <para>
11788 The day <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11789 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was
11790 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11791 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11792 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11793 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11794 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11795 </para>
11796 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11797 <para>
11798 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11799 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11800 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11801 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11802 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11803 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11804 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11805 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11806 </para>
11807 <para>
11808 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11809 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11811 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11812 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11813 the work passed into the public domain.
11814 </para>
11815 <para>
11816 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11817 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11818 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11819 </para>
11820 <para>
11821 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11822 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11823 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11824 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11825 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11826 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11827 everything else, let the content go.
11828 </para>
11829 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11830 <para>
11831 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11832 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11833 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11834 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11835 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11836 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11837 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11838 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11839 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11840 the stupid harm of the present system.
11841 </para>
11842 <para>
11843 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11844 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11845 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11846 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11847 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11848 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11849 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11850 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11851 where copyright owners could be identified.
11852 </para>
11853 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11854 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11855 <para>
11856 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11857 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
11858 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11859 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11860 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11861 <!-- f1. -->
11862 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11863 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11864 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11865 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11866 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11867 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11868 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11869 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11870 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11871 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11872 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11873 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11874 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11875 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11876 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11877 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
11878 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
11879 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11880 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11881 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11882 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11883 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11884 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11885 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11886 </para>
11887 <para>
11888 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11889 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11890 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11891 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11892 know what's protected and what's not.
11893 </para>
11894 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11895 <para>
11896 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11897 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11898 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11899 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11900 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11901 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11902 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
11903 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
11904 </para>
11905 <para>
11906 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11907 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11908 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11909 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11910 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11911 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11912 </para>
11913 <para>
11914 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11915 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11916 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11917 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11918 burden
11919 imposed upon creators.
11920 </para>
11921 <para>
11922 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11923 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11924
11925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11926 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11927 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11928 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11929 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11930 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11931 table.
11932 </para>
11933 <para>
11934 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11935 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11936 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11937 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11938 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11939 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11940 spread.
11941 </para>
11942 <para>
11943 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11944 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11945 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11946 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11947 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11948 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11949 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11950 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11951 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11952 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11953 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11954 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11955 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11956 system of protection for property generally.
11957 </para>
11958 <para>
11959 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11960 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11961 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11962 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11963 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11964 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11965 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11966 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11967
11968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11969 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
11970 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
11971 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
11972 </para>
11973 <para>
11974 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11975 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11976 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11977 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11978 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11979 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11980 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11981 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11982 </para>
11983 <para>
11984 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11985 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11986 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11987 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11988 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11989 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11990 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
11991 </para>
11992 <para>
11993 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11994 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11995 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11996 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11997 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11998 </para>
11999 <para>
12000 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12001 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12002 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12003 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12004 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12005 </para>
12006 <para>
12007 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12008 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12009 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12010 registration?
12011 </para>
12012 <para>
12013 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12014 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12015 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12016
12017 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12018 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12019 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12020 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12021 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12022 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12023 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12024 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12025 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12026 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12027 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12028 </para>
12029 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12030 <para>
12031 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12032 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12033 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12034 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12035 </para>
12036 <para>
12037 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12038 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12039 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12040 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12041 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12042 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12043 something good might happen here.
12044 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12045 </para>
12046 <para>
12047 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12048 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12049 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12050 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12051 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12052 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12053 </para>
12054 <para>
12055 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12056 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12057 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12059 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12060 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12061 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12062 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12063 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12064 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12065 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12066 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12067 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12068 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12069 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12070 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12071 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12072 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12073 film is a valid derivative use.
12074 </para>
12075 <para>
12076 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12077 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12078 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12079 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12080 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12081 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12082 </para>
12083 <para>
12084 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12085 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12086 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12087 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12088 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12089 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12090 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12091 threat.
12092 </para>
12093 <para>
12094 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12095 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12096 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12097 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12098 sense?
12099 </para>
12100 <para>
12101
12102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12103 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12104 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12105 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12106 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12107 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12108 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12109 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12110 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12111 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12112 </para>
12113 <para>
12114 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12115 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12116 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12117 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12118 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12119 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12120 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12121 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12122 </para>
12123 <para>
12124 What does this industry really want?
12125 </para>
12126 <para>
12127 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12128 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12129 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12130 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12131 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12132 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12133 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12134 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12135 first.
12136 </para>
12137 <para>
12138 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12139 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12140 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12141 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12142 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12143 theirs</emphasis>.
