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15 <book id=
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17 <title>Free Culture
</title>
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
24 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
26 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
30 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
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38 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
67 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.png" contentdepth=
"3em" width=
"100%" align=
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70 <imagedata fileref=
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73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
79 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
91 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's
<quote>e.biz
25,
</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's
<quote>50 visionaries.
</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
109 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
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127 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
130 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
132 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
136 <dedication id=
"salespoints">
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
141 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
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148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id=
"alsobylessig">
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
167 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
171 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
174 Excerpt from an editorial titled
<quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,
</quote>
175 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
176 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
179 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711-vcr-handgun-cartoonfig"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
180 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
183 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761-pattern-modern-media-ownership"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
184 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
187 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
191 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
192 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
201 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
205 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
208 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
214 343.7309'
9—dc22
217 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
220 Printed in the United States of America
226 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
234 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
235 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
236 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
237 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
238 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
239 the above publisher of this book.
242 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
243 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
244 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
245 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
246 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
247 author's rights is appreciated.
251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
252 <dedication><title></title>
254 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
262 <title>List of figures
</title>
269 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
270 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
271 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
272 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
277 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
281 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
282 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
283 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
284 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
285 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
286 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
290 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
291 2 Architecture and Law: Force
292 2 Market: Concentration
295 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
296 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
297 2 Constraining Creators
298 2 Constraining Innovators
299 2 Corrupting Citizens
301 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
302 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
306 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
307 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
309 2 1. More Formalities
310 3 Registration and Renewal
313 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
314 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
315 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
323 <preface id=
"preface">
324 <title>PREFACE
</title>
325 <indexterm id='idxpoguedavid' class='startofrange'
><primary>Pogue, David
</primary></indexterm>
327 <emphasis role=
"bold">At the end
</emphasis> of his review of my first
328 book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David
329 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
330 computer-related texts, wrote this:
334 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
335 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
336 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
337 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
338 David Pogue,
<quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
343 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
344 software, or
<quote>code,
</quote> functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
345 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
346 could always
<quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome
</quote>-like simply flip a
347 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
348 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
349 <quote>affect
</quote> us anymore.
352 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
353 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
354 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
355 causes even after the modem is turned
357 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
358 on-line have fundamentally affected
<quote>people who aren't online.
</quote> There
359 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
361 <indexterm startref='idxpoguedavid' class='endofrange'
/>
363 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
364 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
365 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
366 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
370 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
371 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of
<quote>free culture
</quote>—not
372 <quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free beer
</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
373 free software movement
<footnote>
375 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
376 </para></footnote>), but
<quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free speech,
</quote> <quote>free markets,
</quote>
377 <quote>free trade,
</quote> <quote>free enterprise,
</quote> <quote>free will,
</quote> and
<quote>free elections.
</quote> A
378 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
379 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
380 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
381 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
382 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
383 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
384 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
385 <quote>permission culture
</quote>—a culture in which creators get to create
386 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
390 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not
<quote>we
</quote>
391 on the Left or
<quote>you
</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
392 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
393 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
394 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
395 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
396 culture deem fundamental.
398 <indexterm id='idxpowerconcentrationof' class='startofrange'
><primary>power, concentration of
</primary></indexterm>
399 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
400 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
401 <indexterm><primary>Stevens, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
403 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
404 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
405 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
406 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
407 As William Safire described marching
<quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
408 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
409 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,
</quote> he formulated perhaps
410 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
415 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
416 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
417 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
418 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
419 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
420 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
421 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
426 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
427 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
428 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
429 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
430 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
431 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
432 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
433 Safire's left or on his right.
435 <indexterm startref='idxpowerconcentrationof' class='endofrange'
/>
437 <emphasis role=
"strong">The inspiration
</emphasis> for the title and for
438 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
439 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
440 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
441 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
442 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
443 that this work is
<quote>merely
</quote> derivative.
446 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
447 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
448 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
449 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
450 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
451 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
452 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
453 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
456 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
457 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
458 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
459 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
460 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
464 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
465 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
466 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
467 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
468 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
469 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
470 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
478 <chapter label=
"0" id=
"c-introduction">
479 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
480 <indexterm id='idxwrightbrothers' class='startofrange'
><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
482 <emphasis role=
"strong">On December
17</emphasis>,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
483 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
484 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
485 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
486 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
487 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
489 <indexterm id='idxairtrafficlandownershipvs' class='startofrange'
><primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.
</primary></indexterm>
490 <indexterm id='idxlandownershipairtrafficand' class='startofrange'
><primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary></indexterm>
491 <indexterm id='idxpropertyrightsairtrafficvs' class='startofrange'
><primary>property rights
</primary><secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary></indexterm>
493 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
494 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
495 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
496 and all the space above, to
<quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.
</quote><footnote><para>
497 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
498 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
501 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
502 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
503 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
505 <indexterm startref='idxwrightbrothers' class='endofrange'
/>
507 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
508 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
509 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
510 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
511 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
512 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
513 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
515 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
516 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
518 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
519 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
520 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
521 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
522 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
523 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
524 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to
<quote>an indefinite
525 extent, upwards,
</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
526 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
528 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
529 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
530 <indexterm id='idxdouglaswilliamo' class='startofrange'
><primary>Douglas, William O.
</primary></indexterm>
531 <indexterm id='idxsupremecourtusonairspacevslandrights' class='startofrange'
><primary>Supreme Court, U.S.
</primary><secondary>on airspace vs. land rights
</secondary></indexterm>
533 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
534 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
535 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
536 <quote>taking
</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
537 that
<quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
538 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.
</quote> But Justice Douglas
539 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
540 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
544 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
545 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
546 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
547 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
548 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
549 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
550 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
551 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
553 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
554 that there could be a
<quote>taking
</quote> if the government's use of its land
555 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
556 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece,
<quote>(Intellectual)
557 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
558 Authorship,
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
559 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
561 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
562 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
567 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.
</quote>
569 <indexterm startref='idxdouglaswilliamo' class='endofrange'
/>
571 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
572 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
573 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
575 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line:
<quote>Common sense revolts
576 at the idea.
</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
577 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
578 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
579 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
581 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
582 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
583 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
585 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
586 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
587 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
588 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
589 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
590 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
591 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
592 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
593 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by
<quote>what
594 seemed reasonable
</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
595 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
596 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
597 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
598 end, the force of what seems
<quote>obvious
</quote> to everyone else
—the power of
599 <quote>common sense
</quote>—would prevail. Their
<quote>private interest
</quote> would not be
600 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
602 <indexterm startref='idxairtrafficlandownershipvs' class='endofrange'
/>
603 <indexterm startref='idxlandownershipairtrafficand' class='endofrange'
/>
604 <indexterm startref='idxpropertyrightsairtrafficvs' class='endofrange'
/>
605 <indexterm startref='idxsupremecourtusonairspacevslandrights' class='endofrange'
/>
606 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwinhoward' class='startofrange'
><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
607 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
608 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
609 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
610 <indexterm id='idxradiofmspectrumof' class='startofrange'
><primary>radio
</primary><secondary>FM spectrum of
</secondary></indexterm>
612 <emphasis role='strong'
>Edwin Howard Armstrong
</emphasis> is one of
613 America's forgotten inventor geniuses. He came to the great American
614 inventor scene just after the titans Thomas Edison and Alexander
615 Graham Bell. But his work in the area of radio technology was perhaps
616 the most important of any single inventor in the first fifty years of
617 radio. He was better educated than Michael Faraday, who as a
618 bookbinder's apprentice had discovered electric induction in
1831. But
619 he had the same intuition about how the world of radio worked, and on
620 at least three occasions, Armstrong invented profoundly important
621 technologies that advanced our understanding of radio.
622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
625 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
626 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
627 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
628 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
629 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
630 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
631 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
632 much less transmitter power and static.
635 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
636 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
637 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
638 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
639 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
640 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
641 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
642 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
643 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.
</quote>
646 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
650 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
651 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
652 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
653 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
654 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
655 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
<quote>music
656 box.
</quote><footnote><para>
657 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
658 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
662 <indexterm id='idxrca' class='startofrange'
><primary>RCA
</primary></indexterm>
663 <indexterm id='idxmediaownershipconcentrationin' class='startofrange'
><primary>media
</primary><secondary>ownership concentration in
</secondary></indexterm>
665 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
666 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
667 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
668 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
669 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
670 a handful of networks.
673 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
675 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
676 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
677 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
678 that removed static from
<quote>radio.
</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
679 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
683 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
684 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
685 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
686 RCA.
<footnote><para> See
<quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
687 Electronic Era,
</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
688 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
690 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
694 <indexterm id='idxfmradio' class='startofrange'
><primary>FM radio
</primary></indexterm>
695 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
697 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
698 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
699 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
702 <indexterm id='idxlessinglawrence' class='startofrange'
><primary>Lessing, Lawrence
</primary></indexterm>
705 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
706 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
707 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
708 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
709 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
710 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
714 <indexterm id='idxfcconfmradio' class='startofrange'
><primary>FCC
</primary><secondary>on FM radio
</secondary></indexterm>
716 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
717 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
718 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
719 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
720 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
721 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
722 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
723 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
724 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
725 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
726 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
731 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
732 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
733 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
734 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
739 <indexterm startref='idxlessinglawrence' class='endofrange'
/>
740 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
742 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
743 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
744 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
745 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
746 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
747 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
748 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
751 <indexterm startref='idxradiofmspectrumof' class='endofrange'
/>
752 <indexterm startref='idxfcconfmradio' class='endofrange'
/>
754 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
755 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
756 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
757 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
758 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
759 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
760 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
761 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
762 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
763 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
765 <indexterm startref='idxfmradio' class='endofrange'
/>
766 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwinhoward' class='endofrange'
/>
768 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
769 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
770 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
771 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
772 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
773 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
774 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
775 course always public spirited; the reality is something
776 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
777 to themselves, would crumble in
779 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
780 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
781 effect of technological change.
783 <indexterm startref='idxrca' class='endofrange'
/>
784 <indexterm startref='idxmediaownershipconcentrationin' class='endofrange'
/>
785 <indexterm id='idxinternetdevelopmentof' class='startofrange'
><primary>Internet
</primary><secondary>development of
</secondary></indexterm>
787 <emphasis role=
"strong">There's no
</emphasis> single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
788 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
789 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
790 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
791 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
792 before.
<footnote><para>
793 Amanda Lenhart,
<quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
794 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,
</quote> Pew Internet and American
795 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
796 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
798 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
802 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
803 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
804 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
805 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
806 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
807 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
808 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
809 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
810 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
813 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
814 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
815 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
816 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
817 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
818 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
821 <indexterm startref='idxinternetdevelopmentof' class='endofrange'
/>
822 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
823 <indexterm id='idxculturecommercialvsnoncommercial' class='startofrange'
><primary>culture
</primary><secondary>commercial vs. noncommercial
</secondary></indexterm>
824 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
826 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
827 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
828 regulation of each. By
<quote>commercial culture
</quote> I mean that part of our
829 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
830 <quote>noncommercial culture
</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
832 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
833 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
834 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his
<quote>Reader,
</quote> or
835 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
838 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
839 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
840 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
841 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
842 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
843 left this culture
<quote>free.
</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
844 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
845 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
846 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
848 <indexterm id='idxcopyrightinfringementlawsuitscommercialcreativityasprimarypurposeof' class='startofrange'
><primary>Copyright infringement lawsuits
</primary><secondary>commercial creativity as primary purpose of
</secondary></indexterm>
850 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
851 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
852 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
853 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
854 marketplace.
<footnote>
856 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
857 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
858 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
859 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
860 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
861 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
862 D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote> Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
864 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
866 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
867 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
868 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
869 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
871 <indexterm><primary>free culture
</primary><secondary> permission culture vs.
</secondary></indexterm>
872 <indexterm><primary>permission culture
</primary><secondary> free culture vs.
</secondary></indexterm>
874 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
875 been erased.
<footnote><para>
876 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
878 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
880 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
881 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
882 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
883 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
884 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
885 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
886 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
887 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
888 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
889 culture, more and more a permission culture.
891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
892 <indexterm><primary>protection of artists vs. business interests
</primary></indexterm>
894 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
895 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
896 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
897 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
898 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
899 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
900 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
901 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
902 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
903 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
906 <indexterm startref='idxcopyrightinfringementlawsuitscommercialcreativityasprimarypurposeof' class='endofrange'
/>
908 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
909 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
910 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
911 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
912 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
913 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
914 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
915 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
916 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
917 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
918 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
919 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
920 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
921 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
922 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
923 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
924 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
927 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
928 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
929 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
930 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
931 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
932 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
935 <indexterm startref='idxculturecommercialvsnoncommercial' class='endofrange'
/>
936 <indexterm><primary>Valenti, Jack
</primary><secondary> on creative property rights
</secondary></indexterm>
938 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
940 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
941 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether
<quote>piracy
</quote> will
942 be permitted, and whether
<quote>property
</quote> will be protected. The
<quote>war
</quote> that
943 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
944 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
945 calls his
<quote>own terrorist war
</quote><footnote><para>
946 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
947 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,
</quote> <citetitle>New York
948 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
949 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
950 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
951 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
955 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
956 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
957 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
958 <quote>creative property.
</quote> I believe that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that the
959 law, properly tuned, should punish
<quote>piracy,
</quote> whether on or off the
963 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
964 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
965 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet
<quote>pirates
</quote> will also rid our
966 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
968 <indexterm><primary>Constitution, U.S.
</primary><secondary>First Amendment to
</secondary></indexterm>
969 <indexterm><primary>Copyright law
</primary><secondary>as protection of creators
</secondary></indexterm>
970 <indexterm><primary>First Amendment
</primary></indexterm>
971 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
973 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
974 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
975 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
976 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
977 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
979 Neil W. Netanel,
<quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
980 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
981 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
983 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
984 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
985 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
986 could cultivate and extend our culture.
989 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
990 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
991 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
992 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
993 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
994 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
995 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
996 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
997 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
1001 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
1002 <quote>centrality of technology
</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
1003 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
1004 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
1005 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
1006 against an industry.
1009 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
1010 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
1011 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
1012 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
1013 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
1014 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
1015 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
1017 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1018 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1019 <indexterm id='idxintellectualpropertyrights' class='startofrange'
><primary>intellectual property rights
</primary></indexterm>
1021 <emphasis role=
"strong">Like the Causbys'
</emphasis> battle, this war is, in part, about
<quote>property.
</quote> The
1022 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1023 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1024 this
<quote>property
</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1025 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1026 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1027 of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1028 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1029 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1030 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1031 <quote>trespassing
</quote> upon legitimate claims of
<quote>property.
</quote> It is as plain to
1032 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1035 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1036 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1037 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
1039 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1040 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1041 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1042 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1044 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1045 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1048 <indexterm><primary>power, concentration of
</primary></indexterm>
1050 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1051 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1052 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1053 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1054 our
<quote>culture
</quote> was as
<quote>owned
</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1055 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1056 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1057 accepted as it is now.
1060 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1061 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1062 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1063 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1066 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1067 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1070 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1071 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1072 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1073 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1074 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1077 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1078 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1079 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1080 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1083 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1084 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1086 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1087 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1088 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1089 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of
<quote>intellectual
1090 property.
</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1091 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1092 this silliness will be much more profound.
1093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1095 <indexterm startref='idxintellectualpropertyrights' class='endofrange'
/>
1097 <emphasis role=
"strong">The struggle
</emphasis> that rages just now centers on two ideas:
<quote>piracy
</quote> and
1098 <quote>property.
</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1102 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1103 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1104 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1105 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1106 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1107 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1110 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1111 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1112 government, pushed by big media to respond to this
<quote>something new,
</quote> is
1113 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1114 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let
<quote>common
1115 sense
</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1116 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1117 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1118 fundamental about who we have always been.
1121 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1122 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1123 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1124 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1125 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1126 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1130 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1131 <title><quote>PIRACY
</quote></title>
1133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1134 <indexterm><primary>Copyright law
</primary><secondary>English
</secondary></indexterm>
1135 <indexterm id='idxmansfieldwilliammurraylord' class='startofrange'
><primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary></indexterm>
1136 <indexterm><primary>music publishing
</primary></indexterm>
1137 <indexterm><primary>sheet music
</primary></indexterm>
1139 <emphasis role=
"strong">Since the inception
</emphasis> of the law regulating creative property, there has
1140 been a war against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1141 <quote>piracy,
</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1142 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1143 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1147 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1148 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1149 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1151 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1154 <indexterm startref='idxmansfieldwilliammurraylord' class='endofrange'
/>
1156 <indexterm><primary>Internet
</primary><secondary> efficient content distribution on
</secondary></indexterm>
1157 <indexterm id='idxpeertopeerppfilesharingefficiencyof' class='startofrange'
><primary>peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing
</primary><secondary>efficiency of
</secondary></indexterm>
1159 Today we are in the middle of another
<quote>war
</quote> against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The
1160 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1161 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1162 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1163 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1164 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1168 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1169 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1170 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1171 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1172 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will
<quote>rob the author of the
1175 <indexterm startref='idxpeertopeerppfilesharingefficiencyof' class='endofrange'
/>
1177 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1178 increasingly to technology to defend their
<quote>property
</quote> against this
1179 <quote>piracy.
</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1180 raised to believe that
<quote>property
</quote> should be
<quote>free.
</quote> Forget tattoos,
1181 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1182 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1185 There's no doubt that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1186 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1187 notion of
<quote>piracy
</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1188 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1191 The idea goes something like this:
1195 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1196 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1197 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1198 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1199 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1203 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1204 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1205 <indexterm><primary>Girl Scouts
</primary></indexterm>
1206 <indexterm id='idxcreativepropertyifvaluethenrighttheoryof' class='startofrange'
><primary>creative property
</primary><secondary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory of
</secondary></indexterm>
1207 <indexterm id='idxifvaluethenrighttheory' class='startofrange'
><primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary></indexterm>
1209 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1210 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1211 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1213 See Rochelle Dreyfuss,
<quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1214 in the Pepsi Generation,
</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1216 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1217 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1218 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1219 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1221 Lisa Bannon,
<quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1222 Up,
</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1223 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1224 Zittrain,
<quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1225 Speech, No One Wins,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1226 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1228 There was
<quote>value
</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1229 <quote>right
</quote>—even against the Girl Scouts.
1231 <indexterm startref='idxcreativepropertyifvaluethenrighttheoryof' class='endofrange'
/>
1233 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1234 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1236 of law protecting creative property. But the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1237 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1238 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1240 <indexterm startref='idxifvaluethenrighttheory' class='endofrange'
/>
1241 <indexterm id='idxcopyrightlawonrepublishingvstransformationoforiginalwork' class='startofrange'
><primary>copyright law
</primary><secondary>on republishing vs. transformation of original work
</secondary></indexterm>
1242 <indexterm id='idxcreativitylegalrestrictionson' class='startofrange'
><primary>creativity
</primary><secondary>legal restrictions on
</secondary></indexterm>
1244 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1245 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1246 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1247 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1248 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1251 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1252 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1253 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1254 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1255 copyright law today regulates both.
1257 <indexterm startref='idxcopyrightlawonrepublishingvstransformationoforiginalwork' class='endofrange'
/>
1259 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1260 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1261 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1262 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1263 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1264 more expense of doing business.
1266 <indexterm><primary>copyright law
</primary><secondary>creativity impeded by
</secondary></indexterm>
1267 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1268 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1270 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1271 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1272 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1273 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1274 <quote>copying,
</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1275 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1276 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1277 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1278 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1279 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1280 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1281 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1282 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1283 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1284 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1286 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the
<quote>Rise of the Creative
1287 Class.
</quote><footnote>
1290 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York:
1291 Basic Books,
2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1292 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1293 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1294 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1295 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1296 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1298 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1299 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1301 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1302 this creative class.
1304 <indexterm startref='idxcreativitylegalrestrictionson' class='endofrange'
/>
1306 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1307 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1308 context the current battles about behavior labeled
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
1312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1313 <chapter label=
"1" id=
"creators">
1314 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1315 <indexterm id='idxanimatedcartoons' class='startofrange'
><primary>animated cartoons
</primary></indexterm>
1316 <indexterm id='idxcartoonfilms' class='startofrange'
><primary>cartoon films
</primary></indexterm>
1317 <indexterm id='idxfilmsanimated' class='startofrange'
><primary>films
</primary><secondary>animated
</secondary></indexterm>
1318 <indexterm id='idxsteamboatwillie' class='startofrange'
><primary>Steamboat Willie
</primary></indexterm>
1319 <indexterm id='idxmickeymouse' class='startofrange'
><primary>Mickey Mouse
</primary></indexterm>
1321 <emphasis role=
"strong">In
1928</emphasis>, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1322 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1323 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1324 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1325 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1327 <indexterm id='idxdisneywalt' class='startofrange'
><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
1329 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1330 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1331 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1332 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1333 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1334 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1338 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1339 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1340 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1341 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1345 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1346 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1347 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1348 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1349 synchronization was pretty close.
1352 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1353 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1354 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1355 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1356 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1358 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1359 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1363 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1365 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1366 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly:
<quote>I have never been so thrilled
1367 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.
</quote>
1370 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1371 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1372 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1373 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1374 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1375 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1376 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1378 <indexterm startref='idxdisneywalt' class='endofrange'
/>
1379 <indexterm id='idxkeatonbuster' class='startofrange'
><primary>Keaton, Buster
</primary></indexterm>
1380 <indexterm id='idxsteamboatbilljr' class='startofrange'
><primary>Steamboat Bill, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
1382 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1383 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1384 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1385 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1388 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1389 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1390 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1391 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1392 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1393 and among the best of its genre.
1395 <indexterm id='idxderivativeworkspiracyvs' class='startofrange'
><primary>derivative works
</primary><secondary>piracy vs.
</secondary></indexterm>
1396 <indexterm id='idxpiracyderivativeworkvs' class='startofrange'
><primary>piracy
</primary><secondary>derivative work vs.
</secondary></indexterm>
1398 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1401 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1402 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1404 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1405 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1406 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1407 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>:
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote> <quote>The
1408 Simpleton
</quote> (Delille),
<quote>Mischief Makers
</quote> (Carbonara),
<quote>Joyful Hurry No.
1</quote>
1409 (Baron), and
<quote>Gawky Rube
</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song,
<quote>The Turkey in the
1410 Straw,
</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1411 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1413 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1414 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1415 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1416 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote>
1417 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1420 <indexterm startref='idxsteamboatwillie' class='endofrange'
/>
1421 <indexterm startref='idxmickeymouse' class='endofrange'
/>
1422 <indexterm startref='idxkeatonbuster' class='endofrange'
/>
1423 <indexterm startref='idxsteamboatbilljr' class='endofrange'
/>
1424 <indexterm id='idxcreativitybytransformingpreviousworks' class='startofrange'
><primary>creativity
</primary><secondary>by transforming previous works
</secondary></indexterm>
1425 <indexterm id='idxdisneyinc' class='startofrange'
><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
1427 This
<quote>borrowing
</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1428 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1429 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1431 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman,
<quote>The Mouse
1432 that Ate the Public Domain,
</quote> Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1433 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1435 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1436 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1437 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1438 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1439 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1440 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1441 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1442 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1445 <indexterm id='idxgrimmfairytales' class='startofrange'
><primary>Grimm fairy tales
</primary></indexterm>
1447 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1448 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1449 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1450 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1451 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1452 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1453 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1456 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1457 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1458 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1459 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1460 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1461 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1462 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1463 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1464 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1465 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1466 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1468 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1469 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1470 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1471 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1472 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1473 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1474 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1475 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1477 <indexterm startref='idxgrimmfairytales' class='endofrange'
/>
1479 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1480 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1481 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1482 its importance. We could call this
<quote>Disney creativity,
</quote> though that
1483 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely,
<quote>Walt Disney
1484 creativity
</quote>—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1485 culture around us and makes it something different.
1487 <indexterm startref='idxderivativeworkspiracyvs' class='endofrange'
/>
1488 <indexterm startref='idxpiracyderivativeworkvs' class='endofrange'
/>
1489 <indexterm startref='idxcreativitybytransformingpreviousworks' class='endofrange'
/>
1490 <indexterm id='idxcopyrightdurationof' class='startofrange'
><primary>copyright
</primary><secondary>duration of
</secondary></indexterm>
1491 <indexterm id='idxpublicdomaindefined' class='startofrange'
><primary>public domain
</primary><secondary>defined
</secondary></indexterm>
1492 <indexterm id='idxpublicdomaintraditionaltermforconversionto' class='startofrange'
><primary>public domain
</primary><secondary>traditional term for conversion to
</secondary></indexterm>
1493 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1494 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1495 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1496 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1497 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1499 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1500 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the
<quote>average
</quote> term by
1502 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1503 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1504 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1506 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1507 Web site associated with this book, available at
1508 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1510 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1511 copyright holders of a creative work had an
<quote>exclusive right
</quote> to control
1512 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1513 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1516 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1517 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1518 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a
<quote>lawyer-free
1519 zone.
</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1520 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1521 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1522 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1524 <indexterm startref='idxanimatedcartoons' class='endofrange'
/>
1525 <indexterm startref='idxfilmsanimated' class='endofrange'
/>
1527 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1528 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1529 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1530 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1533 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1534 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1535 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1536 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1537 content from before the Great Depression.
1539 <indexterm startref='idxcartoonfilms' class='endofrange'
/>
1540 <indexterm startref='idxdisneyinc' class='endofrange'
/>
1541 <indexterm startref='idxcopyrightdurationof' class='endofrange'
/>
1542 <indexterm startref='idxpublicdomaindefined' class='endofrange'
/>
1543 <indexterm startref='idxpublicdomaintraditionaltermforconversionto' class='endofrange'
/>
1544 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
1546 <emphasis role=
"strong">Of course
</emphasis>, Walt Disney had no monopoly on
<quote>Walt Disney creativity.
</quote>
1547 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1548 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1551 <indexterm id='idxcomicsjapanese' class='startofrange'
><primary>comics, Japanese
</primary></indexterm>
1552 <indexterm id='idxderivativeworkspiracyvs2' class='startofrange'
><primary>derivative works
</primary><secondary>piracy vs.
</secondary></indexterm>
1553 <indexterm id='idxjapanesecomics' class='startofrange'
><primary>Japanese comics
</primary></indexterm>
1554 <indexterm id='idxmanga' class='startofrange'
><primary>manga
</primary></indexterm>
1555 <indexterm id='idxpiracyderivativeworkvs2' class='startofrange'
><primary>piracy
</primary><secondary>derivative work vs.
