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17 <title>Free Culture
</title>
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
24 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
26 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
30 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
35 <!-- <subjectset> and cover <mediaobject> Based on example from
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38 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
67 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.png" contentdepth=
"3em" width=
"100%" align=
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70 <imagedata fileref=
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"100%" align=
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73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
79 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
91 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's
<quote>e.biz
25,
</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's
<quote>50 visionaries.
</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
109 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
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127 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
130 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
132 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
136 <dedication id=
"salespoints">
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
141 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
143 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
</ulink></para></listitem>
144 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin
</ulink></para></listitem>
145 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id=
"alsobylessig">
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <dedication id=
"frontpublisher">
166 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
170 <dedication id=
"frontbookinfo">
177 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
178 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
179 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
189 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
193 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
196 Excerpt from an editorial titled
<quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,
</quote>
197 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
198 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
201 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
202 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
205 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
206 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
209 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
213 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
214 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
223 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
227 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
230 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
236 343.7309'
9—dc22
239 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
242 Printed in the United States of America
248 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
256 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
257 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
258 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
259 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
260 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
261 the above publisher of this book.
264 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
265 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
266 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
267 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
268 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
269 author's rights is appreciated.
273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
274 <dedication><title></title>
276 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
284 <title>List of figures
</title>
291 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
292 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
293 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
294 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
299 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
303 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
304 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
305 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
306 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
307 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
308 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
312 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
313 2 Architecture and Law: Force
314 2 Market: Concentration
317 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
318 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
319 2 Constraining Creators
320 2 Constraining Innovators
321 2 Corrupting Citizens
323 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
324 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
328 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
329 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
331 2 1. More Formalities
332 3 Registration and Renewal
335 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
336 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
337 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
343 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
345 <preface id=
"preface">
346 <title>PREFACE
</title>
347 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
348 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
351 <emphasis role=
"bold">At the end
</emphasis> of his review of my first
352 book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David
353 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
354 computer-related texts, wrote this:
358 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
359 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
360 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
361 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
362 David Pogue,
<quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
367 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
368 software, or
<quote>code,
</quote> functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
369 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
370 could always
<quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome
</quote>-like simply flip a
371 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
372 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
373 <quote>affect
</quote> us anymore.
376 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
377 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
378 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
379 causes even after the modem is turned
381 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
382 on-line have fundamentally affected
<quote>people who aren't online.
</quote> There
383 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
385 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
387 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
388 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
389 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
390 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
394 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
395 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of
<quote>free culture
</quote>—not
396 <quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free beer
</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
397 free software movement
<footnote>
399 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
400 </para></footnote>), but
<quote>free
</quote> as in
<quote>free speech,
</quote> <quote>free markets,
</quote>
401 <quote>free trade,
</quote> <quote>free enterprise,
</quote> <quote>free will,
</quote> and
<quote>free elections.
</quote> A
402 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
403 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
404 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
405 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
406 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
407 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
408 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
409 <quote>permission culture
</quote>—a culture in which creators get to create
410 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
414 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not
<quote>we
</quote>
415 on the Left or
<quote>you
</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
416 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
417 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
418 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
419 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
420 culture deem fundamental.
422 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
424 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
425 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
426 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
427 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
428 As William Safire described marching
<quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
429 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
430 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,
</quote> he formulated perhaps
431 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
433 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
437 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
438 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
439 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
440 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
441 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
442 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
443 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
448 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
449 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
450 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
451 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
452 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
453 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
454 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
455 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
456 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
457 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
458 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
459 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
460 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
461 that this work is
<quote>merely
</quote> derivative.
464 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
465 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
466 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
467 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
468 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
469 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
470 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
471 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
474 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
475 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
476 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
477 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
478 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
482 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
483 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
484 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
485 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
486 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
487 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
488 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
493 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
496 <chapter label=
"0" id=
"c-introduction">
497 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
498 <indexterm id='idxairtraffic' class='startofrange'
>
499 <primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.
</primary>
501 <indexterm id='idxlandownership' class='startofrange'
>
502 <primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary>
504 <indexterm id='idxproprigtair' class='startofrange'
>
505 <primary>property rights
</primary>
506 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
508 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
510 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
511 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
512 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
513 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
514 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
515 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
518 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
519 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
520 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
521 and all the space above, to
<quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.
</quote><footnote><para>
522 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
523 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
526 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
527 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
528 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
531 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
532 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
533 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
534 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
535 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
536 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
537 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
539 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
540 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
542 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
543 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
544 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
545 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
546 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
547 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
548 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to
<quote>an indefinite
549 extent, upwards,
</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
550 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
552 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
553 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
555 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
556 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
557 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
558 <quote>taking
</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
559 that
<quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
560 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.
</quote> But Justice Douglas
561 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
562 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
566 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
567 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
568 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
569 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
570 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
571 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
572 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
573 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
575 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
576 that there could be a
<quote>taking
</quote> if the government's use of its land
577 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
578 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece,
<quote>(Intellectual)
579 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
580 Authorship,
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
581 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
583 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
584 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
589 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.
</quote>
592 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
593 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
594 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
596 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line:
<quote>Common sense revolts
597 at the idea.
</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
598 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
599 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
600 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
602 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
603 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
604 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
606 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
607 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
608 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
609 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
610 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
611 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
612 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
613 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
614 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by
<quote>what
615 seemed reasonable
</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
616 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
617 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
618 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
619 end, the force of what seems
<quote>obvious
</quote> to everyone else
—the power of
620 <quote>common sense
</quote>—would prevail. Their
<quote>private interest
</quote> would not be
621 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
623 <indexterm startref='idxproprigtair' class='endofrange'
/>
624 <indexterm startref='idxlandownership' class='endofrange'
/>
625 <indexterm startref='idxairtraffic' class='endofrange'
/>
626 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwin' class='startofrange'
>
627 <primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary>
630 <emphasis role='strong'
>Edwin Howard Armstrong
</emphasis> is one of America's forgotten inventor
631 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
632 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
633 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
634 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
635 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
636 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
637 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
638 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
639 understanding of radio.
640 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
641 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
642 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
643 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
646 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
647 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
648 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
649 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
650 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
651 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
652 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
653 much less transmitter power and static.
656 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
657 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
658 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
659 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
660 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
661 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
662 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
663 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
664 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.
</quote>
667 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
671 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
672 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
673 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
674 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
675 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
676 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio
<quote>music
677 box.
</quote><footnote><para>
678 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
679 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
684 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
685 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
686 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
687 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
688 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
689 a handful of networks.
693 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
694 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
695 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
696 that removed static from
<quote>radio.
</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
697 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
698 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
702 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
703 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
704 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
705 RCA.
<footnote><para> See
<quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
706 Electronic Era,
</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
707 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
709 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
714 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
715 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
716 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
718 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
722 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
723 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
724 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
725 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
726 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
727 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
732 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
733 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
734 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
735 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
736 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
737 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
738 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
739 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
740 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
741 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
742 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
747 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
748 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
749 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
750 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
755 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
757 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
758 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
759 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
760 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
761 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
762 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
763 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
767 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
768 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
769 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
770 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
771 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
772 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
773 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
774 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
775 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
776 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
778 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwin' class='endofrange'
/>
780 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
781 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
782 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
783 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
784 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
785 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
786 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
787 course always public spirited; the reality is something
788 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
789 to themselves, would crumble in
791 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
792 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
793 effect of technological change.
796 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
797 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
798 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
799 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
800 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
801 before.
<footnote><para>
802 Amanda Lenhart,
<quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
803 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,
</quote> Pew Internet and American
804 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
805 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
807 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
811 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
812 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
813 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
814 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
815 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
816 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
817 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
818 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
819 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
822 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
823 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
824 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
825 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
826 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
827 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
831 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
832 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
833 regulation of each. By
<quote>commercial culture
</quote> I mean that part of our
834 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
835 <quote>noncommercial culture
</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
838 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
839 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his
<quote>Reader,
</quote> or
840 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
841 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
842 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
845 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
846 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
847 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
848 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
849 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
850 left this culture
<quote>free.
</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
851 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
852 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
853 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
856 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
857 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
858 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
859 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
860 marketplace.
<footnote>
862 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
863 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
864 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
865 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
866 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
867 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
868 D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote> Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
870 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
872 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
873 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
874 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
875 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
878 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
879 been erased.
<footnote><para>
880 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
882 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
884 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
885 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
886 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
887 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
888 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
889 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
890 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
891 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
892 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
893 culture, more and more a permission culture.
895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
897 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
898 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
899 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
900 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
901 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
902 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
903 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
904 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
905 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
906 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
910 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
911 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
912 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
913 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
914 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
915 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
916 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
917 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
918 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
919 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
920 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
921 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
922 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
923 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
924 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
925 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
926 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
929 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
930 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
931 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
932 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
933 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
934 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
938 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
940 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
941 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether
<quote>piracy
</quote> will
942 be permitted, and whether
<quote>property
</quote> will be protected. The
<quote>war
</quote> that
943 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
944 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
945 calls his
<quote>own terrorist war
</quote><footnote><para>
946 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
947 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,
</quote> <citetitle>New York
948 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
949 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
950 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
951 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
955 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
956 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
957 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
958 <quote>creative property.
</quote> I believe that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that the
959 law, properly tuned, should punish
<quote>piracy,
</quote> whether on or off the
963 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
964 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
965 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet
<quote>pirates
</quote> will also rid our
966 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
969 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
970 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
971 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
972 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
973 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
975 Neil W. Netanel,
<quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
976 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
977 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
979 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
980 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
981 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
982 could cultivate and extend our culture.
985 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
986 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
987 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
988 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
989 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
990 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
991 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
992 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
993 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
997 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
998 <quote>centrality of technology
</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
999 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
1000 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
1001 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
1002 against an industry.
1005 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
1006 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
1007 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
1008 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
1009 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
1010 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
1011 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
1013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1016 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about
<quote>property.
</quote> The
1017 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1018 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1019 this
<quote>property
</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1020 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1021 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1022 of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1023 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1024 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1025 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1026 <quote>trespassing
</quote> upon legitimate claims of
<quote>property.
</quote> It is as plain to
1027 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1030 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1031 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1032 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers
</primary></indexterm>
1034 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1035 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1036 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1037 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1039 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1040 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1044 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1045 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1046 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1047 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1048 our
<quote>culture
</quote> was as
<quote>owned
</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1049 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1050 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1051 accepted as it is now.
1054 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1055 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1056 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1057 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1060 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1061 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1064 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1065 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1066 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1067 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1068 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1071 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1072 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1073 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1074 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1077 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1078 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1080 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1081 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1082 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1083 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of
<quote>intellectual
1084 property.
</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1085 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1086 this silliness will be much more profound.
1087 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1090 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas:
<quote>piracy
</quote> and
1091 <quote>property.
</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1095 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1096 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1097 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1098 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1099 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1100 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1103 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1104 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1105 government, pushed by big media to respond to this
<quote>something new,
</quote> is
1106 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1107 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let
<quote>common
1108 sense
</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1109 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1110 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1111 fundamental about who we have always been.
1114 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1115 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1116 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1117 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1118 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1119 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1122 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1123 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1124 <title><quote>PIRACY
</quote></title>
1126 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1127 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1128 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1131 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1132 been a war against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1133 <quote>piracy,
</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1134 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1135 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1139 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1140 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1141 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1143 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1146 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1149 Today we are in the middle of another
<quote>war
</quote> against
<quote>piracy.
</quote> The
1150 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1151 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1152 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1153 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1154 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1155 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1158 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1159 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1160 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1161 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1162 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will
<quote>rob the author of the
1166 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1167 increasingly to technology to defend their
<quote>property
</quote> against this
1168 <quote>piracy.
</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1169 raised to believe that
<quote>property
</quote> should be
<quote>free.
</quote> Forget tattoos,
1170 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1171 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1174 There's no doubt that
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1175 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1176 notion of
<quote>piracy
</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1177 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1180 The idea goes something like this:
1184 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1185 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1186 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1187 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1188 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1192 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1194 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1195 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1196 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1198 See Rochelle Dreyfuss,
<quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1199 in the Pepsi Generation,
</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1201 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1202 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1203 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1204 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1206 Lisa Bannon,
<quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1207 Up,
</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1208 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1209 Zittrain,
<quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1210 Speech, No One Wins,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1211 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1213 There was
<quote>value
</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1214 <quote>right
</quote>—even against the Girl Scouts.
1216 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1218 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1219 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1221 of law protecting creative property. But the
<quote>if value, then right
</quote>
1222 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1223 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1226 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1227 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1228 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1229 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1230 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1233 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1234 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1235 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1236 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1237 copyright law today regulates both.
1240 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1241 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1242 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1243 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1244 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1245 more expense of doing business.
1247 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1248 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1250 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1251 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1252 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1253 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1254 <quote>copying,
</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1255 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1256 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1257 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1258 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1259 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1260 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1261 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1262 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1263 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1264 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1266 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the
<quote>Rise of the Creative
1267 Class.
</quote><footnote>
1270 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York:
1271 Basic Books,
2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1272 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1273 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1274 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1275 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1276 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1278 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1279 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1281 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1282 this creative class.
1285 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1286 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1287 context the current battles about behavior labeled
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
1291 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1292 <chapter label=
"1" id=
"creators">
1293 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1294 <indexterm id=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'
>
1295 <primary>animated cartoons
</primary>
1298 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1299 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1300 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1301 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1302 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1305 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1306 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1307 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1308 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1309 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1310 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1314 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1315 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1316 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1317 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1321 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1322 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1323 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1324 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1325 synchronization was pretty close.
1328 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1329 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1330 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1331 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1332 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1334 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1335 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1340 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1341 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly:
<quote>I have never been so thrilled
1342 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.
</quote>
1343 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1346 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1347 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1348 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1349 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1350 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1351 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1352 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1355 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1356 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1357 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1358 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1361 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1362 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1363 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1364 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1365 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1366 and among the best of its genre.
1369 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1372 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1373 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1375 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1376 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1377 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1378 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>:
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote> <quote>The
1379 Simpleton
</quote> (Delille),
<quote>Mischief Makers
</quote> (Carbonara),
<quote>Joyful Hurry No.
1</quote>
1380 (Baron), and
<quote>Gawky Rube
</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song,
<quote>The Turkey in the
1381 Straw,
</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1382 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1384 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1385 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1386 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1387 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song
<quote>Steamboat Bill,
</quote>
1388 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1392 This
<quote>borrowing
</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1393 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1394 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1396 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman,
<quote>The Mouse
1397 that Ate the Public Domain,
</quote> Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1398 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1400 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1401 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1402 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1403 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1404 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1405 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1406 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1407 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1411 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1412 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1413 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1414 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1415 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1416 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1417 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1420 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1421 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1422 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1423 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1424 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1425 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1426 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1427 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1428 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1429 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1430 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1432 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1433 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1434 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1435 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1436 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1437 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1438 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1439 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1441 <indexterm startref=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'
/>
1443 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1444 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1445 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1446 its importance. We could call this
<quote>Disney creativity,
</quote> though that
1447 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely,
<quote>Walt Disney
1448 creativity
</quote>—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1449 culture around us and makes it something different.
1451 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1452 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1453 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1454 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1455 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1457 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1458 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the
<quote>average
</quote> term by
1460 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1461 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1462 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1464 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1465 Web site associated with this book, available at
1466 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1468 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1469 copyright holders of a creative work had an
<quote>exclusive right
</quote> to control
1470 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1471 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1474 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1475 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1476 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a
<quote>lawyer-free
1477 zone.
</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1478 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1479 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1480 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1483 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1484 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1485 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1486 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1489 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1490 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1491 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1492 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1493 content from before the Great Depression.
1496 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on
<quote>Walt Disney creativity.
</quote>
1497 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1498 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1502 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1503 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1504 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1505 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1506 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1507 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1508 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1511 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1512 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1513 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1514 the stories that these
<quote>graphic novels
</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1515 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are
<quote>men in tights.
</quote>
1516 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1517 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1518 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1519 interestingly different way.
1522 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1523 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1524 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1527 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1528 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1529 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1530 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1531 transforming it either subtly or
1532 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1533 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1534 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1535 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1536 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently
<quote>different.
</quote> But they
1537 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1538 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1539 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1542 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1543 huge. More than
33,
000 <quote>circles
</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1544 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1545 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1546 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1547 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1548 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1549 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1550 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1553 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1554 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1555 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1556 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1557 one. Doujinshi are plainly
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> There is no general
1558 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1559 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1560 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1561 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that
<quote>taking
</quote> without
1562 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1563 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1564 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1566 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1567 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1570 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1571 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1572 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me,
<quote>The
1573 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1574 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1576 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1577 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them
</quote>
1578 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1580 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1581 York: Perennial,
2000).
1585 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1586 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1587 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me,
<quote>there are these rules
1588 and you have to stick to them.
</quote> There are things Superman
<quote>cannot
</quote>
1589 do.
<quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1590 which are fifty years old.
</quote>
1592 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1594 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1595 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1596 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1597 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1598 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1599 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1600 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1602 See Salil K. Mehra,
<quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1603 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?
</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1604 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
<quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1605 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1606 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1607 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1608 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1609 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.
</quote>
1613 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1614 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1615 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1616 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1617 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1618 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1619 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1620 a more general pattern of blocking this
<quote>free taking
</quote> by the doujinshi
1624 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1625 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1626 a friend from a major Japanese law firm.
<quote>We don't have enough
1627 lawyers,
</quote> he told me one afternoon. There
<quote>just aren't enough resources
1628 to prosecute cases like this.
</quote>
1631 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1632 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1633 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1634 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1635 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1636 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1637 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1638 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1639 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1640 their clients or hurt them?
1641 Let's pause for a moment.
1644 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1645 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1646 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1649 We live in a world that celebrates
<quote>property.
</quote> I am one of those
1650 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1651 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1652 <quote>intellectual property.
</quote><footnote><para>
1654 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1655 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1656 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1657 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1658 describes a set of
<quote>property
</quote> rights
—copyright, patents,
1659 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1661 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1663 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1664 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1668 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1669 plenty of value out there that
<quote>property
</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1670 mean
<quote>money can't buy you love,
</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1671 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1672 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1673 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1674 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1675 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1676 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1677 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1678 Disney's use would have been considered
<quote>fair.
</quote> There was nothing
1679 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1683 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1684 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1685 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1687 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1688 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1692 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1693 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1694 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1695 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1696 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1697 form, whether large or small.
1700 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1701 say that the copycat comic artists are
<quote>stealing.
</quote> This form of Walt
1702 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1703 particular find it hard to say why.
1706 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1707 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1708 without asking or paying for the privilege. (
<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1709 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1710 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?
</quote>) Acting companies
1711 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1712 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1713 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1714 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1715 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1716 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1717 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1720 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1721 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1722 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1723 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1724 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1725 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1726 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1727 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1731 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1732 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1733 question instead is
<quote><emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?
</quote>
1734 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1735 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1736 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1737 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1738 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1739 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1743 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1744 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1745 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1748 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1750 <chapter label=
"2" id=
"mere-copyists">
1751 <title>CHAPTER TWO:
<quote>Mere Copyists
</quote></title>
1752 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1753 <primary>photography
</primary>
1756 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1757 producing what we would call
<quote>photographs.
</quote> Appropriately enough, they
1758 were called
<quote>daguerreotypes.
</quote> The process was complicated and
1759 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1760 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1761 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1762 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1763 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1766 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1767 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1768 <quote>automatic pictures.
</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1769 making
<quote>negatives.
</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1770 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1771 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1772 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1773 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1775 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1777 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1778 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1781 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1782 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1784 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1785 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1786 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1787 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1788 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1789 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1790 population of photographers.
1793 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1794 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1795 marketed on the basis of its simplicity.
<quote>You press the button and we
1796 do the rest.
</quote><footnote><para>
1798 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1799 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1800 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1804 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1805 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1806 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1807 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1808 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1809 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1810 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1811 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1812 chemicals.
<footnote>
1815 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1817 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1822 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1823 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1824 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1825 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1826 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1827 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1828 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1829 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1830 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1831 percent.
<footnote><para>
1834 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1835 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1837 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1840 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1844 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1845 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1846 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1847 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1848 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes,
<quote>For the
1849 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1850 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1851 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1852 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1853 interpretation or bias.
</quote><footnote><para>
1859 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1860 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1861 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1862 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1863 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1864 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its
<quote>quality
</quote>;
1865 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1866 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1867 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1868 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1872 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1873 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1874 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1875 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1876 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1877 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1878 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1879 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1881 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1882 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1883 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1884 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1889 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1890 familiar. The photographer was
<quote>taking
</quote> something from the person or
1891 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1892 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1893 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1896 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1897 that they thought valuable.