12144 </para>
12145 <para>
12146 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12147 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12148
12149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12150 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12151 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12152 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12153 and to share its own creation.
12154 </para>
12155 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12156 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12157 <para>
12158 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12159 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12160 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12161 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12162 block the progress of others.
12163 </para>
12164 <para>
12165 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12166 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12167 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12168 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12169 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12170 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12171 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12172 </para>
12173 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12174 </chapter>
12175 </part>
12176 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12177 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12178 <para>
12179 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12180 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12181 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12182 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12183 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12184 </para>
12185 <para>
12186 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12187 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12188 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12189 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12190 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12191 the disease almost invisible.
12192 </para>
12193 <para>
12194 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12195 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12196 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12197 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12198 population:
12199 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12200 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12201 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12202 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12203 available at
12204 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12205 release
12206 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12207 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12208 </para></footnote>
12209 </para>
12210 <para>
12211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12212 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12213 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12214 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12215 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12216 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12217 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12218 </para>
12219 <para>
12220 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12221 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12222 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12223 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12224 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12225 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12226 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12227 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12228 changes.
12229 </para>
12230 <para>
12231 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12232 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12233 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12234 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12235 costs significantly below the market price.
12236 </para>
12237 <para>
12238 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12239 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12240 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12241 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12242 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12243 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12244 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12245 <para>
12246 <!-- f2. -->
12247 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12248 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12249 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12250 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12251 </para></footnote>
12252 </para>
12253 <para>
12254 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12255 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12256 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12257 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12258 imports."<footnote><para>
12259 <!-- f3. -->
12260 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12261 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12262 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12263 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12264 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12265 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12266 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12267 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12268 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12269 Love).
12270 </para></footnote>
12271 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12272 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12273 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12274 possible trade sanctions.
12275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12276 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12277 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12278 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12279 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12280 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12281 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12282 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12283 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12284 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12285 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12286 <!-- f4. -->
12287 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12288 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12289 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12290 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12291 </para>
12292 <para>
12293 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12294 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12295 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12296 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12297 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12298 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12299 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12300 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12301 </para>
12302 <para>
12303 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12304 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12305 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12306 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12307 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12308 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12309 </para>
12310 <para>
12311 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12312 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12313 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12314 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12315 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12316 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12317 by U.S. companies.
12318 </para>
12319 <para>
12320 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12321 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12322 argument
12323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12324 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12325 <!-- f5. -->
12326 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12327 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12328 May 1999, A1, available at
12329 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12330 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12331 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12332 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12333 Medicines," <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12334 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12335 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12336 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12337 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <citetitle>Widener Law
12338 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12340 </para></footnote>
12341 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12342 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12343 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12344 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12345 </para>
12346 <para>
12347 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12348 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12349 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12350 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12351 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12352 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12353 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12354 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12355 </para>
12356 <para>
12357 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12358 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12359 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12360 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12361 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12362 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12363 </para>
12364 <para>
12365 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12366 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12367 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12368 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12369 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12370 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12371 </para>
12372 <para>
12373 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12374 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12375 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12376 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12377 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12378 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12379 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12380 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12381 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12382 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12383 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12384 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12385 idea called "intellectual property."
12386 </para>
12387 <para>
12388 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12389 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12390 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12391 What is the argument?
12392 </para>
12393 <para>
12394 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12395 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12396 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12397 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12398 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12399 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12400 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12401 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12402 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12403 were balanced in just this sense.
12404 </para>
12405 <para>
12406 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12407 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12408 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12409 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12410 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12411 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12412 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12413 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12414 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12415 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12416 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12417 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12418 our
12419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12420 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12421 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12422 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12423 this common sense open its eyes.
12424 </para>
12425 <para>
12426 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12427 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12428 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12429 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12430 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12431 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12432 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12433 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12434 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12435 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12436 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12437 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12438 </para>
12439 <para>
12440 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12441 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12442 meeting.<footnote><para>
12443 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12444 August 2003, E1, available at
12445 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12446 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12447 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12448 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12449 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12450 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12451 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12452 </para></footnote>
12453 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12454 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12455 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12456 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12457 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12458 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12459 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12460 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12461 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12462 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12463 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12464 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12465 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12467 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12468 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12469 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12470 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12471 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12472 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12473 </para>
12474 <para>
12475 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12476 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12477 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12478 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12479 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12480 </para>
12481 <para>
12482 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12483 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12484 meeting.
12485 </para></footnote>
12486 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12487 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12488 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12489 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12490 property issues.
