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20 <title>Free Culture
</title>
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
27 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
29 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
33 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
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41 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
43 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
52 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
58 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
59 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
64 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
70 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.png" width=
"100%" align=
"center"/>
73 <imagedata fileref=
"images/cc.svg" width=
"100%" align=
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76 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
82 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
83 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
84 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
85 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
86 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
91 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
94 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
95 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
96 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
97 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
98 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
99 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
100 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
101 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
102 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
103 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
104 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
105 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
106 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
107 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
112 <!-- testing different ways to tag the cover page -->
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130 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
133 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
135 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 1 -->
143 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
145 <itemizedlist mark=
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146 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
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151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
155 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
158 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
161 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
166 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
169 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
175 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
176 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
177 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
184 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
186 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
190 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
193 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
194 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
195 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
198 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
199 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
202 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
203 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
206 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
210 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
211 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
220 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
224 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
227 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
233 343.7309'
9—dc22
236 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
239 Printed in the United States of America
245 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
253 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
254 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
255 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
256 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
257 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
258 the above publisher of this book.
261 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
262 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
263 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
264 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
265 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
266 author's rights is appreciated.
270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
273 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
281 <title>List of figures
</title>
288 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
289 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
290 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
291 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
296 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
300 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
301 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
302 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
303 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
304 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
305 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
309 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
310 2 Architecture and Law: Force
311 2 Market: Concentration
314 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
315 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
316 2 Constraining Creators
317 2 Constraining Innovators
318 2 Corrupting Citizens
320 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
321 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
325 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
326 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
328 2 1. More Formalities
329 3 Registration and Renewal
332 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
333 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
334 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
342 <preface id=
"preface">
343 <title>PREFACE
</title>
344 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
345 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
348 At the end of his review of my first book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other
349 Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
350 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
354 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
355 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
356 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
357 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
358 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
363 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
364 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
365 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
366 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
367 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
368 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
372 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
373 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
374 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
375 causes even after the modem is turned
376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 12 -->
377 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
378 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
379 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
381 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
383 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
384 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
385 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
386 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
390 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
391 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
392 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
393 free software movement
<footnote>
395 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
396 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
397 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
398 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
399 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
400 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
401 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
402 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
403 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
404 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
405 "permission culture"
—a culture in which creators get to create
406 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
410 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
411 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
412 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
413 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
414 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
415 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
416 culture deem fundamental.
418 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
420 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
421 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
422 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
423 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
424 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
425 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
426 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
427 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
429 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
433 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
434 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
435 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
436 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
437 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
438 "The Great Media Gulp,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
439 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
444 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
445 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
446 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
447 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
448 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
449 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
450 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
451 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
452 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
453 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
454 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
455 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
456 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
457 that this work is "merely" derivative.
460 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
461 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
462 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
463 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
464 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
465 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
466 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
467 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
469 <!-- PAGE BREAK 14 -->
470 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
471 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
472 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
473 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
474 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
478 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
479 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
480 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
481 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
482 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
483 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
484 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
492 <chapter id=
"c-introduction">
493 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
495 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
496 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
497 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
498 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
499 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
500 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
503 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
504 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
505 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
506 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
507 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
508 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
511 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
512 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
513 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
516 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
517 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
518 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
519 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
520 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
521 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
522 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
524 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
525 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
527 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
528 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
529 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
530 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
531 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
532 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
533 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
534 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
535 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
537 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
538 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
540 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
541 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
542 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
543 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
544 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
545 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
546 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
547 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
551 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
552 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
553 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
554 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
555 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
556 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
557 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
558 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
560 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
561 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
562 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
563 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
564 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
565 Authorship,"
<citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
566 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
568 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
569 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
574 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
577 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
578 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
579 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
580 <!-- PAGE BREAK 18 -->
581 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
582 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
583 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
584 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
585 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
587 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
588 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
590 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
591 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
592 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
593 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
594 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
595 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
596 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
597 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
598 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
599 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
600 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
601 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
602 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
603 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
604 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
605 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
608 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
609 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
610 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
611 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
612 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
613 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
614 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
615 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
616 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
617 understanding of radio.
618 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
619 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
620 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
621 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
624 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
625 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
626 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
627 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
628 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
629 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
630 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
631 much less transmitter power and static.
634 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
635 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
636 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
637 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
638 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
639 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
640 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
641 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
642 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
645 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
649 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
650 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
651 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
652 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
653 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
654 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
655 box."
<footnote><para>
656 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
657 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
662 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
663 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
664 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
665 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
666 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
667 a handful of networks.
668 <!-- PAGE BREAK 20 -->
671 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
672 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
673 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
674 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
675 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
676 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
680 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
681 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
682 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
683 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
684 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
685 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
687 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
692 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
693 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
694 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
696 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
700 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
701 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
702 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
703 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
704 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
705 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
710 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
711 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
712 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
713 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
714 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
715 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
716 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
717 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
718 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
719 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
720 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
725 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
726 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
727 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
728 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
733 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
735 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
736 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
737 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
738 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
739 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
740 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
741 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
745 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
746 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
747 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
748 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
749 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
750 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
751 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
752 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
753 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
754 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
757 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
758 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
759 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
760 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
761 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
762 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
763 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
764 course always public spirited; the reality is something
765 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
766 to themselves, would crumble in
767 <!-- PAGE BREAK 22 -->
768 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
769 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
770 effect of technological change.
773 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
774 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
775 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
776 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
777 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
778 before.
<footnote><para>
779 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
780 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
781 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
782 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
784 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
788 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
789 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
790 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
791 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
792 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
793 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
794 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
795 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
796 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
799 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
800 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
801 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
802 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
803 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
804 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
808 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
809 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
810 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
811 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
812 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
815 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
816 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
817 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
818 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
819 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
822 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
823 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
824 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
825 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
826 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
827 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
828 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
829 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
830 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
833 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
834 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
835 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
836 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
837 marketplace.
<footnote>
839 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
840 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
841 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
842 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
843 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
844 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
845 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
847 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
849 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
850 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
851 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
852 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
855 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
856 been erased.
<footnote><para>
857 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
859 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
861 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
862 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
863 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
864 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
865 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
866 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
867 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
868 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
869 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
870 culture, more and more a permission culture.
872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
874 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
875 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
876 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
877 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
878 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
879 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
880 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
881 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
882 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
883 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
887 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
888 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
889 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
890 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
891 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
892 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
893 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
894 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
895 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
896 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
897 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
898 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
899 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
900 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
901 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
902 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
903 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
906 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
907 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
908 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
909 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
910 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
911 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
915 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
916 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
917 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
918 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
919 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
920 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
921 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
922 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
923 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
924 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,"
<citetitle>New York
925 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
926 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
927 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
928 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
932 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
933 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
934 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
935 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
936 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
940 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
941 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
942 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
943 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
946 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
947 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
948 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
949 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
950 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
952 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"
<citetitle>Yale Law
953 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
954 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
956 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
957 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
958 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
959 could cultivate and extend our culture.
962 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
963 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
964 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
965 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
966 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
967 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
968 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
969 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
970 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
974 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
975 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
976 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
977 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
978 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
982 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
983 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
984 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
985 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
986 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
987 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
988 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
990 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
991 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
993 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
994 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
995 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
996 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
997 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
998 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
999 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1000 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1001 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1002 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1003 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
1004 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1007 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1008 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1010 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1011 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1012 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1013 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 27 -->
1016 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1020 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1021 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1022 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1023 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1024 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
1025 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1026 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1027 accepted as it is now.
1030 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1031 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1032 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1033 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1036 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1037 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1040 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1041 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1042 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1043 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1044 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1047 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1048 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1049 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1050 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1053 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1054 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1056 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1057 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1058 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1059 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1060 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1061 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1062 this silliness will be much more profound.
1063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1066 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1067 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1071 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1072 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1073 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1074 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1075 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1076 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1079 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1080 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1081 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1082 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1083 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1084 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1085 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1086 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1087 fundamental about who we have always been.
1090 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1091 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1092 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1093 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1094 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1095 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1099 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1100 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1102 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1103 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1104 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1107 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1108 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1109 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1110 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1111 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1115 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1116 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1117 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1119 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1122 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1125 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1126 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1127 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1128 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1129 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1130 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1134 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1135 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1136 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1137 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1138 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1142 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1143 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1144 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1145 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1146 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1147 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1150 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1151 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1152 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1153 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1156 The idea goes something like this:
1160 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1161 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1162 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1163 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1164 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1168 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1170 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1171 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1172 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1174 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1175 in the Pepsi Generation,"
<citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1177 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1178 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1179 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1180 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1182 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1183 Up,"
<citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1184 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1185 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1186 Speech, No One Wins,"
<citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1187 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1189 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1190 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1192 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1194 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1195 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1196 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1197 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1198 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1199 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1202 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1203 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1204 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1205 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1206 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1209 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1210 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1211 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1212 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1213 copyright law today regulates both.
1216 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1217 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1218 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1219 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1220 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1221 more expense of doing business.
1223 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1225 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1226 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1227 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1228 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1229 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1230 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1231 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1232 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1233 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1234 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1235 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1236 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1237 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1238 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1239 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1240 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1241 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative Class."
<footnote>
1244 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
2002),
1245 Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of labor toward a
1246 labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't directly address the
1247 legal conditions under which that creativity is enabled or stifled. I
1248 certainly agree with him about the importance and significance of this
1249 change, but I also believe the conditions under which it will be
1250 enabled are much more tenuous.