1899 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1901 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1902 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1903 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1904 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1905 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1908 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis,
<quote>The Right to Privacy,
</quote>
1909 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1910 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1911 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1912 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1913 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1914 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1915 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1918 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1919 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1920 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1921 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1922 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1923 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1924 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1925 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1926 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1928 See Melville B. Nimmer,
<quote>The Right of Publicity,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1929 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
<quote>Privacy,
</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1930 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1931 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1936 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1937 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1938 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1939 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1940 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1941 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1942 Kodak would be benefiting from the
<quote>theft
</quote> committed by the
1943 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1944 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1945 from the
<quote>image-right
</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1946 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1947 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1948 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1953 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1954 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1955 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1956 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1957 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1958 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1959 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1960 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1961 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1962 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1963 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1964 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1965 striking images, and the logo
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> in place of the name of a
1966 school. But there's little that's
<quote>just
</quote> cerebral in the projects that
1967 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1968 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1969 film of your VCR. Rather the
<quote>film
</quote> of digital cameras. Just Think!
1970 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1971 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1972 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1973 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1974 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1977 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1978 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1980 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1981 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1982 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it,
<quote>Five years ago, a good
1983 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1984 professional quality for $
595.
</quote><footnote><para>
1986 H. Edward Goldberg,
<quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1987 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,
</quote>
1988 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1989 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1991 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1992 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1993 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1994 learning more and more of something teachers call
<quote>media literacy.
</quote>
1997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1998 <quote>Media literacy,
</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1999 Think!, puts it,
<quote>is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
2000 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
2001 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
2002 the way people access it.
</quote>
2003 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
2006 This may seem like an odd way to think about
<quote>literacy.
</quote> For most
2007 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
2008 and noticing split infinitives are the things that
<quote>literate
</quote> people know
2011 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
2013 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
2014 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
2015 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
2017 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2018 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990);
<quote>Findings on Family and TV
2019 Study,
</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
2021 it is increasingly important to understand the
<quote>grammar
</quote> of media. For
2022 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2023 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2024 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2025 (at least at first) terrible media.
2028 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2029 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2030 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
2031 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2032 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2033 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2034 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2035 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2038 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2039 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2040 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2041 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2042 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2043 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2045 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2047 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2048 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2049 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2052 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2053 about
<quote>the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2054 texture.
</quote><footnote>
2057 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2059 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2060 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2062 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2063 <quote>played
</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2064 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2065 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2066 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2067 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2068 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2069 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2071 See Scott Steinberg,
<quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,
</quote> E!online,
4
2072 November
2000, available at
2073 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>;
<quote>Timeline,
</quote> 22 November
2000,
2075 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2078 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2080 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2081 describes,
<quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2082 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2083 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2084 led.
</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2087 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2088 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2089 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2090 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2094 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2095 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2096 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2097 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2102 <quote>Read-only.
</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2103 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2107 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2108 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2109 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2110 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2113 and this literacy in particular, is to
<quote>empower people to choose the
2114 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2115 express.
</quote><footnote>
2118 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2119 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2120 </para></footnote> It is to enable students
<quote>to communicate in the
2121 language of the twenty-first century.
</quote><footnote><para>
2126 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2128 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2129 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2130 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2131 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2132 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2133 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2134 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2135 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2136 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2137 students know something about
—gun violence.
2140 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2141 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2142 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2143 away. The
<quote>kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,
</quote>
2144 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2145 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2148 Using whatever
<quote>free web stuff they could find,
</quote> and relatively simple
2149 tools to enable the kids to mix
<quote>image, sound, and text,
</quote> Barish said
2150 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2151 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2152 close to the lives of these students. The project
<quote>gave them a tool
2153 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2154 it,
</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2155 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2156 been created using only text.
<quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2157 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2158 gone and done something else,
</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2159 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2160 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2161 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2162 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2167 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?
</quote> I asked. In part,
2168 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2169 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of
<quote>constructing
2170 meaning.
</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2171 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2172 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2173 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2178 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2179 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2180 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2181 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2182 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2183 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2184 you say,
<quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.
</quote>
2185 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2186 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2187 you. [But i]nstead, if you say,
<quote>Well, with all these things that you
2188 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2189 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2190 for me something that reflects that.
</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2191 camera and
… saying,
<quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2192 make a little movie.
</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2193 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2194 about the topic.
…
2197 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2198 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2199 bump up against the fact,
<quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2200 to write something.
</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2201 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2204 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2205 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2206 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2208 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2209 had a lot of power with this language.
2211 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2212 not match with any start quote. -->
2215 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2216 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2217 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2218 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2219 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2220 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2221 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2222 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2223 world would be watching.
2226 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2227 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2228 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was
<quote>balance,
</quote>
2229 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2230 increasingly come to expect it,
<quote>news as entertainment,
</quote> even if the
2231 entertainment is tragedy.
2233 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2234 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2236 But in addition to this produced news about the
<quote>tragedy of September
2237 11,
</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2238 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2239 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2240 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2241 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2242 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2243 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2244 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2245 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2246 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2247 was also the Internet.
2250 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2251 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2252 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2253 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2256 by a student on the
<quote>Just Think!
</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2260 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2261 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2262 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2263 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2264 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2265 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2266 spread practically instantaneously.
2269 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2270 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2271 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2272 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2273 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2274 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2275 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2278 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2279 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2280 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2281 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2282 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2283 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2284 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2285 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2286 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2287 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2288 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2289 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2292 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2293 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2294 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2295 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2296 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2299 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2300 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2303 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2304 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2305 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2306 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2307 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2308 most important account of early
<quote>Democracy in America.
</quote> It wasn't
2309 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2310 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2311 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2312 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2313 deliberated. Members argued about the
<quote>right
</quote> result; they tried to
2314 persuade each other of the
<quote>right
</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2315 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2316 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2318 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2319 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2323 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2324 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2325 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2327 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin,
<quote>Deliberation Day,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2328 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2330 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2331 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2332 place for
<quote>democratic deliberation
</quote> to occur.
2335 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2336 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2337 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2338 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2339 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2340 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2342 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2343 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2344 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2345 little beyond what our friends say.
2348 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2349 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2350 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2351 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2352 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2354 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2355 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2359 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2360 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2361 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2362 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2363 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2364 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2367 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2368 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2369 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2370 is having an effect.
2371 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2374 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2375 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2376 <quote>misspoke
</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2377 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2378 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2379 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2380 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2381 more instances of the same
<quote>misspeaking
</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2382 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2383 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2385 Noah Shachtman,
<quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,
</quote> New
2386 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2388 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2391 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2392 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2393 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2394 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2398 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2399 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2400 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2401 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2402 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2403 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2404 peer-generated rankings.
2406 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2407 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2410 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2412 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2413 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2414 difference is the absence of a financial
<quote>conflict of interest.
</quote> <quote>I think you
2415 have to take the conflict of interest
</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2416 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2417 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2418 get it out of the way.
</quote>
2420 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2422 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2423 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2424 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2425 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2426 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2428 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2430 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2431 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2432 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2433 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2434 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2435 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2436 told her that
<emphasis>they
</emphasis> were writing
<quote>the story.
</quote>)
2438 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2439 debate
—<quote>amateur
</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2440 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2441 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2442 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2443 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2444 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2446 John Schwartz,
<quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2447 Information Online,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2448 D. Kramer,
<quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,
</quote>
2449 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2450 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2452 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2453 <quote>triangulate,
</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2454 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2455 out of it
</quote>—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2458 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2459 with blogs.
<quote>It's going to become an essential skill,
</quote> Winer predicts,
2460 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2461 not clear that
<quote>journalism
</quote> is happy about this
—some journalists
2462 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2465 See Michael Falcone,
<quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?
</quote> <citetitle>New
2466 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. (
<quote>Not all news organizations have
2467 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2468 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2469 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2470 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2471 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2472 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.
</quote>)
2473 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2474 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
2476 But it is clear that we are still in transition.
<quote>A
2478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2479 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,
</quote> Winer told me.
2480 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2481 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2482 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said,
<quote>we will
2483 be the last thing that gets shut down.
</quote>
2486 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because
<quote>you
2487 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.
</quote>
2488 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2489 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2490 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2491 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2492 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2493 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2494 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2495 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2496 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2497 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2498 extraordinary to report.
2500 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2501 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2502 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2504 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'
>
2505 <primary>advertising
</primary>
2508 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2509 His work, as his Web site describes it, is
<quote>human learning and
… the
2510 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation.
</quote>
2513 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2514 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2515 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2516 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2520 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When
<quote>a lot of us grew up,
</quote>
2521 he explains, that tinkering was done
<quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2522 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.
</quote> But digital technologies
2523 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2524 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2525 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2527 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2528 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2529 or
<quote>free collage,
</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2530 the tinkering of many others.
2533 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2534 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2535 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2536 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2537 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2540 This opportunity creates a
<quote>completely new kind of learning platform,
</quote>
2541 as Brown describes.
<quote>As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2542 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2543 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2544 if they can improve it.
</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2545 apprenticeship.
<quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.
</quote>
2548 In this process,
<quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2549 They are code.
</quote> Kids are
<quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2550 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2551 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2552 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2553 you tinker the more you improve.
</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2557 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2558 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2559 it,
<quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2560 intelligence.
</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2561 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2562 text.
<quote>The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2563 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2564 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2565 these multiple forms of intelligence.
</quote>
2567 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'
/>
2568 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2570 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2571 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2574 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2575 kind of recognition.
2578 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2579 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2580 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2581 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2582 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2583 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2584 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2587 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2588 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2589 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2590 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the
<quote>right to
2591 tinker
</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2592 general.
<footnote><para>
2594 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel,
<quote>Technological Access
2595 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,
</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2596 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2598 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2599 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2602 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,
</quote> Brown
2603 explains. We need to
<quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2604 and want to learn.
</quote>
2607 <quote>Yet,
</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2608 evince,
<quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2609 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2610 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2611 system that closes down that part of the brain.
</quote>
2613 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2615 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2616 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2617 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2618 the law to close down that technology.
2621 <quote>No way to run a culture,
</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2622 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2623 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2627 <chapter label=
"3" id=
"catalogs">
2628 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2629 <indexterm><primary>RPI
</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</see></indexterm>
2630 <indexterm id=
"idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'
>
2631 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</primary>
2634 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2635 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2636 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2637 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2638 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2641 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2642 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2643 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2644 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2645 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2646 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2649 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2650 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2651 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2652 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2653 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2656 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2658 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2659 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2660 engines can do this even better. The idea of
<quote>intranet
</quote> search
2661 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2662 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2663 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2664 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2665 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2668 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2669 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2670 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2671 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2672 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2673 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2674 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2677 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2678 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2679 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2680 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2681 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2682 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2683 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2684 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2685 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2689 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2690 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2691 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2692 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2693 be on users' computers.
2696 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2697 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2698 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2699 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2701 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2705 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2706 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2707 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2708 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2709 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2710 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2711 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2712 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2713 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2714 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2715 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2716 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2720 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2721 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2722 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2723 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2724 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2725 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2726 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2729 <quote>It was absurd,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>I don't think I did anything
2730 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2731 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2732 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2733 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2734 easier to use
</quote>—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2735 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2736 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2737 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2738 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2742 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2743 network and had therefore
<quote>willfully
</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2745 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2746 <quote>willful infringement,
</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2747 call
<quote>statutory damages.
</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2748 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2749 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2750 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2753 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2754 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2755 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2756 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2757 huge demands for
<quote>damages
</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2758 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2759 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2760 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2761 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2762 2001.
<footnote><para>
2765 Tim Goral,
<quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2766 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,
</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2767 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2770 <indexterm startref=
"idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'
/>
2772 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2773 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2774 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2775 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2776 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2778 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt
</primary></indexterm>
2780 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2781 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2782 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2783 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2784 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2785 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2786 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse,
<quote>You don't want to pay another
2787 visit to a dentist like me.
</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2788 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2791 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2792 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2793 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2794 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2795 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2796 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2797 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2798 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2801 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2802 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2805 <primary>artists
</primary>
2806 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
2809 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2810 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2811 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2812 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2813 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2814 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2815 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2817 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2818 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2819 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2821 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2822 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2823 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2825 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in
<quote>KaZaA and Punishment,
</quote>
2826 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2830 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2831 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2832 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2837 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2838 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2839 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2840 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2844 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2845 his father told me, Jesse
<quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2846 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2847 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2848 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.
</quote>
2850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2852 <chapter label=
"4" id=
"pirates">
2853 <title>CHAPTER FOUR:
<quote>Pirates
</quote></title>
2855 If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means using the creative property of others without
2856 their permission
—if
<quote>if value, then right
</quote> is true
—then the history of
2857 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2858 <quote>big media
</quote> today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2859 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2860 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2865 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2867 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2868 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2869 which details Edison's
<quote>adventures
</quote> with copyright and patent.
2870 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2872 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2873 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2874 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2875 exercised through a monopoly
<quote>trust,
</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2876 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2877 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2878 this creative property
2879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2880 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2883 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2887 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2888 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2889 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2890 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2891 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2892 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2893 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2896 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2897 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2898 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2899 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2900 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2901 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2902 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2903 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2904 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2905 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2907 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2908 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2909 posted at
<quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2910 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,
</quote> available at
2911 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2912 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2913 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From
2914 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2915 the Propertization of Copyright
</quote> (September
2002), University of
2916 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2917 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2918 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2919 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2920 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2924 The Napsters of those days, the
<quote>independents,
</quote> were companies like
2925 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2926 resisted.
<quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2927 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2928 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.
</quote><footnote><para>
2930 Marc Wanamaker,
<quote>The First Studios,
</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2931 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2933 That led the independents to flee the East
2934 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2935 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2936 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2940 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2941 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2942 patent holder a truly
<quote>limited
</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2945 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2946 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2947 Edison's creative property.
2950 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2951 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2953 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2954 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2956 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2957 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2959 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil
</primary></indexterm>
2961 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2962 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2963 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2964 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2965 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2966 1899 hit
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2967 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2968 right to perform it publicly.
2970 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2972 But what if I wanted to record
<quote>Happy Mose,
</quote> using Edison's phonograph
2973 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2974 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2975 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2976 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2977 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2978 <quote>public performance
</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2979 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2980 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2981 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2982 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2983 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2984 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2985 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2986 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2987 its composer anything.
2989 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
2991 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2992 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2993 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2995 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2999 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3000 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3001 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3002 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3003 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3004 rights.
<footnote><para>
3006 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3007 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
3008 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3009 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
3010 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3011 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3012 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
3017 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3018 people's works were
<quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3019 genius of American composers,
</quote><footnote><para>
3021 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
3022 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3024 and the
<quote>music publishing industry
</quote>
3025 was thereby
<quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.
</quote><footnote><para>
3027 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
3028 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3031 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible,
<quote>When they make money
3032 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3034 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3035 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3039 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3040 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3041 player piano argued that
<quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3042 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3043 of anything he had before their introduction.
</quote> Rather, the machines
3044 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3047 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
3048 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3049 Perforating Company of New York).
3050 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3051 Congress was
<quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3052 they represent, and whose servants they are.
</quote> <quote>All talk about
3053 `theft,'
</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3054 wrote,
<quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3055 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3056 statute.
</quote><footnote><para>
3058 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3059 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3060 Graphophone Company Association).
3062 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3065 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3066 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3067 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the
<quote>mechanical
3068 reproductions
</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3069 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3070 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3071 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3072 recorded once. This is the part of
3074 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3075 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3076 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3077 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3080 American law ordinarily calls this a
<quote>compulsory license,
</quote> but I will
3081 refer to it as a
<quote>statutory license.
</quote> A statutory license is a license
3082 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3083 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3084 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3085 the fee set by the statute.
3088 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3089 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3090 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3091 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3092 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3093 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3095 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3098 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3099 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3100 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3101 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3102 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3103 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3104 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3105 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3106 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3107 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3108 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3109 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3112 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3113 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3114 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3115 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3116 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3118 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3121 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3122 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3123 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3128 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3130 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3131 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3132 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3133 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3134 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3135 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3136 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3137 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3138 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3139 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3140 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3141 choice.
<footnote><para>
3143 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3144 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3145 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3146 this report.
</para></footnote>
3150 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3151 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3154 <section id=
"radio">
3155 <title>Radio
</title>
3156 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'
>
3157 <primary>artists
</primary>
3158 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
3161 Radio was also born of piracy.
3164 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3165 <quote>public performance
</quote> of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3167 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3168 record companies printed
<quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast
</quote> and other
3169 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3170 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3171 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3172 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3173 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3174 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3175 Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3176 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3177 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3179 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3180 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3181 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3184 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3185 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3186 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3187 work. It's one thing to have
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> sung on the radio by the
3188 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3189 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3190 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3191 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3192 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3194 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3199 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3200 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3201 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3202 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3203 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3204 of playing the song.
3206 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3207 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3210 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3211 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3212 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3213 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3216 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3217 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3218 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3219 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3220 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3221 <quote>protected
</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3222 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3225 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3227 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3228 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3229 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3230 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3231 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3232 to take something for nothing.
3234 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'
/>
3236 <section id=
"cabletv">
3237 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3240 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3243 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3244 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3245 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3246 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3248 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3249 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3250 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3253 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3254 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3255 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3257 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3258 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3259 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.
</quote><footnote><para>
3261 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3262 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3263 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3264 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3266 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3268 There may have been a
<quote>public interest
</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3269 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3270 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony,
<quote>Does public
3271 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?
</quote><footnote><para>
3273 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3274 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3276 As another broadcaster put it,
3280 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3281 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3282 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3284 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3285 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3290 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3294 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3295 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3296 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3297 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3299 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3300 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3301 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3305 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3307 These were
<quote>free-ride[rs],
</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3308 Heston said, who were
<quote>depriving actors of
3309 compensation.
</quote><footnote><para>
3311 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3312 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3313 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3318 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3319 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3323 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3324 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3325 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3326 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3329 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3330 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3332 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3333 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3334 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3336 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3340 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3341 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3344 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3345 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they
<quote>pirated.
</quote>
3346 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3347 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3348 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3349 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3350 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3351 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3352 companies thus built their empire in part upon a
<quote>piracy
</quote> of the value
3353 created by broadcasters' content.
3356 These separate stories sing a common theme. If
<quote>piracy
</quote> means
3357 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3358 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3359 today
<footnote><para>
3361 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3362 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3363 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3364 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>.
<quote>The
3365 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3366 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet.
</quote>
3368 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3369 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3370 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3371 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3372 last. Every generation
—until now.
3374 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3377 <chapter label=
"5" id=
"piracy">
3378 <title>CHAPTER FIVE:
<quote>Piracy
</quote></title>
3380 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3381 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3382 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3383 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3384 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3388 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of
<quote>taking
</quote>
3389 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3390 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3391 taking
<quote>piracy,
</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3392 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3393 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3394 has so often done in the past.
3395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3397 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3398 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3399 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3401 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3402 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3403 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3404 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3405 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3407 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3408 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3409 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3410 also Ben Hunt,
<quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3411 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3413 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3414 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3417 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3418 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3419 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3420 This piracy is wrong.
3423 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3424 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3425 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3426 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3427 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3428 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3429 of our existence, treated as right.
3432 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3433 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3434 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3435 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3436 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3437 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3438 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3439 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3440 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3443 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3444 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3445 <beginpage pagenum=
"77"/>
3446 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3447 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3451 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3452 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3453 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3454 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3456 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3457 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The
3458 New Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3459 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3460 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3461 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3462 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3463 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3464 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3465 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3466 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3467 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3468 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3469 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3471 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents
</primary></indexterm>
3472 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3473 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3474 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3475 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3478 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3480 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3481 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3482 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3483 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3484 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3486 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3487 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3488 144–90.
<quote>In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3489 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3490 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3491 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3492 pirating were not an option.
</quote> Ibid.,
149.
3493 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3497 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3498 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3499 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3500 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3501 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3502 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?
</quote>
3503 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3504 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3505 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3506 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3507 piracy of the tangible.
3510 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3511 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3512 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3513 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3514 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3515 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3516 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3517 give people the right to
<quote>take
</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3518 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3520 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3521 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3522 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3523 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3524 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3525 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what
<quote>property
</quote> means.
3527 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
3529 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3530 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese
<quote>steal
</quote>
3531 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3532 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3533 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3534 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3535 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3536 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3537 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3538 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3539 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3540 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3541 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3543 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3544 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3546 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3549 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3550 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3551 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3552 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3553 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3554 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3557 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3558 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3559 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3560 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3561 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3562 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3563 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3564 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3565 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3566 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3567 violating the law is still wrong.
3568 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3569 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3570 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3571 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3574 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3575 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3576 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3577 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3578 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3579 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3580 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3581 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3585 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3586 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is. Or
3587 at least, not all
<quote>piracy
</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3588 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of
<quote>piracy
</quote> are useful
3589 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3590 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3591 <quote>piracy
</quote> in that sense of the term.
3594 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3595 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3596 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3597 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3600 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3601 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3602 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3603 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3606 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3607 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3611 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3612 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3614 The key to the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that
<quote>rob[s]
3615 the author of [his] profit.
