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17
18 <book id="index" lang="en">
19 <bookinfo>
20 <title>Free Culture</title>
21
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
23
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
26
27 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
28
29 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
30
31 <authorgroup>
32 <author>
33 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig</surname>
35 </author>
36 </authorgroup>
37
38 <copyright>
39 <year>2004</year>
40 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
41 </copyright>
42
43 <legalnotice>
44 <para>
45 <inlinemediaobject>
46 <imageobject>
47 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.png" width="100%" align="center"/>
48 </imageobject>
49 <imageobject>
50 <imagedata fileref="images/cc.svg" width="100%" align="center"/>
51 </imageobject>
52 <textobject>
53 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
54 </textobject>
55 </inlinemediaobject>
56 </para>
57
58 <para>
59 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
60 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
61 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
62 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
63 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
64 </para>
65 </legalnotice>
66
67 <abstract>
68 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
69 <para>
70 LAWRENCE LESSIG
71 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
72 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
73 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
74 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
75 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
76 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
77 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
78 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
79 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
80 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
81 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz 25," and named one of Scientific
82 American's "50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
83 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
84 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
85 Appeals.
86 </para>
87 </abstract>
88 </bookinfo>
89
90 <colophon>
91 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
92
93 <para>
94 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
95 </para>
96 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
97 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
98 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
99 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
100 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
101 </itemizedlist>
102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
103
104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
105 <para>
106 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
107 </para>
108 <para>
109 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
110 </para>
111 <para>
112 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
113 </para>
114
115 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
116 <para>
117 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
118 </para>
119
120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
121 <para>
122 FREE CULTURE
123 </para>
124
125 <para>
126 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
127 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
128 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
129 </para>
130
131 <para>
132 LAWRENCE LESSIG
133 </para>
134
135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
136 <para>
137 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
138 York, New York
139 </para>
140 <para>
141 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
142 </para>
143 <para>
144 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
145 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
146 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
147 </para>
148 <para>
149 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
150 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
151 </para>
152 <para>
153 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
154 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
155 </para>
156 <para>
157 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
158 </para>
159 <para>
160 Lessig, Lawrence.
161 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
162 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
163 </para>
164 <para>
165 p. cm.
166 </para>
167 <para>
168 Includes index.
169 </para>
170 <para>
171 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
172 </para>
173 <para>
174 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
175 </para>
176 <para>
177 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
178 </para>
179 <para>
180 KF2979.L47
181 </para>
182 <para>
183 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
184 </para>
185 <para>
186 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
187 </para>
188 <para>
189 Printed in the United States of America
190 </para>
191 <para>
192 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
193 </para>
194 <para>
195 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
196 </para>
197
198 <para>
199 &translationblock;
200 </para>
201
202 <para>
203 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
204 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
205 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
206 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
207 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
208 the above publisher of this book. The scanning, uploading, and
209 distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means
210 without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by
211 law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not
212 participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted
213 materials. Your support of the author's rights is appreciated.
214 </para>
215 </colophon>
216
217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
218 <dedication>
219 <para>
220 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
221 it continues still.
222 </para>
223 </dedication>
224
225 <toc id="toc"></toc>
226
227 <lot>
228 <title>List of figures</title>
229 </lot>
230
231 <!--
232 c PREFACE xiii
233 c INTRODUCTION
234 c "PIRACY"
235 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
236 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
237 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
238 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
239 2 Film
240 2 Recorded Music
241 2 Radio
242 2 Cable TV
243 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
244 2 Piracy I
245 2 Piracy II
246 c "PROPERTY"
247 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
248 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
249 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
250 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
251 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
252 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
253 2 Beginnings
254 2 Law: Duration
255 2 Law: Scope
256 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
257 2 Architecture and Law: Force
258 2 Market: Concentration
259 2 Together
260 c PUZZLES
261 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
262 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
263 2 Constraining Creators
264 2 Constraining Innovators
265 2 Corrupting Citizens
266 c BALANCES
267 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
268 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
269 c CONCLUSION
270 c AFTERWORD
271 1 Us, Now
272 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
273 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
274 1 Them, Soon
275 2 1. More Formalities
276 3 Registration and Renewal
277 3 Marking
278 2 2. Shorter Terms
279 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
280 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
281 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
282 c NOTES
283 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
284 c INDEX
285 -->
286
287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
288
289 <preface id="preface">
290 <title>PREFACE</title>
291 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
292 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
293 </indexterm>
294 <para>
295 At the end of his review of my first book, <citetitle>Code: And Other
296 Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
297 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
298 </para>
299 <blockquote>
300 <para>
301 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
302 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
303 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
304 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
305 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
306 </para></footnote>
307 </para>
308 </blockquote>
309 <para>
310 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
311 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
312 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
313 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
314 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
315 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
316 "affect" us anymore.
317 </para>
318 <para>
319 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
320 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
321 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
322 causes even after the modem is turned
323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
324 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
325 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
326 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
327 </para>
328 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
329 <para>
330 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
331 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
332 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
333 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
334 important.
335 </para>
336 <para>
337 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
338 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"&mdash;not
339 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
340 free software movement<footnote>
341 <para>
342 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
343 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
344 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
345 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
346 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
347 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
348 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
349 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
350 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
351 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
352 "permission culture"&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
353 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
354 past.
355 </para>
356 <para>
357 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
358 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
359 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
360 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
361 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
362 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
363 culture deem fundamental.
364 </para>
365 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
366 <para>
367 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
368 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
369 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
370 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
371 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
372 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
373 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
374 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
375 he asked,
376 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
377 </para>
378 <blockquote>
379 <para>
380 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
381 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
382 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
383 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
384 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
385 "The Great Media Gulp," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
386 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
387 </para></footnote>
388 </para>
389 </blockquote>
390 <para>
391 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
392 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
393 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
394 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
395 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
396 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
397 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
398 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
399 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
400 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
401 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
402 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
403 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
404 that this work is "merely" derivative.
405 </para>
406 <para>
407 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
408 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
409 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
410 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
411 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
412 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
413 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
414 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
415
416 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
417 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
418 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
419 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
420 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
421 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
422 what I advance here.
423 </para>
424 <para>
425 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
426 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
427 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
428 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
429 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
430 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
431 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
432 book is written.
433 </para>
434
435 </preface>
436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
437
438 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
439 <chapter id="c-introduction">
440 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
441 <para>
442 On December 17, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
443 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
444 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
445 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
446 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
447 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
448 </para>
449 <para>
450 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
451 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
452 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
453 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."<footnote><para>
454 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
455 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
456 </para></footnote>
457 For many
458 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
459 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
460 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
461 </para>
462 <para>
463 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
464 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
465 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
466 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
467 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
468 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
469 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
470 </para>
471 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
472 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
473 <para>
474 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
475 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
476 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
477 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
478 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
479 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
480 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
481 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
482 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
483 </para>
484 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
485 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
486 <para>
487 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
488 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
489 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
490 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
491 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
492 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
493 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
494 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
495 </para>
496 <blockquote>
497 <para>
498 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
499 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
500 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
501 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
502 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
503 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
504 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
505 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
506 <para>
507 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
508 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
509 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
510 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
511 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
512 Authorship," <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
513 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
514 1112&ndash;13.
515 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
516 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
517 </para></footnote>
518 </para>
519 </blockquote>
520 <para>
521 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
522 </para>
523 <para>
524 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
525 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
526 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
528 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
529 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
530 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
531 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
532 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
533 </para>
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
536 <para>
537 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
538 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
539 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
540 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
541 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
542 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
543 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
544 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
545 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
546 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
547 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
548 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
549 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
550 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else&mdash;the power of
551 "common sense"&mdash;would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
552 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
553 </para>
554 <para>
555 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
556 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
557 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
558 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
559 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
560 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
561 electric induction in 1831. But he had the same intuition about
562 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
563 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
564 understanding of radio.
565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
566 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
567 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
568 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
569 </para>
570 <para>
571 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
572 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
573 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
574 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
575 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
576 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
577 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
578 much less transmitter power and static.
579 </para>
580 <para>
581 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
582 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
583 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
584 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
585 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
586 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
587 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
588 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
589 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
590 </para>
591 <para>
592 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
593 </para>
594 <blockquote>
595 <para>
596 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
597 sounded like a glass of water being poured. . . . A paper was crumpled
598 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
599 fire. . . . Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
600 and guitar number were performed. . . . The music was projected with a
601 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
602 box."<footnote><para>
603 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
604 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
605 </para></footnote>
606 </para>
607 </blockquote>
608 <para>
609 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
610 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
611 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
612 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
613 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
614 a handful of networks.
615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
616 </para>
617 <para>
618 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
619 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
620 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
621 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
622 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
623 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
624 </para>
625 <blockquote>
626 <para>
627 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
628 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
629 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
630 RCA.<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
631 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
632 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
633
634 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
635 </para></footnote>
636 </para>
637 </blockquote>
638 <para>
639 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
640 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
641 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
642 described,
643 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
644 </para>
645 <blockquote>
646 <para>
647 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
648 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
649 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
650 unrestrained, posed . . . a complete reordering of radio power
651 . . . and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
652 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
653 </para></footnote>
654 </para>
655 </blockquote>
656 <para>
657 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
658 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
659 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
660 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
661 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
662 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
663 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
664 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
665 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
666 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
667 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
668 </para>
669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
670 <blockquote>
671 <para>
672 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
673 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
674 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
675 deviousness.<footnote><para>
676 Lessing, 256.
677 </para></footnote>
678 </para>
679 </blockquote>
680 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
681 <para>
682 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
683 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
684 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
685 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
686 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
687 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
688 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
689 least temporarily.
690 </para>
691 <para>
692 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
693 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
694 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
695 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
696 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
697 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
698 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
699 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
700 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
701 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
702 </para>
703 <para>
704 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
705 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
706 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
707 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
708 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
709 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
710 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
711 course always public spirited; the reality is something
712 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
713 to themselves, would crumble in
714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
715 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
716 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
717 effect of technological change.
718 </para>
719 <para>
720 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
721 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
722 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
723 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
724 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
725 before.<footnote><para>
726 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
727 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
728 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
729 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
730 </para></footnote>
731 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
732 of 2004.
733 </para>
734 <para>
735 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
736 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
737 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
738 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
739 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
740 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
741 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
742 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
743 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
744 </para>
745 <para>
746 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
747 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
748 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
749 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
750 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
751 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
752 has introduced.
753 </para>
754 <para>
755 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
756 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
757 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
758 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
759 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
760 parks or on
761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
762 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
763 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
764 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
765 </para>
766 <para>
767 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
768 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
769 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
770 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
771 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
772 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
773 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
774 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
775 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
776 </para>
777 <para>
778 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
779 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
780 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
781 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
782 marketplace.<footnote>
783 <para>
784 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
785 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
786 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
787 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
788 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
789 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
790 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
791 198&ndash;200.
792 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
793 </para></footnote>
794 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
795 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
796 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
797 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
798 </para>
799 <para>
800 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
801 been erased.<footnote><para>
802 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
803 2001), ch. 13.
804 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
805 </para></footnote>
806 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
807 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
808 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
809 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
810 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
811 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
812 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
813 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
814 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
815 culture, more and more a permission culture.
816 </para>
817 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
818 <para>
819 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
820 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
821 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
822 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
823 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
824 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
825 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
826 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
827 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
828 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
829 Causbys.
830 </para>
831 <para>
832 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
833 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
834 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
835 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
836 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
837 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
838 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
839 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
840 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
841 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
842 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
843 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
844 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
845 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
846 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
847 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
848 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
849 </para>
850 <para>
851 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
852 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
853 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
854 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
855 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
856 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
857 remakes them.
858 </para>
859 <para>
860 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
862 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
863 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether "piracy" will
864 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
865 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
866 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
867 calls his "own terrorist war"<footnote><para>
868 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
869 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club," <citetitle>New York
870 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
871 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
872 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
873 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
874 against it.
875 </para>
876 <para>
877 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
878 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
879 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
880 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
881 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
882 Internet.
883 </para>
884 <para>
885 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
886 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
887 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
888 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
889 </para>
890 <para>
891 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
892 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
893 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
894 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
895 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
896 <para>
897 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society," <citetitle>Yale Law
898 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
899 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
900 </para></footnote>
901 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
902 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
903 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
904 could cultivate and extend our culture.
905 </para>
906 <para>
907 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
908 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
909 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
910 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
911 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
912 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
913 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
914 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
915 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
916 </para>
917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
918 <para>
919 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
920 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
921 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
922 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
923 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
924 against an industry.
925 </para>
926 <para>
927 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
928 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
929 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
930 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
931 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
932 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
933 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
934 </para>
935 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
936 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
937 <para>
938 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
939 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
940 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
941 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
942 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
943 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
944 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
945 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
946 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
947 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
948 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
949 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
950 trespass.
951 </para>
952 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
953 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
954 <para>
955 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
956 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
957 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
958 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
959 war. Unlike
960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
961 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
962 on its side.
963 </para>
964 <para>
965 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
966 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
967 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
968 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
969 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
970 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
971 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
972 accepted as it is now.
973 </para>
974 <para>
975 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
976 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
977 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
978 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
979 </para>
980 <para>
981 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
982 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
983 </para>
984 <para>
985 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
986 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
987 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
988 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
989 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
990 </para>
991 <para>
992 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
993 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
994 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
995 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
996 view?
997 </para>
998 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
999 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1000 <para>
1001 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1002 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1003 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1004 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1005 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1006 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1007 this silliness will be much more profound.
1008 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1009 </para>
1010 <para>
1011 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1012 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1013 ideas.
1014 </para>
1015 <para>
1016 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1017 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1018 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1019 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1020 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1021 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1022 </para>
1023 <para>
1024 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1025 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1026 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1027 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1028 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1029 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1030 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1031 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1032 fundamental about who we have always been.
1033 </para>
1034 <para>
1035 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1036 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1037 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1038 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1039 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1040 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1041 </para>
1042 </chapter>
1043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1044 <part id="c-piracy">
1045 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1046 <partintro>
1047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1048 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1049 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1050 </indexterm>
1051 <para>
1052 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1053 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1054 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1055 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1056 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1057 </para>
1058 <blockquote>
1059 <para>
1060 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1061 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1062 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1063 <!-- f1 -->
1064 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1065 </para></footnote>
1066 </para>
1067 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1068 </blockquote>
1069 <para>
1070 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1071 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1072 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1073 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1074 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1075 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1076 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1077 </para>
1078 <para>
1079 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1080 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1081 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1082 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1083 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1084 profit."
1085 </para>
1086 <para>
1087 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1088 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1089 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1090 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1091 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1092 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1093 </para>
1094 <para>
1095 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1096 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1097 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1098 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1099 </para>
1100 <para>
1101 The idea goes something like this:
1102 </para>
1103 <blockquote>
1104 <para>
1105 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1106 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1107 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1108 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1109 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1110 piracy.
1111 </para>
1112 </blockquote>
1113 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1114 <para>
1115 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1116 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1117 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1118 <!-- f2 -->
1119 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1120 in the Pepsi Generation," <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1121 </para></footnote>
1122 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1123 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1124 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1125 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1126 <!-- f3 -->
1127 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1128 Up," <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1129 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1130 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1131 Speech, No One Wins," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1132 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1133 </para></footnote>
1134 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1135 "right"&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1136 </para>
1137 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1138 <para>
1139 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1140 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1142 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1143 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1144 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1145 </para>
1146 <para>
1147 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1148 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1149 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1150 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1151 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1152 </para>
1153 <para>
1154 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1155 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1156 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1157 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1158 copyright law today regulates both.
1159 </para>
1160 <para>
1161 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1162 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1163 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1164 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1165 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1166 more expense of doing business.
1167 </para>
1168 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1169 <para>
1170 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1171 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1172 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1173 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1174 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1175 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1176 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1177 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1178 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1179 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1180 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1181 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1182 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1183 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1184 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1185 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1186 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."<footnote>
1187 <para>
1188 <!-- f4 -->
1189 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
1190 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1191 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1192 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1193 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1194 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1195 enabled are much more tenuous.
1196 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1197 </para></footnote>
1198 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1199 this creative class.
1200 </para>
1201 <para>
1202 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1203 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1204 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1205 </para>
1206 </partintro>
1207
1208 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1209 <chapter id="creators">
1210 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1211 <para>
1212 In 1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1213 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1214 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1215 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1216 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1217 </para>
1218 <para>
1219 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1220 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1221 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1222 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1223 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1224 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1225 </para>
1226 <blockquote>
1227 <para>
1228 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1229 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1230 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1231 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1232 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1233 </para>
1234 <para>
1235 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1236 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1237 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1238 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1239 synchronization was pretty close.
1240 </para>
1241 <para>
1242 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1243 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1244 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1245 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1246 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1247 <!-- f1 -->
1248 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1249 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1250 </para></footnote>
1251 </para>
1252 </blockquote>
1253 <para>
1254 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1255 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1256 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1257 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1258 </para>
1259 <para>
1260 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1261 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1262 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1263 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1264 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1265 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1266 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1267 </para>
1268 <para>
1269 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1270 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1271 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1272 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1273 </para>
1274 <para>
1275 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1276 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1277 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1278 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1279 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1280 and among the best of its genre.
1281 </para>
1282 <para>
1283 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1284 Willie.
1285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1286 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1287 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1288 <!-- f2 -->
1289 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1290 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1291 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1292 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1293 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No. 1"
1294 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1295 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1296 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1297 </para></footnote>
1298 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1299 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1300 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1301 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1302 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1303 Mouse.
1304 </para>
1305 <para>
1306 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1307 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1308 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1309 <!-- f3 -->
1310 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1311 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1312 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1313 </para></footnote>
1314 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1315 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1316 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1317 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1318 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1319 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1320 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1321 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1322 old.
1323 </para>
1324 <para>
1325 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1326 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1327 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1328 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1329 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1330 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1331 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1332 </para>
1333 <para>
1334 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1335 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1336 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1337 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1338 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1339 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1340 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1341 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1342 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1343 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1344 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1346 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1347 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1348 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1349 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1350 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1351 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1352 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1353 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1354 </para>
1355 <para>
1356 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1357 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1358 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1359 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1360 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1361 creativity"&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1362 culture around us and makes it something different.
1363 </para>
1364 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1365 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1366 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1367 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1368 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1369 <!-- f4 -->
1370 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1371 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1372 determining
1373 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1374 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1375 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1376 average
1377 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1378 Web site associated with this book, available at
1379 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1380 </para></footnote>
1381 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1382 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1383 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1384 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1385 </para>
1386 <para>
1387 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1388 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1389 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1390 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1391 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1392 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1393 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1394 </para>
1395 <para>
1396 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1397 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1398 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1399 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1400
1401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1402 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1403 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1404 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1405 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1406 content from before the Great Depression.
1407 </para>
1408 <para>
1409 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1410 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1411 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1412 universal.
1413 </para>
1414 <para>
1415 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1416 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1417 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1418 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1419 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1420 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1421 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1422 </para>
1423 <para>
1424 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1425 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1426 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1427 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1428 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1429 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1430 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1431 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1432 interestingly different way.
1433 </para>
1434 <para>
1435 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1436 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1437 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1438 </para>
1439 <para>
1440 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1441 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1442 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1443 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1444 transforming it either subtly or
1445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1446 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1447 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1448 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1449 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1450 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1451 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1452 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1453 </para>
1454 <para>
1455 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1456 huge. More than 33,000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1457 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1458 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1459 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1460 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1461 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1462 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1463 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1464 </para>
1465 <para>
1466 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1467 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1468 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1469 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1470 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1471 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1472 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1473 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1474 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1475 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1476 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1477 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1478 </para>
1479 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1480 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1481 </indexterm>
1482 <para>
1483 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1484 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1485 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1486 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1487 in Japan now. . . . American comics were born out of copying each
1488 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1489 other. . . . That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1490 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1491 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1492 <!-- f5 -->
1493 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1494 York: Perennial, 2000).
1495 </para></footnote>
1496 </para>
1497 <para>
1498 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1499 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1500 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1501 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1502 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1503 which are fifty years old."
1504 </para>
1505 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1506 <para>
1507 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1508 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1509 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1510 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1511 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1512 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1513 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1514 <!-- f6 -->
1515 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1516 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1517 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. "[T]here might be a collective economic
1518 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1519 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1520 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1521 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1522 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1523 </para></footnote>
1524 </para>
1525 <para>
1526 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1527 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1528 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1529 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1530 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1531 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1532 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1533 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1534 culture?
1535 </para>
1536 <para>
1537 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1538 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1539 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1540 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1541 to prosecute cases like this."
1542 </para>
1543 <para>
1544 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1545 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1546 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1547 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1549 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1550 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1551 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1552 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1553 their clients or hurt them?
1554 Let's pause for a moment.
1555 </para>
1556 <para>
1557 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1558 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1559 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1560 </para>
1561 <para>
1562 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1563 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1564 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1565 "intellectual property."<footnote><para>
1566 <!-- f7 -->
1567 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1568 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1569 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1570 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1571 describes a set of "property" rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1572 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1573 very different.
1574 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1575 </para></footnote>
1576 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1577 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1578 property.
1579 </para>
1580 <para>
1581 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1582 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1583 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1584 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1585 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1586 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1587 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1588 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1589 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1590 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1591 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1592 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1593 the public domain.
1594 </para>
1595 <para>
1596 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1597 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1598 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1599
1600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1601 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1602 freedom is good.
1603 </para>
1604 <para>
1605 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1606 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1607 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1608 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1609 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1610 form, whether large or small.
1611 </para>
1612 <para>
1613 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1614 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1615 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1616 particular find it hard to say why.
1617 </para>
1618 <para>
1619 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1620 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1621 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1622 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1623 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1624 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1625 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1626 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1627 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1628 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1629 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1630 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1631 </para>
1632 <para>
1633 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1634 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1635 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1636 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1637 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1638 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1639 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1640 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1642 </para>
1643 <para>
1644 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1645 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1646 question instead is "<emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1647 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1648 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1649 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1650 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1651 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1652 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1653 a studio or not?
1654 </para>
1655 <para>
1656 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1657 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1658 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1659 </para>
1660
1661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1662 </chapter>
1663 <chapter id="mere-copyists">
1664 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"</title>
1665 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1666 <primary>photography</primary>
1667 </indexterm>
1668 <para>
1669 In 1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1670 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1671 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1672 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1673 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1674 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1675 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1676 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1677 </para>
1678 <para>
1679 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1680 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1681 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1682 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1683 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1684 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1685 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1686 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1687 amateurs.
1688 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1689 </para>
1690 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1691 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1692 </indexterm>
1693 <para>
1694 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1695 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1697 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1698 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1699 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1700 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1701 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1702 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1703 population of photographers.
1704 </para>
1705 <para>
1706 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1707 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1708 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1709 do the rest."<footnote><para>
1710 <!-- f1 -->
1711 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1712 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1713 </para>
1714 <blockquote>
1715 <para>
1716 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1717 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1718 that only an expert can do. . . . We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1719 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1720 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1721 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1722 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1723 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1724 chemicals.<footnote>
1725 <para>
1726 <!-- f2 -->
1727 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1728 1977), 53.
1729 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1730 </para></footnote>
1731 </para>
1732 </blockquote>
1733 <para>
1734 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1735 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1736 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1737 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1738 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1739 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1740 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1741 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1742 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1743 percent.<footnote><para>
1744 <!-- f3 -->
1745 Jenkins, 177.
1746 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1747 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1748 <!-- f4 -->
1749 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1750 </para></footnote>
1751 </para>
1752 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1753 <para>
1754
1755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1756 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1757 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1758 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1759 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1760 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1761 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1762 permanent record of his family and its activities. . . . For the first
1763 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1764 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1765 interpretation or bias."<footnote><para>
1766 <!-- f5 -->
1767 Coe, 58.
1768 </para></footnote>
1769 </para>
1770 <para>
1771 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1772 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1773 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1774 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1775 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1776 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1777 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1778 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1779 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1780 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1781 have before.
1782 </para>
1783 <para>
1784 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1785 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1786 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1787 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1788 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1789 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1790 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1791 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1792 <!-- f6 -->
1793 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1794 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1795 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1796 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1797 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1798 </para></footnote>
1799 </para>
1800 <para>
1801 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1802 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1803 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1804 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1805 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1806 draw
1807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1808 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1809 that they thought valuable.
1810 </para>
1811 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1812 <para>
1813 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1814 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1815 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1816 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1817 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1818 <para>
1819 <!-- f7 -->
1820 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1821 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1822 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1823 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1824 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1825 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1826 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1827 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1828 </para>
1829 <para>
1830 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1831 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1832 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1833 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1834 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1835 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1836 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1837 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1838 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1839 <!-- f8 -->
1840 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity," <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1841 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, "Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1842 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1843 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1844 (1993).
1845 </para></footnote>)
1846 </para>
1847 <para>
1848 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1849 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1850 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1851 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1852 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1853 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1854 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1855 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1856 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1857 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1858 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1859 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1860 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1861 </para>
1862 <para>
1863
1864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1865 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1866 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1867 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1868 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1869 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1870 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1871 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1872 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1873 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1874 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1875 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1876 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1877 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1878 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1879 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1880 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1881 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1882 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1883 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1884 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1885 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1886 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1887 learn.