1251 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1253 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1254 this creative class.
1257 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1258 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1259 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1264 <chapter id=
"creators">
1265 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1267 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1268 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1269 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1270 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1271 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1274 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1275 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1276 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1277 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1278 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1279 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1283 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1284 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1285 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1286 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1290 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1291 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1292 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1293 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1294 synchronization was pretty close.
1297 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1298 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1299 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1300 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1301 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1303 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1304 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1309 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1310 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1311 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1312 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1315 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1316 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1317 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1318 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1319 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1320 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1321 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1324 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1325 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1326 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1327 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1330 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1331 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1332 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1333 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1334 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1335 and among the best of its genre.
1338 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1341 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1342 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1344 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1345 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1346 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1347 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1348 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1349 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1350 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1351 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1353 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1354 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1355 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1356 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1357 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1361 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1362 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1363 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1365 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1366 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1367 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1369 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1370 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1371 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1372 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1373 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1374 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1375 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1376 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1380 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1381 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1382 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1383 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1384 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1385 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1386 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1389 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1390 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1391 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1392 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1393 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1394 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1395 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1396 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1397 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1398 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1399 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1400 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1401 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1402 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1403 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1404 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1405 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1406 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1407 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1408 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1411 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1412 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1413 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1414 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1415 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1416 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1417 culture around us and makes it something different.
1419 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1420 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1421 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1422 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1423 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1425 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1426 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1428 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1429 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1430 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1432 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1433 Web site associated with this book, available at
1434 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1436 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1437 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1438 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1439 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1442 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1443 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1444 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1445 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1446 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1447 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1448 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1451 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1452 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1453 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1454 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1457 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1458 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1459 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1460 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1461 content from before the Great Depression.
1464 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1465 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1466 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1470 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1471 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1472 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1473 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1474 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1475 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1476 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1479 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1480 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1481 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1482 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1483 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1484 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1485 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1486 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1487 interestingly different way.
1490 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1491 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1492 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1495 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1496 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1497 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1498 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1499 transforming it either subtly or
1500 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1501 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1502 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1503 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1504 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1505 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1506 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1507 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1510 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1511 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1512 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1513 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1514 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1515 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1516 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1517 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1518 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1521 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1522 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1523 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1524 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1525 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1526 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1527 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1528 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1529 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1530 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1531 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1532 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1534 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1535 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1538 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1539 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1540 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1541 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1542 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1544 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1545 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1546 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1548 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1549 York: Perennial,
2000).
1553 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1554 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1555 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1556 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1557 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1558 which are fifty years old."
1560 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1562 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1563 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1564 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1565 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1566 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1567 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1568 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1570 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1571 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?"
<citetitle>Rutgers Law
1572 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
"[T]here might be a collective economic
1573 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1574 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1575 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1576 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1577 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1581 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1582 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1583 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1584 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1585 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1586 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1587 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1588 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1592 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1593 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1594 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1595 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1596 to prosecute cases like this."
1599 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1600 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1601 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1602 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1604 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1605 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1606 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1607 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1608 their clients or hurt them?
1609 Let's pause for a moment.
1612 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1613 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1614 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1617 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1618 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1619 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1620 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1622 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1623 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1624 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1625 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1626 describes a set of "property" rights
—copyright, patents,
1627 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1629 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1631 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1632 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1636 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1637 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1638 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1639 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1640 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1641 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1642 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1643 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1644 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1645 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1646 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1647 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1651 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1652 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1653 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1656 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1660 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1661 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1662 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1663 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1664 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1665 form, whether large or small.
1668 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1669 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1670 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1671 particular find it hard to say why.
1674 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1675 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1676 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1677 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1678 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1679 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1680 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1681 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1682 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1683 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1684 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1685 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1688 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1689 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1690 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1691 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1692 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1693 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1694 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1695 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1699 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1700 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1701 question instead is "
<emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1702 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1703 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1704 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1705 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1706 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1707 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1711 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1712 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1713 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1716 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1718 <chapter id=
"mere-copyists">
1719 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1720 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1721 <primary>photography
</primary>
1724 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1725 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1726 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1727 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1728 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1729 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1730 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1731 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1734 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1735 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1736 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1737 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1738 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1739 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1740 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1741 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1743 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1745 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1746 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1749 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1750 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1751 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1752 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1753 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1754 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1755 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1756 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1757 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1758 population of photographers.
1761 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1762 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1763 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1764 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1766 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1767 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1768 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1772 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1773 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1774 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1775 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1776 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1777 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1778 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1779 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1780 chemicals.
<footnote>
1783 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1785 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1790 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1791 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1792 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1793 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1794 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1795 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1796 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1797 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1798 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1799 percent.
<footnote><para>
1802 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1803 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1805 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1808 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1811 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1812 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1813 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1814 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1815 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1816 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1817 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1818 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1819 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1820 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1821 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1827 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1828 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1829 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1830 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1831 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1832 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1833 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1834 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1835 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1836 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1840 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1841 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1842 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1843 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1844 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1845 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1846 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1847 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1849 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1850 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1851 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1852 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1857 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1858 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1859 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1860 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1861 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1864 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1865 that they thought valuable.
1867 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1869 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1870 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1871 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1872 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1873 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1876 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1877 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1878 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1879 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1880 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1881 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1882 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1883 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1886 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1887 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1888 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1889 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1890 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1891 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1892 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1893 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1894 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1896 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity,"
<citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1897 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
"Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1898 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1899 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1904 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1905 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1906 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1907 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1908 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1909 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1910 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1911 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1912 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1913 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1914 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1915 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1916 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1921 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1922 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1923 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1924 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1925 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1926 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1927 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1928 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1929 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1930 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1931 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1932 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1933 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1934 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1935 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1936 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1937 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1938 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1939 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1940 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1941 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1942 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1945 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1946 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1948 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1949 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1950 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1951 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1952 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1954 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1955 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1956 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1957 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1959 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1960 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1961 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1962 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1965 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1966 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1967 Think!, puts it, "is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
1968 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1969 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1970 the way people access it."
1971 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1974 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1975 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1976 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1980 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1981 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1982 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1984 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1985 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
1986 Study,"
<citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
1988 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
1989 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
1990 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
1991 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
1992 (at least at first) terrible media.
1995 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
1996 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
1997 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
1998 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
1999 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2000 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2001 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2002 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2005 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2006 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2007 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2008 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2009 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2010 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2012 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2014 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2015 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2016 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2018 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2019 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2020 about "the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2024 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2026 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2027 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2029 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2030 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2031 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2032 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2033 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2034 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2035 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2036 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2038 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
2039 November
2000, available at
2040 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
2042 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2045 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2047 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2048 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2049 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2050 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2051 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2054 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2055 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2056 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2057 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2061 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2062 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2063 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2064 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2069 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2070 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2074 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2075 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2076 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2077 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2079 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2080 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2081 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2085 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2086 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2087 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2088 language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2093 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2095 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2096 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2097 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2098 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2099 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2100 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2101 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2102 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2103 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2104 students know something about
—gun violence.
2107 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2108 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2109 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2110 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2111 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2112 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2115 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2116 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2117 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2118 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2119 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2120 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2121 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2122 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2123 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2124 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2125 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2126 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2127 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2128 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2129 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2133 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2134 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2135 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2136 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2137 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2138 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2139 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2140 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2145 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2146 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2147 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2148 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2149 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2150 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2151 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2152 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2153 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2154 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2155 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2156 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2157 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2158 camera and
… saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2159 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2160 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2161 about the topic.
…
2164 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2165 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2166 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2167 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2168 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2171 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2172 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2173 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2175 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2176 had a lot of power with this language."
2180 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2181 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2182 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2183 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2184 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2185 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2186 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2187 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2188 world would be watching.
2191 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2192 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2193 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2194 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2195 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2196 entertainment is tragedy.
2198 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2199 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2201 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2202 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2203 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2204 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2205 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2206 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2207 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2208 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2209 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2210 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2211 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2212 was also the Internet.
2215 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2216 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2217 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2218 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2221 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2225 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2226 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2227 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2228 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2229 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2230 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2231 spread practically instantaneously.
2234 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2235 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2236 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2237 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2238 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2239 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2240 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2243 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2244 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2245 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2246 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2247 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2248 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2249 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2250 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2251 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2252 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2253 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2254 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2257 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2258 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2259 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2260 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2261 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2263 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2264 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2265 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2268 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2269 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2270 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2271 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2272 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2273 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2274 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2275 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2276 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2277 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2278 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2279 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2280 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2281 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2283 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2284 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2288 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2289 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2290 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2292 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day,"
<citetitle>Journal of
2293 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2295 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2296 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2297 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2300 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2301 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2302 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2303 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2304 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2305 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2307 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2308 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2309 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2310 little beyond what our friends say.
2313 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2314 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2315 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2316 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2317 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2320 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2324 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2325 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2326 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2327 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2328 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2329 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2332 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2333 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2334 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2335 is having an effect.
2336 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2339 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2340 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2341 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2342 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2343 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2344 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2345 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2346 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2347 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2348 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2350 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2351 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2353 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2356 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2357 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2358 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2359 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2363 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2364 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2365 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2366 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2367 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2368 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2369 peer-generated rankings.
2371 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2372 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2375 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2377 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2378 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2379 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2380 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2381 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2382 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2383 get it out of the way."