12491 </para>
12492 <para>
12493 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12494 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12495 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12496 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12497 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12498 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12499 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12500 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12501 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12502 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12503 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12504 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12505 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12506 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12507 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12508 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12509 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12510 stuff of
12511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12512 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12513 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12514 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12515 </para>
12516 <para>
12517 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12518 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12519 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12520 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12521 </para>
12522 <para>
12523 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12524 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12525 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12526 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12527 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12528 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12529 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12530 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12531 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12532 </para>
12533 <para>
12534 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12535 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12536 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12537 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12538 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12539 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12540 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12541 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12542 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12543 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12544 <!-- f8. -->
12545 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12546 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12547 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12548 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12549 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12550 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12551 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," <citetitle>Government Policy
12552 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12553 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12554 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12555 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12556 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12557 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12558 May 2001), available at
12559 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12560 </para></footnote>
12561 <indexterm><primary>"copyleft" licenses</primary></indexterm>
12562 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12563 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12564 </para>
12565 <para>
12566 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12567 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12568 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12569 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12570 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12571 by
12572 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12573 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12574 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12575 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12576 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12577 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12578 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12579 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12580 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12581 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12582 </para>
12583 <para>
12584 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12585 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12586 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12587 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12588 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12589 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12590 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12591 <!-- f9. -->
12592 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12593 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12594 </para></footnote>
12595 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12596 </para>
12597 <para>
12598 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12599 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12600 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12601 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12602 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12603 its lobbying efforts.
12604 </para>
12605 <para>
12606 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12607 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12608 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12609 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12610 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12611 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12612 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12613 goals of WIPO."
12614 </para>
12615 <para>
12616 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12617 </para>
12618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12619 <para>
12620 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12621 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12622 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12623 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12624 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12625 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12626 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12627 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12628 </para>
12629 <para>
12630 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12631 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12632 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12633 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12634 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12635 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12636 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12637 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12638 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12639 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12640 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12641 </para>
12642 <para>
12643 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12644 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12645 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12646 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12647 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12648 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12649 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
12650 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12651 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12652 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12653 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
12654 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12655 </para>
12656 <para>
12657 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12658 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12659 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12661 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12662 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12663 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12664 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12665 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12666 way possible.
12667 </para>
12668 <para>
12669 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12670 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12671 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12672 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12673 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12674 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12675 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12676 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12677 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12678 that control.
12679 </para>
12680 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12681 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12682 <para>
12683 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12684 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12685 <!-- f10. -->
12686 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
12687 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12688 </para></footnote>
12689 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12690 choice now is whether that information society will be
12691 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
12692 toward the feudal.
12693 </para>
12694 <para>
12695 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12696 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12697 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12698 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12699 </para>
12700 <blockquote>
12701 <para>
12702 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12703 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12704 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12705 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12706 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12707 say anything wrong. But in the world
12708 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12709 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12710 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12711 </para>
12712 </blockquote>
12713 <para>
12714 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12715 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12716 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12717 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12718 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12719 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12720 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12721 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12722 </para>
12723 <para>
12724 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12725 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12726 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12727 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12728 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12729 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12730 </para>
12731 <para>
12732 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12733 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12734 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12735 our own country's history).
12736 </para>
12737 <para>
12738 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12739 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12740 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12741 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12742 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12743 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12744 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12745 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12746 democracy in the world, become?
12747 </para>
12748 <para>
12749 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12750 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12751 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12753 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12754 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12755 </para>
12756 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12757 <para>
12758 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12759 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12760 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12761 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12762 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12763 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12764 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12765 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12766 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12767 hearings and a different result.
12768 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12769 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12770 </para>
12771 <para>
12772 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12773 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12774 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12775 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12776 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12777 concentration in the media.
12778 </para>
12779 <para>
12780 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12781 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12782 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12783 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12784 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12785 </para>
12786 <para>
12787 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12788 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12789 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12790 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12791 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12792 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12793 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12794 </para>
12795 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12796 <para>
12797 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12798 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12799 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12800 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12801 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12802 </para>
12803 <para>
12804 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12805 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12806 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12807 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12808 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12809 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12810 </para>
12811 <para>
12812 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12813 of our tragedy.