</secondary></indexterm>
1557 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1558 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1559 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1560 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1561 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1562 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1563 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1566 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1567 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1568 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1569 the stories that these
<quote>graphic novels
</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1570 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are
<quote>men in tights.
</quote>
1571 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1572 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1573 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1574 interestingly different way.
1577 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1578 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1579 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1581 <indexterm id='idxcreativitybytransformingpreviousworks2' class='startofrange'
><primary>creativity
</primary><secondary>by transforming previous works
</secondary></indexterm>
1582 <indexterm id='idxdoujinshicomics' class='startofrange'
><primary>doujinshi comics
</primary></indexterm>
1584 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1585 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1586 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1587 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1588 transforming it either subtly or
1589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1590 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1591 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1592 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1593 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently
<quote>different.
</quote> But they
1594 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1595 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1596 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1598 <indexterm id='idxdisneywalt2' class='startofrange'
><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
1600 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1601 huge. More than
33,
000 <quote>circles
</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1602 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1603 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1604 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1605 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1606 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1607 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1608 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1610 <indexterm id='idxcopyrightlawjapanese' class='startofrange'
><primary>copyright law
</primary><secondary>Japanese
</secondary></indexterm>
1611 <indexterm><primary>Steamboat Bill, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
1613 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1614 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1615 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1616 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1617 one. Doujinshi are plainly
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> There is no general
1618 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1619 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1620 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1621 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that
<quote>taking
</quote> without
1622 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1623 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1624 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1626 <indexterm startref='idxdisneywalt2' class='endofrange'
/>
1627 <indexterm id='idxwinickjudd' class='startofrange'
><primary>Winick, Judd
</primary></indexterm>
1629 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1630 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1631 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me,
<quote>The
1632 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1633 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1635 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1636 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them
</quote>
1637 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1639 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1640 York: Perennial,
2000).
1643 <indexterm startref='idxcopyrightlawjapanese' class='endofrange'
/>
1644 <indexterm><primary>Superman comics
</primary></indexterm>
1646 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1647 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1648 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me,
<quote>there are these rules
1649 and you have to stick to them.
</quote> There are things Superman
<quote>cannot
</quote>
1650 do.
<quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1651 which are fifty years old.
</quote>
1653 <indexterm startref='idxwinickjudd' class='endofrange'
/>
1654 <indexterm id='idxcopyrightlawjapanese2' class='startofrange'
><primary>copyright law
</primary><secondary>Japanese
</secondary></indexterm>
1655 <indexterm><primary>comics, Japanese
</primary></indexterm>
1656 <indexterm id='idxmehrasalil' class='startofrange'
><primary>Mehra, Salil
</primary></indexterm>
1658 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1659 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1660 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1661 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1662 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1663 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1664 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1666 See Salil K. Mehra,
<quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1667 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?
</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1668 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
<quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1669 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1670 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1671 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1672 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1673 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.
</quote>
1676 <indexterm startref='idxcomicsjapanese' class='endofrange'
/>
1677 <indexterm startref='idxjapanesecomics' class='endofrange'
/>
1678 <indexterm startref='idxmanga' class='endofrange'
/>
1680 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1681 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1682 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1683 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1684 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1685 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1686 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1687 a more general pattern of blocking this
<quote>free taking
</quote> by the doujinshi
1690 <indexterm startref='idxcopyrightlawjapanese2' class='endofrange'
/>
1691 <indexterm startref='idxmehrasalil' class='endofrange'
/>
1693 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1694 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1695 a friend from a major Japanese law firm.
<quote>We don't have enough
1696 lawyers,
</quote> he told me one afternoon. There
<quote>just aren't enough resources
1697 to prosecute cases like this.
</quote>
1700 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1701 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1702 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1703 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1704 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1705 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1706 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1707 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1708 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1709 their clients or hurt them?
1711 <indexterm startref='idxdoujinshicomics' class='endofrange'
/>
1713 <emphasis role='strong'
>Let's pause
</emphasis> for a moment.
1716 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1717 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1718 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1721 We live in a world that celebrates
<quote>property.
</quote> I am one of those
1722 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1723 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1724 <quote>intellectual property.
</quote><footnote><para>
1726 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1727 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1728 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1729 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1730 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1731 describes a set of
<quote>property
</quote> rights
—copyright, patents,
1732 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1735 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1736 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1739 <indexterm id='idxdisneywalt3' class='startofrange'
><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
1740 <indexterm id='idxgrimmfairytales2' class='startofrange'
><primary>Grimm fairy tales
</primary></indexterm>
1741 <indexterm><primary>Keaton, Buster
</primary></indexterm>
1743 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1744 plenty of value out there that
<quote>property
</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1745 mean
<quote>money can't buy you love,
</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1746 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1747 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1748 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1749 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1750 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1751 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1752 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1753 Disney's use would have been considered
<quote>fair.
</quote> There was nothing
1754 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1757 <indexterm id='idxfreeculturederivativeworksbasedon' class='startofrange'
><primary>free culture
</primary><secondary>derivative works based on
</secondary></indexterm>
1759 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1760 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1761 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1764 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1767 <indexterm startref='idxgrimmfairytales2' class='endofrange'
/>
1768 <indexterm id='idxcopyrightlawjapanese3' class='startofrange'
><primary>copyright law
</primary><secondary>Japanese
</secondary></indexterm>
1769 <indexterm><primary>comics, Japanese
</primary></indexterm>
1770 <indexterm id='idxdoujinshicomics2' class='startofrange'
><primary>doujinshi comics
</primary></indexterm>
1771 <indexterm id='idxjapanesecomics2' class='startofrange'
><primary>Japanese comics
</primary></indexterm>
1772 <indexterm id='idxmanga2' class='startofrange'
><primary>manga
</primary></indexterm>
1774 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1775 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1776 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1777 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1778 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1779 form, whether large or small.
1781 <indexterm startref='idxcreativitybytransformingpreviousworks2' class='endofrange'
/>
1783 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1784 say that the copycat comic artists are
<quote>stealing.
</quote> This form of Walt
1785 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1786 particular find it hard to say why.
1788 <indexterm startref='idxderivativeworkspiracyvs2' class='endofrange'
/>
1789 <indexterm startref='idxpiracyderivativeworkvs2' class='endofrange'
/>
1790 <indexterm startref='idxcopyrightlawjapanese3' class='endofrange'
/>
1791 <indexterm startref='idxdoujinshicomics2' class='endofrange'
/>
1792 <indexterm startref='idxjapanesecomics2' class='endofrange'
/>
1793 <indexterm startref='idxmanga2' class='endofrange'
/>
1794 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
1796 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1797 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1798 without asking or paying for the privilege. (
<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1799 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1800 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?
</quote>) Acting companies
1801 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1802 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1803 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1804 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1805 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1806 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1807 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1810 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1811 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1812 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1813 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1814 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1815 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1816 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1817 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1818 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1820 <indexterm startref='idxdisneywalt3' class='endofrange'
/>
1822 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1823 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1824 question instead is
<quote><emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?
</quote>
1825 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1826 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1827 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1828 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1829 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1830 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1834 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1835 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1836 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1838 <indexterm startref='idxfreeculturederivativeworksbasedon' class='endofrange'
/>
1840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1842 <chapter label=
"2" id=
"mere-copyists">
1843 <title>CHAPTER TWO:
<quote>Mere Copyists
</quote></title>
1844 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1845 <indexterm id='idxcameratechnology' class='startofrange'
><primary>camera technology
</primary></indexterm>
1846 <indexterm id='idxphotography' class='startofrange'
><primary>photography
</primary></indexterm>
1848 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1839</emphasis>, Louis Daguerre invented
1849 the first practical technology for producing what we would call
1850 <quote>photographs.
</quote> Appropriately enough, they were called
1851 <quote>daguerreotypes.
</quote> The process was complicated and
1852 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1853 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1854 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1855 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1857 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1859 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1860 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1861 <quote>automatic pictures.
</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1862 making
<quote>negatives.
</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1863 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1864 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1865 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1866 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1869 <indexterm id='idxeastmangeorge' class='startofrange'
><primary>Eastman, George
</primary></indexterm>
1871 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1872 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1874 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1875 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1876 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1877 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1878 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1879 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1880 population of photographers.
1882 <indexterm id='idxkodakcameras' class='startofrange'
><primary>Kodak cameras
</primary></indexterm>
1883 <indexterm id='idxkodakprimertheeastman' class='startofrange'
><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1885 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1886 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1887 marketed on the basis of its simplicity.
<quote>You press the button and we
1888 do the rest.
</quote><footnote><para>
1890 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1891 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1895 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1896 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1897 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1898 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1899 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1900 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1901 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1902 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1903 chemicals.
<footnote>
1906 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1907 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1912 <indexterm startref='idxkodakprimertheeastman' class='endofrange'
/>
1914 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1915 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1916 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1917 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1918 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1919 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1920 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1921 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1922 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1923 percent.
<footnote><para>
1926 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1927 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1929 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1932 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1936 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1937 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1938 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1939 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1940 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes,
<quote>For the
1941 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1942 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1943 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1944 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1945 interpretation or bias.
</quote><footnote><para>
1950 <indexterm><primary>democracy
</primary><secondary>in technologies of expression
</secondary></indexterm>
1951 <indexterm><primary>expression, technologies of
</primary><secondary>democratic
</secondary></indexterm>
1953 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1954 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1955 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1956 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1957 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1958 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its
<quote>quality
</quote>;
1959 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1960 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1961 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1962 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1965 <indexterm startref='idxkodakcameras' class='endofrange'
/>
1966 <indexterm id='idxpermissionsphotographyexemptedfrom' class='startofrange'
><primary>permissions
</primary><secondary>photography exempted from
</secondary></indexterm>
1968 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1969 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1970 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1971 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1972 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1973 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1974 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1975 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1977 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1978 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1979 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1980 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1984 <indexterm startref='idxcameratechnology' class='endofrange'
/>
1985 <indexterm id='idxdisneywalt4' class='startofrange'
><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
1986 <indexterm id='idximagesownershipof' class='startofrange'
><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
1988 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1989 familiar. The photographer was
<quote>taking
</quote> something from the person or
1990 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1991 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1992 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1994 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1995 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1996 that they thought valuable.
1998 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1999 <indexterm><primary>Steamboat Bill, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
2001 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
2002 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
2003 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
2004 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
2005 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
2008 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote>
2009 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
2010 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
2011 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
2012 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
2013 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
2014 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
2015 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
2017 <indexterm startref='idxdisneywalt4' class='endofrange'
/>
2019 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
2020 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
2021 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
2022 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
2023 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
2024 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
2025 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
2026 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
2027 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
2029 See Melville B. Nimmer,
<quote>The Right of Publicity,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
2030 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
<quote>Privacy,
</quote> <citetitle>California Law
2031 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
2032 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
2036 <indexterm><primary>Napster
</primary></indexterm>
2038 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
2039 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
2040 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
2041 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
2042 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
2043 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
2044 Kodak would be benefiting from the
<quote>theft
</quote> committed by the
2045 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
2046 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
2047 from the
<quote>image-right
</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
2048 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
2049 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
2050 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
2052 <indexterm><primary>democracy
</primary><secondary>in technologies of expression
</secondary></indexterm>
2053 <indexterm><primary>expression, technologies of
</primary><secondary>democratic
</secondary></indexterm>
2056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
2057 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
2058 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
2059 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
2060 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
2061 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
2062 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
2063 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
2064 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
2065 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
2066 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
2069 <indexterm startref='idxphotography' class='endofrange'
/>
2070 <indexterm startref='idxeastmangeorge' class='endofrange'
/>
2071 <indexterm startref='idxpermissionsphotographyexemptedfrom' class='endofrange'
/>
2072 <indexterm startref='idximagesownershipof' class='endofrange'
/>
2074 <emphasis role='strong'
>If you drive
</emphasis> through San
2075 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses
2076 painted over with colorful and striking images, and the logo
2077 <quote>Just Think!
</quote> in place of the name of a school. But
2078 there's little that's
<quote>just
</quote> cerebral in the projects
2079 that these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies
2080 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even
2081 the film of your VCR. Rather the
<quote>film
</quote> of digital
2082 cameras. Just Think! is a project that enables kids to make films, as
2083 a way to understand and critique the filmed culture that they find all
2084 around them. Each year, these busses travel to more than thirty
2085 schools and enable three hundred to five hundred children to learn
2086 something about media by doing something with media. By doing, they
2087 think. By tinkering, they learn.
2090 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
2091 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
2092 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it,
<quote>Five years ago, a good
2093 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
2094 professional quality for $
595.
</quote><footnote><para>
2096 H. Edward Goldberg,
<quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
2097 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,
</quote>
2098 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
2099 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
2101 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
2102 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
2103 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
2104 learning more and more of something teachers call
<quote>media literacy.
</quote>
2106 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
2108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
2109 <quote>Media literacy,
</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
2110 Think!, puts it,
<quote>is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
2111 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
2112 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
2113 the way people access it.
</quote>
2116 This may seem like an odd way to think about
<quote>literacy.
</quote> For most
2117 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
2118 and noticing split infinitives are the things that
<quote>literate
</quote> people know
2121 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
2123 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
2124 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
2125 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
2127 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2128 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990);
<quote>Findings on Family and TV
2129 Study,
</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
2131 it is increasingly important to understand the
<quote>grammar
</quote> of media. For
2132 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2133 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2134 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2135 (at least at first) terrible media.
2138 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2139 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2140 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
2141 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2142 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2143 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2144 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2145 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2148 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2149 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2150 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2151 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2152 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2153 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2155 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2157 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2158 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2159 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2162 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2163 about
<quote>the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2164 texture.
</quote><footnote>
2167 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2169 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2170 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2172 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2173 <quote>played
</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2174 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2175 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2176 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2177 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2178 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2179 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2181 See Scott Steinberg,
<quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,
</quote> E!online,
4
2182 November
2000, available at
2183 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>;
<quote>Timeline,
</quote> 22 November
2000,
2185 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2188 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2190 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2191 describes,
<quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2192 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2193 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2194 led.
</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2197 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2198 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2199 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2200 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2204 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2205 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2206 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2207 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2212 <quote>Read-only.
</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2213 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2217 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2218 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2219 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2220 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2223 and this literacy in particular, is to
<quote>empower people to choose the
2224 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2225 express.
</quote><footnote>
2228 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2229 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2230 </para></footnote> It is to enable students
<quote>to communicate in the
2231 language of the twenty-first century.
</quote><footnote><para>
2236 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2238 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2239 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2240 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2241 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2242 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2243 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2244 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2245 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2246 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2247 students know something about
—gun violence.
2250 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2251 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2252 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2253 away. The
<quote>kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,
</quote>
2254 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2255 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2258 Using whatever
<quote>free web stuff they could find,
</quote> and relatively simple
2259 tools to enable the kids to mix
<quote>image, sound, and text,
</quote> Barish said
2260 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2261 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2262 close to the lives of these students. The project
<quote>gave them a tool
2263 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2264 it,
</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2265 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2266 been created using only text.
<quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2267 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2268 gone and done something else,
</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2269 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2270 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2271 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2272 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2277 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?
</quote> I asked. In part,
2278 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2279 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of
<quote>constructing
2280 meaning.
</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2281 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2282 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2283 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2288 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2289 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2290 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2291 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2292 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2293 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2294 you say,
<quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.
</quote>
2295 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2296 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2297 you. [But i]nstead, if you say,
<quote>Well, with all these things that you
2298 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2299 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2300 for me something that reflects that.
</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2301 camera and
… saying,
<quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2302 make a little movie.
</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2303 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2304 about the topic.
…
2307 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2308 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2309 bump up against the fact,
<quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2310 to write something.
</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2311 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2314 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2315 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2316 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2317 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2318 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2319 had a lot of power with this language.
2321 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2322 not match with any start quote. -->
2324 <indexterm><primary>World Trade Center
</primary></indexterm>
2326 <emphasis role='strong'
>When two planes
</emphasis> crashed into the
2327 World Trade Center, another into the Pentagon, and a fourth into a
2328 Pennsylvania field, all media around the world shifted to this
2329 news. Every moment of just about every day for that week, and for
2330 weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold the
2331 story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a
2332 retelling, because we had seen the events that were described. The
2333 genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the delayed second
2334 attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole world would be
2338 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2339 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2340 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was
<quote>balance,
</quote>
2341 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2342 increasingly come to expect it,
<quote>news as entertainment,
</quote> even if the
2343 entertainment is tragedy.
2345 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2346 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2348 But in addition to this produced news about the
<quote>tragedy of September
2349 11,
</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2350 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2351 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2352 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2353 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2354 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2355 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2356 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2357 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2358 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2359 was also the Internet.
2362 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2363 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2364 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2365 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2368 by a student on the
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2372 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2373 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2374 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2375 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2376 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2377 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2378 spread practically instantaneously.
2380 <indexterm><primary>September
11,
2001, terrorist attacks of
</primary></indexterm>
2381 <indexterm id='idxblogsweblogs' class='startofrange'
><primary>blogs (Web-logs)
</primary></indexterm>
2382 <indexterm id='idxinternetblogson' class='startofrange'
><primary>Internet
</primary><secondary>blogs on
</secondary></indexterm>
2383 <indexterm id='idxweblogsblogs' class='startofrange'
><primary>Web-logs (blogs)
</primary></indexterm>
2385 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2386 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2387 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2388 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2389 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2390 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2391 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2393 <indexterm><primary>political discourse
</primary></indexterm>
2394 <indexterm id='idxinternetpublicdiscourseconductedon' class='startofrange'
><primary>Internet
</primary><secondary>public discourse conducted on
</secondary></indexterm>
2396 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2397 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2398 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2399 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2400 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2401 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2402 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2403 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2404 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2405 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2406 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2407 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2409 <indexterm id='idxdemocracyintechnologiesofexpression' class='startofrange'
><primary>democracy
</primary><secondary>in technologies of expression
</secondary></indexterm>
2410 <indexterm id='idxelections' class='startofrange'
><primary>elections
</primary></indexterm>
2411 <indexterm id='idxexpressiontechnologiesofdemocratic' class='startofrange'
><primary>expression, technologies of
</primary><secondary>democratic
</secondary></indexterm>
2413 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2414 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2415 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2416 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2417 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2420 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2421 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2423 <indexterm startref='idxblogsweblogs' class='endofrange'
/>
2424 <indexterm startref='idxinternetblogson' class='endofrange'
/>
2425 <indexterm startref='idxweblogsblogs' class='endofrange'
/>
2426 <indexterm><primary>Tocqueville, Alexis de
</primary></indexterm>
2427 <indexterm id='idxdemocracypublicdiscoursein' class='startofrange'
><primary>democracy
</primary><secondary>public discourse in
</secondary></indexterm>
2428 <indexterm><primary>jury system
</primary></indexterm>
2430 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2431 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2432 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2433 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2434 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2435 most important account of early
<quote>Democracy in America.
</quote> It wasn't
2436 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2437 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2438 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2439 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2440 deliberated. Members argued about the
<quote>right
</quote> result; they tried to
2441 persuade each other of the
<quote>right
</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2442 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2443 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2445 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2446 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2449 <indexterm startref='idxelections' class='endofrange'
/>
2451 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2452 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2453 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2455 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin,
<quote>Deliberation Day,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2456 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2458 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2459 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2460 place for
<quote>democratic deliberation
</quote> to occur.
2462 <indexterm id='idxpoliticaldiscourse' class='startofrange'
><primary>political discourse
</primary></indexterm>
2464 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2465 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2466 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2467 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2468 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2469 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2471 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2472 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2473 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2474 little beyond what our friends say.
2476 <indexterm id='idxblogsweblogs2' class='startofrange'
><primary>blogs (Web-logs)
</primary></indexterm>
2477 <indexterm><primary>e-mail
</primary></indexterm>
2478 <indexterm id='idxinternetblogson2' class='startofrange'
><primary>Internet
</primary><secondary>blogs on
</secondary></indexterm>
2479 <indexterm id='idxweblogsblogs2' class='startofrange'
><primary>Web-logs (blogs)
</primary></indexterm>
2480 <indexterm startref='idxdemocracyintechnologiesofexpression' class='endofrange'
/>
2481 <indexterm startref='idxexpressiontechnologiesofdemocratic' class='endofrange'
/>
2482 <indexterm startref='idxdemocracypublicdiscoursein' class='endofrange'
/>
2484 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2485 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2486 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2487 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2488 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2491 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2495 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2496 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2497 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2498 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2499 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2500 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2502 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2504 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2505 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2506 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2507 is having an effect.
2509 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2510 <indexterm><primary>Thurmond, Strom
</primary></indexterm>
2512 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2513 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2514 <quote>misspoke
</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2515 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2516 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2517 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2518 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2519 more instances of the same
<quote>misspeaking
</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2520 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2521 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2523 Noah Shachtman,
<quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,
</quote> New
2524 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2528 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2529 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2530 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2531 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2535 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2536 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2537 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2538 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2539 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2540 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2541 peer-generated rankings.
2543 <indexterm id='idxwinerdave' class='startofrange'
><primary>Winer, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
2545 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2547 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2548 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2549 difference is the absence of a financial
<quote>conflict of interest.
</quote> <quote>I think you
2550 have to take the conflict of interest
</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2551 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2552 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2553 get it out of the way.
</quote>
2555 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2556 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2558 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2559 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2560 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2561 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2562 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2564 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2566 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2567 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2568 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2569 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2570 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2571 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2572 told her that
<emphasis>they
</emphasis> were writing
<quote>the story.
</quote>)
2574 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2575 debate
—<quote>amateur
</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2576 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2577 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2578 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2579 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2580 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2582 John Schwartz,
<quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2583 Information Online,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2584 D. Kramer,
<quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,
</quote>
2585 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2586 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2588 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2589 <quote>triangulate,
</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2590 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2591 out of it
</quote>—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2594 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2595 with blogs.
<quote>It's going to become an essential skill,
</quote> Winer predicts,
2596 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2597 not clear that
<quote>journalism
</quote> is happy about this
—some journalists
2598 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2601 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2602 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
2603 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
2604 <indexterm><primary>blogs (Web-logs)
</primary></indexterm>
2605 See Michael Falcone,
<quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?
</quote> <citetitle>New
2606 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. (
<quote>Not all news organizations have
2607 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2608 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2609 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2610 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2611 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2612 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.
</quote>)
2614 But it is clear that we are still in transition.
<quote>A
2616 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2617 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,
</quote> Winer told me.
2618 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2619 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2620 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said,
<quote>we will
2621 be the last thing that gets shut down.
</quote>
2624 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
<quote>you
2625 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.
</quote>
2626 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2627 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2628 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2629 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2630 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2631 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2632 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2633 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2634 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2635 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2636 extraordinary to report.
2638 <indexterm startref='idxpoliticaldiscourse' class='endofrange'
/>
2639 <indexterm startref='idxblogsweblogs2' class='endofrange'
/>
2640 <indexterm startref='idxinternetblogson2' class='endofrange'
/>
2641 <indexterm startref='idxweblogsblogs2' class='endofrange'
/>
2642 <indexterm startref='idxwinerdave' class='endofrange'
/>
2643 <indexterm startref='idxinternetpublicdiscourseconductedon' class='endofrange'
/>
2644 <indexterm id='idxbrownjohnseely' class='startofrange'
><primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary></indexterm>
2645 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'
><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
2647 <emphasis role='strong'
>John Seely Brown
</emphasis> is the chief
2648 scientist of the Xerox Corporation. His work, as his Web site
2649 describes it, is
<quote>human learning and
… the creation of
2650 knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation.
</quote>
2653 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2654 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2655 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2656 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2660 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When
<quote>a lot of us grew up,
</quote>
2661 he explains, that tinkering was done
<quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2662 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.
</quote> But digital technologies
2663 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2664 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2665 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2666 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2667 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2668 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2669 or
<quote>free collage,
</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2670 the tinkering of many others.
2673 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2674 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2675 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2676 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2677 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2680 This opportunity creates a
<quote>completely new kind of learning platform,
</quote>
2681 as Brown describes.
<quote>As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2682 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2683 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2684 if they can improve it.
</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2685 apprenticeship.
<quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.
</quote>
2688 In this process,
<quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2689 They are code.
</quote> Kids are
<quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2690 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2691 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2692 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2693 you tinker the more you improve.
</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2697 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2698 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2699 it,
<quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2700 intelligence.
</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2701 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2702 text.
<quote>The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2703 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2704 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2705 these multiple forms of intelligence.
</quote>
2707 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'
/>
2708 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2710 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2711 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2713 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2714 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2715 kind of recognition.
2718 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2719 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2720 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2721 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2722 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2723 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2724 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2727 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2728 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2729 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2730 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the
<quote>right to
2731 tinker
</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2732 general.
<footnote><para>
2734 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel,
<quote>Technological Access
2735 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,
</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2736 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2738 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2739 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2742 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,
</quote> Brown
2743 explains. We need to
<quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2744 and want to learn.
</quote>
2747 <quote>Yet,
</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2748 evince,
<quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2749 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2750 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2751 system that closes down that part of the brain.
</quote>
2753 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2755 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2756 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2757 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2758 the law to close down that technology.
2761 <quote>No way to run a culture,
</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2762 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2763 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2767 <chapter label=
"3" id=
"catalogs">
2768 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2769 <indexterm><primary>RPI
</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</see></indexterm>
2770 <indexterm id='idxrensselaer' class='startofrange'
><primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</primary></indexterm>
2772 <emphasis role='strong'
>In the fall
</emphasis> of
2002, Jesse Jordan
2773 of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as a freshman at Rensselaer
2774 Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York. His major at RPI was
2775 information technology. Though he is not a programmer, in October
2776 Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search engine technology that
2777 was available on the RPI network.
2780 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2781 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2782 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2783 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2784 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2785 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2788 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2789 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2790 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2791 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2792 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2795 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2797 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2798 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2799 engines can do this even better. The idea of
<quote>intranet
</quote> search
2800 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2801 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2802 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2803 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2804 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2807 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2808 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2809 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2810 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2811 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2812 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2813 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2816 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2817 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2818 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2819 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2820 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2821 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2822 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2823 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2824 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2828 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2829 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2830 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2831 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2832 be on users' computers.
2835 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2836 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2837 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2838 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2840 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2844 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2845 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2846 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2847 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2848 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2849 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2850 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2851 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2852 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2853 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2854 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2855 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2859 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2860 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2861 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2862 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2863 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2864 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2865 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2868 <quote>It was absurd,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>I don't think I did anything
2869 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2870 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2871 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2872 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2873 easier to use
</quote>—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2874 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2875 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2876 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2877 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2880 <indexterm><primary>statutory damages
</primary></indexterm>
2882 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2883 network and had therefore
<quote>willfully
</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2885 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2886 <quote>willful infringement,
</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2887 call
<quote>statutory damages.