1888 </para>
1889 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1890 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1891 <para>
1892 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1893 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1894 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1895 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1896 professional quality for $595."<footnote><para>
1897 <!-- f9 -->
1898 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1899 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1900 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1901 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1902 </para></footnote>
1903 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1904 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1905 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1906 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1907 </para>
1908 <para>
1909 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1910 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1911 Think!, puts it, "is the ability . . . to understand, analyze, and
1912 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1913 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1914 the way people access it."
1915 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
1916 </para>
1917 <para>
1918 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1919 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1920 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1921 about.
1922 </para>
1923 <para>
1924 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
1925 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
1926 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
1927 <!-- f10 -->
1928 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1929 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1930 Study," <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
1931 </para></footnote>
1932 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1933 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1934 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1935 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1936 (at least at first) terrible media.
1937 </para>
1938 <para>
1939 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1940 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1941 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
1942 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1943 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
1944 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
1945 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
1946 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
1947 </para>
1948 <para>
1949 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
1950 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
1951 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
1952 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
1953 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
1954 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
1955 </para>
1956 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
1957 <para>
1958 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
1959 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
1960 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
1961
1962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
1963 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
1964 about "the placement of objects, color, . . . rhythm, pacing, and
1965 texture."<footnote>
1966 <para>
1967 <!-- f11 -->
1968 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
1969 2002.
1970 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
1971 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
1972 </para></footnote>
1973 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
1974 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
1975 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
1976 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
1977 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
1978 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
1979 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
1980 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
1981 <!-- f12 -->
1982 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online, 4
1983 November 2000, available at
1984 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; "Timeline," 22 November 2000,
1985 available at
1986 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
1987 </para></footnote>
1988 </para>
1989 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
1990 <para>
1991 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
1992 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
1993 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
1994 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
1995 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
1996 </para>
1997 <para>
1998 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
1999 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2000 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2001 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2002 </para>
2003 <blockquote>
2004 <para>
2005 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2006 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2007 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2008 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2009 being read-only.
2010 </para>
2011 </blockquote>
2012 <para>
2013 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2014 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2015 twentieth century.
2016 </para>
2017 <para>
2018 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2019 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2020 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2021 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2022 literacy,
2023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2024 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2025 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2026 express."<footnote>
2027 <para>
2028 <!-- f13 -->
2029 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2030 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2031 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2032 language of the twenty-first century."<footnote><para>
2033 <!-- f14 -->
2034 Ibid.
2035 </para></footnote>
2036 </para>
2037 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2038 <para>
2039 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2040 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2041 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2042 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2043 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2044 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2045 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2046 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2047 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2048 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2049 </para>
2050 <para>
2051 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2052 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2053 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2054 away. The "kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,"
2055 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2056 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2057 </para>
2058 <para>
2059 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2060 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2061 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2062 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2063 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2064 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2065 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2066 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2067 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2068 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2069 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2070 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2071 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2072 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2073 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2074 </para>
2075 <para>
2076
2077 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2078 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2079 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2080 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2081 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2082 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2083 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2084 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2085 our interview,
2086 </para>
2087 <blockquote>
2088 <para>
2089 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2090 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2091 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2092 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2093 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2094 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2095 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2096 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2097 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2098 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2099 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2100 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2101 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2102 camera and . . . saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2103 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2104 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2105 about the topic. . . .
2106 </para>
2107 <para>
2108 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2109 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2110 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2111 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2112 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2113 </para>
2114 <para>
2115 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2116 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2117 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2118 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2119 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2120 had a lot of power with this language."
2121 </para>
2122 </blockquote>
2123 <para>
2124 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2125 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2126 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2127 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2128 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2129 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2130 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2131 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2132 world would be watching.
2133 </para>
2134 <para>
2135 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2136 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2137 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2138 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2139 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2140 entertainment is tragedy.
2141 </para>
2142 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2143 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2144 <para>
2145 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2146 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2147 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2148 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2149 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2150 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2151 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2152 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2153 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2154 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2155 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2156 was also the Internet.
2157 </para>
2158 <para>
2159 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2160 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2161 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2162 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2163 movie
2164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2165 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2166 with sound or text.
2167 </para>
2168 <para>
2169 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2170 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2171 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2172 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2173 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2174 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2175 spread practically instantaneously.
2176 </para>
2177 <para>
2178 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2179 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2180 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2181 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2182 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2183 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2184 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2185 </para>
2186 <para>
2187 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2188 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2189 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2190 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2191 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2192 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2193 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2194 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2195 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2196 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2197 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2198 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2199 </para>
2200 <para>
2201 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2202 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2203 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2204 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2205 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2206 people vote
2207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2208 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2209 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2210 </para>
2211 <para>
2212 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2213 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2214 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2215 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2216 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2217 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2218 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2219 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2220 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2221 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2222 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2223 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2224 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2225 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2226 <!-- f15 -->
2227 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2228 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2229 </para></footnote>
2230 </para>
2231 <para>
2232 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2233 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2234 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2235 <!-- f16 -->
2236 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day," <citetitle>Journal of
2237 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2238 </para></footnote>
2239 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2240 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2241 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2242 </para>
2243 <para>
2244 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2245 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2246 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2247 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2248 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2249 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2250 <!-- f17 -->
2251 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2252 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2253 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2254 little beyond what our friends say.
2255 </para>
2256 <para>
2257 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2258 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2259 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2260 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2261 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2262
2263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2264 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2265 place.
2266 </para>
2267 <para>
2268 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2269 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2270 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2271 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2272 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2273 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2274 </para>
2275 <para>
2276 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2277 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2278 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2279 is having an effect.
2280 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2281 </para>
2282 <para>
2283 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2284 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2285 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2286 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2287 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2288 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2289 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2290 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2291 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2292 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2293 <!-- f18 -->
2294 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2295 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2296 </para></footnote>
2297 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2298 </para>
2299 <para>
2300 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2301 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2302 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2303 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2304 on.
2305 </para>
2306 <para>
2307 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2308 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2309 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2310 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2311 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2312 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2313 peer-generated rankings.
2314 </para>
2315 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2316 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2317 </indexterm>
2318 <para>
2319 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2320 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2321 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2322 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2323 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2324 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2325 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2326 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2327 get it out of the way."
2328 </para>
2329 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2330 <para>
2331 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2332 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2333 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2334 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2335 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2336 <!-- f19 -->
2337 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2338 </para></footnote>
2339 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2340 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2341 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2342 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2343 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2344 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2345 told her <emphasis>that</emphasis> they were writing "the story.")
2346 </para>
2347 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2348 debate&mdash;"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2349 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2350 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2351 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2352 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2353 had seen.<footnote><para>
2354 <!-- f20 -->
2355 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2356 Information Online," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2357 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2358 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2359 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2360 </para></footnote>
2361 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2362 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2363 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2364 out of it"&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2365 </para>
2366 <para>
2367 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2368 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2369 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2370 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2371 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2372 <para>
2373 <!-- f21 -->
2374 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?" <citetitle>New
2375 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2376 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2377 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2378 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2379 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2380 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2381 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2382 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2383 </para></footnote>
2384 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2385
2386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2387 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2388 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2389 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2390 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2391 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2392 </para>
2393 <para>
2394 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2395 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2396 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2397 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2398 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2399 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2400 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2401 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2402 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2403 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2404 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2405 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2406 extraordinary to report.
2407 </para>
2408 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2409 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2410 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2411 </indexterm>
2412 <para>
2413 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2414 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and . . . the
2415 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating . . . innovation."
2416 </para>
2417 <para>
2418 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2419 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2420 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2421 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2422 affect learning.
2423 </para>
2424 <para>
2425 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2426 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2427 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2428 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2429 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2430 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2432 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2433 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2434 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2435 the tinkering of many others.
2436 </para>
2437 <para>
2438 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2439 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2440 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2441 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2442 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2443 </para>
2444 <para>
2445 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2446 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you . . .
2447 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2448 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2449 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2450 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2451 </para>
2452 <para>
2453 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2454 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2455 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2456 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2457 platform. . . . You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2458 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2459 learn.
2460 </para>
2461 <para>
2462 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2463 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2464 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2465 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2466 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2467 text. "The Web . . . says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2468 you are visual, if you are interested in film . . . [then] there is a
2469 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2470 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2471 </para>
2472 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2473 <para>
2474 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2475 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2476
2477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2478 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2479 kind of recognition.
2480 </para>
2481 <para>
2482 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2483 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2484 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2485 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2486 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2487 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2488 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2489 </para>
2490 <para>
2491 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2492 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2493 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2494 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2495 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2496 general.<footnote><para>
2497 <!-- f22 -->
2498 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2499 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship," <citetitle>Communications
2500 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2501 </para></footnote>
2502 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2503 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2504 </para>
2505 <para>
2506 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2507 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2508 and want to learn."
2509 </para>
2510 <para>
2511 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2512 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2513 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. . . . We're building an
2514 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2515 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2516 </para>
2517 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2518 <para>
2519 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2520 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2521 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2522 the law to close down that technology.
2523 </para>
2524 <para>
2525 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2526 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2527 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2528 </para>
2529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2530 </chapter>
2531 <chapter id="catalogs">
2532 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2533 <para>
2534 In the fall of 2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2535 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2536 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2537 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2538 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2539 </para>
2540 <para>
2541 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2542 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2543 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2544 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2545 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2546 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2547 </para>
2548 <para>
2549 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2550 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2551 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2552 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2553 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2554 </para>
2555 <para>
2556 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2558 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2559 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2560 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2561 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2562 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2563 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2564 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2565 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2566 </para>
2567 <para>
2568 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2569 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2570 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2571 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2572 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2573 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2574 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2575 </para>
2576 <para>
2577 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2578 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2579 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2580 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2581 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2582 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2583 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2584 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2585 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2586 on-line.
2587 </para>
2588 <para>
2589 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2590 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2591 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2592 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2593 be on users' computers.
2594 </para>
2595 <para>
2596 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2597 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2598 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2599 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2601 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2602 computer.
2603 </para>
2604 <para>
2605 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2606 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2607 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2608 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2609 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2610 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2611 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2612 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2613 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2614 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2615 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2616 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2617 supposed to do.
2618 </para>
2619 <para>
2620 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2621 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2622 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2623 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2624 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2625 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2626 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2627 </para>
2628 <para>
2629 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2630 wrong. . . . I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2631 engine that I ran or . . . what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2632 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2633 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2634 easier to use"&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2635 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2636 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2637 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2638 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2639 with music.
2640 </para>
2641 <para>
2642 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2643 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2644 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2645 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2646 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2647 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2648 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2649 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2650 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2651 </para>
2652 <para>
2653 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2654 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2655 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2656 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2657 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2658 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2659 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2660 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2661 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2662 2001.<footnote><para>
2663
2664 <!-- f1 -->
2665 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2666 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages," <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2667 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2668 </para></footnote>
2669 </para>
2670 <para>
2671 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2672 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2673 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2674 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2675 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2676 </para>
2677 <para>
2678 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2679 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2680 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2681 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2682 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2683 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2684 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2685 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2686 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2687 </para>
2688 <para>
2689 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2690 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2691 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2692 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2693 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2695 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2696 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2697 </para>
2698 <para>
2699 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2700 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2701 </para>
2702 <para>
2703 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2704 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2705 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2706 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2707 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2708 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2709 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2710 <!-- f2 -->
2711 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2712 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2713 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2714 </para></footnote>
2715 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2716 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2717 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2718 <!-- f3 -->
2719 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2720 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2721 </para></footnote>
2722 </para>
2723 <para>
2724 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2725 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2726 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2727 activist:
2728 </para>
2729 <blockquote>
2730 <para>
2731 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2732 an activist. . . . [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2733 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2734 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2735 </para>
2736 </blockquote>
2737 <para>
2738 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2739 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2740 I. . . . He's not a tree hugger. . . . I think it's bizarre that they would
2741 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2742 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2743 </para>
2744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2745 </chapter>
2746 <chapter id="pirates">
2747 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"</title>
2748 <para>
2749 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2750 their permission&mdash;if "if value, then right" is true&mdash;then the history of
2751 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2752 "big media" today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2753 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2754 pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until now.
2755 </para>
2756 <section id="film">
2757 <title>Film</title>
2758 <para>
2759 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2760 <!-- f1 -->
2761 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2762 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2763 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2764 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2765 </para></footnote>
2766 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2767 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2768 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2769 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2770 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2771 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2772 this creative property
2773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2774 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2775 </para>
2776 <para>
2777 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2778 </para>
2779 <blockquote>
2780 <para>
2781 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2782 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2783 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2784 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2785 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2786 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2787 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2788 </para>
2789 <para>
2790 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2791 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2792 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2793 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2794 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2795 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2796 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2797 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2798 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2799 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2800 <!-- f2 -->
2801 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2802 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2803 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2804 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2805 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2806 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2807 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2808 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2809 the Propertization of Copyright" (September 2002), University of
2810 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2811 Working Paper No. 159. </para></footnote>
2812 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2813 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2814 </para>
2815 </blockquote>
2816 <para>
2817 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2818 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2819 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2820 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2821 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."<footnote><para>
2822 <!-- f3 -->
2823 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios," <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2824 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2825 </para></footnote>
2826 That led the independents to flee the East
2827 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2828 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2829 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2830 did just that.
2831 </para>
2832 <para>
2833 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2834 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2835 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2836
2837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2838 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2839 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2840 Edison's creative property.
2841 </para>
2842 </section>
2843 <section id="recordedmusic">
2844 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2845 <para>
2846 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2847 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2848 </para>
2849 <para>
2850 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2851 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2852 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2853 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2854 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2855 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2856 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2857 right to perform it publicly.
2858 </para>
2859 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2860 <para>
2861 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2862 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2863 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2864 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2865 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2866 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2867 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2868 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2869 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2870 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
2871 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2872 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2873 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2874 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2875 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2876 its composer anything.
2877 </para>
2878 <para>
2879 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2880 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2881 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2882 put it,
2883 </para>
2884 <blockquote>
2885 <para>
2886 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2887 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2888 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2889 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2890 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2891 rights.<footnote><para>
2892 <!-- f4 -->
2893 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2894 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
2895 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2896 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
2897 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2898 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
2899 </para></footnote>
2900 </para>
2901 </blockquote>
2902 <para>
2903 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2904 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2905 genius of American composers,"<footnote><para>
2906 <!-- f5 -->
2907 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
2908 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2909 </para></footnote>
2910 and the "music publishing industry"
2911 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."<footnote><para>
2912 <!-- f6 -->
2913 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
2914 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2915 </para></footnote>
2916 As John Philip
2917 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2918 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."<footnote><para>
2919 <!-- f7 -->
2920 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
2921 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2922 </para></footnote>
2923 </para>
2924 <para>
2925 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2926 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2927 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2928 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2929 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2930 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
2931 <!-- f8 -->
2932
2933 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
2934 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2935 Perforating Company of New York).
2936 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
2937 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
2938 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
2939 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
2940 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
2941 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
2942 statute."<footnote><para>
2943 <!-- f9 -->
2944 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
2945 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
2946 Graphophone Company Association).
2947 </para></footnote>
2948 </para>
2949 <para>
2950 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
2951 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
2952 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
2953 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
2954 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
2955 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
2956 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
2957 recorded once. This is the part of
2958
2959 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
2960 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
2961 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
2962 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
2963 </para>
2964 <para>
2965 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
2966 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
2967 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
2968 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
2969 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
2970 the fee set by the statute.
2971 </para>
2972 <para>
2973 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
2974 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
2975 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
2976 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
2977 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
2978 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
2979 Grisham.
2980 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
2981 </para>
2982 <para>
2983 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
2984 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
2985 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
2986 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
2987 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
2988 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
2989 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
2990 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
2991 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
2992 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
2993 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
2994 creativity.<footnote><para>
2995
2996 <!-- f10 -->
2997 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
2998 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
2999 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3000 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3001 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3002 </para></footnote>
3003 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3004 </para>
3005 <para>
3006 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3007 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3008 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3009 relates,
3010 </para>
3011 <blockquote>
3012 <para>
3013 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3015 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3016 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3017 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3018 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3019 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3020 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3021 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3022 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3023 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3024 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3025 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3026 choice.<footnote><para>
3027 <!-- f11 -->
3028 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3029 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3030 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3031 this report.</para></footnote>
3032 </para>
3033 </blockquote>
3034 <para>
3035 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3036 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3037 </para>
3038 </section>
3039 <section id="radio">
3040 <title>Radio</title>
3041 <para>
3042 Radio was also born of piracy.
3043 </para>
3044 <para>
3045 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3046 "public performance" of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3047 <!-- f12 -->
3048 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3049 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3050 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3051 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3052 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3053 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3054 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3055 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3056 Copyright," <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3057 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3058 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3059 </para></footnote>
3060 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3061 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3062 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3063 </para>
3064 <para>
3065 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3066 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3067 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3068 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3069 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3070 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3071 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3072 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3073 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3074 music for his work.
3075 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3076
3077 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3078 </para>
3079 <para>
3080 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3081 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3082 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3083 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3084 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3085 of playing the song.
3086 </para>
3087 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3088 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3089 </indexterm>
3090 <para>
3091 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3092 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3093 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3094 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3095 </para>
3096 <para>
3097 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3098 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3099 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3100 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3101 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3102 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3103 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3104 her anything.
3105 </para>
3106 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3107 <para>
3108 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3109 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3110 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3111 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3112 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3113 to take something for nothing.
3114 </para>
3115 </section>
3116 <section id="cabletv">
3117 <title>Cable TV</title>
3118 <para>
3119
3120 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3121 </para>
3122 <para>
3123 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3124 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3125 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3126 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3128 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3129 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3130 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3131 give away.
3132 </para>
3133 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3134 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3135 <para>
3136 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3137 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3138 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."<footnote><para>
3139 <!-- f13 -->
3140 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3141 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3142 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3143 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3144 Commission).
3145 </para></footnote>
3146 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3147 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3148 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3149 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"<footnote><para>
3150 <!-- f14 -->
3151 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3152 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3153 </para></footnote>
3154 As another broadcaster put it,
3155 </para>
3156 <blockquote>
3157 <para>
3158 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3159 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3160 paid for.<footnote><para>
3161 <!-- f15 -->
3162 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3163 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3164 </para></footnote>
3165 </para>
3166 </blockquote>
3167 <para>
3168 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3169 </para>
3170 <blockquote>
3171 <para>
3172 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3173 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3174 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3175 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3176 <!-- f16 -->
3177 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3178 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3179 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3180 </para></footnote>
3181 </para>
3182 </blockquote>
3183 <para>
3184 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3185 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3186 compensation."<footnote><para>
3187 <!-- f17 -->
3188 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3189 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3190 </para></footnote>
3191 </para>
3192 <para>
3193 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3194 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3195 </para>
3196 <blockquote>
3197 <para>
3198 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3199 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3200 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3201 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. . . . The
3202
3203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3204 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3205 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3206 <!-- f18 -->
3207 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3208 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3209 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3210 </para></footnote>
3211 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3212 </para>
3213 </blockquote>
3214 <para>
3215 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3216 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3217 </para>
3218 <para>
3219 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3220 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3221 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3222 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3223 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3224 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3225 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3226 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3227 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3228 created by broadcasters' content.
3229 </para>
3230 <para>
3231 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3232 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3233 from that creator&mdash;as it is increasingly described
3234 today<footnote><para>
3235 <!-- f19 -->
3236 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3237 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3238 Information</citetitle>, available at
3239 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. "The
3240 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3241 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet."
3242 </para></footnote>
3243 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3244 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3245 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. . . . The list is long and
3246 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3247 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3248 </para>
3249 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3250 </section>
3251 </chapter>
3252 <chapter id="piracy">
3253 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"</title>
3254 <para>
3255 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3256 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3257 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3258 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3259 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3260 should stop it.
3261 </para>
3262 <para>
3263 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3264 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3265 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3266 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3267 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3268 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3269 has so often done in the past.
3270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3271 </para>
3272 <section id="piracy-i">
3273 <title>Piracy I</title>
3274 <para>
3275 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3276 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3277 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3278 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3279 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3280 <!-- f1 -->
3281 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3282 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3283 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3284 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk," <citetitle>Financial
3285 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3286 </para></footnote>
3287 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3288 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3289 </para>
3290 <para>
3291 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3292 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3293 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3294 This piracy is wrong.
3295 </para>
3296 <para>
3297 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3298 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3299 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3300 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3301 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3302 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3303 of our existence, treated as right.
3304 </para>
3305 <para>
3306 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3307 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3308 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3309 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3310 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3311 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3312 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3313 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3314 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3315 </para>
3316 <para>
3317 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3318 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3320 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3321 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3322 similar childhood.
3323 </para>
3324 <para>
3325 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3326 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3327 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3328 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3329 <!-- f2 -->
3330 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: <citetitle>Who
3331 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13,
3332 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3333 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3334 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3335 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3336 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3337 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3338 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3339 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3340 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3341 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3342 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3343 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3344 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3345 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3346 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3347 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3348 is wrong.
3349 </para>
3350 <para>
3351 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3352 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3353 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3354 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3355 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3356 <!-- f3 -->
3357 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3358 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3359 144&ndash;90. "In some instances . . . the impact of piracy on the
3360 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3361 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3362 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3363 pirating were not an option." Ibid., 149.
3364 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3365 </para></footnote>
3366 </para>
3367 <para>
3368 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3369 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3370 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3371 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3372 "You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3373 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3374 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3375 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3376 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3377 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3378 piracy of the tangible.
3379 </para>
3380 <para>
3381 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3382 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3383 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3384 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3385 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3386 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3387 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3388 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3389 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3390
3391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3392 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3393 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3394 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3395 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3396 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3397 </para>
3398 <para>
3399 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3400 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3401 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3402 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3403 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3404 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3405 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3406 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3407 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3408 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3409 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3410 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3411 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3412 <indexterm>
3413 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3414 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3415 </indexterm>
3416 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3417 </para>
3418 <para>
3419 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3420 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3421 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3422 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3423 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3424 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3425 </para>
3426 <para>
3427 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3428 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3429 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3430 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3431 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3432 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3433 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3434 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3435 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3436 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3437 violating the law is still wrong.
3438 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3439 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3440 </para>
3441 <para>
3442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3443 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3444 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3445 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3446 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3447 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3448 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3449 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3450 is flat out wrong.
3451 </para>
3452 <para>
3453 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3454 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3455 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3456 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3457 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3458 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3459 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3460 </para>
3461 <para>
3462 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3463 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3464 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3465 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3466 </para>
3467 <para>
3468 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3469 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3470 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3471 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3472 </para>
3473 <para>
3474 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3475 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3476 sharing to survive.
3477 </para>
3478 </section>
3479 <section id="piracy-ii">
3480 <title>Piracy II</title>
3481 <para>
3482 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3483 the author of [his] profit."<footnote><para>
3484 <!-- f4 -->
3485 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3486 </para></footnote>
3487 This means we must determine whether
3488 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3490 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3491 author of his profit.
3492 </para>
3493 <para>
3494 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3495 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3496 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3497 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3498 <!-- f5 -->
3499 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3500 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3501 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3502 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3503 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3504 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3505 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3506 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3507
3508 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3509 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3510 put together components that had been developed independently.
3511 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3512 </para>
3513 <para>
3514 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3515 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3516 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3517 system.<footnote><para>
3518 <!-- f6 -->
3519 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare," <citetitle>San
3520 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3521 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3522 Secures New Financing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3523 "Napster's Wake-Up Call," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3524 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3525 </para></footnote>
3526 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3527 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3528 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3529 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3530 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3531 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3532 or your 20,000 best friends.
3533 </para>
3534 <para>
3535 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3536 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3537 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3538 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3539
3540 <!-- f7 -->
3541 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3542 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3543 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3544 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3545 </para></footnote>
3546 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3547 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3548 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3549 <!-- f8 -->
3550 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight," <citetitle>New
3551 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3552 </para></footnote>
3553 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3554 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3555 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3556 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3557 </para>
3558 <para>
3559 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3560 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3561 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3562 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3563 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3564 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3565 of harm it entails.
3566 </para>
3567 <para>
3568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3569 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3570 different kinds into four types.
3571 </para>
3572 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3573 <listitem><para>
3574 <!-- A. -->
3575 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3576 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3577 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3578 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3579 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3580 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3581 users who download instead of purchasing.
3582 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3583 </para></listitem>
3584 <listitem><para>
3585 <!-- B. -->
3586 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3587 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3588 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3589 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3590 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3591 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3592 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3593 music purchased.
3594 </para></listitem>
3595 <listitem><para>
3596 <!-- C. -->
3597 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3598 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3599 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3600 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3601 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3602 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3603 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3604 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3605 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3606 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3607 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3608 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3609 a local collector.
3610 </para></listitem>
3611 <listitem><para>
3612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3613 <!-- D. -->
3614 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3615 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3616 wants to give away.
3617 </para></listitem>
3618 </orderedlist>
3619 <para>
3620 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3621 </para>
3622 <para>
3623 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3624 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3625 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3626 harmful.<footnote><para>
3627 <!-- f9 -->
3628 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3629 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3630 </para></footnote>
3631 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3632 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3633 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3634 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3635 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3636 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3637 </para>
3638 <para>
3639 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3640 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3641 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3642 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3643 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3644 "devastating" the industry.