2385 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2387 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2388 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2389 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2390 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2391 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2393 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2395 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2396 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2397 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2398 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2399 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2400 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2401 told her
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> they were writing "the story.")
2403 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2404 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2405 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2406 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2407 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2408 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2409 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2411 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2412 Information Online,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2413 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2414 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2415 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2417 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2418 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2419 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2420 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2423 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2424 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2425 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2426 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2427 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2430 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
<citetitle>New
2431 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2432 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2433 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2434 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2435 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2436 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2437 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2438 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2440 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2442 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2443 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2444 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2445 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2446 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2447 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2450 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2451 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2452 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2453 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2454 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2455 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2456 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2457 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2458 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2459 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2460 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2461 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2462 extraordinary to report.
2464 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2465 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2466 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2469 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2470 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and
… the
2471 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation."
2474 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2475 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2476 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2477 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2481 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2482 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2483 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2484 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2485 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2486 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2487 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2488 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2489 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2490 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2491 the tinkering of many others.
2494 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2495 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2496 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2497 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2498 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2501 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2502 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2503 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2504 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2505 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2506 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2509 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2510 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2511 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2512 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2513 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2514 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2518 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2519 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2520 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2521 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2522 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2523 text. "The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2524 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2525 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2526 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2528 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2530 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2531 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2533 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2534 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2535 kind of recognition.
2538 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2539 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2540 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2541 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2542 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2543 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2544 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2547 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2548 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2549 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2550 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2551 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2552 general.
<footnote><para>
2554 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2555 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
<citetitle>Communications
2556 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2558 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2559 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2562 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2563 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2567 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2568 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2569 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2570 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2571 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2573 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2575 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2576 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2577 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2578 the law to close down that technology.
2581 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2582 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2583 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2585 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2587 <chapter id=
"catalogs">
2588 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2590 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2591 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2592 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2593 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2594 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2597 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2598 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2599 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2600 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2601 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2602 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2605 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2606 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2607 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2608 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2609 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2612 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2613 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2614 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2615 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2616 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2617 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2618 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2619 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2620 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2621 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2624 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2625 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2626 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2627 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2628 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2629 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2630 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2633 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2634 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2635 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2636 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2637 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2638 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2639 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2640 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2641 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2645 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2646 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2647 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2648 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2649 be on users' computers.
2652 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2653 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2654 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2655 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2657 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2661 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2662 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2663 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2664 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2665 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2666 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2667 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2668 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2669 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2670 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2671 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2672 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2676 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2677 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2678 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2679 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2680 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2681 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2682 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2685 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2686 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2687 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2688 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2689 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2690 easier to use"
—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2691 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2692 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2693 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2694 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2698 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2699 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2700 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2701 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2702 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2703 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2704 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2705 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2706 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2709 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2710 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2711 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2712 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2713 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2714 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2715 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2716 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2717 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2718 2001.
<footnote><para>
2721 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2722 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,"
<citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2723 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2727 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2728 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2729 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2730 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2731 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2734 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2735 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2736 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2737 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2738 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2739 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2740 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2741 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2742 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2745 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2746 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2747 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2748 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2749 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2751 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2752 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2755 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2756 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2759 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2760 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2761 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2762 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2763 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2764 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2765 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2767 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2768 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2769 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2771 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2772 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2773 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2775 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2776 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2780 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2781 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2782 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2787 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2788 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2789 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2790 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2794 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2795 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2796 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2797 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2798 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2802 <chapter id=
"pirates">
2803 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2805 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2806 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2807 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2808 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2809 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2810 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2815 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2817 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2818 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2819 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2820 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2822 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2823 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2824 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2825 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2826 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2827 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2828 this creative property
2829 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2830 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2833 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2837 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2838 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2839 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2840 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2841 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2842 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2843 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2846 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2847 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2848 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2849 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2850 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2851 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2852 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2853 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2854 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2855 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2857 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2858 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2859 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2860 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2861 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2862 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2863 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2864 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2865 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2866 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2867 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2868 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2869 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2870 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2874 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2875 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2876 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2877 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2878 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2880 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios,"
<citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2881 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2883 That led the independents to flee the East
2884 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2885 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2886 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2890 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2891 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2892 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2895 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2896 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2897 Edison's creative property.
2900 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2901 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2903 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2904 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2906 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2907 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2910 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2911 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2912 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2913 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2914 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2915 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2916 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2917 right to perform it publicly.
2919 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2921 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2922 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2923 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2924 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2925 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2926 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2927 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2928 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2929 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2930 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2931 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2932 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2933 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2934 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2935 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2936 its composer anything.
2938 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
2940 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2942 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2944 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2948 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2949 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2950 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2951 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2952 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2953 rights.
<footnote><para>
2955 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2956 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2957 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2958 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
2959 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2960 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2961 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2966 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2967 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2968 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2970 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2971 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2973 and the "music publishing industry"
2974 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2976 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2977 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2980 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
2981 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
2983 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
2984 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
2988 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
2989 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
2990 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
2991 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
2992 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
2993 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
2996 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
2997 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
2998 Perforating Company of New York).
2999 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3000 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3001 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
3002 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3003 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3004 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3005 statute."
<footnote><para>
3007 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3008 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3009 Graphophone Company Association).
3011 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3014 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3015 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3016 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
3017 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3018 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3019 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3020 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3021 recorded once. This is the part of
3023 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3024 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3025 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3026 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3029 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
3030 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
3031 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3032 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3033 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3034 the fee set by the statute.
3037 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3038 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3039 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3040 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3041 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3042 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3044 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3047 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3048 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3049 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3050 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3051 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3052 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3053 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3054 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3055 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3056 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3057 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3058 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3061 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3062 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3063 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3064 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3065 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3067 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3070 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3071 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3072 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3077 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3078 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3079 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3080 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3081 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3082 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3083 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3084 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3085 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3086 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3087 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3088 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3089 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3090 choice.
<footnote><para>
3092 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3093 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3094 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3095 this report.
</para></footnote>
3099 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3100 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3103 <section id=
"radio">
3104 <title>Radio
</title>
3106 Radio was also born of piracy.
3109 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3110 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3112 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3113 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3114 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3115 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3116 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3117 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3118 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3119 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3120 Copyright,"
<citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3121 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3122 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3124 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3125 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3126 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3129 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3130 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3131 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3132 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3133 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3134 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3135 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3136 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3137 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3139 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3144 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3145 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3146 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3147 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3148 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3149 of playing the song.
3151 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3152 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3155 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3156 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3157 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3158 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3161 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3162 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3163 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3164 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3165 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3166 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3167 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3170 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3172 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3173 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3174 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3175 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3176 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3177 to take something for nothing.
3180 <section id=
"cabletv">
3181 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3184 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3187 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3188 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3189 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3190 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3191 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3192 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3193 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3194 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3197 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3198 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3200 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3201 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3202 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3204 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3205 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3206 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3207 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3210 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3211 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3212 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3213 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3215 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3216 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3218 As another broadcaster put it,
3222 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3223 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3224 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3226 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3227 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3232 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3236 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3237 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3238 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3239 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3241 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3242 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3243 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3248 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3249 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3250 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3252 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3253 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3257 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3258 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3262 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3263 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3264 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3265 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3268 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3269 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3271 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3272 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3273 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3275 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3279 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3280 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3283 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3284 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3285 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3286 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3287 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3288 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3289 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3290 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3291 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3292 created by broadcasters' content.
3295 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3296 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3297 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3298 today
<footnote><para>
3300 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3301 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3302 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3303 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3304 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3305 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3307 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3308 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3309 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3310 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3311 last. Every generation
—until now.
3313 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3316 <chapter id=
"piracy">
3317 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3319 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3320 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3321 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3322 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3323 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3327 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3328 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3329 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3330 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3331 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3332 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3333 has so often done in the past.
3334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3336 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3337 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3339 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3340 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3341 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3342 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3343 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3345 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3346 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3347 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3348 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
<citetitle>Financial
3349 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3351 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3352 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3355 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3356 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3357 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3358 This piracy is wrong.
3361 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3362 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3363 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3364 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3365 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3366 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3367 of our existence, treated as right.
3370 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3371 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3372 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3373 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3374 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3375 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3376 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3377 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3378 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3381 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3382 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3383 <!-- PAGE BREAK 77 -->
3384 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3385 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3389 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3390 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3391 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3392 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3394 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
<citetitle>Who
3395 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
10–13,
3396 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
3397 (TRIPS) agreement obligates member nations to create administrative
3398 and enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, a costly
3399 proposition for developing countries. Additionally, patent rights may
3400 lead to higher prices for staple industries such as
3401 agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the disparity between burdens
3402 imposed upon developing countries and benefits conferred to
3403 industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit governments to use patents
3404 for public, noncommercial uses without first obtaining the patent
3405 holder's permission. Developing nations may be able to use this to
3406 gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower prices. This is a
3407 promising strategy for developing nations within the TRIPS framework.
3408 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3409 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3410 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3411 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3415 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3416 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3417 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3418 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3419 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3421 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3422 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3423 144–90. "In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3424 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3425 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3426 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3427 pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3428 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3432 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3433 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3434 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3435 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3436 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3437 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3438 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3439 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3440 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3441 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3442 piracy of the tangible.