</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2888 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2889 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2890 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2892 <indexterm><primary>Princeton University
</primary></indexterm>
2893 <indexterm><primary>Michigan Technical University
</primary></indexterm>
2895 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2896 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2897 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2898 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2899 huge demands for
<quote>damages
</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2900 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2901 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2902 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2903 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2904 2001.
<footnote><para>
2907 Tim Goral,
<quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2908 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,
</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2909 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2912 <indexterm startref=
"idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'
/>
2914 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2915 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2916 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2917 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2918 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2920 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt
</primary></indexterm>
2922 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2923 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2924 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2925 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2926 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2927 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2928 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse,
<quote>You don't want to pay another
2929 visit to a dentist like me.
</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2930 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2933 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2934 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2935 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2936 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2937 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2939 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2940 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2943 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2944 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2946 <indexterm><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary></indexterm>
2948 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2949 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2950 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2951 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2952 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2953 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2954 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2956 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2957 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2958 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2960 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2961 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2962 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2964 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in
<quote>KaZaA and Punishment,
</quote>
2965 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2969 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2970 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2971 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2976 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2977 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2978 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2979 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2983 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2984 his father told me, Jesse
<quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2985 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2986 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2987 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.
</quote>
2989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2991 <chapter label=
"4" id=
"pirates">
2992 <title>CHAPTER FOUR:
<quote>Pirates
</quote></title>
2993 <indexterm><primary><quote>if value, then right
</quote> theory
</primary></indexterm>
2995 <emphasis role='strong'
>If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
</emphasis>
2996 using the creative property of others without their
2997 permission
—if
<quote>if value, then right
</quote> is
2998 true
—then the history of the content industry is a history of
2999 piracy. Every important sector of
<quote>big media
</quote>
3000 today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
3001 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last
3002 generation's pirates join this generation's country club
—until
3008 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
3010 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
3011 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
3012 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
3013 which details Edison's
<quote>adventures
</quote> with copyright and patent.
3015 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
3016 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
3017 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
3018 exercised through a monopoly
<quote>trust,
</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
3019 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
3020 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
3021 this creative property
3022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
3023 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
3026 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
3030 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
3031 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
3032 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
3033 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
3034 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
3035 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
3036 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
3038 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
3039 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
3040 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3042 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
3043 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
3044 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
3045 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
3046 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
3047 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
3048 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
3049 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
3050 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
3051 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
3053 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
3054 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
3055 posted at
<quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
3056 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,
</quote> available at
3057 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
3058 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
3059 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From
3060 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
3061 the Propertization of Copyright
</quote> (September
2002), University of
3062 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
3063 Working Paper No.
159.
3064 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
3069 The Napsters of those days, the
<quote>independents,
</quote> were companies like
3070 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
3071 resisted.
<quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
3072 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
3073 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.
</quote><footnote><para>
3075 Marc Wanamaker,
<quote>The First Studios,
</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
3076 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
3078 That led the independents to flee the East
3079 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
3080 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
3081 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
3085 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
3086 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
3087 patent holder a truly
<quote>limited
</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
3089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
3090 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
3091 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
3092 Edison's creative property.
3095 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
3096 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
3098 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
3099 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
3101 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
><primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary></indexterm>
3102 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil
</primary></indexterm>
3104 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
3105 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
3106 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
3107 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
3108 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
3109 1899 hit
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
3110 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
3111 right to perform it publicly.
3113 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3115 But what if I wanted to record
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> using Edison's phonograph
3116 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
3117 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
3118 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
3119 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
3120 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
3121 <quote>public performance
</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
3122 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
3123 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
3124 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
3125 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
3126 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
3127 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
3128 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
3129 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
3130 its composer anything.
3132 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
3134 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
3135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
3136 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
3138 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3142 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3143 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3144 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3145 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3146 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3147 rights.
<footnote><para>
3149 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3150 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
3151 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3152 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
3153 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3154 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3155 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3159 <indexterm><primary>Sousa, John Philip
</primary></indexterm>
3161 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3162 people's works were
<quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3163 genius of American composers,
</quote><footnote><para>
3165 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
3166 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3168 and the
<quote>music publishing industry
</quote>
3169 was thereby
<quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.
</quote><footnote><para>
3171 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
3172 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3175 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible,
<quote>When they make money
3176 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3178 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3179 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3182 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3183 <indexterm><primary>player pianos
</primary></indexterm>
3184 <indexterm><primary>sheet music
</primary></indexterm>
3186 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3187 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3188 player piano argued that
<quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3189 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3190 of anything he had before their introduction.
</quote> Rather, the machines
3191 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3194 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
3195 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3196 Perforating Company of New York).
3197 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3198 Congress was
<quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3199 they represent, and whose servants they are.
</quote> <quote>All talk about
3200 `theft,'
</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3201 wrote,
<quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3202 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3203 statute.
</quote><footnote><para>
3205 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3206 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3207 Graphophone Company Association).
3211 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3212 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3213 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the
<quote>mechanical
3214 reproductions
</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3215 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3216 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3217 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3218 recorded once. This is the part of
3220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3221 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3222 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3223 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3226 American law ordinarily calls this a
<quote>compulsory license,
</quote> but I will
3227 refer to it as a
<quote>statutory license.
</quote> A statutory license is a license
3228 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3229 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3230 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3231 the fee set by the statute.
3234 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3235 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3236 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3237 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3238 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3239 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3241 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3244 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3245 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3246 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3247 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3248 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3249 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3250 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3251 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3252 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3253 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3254 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3255 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3258 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3259 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3260 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3261 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3262 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3264 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3267 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3268 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3269 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3274 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3275 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3276 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3277 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3278 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3279 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3280 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3281 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3282 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3283 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3284 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3285 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3286 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3287 choice.
<footnote><para>
3289 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3290 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3291 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3292 this report.
</para></footnote>
3296 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3297 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3300 <section id=
"radio">
3301 <title>Radio
</title>
3302 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'
><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary></indexterm>
3304 Radio was also born of piracy.
3307 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3308 <quote>public performance
</quote> of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3310 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3311 record companies printed
<quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast
</quote> and other
3312 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3313 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3314 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3315 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3316 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3317 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3318 Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3319 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3320 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3322 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3323 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3324 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3327 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3328 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3329 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3330 work. It's one thing to have
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> sung on the radio by the
3331 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3332 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3333 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3334 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3335 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3337 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3339 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3342 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3343 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3344 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3345 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3346 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3347 of playing the song.
3349 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3351 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3352 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3353 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3354 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3357 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3358 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3359 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3360 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3361 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3362 <quote>protected
</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3363 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3366 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3368 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3369 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3370 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3371 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3372 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3373 to take something for nothing.
3375 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'
/>
3377 <section id=
"cabletv">
3378 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3379 <indexterm id='idxcabletv1' class='startofrange'
><primary>cable television
</primary></indexterm>
3381 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3384 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3385 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3386 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3387 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3389 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3390 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3391 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3394 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3395 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3396 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3398 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3399 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3400 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.
</quote><footnote><para>
3402 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3403 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3404 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3405 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3407 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3409 There may have been a
<quote>public interest
</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3410 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3411 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony,
<quote>Does public
3412 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?
</quote><footnote><para>
3414 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3415 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3417 As another broadcaster put it,
3421 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3422 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3423 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3425 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3426 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3431 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3435 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3436 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3437 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3438 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3440 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3441 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3442 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3446 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3448 These were
<quote>free-ride[rs],
</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3449 Heston said, who were
<quote>depriving actors of
3450 compensation.
</quote><footnote><para>
3452 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3453 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3454 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3459 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3460 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3464 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3465 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3466 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3467 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3470 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3471 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3473 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3474 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3475 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3477 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3481 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3482 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3485 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3486 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they
<quote>pirated.
</quote>
3487 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3488 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3489 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3490 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3491 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3492 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3493 companies thus built their empire in part upon a
<quote>piracy
</quote> of the value
3494 created by broadcasters' content.
3496 <indexterm startref='idxcabletv1' class='endofrange'
/>
3498 <emphasis role='strong'
>These separate stories
</emphasis> sing a
3499 common theme. If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means using value from someone
3500 else's creative property without permission from that creator
—as
3501 it is increasingly described today
<footnote><para>
3503 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3504 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3505 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3506 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>.
<quote>The
3507 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3508 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet.
</quote>
3510 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3511 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3512 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3513 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3514 last. Every generation
—until now.
3516 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3519 <chapter label=
"5" id=
"piracy">
3520 <title>CHAPTER FIVE:
<quote>Piracy
</quote></title>
3522 <emphasis role='strong'
>There is piracy
</emphasis> of copyrighted
3523 material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in many forms. The most
3524 significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized taking of other
3525 people's content within a commercial context. Despite the many
3526 justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
3527 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
3530 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of
<quote>taking
</quote>
3531 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3532 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3533 taking
<quote>piracy,
</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3534 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3535 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3536 has so often done in the past.
3537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3539 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3540 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3541 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3542 <indexterm id='idxcdsforeign' class='startofrange'
><primary>CDs
</primary><secondary>foreign piracy of
</secondary></indexterm>
3544 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3545 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3546 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3547 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3548 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3550 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3551 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3552 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3553 also Ben Hunt,
<quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3554 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3556 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3557 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3560 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3561 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3562 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3563 This piracy is wrong.
3566 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3567 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3568 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3569 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3570 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3571 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3572 of our existence, treated as right.
3575 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3576 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3577 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3578 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3579 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3580 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3581 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3582 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3583 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3586 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3587 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77-->
3589 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3590 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3594 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3595 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3596 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3597 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3599 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3600 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The
3601 New Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3602 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3603 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3604 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3605 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3606 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3607 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3608 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3609 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3610 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3611 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3612 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3614 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents
</primary></indexterm>
3615 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3616 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3617 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3618 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3621 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3623 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3624 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3625 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3626 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3627 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3629 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3630 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3631 144–90.
<quote>In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3632 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3633 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3634 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3635 pirating were not an option.
</quote> Ibid.,
149.
3636 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3640 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3641 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3642 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3643 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3644 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3645 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?
</quote>
3646 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3647 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3648 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3649 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3650 piracy of the tangible.
3652 <indexterm startref='idxcdsforeign' class='endofrange'
/>
3654 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3655 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3656 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3657 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3658 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3659 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3660 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3661 give people the right to
<quote>take
</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3662 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3664 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3665 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3666 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3667 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3668 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3669 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what
<quote>property
</quote> means.
3671 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3672 <indexterm><primary>piracy
</primary><secondary>in Asia
</secondary></indexterm>
3673 <indexterm><primary>free software/open-source software (FS/OSS)
</primary></indexterm>
3674 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3675 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3676 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary><secondary>competitive strategies of
</secondary></indexterm>
3677 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3678 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary><secondary>international software piracy of
</secondary></indexterm>
3679 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary><secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary></indexterm>
3681 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3682 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
<quote>steal
</quote>
3683 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3684 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3685 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3686 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3687 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3688 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3689 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3690 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3691 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3693 <indexterm><primary>law
</primary><secondary>databases of case reports in
</secondary></indexterm>
3695 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3696 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3697 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3698 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3699 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3700 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3702 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3703 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3704 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3705 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3707 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3708 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3709 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3710 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3711 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3712 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3713 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3714 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3715 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3716 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3717 violating the law is still wrong.
3720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3721 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3722 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3723 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3724 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3725 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3726 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3727 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3731 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3732 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is. Or
3733 at least, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3734 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of
<quote>piracy
</quote> are useful
3735 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3736 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3737 <quote>piracy
</quote> in that sense of the term.
3740 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3741 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3742 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3743 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3746 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3747 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3748 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3749 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3752 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3753 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3757 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3758 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3760 The key to the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that
<quote>rob[s]
3761 the author of [his] profit.
</quote><footnote><para>
3763 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3765 This means we must determine whether
3766 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3768 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3769 author of his profit.
3771 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3772 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3774 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3775 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3776 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3777 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3779 <indexterm><primary>innovation
</primary></indexterm>
3780 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3781 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3782 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3783 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3784 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3785 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3786 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3787 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3789 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3790 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3791 put together components that had been developed independently.
3794 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3795 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3796 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3797 system.
<footnote><para>
3799 See Carolyn Lochhead,
<quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,
</quote> <citetitle>San
3800 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1;
<quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,
</quote>
3801 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Napster Names CEO,
3802 Secures New Financing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3803 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3804 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet
</quote> (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3806 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3807 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3808 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3809 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3810 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3811 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3812 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3815 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3816 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3817 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3818 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3821 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3822 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3823 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3824 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3826 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3827 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3828 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3830 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,
</quote> <citetitle>New
3831 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3833 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3834 massive quantity of content is being
<quote>taken
</quote> on these networks. The
3835 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3836 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3839 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3840 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3841 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3842 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3843 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3844 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3849 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3850 different kinds into four types.
3852 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3854 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3857 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3858 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3859 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3860 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3861 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3862 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3863 users who download instead of purchasing.
3867 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3868 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3869 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3870 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3871 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3872 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3873 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3878 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3879 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3880 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3881 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3882 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3883 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3884 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend
<quote>recalling
</quote> old
3885 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3886 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3887 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3888 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3889 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3895 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3896 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3901 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3904 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3905 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3906 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3907 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3909 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3910 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3912 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3913 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3914 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3915 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3916 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3917 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3920 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3921 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3922 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3923 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3924 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of
<quote>theft
</quote> that is
3925 <quote>devastating
</quote> the industry.
3927 <indexterm id='idxcassette' class='startofrange'
><primary>cassette recording
</primary><secondary>VCRs
</secondary></indexterm>
3929 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3930 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3931 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3932 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3933 & Young put it,
<quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3934 technology, the labels fought it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3936 <indexterm><primary>cassette recording
</primary></indexterm>
3937 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3938 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3939 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3940 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3941 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption
<quote>Home taping
3942 is killing music.
</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3943 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3944 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3945 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3946 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3947 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3948 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3949 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3950 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3951 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3952 regulating technology was the answer.
3954 <indexterm><primary>MTV
</primary></indexterm>
3956 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3957 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3958 turnaround.
<quote>In the end,
</quote> Cap Gemini concludes,
<quote>the `crisis'
… was
3959 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3961 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3962 innovation at the major labels.
</quote><footnote><para>
3964 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3967 <indexterm startref='idxcassette' class='endofrange'
/>
3969 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3970 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3971 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3972 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3973 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3974 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3975 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3976 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3979 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3980 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3981 The
<quote>net harm
</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3982 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3983 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3984 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3985 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3989 <indexterm id='idxcdssales' class='startofrange'
><primary>CDs
</primary><secondary>sales levels of
</secondary></indexterm>
3991 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3992 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3993 actually suggest it might be close.
3996 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3997 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3998 percent.
<footnote><para>
4000 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
4002 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
4003 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
4004 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
4005 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
4006 #
16</ulink>:
<quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
4007 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
4008 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
4009 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
4010 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
4011 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
4012 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
4015 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
4016 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
4017 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
4018 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
4019 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
4020 account for at least some of the loss.
<quote>From
1999 to
2001, the average
4021 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19.
</quote><footnote>
4024 Jane Black,
<quote>Big Music's Broken Record,
</quote> BusinessWeek online,
13
4025 February
2003, available at
4026 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
4027 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
4030 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
4031 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes,
<quote>The
4032 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
4033 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
4034 $
19.99.
</quote><footnote><para>
4041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
4042 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
4043 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
4044 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
4045 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
4046 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
4047 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
4050 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
4051 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
4052 The recording industry constantly asks,
<quote>What's the difference between
4053 downloading a song and stealing a CD?
</quote>—but their own numbers
4054 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
4055 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
4056 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
4057 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
4058 Kazaa
<quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit
</quote>—then the industry
4059 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
4060 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
4061 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
4062 a huge difference between
<quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.
</quote>
4064 <indexterm startref='idxcdssales' class='endofrange'
/>
4066 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
4067 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
4068 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
4072 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
4073 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
4074 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
4075 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
4076 available.
<footnote><para>
4078 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
4079 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
4080 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
4081 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
4082 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
4083 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
4085 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
4086 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
4087 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
4088 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
4089 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
4091 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>resales of
</secondary></indexterm>
4093 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
4094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
4095 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
4096 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
4097 today.
<footnote><para>
4099 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>resales of
</secondary></indexterm>
4100 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores
4101 in existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the
4102 United States, an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter
4103 Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book
4104 Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
4105 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used
4106 records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See National
4107 Association of Recording Merchandisers,
<quote>2002 Annual Survey
4108 Results,
</quote> available at
4109 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
4111 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
4112 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
4113 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
4114 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
4115 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
4116 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
4117 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
4118 the content they sell.
4120 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
4121 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>out of print
</secondary></indexterm>
4123 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
4124 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
4125 the content available isn't making money from making the content
4126 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
4127 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
4128 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's
<quote>Two Love Songs,
</quote>
4129 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
4130 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
4131 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
4132 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
4133 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
4136 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
4137 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
4138 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
4139 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
4140 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
4143 <indexterm id='idxbooksfreeonline1' class='startofrange'
><primary>books
</primary><secondary>free on-line releases of
</secondary></indexterm>
4145 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
4146 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
4147 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
4148 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
4149 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
4150 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
4152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
4153 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
4154 would be a great advertisement for the
<quote>real
</quote> book. People would read
4155 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
4156 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4157 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4158 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4161 <indexterm startref='idxbooksfreeonline1' class='endofrange'
/>
4163 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4164 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4165 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4166 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4169 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4170 understandably says,
<quote>This is how much we've lost,
</quote> we must also ask,
4171 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4172 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4173 unavailable?
</quote>
4176 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4177 chapter, much of the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4178 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4179 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
4180 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4181 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4182 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4183 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4184 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4185 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4186 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4187 found only with time.
4190 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4191 just what you call type A sharing?
</quote>
4194 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4196 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4197 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4199 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4201 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4203 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4204 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4205 <quote>down to zero.
</quote><footnote><para>
4207 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4208 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4211 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
4212 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4213 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
4214 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
4218 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4219 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4220 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4221 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4222 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4223 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4224 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4225 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4226 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4229 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4230 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4231 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4232 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4233 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4234 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4235 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4237 <indexterm><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary></indexterm>
4239 So, as we've seen, when
<quote>mechanical reproduction
</quote> threatened the
4240 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4241 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4242 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4243 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4244 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4245 complained to Congress that their
<quote>creative property
</quote> was not being
4246 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4247 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4250 <indexterm id='idxcabletv2' class='startofrange'
><primary>cable television
</primary></indexterm>
4252 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4253 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4254 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4255 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4256 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4262 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4263 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4264 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4265 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4266 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4267 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4268 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4269 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4270 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4271 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4272 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4273 Congress chose a path that would assure
4274 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4275 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4277 <indexterm startref='idxcabletv2' class='endofrange'
/>
4278 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4279 <indexterm id='idxcassettevcrs1' class='startofrange'
><primary>cassette recording
</primary><secondary>VCRs
</secondary></indexterm>
4281 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4282 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4283 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4284 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4285 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4286 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4287 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4288 <quote>record
</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4289 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4290 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4291 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4294 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4295 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4296 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4297 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4298 machine to copy only if there were a special
<quote>copy me
</quote> signal on the
4299 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4300 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4301 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4302 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4303 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4304 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4305 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4306 for the architecture it chose.
4309 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4310 champion. Valenti called VCRs
<quote>tapeworms.
</quote> He warned,
<quote>When there are
4311 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4312 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4313 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4314 copyright.
</quote><footnote><para>
4316 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4317 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4318 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4319 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4321 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4322 creative judgment,
</quote> he told Congress,
<quote>to understand the devastation
4323 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4324 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4325 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4326 and plain common sense.
</quote><footnote><para>
4328 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4330 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
45
4331 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4333 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4336 — a use the Court would later hold was not
<quote>fair.
</quote> By
4337 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4338 copyright infringement without creating a mechanism to compensate
4339 copyright owners,
</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would
<quote>take from the
4340 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4341 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4342 profit from its reproduction.
</quote><footnote><para>
4344 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4349 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4350 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4351 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4352 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the
<quote>Hollywood
4353 Circuit
</quote>—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4354 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4355 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4356 called
<quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry
</quote> (worse
4357 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4358 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4359 technology.
<footnote><para>
4361 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4364 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4367 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4370 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4371 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4376 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4377 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4379 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4381 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4382 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4384 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4386 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4391 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4392 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4393 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4394 enough, this
<quote>taking
</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4395 together, a pattern is clear:
4398 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4399 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"left">
4403 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS
<quote>PIRATED
</quote></entry>
4404 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4405 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4410 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4411 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4412 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4413 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4416 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4417 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4419 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4422 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4423 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4424 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4425 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4429 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4430 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4431 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4436 <indexterm startref='idxcassettevcrs1' class='endofrange'
/>
4438 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4439 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4441 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4442 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4443 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4444 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4445 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4446 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4447 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4448 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4449 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,
</quote>
4450 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4451 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
4452 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4454 In each case, throughout our history,
4455 that change meant that someone got a
<quote>free ride
</quote> on someone else's
4459 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4460 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4461 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4462 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4463 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
4464 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4465 the behavior of the
<quote>pirates.
</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4466 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4470 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
4472 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4473 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4474 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4475 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4476 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4478 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4479 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4480 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4481 permission to record a song?
4484 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4485 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4486 copyright
<quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4487 over all possible uses of his work.
</quote><footnote><para>
4489 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4492 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4493 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4494 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4495 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4496 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4497 facilitate the distribution of content.
4500 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4501 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4502 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4503 should not become a tool for
<quote>stealing
</quote> from artists. But neither
4504 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4505 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4506 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4507 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4508 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4509 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4510 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4511 public interest that innovation continue.
4515 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4516 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4517 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4518 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4519 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4520 efficient. Yet these
<quote>potential public benefits,
</quote> as John Schwartz
4521 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
<quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4522 fight.
</quote><footnote><para>
4524 John Schwartz,
<quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4525 Echoes Past Efforts,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4529 <emphasis role='strong'
>Yet when anyone
</emphasis> begins to talk
4530 about
<quote>balance,
</quote> the copyright warriors raise a different
4531 argument.
<quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4532 incentives,
</quote> they say,
<quote>misses a fundamental point. Our
4533 content,
</quote> the warriors insist,
<quote>is our
4534 <emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we wait for Congress to
4535 `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4536 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4537 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether
4538 the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?
</quote>
4541 <quote>It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>,
</quote> the warriors
4542 insist.
<quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4543 is protected.
</quote>
4545 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4549 <part id=
"c-property">
4550 <title><quote>PROPERTY
</quote></title>
4554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4555 <emphasis role='strong'
>The copyright warriors
</emphasis> are right: A
4556 copyright is a kind of property. It can be owned and sold, and the law
4557 protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to
4558 hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand
4559 that partially determine the price she can get.
4562 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a
<quote>property
</quote> right is a
4563 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4564 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4565 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4566 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4567 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4568 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4569 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4570 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4574 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4575 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4577 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4579 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4580 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4581 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4582 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4583 when I copy the way someone else dresses),
<quote>He who receives an idea
4584 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4585 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
</quote><footnote><para>
4587 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4588 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4589 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4593 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4594 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4595 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4597 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4601 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4602 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4603 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4604 <quote>property
</quote> in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4606 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4607 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4608 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4609 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4610 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4611 Adam Mossoff,
<quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,
</quote>
4612 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4616 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4617 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4618 <quote>copyright material is property
</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4619 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4620 these stories, the significance of this true
4621 statement
—<quote>copyright material is property
</quote>— will be a bit
4622 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4623 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4628 <chapter label=
"6" id=
"founders">
4629 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4630 <indexterm><primary>Henry V
</primary></indexterm>
4631 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4632 <indexterm id='idxbooksenglishlaw' class='startofrange'
><primary>books
</primary><secondary>English copyright law developed for
</secondary></indexterm>
4634 <emphasis role='strong'
>William Shakespeare
</emphasis> wrote
4635 <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play was first
4636 published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that Shakespeare had
4637 written. He would continue to write plays through
1613, and the plays
4638 that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American culture ever
4639 since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer seeped
4640 into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source. I
4641 once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of
4642 Henry V:
<quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of
4646 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4647 <quote>copy-right
</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4648 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4650 <indexterm><primary>Jonson, Ben
</primary></indexterm>
4651 <indexterm><primary>Dryden, John
</primary></indexterm>
4652 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4653 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4654 handsome
<quote>definitive editions
</quote> of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4655 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4656 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4657 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker,
<quote>Jacob Tonson,
4658 Bookseller,
</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4660 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4661 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4663 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4664 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4666 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4667 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the
<quote>copy
</quote> of
4668 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4670 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4671 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4672 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4673 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4675 <indexterm id='idxbritishparliament' class='startofrange'
><primary>British Parliament
</primary></indexterm>
4677 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4678 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4679 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4680 adopted the first
<quote>copyright
</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4681 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4682 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4683 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4684 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4686 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4687 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4688 <quote>copyright law.
</quote> See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4689 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4690 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4691 Tonson's control in
1774?
4693 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4695 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
<quote>copyright
</quote>
4696 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4697 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4698 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4699 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4700 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4701 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4702 that the publishers, or
<quote>Stationers,
</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4706 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4707 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4708 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4709 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4710 from legislatures
<quote>positive law.
</quote> We call the words from judges
4711 <quote>common law.
</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4712 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4713 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4714 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4715 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4718 This question was important to the publishers, or
<quote>booksellers,
</quote> as
4719 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4720 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4721 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4723 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4724 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4725 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4727 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4730 The Statute of Anne granted the author or
<quote>proprietor
</quote> of a book an
4731 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4732 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4733 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4734 copyright
<quote>expired,
</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4735 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4739 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4740 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4741 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4742 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4745 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4746 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4747 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4748 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4749 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4750 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4751 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4752 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4753 reason is there to allow someone else to
<quote>steal
</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4756 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4757 about the notion of
<quote>copyright
</quote> that existed at the time of the
4758 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4759 <quote>booksellers.
</quote>
4762 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4763 to apply the concept of
<quote>copyright
</quote> ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4764 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4765 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4766 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was a right
4767 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4768 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4771 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4772 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4773 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4774 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4776 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4778 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4779 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4780 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4781 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4782 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4783 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4784 allowed to make his films. The
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was only an exclusive
4785 right to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4787 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England
</primary></indexterm>
4788 <indexterm><primary>Statute of Monopolies (
1656)
</primary></indexterm>
4790 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4791 They had had a long and ugly experience with
<quote>exclusive rights,
</quote>
4792 especially
<quote>exclusive rights
</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4793 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4794 monopolies
—especially monopolies for works that already
4795 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4796 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4797 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the
4798 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4799 inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4800 monopoly in publishing.