12814 </para>
12815 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12816 <para>
12817 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12818 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12819 <!-- f11. -->
12820 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12821 2003, available at
12822 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12823 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12824 2003, available at
12825 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12826 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12827 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
12828 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12829 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12830 Defendants," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12831 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
12832 available at
12833 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12834 </para></footnote>
12835 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12836 music.<footnote><para>
12837 <!-- f12. -->
12838 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12839 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12840 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12841 </para></footnote>
12842 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12843 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12844 <!-- f13. -->
12845 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12846 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12847 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12849 </para></footnote>
12850 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12851 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12852 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12853 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12854 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12855 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12856 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12857 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12858 kids who use a computer to share content.
12859 </para>
12860 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12861 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12862 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12863 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12864 <para>
12865 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12866 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12867 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12868 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12869 24 August 2003, available at
12870 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12871 </para></footnote>
12872 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12873 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12874 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12875 country.<footnote><para>
12876 <!-- f15. -->
12877 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12878 available at
12879 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12880 </para></footnote>
12881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12882 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12883 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12884 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12885 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12886 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12887 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12888 day into the Causbys.
12889 </para>
12890 <para>
12891 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12892 potential is ever to be realized.
12893
12894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12895
12896 </para>
12897 </chapter>
12898 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12899 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12900 <para>
12901
12902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12903 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12904 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12905 maps what might be done.
12906 </para>
12907 <para>
12908 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12909 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12910 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12911 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12912 </para>
12913 <para>
12914 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12915 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12916 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12917 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12918 is so important.
12919 </para>
12920 <para>
12921 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12922 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12923 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12924 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12925 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12926 </para>
12927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12928
12929 <section id="usnow">
12930 <title>US, NOW</title>
12931 <para>
12932 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12933 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12934 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12935 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12936 </para>
12937 <para>
12938 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12939 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12940 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12941 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12942 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12943 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12944 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12945 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12946 </para>
12947 <para>
12948 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12949 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12950 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12951 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12952 the
12953
12954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12955 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12956 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12957 unprotected.
12958 </para>
12959 <para>
12960 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12961 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12962 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12963 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12964 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12965 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12966 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12967 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12968 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12969 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12970 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12971 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12972 </para>
12973 <para>
12974 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12975 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12976 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12977 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12978 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12979 before.
12980 </para>
12981
12982 <section id="examples">
12983 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12984 <para>
12985 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12986 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12987 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12988 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12989 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12990 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12991 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12992 assured.
12993 </para>
12994 <para>
12995 What made it assured?
12996 </para>
12997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12998 <para>
12999 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13000 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
13001 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13002 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13003 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13004 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13005 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13006 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13007 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13008 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13009 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13010 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13011 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13012 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13013 </para>
13014 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13015 <para>
13016 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13017 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13018 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13019 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13020 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13021 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13022 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13023 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13024 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet</primary></indexterm>
13025 </para>
13026 <para>
13027 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13028 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13029 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13030 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13031 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13032 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13033 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13034 disappears.
13035 </para>
13036 <para>
13037 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13038 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13039 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13040 friction did.<footnote><para>
13041 <!-- f1. -->
13042
13043 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13044 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13045 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13046
13047 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13048 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13049 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13050 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13051 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13052 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13053 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13054
13055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13056 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13057 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13058 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13059 </para>
13060 <para>
13061 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13062 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13063 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13064 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13065 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13066 care much about controlling their software.
13067 </para>
13068 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13069 <para>
13070 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13071 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13072 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13073 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13074 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13075 people's work.
13076 </para>
13077 <para>
13078 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13079 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13080 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13081 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13082 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13083 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13084 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13085 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13086 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13087 anything else?
13088 </para>
13089 <para>
13090 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13091 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13092 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13093 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13094 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13095 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13096 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13097 </para>
13098 <para>
13099 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13100 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13101 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13102 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13103 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13104 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13105 fundamentally weakened.
13106 </para>
13107 <para>
13108 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13109 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13110 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13111 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13112 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13113 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13114 </para>
13115 <para>
13116 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13117 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13118 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13119 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13120 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13121 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13122 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13123 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13124 byproduct.
13125 </para>
13126 <para>
13127 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13128 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13129 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13130 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13131 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13132 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13133 </para>
13134 <para>
13135 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13136 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13137 scientific journals are produced.
13138 </para>
13139 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13140 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13141 </indexterm>
13142 <para>
13143 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13144 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13145 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13146 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13147 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13148 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13149 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13150 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13151 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13152 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13153 and Westlaw are also free
13154 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13155 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13156 Court opinion through their respective services.