</quote><footnote><para>
3617 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3619 This means we must determine whether
3620 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3622 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3623 author of his profit.
3626 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3627 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3628 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3629 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3631 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3632 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3633 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3634 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3635 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3636 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3637 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3638 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3640 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3641 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3642 put together components that had been developed independently.
3643 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3646 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3647 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3648 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3649 system.
<footnote><para>
3651 See Carolyn Lochhead,
<quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,
</quote> <citetitle>San
3652 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1;
<quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,
</quote>
3653 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Napster Names CEO,
3654 Secures New Financing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3655 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3656 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet
</quote> (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3658 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3659 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3660 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3661 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3662 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3663 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3664 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3667 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3668 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3669 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3670 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3673 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3674 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3675 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3676 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3678 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3679 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3680 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3682 Amy Harmon,
<quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,
</quote> <citetitle>New
3683 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3685 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3686 massive quantity of content is being
<quote>taken
</quote> on these networks. The
3687 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3688 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3691 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3692 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3693 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3694 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3695 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3696 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3701 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3702 different kinds into four types.
3704 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3707 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3708 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3709 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3710 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3711 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3712 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3713 users who download instead of purchasing.
3714 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3718 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3719 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3720 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3721 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3722 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3723 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3724 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3729 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3730 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3731 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3732 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3733 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3734 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3735 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend
<quote>recalling
</quote> old
3736 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3737 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3738 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3739 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3740 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3746 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3747 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3752 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3755 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3756 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3757 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3758 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3760 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3761 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3763 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3764 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3765 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3766 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3767 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3768 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3771 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3772 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3773 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3774 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3775 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of
<quote>theft
</quote> that is
3776 <quote>devastating
</quote> the industry.
3779 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3780 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3781 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3782 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3783 & Young put it,
<quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3784 technology, the labels fought it.
</quote><footnote><para>
3786 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3787 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3788 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3789 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3790 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption
<quote>Home taping
3791 is killing music.
</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3792 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3793 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3794 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3795 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3796 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3797 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3798 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3799 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3800 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3801 regulating technology was the answer.
3804 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3805 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3806 turnaround.
<quote>In the end,
</quote> Cap Gemini concludes,
<quote>the `crisis'
… was
3807 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3809 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3810 innovation at the major labels.
</quote><footnote><para>
3812 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3816 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3817 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3818 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3819 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3820 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3821 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3822 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3823 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3826 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3827 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3828 The
<quote>net harm
</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3829 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3830 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3831 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3832 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3837 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3838 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3839 actually suggest it might be close.
3842 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3843 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3844 percent.
<footnote><para>
3846 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3848 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3849 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3850 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3851 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3852 #
16</ulink>:
<quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3853 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3854 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3855 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3856 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3857 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3858 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3861 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3862 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3863 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3864 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3865 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3866 account for at least some of the loss.
<quote>From
1999 to
2001, the average
3867 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19.
</quote><footnote>
3870 Jane Black,
<quote>Big Music's Broken Record,
</quote> BusinessWeek online,
13
3871 February
2003, available at
3872 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3873 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3876 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3877 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes,
<quote>The
3878 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3879 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3880 $
19.99.
</quote><footnote><para>
3887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3888 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3889 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3890 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3891 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3892 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3893 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3896 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3897 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3898 The recording industry constantly asks,
<quote>What's the difference between
3899 downloading a song and stealing a CD?
</quote>—but their own numbers
3900 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3901 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3902 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3903 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3904 Kazaa
<quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit
</quote>—then the industry
3905 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3906 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3907 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3908 a huge difference between
<quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.
</quote>
3911 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3912 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3913 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3917 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3918 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3919 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3920 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3921 available.
<footnote><para>
3923 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3924 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3925 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3926 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3927 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3928 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3930 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3931 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3932 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3933 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3934 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3937 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3938 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3939 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3940 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3941 today.
<footnote><para>
3943 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3944 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3945 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3946 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3947 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3949 Association of Recording Merchandisers,
<quote>2002 Annual Survey
3952 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3954 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3955 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3956 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3957 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3958 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3959 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3960 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3961 the content they sell.
3963 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3965 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3966 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3967 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3968 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3969 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3970 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's
<quote>Two Love Songs,
</quote>
3971 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3972 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3973 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3974 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3975 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3978 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3979 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3980 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3981 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3982 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3986 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3987 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3988 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3989 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3990 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
3991 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3994 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3995 would be a great advertisement for the
<quote>real
</quote> book. People would read
3996 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3997 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3998 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3999 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4003 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4004 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4005 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4006 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4009 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4010 understandably says,
<quote>This is how much we've lost,
</quote> we must also ask,
4011 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4012 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4013 unavailable?
</quote>
4016 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4017 chapter, much of the
<quote>piracy
</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4018 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4019 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
4020 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4021 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4022 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4023 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4024 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4025 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4026 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4027 found only with time.
4030 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4031 just what you call type A sharing?
</quote>
4034 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4036 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4037 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4039 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4041 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4043 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4044 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4045 <quote>down to zero.
</quote><footnote><para>
4047 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4048 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4051 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
4052 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4053 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
4054 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
4058 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4059 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4060 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4061 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4062 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4063 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4064 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4065 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4066 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4069 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4070 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4071 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4072 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4073 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4074 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4075 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4078 <primary>artists
</primary>
4079 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
4082 So, as we've seen, when
<quote>mechanical reproduction
</quote> threatened the
4083 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4084 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4085 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4086 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4087 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4088 complained to Congress that their
<quote>creative property
</quote> was not being
4089 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4090 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4094 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4095 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4096 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4097 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4098 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4104 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4105 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4106 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4107 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4108 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4109 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4110 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4111 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4112 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4113 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4114 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4115 Congress chose a path that would assure
4116 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4117 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4119 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4121 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4122 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4123 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4124 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4125 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4126 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4127 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4128 <quote>record
</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4129 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4130 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4131 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4134 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4135 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4136 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4137 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4138 machine to copy only if there were a special
<quote>copy me
</quote> signal on the
4139 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4140 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4141 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4142 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4143 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4144 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4145 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4146 for the architecture it chose.
4149 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4150 champion. Valenti called VCRs
<quote>tapeworms.
</quote> He warned,
<quote>When there are
4151 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4152 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4153 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4154 copyright.
</quote><footnote><para>
4156 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4157 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4158 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4159 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4161 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4162 creative judgment,
</quote> he told Congress,
<quote>to understand the devastation
4163 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4164 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4165 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4166 and plain common sense.
</quote><footnote><para>
4168 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4170 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4171 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4173 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4176 — a use the Court would later hold was not
<quote>fair.
</quote> By
4177 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4178 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4179 copyrightowners,
</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would
<quote>take from the
4180 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4181 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4182 profit from its reproduction.
</quote><footnote><para>
4184 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4189 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4190 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4191 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4192 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the
<quote>Hollywood
4193 Circuit
</quote>—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4194 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4195 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4196 called
<quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry
</quote> (worse
4197 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4198 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4199 technology.
<footnote><para>
4201 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4204 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4207 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4210 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4211 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4216 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4217 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4219 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4221 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4222 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4224 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4226 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4231 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4232 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4233 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4234 enough, this
<quote>taking
</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4235 together, a pattern is clear:
4238 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4239 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4243 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS
<quote>PIRATED
</quote></entry>
4244 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4245 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4250 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4251 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4252 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4253 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4256 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4257 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4259 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4262 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4263 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4264 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4265 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4269 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4270 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4271 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4278 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4279 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4281 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4282 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4283 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4284 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4285 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4286 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4287 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4288 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4289 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker,
<quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,
</quote>
4290 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4291 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4293 In each case, throughout our history,
4294 that change meant that someone got a
<quote>free ride
</quote> on someone else's
4298 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4299 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4300 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4301 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4302 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of
<quote>piracy.
</quote>
4303 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4304 the behavior of the
<quote>pirates.
</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4305 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4307 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4310 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4311 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4312 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4313 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4314 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4316 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4317 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4318 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4319 permission to record a song?
4322 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4323 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4324 copyright
<quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4325 over all possible uses of his work.
</quote><footnote><para>
4327 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4330 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4331 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4332 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4333 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4334 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4335 facilitate the distribution of content.
4338 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4339 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4340 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4341 should not become a tool for
<quote>stealing
</quote> from artists. But neither
4342 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4343 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4344 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4345 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4346 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4347 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4348 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4349 public interest that innovation continue.
4353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4354 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4355 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4356 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4357 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4358 efficient. Yet these
<quote>potential public benefits,
</quote> as John Schwartz
4359 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
<quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4360 fight.
</quote><footnote><para>
4362 John Schwartz,
<quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4363 Echoes Past Efforts,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4365 Yet when anyone begins to talk about
<quote>balance,
</quote> the copyright warriors
4366 raise a different argument.
<quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4367 incentives,
</quote> they say,
<quote>misses a fundamental point. Our content,
</quote> the
4368 warriors insist,
<quote>is our
<emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we
4369 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4370 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4371 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4372 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4376 <quote>It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>,
</quote> the warriors
4377 insist.
<quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4378 is protected.
</quote>
4380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4384 <part id=
"c-property">
4385 <title><quote>PROPERTY
</quote></title>
4389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4390 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4391 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4392 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4393 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4394 the price she can get.
4397 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a
<quote>property
</quote> right is a
4398 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4399 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4400 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4401 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4402 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4403 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4404 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4405 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4409 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4410 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4412 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4414 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4415 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4416 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4417 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4418 when I copy the way someone else dresses),
<quote>He who receives an idea
4419 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4420 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.
</quote><footnote><para>
4422 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4423 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4424 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4428 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4429 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4430 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4432 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4436 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4437 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4438 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4439 <quote>property
</quote> in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4441 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4442 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4443 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4444 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4445 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4446 Adam Mossoff,
<quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,
</quote>
4447 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4451 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4452 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4453 <quote>copyright material is property
</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4454 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4455 these stories, the significance of this true
4456 statement
—<quote>copyright material is property
</quote>— will be a bit
4457 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4458 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4462 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4463 <chapter label=
"6" id=
"founders">
4464 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4465 <indexterm><primary>Henry V
</primary></indexterm>
4466 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4468 William Shakespeare wrote
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play
4469 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4470 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4471 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4472 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4473 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4474 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4475 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V:
<quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare
4476 is so full of clichés.
</quote>
4479 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4480 <quote>copy-right
</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4481 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4483 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4484 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4485 handsome
<quote>definitive editions
</quote> of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4486 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4487 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4488 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker,
<quote>Jacob Tonson,
4489 Bookseller,
</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4491 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4492 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4494 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4495 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4497 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4498 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the
<quote>copy
</quote> of
4499 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4502 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4503 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4504 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4507 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4508 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4509 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4510 adopted the first
<quote>copyright
</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4511 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4512 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4513 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4514 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4516 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4517 <quote>copyright law.
</quote> See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4518 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4519 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4520 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4521 Tonson's control in
1774?
4524 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a
<quote>copyright
</quote>
4525 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4526 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4527 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4528 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4529 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4530 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4531 that the publishers, or
<quote>Stationers,
</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4533 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4536 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4537 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4538 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4539 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4540 from legislatures
<quote>positive law.
</quote> We call the words from judges
4541 <quote>common law.
</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4542 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4543 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4544 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4545 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4548 This question was important to the publishers, or
<quote>booksellers,
</quote> as
4549 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4550 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4551 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4554 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4555 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4557 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4560 The Statute of Anne granted the author or
<quote>proprietor
</quote> of a book an
4561 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4562 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4563 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4564 copyright
<quote>expired,
</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4565 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4569 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4570 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4571 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4572 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4575 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4576 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4577 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4578 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4579 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4580 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4581 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4582 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4583 reason is there to allow someone else to
<quote>steal
</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4586 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4587 about the notion of
<quote>copyright
</quote> that existed at the time of the
4588 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4589 <quote>booksellers.
</quote>
4592 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4593 to apply the concept of
<quote>copyright
</quote> ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4594 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4595 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4596 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was a right
4597 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4598 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4601 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4602 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4603 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4604 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4606 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
4608 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4609 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4610 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4611 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4612 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4613 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4614 allowed to make his films. The
<quote>copy-right
</quote> was only an exclusive
4615 right to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4617 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England
</primary></indexterm>
4619 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4620 They had had a long and ugly experience with
<quote>exclusive rights,
</quote>
4621 especially
<quote>exclusive rights
</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4622 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4623 monopolies
—especially monopolies for works that already
4624 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4625 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4626 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the
4627 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4628 inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4629 monopoly in publishing.
4632 Thus the
<quote>copy-right,
</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4633 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4634 claim that
<quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,
</quote> try
4635 sounding convincing when uttering,
<quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4636 have it forever.
</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4637 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4638 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4641 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4642 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4643 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4644 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4647 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4648 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4649 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4650 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as
<quote>old patentees
4651 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling
</quote>; they were
<quote>men who do
4652 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4653 indetted.
</quote><footnote><para>
4656 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4657 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4661 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4662 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4663 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4664 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4665 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4669 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4670 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4671 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4672 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4673 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4674 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4676 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4677 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4678 construction and spread of culture.
4681 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4682 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4683 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4684 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4685 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4686 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4687 they said; they needed more time.
4690 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4691 words that echo today,
4695 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4696 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4698 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4699 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4700 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4701 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4702 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4703 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4705 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4706 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4707 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4708 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4709 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4710 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4711 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4716 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4717 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4718 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4719 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4720 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4721 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4722 creative
<quote>property
</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4723 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4724 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4725 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4726 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4727 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4728 way to protect authors.
4731 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4732 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4733 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4734 <quote>The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4735 rancher has for cattle.
</quote><footnote><para>
4737 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4738 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4739 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4740 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4742 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4743 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4746 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4747 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4748 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4750 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4751 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4755 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4756 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4757 reprints
<quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,
</quote> at least
4758 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4760 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4762 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
4764 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4766 and became
<quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.
</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4767 them,
</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was
<quote>the young James Boswell
4768 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4769 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.
</quote><footnote><para>
4773 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4774 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4777 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4778 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4779 inexpensive editions
<quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4780 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4781 Property.
</quote><footnote><para>
4783 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4786 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4787 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4788 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4791 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block
<quote>piracy
</quote> like
4792 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the
<quote>pirates,
</quote>
4793 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4796 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4797 Thomson's poem
<quote>The Seasons.
</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4798 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4799 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4800 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4801 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4803 Howard B. Abrams,
<quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4804 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,
</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4808 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4809 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4812 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4813 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4814 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4815 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4816 law would protect the author against subsequent
<quote>pirates.
</quote>
4817 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4818 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4819 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4820 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4823 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4824 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4825 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4826 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4827 with in
1710: How best to limit
4828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4829 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4830 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4831 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4832 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4833 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4834 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4836 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4838 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4839 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4841 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4843 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4844 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4845 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4849 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4850 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4851 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4852 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4853 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4854 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4857 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4858 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4859 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4860 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4861 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4862 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4863 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4864 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4867 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4868 presented to the House and voted upon first by the
<quote>law lords,
</quote>
4869 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4870 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4871 House of Lords generally voted.
4874 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4875 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4877 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4878 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4879 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4880 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4881 passed into the public domain.
4884 <quote>The public domain.
</quote> Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4885 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4886 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4887 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4888 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4889 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4890 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4891 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4892 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4893 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4894 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4895 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4896 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4899 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4900 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4901 where most of the
<quote>pirate publishers
</quote> did their work, people
4902 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4903 reported,
<quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4904 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4905 decision of which so many individuals were interested.
</quote> <quote>Great
4906 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4907 and illuminations.
</quote><footnote><para>
4913 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4914 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4919 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4920 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4921 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4922 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4923 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4924 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4925 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4926 successors.
<footnote><para>
4933 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4934 <quote>Ruined
</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4935 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4936 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4937 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4938 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4939 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4940 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4941 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4942 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4943 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4944 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4945 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4946 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4947 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4948 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4949 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4950 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4951 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4952 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4955 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4956 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4957 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4962 <chapter label=
"7" id=
"recorders">
4963 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4965 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4966 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4967 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4968 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4972 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4973 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4977 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4978 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4979 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4980 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4981 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4983 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4986 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4987 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4988 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4989 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
4990 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4991 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4995 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4996 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
4997 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4998 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4999 unless
<quote>fair use
</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5002 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5003 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5004 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5005 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5006 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5007 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5010 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5011 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5012 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5013 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5014 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5015 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
5018 Then, as Else told me,
<quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5019 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
5020 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.
</quote>
5021 And second, Fox
<quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5022 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
5023 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.
</quote>
5026 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5027 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5028 explained to her,
<quote>There must be some mistake here.
… We're
5029 asking for your educational rate on this.
</quote> That was the educational
5030 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5031 confirm what he had been told.
5034 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,
</quote> he told me.
<quote>Yes, you
5035 have your facts straight,
</quote> she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
5036 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5040 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else,
<quote>And
5041 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.
</quote> As an assistant
5042 to Herrera told Else later on,
<quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5046 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5047 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5048 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5049 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5050 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5051 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5052 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5053 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
5056 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5057 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5058 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5059 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5060 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5061 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5062 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5063 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5064 says the owner gets to control.
5067 For example,
<quote>public performance
</quote> is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
5068 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5069 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see
<quote>My
5070 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>,
</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5071 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5072 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5076 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5077 thought is
<quote>fair use.
</quote><footnote><para>
5079 For an excellent argument that such use is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> but that
5080 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is
<quote>fair use,
</quote> see Richard
5081 A. Posner with William F. Patry,
<quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5082 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5083 Law School,
5 August
2003.
5085 Else's use of just
4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>
5086 episode is clearly a fair use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>—and fair use does
5087 not require the permission of anyone.
5090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5091 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon
<quote>fair use.
</quote> Here's his reply:
5095 The
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5096 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5097 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5098 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was
<quote>clearly
5099 fair use
</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5100 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5102 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5105 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5106 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5107 <quote>visual cue sheet
</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5108 shot in the film. They take a dim view of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and a claim of
5109 <quote>fair use
</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5113 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5114 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5115 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5116 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5117 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5118 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5119 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5120 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5122 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5126 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5127 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5128 that Fox would
<quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5129 life,
</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5130 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5131 pockets, me or them.
5132 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5136 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5137 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5143 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5144 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5145 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5146 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5147 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5148 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5151 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5152 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5153 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5154 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5159 <chapter label=
"8" id=
"transformers">
5160 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5161 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5162 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'
>
5163 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
5166 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5167 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5168 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5169 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5170 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5172 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'
>
5173 <primary>artists
</primary>
5174 <secondary>retrospective compilations on
</secondary>
5177 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5178 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5179 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5180 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5181 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5182 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5183 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5184 important to his career.
5187 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5188 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5189 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5190 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5194 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5195 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5196 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5197 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5198 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5201 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips.
<quote>Our
5202 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5203 Eastwood's films,
</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5204 arose.
<quote>No one had ever really done this before,
</quote> Alben explained.
<quote>No
5205 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5206 actor's career.
</quote>
5209 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5210 Slade asked,
<quote>Well, what will it take?
</quote>
5213 Alben replied,
<quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5214 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5215 else that we want to use in these film clips.
</quote> Slade said,
<quote>Great! Go
5216 for it.
</quote><footnote>
5219 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5220 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5221 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden
<quote>Rip, Mix,
5222 Burn
</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5224 <primary>artists
</primary>
5225 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5227 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5231 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5232 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5233 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5234 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5235 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5238 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5239 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5240 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5244 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5245 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5246 course we were going to use the
<quote>Make my day
</quote> clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5247 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5248 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5249 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5253 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5254 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5255 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5256 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5257 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5258 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5259 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5260 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5261 started calling people.
5265 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5266 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5267 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5268 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5269 know, $
1,
200?
</quote> And they would say,
<quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5270 to get $
1,
200.
</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5271 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5272 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5276 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—<quote>and even then we
5277 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.
</quote>
5280 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5281 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5282 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5286 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5287 hands and said,
<quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5288 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5289 actors.
</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5290 constituent parts and said,
<quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5291 directors,
… this many musicians,
</quote> and we just went at it very
5292 systematically and cleared the rights.
5297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5298 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5299 loved it, and it sold very well.
5301 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5303 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5304 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5305 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped,
<quote>There is
5306 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5307 at all.
</quote><footnote><para>
5309 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5310 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5311 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5313 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5317 For, as he acknowledged,
<quote>very few
… have the time and resources,
5318 and the will to do this,
</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5319 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5320 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5321 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5325 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5326 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5327 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5328 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5329 compensated for that.
5333 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5334 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5335 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5336 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5337 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5338 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5339 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5340 made to be more clean?