4803 Thus the
<quote>copy-right,
</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4804 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4805 claim that
<quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,
</quote> try
4806 sounding convincing when uttering,
<quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4807 have it forever.
</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4808 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4809 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4811 <indexterm id='idxbooksellers' class='startofrange'
><primary>booksellers, English
</primary></indexterm>
4813 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4814 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4815 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4816 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4819 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4820 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4821 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4822 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as
<quote>old patentees
4823 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling
</quote>; they were
<quote>men who do
4824 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4825 indetted.
</quote><footnote><para>
4828 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4829 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4833 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4834 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4835 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4836 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4837 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4841 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4842 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4843 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4844 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4845 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4846 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4848 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4849 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4850 construction and spread of culture.
4853 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4854 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4855 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4856 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4857 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4858 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4859 they said; they needed more time.
4862 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4863 words that echo today,
4867 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4868 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4870 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4871 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4872 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4873 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4874 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4875 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4877 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4878 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4879 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4880 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4881 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4882 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4883 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4888 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4889 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4890 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4891 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4892 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4893 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4894 creative
<quote>property
</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4895 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4896 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4897 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4898 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4899 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4900 way to protect authors.
4902 <indexterm><primary>Patterson, Raymond
</primary></indexterm>
4904 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4905 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4906 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4907 <quote>The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4908 rancher has for cattle.
</quote><footnote><para>
4910 <indexterm><primary>Patterson, Raymond
</primary></indexterm>
4911 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4912 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4913 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4914 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4916 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4917 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4920 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4921 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4922 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4924 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4925 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4928 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4929 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4931 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4932 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4933 reprints
<quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,
</quote> at least
4934 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4936 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4938 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
4940 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4942 and became
<quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.
</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4943 them,
</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was
<quote>the young James Boswell
4944 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4945 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.
</quote><footnote><para>
4951 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4952 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4953 inexpensive editions
<quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4954 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4955 Property.
</quote><footnote><para>
4957 <indexterm><primary>Patterson, Raymond
</primary></indexterm>
4958 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4961 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4962 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4963 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4966 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block
<quote>piracy
</quote> like
4967 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the
<quote>pirates,
</quote>
4968 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4970 <indexterm><primary>Seasons, The (Thomson)
</primary></indexterm>
4971 <indexterm><primary>Taylor, Robert
</primary></indexterm>
4973 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4974 Thomson's poem
<quote>The Seasons.
</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4975 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4976 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4977 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4978 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4980 Howard B. Abrams,
<quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4981 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4985 <indexterm id='idxmansfieldwilliammurraylord2' class='startofrange'
><primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary></indexterm>
4987 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4988 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4989 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4990 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4991 law would protect the author against subsequent
<quote>pirates.
</quote>
4992 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4993 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4994 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4995 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4998 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4999 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
5000 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
5001 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
5002 with in
1710: How best to limit
5003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
5004 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
5005 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
5006 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
5007 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
5008 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
5009 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
5011 <indexterm startref='idxmansfieldwilliammurraylord2' class='endofrange'
/>
5013 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
5014 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
5016 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
5018 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
5019 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
5020 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
5024 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
5025 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
5026 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
5027 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
5028 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
5029 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
5032 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
5033 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
5034 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
5035 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
5036 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
5037 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
5038 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
5039 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
5042 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
5043 presented to the House and voted upon first by the
<quote>law lords,
</quote>
5044 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
5045 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
5046 House of Lords generally voted.
5049 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
5050 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
5051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
5052 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
5053 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
5054 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
5055 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
5056 passed into the public domain.
5059 <quote>The public domain.
</quote> Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
5060 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
5061 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
5062 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
5063 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
5064 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
5065 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
5066 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
5067 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
5068 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
5069 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
5070 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
5071 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
5074 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
5075 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
5076 where most of the
<quote>pirate publishers
</quote> did their work, people
5077 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
5078 reported,
<quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
5079 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
5080 decision of which so many individuals were interested.
</quote> <quote>Great
5081 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
5082 and illuminations.
</quote><footnote><para>
5088 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
5089 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
5094 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
5095 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
5096 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
5097 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
5098 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
5099 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
5100 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
5101 successors.
<footnote><para>
5108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
5109 <quote>Ruined
</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
5110 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
5111 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
5112 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
5113 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
5114 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
5115 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
5116 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
5117 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
5118 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
5119 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
5120 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
5121 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
5122 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
5123 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
5124 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
5125 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
5126 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
5127 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
5129 <indexterm startref='idxbooksellers' class='endofrange'
/>
5131 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
5132 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
5133 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
5136 <indexterm startref='idxbritishparliament' class='endofrange'
/>
5137 <indexterm startref='idxbooksenglishlaw' class='endofrange'
/>
5138 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
5140 <chapter label=
"7" id=
"recorders">
5141 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
5143 <emphasis role='strong'
>Jon Else
</emphasis> is a filmmaker. He is best
5144 known for his documentaries and has been very successful in spreading
5145 his art. He is also a teacher, and as a teacher myself, I envy the
5146 loyalty and admiration that his students feel for him. (I met, by
5147 accident, two of his students at a dinner party. He was their god.)
5150 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
5151 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
5155 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
5156 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
5157 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
5158 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
5159 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
5161 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5164 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
5165 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
5166 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
5167 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
5168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5169 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5173 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5174 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
5175 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5176 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5177 unless
<quote>fair use
</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5179 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5181 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5182 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5183 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5184 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5185 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5187 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5189 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5190 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5191 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5192 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5193 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5196 Then, as Else told me,
<quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5197 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
5198 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.
</quote>
5199 And second, Fox
<quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5200 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
5201 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.
</quote>
5203 <indexterm><primary>Herrera, Rebecca
</primary></indexterm>
5205 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5206 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5207 explained to her,
<quote>There must be some mistake here.
… We're
5208 asking for your educational rate on this.
</quote> That was the educational
5209 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5210 confirm what he had been told.
5213 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>Yes, you
5214 have your facts straight,
</quote> she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
5215 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5218 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5219 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
<quote>And
5220 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.
</quote> As an assistant
5221 to Herrera told Else later on,
<quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5224 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5225 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
5227 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5228 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5229 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5230 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5231 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5232 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5235 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5236 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5237 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5238 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5239 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5240 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5241 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5242 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5243 says the owner gets to control.
5246 For example,
<quote>public performance
</quote> is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
5247 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5248 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see
<quote>My
5249 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>,
</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5250 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5251 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5255 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5256 thought is
<quote>fair use.
</quote><footnote><para>
5258 For an excellent argument that such use is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> but that
5259 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> see Richard
5260 A. Posner with William F. Patry,
<quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5261 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5262 Law School,
5 August
2003.
5264 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>
5265 episode is clearly a fair use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>—and fair use does
5266 not require the permission of anyone.
5269 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5270 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon
<quote>fair use.
</quote> Here's his reply:
5274 The
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5275 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5276 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5277 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was
<quote>clearly
5278 fair use
</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5279 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5281 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5284 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5285 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5286 <quote>visual cue sheet
</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5287 shot in the film. They take a dim view of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and a claim of
5288 <quote>fair use
</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5291 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle></primary></indexterm>
5292 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5295 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5296 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5297 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5298 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5299 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5300 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5301 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5302 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5307 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5308 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5309 that Fox would
<quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5310 life,
</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5311 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5312 pockets, me or them.
5313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5317 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5318 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5324 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5325 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5326 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5327 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5328 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5329 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5332 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5333 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5334 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5335 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5340 <chapter label=
"8" id=
"transformers">
5341 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5342 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5343 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'
><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5344 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary></indexterm>
5346 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1993</emphasis>, Alex Alben was a lawyer
5347 working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave was an innovative company founded
5348 by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop digital
5349 entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave began
5350 investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
5351 anticipation of the power of networks.
5353 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'
><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>retrospective compilations on
</secondary></indexterm>
5354 <indexterm id='idxcdroms' class='startofrange'
><primary>CD-ROMs, film clips used in
</primary></indexterm>
5356 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5357 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5358 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5359 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5360 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5361 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5362 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5363 important to his career.
5366 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5367 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5368 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5369 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5373 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5374 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5375 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5376 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5377 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5380 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips.
<quote>Our
5381 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5382 Eastwood's films,
</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5383 arose.
<quote>No one had ever really done this before,
</quote> Alben explained.
<quote>No
5384 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5385 actor's career.
</quote>
5388 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5389 Slade asked,
<quote>Well, what will it take?
</quote>
5392 Alben replied,
<quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5393 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5394 else that we want to use in these film clips.
</quote> Slade said,
<quote>Great! Go
5395 for it.
</quote><footnote>
5398 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5399 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5400 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden
<quote>Rip, Mix,
5401 Burn
</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5402 <indexterm><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary></indexterm>
5403 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5407 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5408 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5409 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5410 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5411 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5414 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5415 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5416 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5420 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5421 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5422 course we were going to use the
<quote>Make my day
</quote> clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5423 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5424 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5425 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5429 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5430 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5431 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5432 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5433 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5434 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5435 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5436 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5437 started calling people.
5440 <indexterm><primary>Sutherland, Donald
</primary></indexterm>
5442 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5443 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5444 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5445 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5446 know, $
1,
200?
</quote> And they would say,
<quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5447 to get $
1,
200.
</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5448 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5449 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5453 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—<quote>and even then we
5454 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.
</quote>
5457 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5458 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5459 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5463 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5464 hands and said,
<quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5465 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5466 actors.
</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5467 constituent parts and said,
<quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5468 directors,
… this many musicians,
</quote> and we just went at it very
5469 systematically and cleared the rights.
5474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5475 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5476 loved it, and it sold very well.
5478 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5480 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5481 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5482 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped,
<quote>There is
5483 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5484 at all.
</quote><footnote><para>
5486 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5487 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5488 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5490 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5494 For, as he acknowledged,
<quote>very few
… have the time and resources,
5495 and the will to do this,
</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5496 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5497 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5498 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5502 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5503 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5504 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5505 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5506 compensated for that.
5510 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5511 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5512 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5513 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5514 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5515 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5516 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5517 made to be more clean?
5521 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5522 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5523 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5524 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5526 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5527 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5528 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5529 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5530 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5531 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5532 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5533 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5534 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say,
<quote>Oh, I
5535 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5536 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5537 money,
</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5541 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5542 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5543 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5544 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5545 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5547 <indexterm startref='idxcdroms' class='endofrange'
/>
5548 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'
/>
5550 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5551 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5552 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5553 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5554 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5555 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5556 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5557 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5558 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5559 <quote>Does this still make sense?
</quote>
5561 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'
/>
5563 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5564 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5565 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5566 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5569 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5570 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5573 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5574 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5575 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5576 judges loved every minute of it.
5578 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5580 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5581 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5582 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5583 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5584 began his talk with a question:
<quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5585 were just violated in this room?
</quote>
5587 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5588 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5590 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5591 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5592 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5593 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5594 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5595 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5596 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5597 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5598 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5599 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5600 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5601 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5602 couldn't easily do them legally.
5605 We live in a
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5606 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5607 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5608 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5609 planted in your presentation.
5611 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5613 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5615 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5616 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5617 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5618 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5619 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5620 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5621 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5624 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5625 wanted to be
<quote>legal,
</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5626 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5627 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5628 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5631 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5632 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5633 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5634 necessarily requiring that the
<quote>free
</quote> use be free as in
<quote>free beer.
</quote>
5635 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5636 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5637 along: a rule, for example, that says
<quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5638 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5639 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5640 copyright owner.
</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5641 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5642 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5646 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5647 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5648 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5649 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5652 <emphasis role='strong'
>In February
2003</emphasis>, DreamWorks
5653 studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers, the comic genius of
5654 <citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5656 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5657 would work together to form a
<quote>unique filmmaking pact.
</quote> Under the
5658 agreement, DreamWorks
<quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5659 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5660 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5661 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5662 entertainment.
</quote>
5665 The announcement called this
<quote>film sampling.
</quote> As Myers explained,
5666 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5667 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5668 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5669 to take that same concept and apply it to film.
</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5670 quoted as saying,
<quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5671 new audiences, it is Mike.
</quote>
5674 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5675 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5676 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5677 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5678 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5679 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5680 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5681 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5684 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5685 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of
<quote>fair use.
</quote>
5686 Much of
<quote>sampling
</quote> should be considered
<quote>fair use.
</quote> But few would
5687 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5688 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5689 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5690 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5691 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5692 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5693 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5694 curse, reserved for the few.
5696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5698 <chapter label=
"9" id=
"collectors">
5699 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5700 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'
><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
5701 <indexterm><primary>bots
</primary></indexterm>
5703 <emphasis role='strong'
>In April
1996</emphasis>, millions of
5704 <quote>bots
</quote>—computer codes designed to
5705 <quote>spider,
</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy
5706 content
—began running across the Net. Page by page, these bots
5707 copied Internet-based information onto a small set of computers
5708 located in a basement in San Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots
5709 finished the whole of the Internet, they started again. Over and over
5710 again, once every two months, these bits of code took copies of the
5711 Internet and stored them.
5713 <indexterm><primary>Way Back Machine
</primary></indexterm>
5715 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5716 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5717 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5718 the world. Using a technology called
<quote>the Way Back Machine,
</quote> you could
5719 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5720 well as when those pages changed.
5722 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'
><primary>Orwell, George
</primary></indexterm>
5724 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5725 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5726 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5727 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5732 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5733 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5734 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5737 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5738 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5739 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5740 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5741 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5743 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'
/>
5744 <indexterm><primary>Way Back Machine
</primary></indexterm>
5746 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5747 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5748 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5749 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5750 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5752 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war
</primary></indexterm>
5753 <indexterm><primary>White House press releases
</primary></indexterm>
5754 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5755 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5756 press release stated,
<quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.
</quote> That was
5757 later changed, without notice, to
<quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5758 Have Ended.
</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5761 <indexterm><primary>history, records of
</primary></indexterm>
5763 <emphasis role='strong'
>We take it
</emphasis> for granted that we can
5764 go back to see what we remember reading. Think about newspapers. If
5765 you wanted to study the reaction of your hometown newspaper to the
5766 race riots in Watts in
1965, or to Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963,
5767 you could go to your public library and look at the newspapers. Those
5768 papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in
5769 paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back and
5770 remember
—not just what it is convenient to remember, but
5771 remember something close to the truth.
5774 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5775 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5776 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5777 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5778 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5779 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5780 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5783 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5784 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5785 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5786 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5788 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5789 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5790 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5791 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5794 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5795 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5796 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5797 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5798 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5799 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5800 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5801 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5803 <indexterm><primary>Library of Congress
</primary></indexterm>
5804 <indexterm><primary>Television Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5805 <indexterm><primary>Vanderbilt University
</primary></indexterm>
5806 <indexterm><primary>Way Back Machine
</primary></indexterm>
5807 <indexterm><primary>libraries
</primary><secondary>archival function of
</secondary></indexterm>
5809 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5810 human history. At the end of
2002, it held
<quote>two hundred and thirty
5811 terabytes of material
</quote>—and was
<quote>ten times larger than the
5812 Library of Congress.
</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5813 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5814 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5815 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5816 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5817 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5818 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5819 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5820 is available to scholars for a very low fee.
<quote>But other than that,
5821 [television] is almost unavailable,
</quote> Kahle told me.
<quote>If you were
5822 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5823 just a graduate student?
</quote> As Kahle put it,
5826 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
5827 <indexterm><primary>60 Minutes
</primary></indexterm>
5829 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5830 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5831 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5832 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5833 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5836 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5837 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5840 <indexterm><primary>newspapers
</primary><secondary>archives of
</secondary></indexterm>
5842 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5843 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5844 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5845 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5846 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5847 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5850 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5851 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5852 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5853 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5854 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5857 <indexterm><primary>Library of Congress
</primary></indexterm>
5858 <indexterm><primary>films
</primary><secondary>archive of
</secondary></indexterm>
5860 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5861 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5862 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5863 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5864 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and
<quote>borrowed
5865 back.
</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5866 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5867 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5869 Doug Herrick,
<quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5870 the Library of Congress,
</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5871 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5872 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5877 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5878 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5879 broadcasts, so there was no fear of
<quote>theft.
</quote> But as technology enabled
5880 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5881 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5882 <quote>copyrighted.
</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5883 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5884 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5885 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5887 <indexterm><primary>September
11,
2001, terrorist attacks of
</primary></indexterm>
5889 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5891 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5892 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5893 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5894 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5895 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5896 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5899 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5900 <indexterm><primary>archive.org
</primary><seealso>Internet Archive
</seealso></indexterm>
5901 <indexterm><primary>films
</primary><secondary>archive of
</secondary></indexterm>
5902 <indexterm><primary>Internet Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5903 <indexterm><primary>Duck and Cover film
</primary></indexterm>
5904 <indexterm><primary>ephemeral films
</primary></indexterm>
5905 <indexterm><primary>Prelinger, Rick
</primary></indexterm>
5907 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5908 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 <quote>ephemeral films
</quote> (meaning
5909 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5910 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5911 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5912 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5913 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5914 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5915 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5916 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5917 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5918 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5919 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
<quote>Duck and Cover
</quote> film
5920 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5921 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5922 few minutes
—for free.
5925 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5926 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5927 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5928 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5929 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5933 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5934 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5935 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5936 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5937 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5938 has
—a noncommercial life.
5941 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5942 of creative property goes through different
<quote>lives.
</quote> In its first
5945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5946 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5947 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5948 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5949 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5950 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5953 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5954 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5955 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5956 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5957 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5958 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5961 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>out of print
</secondary></indexterm>
5963 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5964 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5966 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>out of print
</secondary></indexterm>
5967 Dave Barns,
<quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5968 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5969 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5970 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5971 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5972 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5973 </para></footnote>). After
5974 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5975 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5976 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5977 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5978 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5981 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5982 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5983 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5984 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5985 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5986 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5987 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5988 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5992 <emphasis role='strong'
>For most of
</emphasis> the twentieth century,
5993 it was economics that made this so. It would have been insanely
5994 expensive to collect and make accessible all television and film and
5995 music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily high. So even
5996 though the law in principle would have restricted the ability of a
5997 Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5999 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
6000 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
6001 little practical effect.
6004 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
6005 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
6006 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
6007 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
6008 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
6009 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
6012 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
6013 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
6014 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
6018 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>total number of
</secondary></indexterm>
6020 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
6021 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
6022 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
6023 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
6024 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
6025 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
6026 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
6027 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
6028 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
6029 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
6030 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
6033 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
6035 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
6036 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
6037 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
6038 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
6039 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
6040 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
6041 will draw upon it to understand it;
6042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
6043 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
6044 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
6045 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
6046 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
6047 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
6050 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
6051 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
6052 call these
<quote>archives,
</quote> as warm as the idea of a
<quote>library
</quote> might seem,
6053 the
<quote>content
</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
6054 someone's
<quote>property.
</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
6055 that Kahle and others would exercise.
6057 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'
/>
6058 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
6060 <chapter label=
"10" id=
"property-i">
6061 <title>CHAPTER TEN:
<quote>Property
</quote></title>
6062 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
6063 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
6065 <emphasis role='strong'
>Jack Valenti
</emphasis> has been the president
6066 of the Motion Picture Association of America since
1966. He first came
6067 to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
6068 administration
—literally. The famous picture of Johnson's
6069 swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of President
6070 Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty years of
6071 running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps the most
6072 prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
6074 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
6075 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
6076 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
6077 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
6078 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
6079 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
6080 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
6082 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
6083 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
6084 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
6085 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
6086 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
6087 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
6088 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
6089 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
6090 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
6094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
6095 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
6096 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
6097 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
6098 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
6099 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
6100 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
6101 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
6102 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
6103 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
6107 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
6108 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
6109 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
6110 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
6111 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
6112 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
6113 redefine the meaning of
<quote>creative property.
</quote>
6116 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
6121 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
6122 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
6123 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
6124 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
6125 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
6126 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
6127 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
6128 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
6130 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
6131 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
6132 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
6133 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
6134 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
6140 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
6141 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
6142 <quote>central theme
</quote> to which
<quote>reasonable men and women
</quote> will return is
6144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
6145 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
6146 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.
</quote>
6147 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
6148 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
6151 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
6152 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
6153 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
6154 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
6155 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
6156 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
6157 it comes to the nature and scope of
<quote>creative property.
</quote> His views
6158 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
6159 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
6160 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
6163 While
<quote>creative property
</quote> is certainly
<quote>property
</quote> in a nerdy and
6164 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
6166 Lawyers speak of
<quote>property
</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
6167 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
6168 object. Thus, my
<quote>property right
</quote> to my car gives me the right to
6169 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
6170 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of
<quote>property
</quote> to
6171 <quote>lawyer talk,
</quote> see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
6172 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
6173 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
6174 <quote>creative property owners
</quote> have been
<quote>accorded the same rights and
6175 protection resident in all other property owners.
</quote> Indeed, if creative
6176 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
6177 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
6181 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
6182 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6183 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6184 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
6185 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6186 culture would develop.
6189 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6190 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
6191 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6192 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
6193 differently from the rights resident in all other property
6194 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
6195 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
6196 the same would be to
6198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6199 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6200 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6204 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6205 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6206 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6207 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6208 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6209 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6210 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old.
6213 <emphasis role='strong'
>To get
</emphasis> just a hint that there is
6214 something fundamentally wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no
6215 further than the United States Constitution itself.
6218 The framers of our Constitution loved
<quote>property.
</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6219 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6220 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
6221 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6222 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's
<quote>Takings
6223 Clause,
</quote> to pay you
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for that taking. The
6224 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6225 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
6226 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6229 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6230 Valenti calls
<quote>creative property.
</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6231 power to create
<quote>creative property,
</quote> the Constitution
6232 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a
<quote>limited time,
</quote> Congress
6233 take back the rights that it has granted and set the
<quote>creative
6234 property
</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6235 the expiration of a copyright term
<quote>takes
</quote> your copyright and turns it
6236 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6237 pay
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for this
<quote>taking.
</quote> Instead, the same
6238 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6240 requires that you lose your
<quote>creative property
</quote> right without any
6241 compensation at all.
6244 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6245 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6246 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6247 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6248 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6249 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6253 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6254 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6255 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6256 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6257 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6258 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
6259 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6260 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6261 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6262 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6265 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6266 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6267 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6268 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6269 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6273 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6274 history of these
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights, and the control that they
6275 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6276 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6277 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
6278 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6279 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6280 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6281 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6282 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6283 also control how culture develops.
6287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6288 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6289 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6290 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6291 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6292 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6293 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6294 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6296 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6297 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6298 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6301 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6302 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6303 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6304 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6305 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6306 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6307 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6308 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6309 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6310 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6311 Web, you can be punished
6312 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6313 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6314 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6315 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6317 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6319 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6320 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6321 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6322 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6323 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6324 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6325 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6326 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6327 the source of the enforcement.
6329 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6331 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6332 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6333 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6334 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6335 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6336 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6337 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6338 individual or group might behave.
6340 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6342 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6343 <quote>architecture
</quote>—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6344 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6345 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6346 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6347 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6348 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6349 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6350 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6351 theft, but by nature, by
<quote>architecture.
</quote> If a
500-pound boulder
6352 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6353 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6354 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6359 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6360 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6361 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6362 undermined by another.
6365 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6366 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6367 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6368 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6369 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6370 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6371 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6373 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
><primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary></indexterm>
6374 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6375 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6376 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6378 So, for example, consider the
<quote>freedom
</quote> to drive a car at a high
6379 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6380 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6381 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6382 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6383 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6384 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6385 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6386 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6387 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6388 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6389 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6392 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6393 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6394 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6396 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6397 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6398 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6399 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6400 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6401 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6402 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>The New Chicago School,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6405 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6406 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6407 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6408 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6409 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6410 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6411 used to require that other laws be more
6412 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6413 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6414 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6417 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6419 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6420 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6421 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6423 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6425 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6426 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6427 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6428 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6429 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6433 Some people object to this way of talking about
<quote>liberty.
</quote> They object
6434 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6435 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6436 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6437 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6438 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6439 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6440 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6441 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6442 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6443 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6444 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a
6445 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6446 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6447 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6448 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6449 <citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6450 1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6451 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons,
<quote>The
6452 Right to Work,
</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6453 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6454 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6455 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6456 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6457 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6458 12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6459 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6460 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6461 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6462 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990)
</primary></indexterm>
6463 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6464 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6465 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6468 <section id=
"hollywood">
6469 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6471 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6472 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6473 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6474 rallying makes sense.
6477 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6480 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6481 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6482 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6484 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6485 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6488 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6489 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6490 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6491 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6492 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6493 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6494 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6495 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6496 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6497 this form of infringement.
6500 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6501 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6502 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6503 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6504 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6505 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6508 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6509 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6510 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6511 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6514 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6515 looting that results.
6517 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6518 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6519 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6522 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6523 warriors. Indeed, in a
<quote>White Paper
</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6524 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6525 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6526 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6527 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6528 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6529 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6530 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6531 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6533 <indexterm><primary>steel industry
</primary></indexterm>
6535 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6536 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6537 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6538 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6539 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6540 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6541 life. Homeowners living in a
6543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6544 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6545 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6546 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6547 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6548 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6549 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6552 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6553 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6554 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6555 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6556 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6557 Brown describes it, its
<quote>architecture of revenue.
</quote>
6559 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry
</primary></indexterm>
6560 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
6561 <indexterm><primary>camera technology
</primary></indexterm>
6563 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6564 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6565 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6566 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6567 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6568 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6569 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6571 See Geoffrey Smith,
<quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?
</quote>
6572 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6573 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6574 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6575 R. Schoenberger,
<quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?
</quote> Forbes.com,
6
6576 October
2003, available at
6577 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6580 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6581 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6582 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6583 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6584 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6585 weakened the
<quote>stickiness
</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6586 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6587 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6588 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6589 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6590 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6592 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
6593 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6595 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6596 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6597 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6599 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6600 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6601 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6602 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents,
<quote>established companies
6603 have an interest in excluding future competitors.
</quote><footnote><para>
6605 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6608 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6609 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6610 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6611 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6612 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6616 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6617 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6618 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6619 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6620 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6621 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6622 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6623 opportunities for innovation and change.
6626 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6627 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6628 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6629 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6630 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6631 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6632 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6633 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution:
<quote>Congress
6634 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech.