3645 </para>
3646 <para>
3647 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3648 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3649 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3650 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3651 &amp; Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3652 technology, the labels fought it."<footnote><para>
3653 <!-- f10 -->
3654 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3655 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3656 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3657 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3658 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3659 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3660 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3661 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3662 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3663 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3664 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3665 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3666 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3667 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3668 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3669 regulating technology was the answer.
3670 </para>
3671 <para>
3672 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3673 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3674 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis' . . . was
3675 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3677 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3678 innovation at the major labels."<footnote><para>
3679 <!-- f11 -->
3680 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3681 </para></footnote>
3682 </para>
3683 <para>
3684 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3685 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3686 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3687 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3688 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3689 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3690 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3691 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3692 </para>
3693 <para>
3694 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3695 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3696 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3697 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3698 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3699 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3700 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3701 them.
3702
3703 </para>
3704 <para>
3705 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3706 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3707 actually suggest it might be close.
3708 </para>
3709 <para>
3710 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3711 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3712 percent.<footnote><para>
3713 <!-- f12 -->
3714 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3715 available at
3716 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3717 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3718 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3719 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3720 #16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3721 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3722 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3723 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3724 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3725 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3726 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3727 shipments)."
3728 </para></footnote>
3729 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3730 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3731 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3732 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3733 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3734 account for at least some of the loss. "From 1999 to 2001, the average
3735 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19."<footnote>
3736 <!-- f13 -->
3737 <para>
3738 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online, 13
3739 February 2003, available at
3740 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3741 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3742 </para>
3743 </footnote>
3744 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3745 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, "The
3746 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3747 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3748 $19.99."<footnote><para>
3749 <!-- f14 -->
3750 Ibid.
3751 </para></footnote>
3752 </para>
3753 <para>
3754
3755 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3756 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3757 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3758 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3759 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3760 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3761 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3762 </para>
3763 <para>
3764 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3765 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3766 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3767 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"&mdash;but their own numbers
3768 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3769 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3770 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3771 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3772 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"&mdash;then the industry
3773 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3774 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3775 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3776 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3777 </para>
3778 <para>
3779 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3780 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3781 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3782 these costs?
3783 </para>
3784 <para>
3785 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3786 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3787 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3788 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3789 available.<footnote><para>
3790 <!-- f15 -->
3791 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3792 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3793 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3794 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3795 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3796 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3797 </para></footnote>
3798 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3799 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3800 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3801 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3802 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3803 </para>
3804 <para>
3805 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3807 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3808 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3809 today.<footnote><para>
3810 <!-- f16 -->
3811 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3812 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3813 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3814 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3815 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3816 National
3817 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "2002 Annual Survey
3818 Results,"
3819 available at
3820 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3821 </para></footnote>
3822 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3823 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3824 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3825 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3826 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3827 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3828 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3829 the content they sell.
3830 </para>
3831 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3832 <para>
3833 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3834 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3835 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3836 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3837 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3838 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3839 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3840 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3841 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3842 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3843 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3844 </para>
3845 <para>
3846 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3847 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3848 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3849 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3850 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3851 shut as well?
3852 </para>
3853 <para>
3854 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3855 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
3856 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3857 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3858 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
3859 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3860
3861 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3862 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3863 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3864 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3865 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3866 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3867 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3868 great book!)
3869 </para>
3870 <para>
3871 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3872 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3873 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3874 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3875 </para>
3876 <para>
3877 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3878 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3879 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3880 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3881 unavailable?"
3882 </para>
3883 <para>
3884 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3885 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3886 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3887 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
3888 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3889 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3890 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3891 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3892 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3893 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3894 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3895 found only with time.
3896 </para>
3897 <para>
3898 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3899 just what you call type A sharing?"
3900 </para>
3901 <para>
3902 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3903 effect
3904 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3905 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3906 Napster
3907 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3908 developed
3909 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
3910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3911 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
3912 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3913 "down to zero."<footnote><para>
3914 <!-- f17 -->
3915 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
3916 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
3917 MHP, available at
3918
3919 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
3920 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
3921 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
3922 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
3923 </para></footnote>
3924 </para>
3925 <para>
3926 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3927 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3928 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
3929 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
3930 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
3931 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3932 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3933 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
3934 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
3935 </para>
3936 <para>
3937 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
3938 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
3939 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
3940 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
3941 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
3942 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
3943 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
3944 </para>
3945 <para>
3946 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
3947 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
3948 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
3949 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
3950 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
3951 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
3952 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
3953 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
3954 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
3955 benefit was enough.
3956 </para>
3957 <para>
3958 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
3959 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
3960 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
3961 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
3962 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
3963 price.
3964 </para>
3965 <para>
3966
3967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
3968 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
3969 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
3970 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
3971 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
3972 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
3973 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
3974 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
3975 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
3976 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
3977 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
3978 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
3979 Congress chose a path that would assure
3980 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
3981 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
3982 </para>
3983 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
3984 <para>
3985 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
3986 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
3987 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
3988 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
3989 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
3990 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
3991 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
3992 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
3993 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
3994 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
3995 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
3996 </para>
3997 <para>
3998 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
3999 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4000 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4001 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4002 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4003 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4004 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4005 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4006 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4007 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4008 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4009 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4010 for the architecture it chose.
4011 </para>
4012 <para>
4013 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4014 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4015 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4016 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4017 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4018 copyright."<footnote><para>
4019 <!-- f18 -->
4020 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4021 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4022 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4023 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4024 </para></footnote>
4025 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4026 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4027 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4028 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4029 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4030 and plain common sense."<footnote><para>
4031 <!-- f19 -->
4032 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4033 </para></footnote>
4034 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4035 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4036 <!-- f20 -->
4037 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4038 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4039 </para></footnote>
4040 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4041 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4042 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4043 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4044 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4045 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4046 profit from its reproduction."<footnote><para>
4047 <!-- f21 -->
4048 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4049 of Jack Valenti).
4050 </para></footnote>
4051 </para>
4052 <para>
4053 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4054 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4055 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4056 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4057 Circuit"&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4058 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4059 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4060 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4061 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4062 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4063 technology.<footnote><para>
4064 <!-- f22 -->
4065 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4066 1981).
4067 </para></footnote>
4068 </para>
4069 <para>
4070 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4071
4072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4073 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4074 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4075 Court wrote,
4076 </para>
4077 <blockquote>
4078 <para>
4079 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4080 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4081 market
4082 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4083 authority
4084 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4085 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4086 implicated
4087 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4088 <!-- f23 -->
4089 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4090 </para></footnote>
4091 </para>
4092 </blockquote>
4093 <para>
4094 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4095 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4096 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4097 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4098 together, a pattern is clear:
4099 </para>
4100
4101 <table id="t1">
4102 <title>Pattern of Court and Congress response</title>
4103 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4104 <thead>
4105 <row>
4106 <entry>CASE</entry>
4107 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"</entry>
4108 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4109 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4110 </row>
4111 </thead>
4112 <tbody>
4113 <row>
4114 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4115 <entry>Composers</entry>
4116 <entry>No protection</entry>
4117 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4118 </row>
4119 <row>
4120 <entry>Radio</entry>
4121 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4122 <entry>N/A</entry>
4123 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4124 </row>
4125 <row>
4126 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4127 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4128 <entry>No protection</entry>
4129 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4130 </row>
4131 <row>
4132 <entry>VCR</entry>
4133 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4134 <entry>No protection</entry>
4135 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4136 </row>
4137 </tbody>
4138 </tgroup>
4139 </table>
4140
4141 <para>
4142 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4143 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4144 <!-- f24 -->
4145 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4146 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4147 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4148 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4149 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4150 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4151 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4152 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4153 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4154 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4155 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4156 </para></footnote>
4157 In each case, throughout our history,
4158 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4159 work.
4160 </para>
4161 <para>
4162 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4163 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4164 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4165 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4166 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4167 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4168 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4169 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4170 interests at stake.
4171 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4172 </para>
4173 <para>
4174 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4175 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4176 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4177 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4178 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4179 regulated?
4180 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4181 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4182 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4183 permission to record a song?
4184 </para>
4185 <para>
4186 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4187 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4188 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4189 over all possible uses of his work."<footnote><para>
4190 <!-- f25 -->
4191 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4192 (1984).
4193 </para></footnote>
4194 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4195 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4196 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4197 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4198 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4199 facilitate the distribution of content.
4200 </para>
4201 <para>
4202 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4203 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4204 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4205 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4206 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4207 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4208 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4209 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4210 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4211 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4212 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4213 public interest that innovation continue.
4214 </para>
4215 <para>
4216
4217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4218 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4219 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4220 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4221 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4222 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4223 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4224 fight."<footnote><para>
4225 <!-- f26 -->
4226 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4227 Echoes Past Efforts," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4228 </para></footnote>
4229 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4230 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4231 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4232 warriors insist, "is our <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we
4233 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4234 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4235 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4236 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4237 arrest him?"
4238 </para>
4239 <para>
4240 "It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4241 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4242 </para>
4243 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4244 </section>
4245 </chapter>
4246 </part>
4247 <part id="c-property">
4248 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4249 <partintro>
4250 <para>
4251
4252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4253 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4254 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4255 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4256 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4257 the price she can get.
4258 </para>
4259 <para>
4260 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4261 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4262 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4263 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4264 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4265 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4266 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4267 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4268 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4269 then?
4270 </para>
4271 <para>
4272 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4273 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4274 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4275 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4276 narrow
4277 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4278 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4279 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4280 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4281 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4282 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4283 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."<footnote><para>
4284 <!-- f1 -->
4285 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4286 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4287 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4288 </para></footnote>
4289 </para>
4290 <para>
4291 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4292 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4293 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4294 expression
4295 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4296 property.
4297 </para>
4298 <para>
4299 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4300 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4301 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4302 "property" in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4303 <!-- f2 -->
4304 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4305 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4306 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4307 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4308 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4309 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4310 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4311 </para></footnote>
4312 </para>
4313 <para>
4314 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4315 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4316 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4317 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4318 these stories, the significance of this true
4319 statement&mdash;"copyright material is property"&mdash; will be a bit
4320 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4321 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4322 </para>
4323 </partintro>
4324
4325 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4326 <chapter id="founders">
4327 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4328 <para>
4329 William Shakespeare wrote <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play
4330 was first published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4331 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4332 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4333 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4334 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4335 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4336 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4337 is so full of clichés."
4338 </para>
4339 <para>
4340 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4341 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4342 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4343 <!-- f1 -->
4344 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4345 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4346 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4347 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4348 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4349 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4350 Bookseller," <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4351 </para></footnote>
4352 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4353 the Conger<footnote><para>
4354 <!-- f2 -->
4355 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4356 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4357 </para></footnote>
4358 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4359 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4360 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4361 that no
4362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4363 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4364 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4365 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4366 </para>
4367 <para>
4368 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4369 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4370 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4371 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4372 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4373 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4374 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4375 additional years.<footnote><para>
4376 <!-- f3 -->
4377 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4378 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4379 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4380 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4381 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4382 Tonson's control in 1774?
4383 </para>
4384 <para>
4385 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4386 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4387 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4388 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4389 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4390 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4391 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4392 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4393 books.
4394 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4395 </para>
4396 <para>
4397 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4398 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4399 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4400 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4401 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4402 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4403 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4404 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4405 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4406 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4407 </para>
4408 <para>
4409 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4410 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4411 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4412 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4413
4414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4415 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4416 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4417 ultimately
4418 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4419 </para>
4420 <para>
4421 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4422 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4423 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4424 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4425 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4426 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4427 believed.
4428 </para>
4429 <para>
4430 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4431 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4432 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4433 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4434 </para>
4435 <para>
4436 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4437 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4438 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4439 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4440 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4441 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4442 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4443 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4444 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4445 </para>
4446 <para>
4447 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4448 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4449 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4450 "booksellers."
4451 </para>
4452 <para>
4453 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4454 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4455 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4456 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4457 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4458 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4459 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4460 generally how
4461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4462 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4463 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4464 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4465 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4466 </para>
4467 <para>
4468 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4469 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4470 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4471 permission
4472 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4473 anything,
4474 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4475 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4476 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4477 to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4478 </para>
4479 <para>
4480 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4481 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4482 especially
4483 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4484 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4485 monopolies&mdash;especially
4486 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4487 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4488 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4489 against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the Statute of
4490 Monopolies,
4491 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4492 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4493 publishing.
4494 </para>
4495 <para>
4496 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4497 naturally
4498 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4499 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4500 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4501 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4502 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4503 specialinterest
4504 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4505 </para>
4506 <para>
4507 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4508 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4509 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4510 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4512
4513 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4514 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4515 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4516 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4517 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4518 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4519 indetted."<footnote><para>
4520
4521 <!-- f4 -->
4522 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4523 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4524 </para></footnote>
4525 </para>
4526 <para>
4527 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4528 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4529 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4530 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4531 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4532 with that idea.
4533 </para>
4534 <para>
4535 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4536 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4537 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4538 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4539 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4540 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4541 compromise
4542 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4543 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4544 construction and spread of culture.
4545 </para>
4546 <para>
4547 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4548 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4549 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4550 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4551 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4552 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4553 they said; they needed more time.
4554 </para>
4555 <para>
4556 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4557 words that echo today,
4558 </para>
4559 <blockquote>
4560 <para>
4561 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4562 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4563 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4564 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4565 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4566 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4567 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4568 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4569 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4570 <!-- f5 -->
4571 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4572 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4573 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4574 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4575 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4576 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4577 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4578 </para></footnote>
4579 </para>
4580 </blockquote>
4581 <para>
4582 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4583 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4584 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4585 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4586 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4587 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4588 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4589 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4590 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4591 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4592 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4593 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4594 way to protect authors.
4595 </para>
4596 <para>
4597 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4598 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4599 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4600 "The publishers . . . had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4601 rancher has for cattle."<footnote><para>
4602 <!-- f6 -->
4603 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use," <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4604 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4605 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4606 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4607 </para></footnote>
4608 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4609 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4610 </para>
4611 <para>
4612 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4613 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4614 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4615 <!-- f7 -->
4616 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4617 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4618 </para></footnote>
4619 </para>
4620 <para>
4621 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4622 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4623 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4624 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4625 <!-- f8 -->
4626 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4627 1993), 92.
4628 </para></footnote>
4629 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4630 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4631 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4632 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4633 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4634 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."<footnote><para>
4635 <!-- f9 -->
4636 Ibid., 93.
4637 </para></footnote>
4638 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4639 </para>
4640 <para>
4641 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4642 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4643 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4644 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4645 Property."<footnote><para>
4646 <!-- f10 -->
4647 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4648 Borwell).
4649 </para></footnote>
4650 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4651 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4652 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4653 </para>
4654 <para>
4655 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4656 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4657 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4658 </para>
4659 <para>
4660 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4661 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4662 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4663 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4664 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4665 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4666 <!-- f11 -->
4667 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4668 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright," <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4669 (1983): 1152.
4670 </para></footnote>
4671 </para>
4672 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4673 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4674 </indexterm>
4675 <para>
4676 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4677 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4678 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4679 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4680 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4681 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4682 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4683 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4684 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4685 </para>
4686 <para>
4687 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4688 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4689 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4690 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4691 with in 1710: How best to limit
4692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4693 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4694 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4695 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4696 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4697 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4698 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4699 </para>
4700 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4701 <para>
4702 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4703 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4704 </para>
4705 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4706 <para>
4707 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4708 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4709 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4710 <!-- f12 -->
4711 Ibid., 1156.
4712 </para></footnote>
4713 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4714 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4715 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4716 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4717 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4718 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4719 </para>
4720 <para>
4721 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4722 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4723 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4724 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4725 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4726 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4727 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4728 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4729 </para>
4730 <para>
4731 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4732 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4733 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4734 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4735 House of Lords generally voted.
4736 </para>
4737 <para>
4738 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4739 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4740 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4741 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4742 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4743 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4744 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4745 passed into the public domain.
4746 </para>
4747 <para>
4748 "The public domain." Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4749 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4750 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4751 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4752 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4753 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4754 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4755 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4756 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4757 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4758 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4759 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4760 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4761 </para>
4762 <para>
4763 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4764 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4765 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4766 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4767 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4768 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4769 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4770 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4771 and illuminations."<footnote><para>
4772 <!-- f13 -->
4773 Rose, 97.
4774 </para></footnote>
4775 </para>
4776 <para>
4777 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4778 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4779 reported:
4780 </para>
4781 <blockquote>
4782 <para>
4783 By the above decision . . . near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4784 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4785 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4786 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4787 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4788 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4789 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4790 successors.<footnote><para>
4791 <!-- f14 -->
4792 Ibid.
4793 </para></footnote>
4794 </para>
4795 </blockquote>
4796 <para>
4797 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4798 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4799 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4800 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4801 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4802 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4803 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4804 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4805 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4806 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4807 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4808 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4809 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4810 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4811 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4812 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4813 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4814 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4815 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4816 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4817 </para>
4818 <para>
4819 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4820 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4821 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4822 protected.
4823 </para>
4824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4825 </chapter>
4826 <chapter id="recorders">
4827 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4828 <para>
4829 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4830 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4831 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4832 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4833 He was their god.)
4834 </para>
4835 <para>
4836 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4837 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4838 today.
4839 </para>
4840 <para>
4841 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4842 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4843 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4844 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4845 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4846 stage.
4847 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4848 </para>
4849 <para>
4850 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4851 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4852 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4853 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
4854 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4855 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4856 about the scene.
4857 </para>
4858 <para>
4859 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4860 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
4861 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4862 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4863 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4864 </para>
4865 <para>
4866 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4867 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4868 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4869 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4870 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4871 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4872 </para>
4873 <para>
4874 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4875 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4876 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4877 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4878 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4879 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
4880 </para>
4881 <para>
4882 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4883 . . . that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
4884 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4885 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4886 to use this four-point-five seconds of . . . entirely unsolicited
4887 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4888 </para>
4889 <para>
4890 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4891 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4892 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here. . . . We're
4893 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4894 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4895 confirm what he had been told.
4896 </para>
4897 <para>
4898 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4899 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
4900 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4901 about
4902
4903 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4904 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4905 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4906 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4907 the money."
4908 </para>
4909 <para>
4910 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4911 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4912 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4913 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4914 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4915 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
4916 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
4917 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
4918 </para>
4919 <para>
4920 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4921 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
4922 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4923 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4924 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4925 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4926 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4927 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4928 says the owner gets to control.
4929 </para>
4930 <para>
4931 For example, "public performance" is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
4932 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
4933 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
4934 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
4935 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
4936 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
4937 by the law.
4938 </para>
4939 <para>
4940 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
4941 thought is "fair use."<footnote><para>
4942 <!-- f1 -->
4943 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
4944 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
4945 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
4946 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
4947 Law School, 5 August 2003.
4948 </para></footnote>
4949 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
4950 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
4951 not require the permission of anyone.
4952 </para>
4953 <para>
4954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
4955 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use." Here's his reply:
4956 </para>
4957 <blockquote>
4958 <para>
4959 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
4960 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
4961 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
4962 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
4963 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
4964 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
4965 </para>
4966 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
4967 <listitem><para>
4968 <!-- 1. -->
4969 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
4970 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
4971 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
4972 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
4973 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
4974 </para></listitem>
4975 <listitem><para>
4976 <!-- 2. -->
4977 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
4978 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
4979 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
4980 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
4981 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
4982 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
4983 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
4984 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
4985 principle.
4986 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
4987 </para></listitem>
4988 <listitem><para>
4989 <!-- 3. -->
4990 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
4991 School . . . who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
4992 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
4993 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
4994 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
4995 pockets, me or them.
4996 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
4997 </para></listitem>
4998 <listitem><para>
4999 <!-- 4. -->
5000 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5001 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5002 money.
5003 </para></listitem>
5004 </orderedlist>
5005 </blockquote>
5006 <para>
5007 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5008 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5009 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5010 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5011 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5012 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5013 </para>
5014 <para>
5015 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5016 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5017 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5018 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5019 not.
5020 </para>
5021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5022 </chapter>
5023 <chapter id="transformers">
5024 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5025 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5026 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5027 <para>
5028 In 1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5029 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5030 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5031 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5032 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5033 </para>
5034 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5035 <para>
5036 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5037 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5038 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5039 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5040 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5041 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5042 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5043 important to his career.
5044 </para>
5045 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5046 <para>
5047 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5048 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5049 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5050 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5051 </para>
5052 <para>
5053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5054 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5055 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5056 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5057 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5058 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5059 </para>
5060 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5061 <para>
5062 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5063 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5064 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5065 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5066 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5067 actor's career."
5068 </para>
5069 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5070 <para>
5071 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5072 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5073 </para>
5074 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5075 <para>
5076 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5077 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5078 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5079 for it."<footnote>
5080 <para>
5081 <!-- f1 -->
5082 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5083 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5084 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5085 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5086 <indexterm>
5087 <primary>artists</primary>
5088 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5089 </indexterm>
5090 </para></footnote>
5091 </para>
5092 <para>
5093 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5094 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5095 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5096 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5097 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5098 </para>
5099 <para>
5100 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5101 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5102 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5103 </para>
5104 <blockquote>
5105 <para>
5106 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5107 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5108 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5109 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5110 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5111 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5112 </para>
5113 <para>
5114 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5115 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5116 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5117 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5118 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5119 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5120 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5121 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5122 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5123 started calling people.
5124 </para>
5125 </blockquote>
5126 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5127 <para>
5128 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5129 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5130 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5131 "Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5132 know, $1,200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5133 to get $1,200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5134 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5135 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5136 career.
5137 </para>
5138 <para>
5139 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;"and even then we
5140 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5141 </para>
5142 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5143 <para>
5144 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5145 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5146 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5147 </para>
5148 <blockquote>
5149 <para>
5150 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5151 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5152 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5153 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5154 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5155 directors, . . . this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5156 systematically and cleared the rights.
5157 </para>
5158 </blockquote>
5159 <para>
5160
5161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5162 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5163 loved it, and it sold very well.
5164 </para>
5165 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5166 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5167 <para>
5168 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5169 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5170 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5171 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5172 at all."<footnote><para>
5173 <!-- f2 -->
5174 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5175 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5176 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5177 </para></footnote>
5178 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5179 has to be made?
5180 </para>
5181 <para>
5182 For, as he acknowledged, "very few . . . have the time and resources,
5183 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5184 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5185 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5186 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5187 </para>
5188 <blockquote>
5189 <para>
5190 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5191 he or she gets paid very well. . . . And then when 30 seconds of
5192 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5193 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person . . . should be
5194 compensated for that.
5195 </para>
5196 </blockquote>
5197 <para>
5198 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5199 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5200 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5201 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5202 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5203 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5204 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5205 made to be more clean?
5206 </para>
5207 <blockquote>
5208 <para>
5209 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5210 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5211 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5212 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5214 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5215 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5216 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5217 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5218 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5219 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5220 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5221 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5222 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5223 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5224 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5225 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5226 </para>
5227 </blockquote>
5228 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5229 <para>
5230 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5231 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5232 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5233 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5234 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5235 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5236 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5237 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5238 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5239 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5240 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5241 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5242 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5243 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5244 "Does this still make sense?"
5245 </para>
5246 <para>
5247 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5248 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5249 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5250 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5251
5252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5253 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5254 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5255 </para>
5256 <para>
5257 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5258 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5259 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5260 judges loved every minute of it.
5261 </para>
5262 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5263 <para>
5264 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5265 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5266 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5267 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5268 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5269 were just violated in this room?"
5270 </para>
5271 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5272 <para>
5273 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5274 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5275 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5276 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5277 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5278 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5279 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5280 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5281 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5282 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5283 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5284 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5285 couldn't easily do them legally.
5286 </para>
5287 <para>
5288 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5289 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5290 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5291 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5292 planted in your presentation.
5293 </para>
5294 <para>
5295 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5296 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5297 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5298 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5299 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5300 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5301 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5302 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5303 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5304 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5305 </para>
5306 <para>
5307 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5308 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5309 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5310 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5311 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5312 </para>
5313 <para>
5314 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5315 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5316 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5317 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5318 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5319 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5320 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5321 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5322 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5323 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5324 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5325 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5326 registers the work.
5327 </para>
5328 <para>
5329 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5330 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5331 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5332 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5333 </para>
5334 <para>
5335 In February 2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5336 Myers, the comic genius of <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5338 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5339 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5340 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5341 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5342 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5343 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5344 entertainment."
5345 </para>
5346 <para>
5347 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5348 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5349 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5350 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5351 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5352 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5353 new audiences, it is Mike."
5354 </para>
5355 <para>
5356 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5357 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5358 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5359 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5360 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5361 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5362 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5363 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5364 </para>
5365 <para>
5366 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5367 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5368 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5369 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5370 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5371 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5372 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5373 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5374 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5375 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5376 curse, reserved for the few.
5377 </para>
5378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5379 </chapter>
5380 <chapter id="collectors">
5381 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5382 <para>
5383 In April 1996, millions of "bots"&mdash;computer codes designed to
5384 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content&mdash;began
5385 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5386 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5387 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5388 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5389 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5390 </para>
5391 <para>
5392 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5393 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5394 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5395 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5396 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5397 well as when those pages changed.