3445 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3446 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3447 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3448 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3449 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3450 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3451 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3452 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3453 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3455 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3456 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3457 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3458 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3459 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3460 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3463 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3464 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3465 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3466 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3467 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3468 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3469 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3470 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3471 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3472 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3473 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3474 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3475 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3477 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3478 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3480 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3483 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3484 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3485 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3486 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3487 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3488 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3491 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3492 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3493 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3494 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3495 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3496 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3497 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3498 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3499 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3500 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3501 violating the law is still wrong.
3502 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3503 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3504 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3505 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3509 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3510 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3511 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3512 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3513 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3514 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3515 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3519 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3520 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3521 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3522 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3523 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3524 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3525 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3528 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3529 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3530 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3531 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3534 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3535 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3536 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3537 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3540 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3541 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3545 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3546 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3548 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3549 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3551 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3553 This means we must determine whether
3554 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3556 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3557 author of his profit.
3560 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3561 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3562 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3563 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3565 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3566 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3567 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3568 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3569 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3570 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3571 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3572 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3574 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3575 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3576 put together components that had been developed independently.
3577 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3580 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3581 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3582 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3583 system.
<footnote><para>
3585 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
<citetitle>San
3586 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3587 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3588 Secures New Financing,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3589 "Napster's Wake-Up Call,"
<citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3590 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3592 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3593 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3594 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3595 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3596 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3597 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3598 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3601 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3602 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3603 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3604 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3607 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3608 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3609 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3610 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3612 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3613 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3614 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3616 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,"
<citetitle>New
3617 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3619 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3620 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3621 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3622 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3625 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3626 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3627 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3628 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3629 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3630 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3634 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3635 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3636 different kinds into four types.
3638 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3641 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3642 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3643 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3644 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3645 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3646 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3647 users who download instead of purchasing.
3648 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3652 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3653 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3654 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3655 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3656 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3657 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3658 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3663 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3664 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3665 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3666 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3667 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3668 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3669 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3670 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3671 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3672 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3673 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3674 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3680 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3681 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3686 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3689 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3690 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3691 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3692 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3694 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3695 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3697 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3698 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3699 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3700 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3701 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3702 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3705 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3706 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3707 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3708 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3709 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3710 "devastating" the industry.
3713 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3714 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3715 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3716 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3717 & Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3718 technology, the labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3720 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3721 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3722 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3723 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3724 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3725 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3726 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3727 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3728 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3729 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3730 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3731 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3732 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3733 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3734 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3735 regulating technology was the answer.
3738 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3739 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3740 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis'
… was
3741 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3743 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3744 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3746 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3750 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3751 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3752 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3753 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3754 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3755 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3756 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3757 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3760 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3761 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3762 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3763 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3764 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3765 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3766 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3771 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3772 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3773 actually suggest it might be close.
3776 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3777 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3778 percent.
<footnote><para>
3780 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3782 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3783 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3784 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3785 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3786 #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3787 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3788 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3789 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3790 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3791 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3792 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3795 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3796 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3797 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3798 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3799 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3800 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3801 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3804 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3805 February
2003, available at
3806 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3807 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3810 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3811 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes, "The
3812 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3813 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3814 $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3821 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3822 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3823 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3824 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3825 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3826 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3827 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3830 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3831 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3832 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3833 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own numbers
3834 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3835 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3836 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3837 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3838 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry
3839 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3840 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3841 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3842 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3845 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3846 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3847 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3851 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3852 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3853 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3854 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3855 available.
<footnote><para>
3857 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3858 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3859 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3860 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3861 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3862 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3864 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3865 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3866 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3867 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3868 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3871 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3872 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3873 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3874 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3875 today.
<footnote><para>
3877 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3878 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3879 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3880 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3881 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3883 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3886 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3888 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3889 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3890 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3891 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3892 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3893 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3894 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3895 the content they sell.
3897 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3899 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3900 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3901 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3902 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3903 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3904 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3905 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3906 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3907 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3908 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3909 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3912 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3913 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3914 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3915 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3916 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3920 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3921 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3922 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3923 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3924 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
3925 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3927 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3928 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3929 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3930 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3931 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3932 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3933 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3937 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3938 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3939 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3940 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3943 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3944 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3945 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3946 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3950 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3951 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3952 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3953 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
3954 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3955 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3956 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3957 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3958 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3959 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3960 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3961 found only with time.
3964 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3965 just what you call type A sharing?"
3968 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3970 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3971 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
3973 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
3975 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
3976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
3977 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
3978 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
3979 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
3981 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
3982 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
3985 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
3986 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
3987 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
3988 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
3992 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
3993 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
3994 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
3995 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
3996 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
3997 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
3998 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
3999 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4000 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4003 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4004 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4005 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4006 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4007 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4008 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4009 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4012 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
4013 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4014 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4015 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4016 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4017 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4018 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
4019 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4020 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4024 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4025 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4026 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4027 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4028 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4033 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4034 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4035 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4036 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4037 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4038 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4039 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4040 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4041 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4042 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4043 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4044 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4045 Congress chose a path that would assure
4046 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4047 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4049 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4051 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4052 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4053 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4054 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4055 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4056 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4057 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4058 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4059 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4060 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4061 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4064 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4065 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4066 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4067 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4068 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4069 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4070 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4071 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4072 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4073 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4074 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4075 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4076 for the architecture it chose.
4079 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4080 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4081 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4082 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4083 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4084 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4086 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4087 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4088 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4089 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4091 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4092 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4093 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4094 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4095 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4096 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4098 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4100 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4101 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4103 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4106 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4107 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4108 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4109 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4110 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4111 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4112 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4114 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4119 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4120 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4121 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4122 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4123 Circuit"
—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4124 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4125 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4126 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4127 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4128 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4129 technology.
<footnote><para>
4131 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4134 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4137 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4139 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4140 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4141 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4146 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4147 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4149 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4151 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4152 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4154 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4156 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4161 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4162 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4163 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4164 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4165 together, a pattern is clear:
4168 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4169 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4173 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4174 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4175 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4180 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4181 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4182 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4183 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4186 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4187 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4189 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4192 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4193 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4194 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4195 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4199 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4200 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4201 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4208 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4209 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4211 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4212 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4213 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4214 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4215 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4216 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4217 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4218 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4219 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4220 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4221 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4223 In each case, throughout our history,
4224 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4228 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4229 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4230 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4231 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4232 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4233 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4234 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4235 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4240 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4241 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4242 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4243 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4244 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4246 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4247 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4248 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4249 permission to record a song?
4252 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4253 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4254 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4255 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4257 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4260 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4261 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4262 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4263 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4264 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4265 facilitate the distribution of content.
4268 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4269 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4270 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4271 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4272 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4273 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4274 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4275 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4276 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4277 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4278 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4279 public interest that innovation continue.
4283 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4284 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4285 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4286 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4287 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4288 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4289 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4290 fight."
<footnote><para>
4292 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4293 Echoes Past Efforts,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4295 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4296 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4297 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4298 warriors insist, "is our
<emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we
4299 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4300 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4301 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4302 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4306 "It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4307 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4313 <part id=
"c-property">
4314 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4318 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4319 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4320 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4321 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4322 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4323 the price she can get.
4326 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4327 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4328 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4329 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4330 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4331 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4332 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4333 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4334 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4338 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4339 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4340 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4341 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4343 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4344 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4345 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4346 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4347 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4348 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4349 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4351 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4352 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4353 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4357 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4358 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4359 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4361 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4365 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4366 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4367 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4368 "property" in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4370 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4371 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4372 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4373 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4374 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4375 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4376 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4380 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4381 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4382 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4383 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4384 these stories, the significance of this true
4385 statement
—"copyright material is property"
— will be a bit
4386 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4387 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4391 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4392 <chapter id=
"founders">
4393 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4395 William Shakespeare wrote
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play
4396 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4397 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4398 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4399 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4400 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4401 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4402 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4403 is so full of clichés."
4406 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4407 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4408 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4410 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4411 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4412 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4413 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4414 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4415 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4416 Bookseller,"
<citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4418 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4419 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4421 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4422 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4424 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4425 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4426 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4428 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4429 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4430 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4431 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4434 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4435 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4436 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4437 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4438 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4439 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4440 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4441 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4443 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4444 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4445 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4446 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4447 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4448 Tonson's control in
1774?
4451 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4452 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4453 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4454 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4455 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4456 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4457 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4458 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4460 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4463 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4464 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4465 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4466 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4467 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4468 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4469 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4470 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4471 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4472 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4475 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4476 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4477 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4478 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4480 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4481 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4482 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4484 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4487 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4488 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4489 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4490 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4491 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4492 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4496 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4497 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4498 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4499 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4502 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4503 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4504 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4505 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4506 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4507 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4508 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4509 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4510 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4513 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4514 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4515 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4519 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4520 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4521 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4522 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4523 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4524 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4525 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4528 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4529 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4530 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4531 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4534 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4535 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4536 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4538 of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4540 for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4541 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4542 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive right
4543 to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4546 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4547 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4549 "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had fought
4550 a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4551 monopolies
—especially
4552 monopolies for works that already existed. King Henry
4553 VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a monopoly to Darcy to
4554 print playing cards. The English Parliament began to fight back
4555 against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the Statute of
4557 limiting monopolies to patents for new inventions. And by
4558 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing monopoly in
4562 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was
4564 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing
4565 the claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4566 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4567 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but only
4568 so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4570 favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4573 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4574 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4575 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4576 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4577 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4579 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4580 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4581 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4582 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4583 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4584 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4585 indetted."