</quote> So when
6635 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would
<quote>abridge
</quote> the freedom
6636 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6637 regulation is justified.
6640 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6642 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6643 <quote>justified.
</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6644 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6645 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6646 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6649 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6651 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
><primary>DDT
</primary></indexterm>
6652 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6654 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6655 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6656 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6657 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6658 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6661 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6662 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6663 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6665 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6666 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6668 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6669 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6670 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6671 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6674 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6675 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6676 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6677 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6678 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6679 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6680 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6682 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James
</primary></indexterm>
6684 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6685 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an
<quote>environmentalism
</quote> for
6686 culture.
<footnote><para>
6688 See, for example, James Boyle,
<quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6689 Environmentalism for the Net?
</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6691 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6692 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6693 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6694 <quote>for free.
</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6695 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6696 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6698 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6699 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6700 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6701 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6702 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6705 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6706 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6707 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6708 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6709 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6710 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6711 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6712 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6713 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6716 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6717 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6720 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6722 <section id=
"beginnings">
6723 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6725 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6726 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
<quote>creative
6727 property
</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6728 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6731 The power to establish
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights is granted to
6732 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6733 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6736 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6737 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6738 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6741 We can call this the
<quote>Progress Clause,
</quote> for notice what this clause
6742 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6743 <quote>creative property rights.
</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6744 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6745 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6746 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6749 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6750 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6751 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6752 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6753 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6754 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6755 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6756 copyrights extend
<quote>to Authors
</quote> only.
6759 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6760 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6761 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6762 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6763 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6764 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6765 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6766 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6767 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6768 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6769 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6770 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6771 concentrations of power.
6774 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
<quote>copyright
</quote>
6775 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6776 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6777 <quote>copyright
</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6778 years since they first struck its design.
6781 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6782 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6784 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6787 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6788 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6789 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6794 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6795 <title><quote>Copyright
</quote> today.
</title>
6796 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6803 <section id=
"lawduration">
6804 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6806 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6807 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6808 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6809 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6810 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6811 authorship.
<footnote>
6814 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6815 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6816 485–86:
<quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6817 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6818 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis></quote>
6820 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6822 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6823 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6824 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6825 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6826 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6827 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6830 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6831 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6832 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6833 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6834 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6835 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6838 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6839 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6840 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6841 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6842 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6845 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6846 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6847 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6848 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6849 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6850 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6851 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6853 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6854 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel,
<citetitle>A
6855 History of Book Publishing in the United States
</citetitle>, vol.
1,
<citetitle>The Creation
6856 of an Industry,
1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6857 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6858 1790 act; William J. Maher,
<citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6859 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context
</citetitle>,
7–10 (
2002),
6860 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6861 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6862 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6863 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6864 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6865 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6866 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6869 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6870 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6872 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6873 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6874 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6878 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6879 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6880 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6881 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6882 domain.
<footnote><para>
6884 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6885 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6886 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6887 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
<quote>Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
</quote>
6888 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright
</citetitle>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6889 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6890 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote>
6891 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6892 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6894 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>out of print
</secondary></indexterm>
6895 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>resales of
</secondary></indexterm>
6897 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6898 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6899 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6901 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6902 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6903 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6904 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6905 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6906 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6909 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6910 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6911 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6912 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6913 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6914 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6917 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6918 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6919 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6920 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6921 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6922 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6923 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6924 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6927 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6928 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6929 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6930 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6933 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6934 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6935 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6938 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6939 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6940 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6941 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6942 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6943 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6944 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6948 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6949 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6950 maximum term. For
<quote>natural
</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6951 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6952 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6953 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6954 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6955 was ninety-five years.
6958 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6959 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6960 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6961 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6962 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6963 that terms be
<quote>limited,
</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6967 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6968 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6969 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6970 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6971 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6972 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6973 years.
<footnote><para>
6975 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6976 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6977 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6978 Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote> loc. cit.
6981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6983 <section id=
"lawscope">
6984 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6986 The
<quote>scope
</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6987 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6988 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6989 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6992 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only
<quote>maps,
6993 charts, and books.
</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6994 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6995 the author the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> copyrighted works. That
6996 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6997 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6998 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6999 did not extend to what lawyers call
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> It would not,
7000 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
7001 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
7002 (such as a drama based on a published book).
7005 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
7006 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
7007 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
7008 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
7009 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
7010 work not only the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> the work, but also the
7011 exclusive right of control over any
<quote>copies
</quote> of that work. And most
7012 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
7013 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
7014 <quote>derivative work
</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
7015 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
7016 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
7017 on the initial creative work.
7020 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
7021 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
7022 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
7023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
7024 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
7025 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
7026 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
7027 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
7028 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
7029 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
7030 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
7034 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
7035 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
7036 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
7037 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
7038 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
7039 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
7040 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
7041 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
7042 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
7043 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
7044 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
7048 All of these
<quote>formalities
</quote> were abolished in the American system when
7049 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
7050 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
7051 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
7052 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
7053 copy available for others to copy.
7056 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
7060 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
7061 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
7062 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
7063 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
7064 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
7065 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7067 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner,
<quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
7068 Creation of American Literature,
</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
7069 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
7070 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
7073 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
7074 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
7075 the United States
—publishers.
7078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
7079 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
7080 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
7081 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
7082 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
7083 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
7084 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
7088 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
7089 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
7090 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
7091 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
7092 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
7093 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
7097 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
7098 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
7099 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
7102 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
7104 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
7105 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of
<quote>derivative
7106 rights.
</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
7107 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
7108 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
7109 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
7110 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
7112 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
7113 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
7116 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
7117 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
7119 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
7121 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
7122 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
7123 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
7124 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
7127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
7128 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
7129 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
7130 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
7131 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
7132 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
7133 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
7134 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
7135 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
7136 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
7138 Jonathan Zittrain,
<quote>The Copyright Cage,
</quote> <citetitle>Legal
7139 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
7140 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
7141 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
7143 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
7144 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
7145 the wrong of direct piracy.
7148 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
7149 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
7150 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
7151 of my book.
<footnote><para>
7153 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
7154 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
7155 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere
<quote>copies
</quote> and
7156 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld,
<quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
7157 Copyright's Constitutionality,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
7158 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
7160 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb
</primary></indexterm>
7162 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
7164 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
7165 <indexterm><primary>Mickey Mouse
</primary></indexterm>
7167 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
7168 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
7169 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
7170 called
<quote>Mickey Mouse,
</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
7171 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
7175 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
7176 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
7177 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
7178 the rights originally granted.
7181 <section id=
"lawreach">
7182 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
7184 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7185 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7186 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7187 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
7189 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
7190 certainly regulates more than
<quote>copies
</quote>—a public performance of a
7191 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
7192 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7193 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a
<quote>copy
</quote>;
17
7194 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
7195 existing law (which regulates
<quote>copies;
</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
7196 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7200 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7201 <quote>Copies.
</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
7202 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
7203 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that
<quote>creative
7204 property
</quote> deserves the
<quote>same rights
</quote> as all other property, it is the
7205 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7206 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7207 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7208 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7209 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7210 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
7211 the trigger for copyright law.
7214 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7215 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7216 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7217 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
7219 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7220 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7221 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7222 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7225 because it is clear that the
7226 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7227 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7230 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7233 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
7234 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
7235 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
7237 <indexterm id='idxbooksusetypes' class='startofrange'
><primary>books
</primary><secondary>three types of uses of
</secondary></indexterm>
7239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7240 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7241 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7242 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7243 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7244 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7245 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7246 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7247 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7248 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7249 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7250 acts do not make a copy.
7252 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
7253 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
7254 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
7257 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7258 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7259 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7260 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7261 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7262 diagram on next page).
7265 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7266 that remain unregulated because the law considers these
<quote>fair uses.
</quote>
7268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7269 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
7270 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
7271 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
7274 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7275 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7276 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7277 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7278 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7279 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7280 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such
<quote>fair uses
</quote>
7281 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7283 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7284 <title>Unregulated copying considered
<quote>fair uses.
</quote></title>
7285 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7288 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7289 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7290 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7293 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7294 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7295 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7296 are nonetheless deemed
<quote>fair
</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7298 <indexterm startref='idxbooksusetypes' class='endofrange'
/>
7299 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>on Internet
</secondary></indexterm>
7301 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7302 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7304 I don't mean
<quote>nature
</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7305 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7306 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7307 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7310 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7311 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7312 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7313 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7314 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7315 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7316 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7317 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7318 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7322 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7323 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7324 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7325 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7326 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7327 the book once, ten times, or every
7328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7329 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7330 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7331 none of those uses produced a copy.
7333 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>on Internet
</secondary></indexterm>
7335 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7336 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7337 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7338 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7339 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7340 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7341 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7342 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7343 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7344 copyright owner's wish.
7347 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7348 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7349 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7350 points also become clear:
7353 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7354 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7355 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7356 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7357 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7358 part of free culture before the Internet.
7361 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7362 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7363 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7364 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7365 using a machine.
<quote>Copy and paste
</quote> and
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> become
7366 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7367 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7368 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7369 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7373 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7376 burden on category
3 (
<quote>fair use
</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7377 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7378 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7379 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7380 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7381 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7382 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7383 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7387 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7388 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7389 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7390 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7391 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7392 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7393 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7396 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'
><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
7398 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7399 in the business of making
<quote>trailer
</quote> advertisements for movies available
7400 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7401 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7402 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7404 <indexterm><primary>browsing
</primary></indexterm>
7406 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7407 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7408 previews. The idea was to expand their
<quote>selling by sampling
</quote>
7409 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7410 <quote>browsing.
</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7411 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7412 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7415 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7416 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7417 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7418 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7420 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7421 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7422 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7423 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7424 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7425 <quote>fair use
</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7426 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7430 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7431 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had
<quote>willfully
7432 infringed
</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7433 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7434 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7435 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7436 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7437 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7440 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7441 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7442 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7443 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7444 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7445 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7446 Disney's permission.
7448 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'
/>
7450 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7451 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7452 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7453 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7454 was in the marketplace, the
<quote>first-sale doctrine
</quote> would free the
7455 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7456 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7457 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7458 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7459 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7460 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7461 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7463 <indexterm><primary>Barnes
& Noble
</primary></indexterm>
7464 <indexterm><primary>browsing
</primary></indexterm>
7466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7467 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7468 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7469 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7470 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7471 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7472 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7473 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7474 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7475 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7476 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7477 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7478 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7479 happening are quite slight.
7482 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7483 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7484 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7485 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7486 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7487 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7490 <section id=
"lawforce">
7491 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7493 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7494 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7495 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7496 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7499 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7500 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7501 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7502 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7503 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7506 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7507 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7508 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7510 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7511 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7513 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7514 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7515 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7516 plan.
<footnote><para>
7518 See David Lange,
<quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7519 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7523 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7524 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers
<quote>were brothers long before
7525 you were.
</quote><footnote><para>
7527 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7528 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7529 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7531 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7532 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7533 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7534 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7537 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7538 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7539 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7540 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7542 <indexterm id='idxbooksoninternet' class='startofrange'
><primary>books
</primary><secondary>on Internet
</secondary></indexterm>
7544 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7545 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7546 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7547 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7548 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7549 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7550 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7551 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7553 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7554 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7556 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
><primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary></indexterm>
7558 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7561 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7562 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7563 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7564 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7568 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7572 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7573 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7574 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7575 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7576 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7577 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7578 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7581 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7582 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7584 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7585 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7586 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7589 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7590 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7592 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7593 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7594 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7598 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7599 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7600 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7601 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7602 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7603 read aloud through the computer.
7605 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7606 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7608 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7609 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7611 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7612 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote></title>
7613 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7616 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7617 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7620 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7621 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote>.
</title>
7622 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7625 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7626 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7630 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7631 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>The Future of Ideas
</quote>.
</title>
7632 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7635 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7638 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7639 <quote>permissions
</quote>— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7640 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7641 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7642 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7643 power.
<footnote><para>
7645 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7646 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7647 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7648 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7649 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7650 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7651 subsequently acquired the book.
7653 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7654 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7655 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7656 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7657 control that the law would enable.
7660 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7661 within which the e-book
<quote>lives.
</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7662 permissions, they are not the sort of
<quote>permissions
</quote> that most of us
7663 deal with. When a teenager gets
<quote>permission
</quote> to stay out till
7664 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7665 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7666 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7667 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7668 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7669 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7670 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7671 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7672 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7673 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7676 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7679 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7680 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7681 you tried to type
<quote>Warner Brothers,
</quote> erased
<quote>Brothers
</quote> from the
7685 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7686 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7687 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7688 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7689 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7690 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7691 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7694 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7695 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7696 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7697 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7698 to defeat these protections as well?
7701 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7704 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7706 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7707 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7708 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7709 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7710 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7713 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7714 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>Alice's Adventures in
7715 Wonderland
</quote>.
</title>
7716 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7718 <beginpage pagenum=
"164"/>
7720 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7721 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7722 <quote>permissions
</quote> indicated, not allowed to
<quote>read aloud
</quote>!
7725 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7726 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7727 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7728 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7729 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7730 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7733 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7734 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7735 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7736 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7737 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7738 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7739 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7740 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7741 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7742 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7743 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7746 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7747 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7748 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7749 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7750 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7753 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7754 <indexterm startref='idxbooksoninternet' class='endofrange'
/>
7756 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7757 story of mine that makes the same point.
7759 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo1" class='startofrange'
><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7760 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'
><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7761 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'
><primary>Sony
</primary><secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary></indexterm>
7763 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named
<quote>Aibo.
</quote> The Aibo
7764 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7765 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7768 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7769 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7770 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165-->
7772 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7773 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7774 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7777 <quote>Teach
</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7778 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7779 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7780 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7781 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7782 their computer
<quote>dog
</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7784 <indexterm><primary>hacks
</primary></indexterm>
7786 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7787 <citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7788 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7789 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7790 them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much more positive
7791 term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7792 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7793 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7794 old computer doesn't run, or
<quote>drive,
</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7795 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7796 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7800 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7801 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7802 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7803 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7807 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7808 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7809 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7810 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7811 than Sony had built.
7813 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7814 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'
/>
7815 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7817 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7818 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7819 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7820 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7824 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7825 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7826 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7827 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7828 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7829 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7830 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7832 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary><secondary>government case against
</secondary></indexterm>
7834 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7835 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7836 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7837 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7838 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7839 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7840 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7841 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7842 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7845 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7847 See Pamela Samuelson,
<quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,
</quote>
7848 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
<quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7849 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,
</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7850 January
2002;
<quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7851 DMCA,
</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7852 Holland,
<quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,
</quote> <citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7853 May
2001; Janelle Brown,
<quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?
</quote> Salon.com,
7854 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<quote>Frequently Asked
7855 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case,
</quote> available at
7856 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7857 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7859 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7860 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7861 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7862 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7865 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7866 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7867 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7868 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7869 <quote>this music cannot be copied,
</quote> and have a computer respect that
7870 command. The technology was to be part of a
<quote>trusted system
</quote> of
7871 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7875 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7876 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7877 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7878 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7882 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7883 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7884 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7885 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7888 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7889 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7890 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7891 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7892 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7893 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7896 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7897 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7898 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7899 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7900 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7901 constituted, succeed.
7903 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo2" class='startofrange'
><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7904 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'
><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7905 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'
><primary>Sony
</primary><secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary></indexterm>
7907 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7908 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7909 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7914 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7915 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7916 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7919 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7920 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'
/>
7921 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7923 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7924 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7925 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7929 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7930 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7931 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7932 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7933 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (
<quote>DMCA
</quote>).
7937 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7938 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7939 spreading such information an offense.
7942 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7943 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7944 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7945 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7946 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7947 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7948 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7949 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7950 protection for copyright owners.
7953 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7954 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7955 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7956 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7957 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7960 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7961 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7962 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7963 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7964 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7965 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7966 have been a copyright violation.
7968 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7969 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7970 <indexterm><primary>Sony
</primary><secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary></indexterm>
7972 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7973 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7974 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7975 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7976 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7977 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7978 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7980 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7981 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7984 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7985 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7986 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7987 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7988 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7989 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7991 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7992 <indexterm id='idxcassettevcrs2' class='startofrange'
><primary>cassette recording
</primary><secondary>VCRs
</secondary></indexterm>
7994 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7995 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7996 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7997 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7998 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7999 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
<quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,
</quote>
8000 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
8001 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
8002 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
8006 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
8007 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
8008 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
8009 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
8010 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
8011 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the
<quote>Neighborhood
</quote>
8012 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
8013 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
8014 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
8015 broadcasting has always been
<quote>You are an important person just the way
8016 you are. You can make healthy decisions.
</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
8017 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
8018 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
8019 important.
<footnote><para>
8021 <indexterm><primary>cassette recording
</primary><secondary>VCRs
</secondary></indexterm>
8022 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
8023 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
8024 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
8025 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
8026 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
8031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
8032 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
8033 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
8034 the VCR responsible.
8037 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
8039 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
8042 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
8045 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
8046 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
8047 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
8048 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
8049 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
8050 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
8052 <indexterm id='idxhandguns' class='startofrange'
><primary>handguns
</primary></indexterm>
8054 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
8055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
8056 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
8057 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
8058 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
8061 <figure id=
"fig-1711-vcr-handgun-cartoonfig">
8062 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
8063 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
8065 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
8067 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
8068 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
8069 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
8070 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
8071 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
8072 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
8074 <indexterm startref='idxhandguns' class='endofrange'
/>
8075 <indexterm startref='idxcassettevcrs2' class='endofrange'
/>
8076 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
8077 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
8078 <indexterm><primary>Sony
</primary><secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary></indexterm>
8080 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
8081 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
8082 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
8083 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
8084 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
8085 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
8088 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
8089 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
8090 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
8091 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
8092 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
8093 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
8094 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
8095 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
8096 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
8097 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
8100 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
8101 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
8102 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
8103 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
8104 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
8105 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
8106 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
8107 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
8108 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
8112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
8113 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
8114 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
8115 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
8116 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
8117 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
8119 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet,
<quote>Legal Fictions,
8120 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
8121 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
8125 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
8126 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
8127 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
8128 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
8129 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
8131 <indexterm><primary>bots
</primary></indexterm>
8133 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
8134 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
8135 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
8136 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
8137 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
8138 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
8139 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
8140 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
8143 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
8144 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
8145 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
8146 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
8147 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
8148 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
8151 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
8152 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
8154 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
8155 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
8156 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
8157 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
8158 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
8160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
8161 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
8162 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
8163 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
8164 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
8165 market for creative work, has become the single most important
8166 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
8167 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
8168 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
8172 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8173 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8174 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8175 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8176 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8179 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8180 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8181 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8182 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8183 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8184 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8185 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8186 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8190 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8193 <indexterm><primary>cable television
</primary></indexterm>
8194 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
8195 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
8196 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
8197 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8198 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8200 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8201 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8202 ownership,
<quote>five companies control
85 percent of our media sources.
</quote><footnote><para>
8204 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8205 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
8206 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
8207 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8208 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
8209 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
8211 Lynette Holloway,
<quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8212 Slide,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
8214 The
<quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8215 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.
</quote><footnote><para>
8217 Molly Ivins,
<quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,
</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
8222 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8223 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8225 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
8226 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8227 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
8228 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
8229 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
8230 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8232 <indexterm><primary>cable television
</primary></indexterm>
8234 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8235 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8236 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8237 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8238 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
8239 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
8240 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8241 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8242 protected
— by the market.
8245 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8246 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8247 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8248 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8252 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8253 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
8254 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8255 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8256 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8257 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8258 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8259 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8260 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8261 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
8263 James Fallows,
<quote>The Age of Murdoch,
</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
8265 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8270 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8271 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8272 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8273 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8275 <figure id=
"fig-1761-pattern-modern-media-ownership">
8276 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8277 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8281 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8282 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8286 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8287 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8288 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8289 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8292 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8293 integration may matter.
8295 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8296 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8297 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8299 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
8300 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8301 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8302 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8303 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8306 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8307 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8308 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8309 control.
<footnote><para>
8311 Leonard Hill,
<quote>The Axis of Access,
</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8312 Forum,
<quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,
</quote> St. Louis,
8313 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8314 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8315 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8316 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8322 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8323 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8324 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8325 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
8326 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8327 television
—75 percent of it
—was
<quote>independent
</quote> of the
8331 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8332 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8333 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8334 2002, only five independent television studios remained.
<quote>In
1992,
8335 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8336 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8337 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent.
</quote> <quote>In
1992,
16
8338 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8339 year there was one.
</quote><footnote><para>
8341 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8342 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8343 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8344 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8345 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8346 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8347 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8350 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8351 that ran it.
<quote>In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8352 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8353 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8354 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8355 63%.
</quote><footnote><para>
8360 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8362 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8363 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8364 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8365 owned by the network.
8367 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8368 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8370 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8371 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8372 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8376 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8377 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8378 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8379 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8381 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8382 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8383 handful.
<footnote><para>
8385 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,
</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8386 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8387 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8392 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8393 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8394 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8395 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8396 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8397 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8398 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8399 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8400 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8403 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8405 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8406 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the
<quote>Innovator's
8407 Dilemma
</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8408 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8409 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8410 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8412 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8413 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8414 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8415 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8416 Kim B. Clark,
<quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8417 Concepts in Technological Evolution,
</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8418 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8419 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8420 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8421 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8423 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8424 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8426 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8429 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8430 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8431 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8435 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8436 suggest the concern.
8439 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8440 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8441 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8444 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8445 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8446 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8448 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8449 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8450 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8451 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8452 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8453 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8454 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8455 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8456 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8457 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8458 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8459 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8460 outweigh these costs.
8463 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8464 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8465 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8468 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'
><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
8470 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8471 a media campaign as part of the
<quote>war on drugs.
</quote> The campaign produced
8472 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8473 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8474 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8475 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8476 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8477 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8478 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8479 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8482 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8483 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8486 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8487 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8488 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8492 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8494 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8495 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8496 message will be heard then?
8499 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8500 <quote>controversial
</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8501 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8502 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8503 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8504 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8505 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8506 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8507 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8509 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8510 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8511 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as
<quote>against
8512 [their] policy.
</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8513 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8514 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8515 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8516 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8517 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives,
<quote>On the Issue of
8518 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>New
8519 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8520 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8521 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown,
<quote>Ad
8522 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8523 Radio,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8524 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8525 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8526 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8527 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8528 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8529 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross,
<quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8530 After Muni Rejects Ad,
</quote> SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8531 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8532 was that the criticism was
<quote>too controversial.
</quote>
8533 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8534 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8535 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8536 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8537 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8538 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8539 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
8543 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8544 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8545 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8546 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8547 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8548 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8549 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8550 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8551 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8553 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'
/>
8555 <section id=
"together">
8556 <title>Together
</title>
8558 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8559 copyright warriors that the government should
<quote>protect my property.
</quote>
8560 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8561 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8564 But when we see how dramatically this
<quote>property
</quote> has changed
—
8565 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8566 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8567 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8571 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8572 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8573 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8574 the massively expanded
<quote>property
</quote> rights granted by copyright
8575 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8576 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8580 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8581 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8582 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8586 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8587 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8588 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8589 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8590 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8591 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8592 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8593 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8594 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8595 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8598 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8599 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8600 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8601 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8602 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8603 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8604 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8605 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8606 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8607 in control that technology and the market enable.
8610 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8611 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8613 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8614 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8615 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8616 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8619 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8620 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8621 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8622 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8623 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8624 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8625 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8626 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8627 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8628 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8629 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8630 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8631 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8632 known.
<footnote><para>
8634 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8635 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his
<quote>four surrenders
</quote> of
8636 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8640 <emphasis role='strong'
>This has been
</emphasis> a long chapter. Its
8641 point can now be briefly stated.
8644 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8645 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8646 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8647 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8648 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8651 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8652 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"left">
8656 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8657 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8662 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8663 <entry>©</entry>
8667 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8676 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8677 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8678 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8681 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8682 noncommercial work was also free.
8685 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8688 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8689 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"left">
8693 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8694 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8699 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8700 <entry>©</entry>
8701 <entry>©</entry>
8704 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8713 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8714 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8715 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8716 transformation were still essentially free.
8719 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8720 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8721 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8722 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8723 we could say the law began to look like this:
8726 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8727 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"left">
8732 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8737 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8738 <entry>©</entry>
8739 <entry>©</entry>
8742 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8743 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8751 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8752 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8753 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8754 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8755 that the law now looks like this:
8758 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8759 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"left">
8764 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8769 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8770 <entry>©</entry>
8771 <entry>©</entry>
8774 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8775 <entry>©</entry>
8776 <entry>©</entry>
8783 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8784 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8787 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8788 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8791 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8792 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8793 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8794 these domains actually does any good.
8797 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8798 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8799 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8800 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8801 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8802 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8803 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8804 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8805 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8806 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8809 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8810 course copyright is a kind of
<quote>property,
</quote> and of course, as with any
8811 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8812 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8813 property rights
<footnote><para>
8815 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8816 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8817 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey,
<quote>The
8818 Disintegration of Property,
</quote> in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8819 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8821 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8823 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8824 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8825 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8826 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the
<quote>copyright
</quote>
8827 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8828 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8829 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8830 vibrant and rich free culture.
8832 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
8834 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8835 limits on the scope of the interests protected by
<quote>property.
</quote> The very
8836 birth of
<quote>copyright
</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8837 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8838 story of chapter
6). The tradition of
<quote>fair use
</quote> is animated by a
8839 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8840 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8843 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8844 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8845 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8846 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8847 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8848 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8849 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8850 dominates the debate today.
8853 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8854 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8855 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8856 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8857 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8858 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8859 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8860 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8861 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8862 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8869 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8870 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8873 <chapter label=
"11" id=
"chimera">
8874 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8875 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
><primary>chimeras
</primary></indexterm>
8876 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
><primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary></indexterm>
8877 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
><primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The
</quote> (Wells)
</primary></indexterm>
8880 <emphasis role='strong'
>In a well-known
</emphasis> short story by
8881 H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez trips (literally, down an
8882 ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in the Peruvian
8883 Andes.
<footnote><para>
8885 H. G. Wells,
<quote>The Country of the Blind
</quote> (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8886 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8887 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8889 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with
<quote>sweet water, pasture,
8890 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8891 that bore an excellent fruit.
</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8892 takes this as an opportunity.
<quote>In the Country of the Blind,
</quote> he tells
8893 himself,
<quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.
</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8894 villagers to explore life as a king.
8897 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8898 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8899 <quote>blind.
</quote> They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8900 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8901 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8902 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated.