5344 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5345 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5346 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5347 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5349 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5350 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5351 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5352 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5353 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5354 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5355 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5356 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5357 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say,
<quote>Oh, I
5358 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5359 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5360 money,
</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5364 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5365 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5366 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5367 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5368 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5370 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'
/>
5372 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5373 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5374 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5375 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5376 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5377 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5378 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5379 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5380 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5381 <quote>Does this still make sense?
</quote>
5383 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'
/>
5385 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5386 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5387 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5388 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5391 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5392 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5395 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5396 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5397 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5398 judges loved every minute of it.
5400 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5402 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5403 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5404 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5405 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5406 began his talk with a question:
<quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5407 were just violated in this room?
</quote>
5409 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5410 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5412 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5413 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5414 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5415 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5416 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5417 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5418 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5419 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5420 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5421 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5422 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5423 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5424 couldn't easily do them legally.
5427 We live in a
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5428 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5429 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5430 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5431 planted in your presentation.
5434 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5435 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5436 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5437 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5438 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5439 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5440 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5441 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5442 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5443 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5446 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5447 wanted to be
<quote>legal,
</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5448 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5449 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5450 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5453 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5454 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5455 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5456 necessarily requiring that the
<quote>free
</quote> use be free as in
<quote>free beer.
</quote>
5457 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5458 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5459 along: a rule, for example, that says
<quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5460 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5461 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5462 copyright owner.
</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5463 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5464 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5468 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5469 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5470 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5471 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5474 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5475 Myers, the comic genius of
<citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5476 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5477 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5478 would work together to form a
<quote>unique filmmaking pact.
</quote> Under the
5479 agreement, DreamWorks
<quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5480 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5481 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5482 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5483 entertainment.
</quote>
5486 The announcement called this
<quote>film sampling.
</quote> As Myers explained,
5487 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5488 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5489 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5490 to take that same concept and apply it to film.
</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5491 quoted as saying,
<quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5492 new audiences, it is Mike.
</quote>
5495 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5496 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5497 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5498 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5499 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5500 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5501 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5502 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5505 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5506 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of
<quote>fair use.
</quote>
5507 Much of
<quote>sampling
</quote> should be considered
<quote>fair use.
</quote> But few would
5508 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5509 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5510 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5511 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5512 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5513 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5514 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5515 curse, reserved for the few.
5517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5519 <chapter label=
"9" id=
"collectors">
5520 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5521 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'
>
5522 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
5525 In April
1996, millions of
<quote>bots
</quote>—computer codes designed to
5526 <quote>spider,
</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5527 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5528 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5529 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5530 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5531 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5534 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5535 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5536 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5537 the world. Using a technology called
<quote>the Way Back Machine,
</quote> you could
5538 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5539 well as when those pages changed.
5541 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'
>
5542 <primary>Orwell, George
</primary>
5545 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5546 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5547 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5548 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5552 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5553 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5554 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5555 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5558 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5559 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5560 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5561 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5562 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5564 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'
/>
5566 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5567 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5568 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5569 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5570 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5572 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5573 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5574 press release stated,
<quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.
</quote> That was
5575 later changed, without notice, to
<quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5576 Have Ended.
</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5580 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5581 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5582 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5583 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5584 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5585 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5586 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5587 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5591 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5592 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5593 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5594 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5595 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5596 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5597 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5600 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5601 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5602 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5603 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5605 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5606 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5607 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5608 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5611 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5612 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5613 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5614 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5615 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5616 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5617 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5618 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5621 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5622 human history. At the end of
2002, it held
<quote>two hundred and thirty
5623 terabytes of material
</quote>—and was
<quote>ten times larger than the
5624 Library of Congress.
</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5625 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5626 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5627 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5628 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5629 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5630 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5631 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5632 is available to scholars for a very low fee.
<quote>But other than that,
5633 [television] is almost unavailable,
</quote> Kahle told me.
<quote>If you were
5634 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5635 just a graduate student?
</quote> As Kahle put it,
5638 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
5640 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5641 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5642 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5643 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5644 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5646 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5647 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5648 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5652 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5653 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5654 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5655 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5656 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5657 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5660 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5661 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5662 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5663 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5664 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5668 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5669 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5670 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5671 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5672 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and
<quote>borrowed
5673 back.
</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5674 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5675 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5677 Doug Herrick,
<quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5678 the Library of Congress,
</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5679 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5680 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5685 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5686 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5687 broadcasts, so there was no fear of
<quote>theft.
</quote> But as technology enabled
5688 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5689 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5690 <quote>copyrighted.
</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5691 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5692 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5693 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5696 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5697 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5698 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5699 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5700 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5701 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5702 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5703 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5706 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5708 <primary>archive.org
</primary>
5709 <seealso>Internet Archive
</seealso>
5712 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5713 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 <quote>ephemeral films
</quote> (meaning
5714 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5715 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5716 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5717 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5718 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5719 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5720 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5721 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5722 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5723 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5724 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the
<quote>Duck and Cover
</quote> film
5725 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5726 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5727 few minutes
—for free.
5730 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5731 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5732 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5733 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5734 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5738 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5739 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5740 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5741 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5742 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5743 has
—a noncommercial life.
5746 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5747 of creative property goes through different
<quote>lives.
</quote> In its first
5750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5751 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5752 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5753 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5754 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5755 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5758 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5759 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5760 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5761 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5762 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5763 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5767 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5768 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5770 Dave Barns,
<quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5771 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5772 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5773 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5774 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5775 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5776 </para></footnote>). After
5777 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5778 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5779 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5780 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5781 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5784 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5785 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5786 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5787 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5788 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5789 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5790 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5791 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5795 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5796 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5797 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5798 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5799 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5801 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5802 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5803 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5804 little practical effect.
5807 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5808 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5809 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5810 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5811 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5812 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5815 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5816 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5817 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5822 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5823 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5824 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5825 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5826 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5827 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5828 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5829 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5830 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5831 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5832 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5836 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5837 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5838 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5839 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5840 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5841 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5842 will draw upon it to understand it;
5843 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5844 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5845 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5846 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5847 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5848 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5851 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5852 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5853 call these
<quote>archives,
</quote> as warm as the idea of a
<quote>library
</quote> might seem,
5854 the
<quote>content
</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5855 someone's
<quote>property.
</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5856 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5858 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'
/>
5859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5861 <chapter label=
"10" id=
"property-i">
5862 <title>CHAPTER TEN:
<quote>Property
</quote></title>
5864 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5865 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5866 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5867 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5868 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5869 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5870 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5871 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5872 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5875 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5876 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5877 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5878 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5879 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5880 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5881 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5882 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5883 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5885 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5886 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5887 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5888 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5889 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5890 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5891 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5895 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5896 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5897 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5898 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5899 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5900 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5901 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5902 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5903 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5907 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5908 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5909 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5910 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5911 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5912 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5913 redefine the meaning of
<quote>creative property.
</quote>
5916 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5921 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5922 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5923 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5924 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5925 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5926 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5927 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5928 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5930 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5931 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5932 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5933 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5934 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5940 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5941 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5942 <quote>central theme
</quote> to which
<quote>reasonable men and women
</quote> will return is
5944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5945 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5946 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.
</quote>
5947 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5948 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5951 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5952 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5953 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5954 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
5955 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5956 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5957 it comes to the nature and scope of
<quote>creative property.
</quote> His views
5958 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5959 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5960 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5963 While
<quote>creative property
</quote> is certainly
<quote>property
</quote> in a nerdy and
5964 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5966 Lawyers speak of
<quote>property
</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5967 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5968 object. Thus, my
<quote>property right
</quote> to my car gives me the right to
5969 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5970 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of
<quote>property
</quote> to
5971 <quote>lawyer talk,
</quote> see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
5972 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5973 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5974 <quote>creative property owners
</quote> have been
<quote>accorded the same rights and
5975 protection resident in all other property owners.
</quote> Indeed, if creative
5976 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5977 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5981 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5982 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5983 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5984 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5985 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5986 culture would develop.
5989 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5990 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5991 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5992 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5993 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5994 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5995 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5996 the same would be to
5998 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5999 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6000 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6004 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6005 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6006 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6007 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6008 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6009 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6010 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
6011 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
6012 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
6013 Constitution itself.
6016 The framers of our Constitution loved
<quote>property.
</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6017 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6018 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
6019 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6020 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's
<quote>Takings
6021 Clause,
</quote> to pay you
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for that taking. The
6022 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6023 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
6024 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6027 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6028 Valenti calls
<quote>creative property.
</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6029 power to create
<quote>creative property,
</quote> the Constitution
6030 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a
<quote>limited time,
</quote> Congress
6031 take back the rights that it has granted and set the
<quote>creative
6032 property
</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6033 the expiration of a copyright term
<quote>takes
</quote> your copyright and turns it
6034 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6035 pay
<quote>just compensation
</quote> for this
<quote>taking.
</quote> Instead, the same
6036 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6038 requires that you lose your
<quote>creative property
</quote> right without any
6039 compensation at all.
6042 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6043 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6044 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6045 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6046 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6047 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6051 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6052 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6053 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6054 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6055 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6056 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
6057 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6058 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6059 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6060 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6063 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6064 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6065 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6066 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6067 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6071 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6072 history of these
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights, and the control that they
6073 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6074 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6075 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
6076 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6077 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6078 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6079 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6080 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6081 also control how culture develops.
6085 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6086 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6087 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6088 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6089 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6090 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6091 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6092 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6094 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6095 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6096 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6099 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6100 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6101 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6102 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6103 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6104 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6105 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6106 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6107 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6108 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6109 Web, you can be punished
6110 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6111 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6112 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6113 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6115 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6117 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6118 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6119 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6120 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6121 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6122 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6123 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6124 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6125 the source of the enforcement.
6127 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6129 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6130 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6131 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6132 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6133 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6134 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6135 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6136 individual or group might behave.
6138 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6140 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6141 <quote>architecture
</quote>—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6142 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6143 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6144 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6145 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6146 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6147 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6148 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6149 theft, but by nature, by
<quote>architecture.
</quote> If a
500-pound boulder
6150 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6151 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6152 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6157 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6158 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6159 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6160 undermined by another.
6163 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6164 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6165 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6166 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6167 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6168 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6169 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6171 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6172 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6174 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6175 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6176 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6178 So, for example, consider the
<quote>freedom
</quote> to drive a car at a high
6179 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6180 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6181 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6182 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6183 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6184 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6185 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6186 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6187 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6188 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6189 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6192 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6193 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6194 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6196 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6197 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6198 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6199 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6200 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6201 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6202 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>The New Chicago School,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6205 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6206 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6207 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6208 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6209 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6210 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6211 used to require that other laws be more
6212 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6213 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6214 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6217 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6219 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6220 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6221 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6223 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6225 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6226 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6227 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6228 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6229 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6233 Some people object to this way of talking about
<quote>liberty.
</quote> They object
6234 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6235 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6236 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6237 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6238 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6239 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6240 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6241 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6242 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6243 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6244 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a
6245 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6246 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6247 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6248 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6249 <citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6250 1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6251 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons,
<quote>The
6252 Right to Work,
</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6253 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6254 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6255 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6256 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6257 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6258 12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6259 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6260 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6261 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6262 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990)
</primary></indexterm>
6263 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6264 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through
</primary></indexterm>
6265 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6268 <section id=
"hollywood">
6269 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6271 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6272 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6273 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6274 rallying makes sense.
6277 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6280 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6281 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6282 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6284 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
6285 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of
</primary></indexterm>
6287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6288 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6289 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6290 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6291 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6292 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6293 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6294 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6295 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6296 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6297 this form of infringement.
6300 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6301 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6302 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6303 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6304 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6305 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6308 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6309 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6310 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6311 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6314 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6315 looting that results.
6317 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6318 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6319 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6322 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6323 warriors. Indeed, in a
<quote>White Paper
</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6324 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6325 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6326 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6327 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6328 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6329 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6330 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6331 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6334 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6335 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6336 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6337 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6338 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6339 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6340 life. Homeowners living in a
6342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6343 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6344 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6345 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6346 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6347 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6348 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6351 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6352 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6353 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6354 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6355 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6356 Brown describes it, its
<quote>architecture of revenue.
</quote>
6358 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry
</primary></indexterm>
6359 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
6361 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6362 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6363 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6364 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6365 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6366 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6367 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6369 See Geoffrey Smith,
<quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?
</quote>
6370 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6371 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6372 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6373 R. Schoenberger,
<quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?
</quote> Forbes.com,
6
6374 October
2003, available at
6375 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6378 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6379 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6380 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6381 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6382 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6383 weakened the
<quote>stickiness
</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6384 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6385 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6386 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6387 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6388 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6391 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6392 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6393 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6395 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6396 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6397 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6398 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents,
<quote>established companies
6399 have an interest in excluding future competitors.
</quote><footnote><para>
6401 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6404 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6405 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6406 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6407 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6408 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6410 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6413 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6414 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6415 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6416 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6417 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6418 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6419 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6420 opportunities for innovation and change.
6423 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6424 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6425 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6426 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6427 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6428 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6429 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6430 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution:
<quote>Congress
6431 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech.
</quote> So when
6432 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would
<quote>abridge
</quote> the freedom
6433 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6434 regulation is justified.
6437 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6439 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6440 <quote>justified.
</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6441 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6442 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6443 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6446 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6448 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6449 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6452 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6453 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6454 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6455 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6456 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6457 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6460 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6461 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6462 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6464 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6466 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6467 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6468 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6469 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6470 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6471 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6474 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6475 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6476 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6477 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6478 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6479 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6480 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6482 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James
</primary></indexterm>
6484 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6485 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an
<quote>environmentalism
</quote> for
6486 culture.
<footnote><para>
6488 See, for example, James Boyle,
<quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6489 Environmentalism for the Net?
</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6491 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6492 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6493 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6494 <quote>for free.
</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6495 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6496 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6498 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6499 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6500 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6501 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6502 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6505 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6506 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6507 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6508 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6509 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6510 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6511 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6512 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6513 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6516 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6517 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6520 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6522 <section id=
"beginnings">
6523 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6525 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6526 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of
<quote>creative
6527 property
</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6528 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6531 The power to establish
<quote>creative property
</quote> rights is granted to
6532 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6533 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6536 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6537 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6538 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6541 We can call this the
<quote>Progress Clause,
</quote> for notice what this clause
6542 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6543 <quote>creative property rights.
</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6544 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6545 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6546 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6549 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6550 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6551 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6552 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6553 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6554 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6555 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6556 copyrights extend
<quote>to Authors
</quote> only.
6559 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6560 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6561 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6562 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6563 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6564 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6565 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6566 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6567 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6568 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6569 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6570 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6571 concentrations of power.
6574 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call
<quote>copyright
</quote>
6575 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6576 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6577 <quote>copyright
</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6578 years since they first struck its design.
6581 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6582 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6583 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6584 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6587 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6588 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6589 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6594 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6595 <title><quote>Copyright
</quote> today.
</title>
6596 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6603 <section id=
"lawduration">
6604 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6606 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6607 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6608 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6609 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6610 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6611 authorship.
<footnote>
6614 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6615 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6616 485–86:
<quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6617 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6618 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis></quote>
6620 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.
</primary></indexterm>
6622 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6623 States in
1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6624 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6625 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6626 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6627 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6630 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6631 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6632 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6633 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6634 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6635 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6638 In
1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6639 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6640 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6641 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6642 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6645 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6646 ten years of the Republic, only
5 percent of the works were actually
6647 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6648 in the United States both before
1790 and from
1790 through
1800,
95
6649 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6650 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6651 likely within fourteen years.
<footnote><para>
6653 Although
13,
000 titles were published in the United States from
1790
6654 to
1799, only
556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel,
<citetitle>A
6655 History of Book Publishing in the United States
</citetitle>, vol.
1,
<citetitle>The Creation
6656 of an Industry,
1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker,
1972),
141. Of the
21,
000
6657 imprints recorded before
1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6658 1790 act; William J. Maher,
<citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6659 and the Copyright Law of
1790 in Historical Context
</citetitle>,
7–10 (
2002),
6660 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6661 #
25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6662 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6663 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6664 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6665 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6666 Act of May
31,
1790, §
1,
1 stat.
124.
</para></footnote>
6669 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6670 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6672 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6673 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6674 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6678 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6679 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6680 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6681 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6682 domain.
<footnote><para>
6684 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6685 instance, of the
25,
006 copyrights registered in
1883, only
894 were
6686 renewed in
1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6687 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer,
<quote>Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
</quote>
6688 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright
</citetitle>, vol.
1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6689 1963),
618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6690 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote>
6691 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6692 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6695 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6696 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6697 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6699 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6700 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6701 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6702 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6703 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6704 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6707 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6708 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6709 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6710 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6711 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6712 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6715 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6716 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6717 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6718 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6719 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6720 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6721 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6722 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6725 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6726 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6727 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6728 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6731 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6732 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6733 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6736 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6737 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6738 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6739 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6740 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6741 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6742 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6746 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6747 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6748 maximum term. For
<quote>natural
</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6749 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6750 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6751 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6752 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6753 was ninety-five years.
6756 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6757 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6758 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6759 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6760 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6761 that terms be
<quote>limited,
</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6765 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6766 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6767 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6768 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6769 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6770 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6771 years.
<footnote><para>
6773 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6774 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6775 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6776 Posner,
<quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
</quote> loc. cit.
6779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6781 <section id=
"lawscope">
6782 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6784 The
<quote>scope
</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6785 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6786 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6787 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6790 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only
<quote>maps,
6791 charts, and books.
</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6792 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6793 the author the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> copyrighted works. That
6794 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6795 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6796 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6797 did not extend to what lawyers call
<quote>derivative works.
</quote> It would not,
6798 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6799 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6800 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6803 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6804 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6805 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6806 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6807 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6808 work not only the exclusive right to
<quote>publish
</quote> the work, but also the
6809 exclusive right of control over any
<quote>copies
</quote> of that work. And most
6810 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6811 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6812 <quote>derivative work
</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6813 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6814 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6815 on the initial creative work.
6818 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6819 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6820 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6822 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6823 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6824 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6825 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6826 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6827 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6828 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6832 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6833 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6834 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6835 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6836 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6837 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6838 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6839 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6840 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6841 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6842 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6846 All of these
<quote>formalities
</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6847 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6848 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6849 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6850 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6851 copy available for others to copy.
6854 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6858 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6859 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6860 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6861 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6862 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6863 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6865 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner,
<quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6866 Creation of American Literature,
</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6867 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6868 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6871 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6872 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6873 the United States
—publishers.
6876 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6877 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6878 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6879 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6880 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6881 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6882 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6886 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6887 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6888 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6889 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6890 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6891 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6895 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6896 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6897 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6900 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6902 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6903 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of
<quote>derivative
6904 rights.
</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6905 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6906 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6907 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6908 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6910 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6911 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6914 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6915 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6917 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6919 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6920 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6921 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6922 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6926 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6927 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6928 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6929 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6930 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6931 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6932 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6933 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6934 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6936 Jonathan Zittrain,
<quote>The Copyright Cage,
</quote> <citetitle>Legal
6937 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
6938 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6939 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6941 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6942 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6943 the wrong of direct piracy.
6946 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6947 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6948 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6949 of my book.
<footnote><para>
6951 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6952 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6953 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere
<quote>copies
</quote> and
6954 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld,
<quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
6955 Copyright's Constitutionality,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
6956 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
6958 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb
</primary></indexterm>
6960 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6963 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6964 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6965 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6966 called
<quote>Mickey Mouse,
</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6967 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6971 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6972 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6973 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6974 the rights originally granted.
6977 <section id=
"lawreach">
6978 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6980 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6981 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6982 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6983 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6985 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6986 certainly regulates more than
<quote>copies
</quote>—a public performance of a
6987 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6988 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6989 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a
<quote>copy
</quote>;
17
6990 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
6991 existing law (which regulates
<quote>copies;
</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6992 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6997 <quote>Copies.
</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6998 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6999 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that
<quote>creative
7000 property
</quote> deserves the
<quote>same rights
</quote> as all other property, it is the
7001 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7002 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7003 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7004 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7005 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7006 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
7007 the trigger for copyright law.
7010 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7011 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7012 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7013 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
7015 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7016 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7017 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7018 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7021 because it is clear that the
7022 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7023 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7026 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7029 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
7030 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
7031 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
7034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7035 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7036 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7037 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7038 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7039 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7040 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7041 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7042 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7043 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7044 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7045 acts do not make a copy.
7047 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
7048 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
7049 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
7052 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7053 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7054 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7055 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7056 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7057 diagram on next page).
7060 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7061 that remain unregulated because the law considers these
<quote>fair uses.
</quote>
7063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7064 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
7065 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
7066 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
7069 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7070 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7071 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7072 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7073 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7074 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7075 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such
<quote>fair uses
</quote>
7076 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7078 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7079 <title>Unregulated copying considered
<quote>fair uses.