5398 </para>
5399 <para>
5400 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5401 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5402 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5403 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5404 reports.
5405 </para>
5406 <para>
5407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5408 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5409 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5410 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5411 </para>
5412 <para>
5413 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5414 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5415 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5416 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5417 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5418 </para>
5419 <para>
5420 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5421 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5422 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5423 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5424 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5425 <!-- f1 -->
5426 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5427 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5428 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5429 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5430 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5431 </para></footnote>
5432 </para>
5433 <para>
5434 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5435 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5436 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in 1965, or to
5437 Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963, you could go to your public
5438 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5439 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5440 are free, using a library, to go back and remember&mdash;not just what
5441 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5442 truth.
5443 </para>
5444 <para>
5445 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5446 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5447 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5448 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5449 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5450 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5451 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5452 </para>
5453 <para>
5454 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5455 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5456 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5457 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5458 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5459 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5460 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5461 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5462 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5463 </para>
5464 <para>
5465 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5466 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5467 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5468 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5469 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5470 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5471 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5472 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5473 </para>
5474 <para>
5475 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5476 human history. At the end of 2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5477 terabytes of material"&mdash;and was "ten times larger than the
5478 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5479 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5480 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5481 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5482 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5483 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5484 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5485 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5486 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5487 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5488 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5489 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5490 </para>
5491 <blockquote>
5492 <para>
5493 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5494 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5495 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5496 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5497 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5498
5499 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5500 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it . . . it would be almost
5501 impossible. . . . Those materials are almost unfindable. . . .
5502 </para>
5503 </blockquote>
5504 <para>
5505 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5506 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5507 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5508 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5509 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5510 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5511 </para>
5512 <para>
5513 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5514 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5515 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5516 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5517 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5518 work.
5519 </para>
5520 <para>
5521 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5522 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5523 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5524 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5525 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and "borrowed
5526 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5527 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5528 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5529 <!-- f2 -->
5530 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5531 the Library of Congress," <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5532 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5533 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5534 Co., 1992), 36.
5535 </para></footnote>
5536 </para>
5537 <para>
5538 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5539 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5540 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5541 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5542 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5543 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5544 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5545 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5546 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5547 </para>
5548 <para>
5549 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5551 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5552 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5553 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5554 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5555 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5556 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5557 events of that day.
5558 </para>
5559 <para>
5560 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5561 archive of film includes close to 45,000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5562 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5563 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5564 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5565 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5566 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5567 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5568 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5569 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5570 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5571 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5572 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5573 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5574 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5575 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5576 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5577 </para>
5578 <para>
5579 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5580 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5581 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5582 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5583 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5584 to find them.
5585 </para>
5586 <para>
5587 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5588 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5589 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5590 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5591 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5592 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5593 </para>
5594 <para>
5595 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5596 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5597 life, if the
5598
5599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5600 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5601 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5602 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5603 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5604 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5605 </para>
5606 <para>
5607 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5608 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5609 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5610 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5611 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5612 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5613 longer sold.
5614 </para>
5615 <para>
5616 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5617 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5618 <!-- f3 -->
5619 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5620 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5621 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5622 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5623 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks," <citetitle>Boston
5624 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5625 </para></footnote>). After
5626 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5627 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5628 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5629 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5630 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5631 </para>
5632 <para>
5633 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5634 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5635 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5636 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5637 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5638 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5639 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5640 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5641 disappears.
5642 </para>
5643 <para>
5644 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5645 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5646 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5647 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5648 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5649 generally, the
5650 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5651 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5652 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5653 little practical effect.
5654 </para>
5655 <para>
5656 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5657 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5658 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5659 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5660 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5661 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5662 </para>
5663 <para>
5664 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5665 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5666 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5667 Kahle describes,
5668 </para>
5669 <blockquote>
5670 <para>
5671 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5672 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5673 movies, . . . and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5674 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5675 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5676 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5677 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5678 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5679 . . . thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5680 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5681 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5682 </para>
5683 </blockquote>
5684 <para>
5685 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5686 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5687 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5688 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5689 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5690 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5691 will draw upon it to understand it;
5692 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5693 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5694 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5695 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5696 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5697 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5698 </para>
5699 <para>
5700 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5701 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5702 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5703 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5704 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5705 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5706 </para>
5707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5708 </chapter>
5709 <chapter id="property-i">
5710 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"</title>
5711 <para>
5712 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5713 of America since 1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5714 Johnson's administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of
5715 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5716 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5717 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5718 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5719 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5720 </para>
5721 <para>
5722 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5723 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5724 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5725 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5726 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5727 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5728 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5729 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5730 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5731 Warner Brothers.
5732 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5733 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5734 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5735 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5736 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5737 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5738 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5739 </para>
5740 <para>
5741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5742 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5743 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5744 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5745 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5746 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5747 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5748 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5749 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5750 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5751 Washingtonian way.
5752 </para>
5753 <para>
5754 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5755 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5756 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5757 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5758 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5759 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5760 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5761 </para>
5762 <para>
5763 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5764 perfectly:
5765 </para>
5766 <blockquote>
5767 <para>
5768 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5769 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5770 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5771 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5772 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5773 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5774 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5775 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5776 <!-- f1 -->
5777 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5778 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5779 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5780 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5781 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5782 Valenti).
5783 </para></footnote>
5784 </para>
5785 </blockquote>
5786 <para>
5787 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5788 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5789 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5790 this:
5791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5792 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5793 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5794 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5795 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5796 </para>
5797 <para>
5798 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5799 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5800 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5801 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
5802 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5803 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5804 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5805 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5806 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5807 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5808 </para>
5809 <para>
5810 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5811 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
5812 <!-- f2 -->
5813 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5814 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5815 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5816 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
5817 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5818 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
5819 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
5820 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5821 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5822 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5823 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5824 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5825 in our tradition.
5826 </para>
5827 <para>
5828 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5829 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5830 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5831 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5832 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5833 culture would develop.
5834 </para>
5835 <para>
5836 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5837 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5838 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5839 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5840 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5841 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5842 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5843 the same would be to
5844
5845 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5846 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5847 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5848 perfect control.
5849 </para>
5850 <para>
5851 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5852 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5853 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5854 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5855 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5856 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5857 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5858 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5859 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5860 Constitution itself.
5861 </para>
5862 <para>
5863 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5864 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5865 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
5866 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5867 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5868 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5869 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5870 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
5871 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5872 </para>
5873 <para>
5874 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5875 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5876 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5877 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5878 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5879 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5880 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5881 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5882 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5883 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5884 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5885 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5886 compensation at all.
5887 </para>
5888 <para>
5889 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5890 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5891 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5892 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5893 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5894 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5895 itself.
5896 </para>
5897 <para>
5898 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5899 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5900 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5901 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5902 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5903 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
5904 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5905 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5906 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5907 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5908 </para>
5909 <para>
5910 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5911 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
5912 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
5913 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
5914 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
5915 domain?
5916 </para>
5917 <para>
5918 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5919 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5920 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5921 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5922 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
5923 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
5924 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
5925 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
5926 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
5927 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
5928 also control how culture develops.
5929 </para>
5930 <para>
5931
5932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
5933 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
5934 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
5935 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
5936 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
5937 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
5938 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
5939 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
5940 </para>
5941 <figure id="fig-1331">
5942 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
5943 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
5944 </figure>
5945 <para>
5946 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
5947 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
5948 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
5949 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
5950 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
5951 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
5952 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
5953 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
5954 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
5955 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
5956 Web, you can be punished
5957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
5958 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
5959 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
5960 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
5961 </para>
5962 <para>
5963 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
5964 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
5965 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
5966 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
5967 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
5968 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
5969 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
5970 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
5971 the source of the enforcement.
5972 </para>
5973 <para>
5974 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
5975 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
5976 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
5977 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
5978 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
5979 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
5980 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
5981 individual or group might behave.
5982 </para>
5983 <para>
5984 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
5985 "architecture"&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
5986 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
5987 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
5988 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
5989 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
5990 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
5991 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
5992 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
5993 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a 500-pound boulder
5994 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
5995 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
5996 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
5997 </para>
5998 <para>
5999
6000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6001 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6002 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6003 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6004 undermined by another.
6005 </para>
6006 <para>
6007 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6008 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6009 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6010 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6011 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6012 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6013 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6014 </para>
6015 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6016 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6017 </indexterm>
6018 <para>
6019 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6020 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6021 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6022 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6023 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6024 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6025 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6026 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6027 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6028 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6029 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6030 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6031 </para>
6032 <para>
6033 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6034 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6035 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6036 <!-- f3 -->
6037 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6038 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6039 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6040 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6041 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6042 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6043 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6044 June 1998.
6045 </para></footnote>
6046 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6047 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6048 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6049 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6050 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6051 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6052 used to require that other laws be more
6053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6054 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6055 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6056 driving.
6057 </para>
6058 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6059
6060 <figure id="fig-1361">
6061 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6062 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6063 </figure>
6064 <para>
6065 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6066 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6067 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6068 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6069 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6070 another.<footnote>
6071 <para>
6072 <!-- f4 -->
6073 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6074 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6075 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6076 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6077 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6078 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6079 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6080 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6081 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6082 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6083 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6084 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a long tradition of
6085 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6086 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6087 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6088 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill, <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana:
6089 Hackett Publishing Co., 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended
6090 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6091 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6092 J. Samuels, eds., <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6093 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6094 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6095 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6096 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 12101 (2000). Each of
6097 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6098 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6099 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6100 of these groups might face.
6101 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6102 </para></footnote>
6103 </para>
6104 <section id="hollywood">
6105 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6106 <para>
6107 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6108 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6109 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6110 rallying makes sense.
6111 </para>
6112 <para>
6113 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6114 Internet:
6115 </para>
6116 <figure id="fig-1371">
6117 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6118 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6119 </figure>
6120 <para>
6121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6122 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6123 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6124 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6125 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6126 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6127 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6128 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6129 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6130 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6131 this form of infringement.
6132 </para>
6133 <para>
6134 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6135 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6136 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6137 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6138 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6139 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6140 </para>
6141 <para>
6142 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6143 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6144 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6145 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6146 Iraq
6147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6148 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6149 looting that results.
6150 </para>
6151 <figure id="fig-1381">
6152 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6153 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6154 </figure>
6155 <para>
6156 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6157 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6158 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6159 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6160 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6161 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6162 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6163 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6164 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6165 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6166 </para>
6167 <para>
6168 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6169 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6170 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6171 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6172 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6173 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6174 life. Homeowners living in a
6175
6176 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6177 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6178 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6179 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6180 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6181 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6182 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6183 </para>
6184 <para>
6185 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6186 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6187 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6188 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6189 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6190 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6191 </para>
6192 <para>
6193 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6194 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6195 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6196 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6197 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6198 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6199 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6200 <!-- f5 -->
6201 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6202 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6203 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6204 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6205 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com, 6
6206 October 2003, available at
6207 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6208 </para></footnote>
6209
6210 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6211 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6212 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6213 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6214 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6215 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6216 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6217 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6218 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6219 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6220 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6221 </para>
6222 <para>
6223 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6224 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6225 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6226 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6227 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6228 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6229 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6230 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6231 have an interest in excluding future competitors."<footnote><para>
6232 <!-- f6 -->
6233 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6234 </para></footnote>
6235 And relative to a
6236 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6237 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6238 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6239 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6240 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6241 Brezhnev.
6242 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6243 </para>
6244 <para>
6245 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6246 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6247 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6248 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6249 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6250 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6251 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6252 opportunities for innovation and change.
6253 </para>
6254 <para>
6255 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6256 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6257 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6258 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6259 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6260 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6261 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6262 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6263 shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6264 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6265 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6266 regulation is justified.
6267 </para>
6268 <para>
6269 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6271 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6272 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6273 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6274 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6275 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6276 </para>
6277 <para>
6278 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6279 </para>
6280 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6281 <primary>DDT</primary>
6282 </indexterm>
6283 <para>
6284 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6285 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6286 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6287 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6288 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6289 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6290 </para>
6291 <para>
6292 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6293 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6294 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6295 </para>
6296 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6297 <para>
6298 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6299 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6300 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6301 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6302 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6303 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6304 </para>
6305 <para>
6306 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6307 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6308 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6309 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6310 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6311 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6312 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6313 </para>
6314 <para>
6315 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6316 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6317 culture.<footnote><para>
6318 <!-- f7 -->
6319 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6320 Environmentalism for the Net?" <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6321 </para></footnote>
6322 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6323 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6324 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6325 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6326 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6327 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6329 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6330 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6331 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6332 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6333 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6334 </para>
6335 <para>
6336 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6337 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6338 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6339 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6340 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6341 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6342 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6343 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6344 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6345 </para>
6346 <para>
6347 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6348 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6349 be lost.
6350 </para>
6351 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6352 </section>
6353 <section id="beginnings">
6354 <title>Beginnings</title>
6355 <para>
6356 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6357 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6358 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6359 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6360 </para>
6361 <para>
6362 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6363 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6364 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6365 </para>
6366 <para>
6367 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6368 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6369 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6370
6371 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6372 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6373 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6374 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6375 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6376 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6377 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6378 </para>
6379 <para>
6380 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6381 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6382 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6383 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6384 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6385 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6386 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6387 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6388 </para>
6389 <para>
6390 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6391 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6392 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6393 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6394 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6395 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6396 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6397 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6398 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6399 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6400 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6401 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6402 concentrations of power.
6403 </para>
6404 <para>
6405 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6406 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6407 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6408 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6409 years since they first struck its design.
6410 </para>
6411 <para>
6412 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6413 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6415 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6416 started here:
6417 </para>
6418 <figure id="fig-1441">
6419 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6420 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6421 </figure>
6422 <para>
6423 We will end here:
6424 </para>
6425 <figure id="fig-1442">
6426 <title>&quot;Copyright&quot; today.</title>
6427 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6428 </figure>
6429 <para>
6430 Let me explain how.
6431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6432 </para>
6433 </section>
6434 <section id="lawduration">
6435 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6436 <para>
6437 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6438 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6439 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6440 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6441 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6442 authorship.<footnote>
6443 <para>
6444 <!-- f8 -->
6445 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6446 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6447 485&ndash;86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6448 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6449 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis>"
6450 (emphasis added).
6451 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6452 </para></footnote>
6453 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6454 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6455 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6456 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6457 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6458 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6459 </para>
6460 <para>
6461 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6462 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6463 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6464 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6465 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6466 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6467 </para>
6468 <para>
6469 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6470 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6471 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6472 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6473 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6474 </para>
6475 <para>
6476 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6477 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6478 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6479 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6480 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6481 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6482 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6483 <!-- f9 -->
6484 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6485 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6486 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6487 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6488 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6489 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6490 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6491 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6492 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6493 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6494 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6495 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6496 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6497 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6498 </para>
6499 <para>
6500 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6501 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6503 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6504 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6505 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6506 copyright, either.
6507 </para>
6508 <para>
6509 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6510 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6511 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6512 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6513 domain.<footnote><para>
6514 <!-- f10 -->
6515 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6516 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6517 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6518 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,"
6519 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6520 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6521 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6522 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6523 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6524 </para>
6525 <para>
6526 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6527 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6528 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6529 <!-- f11 -->
6530 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6531 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6532 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6533 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6534 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6535 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6536 </para>
6537 <para>
6538 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6539 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6540 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6541 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6542 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6543 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6544 </para>
6545 <para>
6546 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6547 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6548 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6549 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6550 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6551 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6552 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6553 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6554 </para>
6555 <para>
6556 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6557 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6558 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6559 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6560
6561 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6562 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6563 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6564 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6565 </para>
6566 <para>
6567 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6568 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6569 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6570 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6571 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6572 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6573 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6574 value.
6575 </para>
6576 <para>
6577 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6578 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6579 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6580 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6581 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6582 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6583 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6584 was ninety-five years.
6585 </para>
6586 <para>
6587 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6588 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6589 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6590 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6591 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6592 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6593 them.
6594 </para>
6595 <para>
6596 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6597 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6598 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6599 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6600 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6601 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6602 years.<footnote><para>
6603 <!-- f12 -->
6604 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6605 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6606 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6607 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6608 </para></footnote>
6609 </para>
6610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6611 </section>
6612 <section id="lawscope">
6613 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6614 <para>
6615 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6616 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6617 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6618 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6619 </para>
6620 <para>
6621 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6622 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6623 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6624 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6625 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6626 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6627 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6628 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6629 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6630 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6631 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6632 </para>
6633 <para>
6634 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6635 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6636 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6637 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6638 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6639 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6640 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6641 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6642 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6643 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6644 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6645 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6646 on the initial creative work.
6647 </para>
6648 <para>
6649 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6650 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6651 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6653 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6654 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6655 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6656 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6657 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6658 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6659 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6660 secured.
6661 </para>
6662 <para>
6663 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6664 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6665 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6666 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6667 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6668 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6669 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6670 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6671 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6672 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6673 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6674 original author.
6675 </para>
6676 <para>
6677 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6678 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6679 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6680 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6681 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6682 copy available for others to copy.
6683 </para>
6684 <para>
6685 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6686 differences.
6687 </para>
6688 <para>
6689 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6690 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6691 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6692 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6693 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6694 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6695 <!-- f13 -->
6696 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6697 Creation of American Literature," 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6698 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6699 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6700
6701 </para></footnote>
6702 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6703 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6704 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6705 </para>
6706 <para>
6707 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6708 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6709 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6710 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6711 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6712 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6713 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6714 were restrained.
6715 </para>
6716 <para>
6717 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6718 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6719 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6720 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6721 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6722 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6723 protect it.
6724 </para>
6725 <para>
6726 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6727 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6728 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6729 </para>
6730 <para>
6731 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6732 control
6733 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6734 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6735 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6736 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6737 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6738 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6739 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6740 exclusive
6741 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6742 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6743 </para>
6744 <para>
6745 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6746 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6747 expansion
6748 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6749 copyright.
6750 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6751 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6752 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6753 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6754 </para>
6755 <para>
6756 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6757 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6758 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6759 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6760 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6761 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6762 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6763 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6764 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6765 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6766 <!-- f14 -->
6767 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage," <citetitle>Legal Affairs</citetitle>, July/August
6768 2003, available at
6769 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6770 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6771 </para></footnote>
6772 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6773 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6774 the wrong of direct piracy.
6775 </para>
6776 <para>
6777 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6778 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6779 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6780 of my book.<footnote><para>
6781 <!-- f15 -->
6782 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6783 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6784 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6785 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6786 Copyright's Constitutionality," <citetitle>Yale Law Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002):
6787 1&ndash;60 (see especially pp. 53&ndash;59).
6788 </para></footnote>
6789 These two different uses of my creative work are
6790 treated the same.
6791 </para>
6792 <para>
6793 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why
6794 should you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes
6795 money from it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney
6796 creates
6797 a creature called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make
6798 Mickey Mouse toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney
6799 originally created?
6800 </para>
6801 <para>
6802 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6803 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6804 simply
6805 to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from the
6806 rights originally granted.
6807 </para>
6808 </section>
6809 <section id="lawreach">
6810 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
6811 <para>
6812 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6813 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6814 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6815 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
6816 <!-- f16 -->
6817 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6818 certainly regulates more than "copies"&mdash;a public performance of a
6819 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6820 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6821 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy"; 17
6822 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
6823 existing law (which regulates "copies;" 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6824 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6825 </para></footnote>
6826 </para>
6827 <para>
6828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6829 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6830 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6831 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6832 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6833 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6834 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6835 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6836 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6837 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6838 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
6839 the trigger for copyright law.
6840 </para>
6841 <para>
6842 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6843 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6844 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6845 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
6846 <!-- f17 -->
6847 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law extends,
6848 we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good argument for
6849 its extending where it does, and should not determine its reach on the
6850 basis
6851 of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by technology.
6852 </para></footnote>
6853 because it is clear that the
6854 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6855 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6856 </para>
6857 <para>
6858 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6859 empty circle.
6860 </para>
6861 <figure id="fig-1521">
6862 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
6863 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
6864 </figure>
6865 <para>
6866 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6867 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6868 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6869 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6870 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6871 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6872 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6873 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6874 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6875 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6876 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6877 acts do not make a copy.
6878 </para>
6879 <figure id="fig-1531">
6880 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
6881 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
6882 </figure>
6883 <para>
6884 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6885 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6886 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6887 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6888 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6889 diagram on next page).
6890 </para>
6891 <para>
6892 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6893 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6894 </para>
6895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6896 <figure id="fig-1541">
6897 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
6898 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
6899 </figure>
6900 <para>
6901 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law treats
6902 as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6903 unregulated.
6904 You are free to quote from this book, even in a review that
6905 is quite negative, without my permission, even though that quoting
6906 makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright owner the
6907 exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not, but the law
6908 denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses" for public
6909 policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6910 </para>
6911 <figure id="fig-1542">
6912 <title>Unregulated copying considered &quot;fair uses.&quot;</title>
6913 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
6914 </figure>
6915 <para> </para>
6916 <figure id="fig-1551">
6917 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
6918 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
6919 </figure>
6920 <para>
6921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6922 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6923 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
6924 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6925 </para>
6926 <para>
6927 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
6928 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
6929 <!-- f18 -->
6930 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but rather that
6931 its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks need not make
6932 copies of content they transmit, and a digital network could be designed to
6933 delete anything it copies so that the same number of copies remain.
6934 </para></footnote>
6935 And because of this single,
6936 arbitrary feature of the design of a digital network, the scope of
6937 category
6938 1 changes dramatically. Uses that before were presumptively
6939 unregulated
6940 are now presumptively regulated. No longer is there a set of
6941 presumptively unregulated uses that define a freedom associated with a
6942 copyrighted work. Instead, each use is now subject to the copyright,
6943 because each use also makes a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into
6944 category
6945 2. And those who would defend the unregulated uses of
6946 copyrighted
6947 work must look exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the
6948 burden of this shift.
6949 </para>
6950 <para>
6951 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
6952 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
6953 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
6954 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
6955 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
6956 the book once, ten times, or every
6957 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
6958 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of use&mdash;reading&mdash;
6959 could be regulated by copyright law because none of those uses
6960 produced
6961 a copy.
6962 </para>
6963 <para>
6964 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
6965 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
6966 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
6967 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
6968 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
6969 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
6970 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
6971 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
6972 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
6973 copyright owner's wish.
6974 </para>
6975 <para>
6976 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
6977 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
6978 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
6979 points also become clear:
6980 </para>
6981 <para>
6982 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
6983 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
6984 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
6985 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
6986 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
6987 part of free culture before the Internet.
6988 </para>
6989 <para>
6990 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
6991 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
6992 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
6993 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
6994 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
6995 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
6996 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
6997 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
6998 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
6999 creative work.
7000 </para>
7001 <para>
7002 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7003
7004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7005 burden on category 3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to bear.
7006 If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I could read
7007 a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that this is a
7008 violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been any litigation
7009 about whether I have a fair use right to read, because before the
7010 Internet,
7011 reading did not trigger the application of copyright law and hence
7012 the need for a fair use defense. The right to read was effectively
7013 protected
7014 before because reading was not regulated.
7015 </para>
7016 <para>
7017 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7018 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7019 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7020 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7021 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7022 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7023 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7024 enough.
7025 </para>
7026 <para>
7027 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7028 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7029 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7030 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7031 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7032 </para>
7033 <para>
7034 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it
7035 began
7036 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7037 previews.
7038 The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling" technique by
7039 giving on-line stores the same ability to enable "browsing." Just as in a
7040 bookstore you can read a few pages of a book before you buy the book,
7041 so, too, you would be able to sample a bit from the movie on-line
7042 before
7043 you bought it.
7044 </para>
7045 <para>
7046 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film
7047 distributors
7048 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7049 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7050 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7052 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7053 business
7054 on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney films; he
7055 had customers who depended upon his delivering this content. Disney
7056 would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the distribution
7057 immediately.
7058 Video Pipeline thought it was within their "fair use" rights
7059 to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a lawsuit to ask the
7060 court to declare that these rights were in fact their rights.
7061 </para>
7062 <para>
7063 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7064 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7065 infringed"
7066 on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7067 willful
7068 infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the actual
7069 harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set in the
7070 statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred clips of
7071 Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those movies,
7072 Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7073 </para>
7074 <para>
7075 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7076 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7077 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7078 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7079 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7080 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7081 Disney's permission.
7082 </para>
7083 <para>
7084 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7085 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7086 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7087 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7088 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7089 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7090 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7091 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7092 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7093 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7094 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7095 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7096 </para>
7097 <para>
7098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7099 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7100 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7101 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7102 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7103 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7104 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7105 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7106 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7107 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7108 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7109 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7110 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7111 happening are quite slight.
7112 </para>
7113 <para>
7114 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7115 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7116 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7117 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7118 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7119 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7120 </para>
7121 </section>
7122 <section id="lawforce">
7123 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7124 <para>
7125 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7126 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7127 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7128 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7129 </para>
7130 <para>
7131 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7132 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7133 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7134 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7135 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7136 your freedom.