<quote>`You
8903 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8904 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8908 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8909 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8910 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8911 affection, a young woman who to him seems
<quote>the most beautiful thing in
8912 the whole of creation,
</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8913 description of what he sees
<quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8914 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8915 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8916 indulgence.
</quote> <quote>She did not believe,
</quote> Wells tells us, and
<quote>she could
8917 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.
</quote>
8920 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his
<quote>mysteriously delighted
</quote>
8921 love, the father and the village object.
<quote>You see, my dear,
</quote> her
8922 father instructs,
<quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8923 anything right.
</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8926 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion.
<quote>His brain
8927 is affected,
</quote> he reports.
8930 <quote>What affects it?
</quote> the father asks.
<quote>Those queer things that are
8931 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8935 The doctor continues:
<quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8936 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8937 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8938 irritant bodies [the eyes].
</quote>
8941 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!
</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8942 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8943 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8944 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8947 <emphasis role='strong'
>It sometimes
</emphasis> happens that the eggs
8948 of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
8949 <quote>chimera.
</quote> A chimera is a single creature with two sets
8950 of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be different from the
8951 DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8953 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8954 plot for murder mysteries.
<quote>But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8955 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8956 scene.
…</quote>
8958 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8959 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8961 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8962 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8963 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8964 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8965 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8966 understanding of a
<quote>person
</quote> should reflect this reality.
8969 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8970 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8971 unfairly enough,
<quote>the copyright wars,
</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8972 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question
<quote>What is
8973 p2p file sharing?
</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8974 wrong. One side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8975 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8976 thirty years without any question at all.
</quote> That's true, at least in
8977 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8978 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8979 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8980 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8983 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8984 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8985 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8986 <quote>friends
</quote> beyond recognition to say
<quote>my ten thousand best friends
</quote> can
8987 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8988 what
<quote>we have always been allowed to do,
</quote> we have not always been
8989 allowed to share music with
<quote>our ten thousand best friends.
</quote>
8992 Likewise, when the other side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like walking
8993 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8994 with it,
</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8995 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8996 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8998 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9002 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
9003 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
9004 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
9005 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
9006 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
9007 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
9008 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
9009 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
9010 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
9013 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
9014 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
9015 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
9016 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
9017 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
9020 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
9021 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
9022 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
9023 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
9024 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
9025 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
9026 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
9027 implemented.
<footnote><para>
9029 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
9030 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
9031 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
9032 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
9034 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
9035 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
9036 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
9037 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
9038 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
<quote>House Bill Aims to Up
9039 Stakes on Piracy,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
9040 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
9041 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
9042 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
9043 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
9044 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
9045 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
9046 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
9047 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
9048 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
9049 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
9050 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
9051 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
9052 Elizabeth Young,
<quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,
</quote> redandblack.com,
9053 August
2003, available at
9054 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
9055 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
9056 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
9057 identities, see James Collins,
<quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
9058 Name Students,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
9059 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
9060 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
9061 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9065 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
9067 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
9068 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
9069 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
9070 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
9071 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
9074 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
9075 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
9076 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
9077 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
9078 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
9079 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
9080 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
9081 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
9085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
9086 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
9087 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
9088 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
9089 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
9090 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
9091 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
9094 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to
<quote>steal
</quote> music. My
9095 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
9096 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
9097 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
9098 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
9099 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
9100 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
9101 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
9102 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
9103 protection for copyrighted material,
9107 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
9108 material, and we want to protect those rights.
9111 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
9112 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
9113 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
9114 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
9115 produce a totally different industry model.
9118 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
9119 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
9120 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
9121 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
9122 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
9123 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
9124 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
9125 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
9126 interests.
<footnote><para>
9128 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
9129 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
9130 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
9131 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
9132 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
9133 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
9134 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
9137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
9139 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
9140 one of
<quote>the major labels.
</quote> Its position on these matters has now
9142 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
9145 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
9146 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
9147 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
9150 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
9152 <chapter label=
"12" id=
"harms">
9153 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
9155 <emphasis role='strong'
>To fight
</emphasis> <quote>piracy,
</quote> to
9156 protect
<quote>property,
</quote> the content industry has launched a
9157 war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
9158 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both
9159 direct and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these
9160 damages will be suffered most by our own people.
9163 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
9164 particular, the consequences for
<quote>free culture.
</quote> But my aim now is to
9165 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9169 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9170 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9171 power of the property called
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> is at its greatest in
9174 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
9175 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
9177 Yet
<quote>common sense
</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
9178 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
9179 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9180 rejection of
<quote>piracy
</quote> still has play.
9182 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9185 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9186 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9187 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9188 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9189 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9191 <section id=
"constrain">
9192 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
9194 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9195 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9196 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9197 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9198 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9199 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9200 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9201 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9202 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9203 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9204 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9205 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
9206 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9209 This digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> is in part an extension of the
9210 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9211 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9212 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9213 of digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9214 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9215 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9216 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9217 the culture all around.
9220 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9221 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9225 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9226 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9227 storytelling extended across the globe.
9230 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9231 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9232 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9233 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9234 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9235 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9236 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9237 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9238 work is presumptively illegal.
9240 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9242 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9243 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9244 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9245 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9246 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9247 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
9248 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9249 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
9250 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9251 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
9252 million.
<footnote><para>
9254 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
9255 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
9256 the settlement, see MCI press release,
<quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9257 Approval for SEC Settlement
</quote> (
7 July
2003), available at
9258 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
9259 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9261 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9262 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9263 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
9264 suffering.
<footnote>
9266 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9267 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
9268 an overview, see Tanya Albert,
<quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9269 Say Tort Reformers,
</quote> amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
9270 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
9271 and
<quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,
</quote> CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
9273 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9275 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
9277 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9278 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9279 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9281 <indexterm><primary>art, underground
</primary></indexterm>
9283 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9284 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9285 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9286 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9287 Disneys
<quote>pirates.
</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9288 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9292 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9293 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9294 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9295 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
9296 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9297 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9298 fraught. Already, exhibits of
<quote>illegal art
</quote> tour the United
9299 States.
<footnote><para>
9302 See Danit Lidor,
<quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
9304 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9305 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9307 In what does their
<quote>illegality
</quote> consist?
9308 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9309 critical or reflective.
9311 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
9313 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9314 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9315 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
9316 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9317 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9318 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9319 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9320 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9321 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9322 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9324 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of
</primary></indexterm>
9326 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9327 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9328 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9329 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9330 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9331 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9332 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9333 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9334 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9337 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9338 described in chapter
9339 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9340 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9341 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9342 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9348 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9349 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9350 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9351 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9352 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9353 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9354 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9355 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9358 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9359 <quote>breathing room
</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9360 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9361 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9362 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9363 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9364 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9365 these rules have little relationship to the
<quote>law
</quote> with which judges
9369 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9370 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9371 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9372 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9373 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9374 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9375 <quote>copyright
</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9376 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9377 culture that is free.
9380 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9384 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9385 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9386 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9387 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9388 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9390 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying,
<quote>This has been
9391 cleared.
</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9392 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9396 <section id=
"innovators">
9397 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9399 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9400 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9401 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9402 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9403 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9404 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9407 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9408 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9409 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9410 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9411 other aspect by substituting
<quote>free market
</quote> every place I've spoken of
9412 <quote>free culture.
</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9413 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9415 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9417 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9418 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9419 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9420 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9421 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9422 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9423 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9424 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9425 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9426 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9427 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9429 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9431 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9432 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9433 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9434 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9435 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9436 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9437 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9438 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9439 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9440 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9441 <quote>nuclear pall
</quote> that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9444 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9445 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9446 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9448 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
9450 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9451 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9452 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9453 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9454 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9455 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9457 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9458 <indexterm id='idxcdsprefdata' class='startofrange'
><primary>CDs
</primary><secondary>preference data on
</secondary></indexterm>
9460 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9461 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9462 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9463 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9467 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9468 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9469 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9470 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9471 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9472 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9473 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9474 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9475 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9476 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9479 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9480 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9483 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9484 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9485 the kind of content the users liked.
9487 <indexterm startref='idxcdsprefdata' class='endofrange'
/>
9489 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9490 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9491 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9492 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9493 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9494 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9495 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9496 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9497 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9498 they had already bought.
9500 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
9502 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9503 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9504 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9505 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9506 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9507 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9508 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9509 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9512 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9515 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9516 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9517 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9518 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9519 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9520 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9521 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9525 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9526 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9527 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9530 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9531 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9532 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9533 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9535 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9536 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9537 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9538 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad
</primary></indexterm>
9539 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9540 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9542 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9543 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9544 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9545 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9546 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9548 See Joseph Menn,
<quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9549 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9550 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown,
<quote>The Music
9551 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,
</quote> Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9552 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9553 See also Jon Healey,
<quote>Online Music Services Besieged,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9554 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9556 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9557 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9558 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9559 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9560 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9561 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9562 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9563 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9564 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9565 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9566 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9567 discussion with BMW:
9570 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9571 <indexterm><primary>cars, MP3 sound system in
</primary></indexterm>
9573 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9574 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9575 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9576 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9577 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9578 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9579 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9582 Rafe Needleman,
<quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,
</quote> <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9584 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9585 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9586 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9591 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with
<quote>your money or your
9592 life
</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9593 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9594 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9595 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9596 constantly threatened by litigation.
9600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9601 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9602 enterprises. The point is the definition of
<quote>illegal.
</quote> The law is a
9603 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9604 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9605 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9606 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9607 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9608 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9609 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9610 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9611 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9612 much less creativity.
9614 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9616 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9617 use. Whatever the
<quote>real
</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9618 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9619 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9620 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9621 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9622 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9623 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9624 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9625 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9628 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9629 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9630 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9631 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9632 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9633 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9634 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9635 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9636 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9637 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9638 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9639 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9641 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9642 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9643 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9647 <emphasis role='strong'
>The uncertainty
</emphasis> of the law is one
9648 burden on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more
9649 directly. This is the effort by many in the content industry to use
9650 the law to directly regulate the technology of the Internet so that it
9651 better protects their content.
9654 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9655 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9656 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9657 this feature is a
<quote>bug.
</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9658 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9659 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9660 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables
<quote>piracy,
</quote> then,
9661 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9663 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9665 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9666 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9667 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9668 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9669 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> GartnerG2 and
9670 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9671 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9672 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9674 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9675 <quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9676 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9677 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9678 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9679 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9680 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9682 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9686 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9687 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9688 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9689 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9692 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9695 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9697 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9698 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9699 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9701 See David McGuire,
<quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,
</quote> Newsbytes,
9702 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9704 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9705 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9709 <emphasis role='strong'
>There is one
</emphasis> more obvious way in
9710 which this war has harmed innovation
—again, a story that will be
9711 quite familiar to the free market crowd.
9714 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9715 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9716 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9717 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9719 <indexterm><primary>cassette recording
</primary><secondary>VCRs
</secondary></indexterm>
9720 <indexterm><primary>VCRs
</primary></indexterm>
9722 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9723 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9724 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9725 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9726 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9728 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9729 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9730 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9732 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9733 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9734 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9735 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9736 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9739 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9740 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9741 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9742 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9743 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9746 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9748 <indexterm><primary>Grokster, Ltd.
</primary></indexterm>
9749 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9750 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9751 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9752 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9753 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9754 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9755 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9756 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9757 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9758 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9759 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9760 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9763 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9764 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9765 here.
<footnote><para>
9767 <indexterm><primary>Tauzin, Billy
</primary></indexterm>
9768 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9769 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9770 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9771 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9772 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9773 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9774 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a
<quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that
9775 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9776 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9777 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9778 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2,
<quote>Copyright and
9779 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
33–34,
9781 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9782 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9783 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz
</primary></indexterm>
9784 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag
</primary></indexterm>
9786 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9787 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9789 <indexterm><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary></indexterm>
9790 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9793 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9794 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9795 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9796 artist doesn't get paid for that
<quote>radio performance
</quote> unless he or she
9797 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9798 version of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote>—to memorialize her famous
9799 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9800 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9801 copyright owners of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> would get some money, whereas
9802 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9805 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9806 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9807 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9808 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9809 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9810 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9811 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9812 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9816 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9817 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9818 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9819 spectrum. Thus, I can
<quote>tune in
</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9820 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9821 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9825 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9826 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9827 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9828 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9829 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9830 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9831 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9832 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9833 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9834 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9835 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9837 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9841 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9842 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9843 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9844 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9845 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9846 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9851 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9852 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9853 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9854 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9855 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9856 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9857 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9858 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9859 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9860 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9861 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9862 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9863 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9870 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9871 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9872 underestimated the power of
<quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9873 legislation
</quote><footnote><para>
9877 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9880 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9881 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9882 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9883 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9884 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9887 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'
><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary></indexterm>
9889 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9890 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9893 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9894 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9895 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9896 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9897 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9898 of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9899 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9900 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9901 burdens terrestrial radio.
9904 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9905 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9906 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9907 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9908 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9911 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9912 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9913 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9914 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9915 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9916 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9917 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9918 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9919 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9920 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9921 C. Picker,
<quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9922 Distribution,
</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461:
<quote>This was
9923 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9924 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9925 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9926 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9927 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.
</quote>
9928 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9929 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9931 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9934 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'
/>
9936 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9937 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9938 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9939 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9942 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9944 name of the service;
9947 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9950 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9953 date of transmission;
9956 time of transmission;
9959 time zone of origination of transmission;
9962 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9965 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9968 sound recording title;
9971 ISRC code of the recording;
9974 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9977 featured recording artist;
9986 UPC code of the retail album;
9992 copyright owner information;
9995 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9998 name of the service or entity;
10001 channel or program;
10004 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
10007 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
10010 time zone where the signal was received (user);
10013 unique user identifier;
10016 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
10021 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
10022 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
10023 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
10024 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
10025 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
10026 that terrestrial radio does not.
10029 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
10030 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
10031 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
10033 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
10034 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'
><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
10036 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
10037 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
10038 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
10042 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
10043 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
10044 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
10045 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
10046 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
10047 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… <quote>How do you come up with a
10049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
10050 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
10051 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
10052 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
10053 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
10054 business.
…</quote>
10056 <indexterm><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary></indexterm>
10058 And the RIAA experts said,
<quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
10059 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
10060 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
10061 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>.
</quote> (Emphasis
10065 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'
/>
10067 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
10068 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
10069 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
10070 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
10071 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
10072 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
10073 effective to prevent it.
10076 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
10077 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
10079 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
10081 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
10082 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
10085 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
10086 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
10087 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
10090 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
10091 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
10092 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
10093 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
10094 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie,
<quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,
</quote> Pew
10095 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
10096 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
10097 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
10098 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
10100 According to the RIAA,
10101 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
10102 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
10104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
10105 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
10106 the world, but against students building search engines, and
10108 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
10109 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
10110 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
10112 response by the other.
10115 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
10116 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
10117 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
10118 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
10119 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
10120 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
10121 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
10122 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
10123 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
10124 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
10125 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
10126 was.
<footnote><para>
10128 Alex Pham,
<quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,
</quote> <citetitle>Los
10129 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
10131 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
10132 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
10133 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
10134 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
10135 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
10136 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
10139 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
10141 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
10142 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
10143 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
10144 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
10145 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
10146 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
10147 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
10148 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
10149 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
10151 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel,
<quote>Alcohol Consumption During
10152 Prohibition,
</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
10155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
10156 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
10157 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
10159 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
10160 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
10161 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
10163 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
10164 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
10165 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
10166 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
10167 cheat.
<footnote><para>
10169 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein,
<quote>Tax
10170 Compliance,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
10171 compliance literature).
10173 We pride ourselves on our
<quote>free society,
</quote> but an endless array of
10174 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
10175 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10177 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
10179 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10180 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
10181 students about the importance of
<quote>ethics.
</quote> As my colleague Charlie
10182 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
10183 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
10184 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
10185 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
10186 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
10187 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
10188 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
10189 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
10190 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
10191 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
10192 lives both normally and legally, since
<quote>normally
</quote> entails a certain
10193 degree of illegality.
10196 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10197 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10198 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10199 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10200 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10201 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10202 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10203 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10204 to consider the alternative.
10208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10209 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10210 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10211 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10212 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10213 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10216 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10217 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10218 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10219 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10220 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10221 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10222 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10223 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10224 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10225 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10226 introduced this different idea of
<quote>sharing.
</quote> We need to be able to
10227 call these twenty million Americans
<quote>citizens,
</quote> not
<quote>felons.
</quote>
10230 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10231 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10232 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10233 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10234 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10235 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10236 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10237 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10238 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10239 a nation of felons?
10242 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10245 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10246 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10247 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10248 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10252 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That
<quote>use
</quote> of the
10253 recordings is free.
10256 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10257 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10258 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am
<quote>free
</quote> to copy,
10259 or
<quote>rip,
</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10260 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that
<quote>freedom
</quote> was a
10261 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the
<quote>Rip, Mix, Burn
</quote>
10262 capacities of digital technologies.
10264 <indexterm><primary>Andromeda
</primary></indexterm>
10265 <indexterm id='idxcdsmix' class='startofrange'
><primary>CDs
</primary><secondary>mix technology and
</secondary></indexterm>
10267 This
<quote>use
</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10268 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10269 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10270 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10271 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10272 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10273 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10274 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10275 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10278 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
10279 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10280 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10281 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10282 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10283 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10284 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10285 on people's machines.
10288 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10289 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10290 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10291 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10292 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10293 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10296 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10297 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10298 plastic or were part of a massively complex
<quote>digital rights
10299 management
</quote> system.
10301 <indexterm startref='idxcdsmix' class='endofrange'
/>
10303 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10304 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10305 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10306 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10307 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10308 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10309 freedom to move content easily?
10312 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10313 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10314 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10315 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10316 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10317 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10318 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10319 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10320 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10323 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10324 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10325 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10326 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10327 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10328 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10329 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10332 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10333 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10334 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10335 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10338 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10339 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10343 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10344 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10346 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
10347 <indexterm id='idxisps' class='startofrange'
><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by
</primary></indexterm>
10349 <emphasis role='strong'
>There's one more
</emphasis> aspect to this
10350 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and
10351 follows directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier
10352 Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the
10353 <quote>collateral damage
</quote> that
<quote>arises whenever you turn
10354 a very large percentage of the population into criminals.
</quote> This
10355 is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10357 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10359 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,
</quote> von Lohmann
10364 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10365 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10366 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10367 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10368 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10369 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think,
<quote>Oh, well,
10370 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.
</quote> Well, what this campaign
10371 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10372 American Internet-using population into
<quote>lawbreakers.
</quote>
10376 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10377 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10378 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10381 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10382 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10383 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10384 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10385 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10386 an Internet user is revealed.
10389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10390 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10391 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10392 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10393 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10394 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10395 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10396 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10397 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10399 See Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10400 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,
</quote>
10401 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs,
<quote>Worried Parents
10402 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10403 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10404 Being Sued,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10405 Graham,
<quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10406 2003,
4D; John Schwartz,
<quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10407 Fan, Either,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi,
<quote>Is
10408 Brianna a Criminal?
</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10413 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10414 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10415 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10417 See
<quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10418 Some Methods Used,
</quote> CNN.com, available at
10419 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10421 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10422 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10423 one of those MP3s will have the same
<quote>fingerprint.
</quote>
10426 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10427 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10428 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10429 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10430 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10431 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10432 network is
<quote>cooperating
</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10433 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10434 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10435 as a
<quote>criminal.
</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10436 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10438 See Jeff Adler,
<quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,
</quote>
10439 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>Four
10440 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10441 Colleges,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10442 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10443 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas,
<quote>Music
10444 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10445 Lawsuit Possible,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox,
<quote>RIAA
10446 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10447 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10448 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Download Warning
101: Freshman
10449 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10450 Sharing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11;
<quote>Raid, Letters
10451 Are Weapons at Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10453 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10454 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10456 <indexterm startref='idxisps' class='endofrange'
/>
10457 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10459 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10460 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10461 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10462 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10463 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10464 this
<quote>contraband
</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10468 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10469 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10474 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10475 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10476 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10477 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10478 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10479 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10480 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10481 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10482 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10483 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10484 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10485 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10486 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10487 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10488 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10489 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10494 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered
<quote>criminals
</quote> under
10495 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10496 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10497 considered
<quote>criminals,
</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10498 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10499 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10506 <part id=
"c-balances">
10507 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10510 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10512 <emphasis role='strong'
>So here's
</emphasis> the picture: You're
10513 standing at the side of the road. Your car is on fire. You are angry
10514 and upset because in part you helped start the fire. Now you don't
10515 know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket, filled with
10516 gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10519 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10520 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10521 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10522 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10523 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10527 <emphasis role='strong'
>A war
</emphasis> about copyright rages all
10528 around
—and we're all focusing on the wrong thing. No doubt,
10529 current technologies threaten existing businesses. No doubt they may
10530 threaten artists. But technologies change. The industry and
10531 technologists have plenty of ways to use technology to protect
10532 themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This is a fire
10533 that if let alone would burn itself out.
10536 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10537 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10538 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10539 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10540 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10541 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10542 made that is happening all around.
10545 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10546 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10547 gasoline onto this fire.
10550 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10551 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10552 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10553 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10556 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10557 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10558 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10559 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10560 success will require.
10564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10565 <chapter label=
"13" id=
"eldred">
10566 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10567 <indexterm id=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'
><primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel
</primary></indexterm>
10569 <emphasis role='strong'
>In
1995</emphasis>, a father was frustrated
10570 that his daughters didn't seem to like Hawthorne. No doubt there was
10571 more than one such father, but at least one did something about
10572 it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in New
10573 Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
10574 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would
10575 make this nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
10578 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10579 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10580 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10581 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10582 them available for free.
10584 <indexterm id='idxdisneywalt5' class='startofrange'
><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
10585 <indexterm><primary>Grimm fairy tales
</primary></indexterm>
10587 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10588 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10589 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10590 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10591 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10592 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10593 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10594 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10595 accessible
—today.
10598 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10599 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10600 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10601 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10602 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10603 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10604 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10605 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10606 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10607 commercial publications of public domain works.
10609 <indexterm startref='idxhawthornenathaniel' class='endofrange'
/>
10610 <indexterm startref='idxdisneywalt5' class='endofrange'
/>
10612 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10613 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10614 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10615 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10616 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10617 call the
<quote>noncommercial publishing industry,
</quote> which before the
10618 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10619 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10620 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10621 generally.
<footnote><para>
10623 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10624 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10625 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10626 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10627 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10628 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10629 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10630 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10631 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10632 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10633 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10634 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10635 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10636 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10637 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10640 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10641 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10642 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10643 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10644 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10645 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10646 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10647 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10648 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10649 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10650 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10651 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10653 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10654 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10658 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10659 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10660 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10661 <quote>copyrights should be forever.
</quote><footnote><para>
10663 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10664 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10665 The full text is:
<quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10666 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10667 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10668 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10669 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10670 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10671 Congress,
</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10676 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10677 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10678 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10679 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10680 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10681 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10685 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10687 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10689 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10690 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10692 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10696 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10697 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10698 their
… Writings.
…
10702 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10703 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10704 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10705 something
—for example, to regulate
<quote>commerce among the several
10706 states
</quote> or
<quote>declare War.
</quote> But here, the
<quote>something
</quote> is something quite
10707 specific
—to
<quote>promote
… Progress
</quote>—through means that
10708 are also specific
— by
<quote>securing
</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights
</quote> (i.e.,
10709 copyrights)
<quote>for limited Times.
</quote>
10711 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10713 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10714 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10715 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10716 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be
<quote>limited
</quote> will have
10717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10718 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10719 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10720 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms
<quote>on the
10721 installment plan,
</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10724 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10725 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10726 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10727 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10728 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10729 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10730 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10731 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10732 this gravy train going.
10735 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10736 government.
<quote>Corruption
</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10737 bribed. Rather,
<quote>corruption
</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10738 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10739 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10740 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10741 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10744 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10745 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10746 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10747 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10748 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10749 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10750 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10751 published by anyone for free.
10754 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10755 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10756 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10757 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10761 <quote>Next year,
</quote> the adviser announces,
<quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10763 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10764 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10765 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10766 those works.
</quote>
10769 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,
</quote> she continues,
<quote>that
10770 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10771 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10772 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.
</quote>
10775 <quote>Hope?
</quote> a fellow board member says.
<quote>Can't we be doing something
10779 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>We could contribute
10780 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10781 they support the bill.
</quote>
10784 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10785 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it.
<quote>How much
10786 would we get if this extension were passed?
</quote> you ask the adviser.
<quote>How
10787 much is it worth?
</quote>
10790 <quote>Well,
</quote> the adviser says,
<quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10791 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10792 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10793 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate.
</quote>
10796 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10797 correct conclusion:
10800 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10801 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10803 would assure that the bill was passed?
</quote>
10806 <quote>Absolutely,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>It is worth it to you to
10808 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10809 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000.
</quote>
10812 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10813 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10814 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10815 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10817 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10819 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10820 the copyright term extended.
10823 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10824 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10825 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10828 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10830 Term Extension Act, this
<quote>theory
</quote> about incentives was proved
10831 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10832 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10833 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10834 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10835 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press,
<quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10836 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,
</quote>
10837 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10839 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10840 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10841 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10842 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown,
<quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10843 Age,
</quote> available at
10844 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10846 Disney is estimated to have
10847 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10848 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10850 Alan K. Ota,
<quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,
</quote>
10851 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10852 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10857 <emphasis role='strong'
>Constitutional law
</emphasis> is not oblivious
10858 to the obvious. Or at least, it need not be. So when I was considering
10859 Eldred's complaint, this reality about the never-ending incentives to
10860 increase the copyright term was central to my thinking. In my view, a
10861 pragmatic court committed to interpreting and applying the
10862 Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the power
10863 to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
10864 constitutional requirement that terms be
<quote>limited.
</quote> If
10865 they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again and
10869 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10870 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10871 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10872 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10873 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10874 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10878 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10882 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10883 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10884 power to regulate only
<quote>commerce among the several states
</quote> (aka
10886 commerce
</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10887 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10892 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10893 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10894 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10895 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10896 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10898 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
10900 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10901 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10902 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10903 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10904 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10905 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10906 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10907 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10908 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10909 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10910 position to second-guess Congress.
10913 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,
</quote>
10914 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10915 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10917 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10918 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10919 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10920 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10922 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10926 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10927 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10929 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10930 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10931 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10932 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10933 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10934 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10935 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10936 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10937 limitation to
<quote>limited times
</quote> notwithstanding.
10939 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10940 yield the conclusion that Congress
10941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10942 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10943 term, then there would be no
<quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power over
10944 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10945 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10946 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10947 term of existing copyrights.