</quote></title>
7080 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7083 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7084 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7085 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7089 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7090 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7091 are nonetheless deemed
<quote>fair
</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7094 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7095 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7097 I don't mean
<quote>nature
</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7098 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7099 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7100 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7103 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7104 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7105 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7106 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7107 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7108 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7109 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7110 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7111 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7115 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7116 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7117 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7118 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7119 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7120 the book once, ten times, or every
7121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7122 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7123 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7124 none of those uses produced a copy.
7127 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7128 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7129 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7130 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7131 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7132 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7133 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7134 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7135 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7136 copyright owner's wish.
7139 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7140 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7141 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7142 points also become clear:
7145 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7146 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7147 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7148 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7149 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7150 part of free culture before the Internet.
7153 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7154 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7155 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7156 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7157 using a machine.
<quote>Copy and paste
</quote> and
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> become
7158 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7159 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7160 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7161 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7165 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7167 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7168 burden on category
3 (
<quote>fair use
</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7169 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7170 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7171 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7172 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7173 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7174 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7175 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7179 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7180 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7181 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7182 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7183 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7184 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7185 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7188 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'
>
7189 <primary>advertising
</primary>
7192 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7193 in the business of making
<quote>trailer
</quote> advertisements for movies available
7194 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7195 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7196 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7199 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7200 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7201 previews. The idea was to expand their
<quote>selling by sampling
</quote>
7202 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7203 <quote>browsing.
</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7204 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7205 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7208 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7209 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7210 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7211 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7212 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7213 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7214 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7215 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7216 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7217 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7218 <quote>fair use
</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7219 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7223 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7224 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had
<quote>willfully
7225 infringed
</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7226 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7227 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7228 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7229 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7230 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7233 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7234 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7235 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7236 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7237 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7238 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7239 Disney's permission.
7241 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'
/>
7243 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7244 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7245 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7246 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7247 was in the marketplace, the
<quote>first-sale doctrine
</quote> would free the
7248 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7249 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7250 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7251 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7252 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7253 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7254 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7256 <indexterm><primary>Barnes
& Noble
</primary></indexterm>
7258 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7259 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7260 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7261 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7262 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7263 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7264 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7265 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7266 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7267 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7268 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7269 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7270 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7271 happening are quite slight.
7274 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7275 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7276 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7277 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7278 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7279 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7282 <section id=
"lawforce">
7283 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7285 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7286 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7287 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7288 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7291 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7292 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7293 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7294 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7295 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7298 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7299 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7300 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7302 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7303 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7306 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7307 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7309 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7310 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7311 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7312 plan.
<footnote><para>
7314 See David Lange,
<quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,
</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7315 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7319 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7320 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers
<quote>were brothers long before
7321 you were.
</quote><footnote><para>
7323 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7324 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7325 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7327 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7328 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7329 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7330 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7333 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7334 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7335 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7336 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7339 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7340 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7341 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7342 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7343 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7344 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7345 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7346 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7348 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7349 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7351 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7352 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7355 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7358 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7359 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7360 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7361 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7365 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7369 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7370 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7371 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7372 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7373 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7374 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7375 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7378 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7379 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7381 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7382 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7383 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7386 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7387 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7389 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7390 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7391 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7395 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7396 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7397 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7398 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7399 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7400 read aloud through the computer.
7403 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7404 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7405 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7406 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7408 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7409 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote></title>
7410 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7413 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7414 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7417 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7418 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
<quote>Politics
</quote>.
</title>
7419 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7422 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7423 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7427 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7428 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>The Future of Ideas
</quote>.
</title>
7429 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7432 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7435 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7436 <quote>permissions
</quote>— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7437 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7438 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7439 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7440 power.
<footnote><para>
7442 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7443 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7444 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7445 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7446 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7447 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7448 subsequently acquired the book.
7450 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7451 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7452 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7453 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7454 control that the law would enable.
7457 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7458 within which the e-book
<quote>lives.
</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7459 permissions, they are not the sort of
<quote>permissions
</quote> that most of us
7460 deal with. When a teenager gets
<quote>permission
</quote> to stay out till
7461 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7462 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7463 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7464 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7465 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7466 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7467 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7468 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7469 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7470 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7475 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7476 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7477 you tried to type
<quote>Warner Brothers,
</quote> erased
<quote>Brothers
</quote> from the
7479 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7482 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7483 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7484 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7485 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7486 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7487 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7488 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7491 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7492 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7493 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7494 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7495 to defeat these protections as well?
7498 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7502 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7503 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7504 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7505 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7506 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7508 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7510 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7511 <title>List of the permissions for
<quote>Alice's Adventures in
7512 Wonderland
</quote>.
</title>
7513 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7515 <beginpage pagenum=
"164"/>
7517 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7518 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7519 <quote>permissions
</quote> indicated, not allowed to
<quote>read aloud
</quote>!
7522 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7523 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7524 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7525 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7526 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7527 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7530 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7531 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7532 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7533 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7534 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7535 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7536 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7537 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7538 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7539 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7540 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7543 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7544 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7545 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7546 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7547 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7550 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7552 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7553 story of mine that makes the same point.
7555 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7556 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7558 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'
>
7559 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7561 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7562 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7563 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7566 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named
<quote>Aibo.
</quote> The Aibo
7567 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7568 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7571 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7572 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7573 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7574 <beginpage pagenum=
"165"/>
7575 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7576 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7577 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7580 <quote>Teach
</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7581 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7582 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7583 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7584 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7585 their computer
<quote>dog
</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7588 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7589 <citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7590 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7591 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7592 them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much more positive
7593 term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7594 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7595 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7596 old computer doesn't run, or
<quote>drive,
</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7597 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7598 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7602 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7603 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7604 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7605 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7609 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7610 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7611 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7612 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7613 than Sony had built.
7615 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7616 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'
/>
7617 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7619 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7620 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7621 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7622 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7626 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7627 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7628 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7629 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7630 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7631 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7632 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7635 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7636 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7637 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7638 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7639 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7640 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7641 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7642 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7643 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7646 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7648 See Pamela Samuelson,
<quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,
</quote>
7649 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
<quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7650 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,
</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7651 January
2002;
<quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7652 DMCA,
</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7653 Holland,
<quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,
</quote> <citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7654 May
2001; Janelle Brown,
<quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?
</quote> Salon.com,
7655 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation,
<quote>Frequently Asked
7656 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case,
</quote> available at
7657 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7658 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7660 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7661 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7662 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7663 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7666 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7667 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7668 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7669 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7670 <quote>this music cannot be copied,
</quote> and have a computer respect that
7671 command. The technology was to be part of a
<quote>trusted system
</quote> of
7672 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7676 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7677 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7678 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7679 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7683 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7684 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7685 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7686 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7689 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7690 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7691 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7692 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7693 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7694 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7697 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7698 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7699 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7700 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7701 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7702 constituted, succeed.
7704 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7705 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7707 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'
>
7708 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7710 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7711 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7712 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7715 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7716 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7717 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7722 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7723 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7724 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7727 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7728 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'
/>
7729 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7731 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7732 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7733 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7737 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7739 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7740 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7741 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (
<quote>DMCA
</quote>).
7745 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7746 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7747 spreading such information an offense.
7750 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7751 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7752 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7753 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7754 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7755 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7756 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7757 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7758 protection for copyright owners.
7761 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7762 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7763 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7764 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7765 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7768 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7769 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7770 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7771 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7772 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7773 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7774 have been a copyright violation.
7776 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7777 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7779 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7780 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7783 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7784 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7785 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7786 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7787 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7788 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7789 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7790 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7791 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7792 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7795 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7796 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7797 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7798 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7799 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7800 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7802 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7804 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7805 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7806 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7807 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7808 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7809 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka
<quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,
</quote>
7810 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7811 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7812 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7816 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7817 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7818 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7819 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7820 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7821 <quote>Neighborhood
</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the
<quote>Neighborhood
</quote>
7822 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7823 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7824 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7825 broadcasting has always been
<quote>You are an important person just the way
7826 you are. You can make healthy decisions.
</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7827 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7828 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7829 important.
<footnote><para>
7831 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7832 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7833 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7834 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7835 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7841 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7842 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7843 the VCR responsible.
7846 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7848 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7851 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7854 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7855 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7856 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7857 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7858 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7859 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7862 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7864 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7865 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7866 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7869 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7870 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7871 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7874 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7875 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7876 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7877 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7878 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7879 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7880 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7882 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7883 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7885 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7886 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7889 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7890 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7891 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7892 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7893 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7894 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7897 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7898 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7899 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7900 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7901 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7902 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7903 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7904 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7905 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7906 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7909 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7910 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7911 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7912 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7913 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7914 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7915 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7916 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7917 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7922 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7923 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7924 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7925 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7926 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7928 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet,
<quote>Legal Fictions,
7929 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7930 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7934 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7935 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7936 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7937 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7938 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7941 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7942 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7943 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7944 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7945 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7946 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7947 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7948 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7951 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7952 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7953 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7954 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7955 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7956 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7959 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
7960 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7962 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7963 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7964 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7965 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7966 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7969 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7970 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7971 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7972 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7973 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7974 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7975 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7976 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7980 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7981 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7982 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7983 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7984 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7987 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7988 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7989 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7990 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7991 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7992 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7993 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7994 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7998 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8002 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8003 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8004 ownership,
<quote>five companies control
85 percent of our media sources.
</quote><footnote><para>
8006 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8007 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
8008 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
8009 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8010 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
8011 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
8013 Lynette Holloway,
<quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8014 Slide,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
8016 The
<quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8017 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.
</quote><footnote><para>
8019 Molly Ivins,
<quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,
</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
8022 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
8023 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
8024 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
8025 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8026 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
8029 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8030 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8032 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
8033 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8034 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
8035 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
8036 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
8037 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8040 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8041 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8042 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8043 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8044 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
8045 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
8046 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8047 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8048 protected
— by the market.
8051 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8052 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8053 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8054 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8058 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8059 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
8060 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8061 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8062 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8063 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8064 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8065 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8066 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8067 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
8069 James Fallows,
<quote>The Age of Murdoch,
</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
8071 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
8076 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8077 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8078 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8079 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8081 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8082 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8083 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8087 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8088 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8092 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8093 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8094 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8095 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8098 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8099 integration may matter.
8101 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8102 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8103 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8105 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
8106 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8107 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8108 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8109 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8112 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8113 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8114 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8115 control.
<footnote><para>
8117 Leonard Hill,
<quote>The Axis of Access,
</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8118 Forum,
<quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,
</quote> St. Louis,
8119 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8120 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8121 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8122 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8128 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8129 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8130 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8131 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
8132 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8133 television
—75 percent of it
—was
<quote>independent
</quote> of the
8137 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8138 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8139 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8140 2002, only five independent television studios remained.
<quote>In
1992,
8141 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8142 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8143 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent.
</quote> <quote>In
1992,
16
8144 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8145 year there was one.
</quote><footnote><para>
8147 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8148 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8149 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8150 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8151 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8152 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8153 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8156 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8157 that ran it.
<quote>In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8158 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8159 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8160 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8161 63%.
</quote><footnote><para>
8166 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8168 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8169 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8170 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8171 owned by the network.
8174 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8175 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8176 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8177 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8178 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8182 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8183 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8184 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8185 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8187 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8188 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8189 handful.
<footnote><para>
8191 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,
</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8192 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8193 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8198 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8199 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8200 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8201 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8202 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8203 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8204 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8205 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8206 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8209 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8211 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8212 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the
<quote>Innovator's
8213 Dilemma
</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8214 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8215 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8216 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8218 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8219 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8220 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8221 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8222 Kim B. Clark,
<quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8223 Concepts in Technological Evolution,
</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8224 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8225 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8226 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8227 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8229 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8230 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8232 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8235 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8236 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8237 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8241 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8242 suggest the concern.
8245 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8246 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8247 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8250 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8251 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8252 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8254 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8255 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8256 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8257 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8258 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8259 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8260 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8261 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8262 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8263 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8264 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8265 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8266 outweigh these costs.
8269 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8270 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8271 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8274 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'
>
8275 <primary>advertising
</primary>
8278 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8279 a media campaign as part of the
<quote>war on drugs.
</quote> The campaign produced
8280 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8281 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8282 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8283 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8284 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8285 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8286 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8287 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8290 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8291 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8294 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8295 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8296 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8300 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8302 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8303 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8304 message will be heard then?
8307 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8308 <quote>controversial
</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8309 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8310 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8311 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8312 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8313 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8314 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8315 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8317 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8318 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8319 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as
<quote>against
8320 [their] policy.
</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8321 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8322 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8323 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8324 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8325 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives,
<quote>On the Issue of
8326 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,
</quote> <citetitle>New
8327 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8328 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8329 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown,
<quote>Ad
8330 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8331 Radio,
</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8332 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8333 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8334 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8335 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8336 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8337 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross,
<quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8338 After Muni Rejects Ad,
</quote> SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8339 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8340 was that the criticism was
<quote>too controversial.
</quote>
8341 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8342 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8343 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8344 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8345 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8346 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8347 <indexterm><primary>advertising
</primary></indexterm>
8351 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8352 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8353 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8354 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8355 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8356 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8357 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8358 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8359 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8361 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'
/>
8363 <section id=
"together">
8364 <title>Together
</title>
8366 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8367 copyright warriors that the government should
<quote>protect my property.
</quote>
8368 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8369 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8372 But when we see how dramatically this
<quote>property
</quote> has changed
—
8373 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8374 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8375 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8379 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8380 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8381 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8382 the massively expanded
<quote>property
</quote> rights granted by copyright
8383 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8384 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8388 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8389 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8390 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8394 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8395 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8396 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8397 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8398 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8399 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8400 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8401 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8402 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8403 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8406 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8407 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8408 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8409 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8410 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8411 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8412 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8413 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8414 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8415 in control that technology and the market enable.
8418 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8419 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8420 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8421 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8422 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8423 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8424 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8427 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8428 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8429 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8430 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8431 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8432 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8433 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8434 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8435 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8436 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8437 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8438 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8439 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8440 known.
<footnote><para>
8442 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his
<quote>four surrenders
</quote> of
8443 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8444 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8448 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8451 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8452 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8453 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8454 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8455 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8458 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8459 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8463 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8464 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8469 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8470 <entry>©</entry>
8474 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8483 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8484 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8485 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8488 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8489 noncommercial work was also free.
8492 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8495 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8496 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8500 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8501 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8506 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8507 <entry>©</entry>
8508 <entry>©</entry>
8511 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8520 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8521 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8522 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8523 transformation were still essentially free.
8526 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8527 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8528 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8529 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8530 we could say the law began to look like this:
8533 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8534 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8539 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8544 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8545 <entry>©</entry>
8546 <entry>©</entry>
8549 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8550 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8558 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8559 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8560 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8561 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8562 that the law now looks like this:
8565 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8566 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8571 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8576 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8577 <entry>©</entry>
8578 <entry>©</entry>
8581 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8582 <entry>©</entry>
8583 <entry>©</entry>
8590 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8591 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8593 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8594 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8595 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8598 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8599 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8600 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8601 these domains actually does any good.
8604 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8605 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8606 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8607 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8608 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8609 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8610 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8611 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8612 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8613 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8616 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8617 course copyright is a kind of
<quote>property,
</quote> and of course, as with any
8618 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8619 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8620 property rights
<footnote><para>
8622 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8623 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8624 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey,
<quote>The
8625 Disintegration of Property,
</quote> in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8626 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8628 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8630 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8631 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8632 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8633 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the
<quote>copyright
</quote>
8634 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8635 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8636 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8637 vibrant and rich free culture.
8639 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
8641 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8642 limits on the scope of the interests protected by
<quote>property.
</quote> The very
8643 birth of
<quote>copyright
</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8644 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8645 story of chapter
6). The tradition of
<quote>fair use
</quote> is animated by a
8646 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8647 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8649 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8650 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8651 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8652 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8653 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8654 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8655 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8656 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8657 dominates the debate today.
8660 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8661 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8662 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8663 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8664 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8665 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8666 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8667 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8668 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8669 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8672 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8676 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8677 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8680 <chapter label=
"11" id=
"chimera">
8681 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8682 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8683 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8685 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8686 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8688 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8689 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The
</quote> (Wells)
</primary>
8693 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8694 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8695 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8697 H. G. Wells,
<quote>The Country of the Blind
</quote> (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8698 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8699 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8701 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with
<quote>sweet water, pasture,
8702 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8703 that bore an excellent fruit.
</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8704 takes this as an opportunity.
<quote>In the Country of the Blind,
</quote> he tells
8705 himself,
<quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.
</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8706 villagers to explore life as a king.
8709 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8710 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8711 <quote>blind.
</quote> They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8712 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8713 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8714 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated.
<quote>`You
8715 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8716 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8721 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8722 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8723 affection, a young woman who to him seems
<quote>the most beautiful thing in
8724 the whole of creation,
</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8725 description of what he sees
<quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8726 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8727 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8728 indulgence.
</quote> <quote>She did not believe,
</quote> Wells tells us, and
<quote>she could
8729 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.
</quote>
8732 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his
<quote>mysteriously delighted
</quote>
8733 love, the father and the village object.
<quote>You see, my dear,
</quote> her
8734 father instructs,
<quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8735 anything right.
</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8738 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion.
<quote>His brain
8739 is affected,
</quote> he reports.
8742 <quote>What affects it?
</quote> the father asks.
<quote>Those queer things that are
8743 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8747 The doctor continues:
<quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8748 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8749 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8750 irritant bodies [the eyes].
</quote>
8753 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!
</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8754 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8755 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8756 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8757 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8758 womb. That fusion produces a
<quote>chimera.
</quote> A chimera is a single creature
8759 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8760 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8762 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8763 plot for murder mysteries.
<quote>But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8764 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8765 scene.
…</quote>
8767 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8768 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8770 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8771 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8772 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8773 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8774 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8775 understanding of a
<quote>person
</quote> should reflect this reality.
8778 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8779 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8780 unfairly enough,
<quote>the copyright wars,
</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8781 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question
<quote>What is
8782 p2p file sharing?
</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8783 wrong. One side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8784 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8785 thirty years without any question at all.
</quote> That's true, at least in
8786 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8787 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8788 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8789 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8792 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8793 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8794 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8795 <quote>friends
</quote> beyond recognition to say
<quote>my ten thousand best friends
</quote> can
8796 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8797 what
<quote>we have always been allowed to do,
</quote> we have not always been
8798 allowed to share music with
<quote>our ten thousand best friends.
</quote>
8801 Likewise, when the other side says,
<quote>File sharing is just like walking
8802 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8803 with it,
</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8804 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8805 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8807 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8812 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8813 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8814 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8815 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8816 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8817 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8818 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8819 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8822 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8823 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8824 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8825 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8826 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8829 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8830 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8831 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8832 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8833 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8834 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8835 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8836 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8838 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8839 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8840 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
8842 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8843 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8844 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8845 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8846 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey,
<quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8847 Stakes on Piracy,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8848 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8849 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8850 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8851 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8852 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8853 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8854 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8855 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8856 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8857 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8858 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8859 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8860 Elizabeth Young,
<quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,
</quote> redandblack.com,
8861 August
2003, available at
8862 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8863 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8864 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8865 identities, see James Collins,
<quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8866 Name Students,
</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8867 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8868 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
8869 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8873 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8875 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8876 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8877 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8878 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8879 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8882 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8883 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8884 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8885 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8886 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8887 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8888 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8889 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8894 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8895 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8896 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8897 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8898 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8899 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8902 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to
<quote>steal
</quote> music. My
8903 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8904 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8905 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8906 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8907 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8908 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8909 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8910 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8911 protection for copyrighted material,
8915 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8916 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8919 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8920 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8921 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8922 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8923 produce a totally different industry model.
8926 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8927 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8928 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8929 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8930 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8931 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8932 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8933 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8934 interests.
<footnote><para>
8936 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8937 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8938 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8939 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8940 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8941 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8942 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8947 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8948 one of
<quote>the major labels.
</quote> Its position on these matters has now
8950 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8953 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8954 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8955 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8958 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8960 <chapter label=
"12" id=
"harms">
8961 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8963 To fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> to protect
<quote>property,
</quote> the content industry has
8964 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8965 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8966 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8967 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8970 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8971 particular, the consequences for
<quote>free culture.
</quote> But my aim now is to
8972 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8976 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8977 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8978 power of the property called
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> is at its greatest in
8981 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8982 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8984 Yet
<quote>common sense
</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8985 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8986 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8987 rejection of
<quote>piracy
</quote> still has play.
8989 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
8991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8992 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8993 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8994 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8995 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8996 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8998 <section id=
"constrain">
8999 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
9001 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9002 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9003 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9004 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9005 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9006 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9007 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9008 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9009 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9010 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9011 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9012 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
9013 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9016 This digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> is in part an extension of the
9017 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9018 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9019 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9020 of digital
<quote>capturing and sharing
</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9021 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9022 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9023 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9024 the culture all around.
9027 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9028 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9030 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9032 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9033 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9034 storytelling extended across the globe.