13157 </para>
13158 <para>
13159 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13160 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13161 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13162 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13163 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13164 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13165 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13166 </para>
13167 <para>
13168 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13169 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13170 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13171 </para>
13172 <para>
13173 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13174 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13175 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13176 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13177 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13178 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13179 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13180 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13181 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13182 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13183 </para>
13184 <para>
13185 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13186 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13187 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13188 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13189 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13190 granted before.
13191 </para>
13192 <para>
13193 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13194 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13195 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13196 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13197 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13198 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13199 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13200 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13201 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13202 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13203 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13204 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13205 </para>
13206 <para>
13207 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13208 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13209 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13210 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13211 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13212 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13213 and science.
13214 </para>
13215 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13216
13217 </section>
13218 <section id="oneidea">
13219 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13220 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13221 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13222 </indexterm>
13223 <para>
13224 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13225 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13226 </para>
13227 <para>
13228 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13229 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13230 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13231 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13232 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13233 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13234 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13235 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13236 make this possible.
13237 </para>
13238 <para>
13239 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13240 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13241 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13242 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13243 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13244 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13245 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13246 human-readable description, and
13247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13248 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13249 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13250 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13251 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13252 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13253 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13254 certain freedoms are given.
13255 </para>
13256 <para>
13257 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13258 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13259 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13260 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13261 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13262 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13263 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13264 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13265 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13266 </para>
13267 <para>
13268 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13269 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13270 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13271 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13272 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13273 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13274 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13275 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13276 a public domain.
13277 </para>
13278 <para>
13279 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13280 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13281 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13282 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13283 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13284 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13286 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13287 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13288 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13289 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13290 </para>
13291 <para>
13292 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13293 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13294 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13295 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13296 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13297 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13298 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13299 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13300 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13301 to begin to build those rules.
13302 </para>
13303 <para>
13304 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13305 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13306 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13307 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13308 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13309 </para>
13310 <para>
13311 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13312 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13313 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13314 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13315 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13316 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13317 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13318 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13319 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13320 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13321 </para>
13322 <para>
13323 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13324 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13325 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13326 was a total success.
13327 </para>
13328 <para>
13329 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13330 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13331 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13332 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13333 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13334 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13335 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13336 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13337 well.
13338 </para>
13339 <para>
13340 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13341 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13342 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13343 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13344 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13345 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13346 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13347 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13348 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13349 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13350 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13351 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13352 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13353 high<footnote><para>
13354 <!-- f2. -->
13355
13356 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13357 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13358 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13359 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13360 </para></footnote>),
13361 these artists release into the creative environment content
13362 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13363 </para>
13364 <para>
13365 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13366 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13367 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13368 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13369 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13370 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13371 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13372 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13373 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13374 say it to others.
13375 </para>
13376 <para>
13377 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13378 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13379 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13380 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13381
13382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13383 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13384 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13385 </para>
13386 <para>
13387 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13388 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13389 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13390 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13391 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13392 steps are possible.
13393 </para>
13394 <para>
13395 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13396 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13397 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13398 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13399 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13400 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13401 creativity to spread more easily.
13402 </para>
13403 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13404
13405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13406 </section>
13407 </section>
13408 <section id="themsoon">
13409 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13410 <para>
13411 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13412 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13413 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13414 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13415 changes that we need.
13416 </para>
13417 <para>
13418 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13419 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13420 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13421 to our end.
13422 </para>
13423
13424 <section id="formalities">
13425 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13426 <para>
13427 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13428 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13429 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13430 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13431 </para>
13432 <para>
13433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13434 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13435 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13436 protected.
13437 </para>
13438 <para>
13439 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13440 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13441 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13442 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13443 </para>
13444 <para>
13445 Why?
13446 </para>
13447 <para>
13448 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13449 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13450 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13451 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13452 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13453 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13454 formalities were getting in the way.
13455 </para>
13456 <para>
13457 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13458 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13459 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13460 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13461 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13462 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13463 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13464 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13465 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13466 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13467 </para>
13468 <para>
13469 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13470 <!-- f1. -->
13471 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13472 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13473 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13474 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13475 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13476 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13477 </para>
13478 <para>
13479 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13480 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13481 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13482 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13483 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13484 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13485 developed by others.
13486 </para>
13487
13488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13489
13490 <section id="registration">
13491 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13492 <para>
13493 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13494 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13495 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13496 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13497 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13498 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13499 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13500 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13501 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13502 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13503 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13504 </para>
13505 <para>
13506 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13507 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13508 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13509 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13510 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13511 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13512 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13513 </para>
13514 <para>
13515 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13516 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13517 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13518 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13519 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13520 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13521 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13522 with which registration occurs up.