10950 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10951 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10952 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10953 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10954 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10955 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10956 demonstrating the
<quote>fidelity
</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10957 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10958 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10959 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10960 were going to be petty politicians.
10962 <indexterm><primary>Constitution, U.S.
</primary><secondary>copyright purpose established in
</secondary></indexterm>
10963 <indexterm><primary>copyright
</primary><secondary>constitutional purpose of
</secondary></indexterm>
10964 <indexterm><primary>copyright
</primary><secondary>duration of
</secondary></indexterm>
10965 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Walt
</primary></indexterm>
10967 <emphasis role='strong'
>Now let's pause
</emphasis> for a moment to
10968 make sure we understand what the argument in
10969 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10970 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10971 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10972 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10973 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10974 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10975 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10976 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10977 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10978 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10979 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10980 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10981 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10982 piracy that affects us all.
10984 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10986 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10989 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10990 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than
<quote>legal piracy.
</quote><footnote><para>
10992 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10993 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10994 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10996 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10997 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10998 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
11002 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
11004 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
11006 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
11007 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
11008 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
11009 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
11010 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
11011 bought to extend them again.
11014 <emphasis role='strong'
>It is valuable
</emphasis> copyrights that are
11015 responsible for terms being extended. Mickey Mouse and
11016 <quote>Rhapsody in Blue.
</quote> These works are too valuable for
11017 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from
11018 copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.
11019 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from
11020 the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The real
11021 harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The real
11022 harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially exploited,
11023 and no longer available as a result.
11026 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
11027 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
11028 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
11029 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
11030 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
11031 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
11032 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
11034 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
11035 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
11036 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
11041 Think practically about the consequence of this
11042 extension
—practically,
11043 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
11045 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
11046 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
11047 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
11048 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
11050 9,
873. What would you have to do?
11052 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
11054 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
11055 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
11056 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
11057 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
11058 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
11059 list of books still under copyright.
11062 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
11063 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
11066 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
11068 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
11069 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
11070 being at least a list?
11073 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
11074 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
11076 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
11078 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
11079 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
11082 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,
</quote> the
11083 apologists for the system respond.
<quote>Why should there be a list of
11084 copyright owners?
</quote>
11087 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
11088 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
11089 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
11090 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
11091 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
11092 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
11093 what tangible property.
11096 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
11097 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
11098 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
11100 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
11101 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
11102 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
11104 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
11105 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
11106 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
11107 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
11108 know quite well who owns what property.
11111 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
11112 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
11114 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
11115 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
11116 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
11117 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
11118 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
11119 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
11120 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
11123 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
11124 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
11126 for other creative works is much more dire.
11128 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'
><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
11129 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11130 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
11131 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
11133 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
11134 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
11135 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
11136 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
11137 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
11138 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
11139 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
11140 money. According to one estimate,
<quote>Roach has sold about
60,
000
11141 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
11142 films.
</quote><footnote><para>
11144 See David G. Savage,
<quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,
</quote>
11145 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
<quote>Classic Movies,
11146 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
11147 Down Copyright Extension,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
11151 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
11152 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
11153 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
11154 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
11157 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
11159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
11160 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
11161 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
11162 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
11163 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
11164 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
11165 work available for distribution.
11168 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11169 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11170 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11171 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11172 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
11173 mm film.
<footnote><para>
11175 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11176 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11177 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
11178 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
11179 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
11180 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
11185 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11187 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11188 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11189 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11190 locate the copyright owner.
11193 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
11194 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
11195 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
11196 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
11197 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
11198 to these films is exceptionally high.
11201 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11202 copyright owner when she shows up?
</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11203 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11204 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11205 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11206 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11207 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11208 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11209 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11212 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11214 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11215 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11217 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11218 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11219 the copyright expires.
11221 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'
/>
11223 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11224 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11225 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11227 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11231 <emphasis role='strong'
>Of all the
</emphasis> creative work produced
11232 by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has continuing commercial
11233 value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a crucially important
11234 legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright creates incentives
11235 to produce and distribute the creative work. For that tiny fraction,
11236 the copyright acts as an
<quote>engine of free expression.
</quote>
11239 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11240 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11242 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11243 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11244 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11246 the commercial life ends.
11249 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11250 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
11251 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11253 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11255 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11256 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
11257 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11258 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11259 have, we need to have access to this history.
11262 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11265 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11266 this context do no good.
11269 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11270 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11271 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11272 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11273 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11274 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11275 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11276 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11277 was independent of copyright law.
11280 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11281 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
11282 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11283 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11284 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11285 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11286 market didn't have more to offer.
11289 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11290 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11291 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11292 would not have interfered with anything.
11295 But this situation has now changed.
11297 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'
><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
11299 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11300 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11301 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11302 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11303 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11304 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11305 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11306 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11307 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11308 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11311 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11312 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11313 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11314 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11315 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11316 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11317 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11318 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11319 written for a radically different context.
11322 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11323 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11324 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11325 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11326 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11327 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11328 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
11329 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11330 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11333 You may well ask,
<quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11334 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11335 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11336 culture widely?
</quote>
11339 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11340 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11341 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11342 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11343 of a library is to serve what
<quote>the market
</quote> would demand. But if you
11344 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11345 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11346 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11347 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11349 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'
/>
11351 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11352 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11353 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11354 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11357 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11358 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11359 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11360 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11361 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11363 Jason Schultz,
<quote>The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,
</quote> 20
11364 December
2002, available at
11365 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11370 <emphasis role='strong'
>In January
1999</emphasis>, we filed a lawsuit
11371 on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
11372 asking the court to declare the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
11373 Act unconstitutional. The two central claims that we made were (
1)
11374 that extending existing terms violated the Constitution's
11375 <quote>limited Times
</quote> requirement, and (
2) that extending terms
11376 by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11379 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11380 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11381 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11382 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11383 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11386 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11387 copyrights be for
<quote>limited Times
</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11388 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11389 <quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11390 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11391 terms that are
<quote>limited.
</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11392 to interpret the term
<quote>limited Times
</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11393 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11394 power to extend existing terms.
11397 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11398 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11399 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11400 whole, where the court will sit
<quote>en banc
</quote> to hear the case.
11402 <indexterm><primary>Tatel, David
</primary></indexterm>
11404 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11405 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11408 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11409 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11410 overstepped its bounds.
11413 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11414 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11415 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11416 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11417 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11420 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11421 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11422 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11423 briefs and preparing for argument.
11426 <emphasis role='strong'
>It is over
</emphasis> a year later as I write
11427 these words. It is still astonishingly hard. If you know anything at
11428 all about this story, you know that we lost the appeal. And if you
11429 know something more than just the minimum, you probably think there
11430 was no way this case could have been won. After our defeat, I received
11431 literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and supporters,
11432 thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed cause. And
11433 none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail from my
11434 client, Eric Eldred.
11437 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11438 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11439 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11442 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11444 <emphasis role='strong'
>The mistake
</emphasis> was made early, though
11445 it became obvious only at the very end. Our case had been supported
11446 from the very beginning by an extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart,
11447 and by the law firm he had moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and
11448 Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11450 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11451 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11452 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11454 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11455 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11456 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11458 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11459 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11460 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11461 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11462 told me, if we could make the issue seem
<quote>important
</quote> to the Supreme
11463 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11464 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against
<quote>the
11465 most powerful media companies in the world.
</quote>
11468 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11469 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11470 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11471 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11472 <quote>right
</quote> as in
<quote>true,
</quote> I thought, but it is
<quote>wrong
</quote> as in
<quote>it just shouldn't be
11473 that way.
</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11474 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11475 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11477 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11478 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11480 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11481 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11482 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11484 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11485 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11486 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11489 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11490 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11491 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11492 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11493 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11494 why it was unconstitutional.
11497 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11499 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11500 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11501 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11502 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11503 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11504 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11505 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11506 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11507 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11508 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11509 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11510 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11511 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11512 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11513 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11515 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11516 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11518 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11519 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11520 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11521 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11522 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11523 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11524 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11525 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11526 to get bogged down?
</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11527 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11528 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11529 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11532 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11533 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11534 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11535 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11536 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11537 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11539 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11540 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11541 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11542 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11544 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11545 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11548 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11549 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11550 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11551 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11552 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11553 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11554 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11556 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11557 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11559 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11560 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11561 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11562 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11564 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11566 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11567 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11568 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11569 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11572 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11573 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11574 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11575 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11576 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11578 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11579 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11580 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11581 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11582 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11583 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11584 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11585 nothing more than
<quote>rent-seeking
</quote>—the fancy term economists use
11586 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11588 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11589 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan
</primary></indexterm>
11590 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen
</primary></indexterm>
11591 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11593 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11594 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11595 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11596 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11597 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11598 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11599 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11600 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11602 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11603 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11604 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11606 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11608 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11609 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11610 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11611 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11612 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11613 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11614 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11615 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11616 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11617 confidence in our argument.
11620 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11621 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these
<quote>friends
</quote> included
11622 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11623 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11627 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11628 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11629 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11630 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11631 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11632 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11635 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11637 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11638 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11639 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11640 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11641 domain, then people could use it to
<quote>glorify drugs or to create
11642 pornography.
</quote><footnote><para>
11644 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11645 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11647 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11648 <quote>protection
</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11649 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11650 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11652 Dinitia Smith,
<quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11653 Mouse Joins the Fray,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11657 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11658 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11661 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11662 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11663 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11664 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11665 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say,
<quote>Give us twenty years
11666 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11667 better with them than anyone else.
</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11668 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11669 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11670 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11673 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11674 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11675 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11676 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11677 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11680 <emphasis role='strong'
>Between February
</emphasis> and October, there
11681 was little I did beyond preparing for this case. Early on, as I said,
11682 I set the strategy.
11684 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
11685 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11687 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11688 called
<quote>the Conservatives.
</quote> The other we called
<quote>the Rest.
</quote> The
11689 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11690 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11691 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11692 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line
11693 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11694 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11696 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11697 <indexterm id='idxginsburg' class='startofrange'
><primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
</primary></indexterm>
11699 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11700 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11701 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11704 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11705 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11706 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11707 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11708 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11711 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11712 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11713 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11714 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11715 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11716 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11717 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11718 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11721 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11723 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11724 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11725 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11726 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11727 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11728 these retrospective extensions.
11730 <indexterm startref='idxginsburg' class='endofrange'
/>
11732 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11733 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11734 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11735 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11736 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11737 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11740 This analysis of
<quote>the Rest
</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11741 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11742 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11743 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11744 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation
—the
11745 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11746 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11747 powers have limits.
11750 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11751 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11752 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11753 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11754 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11755 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11756 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11757 supposed to be
<quote>limited.
</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11758 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
11759 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11760 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11764 <emphasis role='strong'
>The argument
</emphasis> on the government's
11765 side came down to this: Congress has done it before. It should be
11766 allowed to do it again. The government claimed that from the very
11767 beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
11768 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say
11769 that practice is unconstitutional.
11772 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11773 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831
11774 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11776 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11779 But this
<quote>consistency
</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11781 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11782 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11783 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11785 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11787 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11788 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11790 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11791 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11794 <emphasis role='strong'
>Oral argument
</emphasis> was scheduled for the
11795 first week in October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the
11796 argument. During those two weeks, I was repeatedly
11797 <quote>mooted
</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11800 help in the case. Such
<quote>moots
</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11801 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11804 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11805 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11806 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11807 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11809 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11810 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11813 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11814 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11815 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11817 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11818 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11819 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11820 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11823 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11824 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11825 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11826 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11827 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.
</quote>
11829 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11831 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11832 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11833 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11834 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11835 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11836 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11837 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11838 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11841 <emphasis role='strong'
>The night before
</emphasis> the argument, a
11842 line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The case
11843 had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
11844 culture. Hundreds stood in line
11846 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11847 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11848 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11851 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11852 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11853 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11854 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11856 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11857 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11858 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11859 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11860 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11861 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11862 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11863 family of the Justices.
11866 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11867 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11868 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11869 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11871 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11873 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11874 The history was bothering her.
11878 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11879 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11880 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11881 practice that began with the very first act.
11885 She was quite willing to concede
<quote>that this flies directly in the face
11886 of what the framers had in mind.
</quote> But my response again and again
11887 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11891 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11892 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11894 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11899 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11900 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11901 Kennedy, who observed,
11905 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11906 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11907 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11908 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11909 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11913 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11919 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11920 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11921 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11922 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11923 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11926 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11928 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11929 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11930 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11931 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11932 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11935 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11936 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11937 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11940 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11941 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11947 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11948 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11951 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11952 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11954 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11955 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11956 into the Copyright Clause.
11959 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.
</primary></indexterm>
11961 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11962 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11963 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11967 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11968 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11969 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11970 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11975 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11976 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11977 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11978 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11979 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11980 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11981 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11982 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11983 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11984 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11988 <emphasis role='strong'
>As I left
</emphasis> the court that day, I
11989 knew there were a hundred points I wished I could remake. There were a
11990 hundred questions I wished I had
11992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11993 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11997 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11998 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11999 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
12000 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
12001 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
12002 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
12003 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
12004 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
12005 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
12006 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
12007 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
12008 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
12009 law that it had established elsewhere.
12012 <emphasis role='strong'
>The morning
</emphasis> of January
15,
2003, I
12013 was five minutes late to the office and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from
12014 the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the message, I could tell in an
12015 instant that she had bad news to report.The Supreme Court had affirmed
12016 the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven justices had voted in the
12017 majority. There were two dissents.
12020 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
12021 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
12022 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
12025 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
12026 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
12027 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
12031 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
12032 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
12033 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
12034 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
12035 even appear in the Court's opinion.
12037 <indexterm><primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
</primary></indexterm>
12040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
12041 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
12042 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
12043 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
12046 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
12047 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
12048 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
12049 they had worked so hard to defeat.
12052 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
12053 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
12054 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
12055 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
12056 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
12057 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
12058 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
12059 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
12060 be limited, but in this context it would not.
12063 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
12064 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
12065 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
12066 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
12067 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
12068 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
12069 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
12070 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
12071 the system we have.
12073 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
12075 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
12076 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
12077 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
12078 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
12079 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
12080 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
12081 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
12082 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
12083 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
12085 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
12087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
12088 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
12089 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
12090 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
12091 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
12092 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
12093 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
12094 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
12095 <quote>limited,
</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
12096 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
12099 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
12100 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
12101 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
12102 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
12103 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
12106 <emphasis role='strong'
>Defeat brings depression
</emphasis>. They say
12107 it is a sign of health when depression gives way to anger. My anger
12108 came quickly, but it didn't cure the depression. This anger was of two
12111 <indexterm><primary>originalism
</primary></indexterm>
12113 It was first anger with the five
<quote>Conservatives.
</quote> It would have been
12114 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
12115 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
12116 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
12117 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
12118 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
12119 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is
<quote>originalism
</quote>—to
12120 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
12121 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
12122 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other
<quote>originalist
</quote> rulings. Where was their
12123 <quote>originalism
</quote> now?
12126 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
12127 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
12128 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
12129 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
12131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
12132 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
12133 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
12134 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
12135 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
12136 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
12137 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
12141 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
12143 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
12146 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12148 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
12149 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
12150 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
12151 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
12152 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
12153 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
12154 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
12155 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
12156 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
12159 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
12160 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
12161 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
12162 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
12163 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
12164 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
12165 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
12166 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
12167 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
12168 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
12169 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
12170 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
12171 effort to persuade; but I
12172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
12173 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
12174 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
12175 should decide the issue.
12177 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12178 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
12180 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
12181 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12185 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12186 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12187 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12188 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12191 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12192 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12193 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12194 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12197 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12199 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12200 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12201 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
12202 case was a mistake.
<quote>The Court is not ready,
</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
12203 issue should not be raised until it is.
12206 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12207 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12208 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12209 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12210 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12211 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12212 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
12215 <emphasis role='strong'
>While the reaction
</emphasis> to the Sonny
12216 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the
12217 Court's decision was mixed. No one, at least in the press, tried to
12218 say that extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won
12219 that battle over ideas. Where
12221 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12222 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12223 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12224 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12225 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12226 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12230 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12231 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12232 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12233 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12234 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12235 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12239 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12240 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12241 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12242 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The
<quote>powerful and wealthy
</quote> line is a bit
12243 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12244 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12246 <figure id=
"fig-18">
12247 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
12248 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
12249 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12252 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12253 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That
<quote>grand experiment
</quote> we call the
12254 <quote>public domain
</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think,
<quote>Honey,
12255 I shrunk the Constitution.
</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12256 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12257 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12258 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12260 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12262 <chapter label=
"14" id=
"eldred-ii">
12263 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
12265 <emphasis role='strong'
>The day
</emphasis>
12266 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I
12267 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
12268 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was denied
—meaning the case was
12269 really finally over
—fate would have it that I was giving a
12270 speech to technologists at Disney World.) This was a particularly
12271 long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city from
12272 Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my computer and
12273 wrote an op-ed piece.
12275 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12277 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12278 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12279 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12280 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12281 Justice Kennedy:
<quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12282 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12283 that.
</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12284 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12287 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12288 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12289 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12290 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12291 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12292 the work passed into the public domain.
12295 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12296 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12297 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12300 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12301 is either the
<quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act
</quote> or the
<quote>Copyright
12302 Term Deregulation Act.
</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12303 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12304 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12305 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
12306 everything else, let the content go.
12308 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12310 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12311 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12312 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12313 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12314 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12315 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12316 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12317 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12318 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12319 the stupid harm of the present system.
12322 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12323 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12324 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12325 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12326 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12327 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12328 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12329 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12330 where copyright owners could be identified.
12332 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12333 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12336 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
12337 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12338 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12339 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12341 <indexterm><primary>German copyright law
</primary></indexterm>
12342 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12343 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12344 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12345 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
12346 every text of the Convention has provided that
<quote>the enjoyment and the
12347 exercise
</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention
<quote>shall not be subject
12348 to any formality.
</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12349 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12350 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12351 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12352 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12353 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12354 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12355 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12356 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12357 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
12358 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12359 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
12360 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a
<quote>natural right.
</quote> Natural
12361 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12362 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12363 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12364 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12365 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12368 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12369 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12370 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12371 <quote>Walt Disney creativity
</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12372 know what's protected and what's not.
12374 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12376 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12377 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12378 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12379 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12380 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12381 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12382 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
12383 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12386 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12387 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12388 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12389 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12390 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12391 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12394 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12395 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12396 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12397 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12399 imposed upon creators.
12402 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12403 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12405 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12406 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12407 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12408 the government. He has a property right over the table
<quote>naturally,
</quote>
12409 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12410 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12414 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12415 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12416 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12417 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12418 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12419 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12423 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12424 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12425 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12426 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12427 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12428 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12429 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12430 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12431 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12432 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12433 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12434 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12435 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12436 system of protection for property generally.
12439 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12440 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12441 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12442 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12443 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12444 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12445 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12446 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12448 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12449 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12450 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12451 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12454 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12455 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12456 didn't
<quote>get.
</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12457 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12458 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be,
<quote>short,
</quote> then this
12459 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12460 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12461 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12464 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12465 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12466 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12467 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12468 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12469 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12470 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12473 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12474 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12475 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12476 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12477 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12480 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12481 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12482 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12483 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12484 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12487 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12488 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12489 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12493 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12494 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12495 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12498 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12499 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12500 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12501 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12502 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12503 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12504 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12505 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12506 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12507 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12509 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12511 <emphasis role='strong'
>When Steve Forbes
</emphasis> endorsed the
12512 idea, some in Washington began to pay attention. Many people contacted
12513 me pointing to representatives who might be willing to introduce the
12514 Eldred Act. And I had a few who directly suggested that they might be
12515 willing to take the first step.
12517 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12519 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12520 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12521 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12522 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12523 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog,
<quote>we are
12524 close.
</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12525 something good might happen here.
12528 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12529 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12530 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12531 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12532 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12533 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12536 The MPAA argued first that Congress had
<quote>firmly rejected the central
12537 concept in the proposed bill
</quote>—that copyrights be renewed. That
12538 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's
<quote>firm rejection
</quote> had occurred
12539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12540 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12541 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12542 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12543 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12544 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12545 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12546 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12547 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12548 argued that the bill would impose
<quote>enormous
</quote> costs, since a
12549 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12550 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12551 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12552 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12553 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12554 film is a valid derivative use.
12557 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12558 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12559 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12560 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12561 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12562 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12565 <emphasis role='strong'
>At the beginning
</emphasis> of this book, I
12566 told two stories about the law reacting to changes in technology. In
12567 the one, common sense prevailed. In the other, common sense was
12568 delayed. The difference between the two stories was the power of the
12569 opposition
—the power of the side that fought to defend the
12570 status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
12571 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
12572 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
12575 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12576 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12577 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12578 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12584 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12585 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12586 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12587 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12588 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12589 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12590 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12591 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12592 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12594 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12596 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12597 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12598 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12599 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12600 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12601 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the
<quote>Dark
12602 Content
</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12603 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12606 What does this industry really want?
12609 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12610 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12611 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12612 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12613 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12614 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12615 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12616 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12620 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12621 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12622 its aim not the protection of
<quote>property
</quote> but the rejection of a
12623 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12624 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12628 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12629 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12632 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12633 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12634 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12635 and to share its own creation.
12637 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12638 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12640 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12641 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12642 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12643 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12644 block the progress of others.
12647 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12648 <quote>property
</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12649 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12650 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing
<quote>permission
12651 society.
</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12652 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12653 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12658 <chapter label=
"15" id=
"c-conclusion">
12659 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12660 <indexterm id=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'
><primary>antiretroviral drugs
</primary></indexterm>
12661 <indexterm id=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'
><primary>HIV/AIDS therapies
</primary></indexterm>
12662 <indexterm id=
"idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'
><primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in
</primary></indexterm>
12664 <emphasis role='strong'
>There are more
</emphasis> than
35 million
12665 people with the AIDS virus worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live
12666 in sub-Saharan Africa. Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen
12667 million Africans is proportional percentage-wise to seven million
12668 Americans. More importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12671 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12672 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12673 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12674 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12675 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12676 the disease almost invisible.
12679 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12680 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12681 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12682 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12684 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12685 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12686 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
<quote>Final Report: Integrating
12687 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy
</quote> (London,
2002),
12689 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12691 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12692 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12697 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12698 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12699 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12700 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12701 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12702 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12705 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12706 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12707 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12708 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12709 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12710 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12711 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12712 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12716 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12717 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12718 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12719 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12720 costs significantly below the market price.
12723 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12724 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12725 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12726 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12727 Africa from India. This is called
<quote>parallel importation,
</quote> and it is
12728 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12729 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12732 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12733 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12734 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12735 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12739 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12740 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12741 characterized it,
<quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12742 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12743 imports.
</quote><footnote><para>
12745 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12746 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12747 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12748 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12749 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12750 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12751 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12752 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12753 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12756 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12757 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12758 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12759 possible trade sanctions.
12760 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12761 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12762 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12763 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12764 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12765 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12766 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12767 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12768 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12769 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12770 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12772 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12773 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12774 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12775 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12778 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12779 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12780 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12781 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12782 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12783 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12784 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12785 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12788 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12789 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12790 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12791 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12792 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12793 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12796 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12797 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12798 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12799 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12800 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12801 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12805 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12806 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12809 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12811 See Sabin Russell,
<quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12812 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12813 May
1999, A1, available at
12814 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12815 (
<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12816 system of intellectual property protection
</quote>); Robert Weissman,
<quote>AIDS
12817 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12818 Medicines,
</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12819 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12820 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson,
<quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12821 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12822 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,
</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12823 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12826 It was because
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> would be violated that these
12827 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12828 importance of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> that led these government actors
12829 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12832 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12833 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12834 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12835 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12836 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the
<quote>sanctity
</quote> of an
12837 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12838 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12839 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12842 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12843 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12844 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12845 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12846 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12847 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12850 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12851 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12852 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12853 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12854 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12855 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12858 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12859 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12860 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask,
<quote>How
12861 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12862 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?
</quote> Because there is no
<quote>sound
12863 bite
</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12864 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12865 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12867 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12868 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12869 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12870 idea called
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote>
12873 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12874 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12875 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12876 What is the argument?
12879 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12880 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12881 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12882 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12883 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12884 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12885 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12886 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12887 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12888 were balanced in just this sense.
12891 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12892 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12893 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12894 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12895 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12896 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12898 <indexterm startref=
"idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'
/>
12899 <indexterm startref=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'
/>
12900 <indexterm startref=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'
/>
12902 <emphasis role='strong'
>A simple idea
</emphasis> blinds us, and under
12903 the cover of darkness, much happens that most of us would reject if
12904 any of us looked. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in
12905 ideas that we don't even notice how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a
12906 people who are dying without them. So uncritically do we accept the
12907 idea of property in culture that we don't even question when the
12908 control of that property removes our
12909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12910 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12911 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12912 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12913 this common sense open its eyes.
12916 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12917 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12918 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12919 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12920 to fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12921 the idea of
<quote>creative property,
</quote> while transforming real creators into
12922 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12923 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12924 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12925 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12926 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12927 produce the
<quote>perfect storm
</quote> for free culture.
12929 <indexterm><primary>public domain
</primary><secondary>public projects in
</secondary></indexterm>
12930 <indexterm><primary>single nucleotied polymorphisms (SNPs)
</primary></indexterm>
12931 <indexterm><primary>Wellcome Trust
</primary></indexterm>
12932 <indexterm><primary>World Wide Web
</primary></indexterm>
12933 <indexterm><primary>Global Positioning System
</primary></indexterm>
12934 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
12935 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'
><primary>biomedical research
</primary></indexterm>
12937 <emphasis role='strong'
>In August
2003</emphasis>, a fight broke out
12938 in the United States about a decision by the World Intellectual
12939 Property Organization to cancel a meeting.
<footnote><para>
12940 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12941 August
2003, E1, available at
12942 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New,
<quote>Global Group's
12943 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12944 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12945 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New,
<quote>U.S. Official
12946 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12947 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12948 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12950 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12951 a meeting to discuss
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12952 goods.
</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12953 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12954 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12955 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12956 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12957 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12958 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12959 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12960 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12961 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12962 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12964 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12965 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12966 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12967 in the early
1980s. And it included
<quote>open source and free software.