<footnote><para>
4588 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4589 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4593 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4594 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4595 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4596 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4597 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4601 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4602 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4603 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4604 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4605 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4606 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4608 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4609 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4610 construction and spread of culture.
4613 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4614 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4615 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4616 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4617 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4618 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4619 they said; they needed more time.
4622 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4623 words that echo today,
4627 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4628 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4630 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4631 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4632 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4633 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4634 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4635 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4637 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4638 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4639 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4640 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4641 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4642 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4643 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4648 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4649 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4650 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4651 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4652 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4653 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4654 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4655 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4656 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4657 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4658 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4659 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4660 way to protect authors.
4663 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4664 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4665 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4666 "The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4667 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4669 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
<citetitle>Vanderbilt
4670 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4671 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4672 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4674 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4675 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4678 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4679 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4680 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4682 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4683 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4687 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4688 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4689 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4690 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4692 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4695 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4696 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4697 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4698 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4699 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4700 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4704 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4705 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4708 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4709 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4710 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4711 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4712 Property."
<footnote><para>
4714 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4717 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4718 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4719 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4722 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4723 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4724 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4727 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4728 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4729 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4730 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4731 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4732 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4734 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4735 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,"
<citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4739 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4740 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4743 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4744 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4745 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4746 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4747 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4748 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4749 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4750 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4751 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4754 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4755 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4756 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4757 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4758 with in
1710: How best to limit
4759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4760 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4761 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4762 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4763 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4764 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4765 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4767 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4769 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4770 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4772 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4774 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4775 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4776 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4780 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4781 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4782 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4783 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4784 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4785 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4788 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4789 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4790 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4791 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4792 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4793 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4794 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4795 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4798 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4799 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4800 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4801 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4802 House of Lords generally voted.
4805 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4806 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4808 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4809 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4810 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4811 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4812 passed into the public domain.
4815 "The public domain." Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4816 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4817 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4818 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4819 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4820 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4821 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4822 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4823 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4824 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4825 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4826 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4827 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4830 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4831 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4832 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4833 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4834 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4835 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4836 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4837 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4838 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4844 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4845 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4850 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4851 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4852 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4853 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4854 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4855 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4856 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4857 successors.
<footnote><para>
4864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4865 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4866 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4867 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4868 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4869 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4870 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4871 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4872 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4873 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4874 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4875 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4876 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4877 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4878 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4879 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4880 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4881 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4882 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4883 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4886 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4887 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4888 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4891 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4893 <chapter id=
"recorders">
4894 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4896 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4897 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4898 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4899 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4903 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4904 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4908 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4909 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4910 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4911 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4912 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4914 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4917 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4918 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4919 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4920 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
4921 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4922 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4926 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4927 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
4928 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4929 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4930 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4933 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4934 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4935 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4936 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4937 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4938 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4941 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4942 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4943 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4944 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4945 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4946 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4949 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4950 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4951 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4952 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4953 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
4954 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4957 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4958 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4959 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here.
… We're
4960 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4961 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4962 confirm what he had been told.
4965 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4966 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4967 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4970 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4971 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4972 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4973 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
4977 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
4978 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
4979 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
4980 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
4981 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
4982 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
4983 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4984 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
4987 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
4988 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
4989 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
4990 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
4991 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
4992 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
4993 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
4994 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
4995 says the owner gets to control.
4998 For example, "public performance" is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
4999 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5000 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
5001 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
5002 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5003 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5007 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5008 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
5010 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
5011 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
5012 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5013 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5014 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5016 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5017 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>—and fair use does
5018 not require the permission of anyone.
5021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5022 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use.
" Here's his reply:
5026 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5027 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5028 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5029 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
5030 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5031 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5033 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5036 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5037 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5038 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5039 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5040 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5044 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5045 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5046 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5047 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5048 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5049 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5050 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5051 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5053 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5057 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5058 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5059 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5060 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5061 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5062 pockets, me or them.
5063 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5067 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5068 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5074 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5075 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5076 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5077 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5078 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5079 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5082 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5083 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5084 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5085 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5090 <chapter id=
"transformers">
5091 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5092 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5093 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5095 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5096 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5097 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5098 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5099 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5101 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5103 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5104 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5105 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5106 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5107 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5108 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5109 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5110 important to his career.
5112 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5114 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5115 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5116 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5117 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5120 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5121 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5122 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5123 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5124 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5125 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5127 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5129 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5130 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5131 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5132 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5133 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5136 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5138 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5139 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5141 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5143 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5144 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5145 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5149 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5150 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5151 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5152 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5154 <primary>artists
</primary>
5155 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5160 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5161 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5162 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5163 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5164 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5167 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5168 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5169 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5173 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5174 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5175 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5176 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5177 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5178 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5182 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5183 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5184 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5185 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5186 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5187 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5188 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5189 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5190 started calling people.
5193 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5195 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5196 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5197 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5198 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5199 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5200 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5201 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5202 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5206 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—"and even then we
5207 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5209 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5211 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5212 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5213 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5217 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5218 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5219 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5220 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5221 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5222 directors,
… this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5223 systematically and cleared the rights.
5228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5229 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5230 loved it, and it sold very well.
5232 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5233 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5235 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5236 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5237 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5238 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5239 at all."
<footnote><para>
5241 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5242 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5243 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5245 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5249 For, as he acknowledged, "very few
… have the time and resources,
5250 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5251 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5252 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5253 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5257 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5258 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5259 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5260 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5261 compensated for that.
5265 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5266 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5267 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5268 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5269 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5270 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5271 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5272 made to be more clean?
5276 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5277 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5278 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5279 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5280 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5281 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5282 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5283 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5284 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5285 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5286 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5287 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5288 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5289 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5290 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5291 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5292 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5295 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5297 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5298 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5299 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5300 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5301 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5302 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5303 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5304 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5305 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5306 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5307 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5308 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5309 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5310 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5311 "Does this still make sense?"
5314 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5315 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5316 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5317 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5320 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5321 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5324 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5325 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5326 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5327 judges loved every minute of it.
5329 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5331 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5332 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5333 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5334 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5335 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5336 were just violated in this room?"
5338 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5340 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5341 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5342 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5343 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5344 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5345 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5346 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5347 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5348 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5349 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5350 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5351 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5352 couldn't easily do them legally.
5355 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5356 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5357 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5358 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5359 planted in your presentation.
5362 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5363 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5364 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5365 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5366 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5367 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5368 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5369 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5370 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5371 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5374 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5375 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5376 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5377 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5378 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5381 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5382 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5383 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5384 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5385 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5386 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5387 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5388 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5389 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5390 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5391 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5392 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5396 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5397 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5398 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5399 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5402 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5403 Myers, the comic genius of
<citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5405 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5406 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5407 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5408 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5409 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5410 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5414 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5415 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5416 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5417 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5418 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5419 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5420 new audiences, it is Mike."
5423 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5424 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5425 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5426 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5427 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5428 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5429 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5430 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5433 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5434 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5435 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5436 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5437 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5438 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5439 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5440 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5441 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5442 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5443 curse, reserved for the few.
5445 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5447 <chapter id=
"collectors">
5448 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5450 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5451 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5452 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5453 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5454 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5455 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5456 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5459 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5460 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5461 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5462 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5463 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5464 well as when those pages changed.
5467 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5468 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5469 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5470 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5475 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5476 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5477 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5480 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5481 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5482 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5483 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5484 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5487 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5488 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5489 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5490 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5491 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5493 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5494 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5495 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5496 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5497 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5501 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5502 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5503 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5504 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5505 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5506 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5507 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5508 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5512 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5513 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5514 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5515 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5516 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5517 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5518 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5521 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5522 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5523 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5524 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5526 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5527 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5528 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5529 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5532 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5533 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5534 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5535 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5536 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5537 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5538 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5539 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5542 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5543 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5544 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5545 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5546 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5547 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5548 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5549 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5550 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5551 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5552 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5553 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5554 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5555 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5556 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5560 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5561 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5562 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5563 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5564 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5567 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5568 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5572 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5573 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5574 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5575 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5576 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5577 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5580 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5581 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5582 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5583 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5584 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5588 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5589 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5590 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5591 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5592 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5593 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5594 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5595 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5597 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5598 the Library of Congress,"
<citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5599 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5600 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5605 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5606 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5607 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5608 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5609 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5610 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5611 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5612 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5613 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5616 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5618 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5619 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5620 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5621 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5622 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5623 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5627 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5628 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5629 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5630 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5631 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5632 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5633 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5634 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5635 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5636 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5637 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5638 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5639 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5640 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5641 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5642 few minutes
—for free.
5643 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5646 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5647 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5648 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5649 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5650 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5654 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5655 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5656 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5657 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5658 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5659 has
—a noncommercial life.
5662 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5663 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5666 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5667 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5668 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5669 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5670 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5671 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5674 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5675 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5676 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5677 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5678 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5679 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5683 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5684 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5686 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5687 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,"
<citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5688 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5689 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5690 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
<citetitle>Boston
5691 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5692 </para></footnote>). After
5693 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5694 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5695 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5696 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5697 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5700 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5701 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5702 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5703 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5704 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5705 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5706 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5707 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5711 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5712 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5713 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5714 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5715 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5717 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5718 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5719 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5720 little practical effect.