13523 </para>
13524 <para>
13525 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13526 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13527 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13528 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13529 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13530 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13531 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13532 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13533 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13535 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13536 </para>
13537
13538 </section>
13539 <section id="marking">
13540 <title>MARKING</title>
13541 <para>
13542 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13543 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13544 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13545 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13546 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13547 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13548 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13549 uniformly across all media.
13550 </para>
13551 <para>
13552 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13553 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13554 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13555 use the work.
13556 </para>
13557 <para>
13558 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13559 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13560 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13561 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13562 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13563 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13564 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13565 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13566 </para>
13567 <para>
13568 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13569 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13570 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13571 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13572 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13573 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13574 <!-- f2. -->
13575 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13576 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13577 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13578 </para></footnote>
13579 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13580 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13581 stop using the work in any new
13582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13583 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13584 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13585 their work.
13586 </para>
13587 <para>
13588 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13589 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13590 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13591 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13592 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13593 </para>
13594 <para>
13595 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13596 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13597 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13598 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13599 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13600 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13601 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13602 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13603 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13604 other important functions.
13605 </para>
13606 <para>
13607 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13608 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13609 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13610 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13611 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13612 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13613 </para>
13614 <para>
13615 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13616 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13617 make things unclear.
13618 </para>
13619 <para>
13620 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13621 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13622 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13623 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13624 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13625 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13626 </para>
13627
13628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13629 </section>
13630 </section>
13631 <section id="shortterms">
13632 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13633 <para>
13634 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13635 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13636 natural authors.
13637 </para>
13638 <para>
13639 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13640 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13641 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13642 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13643 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13644 copyright term.<footnote><para>
13645
13646 <!-- f3. -->
13647 "A Radical Rethink," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13648 available at
13649 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13650 </para></footnote>
13651 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13652 </para>
13653 <para>
13654 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13655 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13656 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13657 terms.
13658 </para>
13659 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13660 <listitem><para>
13661 <!-- (1) -->
13662 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13663 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13664 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13665 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13666 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13667 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13668 </para></listitem>
13669 <listitem><para>
13670 <!-- (2) -->
13671 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
13672 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13673 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13674 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13675 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13676 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13677 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13678 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13679 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13681 </para></listitem>
13682 <listitem><para>
13683 <!-- (3) -->
13684 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13685 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13686 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13687 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13688 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13689 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13690 pension.<footnote><para>
13691 <!-- f4. -->
13692 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13693 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13694 available at
13695 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13696 </para></footnote>
13697 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13698 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13699 single form.
13700 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
13701 </para></listitem>
13702 <listitem><para>
13703 <!-- (4) -->
13704 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13705 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13706 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13707 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13708 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13709 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
13710 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13711 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13712 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
13713 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13714 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13715 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13716 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13717 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13718 </orderedlist>
13719 <para>
13720 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
13721 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
13722 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13723 same.
13724 </para>
13725 <para>
13726 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13727 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13728 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13729 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13730 </para>
13731
13732 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13733
13734 </section>
13735 <section id="freefairuse">
13736 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13737 <para>
13738 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13739 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13740 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13741 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13742 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13743 the emergence of that new technology.
13744 </para>
13745 <para>
13746 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13747 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13748 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13749 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13750 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13751 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13752 though that movie is not "my writing."
13753 </para>
13754 <para>
13755 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13756 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13757 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13758 <!-- f5. -->
13759 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13760 University Press, 1967), 32.
13761 </para></footnote>
13762 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13763 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13764 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13765 </para>
13766 <blockquote>
13767 <para>
13768 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13769 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13770 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13771 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13772 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13773 </para></footnote>
13774 </para>
13775 </blockquote>
13776 <para>
13777 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13778 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13779 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13780 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13781 Consider each limitation in turn.
13782 </para>
13783 <para>
13784 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13785 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13786 sense to protect John
13787
13788 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13789 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13790 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13791 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13792 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13793 after the creative work is done.
13794 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13795 </para>
13796 <para>
13797 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13798 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13799 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13800 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13801 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13802 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13803 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13804 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13805 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13806 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13807 the creative process. Smothers it.
13808 </para>
13809 <para>
13810 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13811 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13812 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13813 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13814 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13815 much more sense.