</quote>
12968 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12969 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12970 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12972 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'
/>
12974 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12975 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12976 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12977 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12978 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12981 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12982 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12985 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12986 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12987 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12988 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12992 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12993 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12994 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12995 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12996 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12997 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12998 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12999 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
13000 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
13001 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
13002 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
13003 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
13004 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
13005 talk about an
<quote>Information Society
</quote> unless one also talked about the
13006 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
13007 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
13008 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
13010 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
13011 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
13012 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
13013 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
13016 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
13017 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
13018 thus the meeting about
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create
13019 public goods
</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
13021 <indexterm><primary>Apple Corporation
</primary></indexterm>
13023 But there is one project within that list that is highly
13024 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is
<quote>open source
13025 and free software.
</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
13026 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
13027 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
13028 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
13029 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
13030 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
13031 rather than
<quote>proprietary software,
</quote> for their own internal uses.
13033 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft
</quote> licenses
</primary></indexterm>
13034 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13035 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13036 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13038 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
13039 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
13040 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
13041 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
13042 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
13043 operating system, the most famous bit of
<quote>free software
</quote>—and IBM
13044 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support
<quote>open source and
13045 free software
</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
13046 to support a mode of software development that is different from
13047 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
13049 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
13050 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
13051 <quote>open source
</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
13052 principal opposition is to
<quote>free software
</quote> licensed under a
<quote>copyleft
</quote>
13053 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
13054 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith,
<quote>The Future
13055 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,
</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
13056 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
13057 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
13058 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
13059 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
13060 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
13061 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
13062 May
2001), available at
13063 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
13066 <indexterm><primary>General Public License (GPL)
</primary></indexterm>
13067 <indexterm><primary>GPL (General Public License)
</primary></indexterm>
13069 More important for our purposes, to support
<quote>open source and free
13070 software
</quote> is not to oppose copyright.
<quote>Open source and free software
</quote>
13071 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
13072 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
13073 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
13075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
13076 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
13077 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
13078 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
13079 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
13080 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
13081 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
13082 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
13083 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
13084 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
13086 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
13087 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft
</primary><secondary>WIPO meeting opposed by
</secondary></indexterm>
13089 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
13090 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
13091 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
13092 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
13093 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
13094 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
13095 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
13097 Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> available at
<ulink
13098 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
13100 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
13103 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
13104 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
13105 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
13106 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
13107 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
13108 its lobbying efforts.
13110 <indexterm><primary>Boland, Lois
</primary></indexterm>
13112 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
13113 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
13114 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
13115 Office, explained that
<quote>open-source software runs counter to the
13116 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.
</quote>
13117 She is quoted as saying,
<quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
13118 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
13119 goals of WIPO.
</quote>
13122 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
13124 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
13126 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
13127 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
13128 right called
<quote>copyright
</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
13129 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it
<quote>runs counter
</quote> to the mission
13130 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
13131 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
13132 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
13133 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
13135 <indexterm><primary>generic drugs
</primary></indexterm>
13137 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to
<quote>promote
</quote>
13138 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
13139 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
13140 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
13141 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
13142 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
13143 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
13144 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
13145 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
13146 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
13147 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
13149 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
13151 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
13152 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
13153 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
13154 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
13155 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to
<quote>waive
</quote> or
13156 <quote>disclaim
</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
13157 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
13158 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
13159 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
13160 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
13161 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
13163 <indexterm id='idxboland' class='startofrange'
><primary>Boland, Lois
</primary></indexterm>
13165 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
13166 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,
</quote> she's
13167 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
13168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
13169 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
13170 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from
<quote>waiving
</quote> or
13171 <quote>disclaiming
</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
13172 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
13173 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
13177 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
13178 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called
<quote>feudalism.
</quote> Under
13179 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
13180 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
13181 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
13182 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
13183 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
13184 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
13185 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
13188 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13189 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
13191 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13192 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
13194 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
13195 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13197 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13198 choice now is whether that information society will be
13199 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
13203 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13204 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13205 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13206 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13210 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13211 it should be (
<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13212 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
13213 not simply to promote intellectual property rights
</quote>), not as it is. If
13214 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13215 say anything wrong. But in the world
13216 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13217 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13218 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13222 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13223 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13224 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13225 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13226 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13227 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13228 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13229 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13231 <indexterm startref='idxboland' class='endofrange'
/>
13233 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13234 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13235 <quote>goal
</quote> of a government should be
<quote>to promote the right balance
</quote> of
13236 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13237 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism.
<quote>Typical for
13238 an academic,
</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13241 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13242 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13243 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13244 our own country's history).
13247 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13248 government should be to
<quote>seek balance,
</quote> then count me with the silly,
13249 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13250 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13251 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13252 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13253 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13254 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
13255 democracy in the world, become?
13258 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13259 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13260 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13261 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13262 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13263 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
13266 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13268 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
13269 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
13270 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
13272 <emphasis role='strong'
>There are moments
</emphasis> of hope in this
13273 struggle. And moments that surprise. When the FCC was considering
13274 relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby further increase the
13275 concentration in media ownership, an extraordinary bipartisan
13276 coalition formed to fight this change. For perhaps the first time in
13277 history, interests as diverse as the NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org,
13278 William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women for Peace organized to
13279 oppose this change in FCC policy. An astonishing
700,
000 letters were
13280 sent to the FCC, demanding more hearings and a different result.
13283 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13284 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13285 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13286 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13287 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13288 concentration in the media.
13291 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13292 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13293 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13294 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13295 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13298 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13299 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13300 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13301 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13302 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13303 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
13304 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
13306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13308 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13309 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13310 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13311 Americans have a long history of fighting
<quote>big,
</quote> wisely or not. That
13312 we could be motivated to fight
<quote>big
</quote> again is not something new.
13315 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13316 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13317 the idea of
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13318 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13319 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13320 called
<quote>property
</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13323 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13326 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
13328 <emphasis role='strong'
>As I write
</emphasis> these final words, the
13329 news is filled with stories about the RIAA lawsuits against almost
13330 three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
13332 John Borland,
<quote>RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers,
</quote> CNET News.com, September
13334 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
13335 R. La Monica,
<quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,
</quote> CNN/Money,
8 September
13337 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
13338 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty,
<quote>Sued for a Song,
13339 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
13340 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13341 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13342 Defendants,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13343 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
13345 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
13347 Eminem has just been sued for
<quote>sampling
</quote> someone else's
13348 music.
<footnote><para>
13350 Jon Wiederhorn,
<quote>Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,
</quote>
13351 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
13352 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
13354 The story about Bob Dylan
<quote>stealing
</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13355 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
13357 Kenji Hall, Associated Press,
<quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13358 Dylan Songs,
</quote> Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
13359 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
13360 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13362 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
13363 anonymous
—reports
<quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13364 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13365 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13366 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13367 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.
</quote> Congressmen are
13368 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13369 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13370 kids who use a computer to share content.
13372 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
13373 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
13374 <indexterm><primary>BBC
</primary></indexterm>
13375 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in
</primary></indexterm>
13376 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13377 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
13378 <indexterm><primary>United Kingdom
</primary><secondary>public creative archive in
</secondary></indexterm>
13380 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13381 that it will build a
<quote>Creative Archive,
</quote> from which British citizens can
13382 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13383 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,
</quote> BBC press release,
13384 24 August
2003, available at
13385 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13387 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13388 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13389 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13390 country.
<footnote><para>
13392 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,
</quote> Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
13394 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13397 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13398 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13399 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13400 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13401 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13402 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13403 day into the Causbys.
13406 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13407 potential is ever to be realized.
13409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13413 <chapter label=
"16" id=
"c-afterword">
13414 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13417 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13418 <emphasis role='strong'
>At least some
</emphasis> who have read this
13419 far will agree with me that something must be done to change where we
13420 are heading. The balance of this book maps what might be done.
13423 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13424 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13425 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13426 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13429 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13430 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13431 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13432 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13436 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13437 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13438 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13439 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13440 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13444 <section id=
"usnow">
13445 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13447 <emphasis role='strong'
>Common sense
</emphasis> is with the copyright
13448 warriors because the debate so far has been framed at the
13449 extremes
—as a grand either/or: either property or anarchy,
13450 either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is the
13451 choice, then the warriors should win.
13454 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13455 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13456 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—<quote>All Rights
13457 Reserved
</quote>— and those who reject copyright
—<quote>No Rights
13458 Reserved.
</quote> The
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13459 permission before you
<quote>use
</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The
<quote>No
13460 Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13461 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13464 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13465 tilted in the
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13466 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13467 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13471 original design of the Internet was
<quote>no rights reserved.
</quote> Content was
13472 <quote>taken
</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13476 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13477 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13478 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13479 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13480 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13481 architecture made the effective default
<quote>no rights reserved,
</quote> the
13482 future architecture will make the effective default
<quote>all rights
13483 reserved.
</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13484 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13485 content requires permission. The
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> world that defines
13486 the Internet today will become a
<quote>get permission to cut and paste
</quote>
13487 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13490 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13491 <quote>all rights reserved
</quote> nor
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> but
<quote>some rights
13492 reserved
</quote>— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13493 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13494 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13498 <section id=
"examples">
13499 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13500 <indexterm id='browsing' class='startofrange'
><primary>browsing
</primary></indexterm>
13502 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13503 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13504 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13505 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13506 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13507 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13508 to your neighbors or boss. The
<quote>privacy
</quote> of your browsing habits was
13512 What made it assured?
13514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13516 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13517 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13518 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13519 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13520 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13521 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13522 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13523 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13524 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13525 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13526 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13527 (there is no law protecting
<quote>privacy
</quote> in public places), and in many
13528 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13529 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13531 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13532 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13534 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13535 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13536 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13537 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13538 <quote>recently viewed
</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13539 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13540 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13541 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13544 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13545 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13546 people should have the
<quote>right
</quote> to browse in a library without the
13547 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13548 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13549 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13550 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13553 <indexterm startref='browsing' class='endofrange'
/>
13555 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13556 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13557 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13558 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13561 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg,
<quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13562 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13563 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13565 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13566 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13567 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13568 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13569 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13570 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13571 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13574 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13575 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13576 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13579 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13580 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13581 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13582 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13583 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13584 care much about controlling their software.
13585 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13587 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13589 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13590 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13591 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13592 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13593 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13597 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13598 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13599 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13600 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13601 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13602 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13603 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13604 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13605 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13609 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13610 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13611 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13612 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13613 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13614 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13615 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13618 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13619 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13620 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13621 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13622 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13623 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13624 fundamentally weakened.
13626 <indexterm><primary>Torvalds, Linus
</primary></indexterm>
13628 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13629 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13630 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's
<quote>Linux
</quote>
13631 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13632 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13633 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13636 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13637 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13638 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13639 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13640 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13641 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13642 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13643 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13647 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13648 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13649 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13650 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13651 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13652 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13655 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13656 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13657 scientific journals are produced.
13659 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
13661 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13662 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13663 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13664 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13665 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13666 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13667 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13668 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13669 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13670 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13671 and Westlaw are also free
13672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13673 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13674 Court opinion through their respective services.
13677 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13678 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13679 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13680 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13681 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13682 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13683 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13686 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13687 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13688 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13691 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13692 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13693 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13694 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13695 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13696 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13697 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13698 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13699 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13700 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13703 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13704 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13705 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13706 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13707 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13711 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13712 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13713 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13714 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13716 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13717 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13718 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13719 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13720 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13721 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13722 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13725 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13726 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13727 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13728 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13729 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13730 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13733 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13736 <section id=
"oneidea">
13737 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13738 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13740 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13741 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13743 <indexterm><primary>Stanford University
</primary></indexterm>
13745 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13746 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13747 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13748 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13749 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13750 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13751 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13752 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13753 make this possible.
13756 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13757 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13758 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13759 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13760 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13761 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13762 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13763 human-readable description, and
13764 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13765 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13766 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13767 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13768 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13769 different than the
<quote>All
</quote> or
<quote>No
</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13770 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13771 certain freedoms are given.
13774 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13775 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13776 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13777 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13778 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13779 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (
<quote>share and share
13780 alike
</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13781 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13782 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13785 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13786 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13787 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13788 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13789 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13790 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13791 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13792 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13795 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13797 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13798 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13799 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13800 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13801 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13802 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13804 of content (
<quote>content conducers,
</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13805 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13806 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13809 The aim is not to fight the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13810 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13811 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13812 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13813 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13814 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13815 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13816 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13817 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13818 to begin to build those rules.
13820 <indexterm id='idxbooksfreeonline2' class='startofrange'
><primary>books
</primary><secondary>free on-line releases of
</secondary></indexterm>
13822 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13823 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13824 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13825 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13826 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13829 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13830 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13831 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13832 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13833 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13834 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13835 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13836 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13837 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13838 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13841 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13842 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13843 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13844 was a total success.
13846 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13847 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13849 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13850 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13852 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13853 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13854 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13855 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13856 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13859 <indexterm startref='idxbooksfreeonline2' class='endofrange'
/>
13860 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy
</primary></indexterm>
13861 <indexterm><primary>rap music
</primary></indexterm>
13862 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13864 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13865 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13866 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13867 reasons. Many who use the
<quote>sampling license
</quote> do so because anything
13868 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13869 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13870 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13871 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13872 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13873 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13874 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13875 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not
<quote>allow
</quote>
13876 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13877 high
<footnote><para>
13879 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13880 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13881 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13882 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13883 </para></footnote>),
13884 these artists release into the creative environment content
13885 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13888 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13889 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13890 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13891 you are effectively saying you believe in the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote>
13892 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13893 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13894 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13895 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13896 this notion of
<quote>Some Rights Reserved,
</quote> and gives many the chance to
13900 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13901 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13902 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13903 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13906 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13907 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13910 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13911 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13912 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13913 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13914 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13915 steps are possible.
13918 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13919 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13920 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13921 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13922 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13923 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13924 creativity to spread more easily.
13926 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13928 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13931 <section id=
"themsoon">
13932 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13934 <emphasis role='strong'
>We will
</emphasis> not reclaim a free culture
13935 by individual action alone. It will also take important reforms of
13936 laws. We have a long way to go before the politicians will listen to
13937 these ideas and implement these reforms. But that also means that we
13938 have time to build awareness around the changes that we need.
13941 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13942 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13943 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13947 <section id=
"formalities">
13948 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13950 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13951 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13952 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13953 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13956 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13957 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13958 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13962 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13963 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13964 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13965 default is control, and
<quote>formalities
</quote> are banished.
13971 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13972 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13973 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13974 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13975 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13976 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13977 formalities were getting in the way.
13980 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13981 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13982 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13983 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13984 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13985 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13986 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13987 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13988 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13989 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13992 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13994 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13995 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13996 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13997 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13998 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13999 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
14002 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
14003 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
14004 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
14005 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
14006 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
14007 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
14008 developed by others.
14011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
14013 <section id=
"registration">
14014 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
14016 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
14017 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
14018 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
14019 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
14020 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
14021 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
14022 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
14023 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
14024 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
14025 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
14026 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
14029 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
14030 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
14031 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
14032 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
14033 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
14034 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
14035 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
14038 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
14039 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
14040 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
14041 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
14042 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
14043 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
14044 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
14045 with which registration occurs up.
14048 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
14049 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
14050 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
14051 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
14052 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
14053 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
14054 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
14055 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
14056 formality
—while producing a database
14057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
14058 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
14062 <section id=
"marking">
14063 <title>MARKING
</title>
14065 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
14066 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
14067 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
14068 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
14069 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
14070 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
14071 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
14072 uniformly across all media.
14075 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
14076 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
14077 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
14081 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
14082 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
14083 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
14084 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
14085 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
14086 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
14087 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
14088 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
14091 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
14092 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
14093 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
14094 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
14095 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
14096 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
14098 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
14099 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
14100 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
14102 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be
<quote>use unless someone
14103 complains.
</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
14104 stop using the work in any new
14105 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
14106 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
14107 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
14111 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
14112 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
14113 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
14114 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
14115 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
14117 <indexterm><primary>CDs
</primary><secondary>copyright marking of
</secondary></indexterm>
14119 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
14120 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
14121 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
14122 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
14123 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
14124 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
14125 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
14126 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
14127 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
14128 other important functions.
14131 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
14132 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
14133 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
14134 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
14135 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
14136 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
14139 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
14140 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
14141 make things unclear.
14144 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
14145 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
14146 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
14147 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
14148 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
14149 that assertion at the appropriate time.
14152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
14155 <section id=
"shortterms">
14156 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
14158 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
14159 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
14163 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
14164 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
14165 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
14166 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
14167 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
14168 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
14171 <quote>A Radical Rethink,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
14173 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
14175 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14178 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14179 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
14180 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
14183 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14186 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
14187 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
14188 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
14189 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14190 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14191 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
14195 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
14196 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14197 fuzziness of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and the distinction between
<quote>ideas
</quote> and
14198 <quote>expression.
</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14199 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
14200 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
14201 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
14202 <quote>lawyer-free zone
</quote> makes the complexities of
<quote>fair use
</quote> and
14203 <quote>idea/expression
</quote> less necessary to navigate.
14204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14207 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
14210 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
14211 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14212 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
14213 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
14214 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
14215 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
14216 pension.
<footnote><para>
14218 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14219 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
14221 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
14223 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
14224 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
14229 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
14230 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
14231 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
14232 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
14233 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
14234 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
14235 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
14236 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
14237 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
14238 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14239 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14240 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14241 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14242 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
14245 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
14246 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
14247 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14251 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas
<quote>radical.
</quote> (After all, I
14252 call them
<quote>extremists.
</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14253 than the term under Richard Nixon. How
<quote>radical
</quote> can it be to ask for
14254 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14260 <section id=
"freefairuse">
14261 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
14262 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary></indexterm>
14263 <indexterm><primary>property rights
</primary><secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary></indexterm>
14265 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14266 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14267 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14268 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14269 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14270 the emergence of that new technology.
14273 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
<quote>exclusive
14274 right
</quote> to
<quote>their writings.
</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14275 right to
<quote>their writings
</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14276 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14277 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14278 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14279 though that movie is not
<quote>my writing.
</quote>
14281 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
14283 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
14284 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14285 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
14287 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14288 University Press,
1967),
32.
14290 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14291 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14292 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14296 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14297 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14298 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14299 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
14300 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
14305 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14306 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14307 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14308 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14309 Consider each limitation in turn.
14312 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14313 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14314 sense to protect John
14316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14317 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14318 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14319 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14320 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14321 after the creative work is done.
14322 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
14325 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14326 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14327 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14328 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14329 material. When all
<quote>reuse
</quote> of creative material was within the control
14330 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14331 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14332 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14333 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14334 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14335 the creative process. Smothers it.
14337 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
14339 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14340 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14341 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
14342 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
14343 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14347 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14348 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14349 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14350 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
14353 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14354 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
14355 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
14357 His view is that the law should be written so that
14358 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14361 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14362 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14363 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14364 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14365 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14368 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14369 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14370 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14371 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14372 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14373 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14377 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
14378 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
14380 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14381 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14382 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
14383 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14384 battles around the sharing of music.
14387 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14388 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14389 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14390 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14391 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14392 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14393 innovation on the network.
14396 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14397 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14398 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14399 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14400 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14403 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14404 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14405 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14406 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
14407 four different kinds of sharing:
14409 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14412 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14413 for purchasing CDs.
14417 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14418 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14421 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14423 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14424 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14425 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14429 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14430 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14431 owner plainly endorses.
14434 <indexterm><primary>cassette recording
</primary><secondary>VCRs
</secondary></indexterm>
14435 <indexterm><primary>VCRs
</primary></indexterm>
14437 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14438 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14439 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14440 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14441 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14442 significantly weakened.
14445 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14446 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14447 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14448 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14449 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14453 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14454 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14458 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14459 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14460 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14461 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14462 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14463 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14464 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14465 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14466 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14467 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14470 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14471 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14472 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14474 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14475 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14476 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14477 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14478 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14479 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14480 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14481 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14482 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14484 <indexterm><primary>cell phones, music streamed over
</primary></indexterm>
14486 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14487 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14488 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14489 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14490 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14491 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14492 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14493 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14494 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14495 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14496 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14497 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14498 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14499 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14500 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14501 paying for this content even though
<quote>free
</quote> content is available in the
14502 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14504 See, for example,
<quote>Music Media Watch,
</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14505 April
2002, available at
14506 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14511 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14512 present: It is emphatically temporary. The
<quote>problem
</quote> with file
14513 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14514 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14515 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14516 makers today to be
<quote>solving
</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14517 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14518 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14519 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14520 artists get paid, during
14522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14523 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14524 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14527 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different
<quote>problems
</quote>
14528 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14529 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14530 <quote>problem
</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14531 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14532 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14533 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14534 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14535 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14538 Type C content raises a different
<quote>problem.
</quote> This is content that was,
14539 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14540 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14541 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14542 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14543 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14544 way that returns something to the artist.
14546 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>out of print
</secondary></indexterm>
14547 <indexterm><primary>books
</primary><secondary>resales of
</secondary></indexterm>
14549 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14550 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14551 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14552 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14553 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14554 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14555 from the author's perspective, this
<quote>sharing
</quote> of his content without
14556 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14559 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14560 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14561 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14562 providers would be free, under this rule, to
<quote>share
</quote> that content,
14563 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14564 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14565 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14570 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14571 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14572 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14573 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14574 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14575 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14576 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14580 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14581 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14582 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14583 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14584 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14585 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14586 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14587 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14590 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14591 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14592 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14593 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14594 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14595 delivering and accessing content.
14598 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14599 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14602 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14603 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14604 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14605 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14606 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14607 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14608 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14609 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14613 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14614 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14615 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14616 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14617 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14618 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14620 <indexterm id='idxpromisestokeepfisher' class='startofrange'
><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14622 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14623 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14626 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'
><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary></indexterm>
14627 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14628 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14629 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14630 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14631 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14632 2004), ch.
6, available at
14633 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14634 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14635 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14636 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
<quote>Impose a
14637 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,
</quote> available at
14638 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Who's Holding Back
14639 Broadband?
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14640 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14641 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14643 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14644 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14645 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14646 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14648 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry,
<quote>Getting Copyright Right,
</quote>
14649 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14650 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14651 McCullagh,
<quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,
</quote> CNET News.com,
27 August
14653 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14654 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14655 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14656 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14657 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14658 debate by about a decade. See
14659 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14660 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14661 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14662 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14663 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'
/>
14665 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14666 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14667 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14668 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14669 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14670 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14671 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14672 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14676 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14677 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14678 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14679 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14680 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14681 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14682 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14683 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14684 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14685 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14686 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14687 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14688 controlling access.
14690 <indexterm startref='idxpromisestokeepfisher' class='endofrange'
/>
14691 <indexterm><primary>artists
</primary><secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary></indexterm>
14693 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14694 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14695 the system supports the widest range of
<quote>semiotic democracy
</quote>
14696 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14697 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14698 limits on derivative
14700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14701 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14702 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14703 allowed to do with the content itself.
14705 <indexterm><primary>Apple Corporation
</primary></indexterm>
14706 <indexterm><primary>MusicStore
</primary></indexterm>
14707 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
14708 <indexterm><primary>CDs
</primary><secondary>prices of
</secondary></indexterm>
14710 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14711 <quote>harm
</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14712 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14713 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14714 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14715 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat
<quote>free
</quote> by being
14716 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14717 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14718 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14719 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14720 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14721 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14724 <indexterm><primary>cable television
</primary></indexterm>
14725 <indexterm><primary>television
</primary><secondary>cable vs. broadcast
</secondary></indexterm>
14726 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
14727 <indexterm><primary>piracy
</primary><secondary>in Asia
</secondary></indexterm>
14728 <indexterm><primary>film industry
</primary><secondary>luxury theatres vs. video piracy in
</secondary></indexterm>
14730 This competition has already occurred against the background of
<quote>free
</quote>
14731 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14732 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14733 that, there is nothing impossible at all about
<quote>competing with free.
</quote>
14734 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14735 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14736 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14737 theaters are often luxurious
—with
<quote>first class
</quote> seats, and meals
14738 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14739 finding ways to compete with
<quote>free.
</quote>
14742 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14743 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14744 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14745 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14746 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14747 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14751 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14756 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14757 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14758 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14759 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14763 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14766 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14769 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14773 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14774 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14779 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14780 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14784 But what if
<quote>piracy
</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14785 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14786 consumers continue to
<quote>take
</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14790 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14791 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14792 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14793 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14794 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14795 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14796 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14797 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14798 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14799 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14800 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14804 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14805 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14806 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14809 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14810 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14814 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14815 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14817 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14818 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14819 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14820 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14823 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14824 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14825 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14826 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14827 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14828 strong view queers the law.
14830 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, Melville
</primary></indexterm>
14831 <indexterm><primary>Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) (
1998)
</primary><secondary>Supreme Court challenge of
</secondary></indexterm>
14833 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14834 <quote>radical
</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14835 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14836 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14837 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14838 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14839 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14840 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14842 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Copyright's First Amendment
</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14843 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14848 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14849 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14850 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14853 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14854 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14855 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14856 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14858 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14859 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14860 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14861 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14862 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14863 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14864 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14865 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14866 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14867 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?
</quote> working paper, June
2003,
14869 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14870 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14871 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14872 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14873 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14874 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14876 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14877 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14882 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14883 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14884 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14885 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14886 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14887 practically never be done.
14890 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14891 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14892 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14893 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14894 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14895 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14896 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14897 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14900 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14901 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14902 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14903 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14904 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14905 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14908 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14909 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14910 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14913 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid
</primary></indexterm>
14915 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14916 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14917 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14918 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14919 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14920 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14921 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14924 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14925 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311-->
14928 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14929 simple pragmatic question:
<quote>Will it do good?
</quote> When challenged about
14930 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers,
<quote>Why not?
</quote>
14933 We should ask,
<quote>Why?
</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14934 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14935 keep your lawyers away.
14937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14941 <chapter label=
"17" id=
"c-notes">
14942 <title>NOTES
</title>
14944 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14945 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14946 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14947 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14948 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14949 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14950 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14951 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14952 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14956 <!-- insert endnotes here -->
14957 <?latex \theendnotes
?>
14959 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14962 <chapter label=
"18" id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14963 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14965 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14966 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14967 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14968 to him that this book is dedicated.
14970 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
14972 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14973 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14974 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14975 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14976 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14977 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14978 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14979 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14980 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14981 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14982 critical eye on much of this.
14985 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14986 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14987 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14988 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14989 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14990 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14991 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14992 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14993 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14996 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14997 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14998 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14999 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
15000 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
15001 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
15002 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
15003 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
15004 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
15005 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
15006 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
15007 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
15008 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
15009 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
15010 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams,
<quote>Wink,
</quote> Roger Wood,
<quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,
</quote>
15011 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
15012 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
15013 a bunch of great replies.)
15016 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
15017 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
15018 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
15019 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
15020 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
15021 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
15022 throughout this book.
15025 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
15026 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
15027 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
15028 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
15030 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->