7137 </para>
7138 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7139 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7140 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7141 </indexterm>
7142 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7143 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7144 </indexterm>
7145 <para>
7146 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7147 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7149 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7150 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7151 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7152 plan.<footnote><para>
7153 <!-- f19 -->
7154 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain," <citetitle>Law and
7155 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7156 </para></footnote>
7157 </para>
7158 <para>
7159 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7160 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7161 you were."<footnote><para>
7162 <!-- f20 -->
7163 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7164 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7165 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7166 </para></footnote>
7167 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7168 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7169 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7170 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7171 </para>
7172 <para>
7173 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7174 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7175 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7176 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7177 </para>
7178 <para>
7179 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7180 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7181 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7182 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7183 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7184 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7185 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7186 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7187 </para>
7188 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7189 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7190
7191 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7192 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7193 </indexterm>
7194 <para>
7195 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7196 </para>
7197 <para>
7198 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7199 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7200 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7201 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7202 technology.
7203 </para>
7204 <para>
7205 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7206 Reader.
7207 </para>
7208 <para>
7209 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7210 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7211 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7212 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7213 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7214 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7215 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7216 copy of
7217 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7218 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7219 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7220 </para>
7221 <figure id="fig-1611">
7222 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7223 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7224 </figure>
7225 <para>
7226 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7227 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7228 </para>
7229 <figure id="fig-1612">
7230 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7231 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7232 </figure>
7233 <para>
7234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7235 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7236 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7237 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7238 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7239 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7240 read aloud through the computer.
7241 </para>
7242 <para>
7243 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7244 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7245 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7246 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7247 </para>
7248 <figure id="fig-1621">
7249 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;</title>
7250 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7251 </figure>
7252 <para>
7253 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7254 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7255 the book.
7256 </para>
7257 <figure id="fig-1622">
7258 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s &quot;Politics&quot;.</title>
7259 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7260 </figure>
7261 <para>
7262 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7263 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7264 Ideas</citetitle>:
7265 </para>
7266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7267 <figure id="fig-1631">
7268 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;The Future of Ideas&quot;.</title>
7269 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7270 </figure>
7271 <para>
7272 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7273 </para>
7274 <para>
7275 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7276 "permissions"&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7277 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7278 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7279 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7280 power.<footnote><para>
7281 <!-- f21 -->
7282 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7283 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7284 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7285 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7286 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7287 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7288 subsequently acquired the book.
7289 </para></footnote>
7290 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7291 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7292 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7293 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7294 control that the law would enable.
7295 </para>
7296 <para>
7297 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7298 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7299 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7300 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7301 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7302 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7303 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7304 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7305 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7306 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7307 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7308 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7309 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7310 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7311 won't read aloud.
7312 </para>
7313 <para>
7314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7315 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7316 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7317 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7318 sentence.
7319 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7320 </para>
7321 <para>
7322 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7323 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7324 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7325 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7326 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7327 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7328 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7329 </para>
7330 <para>
7331 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7332 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7333 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7334 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7335 to defeat these protections as well?
7336 </para>
7337 <para>
7338 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7339 eBook Reader.
7340 </para>
7341 <para>
7342 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7343 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7344 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7345 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7346 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7347 following report:
7348 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7349 </para>
7350 <figure id="fig-1641">
7351 <title>List of the permissions for &quot;Alice's Adventures in
7352 Wonderland&quot;.</title>
7353 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7354 </figure>
7355 <para>
7356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7357 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7358 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7359 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7360 </para>
7361 <para>
7362 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7363 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7364 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7365 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7366 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7367 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7368 </para>
7369 <para>
7370 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7371 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7372 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7373 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7374 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7375 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7376 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7377 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7378 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7379 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7380 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7381 </para>
7382 <para>
7383 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7384 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7385 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7386 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7387 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7388 often crazy.
7389 </para>
7390 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7391 <para>
7392 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7393 story of mine that makes the same point.
7394 </para>
7395 <indexterm id="idxaibo" class='startofrange'>
7396 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7397 </indexterm>
7398 <para>
7399 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7400 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7401 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7402 </para>
7403 <para>
7404 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7405 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7406 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7408 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7409 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7410 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7411 </para>
7412 <para>
7413 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7414 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7415 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7416 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7417 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7418 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7419 </para>
7420 <para>
7421 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7422 word <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7423 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7424 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much
7425 more positive term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the program to
7426 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7427 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7428 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7429 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7430 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7431 </para>
7432 <para>
7433 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7434 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7435 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7436 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7437 ethically.
7438 </para>
7439 <para>
7440 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7441 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7442 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7443 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7444 than Sony had built.
7445 </para>
7446 <indexterm startref="idxaibo" class='endofrange'/>
7447 <para>
7448 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7449 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7450 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7451 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7452 the
7453
7454 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7455 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7456 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7457 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7458 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7459 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7460 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7461 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7462 </para>
7463 <para>
7464 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7465 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7466 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7467 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7468 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7469 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7470 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7471 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7472 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7473 </para>
7474 <para>
7475 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7476 <!-- f22 -->
7477 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7478 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, "Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7479 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7480 January 2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7481 DMCA," <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7482 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns," <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7483 May 2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7484 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7485 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7486 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7487 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7488 </para></footnote>
7489 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7490 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7491 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7492 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7493 </para>
7494 <para>
7495 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7496 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7497 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7498 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7499 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7500 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7501 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7502 Internet much more.
7503 </para>
7504 <para>
7505 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7506 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7507 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7508 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7509 </para>
7510 <para>
7511 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7512 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7513 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7514 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7515 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7516 </para>
7517 <para>
7518 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7519 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7520 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7521 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7522 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7523 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7524 </para>
7525 <para>
7526 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7527 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7528 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7529 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7530 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7531 constituted, succeed.
7532 </para>
7533 <para>
7534 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7535 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7536 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7537 wrote:
7538 </para>
7539 <blockquote>
7540 <para>
7541 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7542 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7543 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7544 </para>
7545 </blockquote>
7546 <para>
7547 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7548 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7549 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7550 </para>
7551 <blockquote>
7552 <para>
7553 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7555 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7556 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7557 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7558 </para>
7559 </blockquote>
7560 <para>
7561 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7562 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7563 spreading such information an offense.
7564 </para>
7565 <para>
7566 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7567 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7568 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7569 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7570 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7571 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7572 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7573 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7574 protection for copyright owners.
7575 </para>
7576 <para>
7577 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7578 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7579 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7580 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7581 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7582 </para>
7583 <para>
7584 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7585 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7586 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7587 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7588 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7589 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7590 have been a copyright violation.
7591 </para>
7592 <para>
7593 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7594 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7595 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7596 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7597 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7598 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7599 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7600 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7601 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7602 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7603 </para>
7604 <para>
7605 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7606 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7607 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7608 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7609 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7610 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7611 </para>
7612 <para>
7613 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7614 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7615 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7616 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7617 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7618 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "<citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>," for example, had
7619 testified in that case that he wanted people to feel free to tape
7620 Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7621 </para>
7622 <blockquote>
7623 <para>
7624 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7625 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7626 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7627 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7628 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7629 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7630 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7631 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7632 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7633 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7634 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7635 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7636 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7637 important.<footnote><para>
7638 <!-- f23 -->
7639 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7640 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7641 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7642 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7643 </para></footnote>
7644 </para>
7645 </blockquote>
7646 <para>
7647 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7648 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7649 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7650 the VCR responsible.
7651 </para>
7652 <para>
7653 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7654 the DMCA.
7655 </para>
7656 <para>
7657 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7658 </para>
7659 <para>
7660 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7661 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7662 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7663 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7664 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7665 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7666 </para>
7667 <para>
7668 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7670 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7671 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7672 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7673 and bad uses.
7674 </para>
7675 <figure id="fig-1711">
7676 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7677 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7678 </figure>
7679 <para>
7680 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7681 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7682 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7683 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7684 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7685 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7686 </para>
7687 <para>
7688 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7689 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7690 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7691 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7692 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7693 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7694 </para>
7695 <para>
7696 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7697 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7698 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7699 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7700 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7701 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7702 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7703 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7704 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7705 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7706 </para>
7707 <para>
7708 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7709 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7710 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7711 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7712 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7713 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7714 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7715 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7716 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7717 </para>
7718 <para>
7719
7720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7721 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7722 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7723 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7724 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7725 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7726 <!-- f24 -->
7727 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7728 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law," <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7729 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7730 </para></footnote>
7731 </para>
7732 <para>
7733 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7734 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7735 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7736 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7737 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7738 </para>
7739 <para>
7740 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7741 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7742 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7743 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7744 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7745 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7746 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7747 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7748 </para>
7749 <para>
7750 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7751 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7752 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7753 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7754 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7755 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7756 </para>
7757 </section>
7758 <section id="marketconcentration">
7759 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
7760 <para>
7761 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
7762 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7763 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7764 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7765 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7766 find better ways
7767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7768 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7769 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7770 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7771 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7772 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7773 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7774 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7775 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7776 control.
7777 </para>
7778 <para>
7779 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7780 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7781 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7782 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7783 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7784 </para>
7785 <para>
7786 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7787 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7788 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7789 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7790 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7791 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7792 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7793 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7794 of the media.
7795 </para>
7796 <para>
7797 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7798 nature.
7799 </para>
7800 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
7801 <para>
7802 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7803 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7804 ownership, "five companies control 85 percent of our media sources."<footnote><para>
7805 <!-- f25 -->
7806 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7807 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
7808 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
7809 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7810 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
7811 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
7812 <!-- f26 -->
7813 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7814 Slide," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
7815 </para></footnote>
7816 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7817 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."<footnote><para>
7818 <!-- f27 -->
7819 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped," <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
7820 31 May 2003.
7821 </para></footnote>
7822 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
7823 </para>
7824 <para>
7825 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7826 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7827 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7828 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
7829 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7830 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
7831 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
7832 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
7833 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7834 </para>
7835 <para>
7836 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7837 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7838 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7839 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7840 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
7841 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
7842 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7843 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7844 protected&mdash; by the market.
7845 </para>
7846 <para>
7847 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7848 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7849 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7850 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7851 </para>
7852 <blockquote>
7853 <para>
7854 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7855 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
7856 . . . Fox TV shows . . . Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7857 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7858 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7859 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7860 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7861 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7862 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7863 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
7864 <!-- f28 -->
7865 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch," <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
7866 2003): 89.
7867 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
7868 </para></footnote>
7869 </para>
7870 </blockquote>
7871 <para>
7872 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7873 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7874 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7875 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7876 </para>
7877 <figure id="fig-1761">
7878 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
7879 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
7880 </figure>
7881 <para>
7882 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7883 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7884 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7885 distribute content?
7886 </para>
7887 <para>
7888 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7889 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7890 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7891 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7892 </para>
7893 <para>
7894 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7895 integration may matter.
7896 </para>
7897 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
7898 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
7899 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7900 <para>
7901 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
7902 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7903 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7904 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7905 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7906 </para>
7907 <para>
7908 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7909 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7910 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7911 control.<footnote><para>
7912 <!-- f29 -->
7913 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7914 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7915 Missouri,
7916 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7917 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
7918 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7919 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
7920 </para></footnote>
7921 </para>
7922 <para>
7923
7924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7925 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7926 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7927 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7928 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
7929 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7930 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was "independent" of the
7931 networks.
7932 </para>
7933 <para>
7934 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7935 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
7936 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7937 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In 1992,
7938 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7939 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7940 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent." "In 1992, 16
7941 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
7942 year there was one."<footnote><para>
7943 <!-- f30 -->
7944 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
7945 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
7946 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
7947 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
7948 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
7949 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
7950 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
7951 2003.
7952 </para></footnote>
7953 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
7954 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
7955 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
7956 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
7957 per week produced by independent studios decreased
7958 63%."<footnote><para>
7959 <!-- f31 -->
7960 Ibid.
7961 </para></footnote>
7962 </para>
7963 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
7964 <para>
7965 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
7966 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
7967 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
7968 owned by the network.
7969 </para>
7970 <para>
7971 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
7972 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
7973 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
7974 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
7975 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
7976 </para>
7977 <blockquote>
7978 <para>
7979 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
7980 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
7981 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
7982 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
7983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
7984 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
7985 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
7986 handful.<footnote><para>
7987 <!-- f32 -->
7988 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation," <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
7989 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
7990 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
7991 </para></footnote>
7992 </para>
7993 </blockquote>
7994 <para>
7995 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
7996 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
7997 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
7998 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
7999 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8000 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8001 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8002 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8003 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8004 democracy.
8005 </para>
8006 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8007 <para>
8008 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8009 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8010 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8011 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8012 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8013 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8014 <!-- f33 -->
8015 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8016 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8017 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8018 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8019 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8020 Concepts in Technological Evolution," <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8021 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8022 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8023 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8024 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8025
8026 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8027 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8028 sprinting.
8029 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8030 </para>
8031 <para>
8032 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8033 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8034 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8035 measure.
8036 </para>
8037 <para>
8038 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8039 suggest the concern.
8040 </para>
8041 <para>
8042 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8043 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8044 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8045 </para>
8046 <para>
8047 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8048 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8049 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8050
8051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8052 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8053 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8054 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8055 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8056 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8057 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8058 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8059 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8060 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8061 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8062 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8063 outweigh these costs.
8064 </para>
8065 <para>
8066 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8067 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8068 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8069 these issues.
8070 </para>
8071 <para>
8072 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8073 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8074 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8075 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8076 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8077 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8078 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8079 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8080 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8081 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8082 </para>
8083 <para>
8084 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8085 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8086 </para>
8087 <para>
8088 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8089 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8090 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8091 war. Can you do it?
8092 </para>
8093 <para>
8094 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8096 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8097 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8098 message will be heard then?
8099 </para>
8100 <para>
8101 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8102 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8103 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8104 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8105 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8106 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8107 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8108 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8109 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8110 <!-- f34 -->
8111 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8112 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8113 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8114 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8115 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8116 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8117 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8118 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8119 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8120 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks," <citetitle>New
8121 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8122 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8123 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8124 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8125 Radio," <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8126 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8127 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8128 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8129 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8130 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8131 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8132 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8133 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8134 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8135 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8136 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8137 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8138 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8139 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8140 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8141 </para></footnote>
8142 </para>
8143 <para>
8144 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8145 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8146 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8147 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8148 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8149 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8150 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8151 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8152 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8153 </para>
8154 </section>
8155 <section id="together">
8156 <title>Together</title>
8157 <para>
8158 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8159 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8160 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8161 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8162 </para>
8163 <para>
8164 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed&mdash;
8165 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8166 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8167 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8168 to seem
8169
8170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8171 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8172 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8173 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8174 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8175 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8176 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8177 be redefined.
8178 </para>
8179 <para>
8180 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8181 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8182 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8183 our culture today.
8184 </para>
8185 <para>
8186 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8187 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8188 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8189 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8190 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8191 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8192 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8193 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8194 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8195 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8196 </para>
8197 <para>
8198 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8199 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8200 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8201 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8202 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8203 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8204 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8205 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8206 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8207 in control that technology and the market enable.
8208 </para>
8209 <para>
8210 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8211 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8212 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8213 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8214 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8215 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8216 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8217 </para>
8218 <para>
8219 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8220 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8221 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8222 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8223 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8224 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8225 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8226 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8227 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8228 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8229 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8230 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8231 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8232 known.<footnote><para>
8233 <!-- f35 -->
8234 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8235 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8236 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8237 </para></footnote>
8238 </para>
8239 <para>
8240 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8241 </para>
8242 <para>
8243 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8244 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8245 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8246 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8247 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8248 </para>
8249
8250 <table id="t2">
8251 <title>Law status in 1790</title>
8252 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8253 <thead>
8254 <row>
8255 <entry></entry>
8256 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8257 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8258 </row>
8259 </thead>
8260 <tbody>
8261 <row>
8262 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8263 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8264 <entry>Free</entry>
8265 </row>
8266 <row>
8267 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8268 <entry>Free</entry>
8269 <entry>Free</entry>
8270 </row>
8271 </tbody>
8272 </tgroup>
8273 </table>
8274
8275 <para>
8276 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8277 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8278 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8279
8280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8281 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8282 noncommercial work was also free.
8283 </para>
8284 <para>
8285 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8286 </para>
8287
8288 <table id="t3">
8289 <title>Law status at the end of ninetheenth centory</title>
8290 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8291 <thead>
8292 <row>
8293 <entry></entry>
8294 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8295 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8296 </row>
8297 </thead>
8298 <tbody>
8299 <row>
8300 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8301 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8302 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8303 </row>
8304 <row>
8305 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8306 <entry>Free</entry>
8307 <entry>Free</entry>
8308 </row>
8309 </tbody>
8310 </tgroup>
8311 </table>
8312
8313 <para>
8314 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8315 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8316 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8317 transformation were still essentially free.
8318 </para>
8319 <para>
8320 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8321 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8322 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8323 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8324 we could say the law began to look like this:
8325 </para>
8326
8327 <table id="t4">
8328 <title>Law status in 1975</title>
8329 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8330 <thead>
8331 <row>
8332 <entry></entry>
8333 <entry>COPY</entry>
8334 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8335 </row>
8336 </thead>
8337 <tbody>
8338 <row>
8339 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8340 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8341 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8342 </row>
8343 <row>
8344 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8345 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8346 <entry>Free</entry>
8347 </row>
8348 </tbody>
8349 </tgroup>
8350 </table>
8351
8352 <para>
8353 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8354 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8355 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8356 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8357 that the law now looks like this:
8358 </para>
8359
8360 <table id="t5">
8361 <title>Law status now</title>
8362 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8363 <thead>
8364 <row>
8365 <entry></entry>
8366 <entry>COPY</entry>
8367 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8368 </row>
8369 </thead>
8370 <tbody>
8371 <row>
8372 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8373 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8374 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8375 </row>
8376 <row>
8377 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8378 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8379 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8380 </row>
8381 </tbody>
8382 </tgroup>
8383 </table>
8384
8385 <para>
8386 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8387 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8388 creativity&mdash;
8389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8390 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8391 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8392 </para>
8393 <para>
8394 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8395 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8396 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8397 these domains actually does any good.
8398 </para>
8399 <para>
8400 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8401 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8402 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8403 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8404 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8405 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8406 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8407 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8408 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8409 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8410 </para>
8411 <para>
8412 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8413 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8414 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8415 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8416 property rights<footnote><para>
8417 <!-- f36 -->
8418 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8419 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8420 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8421 Disintegration of Property," in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8422 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8423 Press, 1980).
8424 </para></footnote>)
8425 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8426 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8427 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8428 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8429 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8430 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8431 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8432 vibrant and rich free culture.
8433 </para>
8434 <para>
8435 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8436 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8437 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8438 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8439 story of chapter 6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8440 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8441 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8442 chapter 7). Adding
8443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8444 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8445 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8446 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8447 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8448 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8449 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8450 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8451 dominates the debate today.
8452 </para>
8453 <para>
8454 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8455 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8456 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8457 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8458 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8459 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8460 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8461 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8462 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8463 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8464 lawyer.
8465 </para>
8466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8467 </section>
8468 </chapter>
8469 </part>
8470 <part id="c-puzzles">
8471 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8472
8473 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8474 <chapter id="chimera">
8475 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8476 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8477 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8478 </indexterm>
8479 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8480 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8481 </indexterm>
8482 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8483 <primary>&quot;Country of the Blind, The&quot; (Wells)</primary>
8484 </indexterm>
8485
8486 <para>
8487 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8488 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8489 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.<footnote><para>
8490 <!-- f1. -->
8491 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8492 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8493 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8494 </para></footnote>
8495 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8496 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8497 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8498 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8499 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8500 villagers to explore life as a king.
8501 </para>
8502 <para>
8503 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8504 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8505 "blind." They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8506 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8507 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8508 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8509 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8510 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8511 alone!'"
8512 </para>
8513 <para>
8514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8515 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8516 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8517 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8518 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8519 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8520 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8521 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8522 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8523 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8524 </para>
8525 <para>
8526 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8527 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8528 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8529 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8530 </para>
8531 <para>
8532 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8533 is affected," he reports.
8534 </para>
8535 <para>
8536 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8537 called the eyes . . . are diseased . . . in such a way as to affect
8538 his brain."
8539 </para>
8540 <para>
8541 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8542 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8543 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8544 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8545 </para>
8546 <para>
8547 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8548 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8549 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8550 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8551 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8552 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8553 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8554 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8555
8556 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8557 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8558 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8559 scene. . . ."
8560 </para>
8561 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8562 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8563 <para>
8564 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8565 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8566 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8567 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8568 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8569 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8570 </para>
8571 <para>
8572 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8573 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8574 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8575 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8576 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8577 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8578 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8579 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8580 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8581 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8582 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8583 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8584 </para>
8585 <para>
8586 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8587 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8588 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8589 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8590 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8591 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8592 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8593 </para>
8594 <para>
8595 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8596 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8597 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8598 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8599 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8600 from Tower.
8601 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8602 </para>
8603 <para>
8604
8605 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8606 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8607 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8608 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8609 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8610 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8611 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8612 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8613 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8614 </para>
8615 <para>
8616 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8617 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8618 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8619 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8620 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8621 </para>
8622 <para>
8623 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8624 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8625 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8626 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8627 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8628 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8629 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8630 implemented.<footnote><para>
8631 <!-- f2. -->
8632 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8633 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8634 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003,
8635 available at
8636 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8637 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8638 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8639 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8640 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8641 Stakes on Piracy," <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8642 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8643 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8644 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8645 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8646 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8647 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8648 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8649 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8650 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8651 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8652 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8653 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8654 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8655 August 2003, available at
8656 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8657 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8658 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8659 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8660 Name Students," <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8661 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8662 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8663 </para></footnote>
8664
8665 </para>
8666 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8667 <para>
8668 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8669 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8670 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8671 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8672 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8673 </para>
8674 <para>
8675 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8676 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8677 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8678 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8679 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8680 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8681 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8682 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8683 </para>
8684 <para>
8685
8686 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8687 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8688 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8689 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8690 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8691 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8692 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8693 </para>
8694 <para>
8695 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8696 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8697 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8698 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8699 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8700 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8701 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8702 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8703 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8704 protection for copyrighted material,
8705 </para>
8706 <blockquote>
8707 <para>
8708 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8709 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8710 </para>
8711 <para>
8712 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of
8713 the major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8714 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8715 answer
8716 that question. Market forces operating naturally may very
8717 well produce a totally different industry model.
8718 </para>
8719 <para>
8720 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8721 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8722 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8723 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8724 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8725 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8726 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8727 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8728 interests.<footnote><para>
8729 <!-- f3. -->
8730 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8731 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8732 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8733 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
8734 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8735 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8736 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
8737 </para>
8738 </blockquote>
8739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8740 <para>
8741 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8742 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8743 changed.
8744 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
8745 </para>
8746 <para>
8747 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8748 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8749 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8750 </para>
8751
8752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8753 </chapter>
8754 <chapter id="harms">
8755 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
8756 <para>
8757
8758 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8759 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have
8760 now brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one
8761 will have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8762 prohibition,
8763 these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8764 </para>
8765 <para>
8766 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8767 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8768 extend
8769 this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8770 justified?
8771 </para>
8772 <para>
8773 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8774 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8775 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8776 our history.
8777 </para>
8778 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
8779 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
8780 <para>
8781 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8782 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8783 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8784 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8785 </para>
8786 <para>
8787 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8788 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8789 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8790 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8791 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8792 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8793 </para>
8794 <section id="constrain">
8795 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
8796 <para>
8797 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8798 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8799 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8800 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8801 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8802 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8803 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8804 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8805 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8806 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8807 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8808 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
8809 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8810 </para>
8811 <para>
8812 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8813 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8814 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8815 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8816 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8817 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8818 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8819 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8820 the culture all around.
8821 </para>
8822 <para>
8823 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8824 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8825
8826 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8827
8828 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8829 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8830 storytelling extended across the globe.
8831 </para>
8832 <para>
8833 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8834 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8835 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8836 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8837 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8838 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8839 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8840 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8841 work is presumptively illegal.
8842 </para>
8843 <para>
8844 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8845 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8846 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8847 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8848 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8849 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
8850 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8851 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
8852 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8853 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
8854 million.<footnote><para>
8855 <!-- f1. -->
8856 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
8857 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
8858 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8859 Approval for SEC Settlement" (7 July 2003), available at
8860 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
8861 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8862 </para></footnote>
8863 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8864 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8865 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
8866 suffering.<footnote>
8867 <para>
8868 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8869 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
8870 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8871 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
8872 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
8873 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
8874 available at
8875 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8876 recent months.
8877 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
8878 </para></footnote>
8879 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8880 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8881 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8882 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
8883 </para>
8884 <para>
8885 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8886 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
8887 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
8888 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
8889 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
8890 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
8891 designed to
8892
8893 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8894 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
8895 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
8896 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
8897 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
8898 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
8899 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
8900 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
8901 States.<footnote><para>
8902 <!-- f3. -->
8903
8904 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free," <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
8905 2003, available at
8906 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8907 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
8908 </para></footnote>
8909 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8910 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8911 critical or reflective.
8912 </para>
8913 <para>
8914 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8915 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
8916 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
8917 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8918 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8919 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8920 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8921 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8922 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8923 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8924 </para>
8925 <para>
8926 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8927 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8928 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8929 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8930 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8931 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8932 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8933 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8934 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8935 </para>
8936 <para>
8937 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8938 described in chapter
8939 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
8940 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
8941 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
8942 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
8943 use.