13816 </para>
13817 <para>
13818 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13819 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13820 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13821 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13822 <para>
13823 <!-- f7. -->
13824 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13825 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13826 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13827 </para></footnote>
13828 His view is that the law should be written so that
13829 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13830 </para>
13831 <para>
13832 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13833 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13834 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13835 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13836 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13837 </para>
13838 <para>
13839 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13841 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13842 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13843 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13844 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13845 </para>
13846 </section>
13847
13848 <section id="liberatemusic">
13849 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13850 <para>
13851 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13852 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13853 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13854 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13855 battles around the sharing of music.
13856 </para>
13857 <para>
13858 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13859 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13860 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13861 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13862 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13863 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13864 innovation on the network.
13865 </para>
13866 <para>
13867 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13868 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13869 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13870 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13871 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13872 </para>
13873 <para>
13874 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
13875 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
13876 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
13877 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
13878 four different kinds of sharing:
13879 </para>
13880 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13881 <listitem><para>
13882 <!-- A. -->
13883 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13884 for purchasing CDs.
13885 </para></listitem>
13886 <listitem><para>
13887 <!-- B. -->
13888 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13889 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13890 </para></listitem>
13891 <listitem><para>
13892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13893 <!-- C. -->
13894 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13895 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13896 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13897 </para></listitem>
13898 <listitem><para>
13899 <!-- D. -->
13900 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13901 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13902 owner plainly endorses.
13903 </para></listitem>
13904 </orderedlist>
13905 <para>
13906 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13907 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13908 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13909 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13910 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13911 significantly weakened.
13912 </para>
13913 <para>
13914 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13915 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13916 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13917 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13918 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13919 networks.
13920 </para>
13921 <para>
13922 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13923 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13924 should respond.
13925 </para>
13926 <para>
13927 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13928 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13929 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13930 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13931 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13932 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13933 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13934 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13935 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13936 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13937 </para>
13938 <para>
13939 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13940 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13941 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13942 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13943 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13944 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13945 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13946 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13947 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13948 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13949 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13950 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13951 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13952 </para>
13953 <para>
13954 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
13955 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
13956 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
13957 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
13958 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
13959 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
13960 access to content than it will be to download and store content
13961 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
13962 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
13963 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13964 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13965 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13966 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13967 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13968 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13969 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13970 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13971 <!-- f8. -->
13972 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13973 April 2002, available at
13974 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13975 </para></footnote>
13976
13977 </para>
13978 <para>
13979 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13980 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13981 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13982 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13983 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13984 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13985 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13986 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13987 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13988 artists get paid, during
13989
13990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13991 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13992 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13993 </para>
13994 <para>
13995 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13996 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13997 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13998 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13999 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14000 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14001 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14002 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14003 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14004 </para>
14005 <para>
14006 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14007 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14008 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14009 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14010 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14011 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14012 way that returns something to the artist.
14013 </para>
14014 <para>
14015 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14016 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14017 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14018 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14019 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14020 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14021 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14022 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14023 </para>
14024 <para>
14025 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14026 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14027 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14028 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14029 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14030 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14031 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14032 </para>
14033 <para>
14034
14035 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14036 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14037 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14038 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14039 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14040 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14041 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14042 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14043 trade.
14044 </para>
14045 <para>
14046 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14047 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14048 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14049 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14050 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14051 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14052 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14053 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14054 </para>
14055 <para>
14056 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14057 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14058 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14059 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14060 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14061 delivering and accessing content.
14062 </para>
14063 <para>
14064 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14065 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14066 </para>
14067 <para>
14068 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14069 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14070 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14071 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14072 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14073 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14074 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14075 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14076 </para>
14077 <para>
14078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14079 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14080 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14081 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14082 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14083 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14084 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14085 </para>
14086 <para>
14087 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14088 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14089 <para>
14090 <!-- f9. -->
14091 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14092 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14093 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14094 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14095 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14096 2004), ch. 6, available at
14097 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14098 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14099 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14100 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14101 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14102 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14103 Broadband?" <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14104 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14105 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14106 available at
14107 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14108 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14109 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14110 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14111 2002, available at
14112 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14113 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14114 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14115 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14116 2002, available at
14117 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14118 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14119 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14120 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14121 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14122 debate by about a decade. See
14123 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14124 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14125 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14126 </para></footnote>
14127 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14128 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14129 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14130 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14131 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14132 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14133 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14134 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14135 tax.
14136 </para>
14137 <para>
14138 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14139 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14140 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14141 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14142 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14143 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14144 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14145 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14146 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14147 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14148 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14149 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14150 controlling access.