9037 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9038 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9039 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9040 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9041 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9042 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9043 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9044 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9045 work is presumptively illegal.
9048 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9049 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9050 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9051 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9052 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9053 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
9054 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9055 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
9056 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9057 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
9058 million.
<footnote><para>
9060 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
9061 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
9062 the settlement, see MCI press release,
<quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9063 Approval for SEC Settlement
</quote> (
7 July
2003), available at
9064 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
9065 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9067 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9068 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9069 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
9070 suffering.
<footnote>
9072 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9073 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
9074 an overview, see Tanya Albert,
<quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9075 Say Tort Reformers,
</quote> amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
9076 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
9077 and
<quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,
</quote> CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
9079 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9081 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
9083 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9084 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9085 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9086 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9088 <indexterm><primary>art, underground
</primary></indexterm>
9090 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9091 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9092 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9093 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9094 Disneys
<quote>pirates.
</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9095 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9099 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9100 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9101 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9102 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
9103 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9104 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9105 fraught. Already, exhibits of
<quote>illegal art
</quote> tour the United
9106 States.
<footnote><para>
9109 See Danit Lidor,
<quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
9111 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9112 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9114 In what does their
<quote>illegality
</quote> consist?
9115 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9116 critical or reflective.
9119 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9120 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9121 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
9122 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9123 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9124 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9125 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9126 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9127 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9128 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9131 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9132 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9133 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9134 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9135 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9136 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9137 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9138 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9139 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9142 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9143 described in chapter
9144 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9145 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9146 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9147 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9153 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9154 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9155 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9156 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9157 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9158 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9159 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9160 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9163 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9164 <quote>breathing room
</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9165 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9166 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9167 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9168 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9169 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9170 these rules have little relationship to the
<quote>law
</quote> with which judges
9174 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9175 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9176 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9177 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9178 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9179 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9180 <quote>copyright
</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9181 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9182 culture that is free.
9185 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9189 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9190 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9191 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9192 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9193 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9195 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying,
<quote>This has been
9196 cleared.
</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9197 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9201 <section id=
"innovators">
9202 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9204 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9205 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9206 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9207 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9208 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9209 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9212 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9213 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9214 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9215 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9216 other aspect by substituting
<quote>free market
</quote> every place I've spoken of
9217 <quote>free culture.
</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9218 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9220 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9222 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9223 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9224 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9225 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9226 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9227 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9228 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9229 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9230 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9231 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9232 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9234 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9236 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9238 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9239 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9240 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9241 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9242 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9243 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9244 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9245 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9246 <quote>nuclear pall
</quote> that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9249 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9250 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9251 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9253 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
9255 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9256 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9257 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9258 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9259 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9260 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9263 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9264 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9265 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9266 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9268 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9271 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9272 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9273 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9274 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9275 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9276 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9277 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9278 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9279 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9280 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9283 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9284 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9286 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9287 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9288 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9289 the kind of content the users liked.
9292 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9293 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9294 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9295 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9296 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9297 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9298 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9299 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9300 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9301 they had already bought.
9303 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9304 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9307 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9308 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9309 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9310 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9311 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9312 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9313 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9314 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9317 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9320 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9321 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9322 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9323 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9324 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9325 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9326 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9330 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9331 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9332 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9335 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9336 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9337 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9338 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9340 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9341 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9342 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9343 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad
</primary></indexterm>
9345 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9346 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9347 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9348 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9349 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9351 See Joseph Menn,
<quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9352 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9353 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown,
<quote>The Music
9354 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,
</quote> Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9355 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9356 See also Jon Healey,
<quote>Online Music Services Besieged,
</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9357 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9359 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9360 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9361 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9362 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9363 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9364 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9365 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9366 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9367 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9368 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9369 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9370 discussion with BMW:
9371 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9372 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9375 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9377 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9378 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9379 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9380 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9381 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9382 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9383 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9386 Rafe Needleman,
<quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,
</quote> <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9388 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9389 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9390 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9395 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with
<quote>your money or your
9396 life
</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9397 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9398 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9399 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9400 constantly threatened by litigation.
9404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9405 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9406 enterprises. The point is the definition of
<quote>illegal.
</quote> The law is a
9407 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9408 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9409 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9410 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9411 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9412 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9413 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9414 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9415 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9416 much less creativity.
9418 <indexterm><primary>market constraints
</primary></indexterm>
9420 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9421 use. Whatever the
<quote>real
</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9422 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9423 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9424 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9425 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9426 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9427 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9428 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9429 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9432 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9433 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9434 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9435 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9436 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9437 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9438 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9439 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9440 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9441 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9442 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9443 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9444 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9445 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9446 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9447 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9448 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9449 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9450 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9451 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9454 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9455 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9456 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9457 this feature is a
<quote>bug.
</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9458 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9459 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9460 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables
<quote>piracy,
</quote> then,
9461 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9464 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9465 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9466 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9467 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9468 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> GartnerG2 and
9469 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9470 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9471 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9473 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9474 <quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9475 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9476 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9477 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9478 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9479 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9481 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9485 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9486 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9487 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9488 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9490 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9491 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9495 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9496 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9497 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9499 See David McGuire,
<quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,
</quote> Newsbytes,
9500 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9502 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9503 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9505 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9508 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9509 innovation
—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9513 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9514 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9515 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9516 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9519 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9520 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9521 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9522 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9523 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9525 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9526 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9527 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9529 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9530 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9531 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9532 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9533 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9536 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9537 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9538 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9539 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9540 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9543 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9545 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9546 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9547 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9548 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9549 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9550 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9551 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9552 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9553 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9554 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9555 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9556 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9559 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9560 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9561 here.
<footnote><para>
9563 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9564 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9565 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9566 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9567 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9568 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9569 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a
<quote>broadcast flag
</quote> that
9570 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9571 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9572 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9573 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2,
<quote>Copyright and
9574 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,
</quote> 27 June
2003,
33–34,
9576 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9577 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9578 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz
</primary></indexterm>
9580 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9581 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9584 <primary>artists
</primary>
9585 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9590 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9591 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9592 artist doesn't get paid for that
<quote>radio performance
</quote> unless he or she
9593 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9594 version of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote>—to memorialize her famous
9595 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9596 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9597 copyright owners of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> would get some money, whereas
9598 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9599 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9602 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9603 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9604 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9605 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9606 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9607 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9608 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9609 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9613 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9614 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9615 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9616 spectrum. Thus, I can
<quote>tune in
</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9617 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9618 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9622 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9623 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9624 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9625 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9626 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9627 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9628 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9629 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9630 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9631 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9632 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9634 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard
</primary></indexterm>
9637 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9638 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9639 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9640 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9641 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9642 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9643 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9648 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9649 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9650 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9651 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9652 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9653 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9654 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9655 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9656 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9657 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9658 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9659 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9660 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9667 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9668 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9669 underestimated the power of
<quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9670 legislation
</quote><footnote><para>
9674 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9677 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9678 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9679 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9680 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9681 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9684 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'
>
9685 <primary>artists
</primary>
9686 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9689 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9690 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9693 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9694 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9695 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9696 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9697 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9698 of
<quote>Happy Birthday
</quote> on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9699 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9700 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9701 burdens terrestrial radio.
9704 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9705 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9706 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9707 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9708 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9711 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9712 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9713 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9714 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9715 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9716 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9717 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9718 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9719 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9720 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9721 C. Picker,
<quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9722 Distribution,
</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461:
<quote>This was
9723 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9724 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9725 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9726 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9727 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.
</quote>
9728 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9729 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9731 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9734 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'
/>
9736 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9737 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9738 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9739 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9742 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9744 name of the service;
9747 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9750 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9753 date of transmission;
9756 time of transmission;
9759 time zone of origination of transmission;
9762 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9765 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9768 sound recording title;
9771 ISRC code of the recording;
9774 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9777 featured recording artist;
9786 UPC code of the retail album;
9792 copyright owner information;
9795 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9798 name of the service or entity;
9804 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9807 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9810 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9813 unique user identifier;
9816 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9821 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9822 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9823 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9824 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9825 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9826 that terrestrial radio does not.
9829 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9830 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9831 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9833 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
9834 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'
>
9835 <primary>Alben, Alex
</primary>
9838 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9839 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9840 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9844 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9845 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9846 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9847 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9848 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9849 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… <quote>How do you come up with a
9851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9852 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9853 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9854 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9855 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9856 business.
…</quote>
9859 <primary>artists
</primary>
9860 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
9863 And the RIAA experts said,
<quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
9864 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9865 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9866 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>.
</quote> (Emphasis
9870 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'
/>
9872 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9873 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9874 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9875 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9876 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9877 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9878 effective to prevent it.
9881 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9882 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9884 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9886 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9887 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9890 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9891 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9892 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9895 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9896 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9897 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9898 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9899 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie,
<quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,
</quote> Pew
9900 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9901 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9902 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9903 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9905 According to the RIAA,
9906 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9907 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9910 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9911 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9913 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9914 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9915 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9917 response by the other.
9920 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9921 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9922 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9923 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9924 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9925 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9926 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9927 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9928 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9929 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9930 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9931 was.
<footnote><para>
9933 Alex Pham,
<quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,
</quote> <citetitle>Los
9934 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
9936 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9937 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9938 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9939 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9940 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9941 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9945 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9946 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9947 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9948 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9949 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9950 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9951 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9952 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9953 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9955 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel,
<quote>Alcohol Consumption During
9956 Prohibition,
</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9959 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9960 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9961 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9963 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9964 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9965 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9967 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9968 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9969 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9970 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9971 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9973 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein,
<quote>Tax
9974 Compliance,
</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9975 compliance literature).
9977 We pride ourselves on our
<quote>free society,
</quote> but an endless array of
9978 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9979 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9980 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
9983 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9984 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9985 students about the importance of
<quote>ethics.
</quote> As my colleague Charlie
9986 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9987 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9988 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9989 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9990 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9991 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9992 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9993 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9994 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9995 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9996 lives both normally and legally, since
<quote>normally
</quote> entails a certain
9997 degree of illegality.
9998 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
10001 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10002 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10003 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10004 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10005 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10006 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10007 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10008 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10009 to consider the alternative.
10013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10014 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10015 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10016 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10017 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10018 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10021 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10022 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10023 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10024 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10025 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10026 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10027 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10028 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10029 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10030 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10031 introduced this different idea of
<quote>sharing.
</quote> We need to be able to
10032 call these twenty million Americans
<quote>citizens,
</quote> not
<quote>felons.
</quote>
10035 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10036 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10037 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10038 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10039 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10040 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10041 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10042 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10043 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10044 a nation of felons?
10047 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10050 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10051 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10052 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10053 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10056 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10057 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That
<quote>use
</quote> of the
10058 recordings is free.
10061 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10062 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10063 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am
<quote>free
</quote> to copy,
10064 or
<quote>rip,
</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10065 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that
<quote>freedom
</quote> was a
10066 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the
<quote>Rip, Mix, Burn
</quote>
10067 capacities of digital technologies.
10069 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
10071 This
<quote>use
</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10072 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10073 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10074 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10075 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10076 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10077 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10078 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10079 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10082 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
10083 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10084 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10085 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10086 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10087 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10088 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10089 on people's machines.
10092 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10093 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10094 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10095 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10096 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10097 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10100 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10101 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10102 plastic or were part of a massively complex
<quote>digital rights
10103 management
</quote> system.
10106 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10107 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10108 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10109 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10110 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10111 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10112 freedom to move content easily?
10115 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10116 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10117 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10118 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10119 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10120 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10121 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10122 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10123 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10126 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10127 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10128 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10129 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10130 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10131 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10132 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10135 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10136 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10137 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10138 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10141 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10142 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10146 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10147 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10148 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10149 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10150 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10151 Lohmann describes, this is the
<quote>collateral damage
</quote> that
<quote>arises
10152 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10153 criminals.
</quote> This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10155 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
10158 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,
</quote> von Lohmann
10160 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10164 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10165 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10166 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10167 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10168 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10169 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think,
<quote>Oh, well,
10170 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.
</quote> Well, what this campaign
10171 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10172 American Internet-using population into
<quote>lawbreakers.
</quote>
10176 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10177 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10178 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10181 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10182 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10183 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10184 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10185 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10186 an Internet user is revealed.
10189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10190 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10191 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10192 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10193 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10194 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10195 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10196 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10197 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10199 See Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10200 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,
</quote>
10201 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs,
<quote>Worried Parents
10202 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10203 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10204 Being Sued,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10205 Graham,
<quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10206 2003,
4D; John Schwartz,
<quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10207 Fan, Either,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi,
<quote>Is
10208 Brianna a Criminal?
</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10213 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10214 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10215 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10217 See
<quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10218 Some Methods Used,
</quote> CNN.com, available at
10219 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10221 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10222 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10223 one of those MP3s will have the same
<quote>fingerprint.
</quote>
10226 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10227 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10228 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10229 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10230 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10231 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10232 network is
<quote>cooperating
</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10233 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10234 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10235 as a
<quote>criminal.
</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10236 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10238 See Jeff Adler,
<quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,
</quote>
10239 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>Four
10240 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10241 Colleges,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10242 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,
</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10243 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas,
<quote>Music
10244 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10245 Lawsuit Possible,
</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox,
<quote>RIAA
10246 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10247 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10248 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista,
<quote>Download Warning
101: Freshman
10249 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10250 Sharing,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11;
<quote>Raid, Letters
10251 Are Weapons at Universities,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10253 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10254 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10257 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10258 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10259 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10260 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10261 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10262 this
<quote>contraband
</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10265 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10266 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10267 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10269 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10273 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10274 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10275 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10276 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10277 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10278 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10279 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10280 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10281 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10282 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10283 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10284 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10285 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10286 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10287 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10288 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10293 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered
<quote>criminals
</quote> under
10294 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10295 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10296 considered
<quote>criminals,
</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10297 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10298 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10305 <part id=
"c-balances">
10306 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10311 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10312 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10313 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10314 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10317 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10318 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10319 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10320 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10321 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10325 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10326 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10327 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10328 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10329 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10330 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10334 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10335 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10336 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10337 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10338 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10339 made that is happening all around.
10342 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10343 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10344 gasoline onto this fire.
10347 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10348 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10349 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10350 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10353 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10354 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10355 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10356 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10357 success will require.
10361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10362 <chapter label=
"13" id=
"eldred">
10363 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10364 <indexterm id=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'
>
10365 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel
</primary>
10368 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10369 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10370 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10371 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10372 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10373 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10377 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10378 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10379 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10380 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10381 them available for free.
10384 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10385 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10386 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10387 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10388 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10390 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10391 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10392 accessible
—today.
10395 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10396 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10397 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10398 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10399 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10400 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10401 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10402 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10403 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10404 commercial publications of public domain works.
10406 <indexterm startref=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'
/>
10408 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10409 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10410 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10411 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10412 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10413 call the
<quote>noncommercial publishing industry,
</quote> which before the
10414 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10415 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10416 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10417 generally.
<footnote><para>
10419 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10420 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10421 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10422 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10423 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10424 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10425 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10426 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10427 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10428 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10429 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10430 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10431 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10432 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10433 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10436 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10437 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10438 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10439 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10440 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10441 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10442 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10443 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10444 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10445 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10446 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10447 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10449 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10450 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10454 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10455 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10456 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10457 <quote>copyrights should be forever.
</quote><footnote><para>
10459 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary
</primary></indexterm>
10460 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny
</primary></indexterm>
10461 The full text is:
<quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10462 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10463 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10464 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10465 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10466 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10467 Congress,
</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10472 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10473 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10474 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10475 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10476 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10477 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10481 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10483 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10485 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10486 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10488 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10492 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10493 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10494 their
… Writings.
…
10498 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10499 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10500 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10501 something
—for example, to regulate
<quote>commerce among the several
10502 states
</quote> or
<quote>declare War.
</quote> But here, the
<quote>something
</quote> is something quite
10503 specific
—to
<quote>promote
… Progress
</quote>—through means that
10504 are also specific
— by
<quote>securing
</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights
</quote> (i.e.,
10505 copyrights)
<quote>for limited Times.
</quote>
10508 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10509 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10510 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10511 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be
<quote>limited
</quote> will have
10512 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10513 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10514 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10515 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms
<quote>on the
10516 installment plan,
</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10517 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10520 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10521 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10522 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10523 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10524 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10525 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10526 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10527 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10528 this gravy train going.
10531 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10532 government.
<quote>Corruption
</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10533 bribed. Rather,
<quote>corruption
</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10534 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10535 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10536 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10537 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10540 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10541 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10542 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10543 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10544 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10545 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10546 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10547 published by anyone for free.
10550 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10551 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10552 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10553 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10557 <quote>Next year,
</quote> the adviser announces,
<quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10560 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10561 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10562 those works.
</quote>
10565 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,
</quote> she continues,
<quote>that
10566 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10567 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10568 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.
</quote>
10571 <quote>Hope?
</quote> a fellow board member says.
<quote>Can't we be doing something
10575 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>We could contribute
10576 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10577 they support the bill.
</quote>
10580 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10581 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it.
<quote>How much
10582 would we get if this extension were passed?
</quote> you ask the adviser.
<quote>How
10583 much is it worth?
</quote>
10586 <quote>Well,
</quote> the adviser says,
<quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10587 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10588 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10589 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate.
</quote>
10592 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10593 correct conclusion:
10596 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10597 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10599 would assure that the bill was passed?
</quote>
10602 <quote>Absolutely,
</quote> the adviser responds.
<quote>It is worth it to you to
10604 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10605 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000.
</quote>
10608 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10609 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10610 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10611 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10613 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10615 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10616 the copyright term extended.
10619 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10620 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10621 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10624 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10626 Term Extension Act, this
<quote>theory
</quote> about incentives was proved
10627 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10628 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10629 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10630 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10631 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press,
<quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10632 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,
</quote>
10633 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10635 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10636 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10637 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10638 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown,
<quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10639 Age,
</quote> available at
10640 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10642 Disney is estimated to have
10643 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10644 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10646 Alan K. Ota,
<quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,
</quote>
10647 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10648 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10653 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10654 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10656 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10657 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10658 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10659 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10660 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10661 <quote>limited.
</quote>
10662 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10666 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10667 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10668 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10669 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10670 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10671 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10675 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10679 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10680 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10681 power to regulate only
<quote>commerce among the several states
</quote> (aka
10683 commerce
</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10684 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10689 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10690 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10691 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10692 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10693 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10695 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
10697 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10698 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10699 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10700 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10701 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10702 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10703 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10704 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10705 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10706 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10707 position to second-guess Congress.
10710 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,
</quote>
10711 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10712 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10714 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10715 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10716 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10717 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10719 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10723 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10724 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10726 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10727 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10728 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10729 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10730 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10731 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10732 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10733 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10734 limitation to
<quote>limited times
</quote> notwithstanding.
10736 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10737 yield the conclusion that Congress
10738 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10739 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10740 term, then there would be no
<quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power over
10741 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10742 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10743 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10744 term of existing copyrights.
10747 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10748 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10749 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10750 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10751 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10752 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10753 demonstrating the
<quote>fidelity
</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10754 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10755 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10756 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10757 were going to be petty politicians.
10760 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10761 argument in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10762 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10763 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10764 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10765 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10766 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10767 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10768 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10769 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10770 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10771 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10772 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10773 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10774 piracy that affects us all.
10777 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10779 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10780 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10781 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than
<quote>legal piracy.
</quote><footnote><para>
10783 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10784 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10785 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10787 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10788 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10789 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10791 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10794 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10796 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10798 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10799 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10800 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10801 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10802 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10803 bought to extend them again.
10806 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10808 Mickey Mouse and
<quote>Rhapsody in Blue.
</quote> These works are too
10809 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10811 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10813 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10814 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10815 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10816 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10818 and no longer available as a result.
10821 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10822 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10823 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10824 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10825 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10826 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10827 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10829 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10830 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10831 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10836 Think practically about the consequence of this
10837 extension
—practically,
10838 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10840 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10841 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10842 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10843 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10845 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10847 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital
</primary></indexterm>
10849 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10850 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10851 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10852 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10853 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10854 list of books still under copyright.
10857 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10858 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10861 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10863 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10864 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10865 being at least a list?
10868 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10869 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10871 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10873 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10874 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10877 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,
</quote> the
10878 apologists for the system respond.
<quote>Why should there be a list of
10879 copyright owners?
</quote>
10882 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10883 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10884 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10885 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10886 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10887 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10888 what tangible property.
10891 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10892 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10893 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10896 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10897 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10899 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10900 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10901 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10902 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10903 know quite well who owns what property.
10906 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10907 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10909 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10910 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10911 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10912 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10913 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10914 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10915 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10918 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10919 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10921 for other creative works is much more dire.
10923 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'
>
10924 <primary>Agee, Michael
</primary>
10926 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
10927 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
10929 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10930 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10931 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10932 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
10933 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10934 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10935 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10936 money. According to one estimate,
<quote>Roach has sold about
60,
000
10937 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10938 films.