8944 </para>
8945 <para>
8946
8947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
8948 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
8949 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
8950 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
8951 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
8952 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
8953 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
8954 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
8955 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
8956 </para>
8957 <para>
8958 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
8959 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
8960 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
8961 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
8962 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
8963 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
8964 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
8965 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
8966 comfort themselves.
8967 </para>
8968 <para>
8969 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
8970 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
8971 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
8972 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
8973 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
8974 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
8975 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
8976 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
8977 culture that is free.
8978 </para>
8979 <para>
8980 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
8981 </para>
8982 <blockquote>
8983 <para>
8984 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
8985 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
8986 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
8987 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made . . . you're not
8988 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
8989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
8990 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
8991 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
8992 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
8993 </para>
8994 </blockquote>
8995 </section>
8996 <section id="innovators">
8997 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
8998 <para>
8999 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9000 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9001 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9002 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9003 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9004 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9005 </para>
9006 <para>
9007 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9008 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9009 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9010 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9011 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9012 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9013 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9014 </para>
9015 <para>
9016 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9017 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9018 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9019 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9020 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9021 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9022 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9023 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9024 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9025 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9026 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9027 </para>
9028 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9029 <para>
9030 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9031 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9032 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9033 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9034 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9035 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9036 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9037 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9038 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9039 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9040 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9041 </para>
9042 <para>
9043 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9044 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9045 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9046 </para>
9047 <para>
9048 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9049 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9050 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9051 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9052 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9053 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9054 </para>
9055 <para>
9056 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9057 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9058 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9059 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9060 Raitt. And so on.
9061 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9062 </para>
9063 <para>
9064 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9065 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9066 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9067 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9068 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9069 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9070 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9071 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9072 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9073 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9074 </para>
9075 <para>
9076 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9077 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9078
9079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9080 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9081 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9082 the kind of content the users liked.
9083 </para>
9084 <para>
9085 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9086 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9087 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9088 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9089 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9090 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9091 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9092 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9093 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9094 they had already bought.
9095 </para>
9096 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9097 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9098 </indexterm>
9099 <para>
9100 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9101 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9102 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9103 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9104 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9105 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9106 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9107 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9108 </para>
9109 <para>
9110 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9111 </para>
9112 <para>
9113 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9114 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9115 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9116 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9117 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9118 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9119 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9120 demanded.
9121 </para>
9122 <para>
9123 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9124 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9125 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9126 clients in this
9127 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9128 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9129 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9130 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9131 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9132 </para>
9133 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9134 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9135 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9136 <para>
9137 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9138 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9139 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9140 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9141 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9142 <!-- f4. -->
9143 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9144 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9145 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9146 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9147 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9148 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged," <citetitle>Los Angeles
9149 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9150 </para></footnote>
9151 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9152 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9153 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9154 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9155 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9156 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9157 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9158 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9159 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9160 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in <citetitle>Business
9161 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a discussion with BMW:
9162 </para>
9163 <blockquote>
9164 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9165 <para>
9166 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9167 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9168 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9169 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9170 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9171 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9172 United States with bona fide MP3 players. . . . <footnote>
9173 <para>
9174 <!-- f5. -->
9175 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s," <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9176 2003, available at
9177 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9178 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9179 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9180 </para></footnote>
9181 </para>
9182 </blockquote>
9183 <para>
9184 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with "your money or your
9185 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9186 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9187 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9188 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9189 constantly threatened by litigation.
9190 </para>
9191 <para>
9192
9193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9194 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9195 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a mess of
9196 uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply to new
9197 technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial deference, and
9198 by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that copyright law
9199 imposes,
9200 that uncertainty now yields a reality which is far more
9201 conservative
9202 than is right. If the law imposed the death penalty for parking
9203 tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets, we'd also have much
9204 less driving. The same principle applies to innovation. If innovation is
9205 constantly checked by this uncertain and unlimited liability, we will
9206 have much less vibrant innovation and much less creativity.
9207 </para>
9208 <para>
9209 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9210 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9211 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9212 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9213 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9214 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9215 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9216 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9217 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9218 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9219 </para>
9220 <para>
9221 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9222 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9223 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9224 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9225 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9226 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9227 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9228 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9229 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9230 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9231 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9232 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9234 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9235 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9236 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9237 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9238 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9239 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9240 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9241 </para>
9242 <para>
9243 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9244 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9245 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9246 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9247 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9248 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9249 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9250 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9251 </para>
9252 <para>
9253 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9254 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9255 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9256 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9257 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9258 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9259 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9260 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9261 </para></footnote>
9262
9263 Congress
9264 has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9265 "broadcast
9266 flag" that would be required on any device capable of transmitting
9267 digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable the copying of
9268 any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other members of
9269 Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from liability
9270 for technology they might deploy that would hunt down copyright
9271 violators
9272 and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9273 <!-- f7. --> GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9274 </para></footnote>
9275
9276 </para>
9277 <para>
9278 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9279 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9280 regulation
9281 of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the particular
9282 technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens and costs on
9283
9284 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9285 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9286 those requirements.
9287 </para>
9288 <para>
9289 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9290 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation would
9291 impose.<footnote><para>
9292 <!-- f8. --> See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9293 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9294 </para></footnote>
9295 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not
9296 be protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9297 harm than good.
9298 </para>
9299 <para>
9300 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9301 innovation&mdash;again,
9302 a story that will be quite familiar to the free market
9303 crowd.
9304 </para>
9305 <para>
9306 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9307 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9308 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9309 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9310 </para>
9311 <para>
9312 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9313 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9314 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9315 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9316 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9317 <!-- f9. -->
9318 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9319 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9320 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9321 </para></footnote>
9322 overall this history of copyright
9323 is not bad. As chapter 10 details, when new technologies have come
9324 along, Congress has struck a balance to assure that the new is protected
9325 from the old. Compulsory, or statutory, licenses have been one part of
9326 that strategy. Free use (as in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9327 </para>
9328 <para>
9329 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9330 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9331 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9332 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9333 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9334 </para>
9335 <para>
9336 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9337 <!-- f10. -->
9338 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9339 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9340 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9341 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9342 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9343 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9344 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9345 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9346 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9347 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9348 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9349 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9350 liability.
9351 </para></footnote>
9352 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9353 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9354 here.<footnote><para>
9355 <!-- f11. -->
9356 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9357 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9358 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9359 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9360 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9361 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9362 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9363 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9364 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9365 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9366 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9367 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9368 available at
9369 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9370 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9371 </para></footnote>
9372 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9373 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9374 </para>
9375 <para>
9376
9377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9378 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9379 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9380 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9381 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9382 version of "Happy Birthday"&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9383 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9384 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9385 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9386 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9387 </para>
9388 <para>
9389 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9390 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9391 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9392 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9393 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9394 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9395 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9396 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9397 recording artists.
9398 </para>
9399 <para>
9400 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9401 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9402 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9403 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9404 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9405 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9406 metropolitan area.
9407 </para>
9408 <para>
9409 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9410 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9411 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9412 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9413 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9414 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9415 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9416 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9417 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9418 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9419 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9420 </para>
9421 <para>
9422
9423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9424 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9425 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9426 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9427 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9428 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9429 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9430 FM radio,
9431 </para>
9432 <blockquote>
9433 <para>
9434 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9435 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9436 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9437 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9438 than by technical restrictions. . . . Armstrong likened the situation
9439 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9440 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9441 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9442 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9443 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9444 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9445 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9446 shackles.<footnote><para>
9447 <!-- f12. -->
9448 Lessing, 239.
9449 </para></footnote>
9450 </para>
9451 </blockquote>
9452 <para>
9453 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9454 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9455 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9456 legislation"<footnote><para>
9457 <!-- f13. -->
9458 Ibid., 229.
9459 </para></footnote>
9460 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9461 </para>
9462 <para>
9463 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9464 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9465 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9466 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9467 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9468 radio?
9469 </para>
9470 <para>
9471 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9472 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9473
9474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9475 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9476 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9477 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9478 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9479 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9480 of "Happy Birthday" on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9481 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9482 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9483 burdens terrestrial radio.
9484 </para>
9485 <para>
9486 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9487 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9488 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9489 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9490 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9491 <para>
9492 <!-- f14. -->
9493 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9494 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9495 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9496 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9497 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9498 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9499 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9500 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9501 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9502 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9503 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9504 Distribution," <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: "This was
9505 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9506 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9507 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9508 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9509 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9510 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9511 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9512 </para></footnote>
9513 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9514 equivalent fee.
9515 </para>
9516 <para>
9517 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9518 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9519 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9520 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9521 </para>
9522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9523 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9524 <listitem><para>
9525 name of the service;
9526 </para></listitem>
9527 <listitem><para>
9528 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9529 </para></listitem>
9530 <listitem><para>
9531 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9532 </para></listitem>
9533 <listitem><para>
9534 date of transmission;
9535 </para></listitem>
9536 <listitem><para>
9537 time of transmission;
9538 </para></listitem>
9539 <listitem><para>
9540 time zone of origination of transmission;
9541 </para></listitem>
9542 <listitem><para>
9543 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9544 </para></listitem>
9545 <listitem><para>
9546 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9547 </para></listitem>
9548 <listitem><para>
9549 sound recording title;
9550 </para></listitem>
9551 <listitem><para>
9552 ISRC code of the recording;
9553 </para></listitem>
9554 <listitem><para>
9555 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9556 </para></listitem>
9557 <listitem><para>
9558 featured recording artist;
9559 </para></listitem>
9560 <listitem><para>
9561 retail album title;
9562 </para></listitem>
9563 <listitem><para>
9564 recording label;
9565 </para></listitem>
9566 <listitem><para>
9567 UPC code of the retail album;
9568 </para></listitem>
9569 <listitem><para>
9570 catalog number;
9571 </para></listitem>
9572 <listitem><para>
9573 copyright owner information;
9574 </para></listitem>
9575 <listitem><para>
9576 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9577 </para></listitem>
9578 <listitem><para>
9579 name of the service or entity;
9580 </para></listitem>
9581 <listitem><para>
9582 channel or program;
9583 </para></listitem>
9584 <listitem><para>
9585 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9586 </para></listitem>
9587 <listitem><para>
9588 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9589 </para></listitem>
9590 <listitem><para>
9591 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9592 </para></listitem>
9593 <listitem><para>
9594 Unique User identifier;
9595 </para></listitem>
9596 <listitem><para>
9597 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9598 </para></listitem>
9599 </orderedlist>
9600
9601 <para>
9602 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9603 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9604 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9605 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9606 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9607 that terrestrial radio does not.
9608 </para>
9609 <para>
9610 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9611 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9612 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9613 </para>
9614 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
9615 <para>
9616 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9617 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9618 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9619 </para>
9620 <blockquote>
9621 <para>
9622 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9623 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9624 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9625 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9626 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9627 webcasters asked the RIAA, . . . "How do you come up with a
9628
9629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9630 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9631 Because
9632 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9633 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9634 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9635 of business. . . ."
9636 </para>
9637 <para>
9638 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9639 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9640 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9641 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9642 added.)
9643 </para>
9644 </blockquote>
9645 <para>
9646 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9647 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9648 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9649 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9650 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9651 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9652 effective to prevent it.
9653 </para>
9654 </section>
9655 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9656 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9657 <para>
9658 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9659 dinosaurs
9660 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9661 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9662 </para>
9663 <para>
9664 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9665 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9666 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9667 </para>
9668 <para>
9669 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9670 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9671 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9672 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9673 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9674 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9675 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9676 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9677 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9678 </para></footnote>
9679 According to the RIAA,
9680 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9681 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9682
9683 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9684 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9685 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9686 increasingly
9687 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9688 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9689 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9690 extreme
9691 response by the other.
9692 </para>
9693 <para>
9694 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9695 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9696 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9697 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9698 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9699 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
9700 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9701 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9702 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
9703 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9704 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9705 was.<footnote><para>
9706 <!-- f16. -->
9707 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case," <citetitle>Los
9708 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
9709 </para></footnote>
9710 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9711 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9712 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
9713 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9714 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9715 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9716 they oppose.
9717 </para>
9718 <para>
9719 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9720 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9721 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9722 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9723 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
9724 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9725 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
9726 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9727 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
9728 <!-- f17. -->
9729 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9730 Prohibition," <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
9731 </para></footnote>
9732 We have
9733 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9734 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9735 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
9736 <!-- f18. -->
9737 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9738 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
9739 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9740 </para></footnote>
9741 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
9742 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9743 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9744 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9745 cheat.<footnote><para>
9746 <!-- f19. -->
9747 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9748 Compliance," <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
9749 compliance literature).
9750 </para></footnote>
9751 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9752 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9753 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9754 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
9755 </para>
9756 <para>
9757 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9758 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9759 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9760 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9761 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9762 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9763 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9764 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9765 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
9766 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9767 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9768 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
9769 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
9770 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9771 degree of illegality.
9772 </para>
9773 <para>
9774 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9775 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9776 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9777 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9778 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9779 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9780 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9781 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9782 to consider the alternative.
9783 </para>
9784 <para>
9785
9786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9787 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9788 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9789 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9790 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9791 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9792 </para>
9793 <para>
9794 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9795 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9796 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9797 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9798 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9799 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9800 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9801 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9802 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9803 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9804 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9805 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9806 </para>
9807 <para>
9808 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9809 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9810 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9811 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9812 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9813 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9814 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9815 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9816 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9817 a nation of felons?
9818 </para>
9819 <para>
9820 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9821 </para>
9822 <para>
9823 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9824 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9825 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9826 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9827 used
9828
9829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9830 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9831 recordings is free.
9832 </para>
9833 <para>
9834 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9835 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9836 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9837 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9838 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9839 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9840 capacities of digital technologies.
9841 </para>
9842 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
9843 <para>
9844 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9845 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9846 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9847 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9848 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9849 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9850 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9851 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9852 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9853 </para>
9854 <para>
9855 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
9856 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9857 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9858 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9859 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9860 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9861 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9862 on people's machines.
9863 </para>
9864 <para>
9865 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9866 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9867 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9868 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9869 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9870 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9871
9872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9873 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9874 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9875 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9876 management" system.
9877 </para>
9878 <para>
9879 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9880 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9881 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9882 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9883 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9884 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9885 freedom to move content easily?
9886 </para>
9887 <para>
9888 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9889 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9890 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9891 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9892 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9893 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9894 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9895 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9896 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9897 </para>
9898 <para>
9899 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9900 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9901 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9902 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9903 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9904 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9905 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9906 </para>
9907 <para>
9908 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9909 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9910 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9911 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9912 </para>
9913 <para>
9914 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9915 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9916
9917 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9918
9919 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9920 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9921 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9922 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9923 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9924 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9925 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9926 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9927 generally.
9928 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
9929 </para>
9930 <para>
9931 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9932 explains,
9933 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
9934 </para>
9935 <blockquote>
9936 <para>
9937 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9938 evaporate to one degree or another. . . . If you're a copyright
9939 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9940 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9941 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9942 access? . . . Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9943 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9944 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9945 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
9946 </para>
9947 </blockquote>
9948 <para>
9949 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
9950 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
9951 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
9952 </para>
9953 <para>
9954 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
9955 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
9956 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
9957 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
9958 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
9959 an Internet user is revealed.
9960 </para>
9961 <para>
9962 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
9963 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
9964 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
9965 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
9966 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
9967 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
9968 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
9969 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
9970 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
9971 <!-- f20. -->
9972 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
9973 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
9974 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
9975 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
9976 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
9977 Being Sued," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
9978 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
9979 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
9980 Fan, Either," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
9981 Brianna a Criminal?" <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
9982 </para></footnote>
9983
9984 </para>
9985 <para>
9986 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
9987 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
9988 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
9989 <!-- f21. -->
9990 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
9991 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
9992 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
9993 </para></footnote>
9994 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
9995 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
9996 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
9997 </para>
9998 <para>
9999 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10000 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10001 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10002 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10003 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10004 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10005 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10006 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10007 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10008 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10009 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10010 <!-- f22. -->
10011 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10012 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10013 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10014 Colleges," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10015 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk," <citetitle>Christian Science
10016 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10017 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10018 Lawsuit Possible," <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10019 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities," <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10020 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10021 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning 101: Freshman
10022 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10023 Sharing," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10024 Are Weapons at Universities," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10025 </para></footnote>
10026 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10027 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10028 </para>
10029 <para>
10030 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10031 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10032 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10033 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10034 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10035 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10036 college students
10037
10038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10039 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10040 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10041 Says von Lohmann,
10042 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10043 </para>
10044 <blockquote>
10045 <para>
10046 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10047 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10048 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10049 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10050 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10051 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10052 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10053 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10054 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10055 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10056 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10057 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10058 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10059 larger number of Americans than drug use. . . . If forty to sixty
10060 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10061 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10062 million of them.
10063 </para>
10064 </blockquote>
10065 <para>
10066 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10067 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10068 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10069 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10070 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10071 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10072 </para>
10073
10074 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10075 </section>
10076 </chapter>
10077 </part>
10078 <part id="c-balances">
10079 <title>BALANCES</title>
10080 <partintro>
10081
10082 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10083 <para>
10084 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10085 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10086 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10087 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10088 </para>
10089 <para>
10090 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10091 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10092 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10093 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10094 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10095 everything around.
10096 </para>
10097 <para>
10098 A war about copyright rages all around&mdash;and we're all focusing on
10099 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10100 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10101 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10102 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10103 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10104 </para>
10105 <para>
10106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10107 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10108 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10109 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10110 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10111 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10112 made that is happening all around.
10113 </para>
10114 <para>
10115 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10116 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10117 gasoline onto this fire.
10118 </para>
10119 <para>
10120 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10121 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10122 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10123 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10124 </para>
10125 <para>
10126 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10127 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10128 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10129 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10130 success will require.
10131 </para>
10132 </partintro>
10133
10134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10135 <chapter id="eldred">
10136 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10137 <para>
10138 In 1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10139 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10140 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10141 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10142 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10143 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10144 come alive.
10145 </para>
10146 <para>
10147 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10148 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10149 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10150 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10151 them available for free.
10152 </para>
10153 <para>
10154 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10155 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10156 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10157 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10158 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10160 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10161 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10162 accessible&mdash;today.
10163 </para>
10164 <para>
10165 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10166 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10167 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10168 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10169 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10170 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10171 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10172 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10173 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10174 commercial publications of public domain works.
10175 </para>
10176 <para>
10177 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10178 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10179 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10180 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10181 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10182 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10183 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10184 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10185 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10186 generally.<footnote><para>
10187 <!-- f1. -->
10188 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10189 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10190 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10191 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10192 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10193 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10194 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10195 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10196 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10197 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10198 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10199 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10200 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10201 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10202 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10203 </para>
10204 <para>
10205 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10206 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10207 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10208 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10209 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10210 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10211 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10212 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10213 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10214 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10215 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10216 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10217 </para>
10218 <para>
10219
10220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10221 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10222 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10223 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10224 "copyrights should be forever."<footnote><para>
10225 <!-- f2. -->
10226 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10227 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10228 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10229 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10230 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10231 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10232 Congress," 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10233 </para></footnote>
10234
10235 </para>
10236 <para>
10237 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10238 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10239 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10240 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10241 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10242 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10243 to undertake.
10244 </para>
10245 <para>
10246 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10247 constitutional
10248 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10249 interpretation.
10250 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10251 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10252 importantly
10253 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10254 </para>
10255 <blockquote>
10256 <para>
10257 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science . . .
10258 by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . exclusive Right to
10259 their . . . Writings. . . .
10260 </para>
10261 </blockquote>
10262 <para>
10263 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10264 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10265 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10266 something&mdash;for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10267 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10268 specific&mdash;to "promote . . . Progress"&mdash;through means that
10269 are also specific&mdash; by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10270 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10271 </para>
10272 <para>
10273 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10274 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10275 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10276 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10278 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10279 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10280 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms "on the
10281 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10282 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10283 </para>
10284 <para>
10285 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10286 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10287 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10288 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10289 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10290 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10291 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10292 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10293 this gravy train going.
10294 </para>
10295 <para>
10296 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10297 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10298 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10299 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10300 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10301 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10302 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10303 </para>
10304 <para>
10305 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10306 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10307 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10308 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10309 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10310 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10311 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10312 published by anyone for free.
10313 </para>
10314 <para>
10315 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10316 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10317 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10318 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10319 report:
10320 </para>
10321 <para>
10322 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10323
10324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10325 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10326 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10327 those works.
10328 </para>
10329 <para>
10330 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10331 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10332 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10333 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10334 </para>
10335 <para>
10336 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10337 about it?"
10338 </para>
10339 <para>
10340 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10341 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10342 they support the bill."
10343 </para>
10344 <para>
10345 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10346 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10347 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10348 much is it worth?"
10349 </para>
10350 <para>
10351 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10352 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10353 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10354 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate."
10355 </para>
10356 <para>
10357 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10358 correct conclusion:
10359 </para>
10360 <para>
10361 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10362 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10363 contributions
10364 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10365 </para>
10366 <para>
10367 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10368 contribute
10369 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10370 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000."
10371 </para>
10372 <para>
10373 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10374 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10375 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10376 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10377 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10378 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10379 copyrights
10380 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10381 the copyright term extended.
10382 </para>
10383 <para>
10384 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10385 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10386 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10387 </para>
10388 <para>
10389 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10390 Copyright
10391 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10392 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10393 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10394 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10395 contributions.<footnote><para>
10396 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10397 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,"
10398 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10399 </para></footnote>
10400 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10401 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10402 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10403 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10404 Age," available at
10405 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10406 </para></footnote>
10407 Disney is estimated to have
10408 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10409 cycle.<footnote><para>
10410 <!-- f5. -->
10411 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10412 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10413 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10414 </para></footnote>
10415
10416 </para>
10417 <para>
10418 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10419 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10420 reality
10421 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10422 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10423 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10424 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10425 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10426 "limited."
10427 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10428 and again.
10429 </para>
10430 <para>
10431 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10432 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10433 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10434 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10435 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10436 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10437 Supreme Court's
10438
10439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10440 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10441 guns near schools.
10442 </para>
10443 <para>
10444 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10445 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10446 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10447 "interstate
10448 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10449 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10450 interstate
10451 commerce.
10452 </para>
10453 <para>
10454 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10455 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10456 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10457 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10458 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10459 </para>
10460 <para>
10461 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10462 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10463 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10464 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10465 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10466 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10467 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10468 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10469 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10470 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10471 position to second-guess Congress.
10472 </para>
10473 <para>
10474 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10475 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10476 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10477 </para></footnote>
10478 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10479 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10480 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10481 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10482 <!-- f7. -->
10483 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10484 </para></footnote>
10485 </para>
10486 <para>
10487 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10488 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10489 <!-- f8. -->
10490 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10491 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10492 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10493 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10494 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10495 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10496 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10497 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10498 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10499 </para></footnote>
10500 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10501 yield the conclusion that Congress
10502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10503 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10504 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10505 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10506 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10507 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10508 term of existing copyrights.
10509 </para>
10510 <para>
10511 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10512 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10513 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10514 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10515 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10516 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10517 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10518 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10519 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10520 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10521 were going to be petty politicians.
10522 </para>
10523 <para>
10524 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10525 argument in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10526 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10527 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10528 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10529 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10530 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10531 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10532 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10533 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10534 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10535 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10536 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10537 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10538 piracy that affects us all.
10539 </para>
10540 <para>
10541 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10542
10543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10544 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10545 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."<footnote><para>
10546 <!-- f9. -->
10547 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10548 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10549 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10550 </para></footnote>
10551 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10552 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10553 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10554 charter.
10555 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10556 </para>
10557 <para>
10558 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10559 copyright
10560 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10561 influence
10562 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10563 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10564 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10565 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10566 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10567 bought to extend them again.
10568 </para>
10569 <para>
10570 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10571 extended.
10572 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10573 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10574 society
10575 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10576 Disney's.
10577 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10578 from the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10579 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10580 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10581 exploited,
10582 and no longer available as a result.
10583 </para>
10584 <para>
10585 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10586 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10587 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10588 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10589 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10590 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10591 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10592 Congressional
10593 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10594 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10595 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10596 </para></footnote>
10597
10598 </para>
10599 <para>
10600 Think practically about the consequence of this
10601 extension&mdash;practically,
10602 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10603
10604 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10605 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10606 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10607 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10608 remaining
10609 9,873. What would you have to do?
10610 </para>
10611 <para>
10612 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10613 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10614 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10615 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10616 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10617 list of books still under copyright.
10618 </para>
10619 <para>
10620 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10621 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10622 </para>
10623 <para>
10624 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10625 owners
10626 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10627 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10628 being at least a list?
10629 </para>
10630 <para>
10631 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10632 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10633 practically
10634 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10635 thousands
10636 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10637 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10638 </para>
10639 <para>
10640 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10641 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10642 copyright owners?"
10643 </para>
10644 <para>
10645 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10646 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10647 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10648 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10649 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10650 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10651 what tangible property.
10652 </para>
10653 <para>
10654 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10655 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10656 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10657
10658 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10659 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10660 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10661 happen
10662 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10663 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10664 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10665 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10666 know quite well who owns what property.