14151 </para>
14152 <para>
14153 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14154 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14155 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14156 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14157 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14158 limits on derivative
14159
14160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14161 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14162 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14163 allowed to do with the content itself.
14164 </para>
14165 <para>
14166 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14167 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14168 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14169 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14170 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14171 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14172 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14173 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14174 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14175 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14176 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14177 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14178 on-line.
14179 </para>
14180 <para>
14181 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14182 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14183 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14184 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14185 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14186 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14187 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14188 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14189 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14190 finding ways to compete with "free."
14191 </para>
14192 <para>
14193 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14194 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14195 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14196 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14197 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14198 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14199 the law.
14200 </para>
14201 <para>
14202 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14203 </para>
14204 <para>
14205
14206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14207 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14208 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14209 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14210 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14211 create.
14212 </para>
14213 <para>
14214 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14215 by
14216 </para>
14217 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14218 <listitem><para>
14219 <!-- 1. -->
14220 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14221 </para></listitem>
14222 <listitem><para>
14223 <!-- 2. -->
14224 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14225 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14226 statute;
14227 </para></listitem>
14228 <listitem><para>
14229 <!-- 3. -->
14230 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14231 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14232 </para></listitem>
14233 </orderedlist>
14234 <para>
14235 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14236 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14237 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14238 something then?
14239 </para>
14240 <para>
14241 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14242 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14243 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14244 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14245 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14246 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14247 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14248 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14249 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14250 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14251 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14252 pirates.
14253 </para>
14254 <para>
14255 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14256 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14257 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14258
14259 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14260 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14261 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14262 </para>
14263 </section>
14264
14265 <section id="firelawyers">
14266 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14267 <para>
14268 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14269 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14270 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14271 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14272 </para>
14273 <para>
14274 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14275 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14276 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14277 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14278 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14279 strong view queers the law.
14280 </para>
14281 <para>
14282 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14283 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14284 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14285 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14286 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14287 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14288 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14289 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14290 <!-- f10. -->
14291 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14292 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14293 </para></footnote>
14294
14295 </para>
14296 <para>
14297 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14298 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14299 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14300 </para>
14301 <para>
14302 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14303 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14304 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14305 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14306 <!-- f11. -->
14307 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14308 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14309 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14310 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14311 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14312 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14313 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14314 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14315 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14316 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14317 available at
14318 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14319 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14320 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14321 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14322 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14323 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14324 </para></footnote>
14325 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14326 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14327 them it works.
14328 </para>
14329 <para>
14330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14331 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14332 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14333 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14334 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14335 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14336 practically never be done.
14337 </para>
14338 <para>
14339 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14340 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14341 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14342 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14343 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14344 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14345 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14346 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14347 </para>
14348 <para>
14349 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14350 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14351 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14352 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14353 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14354 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14355 </para>
14356 <para>
14357 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14358 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14359 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14360 its review.
14361 </para>
14362 <para>
14363 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14364 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14365 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14366 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14367 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14368 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14369 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14370 </para>
14371 <para>
14372 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14373 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14374
14375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14376 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14377 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14378 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14379 </para>
14380 <para>
14381 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14382 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14383 keep your lawyers away.
14384 </para>
14385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14386 </section>
14387 </section>
14388 </chapter>
14389 <chapter id="c-notes">
14390 <title>NOTES</title>
14391 <para>
14392 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14393 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14394 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14395 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14396 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14397 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14398 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14399 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14400 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14401 the material.
14402 </para>
14403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14404
14405 </chapter>
14406 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14407 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14408 <para>
14409 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14410 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14411 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14412 to him that this book is dedicated.
14413 </para>
14414 <para>
14415 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14416 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14417 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14418 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14419 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14420 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14421 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14422 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14423 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14424 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14425 critical eye on much of this.
14426 </para>
14427 <para>
14428 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14429 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14430 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14431 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14433 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14434 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14435 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14436 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14437 </para>
14438 <para>
14439 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14440 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14441 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14442 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14443 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14444 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14445 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14446 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14447 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14448 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14449 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14450 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14451 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14452 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14453 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14454 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14455 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14456 a bunch of great replies.)
14457 </para>
14458 <para>
14459 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14460 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14461 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14462 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14463 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14464 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14465 throughout this book.
14466 </para>
14467 <para>
14468 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14469 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14470 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14471 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14472 </para>
14473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14474
14475 </chapter>
14476 <index></index>
14477 </book>