</quote><footnote><para>
10940 See David G. Savage,
<quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,
</quote>
10941 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld,
<quote>Classic Movies,
10942 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10943 Down Copyright Extension,
</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
10946 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10949 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10950 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10951 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10952 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10955 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10958 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10959 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10960 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10961 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10962 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10963 work available for distribution.
10966 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10967 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10968 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10969 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10970 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10971 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10973 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10974 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
10975 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10976 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10977 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
10978 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10983 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10985 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10986 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10987 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10988 locate the copyright owner.
10991 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10992 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10993 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10994 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10995 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10996 to these films is exceptionally high.
10999 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11000 copyright owner when she shows up?
</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11001 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11002 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11003 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11004 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11005 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11006 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11007 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11010 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11013 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11015 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11016 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11017 the copyright expires.
11019 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'
/>
11021 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11022 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11023 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11025 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11029 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
11030 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
11031 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
11032 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
11034 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an
<quote>engine of
11035 free expression.
</quote>
11038 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11039 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11041 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11042 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11043 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11045 the commercial life ends.
11048 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11049 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
11050 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11052 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11054 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11055 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
11056 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11057 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11058 have, we need to have access to this history.
11061 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11064 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11065 this context do no good.
11068 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11069 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11070 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11071 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11072 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11073 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11074 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11075 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11076 was independent of copyright law.
11079 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11080 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
11081 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11082 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11083 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11084 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11085 market didn't have more to offer.
11088 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11089 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11090 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11091 would not have interfered with anything.
11094 But this situation has now changed.
11096 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'
>
11097 <primary>archives, digital
</primary>
11100 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11101 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11102 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11103 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11104 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11105 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11106 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11107 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11108 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11109 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11113 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11114 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11115 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11116 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11117 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11118 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11119 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11120 written for a radically different context.
11123 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11124 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11125 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11126 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11127 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11128 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11129 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
11130 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11131 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11134 You may well ask,
<quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11135 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11136 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11137 culture widely?
</quote>
11140 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11141 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11142 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11143 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11144 of a library is to serve what
<quote>the market
</quote> would demand. But if you
11145 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11146 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11147 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11148 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11150 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'
/>
11152 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11153 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11154 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11155 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11157 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11158 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11159 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11160 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11161 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11162 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11164 Jason Schultz,
<quote>The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,
</quote> 20
11165 December
2002, available at
11166 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11171 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11172 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11173 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11174 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
11175 violated the Constitution's
<quote>limited Times
</quote> requirement, and (
2) that
11176 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11179 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11180 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11181 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11182 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11183 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11186 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11187 copyrights be for
<quote>limited Times
</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11188 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11189 <quote>stopping point
</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11190 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11191 terms that are
<quote>limited.
</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11192 to interpret the term
<quote>limited Times
</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11193 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11194 power to extend existing terms.
11197 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11198 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11199 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11200 whole, where the court will sit
<quote>en banc
</quote> to hear the case.
11203 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11204 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11207 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11208 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11209 overstepped its bounds.
11212 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11213 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11214 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11215 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11216 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11219 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11220 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11221 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11222 briefs and preparing for argument.
11225 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11226 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11227 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11228 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11229 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11230 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11231 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11232 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11235 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11236 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11237 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11240 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11242 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11243 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11244 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11245 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11248 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11249 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11250 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11252 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11253 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11254 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11256 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11257 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11258 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11259 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11260 told me, if we could make the issue seem
<quote>important
</quote> to the Supreme
11261 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11262 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against
<quote>the
11263 most powerful media companies in the world.
</quote>
11266 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11267 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11268 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11269 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11270 <quote>right
</quote> as in
<quote>true,
</quote> I thought, but it is
<quote>wrong
</quote> as in
<quote>it just shouldn't be
11271 that way.
</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11272 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11273 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11275 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11276 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11278 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11279 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11280 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11282 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11283 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11284 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11287 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11288 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11289 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11290 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11291 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11292 why it was unconstitutional.
11295 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11297 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11298 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11299 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11300 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11301 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11302 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11303 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11304 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11305 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11306 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11307 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11308 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11309 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11310 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11311 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11314 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11315 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11316 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11317 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11318 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11319 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11320 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11321 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11322 to get bogged down?
</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11323 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11324 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11325 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11326 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11327 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11330 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11331 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11332 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11333 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11334 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11335 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11338 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11339 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11341 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11342 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11343 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11344 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11345 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11346 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11347 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11348 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11349 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11350 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11351 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11352 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11355 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11356 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11357 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11358 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11359 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11360 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11362 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11364 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11365 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11366 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11367 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11370 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11371 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11372 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11373 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11374 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11376 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11377 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11378 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11379 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11380 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11381 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11382 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11383 nothing more than
<quote>rent-seeking
</quote>—the fancy term economists use
11384 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11387 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11388 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11389 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11390 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11391 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11392 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11393 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11394 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11397 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11398 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11399 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11400 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan
</primary></indexterm>
11401 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen
</primary></indexterm>
11402 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11405 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11406 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11407 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11408 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11409 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11410 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11411 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11412 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11413 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11414 confidence in our argument.
11415 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11418 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11419 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these
<quote>friends
</quote> included
11420 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11421 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11425 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11426 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11427 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11428 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11429 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11430 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11434 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11435 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11436 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11437 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11438 domain, then people could use it to
<quote>glorify drugs or to create
11439 pornography.
</quote><footnote><para>
11441 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11442 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11444 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11445 <quote>protection
</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11446 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11447 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11449 Dinitia Smith,
<quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11450 Mouse Joins the Fray,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11453 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11454 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11455 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11456 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11459 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11460 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11461 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11462 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11463 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say,
<quote>Give us twenty years
11464 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11465 better with them than anyone else.
</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11466 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11467 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11468 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11471 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11472 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11473 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11474 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11475 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11476 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11477 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11479 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
11480 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11482 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11483 called
<quote>the Conservatives.
</quote> The other we called
<quote>the Rest.
</quote> The
11484 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11485 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11486 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11487 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line
11488 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11489 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11491 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11493 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11494 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11495 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11498 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11499 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11500 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11501 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11502 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11505 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11506 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11507 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11508 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11509 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11510 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11511 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11512 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11515 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11517 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11518 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11519 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11520 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11521 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11522 these retrospective extensions.
11525 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11526 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11527 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11528 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11529 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11530 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11533 This analysis of
<quote>the Rest
</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11534 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11535 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11536 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11537 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation
—the
11538 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11539 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11540 powers have limits.
11543 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11544 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11545 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11547 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11548 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11549 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11550 supposed to be
<quote>limited.
</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11551 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
11552 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11553 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11557 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11558 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11559 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11560 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11561 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11564 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11565 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831
11566 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11568 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11571 But this
<quote>consistency
</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11573 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11574 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11575 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11577 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11579 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11580 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11582 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11583 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11584 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11586 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11587 weeks, I was repeatedly
<quote>mooted
</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11589 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11590 help in the case. Such
<quote>moots
</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11591 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11594 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11595 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11596 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11597 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11599 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11600 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11603 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11604 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11606 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11607 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11608 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11609 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11610 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11613 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11614 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11615 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11616 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11617 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.
</quote>
11619 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11621 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11622 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11623 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11624 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11625 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11626 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11627 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11628 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11629 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11630 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11631 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11634 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11635 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11638 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11639 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11640 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11641 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11643 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11644 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11645 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11646 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11647 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11648 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11649 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11650 family of the Justices.
11653 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11654 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11655 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11656 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11658 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day
</primary></indexterm>
11660 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11661 The history was bothering her.
11665 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11666 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11667 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11668 practice that began with the very first act.
11672 She was quite willing to concede
<quote>that this flies directly in the face
11673 of what the framers had in mind.
</quote> But my response again and again
11674 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11678 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11679 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11681 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11686 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11687 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11688 Kennedy, who observed,
11692 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11693 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11694 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11695 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11696 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11700 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11706 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11707 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11708 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11709 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11710 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11713 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11715 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11716 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11717 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11718 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11719 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11722 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11723 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11724 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11727 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11728 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11734 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11735 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11738 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11739 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11741 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11742 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11743 into the Copyright Clause.
11746 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.
</primary></indexterm>
11748 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11749 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11750 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11754 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11755 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11756 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11757 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11762 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11763 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11764 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11765 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11766 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11767 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11768 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11769 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11770 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11771 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11775 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11776 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11779 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11783 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11784 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11785 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11786 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11787 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11788 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11789 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11790 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11791 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11792 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11793 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11794 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11795 law that it had established elsewhere.
11798 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11799 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11800 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11801 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11802 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11805 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11806 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11807 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11810 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11811 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11812 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11816 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11817 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11818 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11819 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11820 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11825 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11826 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11827 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11830 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11831 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11832 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11833 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11836 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11837 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11838 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11839 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11840 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11841 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11842 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11843 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11844 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11847 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11848 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11849 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11850 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11851 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11852 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11853 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11854 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11855 the system we have.
11857 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11859 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11860 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11861 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11862 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11863 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11864 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11865 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11866 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11867 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11869 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11871 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11872 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11873 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11874 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11875 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11876 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11877 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11878 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11879 <quote>limited,
</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11880 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11883 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11884 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11885 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11886 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11887 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11890 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11891 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11892 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11894 <indexterm><primary>originalism
</primary></indexterm>
11896 It was first anger with the five
<quote>Conservatives.
</quote> It would have been
11897 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11898 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11899 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11900 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11901 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11902 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is
<quote>originalism
</quote>—to
11903 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11904 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11905 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other
<quote>originalist
</quote> rulings. Where was their
11906 <quote>originalism
</quote> now?
11909 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11910 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11911 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11912 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11915 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11916 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11917 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11918 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11919 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11920 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11924 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11926 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11929 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11931 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11932 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11933 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11934 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11935 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11936 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11937 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11938 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11939 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11942 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11943 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11944 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11945 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11946 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11947 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11948 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11949 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11950 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11951 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11952 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11953 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11954 effort to persuade; but I
11955 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11956 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11957 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11958 should decide the issue.
11960 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11962 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11963 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11965 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11968 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11969 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11970 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11971 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11974 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11975 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11976 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11977 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11981 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11982 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11983 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11984 case was a mistake.
<quote>The Court is not ready,
</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
11985 issue should not be raised until it is.
11986 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11989 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11990 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11991 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11992 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11993 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11994 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11995 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11996 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11997 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11998 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11999 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
12001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12002 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12003 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12004 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12005 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12006 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12010 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12011 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12012 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12013 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12014 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12015 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12019 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12020 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12021 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12022 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The
<quote>powerful and wealthy
</quote> line is a bit
12023 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12024 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12026 <figure id=
"fig-18">
12027 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
12028 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
12029 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
12032 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12033 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That
<quote>grand experiment
</quote> we call the
12034 <quote>public domain
</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think,
<quote>Honey,
12035 I shrunk the Constitution.
</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12036 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12037 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12038 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12042 <chapter label=
"14" id=
"eldred-ii">
12043 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
12045 The day
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
12046 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was
12047 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
12048 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
12049 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
12050 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
12051 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
12053 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
12055 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12056 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12057 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12058 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12059 Justice Kennedy:
<quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12060 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12061 that.
</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12062 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12065 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12066 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12068 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12069 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12070 the work passed into the public domain.
12073 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12074 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12075 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12078 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12079 is either the
<quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act
</quote> or the
<quote>Copyright
12080 Term Deregulation Act.
</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12081 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12082 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12083 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
12084 everything else, let the content go.
12086 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12088 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12089 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12090 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12091 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12092 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12093 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12094 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12095 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12096 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12097 the stupid harm of the present system.
12100 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12101 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12102 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12103 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12104 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12105 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12106 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12107 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12108 where copyright owners could be identified.
12110 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12111 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12114 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
12115 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12116 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12117 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
12119 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12120 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12121 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12122 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
12123 every text of the Convention has provided that
<quote>the enjoyment and the
12124 exercise
</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention
<quote>shall not be subject
12125 to any formality.
</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12126 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12127 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12128 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12129 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12130 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12131 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12132 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12133 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12134 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
12135 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12136 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
12137 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a
<quote>natural right.
</quote> Natural
12138 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12139 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12140 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12141 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12142 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12145 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12146 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12147 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12148 <quote>Walt Disney creativity
</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12149 know what's protected and what's not.
12151 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12153 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12154 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12155 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12156 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12157 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12158 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12159 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
12160 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12163 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12164 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12165 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12166 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12167 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12168 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12171 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12172 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12173 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12174 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12176 imposed upon creators.
12179 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12180 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12182 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12183 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12184 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12185 the government. He has a property right over the table
<quote>naturally,
</quote>
12186 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12187 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12191 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12192 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12193 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12194 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12195 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12196 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12200 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12201 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12202 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12203 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12204 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12205 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12206 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12207 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12208 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12209 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12210 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12211 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12212 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12213 system of protection for property generally.
12216 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12217 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12218 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12219 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12220 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12221 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12222 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12223 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12225 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12226 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12227 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12228 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12231 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12232 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12233 didn't
<quote>get.
</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12234 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12235 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be,
<quote>short,
</quote> then this
12236 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12237 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12238 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12241 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12242 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12243 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12244 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12245 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12246 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12247 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12250 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12251 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12252 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12253 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12254 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12257 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12258 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12259 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12260 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12261 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12264 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12265 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12266 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12270 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12271 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12272 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12275 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12276 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12277 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12278 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12279 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12280 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12281 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12282 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12283 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12284 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12286 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12288 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12289 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12290 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12291 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12294 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12295 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12296 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12297 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12298 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog,
<quote>we are
12299 close.
</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12300 something good might happen here.
12301 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12304 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12305 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12306 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12307 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12308 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12309 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12312 The MPAA argued first that Congress had
<quote>firmly rejected the central
12313 concept in the proposed bill
</quote>—that copyrights be renewed. That
12314 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's
<quote>firm rejection
</quote> had occurred
12315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12316 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12317 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12318 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12319 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12320 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12321 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12322 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12323 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12324 argued that the bill would impose
<quote>enormous
</quote> costs, since a
12325 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12326 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12327 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12328 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12329 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12330 film is a valid derivative use.
12333 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12334 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12335 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12336 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12337 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12338 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12341 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12342 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12343 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12344 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12345 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12346 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12347 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12351 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12352 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12353 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12354 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12359 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12360 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12361 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12362 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12363 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12364 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12365 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12366 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12367 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12368 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12371 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12372 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12373 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12374 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12375 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12376 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the
<quote>Dark
12377 Content
</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12378 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12379 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12382 What does this industry really want?
12385 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12386 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12387 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12388 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12389 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12390 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12391 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12392 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12396 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12397 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12398 its aim not the protection of
<quote>property
</quote> but the rejection of a
12399 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12400 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12404 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12405 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12408 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12409 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12410 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12411 and to share its own creation.
12413 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12414 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12416 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12417 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12418 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12419 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12420 block the progress of others.
12423 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12424 <quote>property
</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12425 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12426 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing
<quote>permission
12427 society.
</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12428 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12429 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12434 <chapter label=
"15" id=
"c-conclusion">
12435 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12436 <indexterm id=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'
>
12437 <primary>antiretroviral drugs
</primary>
12439 <indexterm id=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'
>
12440 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies
</primary>
12442 <indexterm id=
"idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'
>
12443 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in
</primary>
12446 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12447 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12448 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12449 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12450 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12453 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12454 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12455 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12456 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12457 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12458 the disease almost invisible.
12461 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12462 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12463 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12464 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12466 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12467 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12468 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,
<quote>Final Report: Integrating
12469 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy
</quote> (London,
2002),
12471 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12473 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12474 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12478 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12479 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12480 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12481 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12482 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12483 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12484 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12487 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12488 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12489 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12490 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12491 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12492 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12493 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12494 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12498 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12499 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12500 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12501 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12502 costs significantly below the market price.
12505 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12506 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12507 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12508 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12509 Africa from India. This is called
<quote>parallel importation,
</quote> and it is
12510 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12511 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12514 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12515 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12516 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12517 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12521 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12522 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12523 characterized it,
<quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12524 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12525 imports.
</quote><footnote><para>
12527 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12528 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12529 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12530 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12531 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12532 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12533 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12534 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12535 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12538 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12539 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12540 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12541 possible trade sanctions.
12542 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12543 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12544 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12545 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12546 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12547 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12548 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12549 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12550 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12551 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12552 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12554 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12555 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12556 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12557 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12560 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12561 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12562 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12563 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12564 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12565 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12566 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12567 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12570 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12571 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12572 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12573 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12574 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12575 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12578 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12579 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12580 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12581 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12582 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12583 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12587 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12588 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12591 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12593 See Sabin Russell,
<quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12594 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,
</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12595 May
1999, A1, available at
12596 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12597 (
<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12598 system of intellectual property protection
</quote>); Robert Weissman,
<quote>AIDS
12599 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12600 Medicines,
</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12601 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12602 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson,
<quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12603 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12604 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,
</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12605 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12606 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12608 It was because
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> would be violated that these
12609 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12610 importance of
<quote>intellectual property
</quote> that led these government actors
12611 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12614 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12615 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12616 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12617 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12618 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the
<quote>sanctity
</quote> of an
12619 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12620 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12621 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12624 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12625 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12626 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12627 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12628 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12629 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12632 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12633 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12634 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12635 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12636 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12637 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12640 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12641 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12642 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask,
<quote>How
12643 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12644 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?
</quote> Because there is no
<quote>sound
12645 bite
</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12646 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12647 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12648 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12649 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12650 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12651 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12652 idea called
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote>
12655 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12656 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12657 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12658 What is the argument?
12661 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12662 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12663 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12664 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12665 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12666 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12667 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12668 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12669 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12670 were balanced in just this sense.
12673 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12674 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12675 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12676 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12677 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12678 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12680 <indexterm startref=
"idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'
/>
12681 <indexterm startref=
"idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'
/>
12682 <indexterm startref=
"idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'
/>
12684 A simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12685 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12686 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12687 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12688 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12689 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12691 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12692 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12693 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12694 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12695 this common sense open its eyes.
12698 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12699 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12700 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12701 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12702 to fight
<quote>piracy,
</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12703 the idea of
<quote>creative property,
</quote> while transforming real creators into
12704 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12705 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12706 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12707 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12708 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12709 produce the
<quote>perfect storm
</quote> for free culture.
12711 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
12712 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'
>
12713 <primary>biomedical research
</primary>
12716 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12717 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12718 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12719 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12720 August
2003, E1, available at
12721 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New,
<quote>Global Group's
12722 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12723 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12724 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New,
<quote>U.S. Official
12725 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,
</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12726 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12727 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12729 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12730 a meeting to discuss
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12731 goods.
</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12732 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12733 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12734 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12735 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12736 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12737 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12738 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12739 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12740 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12741 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12743 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12744 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12745 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12746 in the early
1980s. And it included
<quote>open source and free software.
</quote>
12747 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12748 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12749 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12751 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'
/>
12753 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12754 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12755 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12756 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12757 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12760 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12761 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12764 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12765 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12766 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12767 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12771 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12772 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12773 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12774 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12775 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12776 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12777 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12778 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12779 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12780 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12781 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12782 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12783 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12784 talk about an
<quote>Information Society
</quote> unless one also talked about the
12785 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12786 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12787 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12790 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12791 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12792 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12795 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12796 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12797 thus the meeting about
<quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12798 public goods
</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12801 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12802 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is
<quote>open source
12803 and free software.
</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12804 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12805 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12806 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12807 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12808 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12809 rather than
<quote>proprietary software,
</quote> for their own internal uses.
12812 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12813 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12814 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12815 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12816 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12817 operating system, the most famous bit of
<quote>free software
</quote>—and IBM
12818 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support
<quote>open source and
12819 free software
</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12820 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12821 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12823 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12824 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12825 <quote>open source
</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12826 principal opposition is to
<quote>free software
</quote> licensed under a
<quote>copyleft
</quote>
12827 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12828 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith,
<quote>The Future
12829 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,
</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
12830 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12831 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12832 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12833 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12834 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12835 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12836 May
2001), available at
12837 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12839 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12840 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft
</quote> licenses
</primary></indexterm>
12841 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12842 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12845 More important for our purposes, to support
<quote>open source and free
12846 software
</quote> is not to oppose copyright.
<quote>Open source and free software
</quote>
12847 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12848 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12849 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12852 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12853 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12854 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12855 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12856 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12857 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12858 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12859 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12860 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12863 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12864 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12865 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12866 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12867 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12868 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12869 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12871 Krim,
<quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,
</quote> available at
<ulink
12872 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12874 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12875 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
12878 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12879 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12880 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12881 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12882 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12883 its lobbying efforts.
12886 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12887 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12888 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12889 Office, explained that
<quote>open-source software runs counter to the
12890 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.