10667 </para>
10668 <para>
10669 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10670 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10671 already
10672 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10673 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10674 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10675 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10676 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10677 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10678 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10679 </para>
10680 <para>
10681 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10682 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10683 consequence
10684 for other creative works is much more dire.
10685 </para>
10686 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael</primary></indexterm>
10687 <para>
10688 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10689 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10690 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10691 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
10692 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
10693 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10694 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10695 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about 60,000
10696 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10697 films."<footnote><para>
10698 <!-- f11. -->
10699 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10700 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10701 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10702 Down Copyright Extension," <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
10703 </para></footnote>
10704
10705 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
10706 </para>
10707 <para>
10708 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10709 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10710 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10711 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10712 </para>
10713 <para>
10714 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10715
10716 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10717 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
10718 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10719 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10720 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10721 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10722 work available for distribution.
10723 </para>
10724 <para>
10725 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10726 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10727 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10728 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10729 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
10730 mm film.<footnote><para>
10731 <!-- f12. -->
10732 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10733 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
10734 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10735 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10736 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
10737 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
10738 </para></footnote>
10739
10740 </para>
10741 <para>
10742 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10743 important.
10744 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10745 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10746 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10747 locate the copyright owner.
10748 </para>
10749 <para>
10750 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10751 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10752 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10753 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10754 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10755 to these films is exceptionally high.
10756 </para>
10757 <para>
10758 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10759 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10760 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10761 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10762 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10763 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10764 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10765 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10766 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10767 </para>
10768 <para>
10769 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10770
10771 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10772 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10773 benefit
10774 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10775 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10776 the copyright expires.
10777 </para>
10778 <para>
10779 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10780 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10781 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10782 canisters
10783 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10784 than dust.
10785 </para>
10786 <para>
10787 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10788 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10789 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10790 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10791 creative
10792 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10793 free expression."
10794 </para>
10795 <para>
10796 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10797 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10798 indicated,
10799 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10800 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10801 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10802 distributors,
10803 the commercial life ends.
10804 </para>
10805 <para>
10806 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10807 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
10808 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10809 between
10810 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10811 Friday
10812 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10813 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
10814 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10815 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10816 have, we need to have access to this history.
10817 </para>
10818 <para>
10819 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10820
10821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10822 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10823 this context do no good.
10824 </para>
10825 <para>
10826 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10827 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10828 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10829 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10830 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10831 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10832 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10833 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10834 was independent of copyright law.
10835 </para>
10836 <para>
10837 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10838 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
10839 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10840 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10841 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10842 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10843 market didn't have more to offer.
10844 </para>
10845 <para>
10846 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10847 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10848 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10849 would not have interfered with anything.
10850 </para>
10851 <para>
10852 But this situation has now changed.
10853 </para>
10854 <para>
10855 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10856 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10857 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10858 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10859 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10860 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10861 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10862 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10863 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10864 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10865 </para>
10866 <para>
10867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10868 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10869 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10870 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10871 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10872 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10873 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10874 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10875 written for a radically different context.
10876 </para>
10877 <para>
10878 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10879 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10880 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10881 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
10882 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
10883 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
10884 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
10885 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
10886 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
10887 </para>
10888 <para>
10889 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10890 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10891 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10892 culture widely?"
10893 </para>
10894 <para>
10895 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10896 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
10897 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10898 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10899 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10900 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
10901 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10902 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
10903 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10904 </para>
10905 <para>
10906 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10907 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10908 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10909 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10910
10911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10912 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10913 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10914 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10915 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
10916 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
10917 <!-- f13. -->
10918 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory," 20
10919 December 2002, available at
10920 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
10921 </para></footnote>
10922
10923 </para>
10924 <para>
10925 In January 1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10926 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10927 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10928 central claims that we made were (1) that extending existing terms
10929 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (2) that
10930 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10931 </para>
10932 <para>
10933 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10934 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10935 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10936 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10937 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10938 </para>
10939 <para>
10940 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10941 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10942 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10943 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10944 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10945 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10946 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
10947 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
10948 power to extend existing terms.
10949 </para>
10950 <para>
10951 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
10952 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
10953 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
10954 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
10955 </para>
10956 <para>
10957 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
10958 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
10959
10960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
10961 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
10962 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
10963 overstepped its bounds.
10964 </para>
10965 <para>
10966 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
10967 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
10968 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
10969 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
10970 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
10971 </para>
10972 <para>
10973 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
10974 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
10975 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
10976 briefs and preparing for argument.
10977 </para>
10978 <para>
10979 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
10980 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
10981 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
10982 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
10983 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
10984 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
10985 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
10986 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
10987 </para>
10988 <para>
10989 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
10990 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
10991 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
10992 mistake lost it.
10993 </para>
10994 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
10995 <para>
10996 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
10997 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
10998 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
10999 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11000 heat
11001 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11002 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11003 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11004 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11005 </para>
11006 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11007 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11008 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11009 <para>
11010 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11011 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11012 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11013 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11014 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11015 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11016 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11017 most powerful media companies in the world."
11018 </para>
11019 <para>
11020 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11021 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11022 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11023 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11024 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11025 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11026 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11027 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11028 interpretation
11029 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11030 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11031 unconstitutional,
11032 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11033 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11034 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11035 Constitution,
11036 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11037 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11038 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11039 </para>
11040 <para>
11041 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11042 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11043 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11044 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11045 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11046 why it was unconstitutional.
11047 </para>
11048 <para>
11049 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11050
11051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11052 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11053 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11054 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11055 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11056 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11057 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11058 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11059 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11060 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11061 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11062 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11063 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11064 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11065 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11066 </para>
11067 <para>
11068 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11069 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11070 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11071 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11072 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11073 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11074 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11075 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11076 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11077 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11078 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11079 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11080 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11081 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11082 </para>
11083 <para>
11084 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11085 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11086 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11087 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11088 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11089 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11090 </para>
11091 <para>
11092 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11093 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11094
11095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11096 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11097 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11098 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11099 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11100 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11101 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11102 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11103 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11104 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11105 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11106 </para>
11107 <para>
11108 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11109 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11110 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11111 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11112 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11113 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11114 </para>
11115 <para>
11116 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11117 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11118 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11119 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11120 clear.
11121 </para>
11122 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11123 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11124 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11125 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11126 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11127 <para>
11128 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11129 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11130 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11131 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11132 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11133 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11134 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11135 nothing more than "rent-seeking"&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11136 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11137 </para>
11138 <para>
11139 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11140 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11141 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11142 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11143 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11144 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11145 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11146 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11147
11148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11149 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11150 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11151 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11152 </para>
11153 <para>
11154 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11155 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11156 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11157 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11158 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11159 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11160 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11161 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11162 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11163 confidence in our argument.
11164 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11165 </para>
11166 <para>
11167 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11168 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11169 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11170 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11171 copyright holders.
11172 </para>
11173 <para>
11174 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11175 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11176 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11177 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11178 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11179 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11180 wanted to control.
11181 </para>
11182 <para>
11183 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11184 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11185 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11186 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11187 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11188 pornography."<footnote><para>
11189 <!-- f14. -->
11190 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11191 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11192 </para></footnote>
11193 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11194 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11195 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11196 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11197 <!-- f15. -->
11198 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11199 Mouse Joins the Fray," <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11200 </para></footnote>
11201 That's
11202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11203 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11204 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11205 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11206 </para>
11207 <para>
11208 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11209 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11210 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11211 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11212 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11213 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11214 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11215 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11216 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11217 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11218 </para>
11219 <para>
11220 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11221 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11222 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11223 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11224 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11225 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11226 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11227 </para>
11228 <para>
11229 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11230 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11231 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11232 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11233 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11234 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line of cases that said that
11235 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11236 powers had limits.
11237 </para>
11238 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11239 <para>
11240 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11241 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11242 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11243 the Constitution
11244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11245 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11246 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11247 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11248 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11249 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11250 </para>
11251 <para>
11252 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11253 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11254 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11255 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11256 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11257 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11258 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11259 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11260 sense.
11261 </para>
11262 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11263 <para>
11264 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11265 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11266 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11267 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11268 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11269 these retrospective extensions.
11270 </para>
11271 <para>
11272 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11273 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11274 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11275 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11276 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11277 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11278 </para>
11279 <para>
11280 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11281 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11282 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11283 overriding
11284 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11285 most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the argument that Judge
11286 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11287 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11288 </para>
11289 <para>
11290 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11291 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11292 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11293
11294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11295 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11296 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11297 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11298 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11299 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to
11300 regulate commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to
11301 regulate copyright be limited.
11302 </para>
11303 <para>
11304 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11305 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11306 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11307 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11308 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11309 </para>
11310 <para>
11311 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11312 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11313 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11314 existing
11315 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11316 </para>
11317 <para>
11318 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11319 extended
11320 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11321 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11322 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11323 existing
11324 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11325 restraint
11326 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11327 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11328 hesitated
11329 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11330 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11331 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11332 arrived
11333 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11334 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11335
11336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11337 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11338 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11339 </para>
11340 <para>
11341 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11342 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11343 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11344 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11345 Congress
11346 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11347 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11348 this central idea.
11349 </para>
11350 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11351 <para>
11352 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11353 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11354 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11355 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11356 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11357 </para>
11358 <para>
11359 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11360 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11361 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11362 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11363 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11364 </para>
11365 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11366 <para>
11367 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11368 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11369 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11370 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11371 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11372 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11373 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11374 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11375 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11376 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11377 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11378
11379 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11380 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11381 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11382 </para>
11383 <para>
11384 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11385 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11386 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11387 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11388 congressmen
11389 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11390 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11391 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11392 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11393 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11394 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11395 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11396 family of the Justices.
11397 </para>
11398 <para>
11399 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11400 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11401 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11402 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11403 </para>
11404 <para>
11405 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11406 The history was bothering her.
11407 </para>
11408 <blockquote>
11409 <para>
11410 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11411 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11412 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11413 practice that began with the very first act.
11414 </para>
11415 </blockquote>
11416 <para>
11417 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11418 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11419 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11420 </para>
11421 <blockquote>
11422 <para>
11423 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11424 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11426 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11427 is yes.
11428 </para>
11429 </blockquote>
11430 <para>
11431 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11432 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11433 Kennedy, who observed,
11434 </para>
11435 <blockquote>
11436 <para>
11437 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11438 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11439 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11440 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11441 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11442 </para>
11443 </blockquote>
11444 <para>
11445 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11446 student,
11447 I answered,
11448 </para>
11449 <blockquote>
11450 <para>
11451 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11452 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11453 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11454 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11455 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11456 </para>
11457 </blockquote>
11458 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11459 <para>
11460 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11461 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11462 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11463 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11464 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11465 </para>
11466 <para>
11467 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11468 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11469 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11470 </para>
11471 <para>
11472 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11473 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11474
11475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11476 </para>
11477 <blockquote>
11478 <para>
11479 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11480 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11481 </para>
11482 <para>
11483 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11484 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11485 domain
11486 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11487 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11488 into the Copyright Clause.
11489 </para>
11490 </blockquote>
11491 <para>
11492 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11493 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11494 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11495 </para>
11496 <blockquote>
11497 <para>
11498 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11499 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11500 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11501 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11502 time.
11503 </para>
11504 </blockquote>
11505 <para>
11506 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11507 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11508 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11509 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11510 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11511 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11512 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11513 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11514 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11515 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11516 Court to my side.
11517 </para>
11518 <para>
11519 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11520 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11521
11522 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11523 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11524 optimistic.
11525 </para>
11526 <para>
11527 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11528 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11529 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11530 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11531 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11532 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11533 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11534 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11535 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11536 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11537 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11538 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11539 law that it had established elsewhere.
11540 </para>
11541 <para>
11542 The morning of January 15, 2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11543 and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11544 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11545 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11546 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11547 </para>
11548 <para>
11549 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11550 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11551 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11552 </para>
11553 <para>
11554 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11555 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11556 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11557 reasoning.
11558 </para>
11559 <para>
11560 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11561 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11562 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11563 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11564 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11565 </para>
11566 <para>
11567
11568 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11569 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11570 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11571 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11572 </para>
11573 <para>
11574 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11575 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11576 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11577 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11578 </para>
11579 <para>
11580 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11581 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11582 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11583 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11584 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11585 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11586 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11587 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11588 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11589 </para>
11590 <para>
11591 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11592 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11593 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11594 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11595 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11596 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11597 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11598 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11599 the system we have.
11600 </para>
11601 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11602 <para>
11603 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11604 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11605 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11606 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11607 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11608 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11609 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11610 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11611 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11612 </para>
11613 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11614 <para>
11615 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11616 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11617 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11618 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11619 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11620 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11621 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11622 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11623 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11624 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11625 </para>
11626 <para>
11627 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11628 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11629 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11630 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11631 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11632 </para>
11633 <para>
11634 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11635 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11636 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11637 </para>
11638 <para>
11639 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11640 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
11641 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11642 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11643 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11644 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11645 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"&mdash;to
11646 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11647 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11648 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11649 "originalism" now?
11650 </para>
11651 <para>
11652 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11653 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11654 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11655 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11656
11657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11658 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11659 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11660 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11661 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11662 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11663 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11664 own principles.
11665 </para>
11666 <para>
11667 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11668 myself.
11669 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11670 the law as it is.
11671 </para>
11672 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11673 <para>
11674 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11675 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11676 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11677 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11678 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11679 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11680 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11681 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11682 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11683 </para>
11684 <para>
11685 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11686 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11687 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11688 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11689 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11690 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11691 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11692 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11693 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11694 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11695 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11696 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11697 effort to persuade; but I
11698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11699 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11700 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11701 should decide the issue.
11702 </para>
11703 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11704 <para>
11705 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11706 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11707 Kathleen Sullivan?
11708 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11709 </para>
11710 <para>
11711 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11712 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11713 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11714 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11715 </para>
11716 <para>
11717 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11718 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11719 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11720 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11721 have persuaded.
11722 </para>
11723 <para>
11724 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11725 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11726 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11727 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11728 issue should not be raised until it is.
11729 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
11730 </para>
11731 <para>
11732 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11733 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11734 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11735 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11736 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11737 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11738 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
11739 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11740 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11741 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11742 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11743
11744 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11745 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11746 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11747 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11748 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11749 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11750 </para>
11751 <blockquote>
11752 <para>
11753 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11754 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11755 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11756 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11757 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11758 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11759 </para>
11760 </blockquote>
11761 <para>
11762 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11763 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11764 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next
11765 page. The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit unfair. But the punch
11766 in the face felt exactly like that.
11767 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
11768 </para>
11769 <para>
11770 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11771 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11772 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11773 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11774 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11775 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11776 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11777 </para>
11778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11779 </chapter>
11780 <chapter id="eldred-ii">
11781 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
11782 <para>
11783 The day <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11784 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was
11785 denied&mdash;meaning the case was really finally over&mdash;fate would
11786 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11787 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11788 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11789 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11790 </para>
11791 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11792 <para>
11793 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11794 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11795 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11796 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11797 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11798 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11799 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11800 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11801 </para>
11802 <para>
11803 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11804 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11805 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11806 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11807 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11808 the work passed into the public domain.
11809 </para>
11810 <para>
11811 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11812 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11813 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11814 </para>
11815 <para>
11816 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11817 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11818 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11819 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11820 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11821 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
11822 everything else, let the content go.
11823 </para>
11824 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
11825 <para>
11826 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11827 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11828 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11829 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11830 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11831 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11832 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11833 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11834 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11835 the stupid harm of the present system.
11836 </para>
11837 <para>
11838 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11839 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11840 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11841 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11842 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11843 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11844 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11845 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11846 where copyright owners could be identified.
11847 </para>
11848 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11849 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11850 <para>
11851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11852 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
11853 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11854 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11855 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
11856 <!-- f1. -->
11857 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11858 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11859 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11860 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
11861 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11862 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11863 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11864 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11865 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11866 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11867 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11868 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11869 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11870 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11871 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11872 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
11873 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
11874 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
11875 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11876 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11877 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11878 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11879 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11880 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11881 </para>
11882 <para>
11883 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11884 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11885 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11886 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11887 know what's protected and what's not.
11888 </para>
11889 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
11890 <para>
11891 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11892 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11893 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11894 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11895 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11896 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11897 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
11898 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
11899 </para>
11900 <para>
11901 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11902 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11903 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11904 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11905 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11906 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11907 </para>
11908 <para>
11909 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11910 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11911 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11912 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11913 burden
11914 imposed upon creators.
11915 </para>
11916 <para>
11917 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
11918 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11919
11920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11921 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11922 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11923 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11924 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11925 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11926 table.
11927 </para>
11928 <para>
11929 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11930 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11931 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11932 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11933 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11934 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11935 spread.
11936 </para>
11937 <para>
11938 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11939 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11940 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
11941 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
11942 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
11943 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
11944 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
11945 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
11946 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
11947 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
11948 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
11949 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
11950 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
11951 system of protection for property generally.
11952 </para>
11953 <para>
11954 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
11955 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
11956 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
11957 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
11958 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
11959 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
11960 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
11961 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
11962
11963 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
11964 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
11965 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
11966 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
11967 </para>
11968 <para>
11969 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
11970 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
11971 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
11972 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
11973 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
11974 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
11975 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
11976 be presumptively uncontrolled.
11977 </para>
11978 <para>
11979 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
11980 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
11981 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
11982 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
11983 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
11984 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
11985 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
11986 </para>
11987 <para>
11988 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
11989 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
11990 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
11991 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
11992 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
11993 </para>
11994 <para>
11995 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
11996 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
11997 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
11998 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
11999 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12000 </para>
12001 <para>
12002 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12003 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12004 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12005 registration?
12006 </para>
12007 <para>
12008 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12009 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12010 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12011
12012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12013 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12014 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12015 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12016 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12017 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12018 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12019 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12020 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12021 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12022 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12023 </para>
12024 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12025 <para>
12026 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12027 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12028 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12029 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12030 </para>
12031 <para>
12032 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12033 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12034 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12035 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12036 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12037 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12038 something good might happen here.
12039 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12040 </para>
12041 <para>
12042 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12043 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12044 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12045 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12046 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12047 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12048 </para>
12049 <para>
12050 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12051 concept in the proposed bill"&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12052 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12053 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12054 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12055 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12056 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12057 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12058 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12059 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12060 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12061 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12062 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12063 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12064 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12065 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12066 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12067 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12068 film is a valid derivative use.
12069 </para>
12070 <para>
12071 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12072 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12073 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12074 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12075 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12076 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12077 </para>
12078 <para>
12079 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12080 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12081 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12082 stories was the power of the opposition&mdash;the power of the side
12083 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12084 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12085 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12086 threat.
12087 </para>
12088 <para>
12089 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12090 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12091 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12092 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12093 sense?
12094 </para>
12095 <para>
12096
12097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12098 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12099 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12100 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12101 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12102 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12103 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12104 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12105 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12106 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12107 </para>
12108 <para>
12109 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12110 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12111 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12112 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12113 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12114 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12115 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12116 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12117 </para>
12118 <para>
12119 What does this industry really want?
12120 </para>
12121 <para>
12122 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12123 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12124 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12125 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12126 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12127 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12128 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12129 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12130 first.
12131 </para>
12132 <para>
12133 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12134 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12135 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12136 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12137 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12138 theirs</emphasis>.
12139 </para>
12140 <para>
12141 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12142 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12143
12144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12145 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12146 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12147 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12148 and to share its own creation.
12149 </para>
12150 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12151 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12152 <para>
12153 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12154 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12155 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12156 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12157 block the progress of others.
12158 </para>
12159 <para>
12160 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12161 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12162 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12163 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12164 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12165 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12166 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12167 </para>
12168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12169 </chapter>
12170 </part>
12171 <chapter id="c-conclusion">
12172 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12173 <para>
12174 There are more than 35 million people with the AIDS virus
12175 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12176 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12177 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12178 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12179 </para>
12180 <para>
12181 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12182 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12183 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12184 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12185 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12186 the disease almost invisible.
12187 </para>
12188 <para>
12189 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12190 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12191 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12192 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12193 population:
12194 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12195 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12196 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12197 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London, 2002),
12198 available at
12199 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12200 release
12201 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12202 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12203 </para></footnote>
12204 </para>
12205 <para>
12206 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12207 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12208 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12209 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12210 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12211 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12212 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12213 </para>
12214 <para>
12215 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12216 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12217 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12218 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12219 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12220 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12221 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12222 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12223 changes.
12224 </para>
12225 <para>
12226 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12227 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12228 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12229 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12230 costs significantly below the market price.
12231 </para>
12232 <para>
12233 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12234 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12235 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12236 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12237 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12238 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12239 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12240 <para>
12241 <!-- f2. -->
12242 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12243 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12244 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12245 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12246 </para></footnote>
12247 </para>
12248 <para>
12249 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12250 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12251 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa . . .
12252 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12253 imports."<footnote><para>
12254 <!-- f3. -->
12255 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12256 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12257 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12258 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12259 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12260 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12261 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12262 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12263 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12264 Love).
12265 </para></footnote>
12266 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12267 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12268 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12269 possible trade sanctions.
12270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12271 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12272 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12273 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12274 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12275 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12276 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12277 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12278 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12279 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12280 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12281 <!-- f4. -->
12282 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12283 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12284 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12285 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12286 </para>
12287 <para>
12288 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12289 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12290 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12291 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12292 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12293 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12294 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12295 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12296 </para>
12297 <para>
12298 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12299 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12300 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12301 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12302 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12303 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12304 </para>
12305 <para>
12306 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12307 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12308 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12309 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12310 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12311 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12312 by U.S. companies.
12313 </para>
12314 <para>
12315 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12316 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12317 argument
12318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12319 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12320 <!-- f5. -->
12321 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12322 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive," <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12323 May 1999, A1, available at
12324 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12325 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12326 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12327 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12328 Medicines," <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12329 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12330 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12331 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12332 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis," <citetitle>Widener Law
12333 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12335 </para></footnote>
12336 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12337 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12338 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12339 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12340 </para>
12341 <para>
12342 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12343 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12344 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12345 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12346 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12347 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12348 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12349 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12350 </para>
12351 <para>
12352 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12353 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12354 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12355 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12356 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12357 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12358 </para>
12359 <para>
12360 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12361 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12362 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12363 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12364 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12365 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12366 </para>
12367 <para>
12368 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12369 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12370 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12371 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12372 drug would cost an American $1,500?" Because there is no "sound
12373 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12374 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12375 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12377 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12378 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12379 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12380 idea called "intellectual property."
12381 </para>
12382 <para>
12383 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12384 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12385 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12386 What is the argument?
12387 </para>
12388 <para>
12389 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12390 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12391 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12392 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12393 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12394 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12395 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12396 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12397 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12398 were balanced in just this sense.
12399 </para>
12400 <para>
12401 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12402 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12403 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12404 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12405 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12406 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12407 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12408 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12409 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12410 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12411 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12412 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12413 our
12414 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12415 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12416 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12417 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12418 this common sense open its eyes.
12419 </para>
12420 <para>
12421 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12422 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12423 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12424 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12425 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12426 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12427 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12428 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12429 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12430 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12431 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12432 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12433 </para>
12434 <para>
12435 In August 2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12436 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12437 meeting.<footnote><para>
12438 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12439 August 2003, E1, available at
12440 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12441 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12442 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12443 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12444 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO," <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12445 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12446 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12447 </para></footnote>
12448 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12449 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12450 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12451 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12452 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12453 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12454 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12455 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12456 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12457 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12458 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12459 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12460 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12461 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12462 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12463 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12464 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12465 in the early 1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12466 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12467 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12468 </para>
12469 <para>
12470 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12471 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12472 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12473 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12474 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12475 </para>
12476 <para>
12477 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12478 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12479 meeting.
12480 </para></footnote>
12481 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12482 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12483 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12484 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12485 property issues.
12486 </para>
12487 <para>
12488 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12489 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12490 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12491 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12492 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12493 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12494 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12495 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12496 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12497 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12498 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12499 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12500 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12501 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12502 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12503 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12504 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12505 stuff of
12506 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12507 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12508 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12509 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12510 </para>
12511 <para>
12512 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12513 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12514 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12515 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12516 </para>
12517 <para>
12518 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12519 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12520 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12521 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12522 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12523 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12524 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12525 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12526 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12527 </para>
12528 <para>
12529 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12530 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12531 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12532 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12533 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12534 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"&mdash;and IBM
12535 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12536 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12537 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12538 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12539 <!-- f8. -->
12540 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12541 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12542 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12543 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12544 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12545 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12546 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide," <citetitle>Government Policy
12547 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12548 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12549 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12550 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12551 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12552 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12553 May 2001), available at
12554 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12555 </para></footnote>
12556 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12557 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12558 </para>
12559 <para>
12560 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12561 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12562 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12563 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12564 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12565 by
12566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12567 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12568 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12569 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12570 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12571 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12572 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12573 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12574 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12575 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12576 </para>
12577 <para>
12578 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12579 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12580 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12581 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12582 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12583 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12584 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12585 <!-- f9. -->
12586 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at <ulink
12587 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12588 </para></footnote>
12589 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12590 </para>
12591 <para>
12592 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12593 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12594 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12595 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12596 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12597 its lobbying efforts.