5723 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5724 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5725 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5726 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5727 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5728 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5731 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5732 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5733 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5738 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5739 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5740 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5741 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5742 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5743 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5744 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5745 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5746 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5747 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5748 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5752 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5753 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5754 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5755 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5756 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5757 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5758 will draw upon it to understand it;
5759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5760 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5761 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5762 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5763 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5764 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5767 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5768 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5769 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5770 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5771 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5772 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5774 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5776 <chapter id=
"property-i">
5777 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5779 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5780 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5781 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5782 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5783 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5784 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5785 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5786 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5787 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5790 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5791 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5792 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5793 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5794 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5795 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5796 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5797 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5798 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5800 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5801 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5802 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5803 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5804 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5805 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5806 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5809 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5810 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5811 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5812 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5813 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5814 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5815 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5816 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5817 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5818 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5822 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5823 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5824 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5825 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5826 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5827 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5828 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5831 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5836 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5837 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5838 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5839 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5840 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5841 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5842 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5843 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5845 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5846 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5847 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5848 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5849 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5855 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5856 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5857 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5859 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5860 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5861 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5862 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5863 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5866 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5867 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5868 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5869 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
5870 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5871 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5872 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5873 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5874 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5875 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5878 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5879 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5881 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5882 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5883 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5884 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5885 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5886 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
5887 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5888 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5889 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5890 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5891 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5892 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5896 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5897 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5898 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5899 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5900 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5901 culture would develop.
5904 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5905 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5906 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5907 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5908 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5909 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5910 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5911 the same would be to
5913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5914 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5915 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5919 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5920 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5921 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5922 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5923 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5924 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5925 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5926 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5927 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5928 Constitution itself.
5931 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5932 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5933 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5934 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5935 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5936 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5937 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5938 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
5939 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5942 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5943 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5944 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5945 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5946 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5947 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5948 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5949 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5950 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5951 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5953 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5954 compensation at all.
5957 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5958 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5959 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5960 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5961 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5962 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5966 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5967 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5968 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5969 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5970 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5971 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5972 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5973 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5974 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5975 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
5978 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
5979 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
5980 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
5981 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
5982 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
5986 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
5987 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
5988 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
5989 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
5990 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
5991 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
5992 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
5993 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
5994 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
5995 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
5996 also control how culture develops.
6000 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6001 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6002 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6003 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6004 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6005 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6006 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6007 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6009 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6010 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6011 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6014 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6015 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6016 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6017 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6018 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6019 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6020 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6021 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6022 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6023 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6024 Web, you can be punished
6025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6026 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6027 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6028 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6031 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6032 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6033 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6034 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6035 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6036 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6037 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6038 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6039 the source of the enforcement.
6042 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6043 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6044 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6045 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6046 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6047 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6048 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6049 individual or group might behave.
6052 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6053 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6054 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6055 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6056 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6057 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6058 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6059 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6060 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6061 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
6062 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6063 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6064 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6069 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6070 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6071 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6072 undermined by another.
6075 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6076 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6077 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6078 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6079 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6080 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6081 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6083 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6084 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6087 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6088 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6089 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6090 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6091 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6092 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6093 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6094 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6095 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6096 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6097 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6098 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6101 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6102 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6103 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6105 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6106 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6107 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6108 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6109 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6110 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6111 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School,"
<citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6114 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6115 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6116 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6117 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6118 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6119 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6120 used to require that other laws be more
6121 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6122 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6123 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6126 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6128 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6129 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6130 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6133 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6134 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6135 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6136 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6137 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6141 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6142 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6143 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6144 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6145 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6146 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6147 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6148 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6149 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6150 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6151 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6152 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a long tradition of
6153 political thought with a broader focus than the narrow question of
6154 what the government did when. John Stuart Mill defended freedom of
6155 speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow minds, not from the
6156 fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
<citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana:
6157 Hackett Publishing Co.,
1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended
6158 the economic freedom of labor from constraints imposed by the market;
6159 John R. Commons, "The Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren
6160 J. Samuels, eds.,
<citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6161 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6162 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6163 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6164 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
12101 (
2000). Each of
6165 these interventions to change existing conditions changes the liberty
6166 of a particular group. The effect of those interventions should be
6167 accounted for in order to understand the effective liberty that each
6168 of these groups might face.
6169 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6172 <section id=
"hollywood">
6173 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6175 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6176 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6177 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6178 rallying makes sense.
6181 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6184 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6185 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6186 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6190 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6191 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6192 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6193 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6194 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6195 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6196 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6197 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6198 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6199 this form of infringement.
6202 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6203 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6204 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6205 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6206 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6207 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6210 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6211 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6212 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6213 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6216 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6217 looting that results.
6219 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6220 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6221 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6224 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6225 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6226 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6227 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6228 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6229 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6230 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6231 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6232 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6233 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6236 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6237 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6238 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6239 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6240 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6241 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6242 life. Homeowners living in a
6244 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6245 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6246 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6247 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6248 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6249 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6250 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6253 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6254 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6255 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6256 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6257 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6258 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6261 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6262 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6263 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6264 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6265 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6266 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6267 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6269 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6270 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6271 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6272 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6273 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6274 October
2003, available at
6275 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6278 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6279 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6280 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6281 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6282 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6283 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6284 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6285 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6286 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6287 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6288 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6291 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6292 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6293 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6295 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6296 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6297 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6298 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6299 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6301 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6304 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6305 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6306 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6307 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6308 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6310 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6313 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6314 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6315 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6316 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6317 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6318 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6319 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6320 opportunities for innovation and change.
6323 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6324 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6325 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6326 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6327 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6328 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6329 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6330 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6331 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6332 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6333 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6334 regulation is justified.
6337 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6339 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6340 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6341 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6342 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6343 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6346 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6348 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6349 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6352 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6353 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6354 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6355 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6356 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6357 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6360 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6361 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6362 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6364 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6366 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6367 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6368 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6369 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6370 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6371 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6374 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6375 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6376 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6377 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6378 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6379 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6380 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6383 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6384 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6385 culture.
<footnote><para>
6387 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6388 Environmentalism for the Net?"
<citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6390 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6391 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6392 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6393 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6394 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6395 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6396 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6397 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6398 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6399 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6400 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6401 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6404 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6405 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6406 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6407 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6408 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6409 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6410 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6411 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6412 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6415 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6416 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6419 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6421 <section id=
"beginnings">
6422 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6424 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6425 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6426 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6427 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6430 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6431 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6432 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6435 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6436 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6437 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6440 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6441 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6442 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6443 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6444 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6445 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6448 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6449 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6450 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6451 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6452 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6453 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6454 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6455 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6458 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6459 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6460 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6461 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6462 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6463 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6464 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6465 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6466 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6467 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6468 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6469 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6470 concentrations of power.
6473 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6474 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6475 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6476 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6477 years since they first struck its design.
6480 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6481 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6483 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6486 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6487 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6488 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6493 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6494 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6495 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6499 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6502 <section id=
"lawduration">
6503 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6505 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6506 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6507 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6508 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6509 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6510 authorship.
<footnote>
6513 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6514 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6515 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6516 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6517 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis>"
6519 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6521 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6522 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6523 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6524 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6525 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6526 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6529 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6530 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6531 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6532 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6533 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6534 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6537 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6538 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6539 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6540 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6541 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6544 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6545 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6546 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6547 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6548 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6549 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6550 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6552 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6553 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6554 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6555 of an Industry, 1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6556 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6557 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6558 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7–10 (2002),
6559 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/
">link
6560 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6561 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6562 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6563 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6564 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6565 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6568 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6569 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6570 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6571 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6572 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6573 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6577 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6578 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6579 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6580 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6581 domain.<footnote><para>
6583 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6584 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6585 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6586 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
"
6587 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6588 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6589 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6590 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6591 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6594 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6595 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6596 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6598 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6599 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6600 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6601 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6602 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6603 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6606 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6607 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6608 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6609 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6610 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6611 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6614 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6615 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6616 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6617 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6618 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6619 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6620 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6621 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6624 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6625 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6626 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6627 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6630 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6631 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6632 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6635 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6636 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6637 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6638 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6639 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6640 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6641 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6645 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6646 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6647 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6648 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6649 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6650 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6651 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6652 was ninety-five years.
6655 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6656 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6657 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6658 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6659 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6660 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6664 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6665 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6666 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6667 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6668 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6669 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6670 years.
<footnote><para>
6672 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6673 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6674 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6675 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6678 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6680 <section id=
"lawscope">
6681 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6683 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6684 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6685 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6686 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6689 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6690 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6691 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6692 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6693 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6694 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6695 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6696 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6697 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6698 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6699 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6702 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6703 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6704 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6705 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6706 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6707 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6708 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6709 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6710 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6711 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6712 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6713 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6714 on the initial creative work.
6717 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6718 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6719 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6720 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6721 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6722 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6723 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6724 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6725 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6726 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6727 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6731 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6732 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6733 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6734 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6735 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6736 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6737 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6738 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6739 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6740 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6741 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6745 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6746 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6747 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6748 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6749 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6750 copy available for others to copy.
6753 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6757 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6758 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6759 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6760 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6761 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6762 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6764 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6765 Creation of American Literature,"
29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6766 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6767 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6770 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6771 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6772 the United States
—publishers.
6775 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6776 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6777 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6778 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6779 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6780 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6781 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6785 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6786 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6787 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6788 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6789 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6790 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6794 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6795 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6796 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6799 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6801 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6802 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6803 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6804 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6805 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6806 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6807 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6809 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6810 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6813 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6814 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6816 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6818 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6819 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6820 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6821 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6825 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6826 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6827 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6828 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6829 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6830 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6831 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6832 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6833 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6835 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage,"
<citetitle>Legal
6836 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
6837 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6838 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6840 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6841 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6842 the wrong of direct piracy.