</quote>
12891 She is quoted as saying,
<quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12892 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12893 goals of WIPO.
</quote>
12896 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12898 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12900 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12901 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12902 right called
<quote>copyright
</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12903 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it
<quote>runs counter
</quote> to the mission
12904 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12905 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12906 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12907 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12910 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to
<quote>promote
</quote>
12911 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12912 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12913 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12914 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12915 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12916 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12917 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12918 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12919 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12920 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12923 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12924 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12925 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12926 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12927 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to
<quote>waive
</quote> or
12928 <quote>disclaim
</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12929 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
12930 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12931 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12932 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12933 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
12934 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12937 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12938 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,
</quote> she's
12939 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12940 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12941 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12942 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from
<quote>waiving
</quote> or
12943 <quote>disclaiming
</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12944 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12945 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12949 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12950 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called
<quote>feudalism.
</quote> Under
12951 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12952 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12953 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12954 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12955 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12956 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12957 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12960 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12961 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12963 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12964 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12966 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
12967 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12969 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12970 choice now is whether that information society will be
12971 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
12975 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12976 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12977 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12978 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12982 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12983 it should be (
<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12984 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12985 not simply to promote intellectual property rights
</quote>), not as it is. If
12986 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12987 say anything wrong. But in the world
12988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12989 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12990 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12994 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12995 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12996 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12997 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12998 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12999 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13000 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13001 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13004 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13005 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13006 <quote>goal
</quote> of a government should be
<quote>to promote the right balance
</quote> of
13007 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13008 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism.
<quote>Typical for
13009 an academic,
</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13012 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13013 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13014 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13015 our own country's history).
13018 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13019 government should be to
<quote>seek balance,
</quote> then count me with the silly,
13020 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13021 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13022 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13023 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13024 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13025 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
13026 democracy in the world, become?
13029 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13030 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13031 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13033 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13034 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
13036 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
13038 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
13039 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
13040 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
13041 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
13042 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
13043 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
13044 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
13045 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
13046 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
13047 hearings and a different result.
13048 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
13049 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
13052 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13053 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13054 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13055 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13056 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13057 concentration in the media.
13060 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13061 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13062 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13063 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13064 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13067 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13068 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13069 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13070 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13071 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13072 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
13073 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
13075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13077 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13078 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13079 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13080 Americans have a long history of fighting
<quote>big,
</quote> wisely or not. That
13081 we could be motivated to fight
<quote>big
</quote> again is not something new.
13084 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13085 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13086 the idea of
<quote>intellectual property.
</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13087 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13088 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13089 called
<quote>property
</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13092 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13095 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
13097 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
13098 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
13100 John Borland,
<quote>RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers,
</quote> CNET News.com, September
13102 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
13103 R. La Monica,
<quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,
</quote> CNN/Money,
8 September
13105 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
13106 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty,
<quote>Sued for a Song,
13107 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,
</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
13108 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens,
<quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13109 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13110 Defendants,
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13111 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,
</quote> <citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
13113 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
13115 Eminem has just been sued for
<quote>sampling
</quote> someone else's
13116 music.
<footnote><para>
13118 Jon Wiederhorn,
<quote>Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,
</quote>
13119 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
13120 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
13122 The story about Bob Dylan
<quote>stealing
</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13123 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
13125 Kenji Hall, Associated Press,
<quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13126 Dylan Songs,
</quote> Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
13127 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
13128 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13130 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
13131 anonymous
—reports
<quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13132 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13133 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13134 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13135 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.
</quote> Congressmen are
13136 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13137 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13138 kids who use a computer to share content.
13140 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
13141 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
13142 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13143 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
13144 <indexterm><primary>BBC
</primary></indexterm>
13145 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in
</primary></indexterm>
13147 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13148 that it will build a
<quote>Creative Archive,
</quote> from which British citizens can
13149 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13150 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,
</quote> BBC press release,
13151 24 August
2003, available at
13152 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13154 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13155 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13156 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13157 country.
<footnote><para>
13159 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,
</quote> Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
13161 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13164 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13165 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13166 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13167 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13168 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13169 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13170 day into the Causbys.
13173 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13174 potential is ever to be realized.
13176 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13180 <chapter label=
"16" id=
"c-afterword">
13181 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13185 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13186 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13187 maps what might be done.
13190 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13191 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13192 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13193 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13196 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13197 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13198 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13199 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13203 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13204 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13205 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13206 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13207 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13209 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13211 <section id=
"usnow">
13212 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13214 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13215 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
13216 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13217 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13220 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13221 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13222 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—<quote>All Rights
13223 Reserved
</quote>— and those who reject copyright
—<quote>No Rights
13224 Reserved.
</quote> The
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13225 permission before you
<quote>use
</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The
<quote>No
13226 Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13227 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13230 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13231 tilted in the
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13232 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13233 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13237 original design of the Internet was
<quote>no rights reserved.
</quote> Content was
13238 <quote>taken
</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13242 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13243 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13244 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13245 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13246 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13247 architecture made the effective default
<quote>no rights reserved,
</quote> the
13248 future architecture will make the effective default
<quote>all rights
13249 reserved.
</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13250 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13251 content requires permission. The
<quote>cut and paste
</quote> world that defines
13252 the Internet today will become a
<quote>get permission to cut and paste
</quote>
13253 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13256 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13257 <quote>all rights reserved
</quote> nor
<quote>no rights reserved
</quote> but
<quote>some rights
13258 reserved
</quote>— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13259 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13260 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13264 <section id=
"examples">
13265 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13267 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13268 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13269 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13270 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13271 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13272 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13273 to your neighbors or boss. The
<quote>privacy
</quote> of your browsing habits was
13277 What made it assured?
13279 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13281 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13282 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13283 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13284 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13285 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13286 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13287 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13288 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13289 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13290 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13291 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13292 (there is no law protecting
<quote>privacy
</quote> in public places), and in many
13293 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13294 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13296 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13298 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13299 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13300 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13301 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13302 <quote>recently viewed
</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13303 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13304 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13305 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13306 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13309 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13310 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13311 people should have the
<quote>right
</quote> to browse in a library without the
13312 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13313 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13314 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13315 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13319 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define
<quote>privacy
</quote>
13320 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13321 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13322 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13325 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg,
<quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13326 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),
</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13327 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13329 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13330 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13331 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13332 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13333 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13334 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13335 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13338 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13339 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13340 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13343 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13344 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13345 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13346 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13347 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13348 care much about controlling their software.
13349 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13351 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13353 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13354 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13355 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13356 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13357 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13361 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13362 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13363 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13364 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13365 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13366 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13367 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13368 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13369 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13373 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13374 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13375 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13376 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13377 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13378 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13379 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13382 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13383 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13384 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13385 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13386 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13387 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13388 fundamentally weakened.
13391 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13392 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13393 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's
<quote>Linux
</quote>
13394 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13395 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13396 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13399 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13400 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13401 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13402 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13403 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13404 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13405 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13406 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13410 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13411 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13412 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13413 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13414 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13415 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13418 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13419 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13420 scientific journals are produced.
13422 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13423 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13426 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13427 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13428 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13429 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13430 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13431 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13432 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13433 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13434 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13435 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13436 and Westlaw are also free
13437 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13438 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13439 Court opinion through their respective services.
13442 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13443 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13444 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13445 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13446 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13447 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13448 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13451 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13452 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13453 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13456 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13457 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13458 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13459 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13460 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13461 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13462 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13463 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13464 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13465 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13468 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13469 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13470 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13471 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13472 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13476 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13477 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13478 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13479 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13481 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13482 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13483 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13484 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13485 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13486 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13487 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13490 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13491 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13492 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13493 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13494 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13495 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13498 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13501 <section id=
"oneidea">
13502 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13503 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13504 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13507 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13508 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13511 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13512 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13513 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13514 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13515 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13516 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13517 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13518 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13519 make this possible.
13522 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13523 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13524 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13525 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13526 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13527 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13528 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13529 human-readable description, and
13530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13531 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13532 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13533 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13534 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13535 different than the
<quote>All
</quote> or
<quote>No
</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13536 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13537 certain freedoms are given.
13540 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13541 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13542 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13543 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13544 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13545 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (
<quote>share and share
13546 alike
</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13547 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13548 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13551 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13552 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13553 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13554 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13555 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13556 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13557 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13558 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13562 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13563 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13564 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13565 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13566 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13567 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13569 of content (
<quote>content conducers,
</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13570 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13571 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13572 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13575 The aim is not to fight the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13576 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13577 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13578 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13579 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13580 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13581 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13582 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13583 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13584 to begin to build those rules.
13587 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13588 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13589 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13590 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13591 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13594 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13595 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13596 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13597 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13598 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13599 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13600 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13601 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13602 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13603 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13606 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13607 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13608 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13609 was a total success.
13612 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13613 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13614 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13615 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13616 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13617 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13618 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13619 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13621 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13622 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13624 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy
</primary></indexterm>
13625 <indexterm><primary>rap music
</primary></indexterm>
13627 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13628 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13629 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13630 reasons. Many who use the
<quote>sampling license
</quote> do so because anything
13631 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13632 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13633 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13634 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13635 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13636 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13637 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13638 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not
<quote>allow
</quote>
13639 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13640 high
<footnote><para>
13642 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13643 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13644 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13645 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13646 </para></footnote>),
13647 these artists release into the creative environment content
13648 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13649 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13652 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13653 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13654 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13655 you are effectively saying you believe in the
<quote>All Rights Reserved
</quote>
13656 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13657 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13658 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13659 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13660 this notion of
<quote>Some Rights Reserved,
</quote> and gives many the chance to
13664 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13665 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13666 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13667 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13670 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13671 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13674 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13675 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13676 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13677 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13678 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13679 steps are possible.
13682 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13683 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13684 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13685 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13686 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13687 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13688 creativity to spread more easily.
13690 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13695 <section id=
"themsoon">
13696 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13698 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13699 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13700 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13701 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13702 changes that we need.
13705 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13706 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13707 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13711 <section id=
"formalities">
13712 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13714 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13715 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13716 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13717 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13721 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13722 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13726 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13727 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13728 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13729 default is control, and
<quote>formalities
</quote> are banished.
13735 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13736 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13737 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13738 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13739 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13740 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13741 formalities were getting in the way.
13744 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13745 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13746 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13747 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13748 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13749 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13750 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13751 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13752 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13753 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13756 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13758 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13759 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13760 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13761 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13762 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13763 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13766 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13767 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13768 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13769 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13770 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13771 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13772 developed by others.
13775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13777 <section id=
"registration">
13778 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13780 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13781 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13782 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13783 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13784 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13785 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13786 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13787 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13788 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13789 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13790 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13793 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13794 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13795 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13796 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13797 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13798 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13799 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13802 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13803 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13804 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13805 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13806 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13807 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13808 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13809 with which registration occurs up.
13812 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13813 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13814 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13815 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13816 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13817 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13818 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13819 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13820 formality
—while producing a database
13821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13822 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13826 <section id=
"marking">
13827 <title>MARKING
</title>
13829 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13830 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13831 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13832 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13833 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13834 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13835 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13836 uniformly across all media.
13839 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13840 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13841 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13845 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13846 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13847 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13848 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13849 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13850 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13851 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13852 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13855 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13856 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13857 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13858 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13859 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13860 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13862 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13863 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13864 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13866 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be
<quote>use unless someone
13867 complains.
</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13868 stop using the work in any new
13869 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13870 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13871 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13875 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13876 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13877 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13878 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13879 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13882 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13883 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13884 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13885 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13886 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13887 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13888 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13889 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13890 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13891 other important functions.
13894 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13895 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13896 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13897 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13898 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13899 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13902 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13903 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13904 make things unclear.
13907 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13908 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13909 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13910 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13911 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13912 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13915 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13918 <section id=
"shortterms">
13919 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13921 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13922 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13926 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13927 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13928 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13929 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13930 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13931 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13934 <quote>A Radical Rethink,
</quote> <citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13936 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13938 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13941 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13942 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13943 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13946 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13949 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13950 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13951 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13952 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13953 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13954 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13958 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
13959 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13960 fuzziness of
<quote>fair use,
</quote> and the distinction between
<quote>ideas
</quote> and
13961 <quote>expression.
</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13962 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13963 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13964 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13965 <quote>lawyer-free zone
</quote> makes the complexities of
<quote>fair use
</quote> and
13966 <quote>idea/expression
</quote> less necessary to navigate.
13967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13971 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13972 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13973 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13974 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13975 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13976 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13977 pension.
<footnote><para>
13979 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13980 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13982 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13984 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13985 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13987 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
13991 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13992 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13993 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13994 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13995 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13996 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
13997 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13998 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13999 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
14000 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14001 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14002 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14003 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14004 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
14007 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
14008 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
14009 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14013 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas
<quote>radical.
</quote> (After all, I
14014 call them
<quote>extremists.
</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14015 than the term under Richard Nixon. How
<quote>radical
</quote> can it be to ask for
14016 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14022 <section id=
"freefairuse">
14023 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
14024 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and
</primary></indexterm>
14026 <primary>property rights
</primary>
14027 <secondary>air traffic vs.
</secondary>
14030 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14031 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14032 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14033 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14034 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14035 the emergence of that new technology.
14038 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors
<quote>exclusive
14039 right
</quote> to
<quote>their writings.
</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14040 right to
<quote>their writings
</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14041 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14042 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14043 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14044 though that movie is not
<quote>my writing.
</quote>
14047 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
14048 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14049 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
14051 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14052 University Press,
1967),
32.
14054 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14055 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14056 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14057 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
14061 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14062 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14063 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14064 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
14065 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
14070 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14071 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14072 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14073 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14074 Consider each limitation in turn.
14077 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14078 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14079 sense to protect John
14081 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14082 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14083 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14084 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14085 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14086 after the creative work is done.
14087 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
14090 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14091 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14092 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14093 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14094 material. When all
<quote>reuse
</quote> of creative material was within the control
14095 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14096 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14097 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14098 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14099 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14100 the creative process. Smothers it.
14102 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
14104 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14105 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14106 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
14107 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
14108 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14112 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14113 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14114 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14115 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
14118 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14119 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
14120 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
14122 His view is that the law should be written so that
14123 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14126 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14127 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14128 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14129 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14130 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14133 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14135 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14136 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14137 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14138 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14142 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
14143 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
14145 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14146 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14147 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
14148 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14149 battles around the sharing of music.
14152 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14153 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14154 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14155 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14156 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14157 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14158 innovation on the network.
14161 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14162 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14163 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14164 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14165 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14168 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14169 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14170 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14171 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
14172 four different kinds of sharing:
14174 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14177 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14178 for purchasing CDs.
14182 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14183 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14188 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14189 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14190 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14194 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14195 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14196 owner plainly endorses.
14200 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14201 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14202 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14203 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14204 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14205 significantly weakened.
14208 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14209 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14210 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14211 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14212 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14216 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14217 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14221 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14222 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14223 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14224 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14225 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14226 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14227 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14228 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14229 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14230 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14233 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14234 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14235 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14236 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14237 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14238 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14239 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14240 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14241 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14242 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14243 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14244 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14245 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14248 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14249 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14250 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14251 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14252 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14253 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14254 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14255 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14256 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14257 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14258 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14259 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14260 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14261 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14262 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14263 paying for this content even though
<quote>free
</quote> content is available in the
14264 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14266 See, for example,
<quote>Music Media Watch,
</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14267 April
2002, available at
14268 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14273 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14274 present: It is emphatically temporary. The
<quote>problem
</quote> with file
14275 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14276 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14277 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14278 makers today to be
<quote>solving
</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14279 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14280 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14281 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14282 artists get paid, during
14284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14285 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14286 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14289 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different
<quote>problems
</quote>
14290 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14291 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14292 <quote>problem
</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14293 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14294 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14295 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14296 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14297 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14300 Type C content raises a different
<quote>problem.
</quote> This is content that was,
14301 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14302 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14303 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14304 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14305 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14306 way that returns something to the artist.
14309 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14310 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14311 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14312 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14313 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14314 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14315 from the author's perspective, this
<quote>sharing
</quote> of his content without
14316 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14319 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14320 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14321 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14322 providers would be free, under this rule, to
<quote>share
</quote> that content,
14323 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14324 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14325 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14330 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14331 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14332 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14333 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14334 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14335 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14336 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14340 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14341 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14342 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14343 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14344 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14345 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14346 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14347 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14350 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14351 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14352 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14353 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14354 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14355 delivering and accessing content.
14358 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14359 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14362 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14363 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14364 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14365 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14366 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14367 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14368 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14369 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14372 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14373 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14374 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14375 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14376 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14377 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14378 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14381 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14382 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14385 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'
>
14386 <primary>artists
</primary>
14387 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14389 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14390 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14391 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14392 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14393 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14394 2004), ch.
6, available at
14395 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14396 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14397 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14398 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel,
<quote>Impose a
14399 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,
</quote> available at
14400 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Who's Holding Back
14401 Broadband?
</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14402 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14403 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14405 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14406 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14407 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14408 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,
</quote> <citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14410 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry,
<quote>Getting Copyright Right,
</quote>
14411 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14412 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14413 McCullagh,
<quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,
</quote> CNET News.com,
27 August
14415 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14416 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14417 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14418 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14419 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14420 debate by about a decade. See
14421 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14422 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14423 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14424 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14425 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'
/>
14427 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14428 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14429 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14430 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14431 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14432 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14433 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14434 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14438 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14439 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14440 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14441 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14442 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14443 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14444 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14445 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14446 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14447 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14448 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14449 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14450 controlling access.
14451 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14454 <primary>artists
</primary>
14455 <secondary>recording industry payments to
</secondary>
14458 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14459 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14460 the system supports the widest range of
<quote>semiotic democracy
</quote>
14461 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14462 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14463 limits on derivative
14465 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14466 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14467 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14468 allowed to do with the content itself.
14470 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
14472 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14473 <quote>harm
</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14474 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14475 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14476 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14477 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat
<quote>free
</quote> by being
14478 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14479 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14480 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14481 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14482 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14483 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14486 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in
</primary></indexterm>
14488 This competition has already occurred against the background of
<quote>free
</quote>
14489 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14490 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14491 that, there is nothing impossible at all about
<quote>competing with free.
</quote>
14492 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14493 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14494 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14495 theaters are often luxurious
—with
<quote>first class
</quote> seats, and meals
14496 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14497 finding ways to compete with
<quote>free.
</quote>
14500 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14501 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14502 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14503 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14504 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14505 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14509 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14513 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14514 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14515 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14516 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14517 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14521 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14524 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14527 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14531 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14532 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14537 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14538 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14542 But what if
<quote>piracy
</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14543 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14544 consumers continue to
<quote>take
</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14548 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14549 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14550 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14551 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14552 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14553 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14554 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14555 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14556 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14557 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14558 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14562 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14563 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14564 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14567 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14568 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14572 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14573 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14575 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14576 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14577 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14578 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14581 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14582 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14583 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14584 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14585 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14586 strong view queers the law.
14589 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14590 <quote>radical
</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14591 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14592 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14593 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14594 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14595 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14596 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14598 Lawrence Lessig,
<quote>Copyright's First Amendment
</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14599 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14604 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14605 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14606 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14609 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14610 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14611 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14612 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14614 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14615 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14616 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14617 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14618 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14619 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14620 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14621 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14622 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14623 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?
</quote> working paper, June
2003,
14625 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14626 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14627 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14628 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14629 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14630 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14632 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14633 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14637 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14638 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14639 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14640 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14641 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14642 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14643 practically never be done.
14646 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14647 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14648 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14649 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14650 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14651 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14652 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14653 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14656 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14657 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14658 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14659 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14660 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14661 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14664 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14665 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14666 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14670 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14671 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14672 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14673 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14674 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14675 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14676 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14679 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14680 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14683 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14684 simple pragmatic question:
<quote>Will it do good?
</quote> When challenged about
14685 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers,
<quote>Why not?
</quote>
14688 We should ask,
<quote>Why?
</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14689 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14690 keep your lawyers away.
14692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14696 <chapter label=
"17" id=
"c-notes">
14697 <title>NOTES
</title>
14699 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14700 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14701 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14702 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14703 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14704 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14705 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14706 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14707 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14710 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14713 <chapter label=
"18" id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14714 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14716 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14717 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14718 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14719 to him that this book is dedicated.
14721 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
14723 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14724 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14725 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14726 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14727 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14728 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14729 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14730 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14731 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14732 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14733 critical eye on much of this.
14736 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14737 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14738 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14739 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14740 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14741 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14742 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14743 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14744 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14747 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14748 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14749 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14750 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14751 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14752 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14753 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14754 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14755 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14756 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14757 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14758 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14759 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14760 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14761 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams,
<quote>Wink,
</quote> Roger Wood,
<quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,
</quote>
14762 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14763 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14764 a bunch of great replies.)
14767 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14768 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14769 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14770 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14771 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14772 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14773 throughout this book.
14776 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14777 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14778 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14779 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14781 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->