12598 </para>
12599 <para>
12600 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12601 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12602 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12603 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12604 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12605 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12606 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12607 goals of WIPO."
12608 </para>
12609 <para>
12610 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12611 </para>
12612 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12613 <para>
12614 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12615 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12616 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12617 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12618 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12619 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12620 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12621 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12622 </para>
12623 <para>
12624 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12625 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12626 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12627 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12628 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12629 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12630 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12631 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12632 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12633 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12634 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12635 </para>
12636 <para>
12637 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12638 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12639 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12640 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12641 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12642 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12643 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
12644 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12645 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12646 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12647 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
12648 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
12649 </para>
12650 <para>
12651 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12652 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12653 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12654 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12655 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12656 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12657 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12658 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12659 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12660 way possible.
12661 </para>
12662 <para>
12663 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12664 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12665 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12666 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12667 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12668 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12669 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12670 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12671 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12672 that control.
12673 </para>
12674 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12675 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12676 <para>
12677 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12678 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
12679 <!-- f10. -->
12680 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
12681 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12682 </para></footnote>
12683 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12684 choice now is whether that information society will be
12685 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
12686 toward the feudal.
12687 </para>
12688 <para>
12689 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12690 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12691 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12692 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12693 </para>
12694 <blockquote>
12695 <para>
12696 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12697 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12698 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12699 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12700 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12701 say anything wrong. But in the world
12702 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12703 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12704 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12705 </para>
12706 </blockquote>
12707 <para>
12708 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12709 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12710 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12711 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12712 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12713 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12714 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12715 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12716 </para>
12717 <para>
12718 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12719 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12720 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12721 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12722 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12723 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12724 </para>
12725 <para>
12726 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12727 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12728 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12729 our own country's history).
12730 </para>
12731 <para>
12732 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12733 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12734 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12735 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12736 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12737 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12738 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12739 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
12740 democracy in the world, become?
12741 </para>
12742 <para>
12743 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12744 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12745 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12746 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12747 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12748 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
12749 </para>
12750 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
12751 <para>
12752 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12753 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12754 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12755 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12756 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12757 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12758 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12759 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12760 astonishing 700,000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12761 hearings and a different result.
12762 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
12763 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
12764 </para>
12765 <para>
12766 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12767 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12768 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12769 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12770 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12771 concentration in the media.
12772 </para>
12773 <para>
12774 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12775 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12776 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12777 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12778 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12779 </para>
12780 <para>
12781 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12782 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12783 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12784 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12785 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12786 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
12787 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
12788 </para>
12789 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12790 <para>
12791 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12792 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12793 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12794 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12795 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12796 </para>
12797 <para>
12798 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12799 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12800 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12801 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12802 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12803 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12804 </para>
12805 <para>
12806 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12807 of our tragedy.
12808 </para>
12809 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
12810 <para>
12811 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12812 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
12813 <!-- f11. -->
12814 John Borland, "RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12815 2003, available at
12816 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
12817 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money, 8 September
12818 2003, available at
12819 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
12820 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12821 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers," <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
12822 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12823 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12824 Defendants," <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12825 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA," <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
12826 available at
12827 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
12828 </para></footnote>
12829 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12830 music.<footnote><para>
12831 <!-- f12. -->
12832 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued . . . by a Little Old Lady,"
12833 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
12834 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
12835 </para></footnote>
12836 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12837 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
12838 <!-- f13. -->
12839 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12840 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
12841 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
12842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12843 </para></footnote>
12844 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
12845 anonymous&mdash;reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12846 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12847 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12848 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12849 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12850 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12851 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12852 kids who use a computer to share content.
12853 </para>
12854 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12855 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12856 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
12857 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
12858 <para>
12859 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12860 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12861 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
12862 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12863 24 August 2003, available at
12864 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
12865 </para></footnote>
12866 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12867 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12868 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12869 country.<footnote><para>
12870 <!-- f15. -->
12871 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
12872 available at
12873 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
12874 </para></footnote>
12875 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12876 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12877 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12878 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12879 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12880 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12881 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12882 day into the Causbys.
12883 </para>
12884 <para>
12885 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12886 potential is ever to be realized.
12887
12888 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12889
12890 </para>
12891 </chapter>
12892 <chapter id="c-afterword">
12893 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
12894 <para>
12895
12896 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12897 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12898 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12899 maps what might be done.
12900 </para>
12901 <para>
12902 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12903 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12904 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12905 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12906 </para>
12907 <para>
12908 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12909 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12910 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
12911 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12912 is so important.
12913 </para>
12914 <para>
12915 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12916 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12917 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12918 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12919 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12920 </para>
12921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12922
12923 <section id="usnow">
12924 <title>US, NOW</title>
12925 <para>
12926 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12927 has been framed at the extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either
12928 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12929 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12930 </para>
12931 <para>
12932 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12933 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12934 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;"All Rights
12935 Reserved"&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;"No Rights
12936 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
12937 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
12938 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
12939 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
12940 </para>
12941 <para>
12942 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
12943 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
12944 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
12945 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
12946 the
12947
12948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
12949 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
12950 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
12951 unprotected.
12952 </para>
12953 <para>
12954 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
12955 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
12956 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
12957 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
12958 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
12959 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
12960 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
12961 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
12962 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
12963 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
12964 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
12965 world that is a creator's nightmare.
12966 </para>
12967 <para>
12968 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
12969 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
12970 reserved"&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
12971 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
12972 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
12973 before.
12974 </para>
12975
12976 <section id="examples">
12977 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
12978 <para>
12979 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
12980 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
12981 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
12982 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
12983 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
12984 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
12985 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
12986 assured.
12987 </para>
12988 <para>
12989 What made it assured?
12990 </para>
12991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
12992 <para>
12993 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
12994 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
12995 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
12996 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
12997 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
12998 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
12999 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13000 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13001 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13002 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13003 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13004 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13005 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13006 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13007 </para>
13008 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13009 <para>
13010 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13011 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13012 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13013 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13014 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13015 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13016 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13017 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13018 </para>
13019 <para>
13020 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13021 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13022 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13023 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13024 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13025 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13026 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13027 disappears.
13028 </para>
13029 <para>
13030 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13031 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13032 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13033 friction did.<footnote><para>
13034 <!-- f1. -->
13035
13036 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13037 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get)," <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13038 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13039
13040 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13041 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13042 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13043 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13044 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13045 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13046 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13047
13048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13049 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13050 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13051 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13052 </para>
13053 <para>
13054 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13055 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13056 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13057 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13058 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13059 care much about controlling their software.
13060 </para>
13061 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13062 <para>
13063 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13064 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13065 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13066 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13067 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13068 people's work.
13069 </para>
13070 <para>
13071 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13072 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13073 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13074 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13075 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13076 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13077 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13078 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13079 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13080 anything else?
13081 </para>
13082 <para>
13083 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13084 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13085 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13086 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13087 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13088 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13089 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13090 </para>
13091 <para>
13092 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13093 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13095 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13096 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13097 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13098 fundamentally weakened.
13099 </para>
13100 <para>
13101 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13102 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13103 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13104 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13105 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13106 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13107 </para>
13108 <para>
13109 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13110 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13111 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13112 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13113 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13114 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13115 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13116 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13117 byproduct.
13118 </para>
13119 <para>
13120 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13121 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13122 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13123 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13124 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13125 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13126 </para>
13127 <para>
13128 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13129 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13130 scientific journals are produced.
13131 </para>
13132 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13133 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13134 </indexterm>
13135 <para>
13136 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13137 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13138 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13139 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13140 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13141 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13142 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13143 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13144 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13145 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13146 and Westlaw are also free
13147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13148 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13149 Court opinion through their respective services.
13150 </para>
13151 <para>
13152 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13153 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13154 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13155 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13156 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13157 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13158 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13159 </para>
13160 <para>
13161 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13162 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13163 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13164 </para>
13165 <para>
13166 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13167 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13168 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13169 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13170 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13171 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13172 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13173 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13174 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13175 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13176 </para>
13177 <para>
13178 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13179 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13180 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13181 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13182 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13183 granted before.
13184 </para>
13185 <para>
13186 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13187 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13188 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13189 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13190 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13191 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13192 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13193 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13194 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13195 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13196 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13197 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13198 </para>
13199 <para>
13200 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13201 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13202 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13203 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13204 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13205 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13206 and science.
13207 </para>
13208 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13209
13210 </section>
13211 <section id="oneidea">
13212 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13213 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13214 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13215 </indexterm>
13216 <para>
13217 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13218 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13219 </para>
13220 <para>
13221 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13222 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13223 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13224 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13225 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13226 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13227 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13228 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13229 make this possible.
13230 </para>
13231 <para>
13232 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13233 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13234 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13235 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13236 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13237 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13238 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13239 human-readable description, and
13240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13241 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13242 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13243 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13244 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13245 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13246 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13247 certain freedoms are given.
13248 </para>
13249 <para>
13250 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13251 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13252 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13253 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13254 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13255 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13256 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13257 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13258 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13259 </para>
13260 <para>
13261 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13262 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13263 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13264 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13265 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13266 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13267 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13268 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13269 a public domain.
13270 </para>
13271 <para>
13272 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13273 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13274 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13275 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13276 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13277 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13279 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13280 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13281 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13282 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13283 </para>
13284 <para>
13285 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13286 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13287 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13288 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13289 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13290 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13291 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13292 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13293 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13294 to begin to build those rules.
13295 </para>
13296 <para>
13297 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13298 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13299 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13300 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13301 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13302 </para>
13303 <para>
13304 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13305 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13306 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13307 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13308 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13309 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13310 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13311 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13312 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13313 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13314 </para>
13315 <para>
13316 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13317 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13318 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13319 was a total success.
13320 </para>
13321 <para>
13322 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13323 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13324 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13325 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13326 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13327 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13328 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13329 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13330 well.
13331 </para>
13332 <para>
13333 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13334 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13335 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13336 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13337 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13338 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13339 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13340 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13341 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13342 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13343 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13344 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13345 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13346 high<footnote><para>
13347 <!-- f2. -->
13348
13349 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13350 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13351 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13352 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13353 </para></footnote>),
13354 these artists release into the creative environment content
13355 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13356 </para>
13357 <para>
13358 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13359 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13360 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13361 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13362 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13363 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13364 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13365 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13366 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13367 say it to others.
13368 </para>
13369 <para>
13370 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13371 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13372 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13373 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13374
13375 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13376 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13377 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13378 </para>
13379 <para>
13380 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13381 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13382 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13383 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13384 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13385 steps are possible.
13386 </para>
13387 <para>
13388 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13389 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13390 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13391 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13392 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13393 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13394 creativity to spread more easily.
13395 </para>
13396 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13397
13398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13399 </section>
13400 </section>
13401 <section id="themsoon">
13402 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13403 <para>
13404 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13405 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13406 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13407 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13408 changes that we need.
13409 </para>
13410 <para>
13411 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13412 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13413 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13414 to our end.
13415 </para>
13416
13417 <section id="formalities">
13418 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13419 <para>
13420 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13421 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13422 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13423 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13424 </para>
13425 <para>
13426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13427 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13428 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13429 protected.
13430 </para>
13431 <para>
13432 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13433 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13434 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13435 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13436 </para>
13437 <para>
13438 Why?
13439 </para>
13440 <para>
13441 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13442 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13443 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13444 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13445 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13446 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13447 formalities were getting in the way.
13448 </para>
13449 <para>
13450 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13451 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13452 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13453 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13454 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13455 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13456 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13457 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13458 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13459 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13460 </para>
13461 <para>
13462 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13463 <!-- f1. -->
13464 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13465 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13466 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13467 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13468 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13469 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13470 </para>
13471 <para>
13472 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13473 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13474 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13475 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13476 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13477 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13478 developed by others.
13479 </para>
13480
13481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13482
13483 <section id="registration">
13484 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13485 <para>
13486 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13487 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13488 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13489 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13490 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13491 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13492 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13493 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13494 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13495 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13496 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13497 </para>
13498 <para>
13499 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13500 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13501 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13502 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13503 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13504 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13505 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13506 </para>
13507 <para>
13508 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13509 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13510 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13511 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13512 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13513 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13514 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13515 with which registration occurs up.
13516 </para>
13517 <para>
13518 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13519 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13520 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13521 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13522 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13523 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13524 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13525 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13526 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13528 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13529 </para>
13530
13531 </section>
13532 <section id="marking">
13533 <title>MARKING</title>
13534 <para>
13535 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13536 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13537 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13538 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13539 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13540 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13541 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13542 uniformly across all media.
13543 </para>
13544 <para>
13545 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13546 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13547 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13548 use the work.
13549 </para>
13550 <para>
13551 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13552 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13553 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13554 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13555 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13556 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13557 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13558 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13559 </para>
13560 <para>
13561 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13562 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13563 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13564 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13565 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13566 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13567 <!-- f2. -->
13568 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13569 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13570 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13571 </para></footnote>
13572 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13573 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13574 stop using the work in any new
13575 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13576 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13577 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13578 their work.
13579 </para>
13580 <para>
13581 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13582 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13583 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13584 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13585 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13586 </para>
13587 <para>
13588 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13589 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13590 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13591 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13592 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13593 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13594 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13595 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13596 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13597 other important functions.
13598 </para>
13599 <para>
13600 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13601 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13602 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13603 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13604 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13605 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13606 </para>
13607 <para>
13608 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13609 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13610 make things unclear.
13611 </para>
13612 <para>
13613 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13614 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13615 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13616 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13617 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13618 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13619 </para>
13620
13621 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13622 </section>
13623 </section>
13624 <section id="shortterms">
13625 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
13626 <para>
13627 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13628 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13629 natural authors.
13630 </para>
13631 <para>
13632 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13633 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13634 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13635 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13636 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13637 copyright term.<footnote><para>
13638
13639 <!-- f3. -->
13640 "A Radical Rethink," <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
13641 available at
13642 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
13643 </para></footnote>
13644 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13645 </para>
13646 <para>
13647 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13648 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13649 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13650 terms.
13651 </para>
13652 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
13653 <listitem><para>
13654 <!-- (1) -->
13655 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13656 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13657 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13658 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13659 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13660 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13661 </para></listitem>
13662 <listitem><para>
13663 <!-- (2) -->
13664 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
13665 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13666 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13667 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13668 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13669 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13670 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13671 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13672 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13673 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13674 </para></listitem>
13675 <listitem><para>
13676 <!-- (3) -->
13677 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13678 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13679 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13680 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13681 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13682 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13683 pension.<footnote><para>
13684 <!-- f4. -->
13685 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13686 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
13687 available at
13688 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
13689 </para></footnote>
13690 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13691 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13692 single form.
13693 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
13694 </para></listitem>
13695 <listitem><para>
13696 <!-- (4) -->
13697 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13698 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13699 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13700 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13701 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13702 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
13703 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13704 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13705 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
13706 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13707 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13708 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13709 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13710 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
13711 </orderedlist>
13712 <para>
13713 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
13714 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
13715 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13716 same.
13717 </para>
13718 <para>
13719 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13720 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13721 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13722 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13723 </para>
13724
13725 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13726
13727 </section>
13728 <section id="freefairuse">
13729 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
13730 <para>
13731 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13732 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13733 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13734 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13735 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13736 the emergence of that new technology.
13737 </para>
13738 <para>
13739 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13740 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13741 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13742 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13743 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13744 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13745 though that movie is not "my writing."
13746 </para>
13747 <para>
13748 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
13749 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13750 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
13751 <!-- f5. -->
13752 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13753 University Press, 1967), 32.
13754 </para></footnote>
13755 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13756 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13757 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13758 </para>
13759 <blockquote>
13760 <para>
13761 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13762 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13763 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13764 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
13765 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
13766 </para></footnote>
13767 </para>
13768 </blockquote>
13769 <para>
13770 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13771 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13772 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13773 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13774 Consider each limitation in turn.
13775 </para>
13776 <para>
13777 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13778 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13779 sense to protect John
13780
13781 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13782 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13783 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13784 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13785 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13786 after the creative work is done.
13787 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
13788 </para>
13789 <para>
13790 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13791 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13792 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13793 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13794 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13795 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13796 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13797 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13798 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13799 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13800 the creative process. Smothers it.
13801 </para>
13802 <para>
13803 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13804 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13805 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
13806 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
13807 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13808 much more sense.
13809 </para>
13810 <para>
13811 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13812 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13813 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13814 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
13815 <para>
13816 <!-- f7. -->
13817 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13818 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
13819 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
13820 </para></footnote>
13821 His view is that the law should be written so that
13822 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13823 </para>
13824 <para>
13825 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13826 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13827 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13828 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13829 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13830 </para>
13831 <para>
13832 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13834 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13835 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13836 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13837 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13838 </para>
13839 </section>
13840
13841 <section id="liberatemusic">
13842 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
13843 <para>
13844 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13845 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13846 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
13847 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13848 battles around the sharing of music.
13849 </para>
13850 <para>
13851 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13852 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13853 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13854 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13855 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13856 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13857 innovation on the network.
13858 </para>
13859 <para>
13860 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13861 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13862 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13863 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13864 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13865 </para>
13866 <para>
13867 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
13868 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
13869 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
13870 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
13871 four different kinds of sharing:
13872 </para>
13873 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
13874 <listitem><para>
13875 <!-- A. -->
13876 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13877 for purchasing CDs.
13878 </para></listitem>
13879 <listitem><para>
13880 <!-- B. -->
13881 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13882 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13883 </para></listitem>
13884 <listitem><para>
13885 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13886 <!-- C. -->
13887 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13888 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13889 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13890 </para></listitem>
13891 <listitem><para>
13892 <!-- D. -->
13893 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13894 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13895 owner plainly endorses.
13896 </para></listitem>
13897 </orderedlist>
13898 <para>
13899 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13900 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13901 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13902 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13903 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13904 significantly weakened.
13905 </para>
13906 <para>
13907 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13908 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13909 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13910 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13911 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13912 networks.
13913 </para>
13914 <para>
13915 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13916 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13917 should respond.
13918 </para>
13919 <para>
13920 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13921 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13922 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13923 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13924 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
13925 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13926 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13927 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13928 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13929 Internet is mainly just an idea.
13930 </para>
13931 <para>
13932 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
13933 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
13934 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
13935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
13936 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
13937 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
13938 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
13939 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
13940 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
13941 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
13942 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
13943 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
13944 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
13945 </para>
13946 <para>
13947 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
13948 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
13949 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
13950 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
13951 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
13952 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
13953 access to content than it will be to download and store content
13954 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
13955 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
13956 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
13957 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
13958 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
13959 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
13960 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
13961 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
13962 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
13963 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
13964 <!-- f8. -->
13965 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
13966 April 2002, available at
13967 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
13968 </para></footnote>
13969
13970 </para>
13971 <para>
13972 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
13973 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
13974 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
13975 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
13976 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
13977 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
13978 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
13979 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
13980 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
13981 artists get paid, during
13982
13983 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
13984 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
13985 and twenty-first-century technologies.
13986 </para>
13987 <para>
13988 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
13989 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
13990 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
13991 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
13992 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
13993 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
13994 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
13995 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
13996 order to eliminate kidnapping.
13997 </para>
13998 <para>
13999 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14000 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14001 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14002 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14003 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14004 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14005 way that returns something to the artist.
14006 </para>
14007 <para>
14008 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14009 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14010 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14011 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14012 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14013 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14014 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14015 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14016 </para>
14017 <para>
14018 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14019 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14020 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14021 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14022 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14023 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14024 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14025 </para>
14026 <para>
14027
14028 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14029 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14030 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14031 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14032 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14033 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14034 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14035 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14036 trade.
14037 </para>
14038 <para>
14039 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14040 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14041 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14042 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14043 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14044 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14045 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14046 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14047 </para>
14048 <para>
14049 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14050 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14051 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14052 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14053 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14054 delivering and accessing content.
14055 </para>
14056 <para>
14057 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14058 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14059 </para>
14060 <para>
14061 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14062 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14063 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14064 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14065 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14066 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14067 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14068 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14069 </para>
14070 <para>
14071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14072 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14073 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14074 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14075 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14076 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14077 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14078 </para>
14079 <para>
14080 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14081 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14082 <para>
14083 <!-- f9. -->
14084 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14085 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14086 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14087 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14088 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14089 2004), ch. 6, available at
14090 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14091 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14092 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14093 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14094 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14095 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14096 Broadband?" <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14097 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14098 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14099 available at
14100 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14101 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14102 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14103 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly," <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14104 2002, available at
14105 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14106 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14107 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14108 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com, 27 August
14109 2002, available at
14110 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14111 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14112 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14113 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14114 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14115 debate by about a decade. See
14116 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14117 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14118 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14119 </para></footnote>
14120 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14121 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14122 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14123 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14124 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14125 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14126 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14127 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14128 tax.
14129 </para>
14130 <para>
14131 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14132 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14133 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14134 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14135 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14136 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14137 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14138 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14139 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14140 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14141 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14142 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14143 controlling access.
14144 </para>
14145 <para>
14146 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14147 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14148 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14149 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14150 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14151 limits on derivative
14152
14153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14154 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14155 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14156 allowed to do with the content itself.
14157 </para>
14158 <para>
14159 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14160 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14161 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14162 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14163 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14164 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14165 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14166 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14167 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14168 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14169 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14170 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14171 on-line.
14172 </para>
14173 <para>
14174 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14175 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14176 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14177 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14178 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14179 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14180 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14181 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with "first class" seats, and meals
14182 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14183 finding ways to compete with "free."
14184 </para>
14185 <para>
14186 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14187 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14188 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14189 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14190 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14191 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14192 the law.
14193 </para>
14194 <para>
14195 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14196 </para>
14197 <para>
14198
14199 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14200 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14201 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14202 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14203 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14204 create.
14205 </para>
14206 <para>
14207 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14208 by
14209 </para>
14210 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14211 <listitem><para>
14212 <!-- 1. -->
14213 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14214 </para></listitem>
14215 <listitem><para>
14216 <!-- 2. -->
14217 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14218 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14219 statute;
14220 </para></listitem>
14221 <listitem><para>
14222 <!-- 3. -->
14223 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14224 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14225 </para></listitem>
14226 </orderedlist>
14227 <para>
14228 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14229 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14230 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14231 something then?
14232 </para>
14233 <para>
14234 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14235 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14236 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14237 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14238 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14239 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14240 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14241 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14242 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14243 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14244 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14245 pirates.
14246 </para>
14247 <para>
14248 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14249 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14250 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14251
14252 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14253 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14254 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14255 </para>
14256 </section>
14257
14258 <section id="firelawyers">
14259 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14260 <para>
14261 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14262 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14263 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14264 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14265 </para>
14266 <para>
14267 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14268 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14269 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14270 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14271 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14272 strong view queers the law.
14273 </para>
14274 <para>
14275 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14276 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14277 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14278 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14279 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14280 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14281 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14282 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14283 <!-- f10. -->
14284 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14285 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14286 </para></footnote>
14287
14288 </para>
14289 <para>
14290 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14291 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14292 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14293 </para>
14294 <para>
14295 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14296 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14297 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14298 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14299 <!-- f11. -->
14300 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14301 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14302 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14303 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14304 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14305 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14306 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14307 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14308 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14309 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June 2003,
14310 available at
14311 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14312 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14313 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14314 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14315 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14316 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14317 </para></footnote>
14318 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14319 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14320 them it works.
14321 </para>
14322 <para>
14323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14324 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14325 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14326 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14327 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14328 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14329 practically never be done.
14330 </para>
14331 <para>
14332 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14333 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14334 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14335 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14336 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14337 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14338 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14339 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14340 </para>
14341 <para>
14342 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14343 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14344 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14345 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14346 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14347 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14348 </para>
14349 <para>
14350 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14351 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14352 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14353 its review.
14354 </para>
14355 <para>
14356 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14357 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14358 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14359 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14360 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14361 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14362 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14363 </para>
14364 <para>
14365 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14366 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14367
14368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14369 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14370 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14371 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14372 </para>
14373 <para>
14374 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14375 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14376 keep your lawyers away.
14377 </para>
14378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14379 </section>
14380 </section>
14381 </chapter>
14382 <chapter id="c-notes">
14383 <title>NOTES</title>
14384 <para>
14385 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14386 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14387 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14388 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14389 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14390 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14391 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14392 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14393 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14394 the material.
14395 </para>
14396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14397
14398 </chapter>
14399 <chapter id="c-acknowledgments">
14400 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14401 <para>
14402 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14403 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14404 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14405 to him that this book is dedicated.
14406 </para>
14407 <para>
14408 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14409 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14410 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14411 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14412 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14413 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14414 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14415 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14416 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14417 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14418 critical eye on much of this.
14419 </para>
14420 <para>
14421 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14422 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14423 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14424 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14425 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14426 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14427 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14428 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14429 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14430 </para>
14431 <para>
14432 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14433 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14434 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14435 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14436 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14437 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14438 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14439 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14440 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14441 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14442 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14443 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14444 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14445 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14446 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14447 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14448 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14449 a bunch of great replies.)
14450 </para>
14451 <para>
14452 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14453 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14454 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14455 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14456 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14457 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14458 throughout this book.
14459 </para>
14460 <para>
14461 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14462 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14463 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14464 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14465 </para>
14466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->
14467
14468 </chapter>
14469 <index></index>
14470 </book>