6845 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6846 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6847 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6848 of my book.
<footnote><para>
6850 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6851 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6852 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6853 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6854 Copyright's Constitutionality,"
<citetitle>Yale Law
6855 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
6858 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6861 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6862 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6863 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6864 called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6865 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6869 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6870 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6871 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6872 the rights originally granted.
6875 <section id=
"lawreach">
6876 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6878 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6879 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6880 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6881 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6883 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6884 certainly regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a
6885 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6886 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6887 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy";
17
6888 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
6889 existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6890 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6894 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6895 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6896 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6897 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6898 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6899 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6900 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6901 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6902 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6903 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6904 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
6905 the trigger for copyright law.
6908 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6909 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6910 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6911 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6913 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
6914 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
6915 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
6916 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
6919 because it is clear that the
6920 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6921 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6924 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6927 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6928 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6929 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6933 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6934 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6935 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6936 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6937 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6938 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6939 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6940 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6941 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6942 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6943 acts do not make a copy.
6945 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6946 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6947 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6950 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6951 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6952 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6953 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6954 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6955 diagram on next page).
6958 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6959 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6962 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6963 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6964 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6967 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
6968 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6969 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
6970 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
6971 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
6972 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
6973 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses"
6974 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
6976 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
6977 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
6978 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
6981 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
6982 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
6983 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
6986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
6987 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
6988 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
6989 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
6992 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
6993 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
6995 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
6996 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
6997 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
6998 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7001 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7002 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7003 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7004 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7005 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7006 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7007 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7008 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7009 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7013 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7014 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7015 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7016 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7017 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7018 the book once, ten times, or every
7019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7020 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7021 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7022 none of those uses produced a copy.
7025 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7026 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7027 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7028 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7029 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7030 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7031 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7032 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7033 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7034 copyright owner's wish.
7037 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7038 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7039 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7040 points also become clear:
7043 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7044 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7045 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7046 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7047 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7048 part of free culture before the Internet.
7051 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7052 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7053 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7054 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7055 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
7056 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7057 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7058 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7059 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7063 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7066 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to
7067 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7068 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7069 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7070 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7071 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7072 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7073 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7077 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7078 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7079 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7080 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7081 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7082 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7083 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7087 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7088 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7089 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7090 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7091 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7094 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7095 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7096 previews. The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling"
7097 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7098 "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7099 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7100 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7103 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7104 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7105 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7106 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7108 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7109 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7110 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7111 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7112 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7113 "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7114 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7118 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7119 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7120 infringed" on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7121 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7122 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7123 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7124 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7125 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7128 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7129 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7130 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7131 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7132 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7133 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7134 Disney's permission.
7137 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7138 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7139 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7140 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7141 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7142 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7143 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7144 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7145 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7146 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7147 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7148 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7152 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7153 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7154 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7155 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7156 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7157 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7158 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7159 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7160 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7161 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7162 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7163 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7164 happening are quite slight.
7167 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7168 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7169 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7170 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7171 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7172 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7175 <section id=
"lawforce">
7176 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7178 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7179 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7180 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7181 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7184 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7185 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7186 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7187 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7188 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7191 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7192 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7193 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7195 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7196 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7199 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7200 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7201 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7202 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7203 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7204 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7205 plan.
<footnote><para>
7207 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain,"
<citetitle>Law and
7208 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7212 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7213 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7214 you were."
<footnote><para>
7216 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7217 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7218 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7220 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7221 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7222 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7223 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7226 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7227 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7228 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7229 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7232 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7233 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7234 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7235 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7236 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7237 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7238 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7239 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7241 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7242 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7244 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7245 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7248 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7251 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7252 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7253 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7254 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7258 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7262 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7263 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7264 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7265 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7266 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7267 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7268 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7271 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7272 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7274 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7275 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7276 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7279 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7280 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7282 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7283 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7284 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7288 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7289 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7290 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7291 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7292 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7293 read aloud through the computer.
7296 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7297 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7298 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7299 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7301 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7302 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7303 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7306 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7307 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7310 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7311 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7312 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7315 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7316 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7319 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7320 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7321 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7322 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7325 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7328 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7329 "permissions"
— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7330 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7331 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7332 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7333 power.
<footnote><para>
7335 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7336 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7337 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7338 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7339 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7340 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7341 subsequently acquired the book.
7343 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7344 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7345 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7346 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7347 control that the law would enable.
7350 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7351 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7352 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7353 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7354 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7355 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7356 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7357 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7358 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7359 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7360 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7361 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7362 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7363 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7368 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7369 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7370 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7372 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7375 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7376 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7377 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7378 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7379 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7380 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7381 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7384 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7385 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7386 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7387 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7388 to defeat these protections as well?
7391 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7395 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7396 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7397 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7398 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7399 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7401 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7403 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7404 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7405 Wonderland
".
</title>
7406 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7409 <!-- PAGE BREAK 164 -->
7410 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7411 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7412 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7415 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7416 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7417 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7418 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7419 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7420 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7423 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7424 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7425 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7426 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7427 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7428 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7429 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7430 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7431 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7432 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7433 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7436 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7437 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7438 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7439 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7440 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7443 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7445 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7446 story of mine that makes the same point.
7448 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo" class='startofrange'
>
7449 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7452 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7453 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7454 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7457 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7458 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7459 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7460 <!-- PAGE BREAK 165 -->
7461 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7462 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7463 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7466 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7467 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7468 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7469 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7470 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7471 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7474 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the
7475 word
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly connotation. Nonprogrammers
7476 hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in horror movies do even
7477 worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much
7478 more positive term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the program to
7479 do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to do. If you buy
7480 a new printer for an old computer, you might find the old computer
7481 doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered that, you'd later be
7482 happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone who has written a
7483 driver to enable the computer to drive the printer you just bought.
7486 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7487 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7488 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7489 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7493 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7494 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7495 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7496 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7497 than Sony had built.
7499 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo" class='endofrange'
/>
7501 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7502 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7503 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7504 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7507 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7508 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7509 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7510 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7511 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7512 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7513 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7514 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7517 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7518 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7519 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7520 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7521 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7522 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7523 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7524 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7525 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7528 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7530 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7531 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
"Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7532 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7533 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7534 DMCA,"
<citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7535 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,"
<citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7536 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7537 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7538 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7539 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7540 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7542 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7543 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7544 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7545 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7548 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7549 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7550 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7551 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7552 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7553 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7554 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7558 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7559 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7560 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7561 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7565 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7566 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7567 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7568 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7571 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7572 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7573 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7574 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7575 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7576 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7579 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7580 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7581 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7582 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7583 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7584 constituted, succeed.
7587 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7588 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7589 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7594 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7595 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7596 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7600 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7601 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7602 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7606 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7607 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7608 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7609 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7610 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7614 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7615 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7616 spreading such information an offense.
7619 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7620 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7621 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7622 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7623 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7624 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7625 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7626 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7627 protection for copyright owners.
7630 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7631 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7632 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7633 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7634 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7637 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7638 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7639 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7640 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7641 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7642 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7643 have been a copyright violation.
7646 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7647 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7648 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7649 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7650 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7651 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7652 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7653 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7654 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7655 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7658 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7659 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7660 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7661 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7662 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7663 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7666 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7667 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7668 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7669 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7670 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7671 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "
<citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,"
7672 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7673 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7674 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7678 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7679 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7680 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7681 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7682 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7683 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7684 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7685 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7686 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7687 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7688 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7689 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7690 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7691 important.
<footnote><para>
7693 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7694 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7695 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7696 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7701 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7702 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7703 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7704 the VCR responsible.
7707 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7709 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7712 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7715 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7716 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7717 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7718 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7719 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7720 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7723 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7724 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7725 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7726 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7727 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7730 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7731 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7732 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7735 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7736 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7737 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7738 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7739 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7740 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7741 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7744 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7745 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7746 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7747 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7748 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7749 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7752 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7753 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7754 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7755 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7756 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7757 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7758 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7759 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7760 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7761 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7764 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7765 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7766 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7767 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7768 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7769 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7770 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7771 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7772 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7776 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7777 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7778 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7779 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7780 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7781 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7783 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7784 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,"
<citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7785 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7789 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7790 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7791 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7792 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7793 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7796 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7797 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7798 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7799 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7800 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7801 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7802 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7803 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7806 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7807 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7808 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7809 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7810 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7811 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7814 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
7815 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7817 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7818 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7819 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7820 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7821 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7824 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7825 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7826 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7827 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7828 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7829 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7830 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7831 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7835 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7836 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7837 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7838 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7839 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7842 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7843 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7844 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7845 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7846 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7847 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7848 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7849 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7853 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7857 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7858 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7859 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7861 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7862 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7863 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7864 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7865 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7866 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7868 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7869 Slide,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
7871 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7872 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7874 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,"
<citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
7877 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7878 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
7879 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
7880 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
7881 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
7884 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7885 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7886 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7887 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
7888 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7889 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
7890 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
7891 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
7892 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7895 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7896 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7897 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7898 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7899 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7900 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7901 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7902 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7903 protected
— by the market.
7906 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7907 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7908 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7909 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7913 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7914 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7915 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7916 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7917 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7918 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7919 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7920 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7921 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7922 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7924 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch,"
<citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
7926 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7931 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7932 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7933 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
7934 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
7936 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
7937 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
7938 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
7941 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
7942 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
7943 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
7947 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
7948 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
7949 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
7950 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
7953 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
7954 integration may matter.
7956 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
7957 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
7958 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
7960 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
7961 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
7962 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
7963 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
7964 We wanted less edgy, not more.
7967 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
7968 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
7969 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
7970 control.
<footnote><para>
7972 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
7973 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
7974 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
7975 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
7976 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
7977 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
7982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
7983 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
7984 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
7985 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
7986 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
7987 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
7988 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
7992 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
7993 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
7994 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
7995 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
7996 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
7997 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
7998 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
7999 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8000 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
8002 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8003 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8004 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8005 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8006 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8007 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8008 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8011 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8012 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8013 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8014 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8015 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8016 63%."
<footnote><para>
8021 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8023 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8024 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8025 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8026 owned by the network.
8029 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8030 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8031 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8032 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8033 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8037 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8038 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8039 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8040 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8042 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8043 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8044 handful.
<footnote><para>
8046 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,"
<citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8047 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8048 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8053 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8054 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8055 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8056 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8057 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8058 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8059 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8060 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8061 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8064 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8066 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8067 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8068 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8069 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8070 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8071 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8073 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8074 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8075 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8076 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8077 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8078 Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
<citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8079 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8080 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8081 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8082 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8084 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8085 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8087 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8090 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8091 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8092 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8096 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8097 suggest the concern.
8100 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8101 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8102 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8105 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8106 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8107 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8109 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8110 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8111 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8112 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8113 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8114 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8115 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8116 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8117 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8118 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8119 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8120 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8121 outweigh these costs.
8124 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8125 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8126 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8130 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8131 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8132 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8133 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8134 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8135 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8136 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8137 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8138 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8139 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8142 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8143 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8146 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8147 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8148 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8152 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8154 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8155 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8156 message will be heard then?
8159 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8160 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8161 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8162 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8163 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8164 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8165 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8166 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8167 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8169 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8170 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8171 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8172 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8173 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8174 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8175 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8176 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8177 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8178 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,"
<citetitle>New
8179 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8180 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8181 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8182 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8183 Radio,"
<citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8184 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8185 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8186 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8187 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8188 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8189 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8190 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8191 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8192 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8193 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8194 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8195 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8196 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8197 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8198 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8202 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8203 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8204 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8205 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8206 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8207 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8208 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8209 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8210 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8213 <section id=
"together">
8214 <title>Together
</title>
8216 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8217 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8218 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8219 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8222 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8223 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8224 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8225 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8229 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8230 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8231 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8232 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8233 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8234 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8238 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8239 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8240 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8244 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8245 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8246 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8247 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8248 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8249 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8250 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8251 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8252 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8253 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8256 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8257 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8258 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8259 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8260 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8261 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8262 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8263 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8264 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8265 in control that technology and the market enable.
8268 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8269 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8271 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8272 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8273 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8274 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8277 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8278 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8279 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8280 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8281 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8282 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8283 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8284 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8285 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8286 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8287 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8288 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8289 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8290 known.
<footnote><para>
8292 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8293 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8294 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8298 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8301 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8302 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8303 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8304 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8305 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8308 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8309 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8313 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8314 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8319 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8320 <entry>©</entry>
8324 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8333 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8334 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8335 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8337 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8338 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8339 noncommercial work was also free.
8342 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8345 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8346 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8350 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8351 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8356 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8357 <entry>©</entry>
8358 <entry>©</entry>
8361 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8370 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8371 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8372 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8373 transformation were still essentially free.
8376 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8377 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8378 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8379 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8380 we could say the law began to look like this:
8383 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8384 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8389 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8394 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8395 <entry>©</entry>
8396 <entry>©</entry>
8399 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8400 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8408 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8409 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8410 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8411 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8412 that the law now looks like this:
8415 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8416 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8421 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8426 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8427 <entry>©</entry>
8428 <entry>©</entry>
8431 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8432 <entry>©</entry>
8433 <entry>©</entry>
8440 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8441 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8444 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8445 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8448 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8449 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8450 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8451 these domains actually does any good.
8454 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8455 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8456 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8457 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8458 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8459 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8460 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8461 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8462 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8463 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8466 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8467 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8468 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8469 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8470 property rights
<footnote><para>
8472 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8473 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8474 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8475 Disintegration of Property," in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8476 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8478 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8480 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8481 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8482 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8483 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8484 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8485 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8486 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8487 vibrant and rich free culture.
8490 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8491 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8492 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8493 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8494 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8495 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8496 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8498 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8499 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8500 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8501 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8502 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8503 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8504 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8505 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8506 dominates the debate today.
8509 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8510 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8511 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8512 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8513 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8514 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8515 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8516 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8517 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8518 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8525 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8526 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8528 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8529 <chapter id=
"chimera">
8530 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8531 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8532 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8534 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8535 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8537 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8538 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8542 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8543 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8544 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8546 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8547 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8548 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8550 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8551 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8552 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8553 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8554 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8555 villagers to explore life as a king.
8558 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8559 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8560 "blind." They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8561 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8562 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8563 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8564 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8565 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8569 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8570 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8571 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8572 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8573 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8574 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8575 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8576 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8577 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8578 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8581 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8582 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8583 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8584 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8587 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8588 is affected," he reports.
8591 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8592 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8596 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8597 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8598 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8599 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8602 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8603 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8604 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8605 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8606 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8607 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8608 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8609 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8611 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8612 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8613 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8616 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8617 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8619 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8620 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8621 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8622 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8623 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8624 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8627 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8628 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8629 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8630 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8631 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8632 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8633 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8634 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8635 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8636 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8637 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8638 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8641 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8642 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8643 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8644 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8645 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8646 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8647 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8650 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8651 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8652 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8653 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8654 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8656 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8660 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8661 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8662 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8663 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8664 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8665 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8666 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8667 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8668 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8671 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8672 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8673 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8674 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8675 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8678 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8679 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8680 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8681 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8682 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8683 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8684 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8685 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8687 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8688 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8689 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
8691 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8692 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8693 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8694 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8695 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8696 Stakes on Piracy,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8697 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8698 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8699 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8700 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8701 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8702 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8703 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8704 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8705 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8706 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8707 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8708 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8709 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8710 August
2003, available at
8711 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8712 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8713 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8714 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8715 Name Students,"
<citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8716 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8717 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
8718 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8722 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8724 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8725 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8726 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8727 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8728 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8731 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8732 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8733 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8734 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8735 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8736 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8737 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8738 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8743 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8744 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8745 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8746 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8747 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8748 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8751 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8752 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8753 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8754 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8755 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8756 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8757 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8758 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8759 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8760 protection for copyrighted material,
8764 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8765 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8768 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8769 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8770 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8771 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8772 produce a totally different industry model.
8775 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8776 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8777 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8778 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8779 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8780 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8781 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8782 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8783 interests.
<footnote><para>
8785 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8786 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8787 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8788 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8789 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8790 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8791 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8794 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8796 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8797 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8799 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8802 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8803 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8804 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8807 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8809 <chapter id=
"harms">
8810 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8812 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8813 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8814 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8815 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8816 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8819 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8820 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8821 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8825 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8826 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8827 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8830 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8831 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8833 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8834 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8835 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8836 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8839 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8840 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8841 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8842 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8843 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8844 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8846 <section id=
"constrain">
8847 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8849 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8850 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8851 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8852 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8853 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8854 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8855 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8856 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8857 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8858 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8859 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8860 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8861 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8864 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8865 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8866 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8867 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8868 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8869 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8870 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8871 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8872 the culture all around.
8875 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8876 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8880 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8881 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8882 storytelling extended across the globe.
8885 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8886 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8887 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8888 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8889 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8890 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8891 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8892 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8893 work is presumptively illegal.
8896 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8897 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8898 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8899 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8900 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8901 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8902 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8903 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8904 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8905 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8906 million.
<footnote><para>
8908 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
8909 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8910 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8911 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8912 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8913 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8915 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8916 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8917 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8918 suffering.
<footnote>
8920 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8921 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8922 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8923 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8924 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8925 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8927 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8929 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8931 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8932 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8933 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
8934 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8937 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
8938 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
8939 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
8940 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
8941 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
8942 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
8945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
8946 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
8947 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
8948 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
8949 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
8950 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
8951 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
8952 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
8953 States.
<footnote><para>
8956 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free,"
<citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
8958 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
8959 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
8961 In what does their "illegality" consist?
8962 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
8963 critical or reflective.
8966 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
8967 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
8968 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
8969 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
8970 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
8971 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
8972 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
8973 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
8974 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
8975 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
8978 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
8979 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
8980 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
8981 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
8982 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
8983 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
8984 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
8985 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
8986 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
8989 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
8990 described in chapter
8991 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
8992 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
8993 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
8994 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
8999 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9000 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9001 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9002 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9003 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9004 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9005 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9006 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9007 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9010 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9011 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9012 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9013 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9014 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9015 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9016 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9017 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9021 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9022 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9023 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9024 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9025 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9026 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9027 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9028 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9029 culture that is free.
9032 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9036 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9037 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9038 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9039 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9040 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9041 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9042 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9043 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9044 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9048 <section id=
"innovators">
9049 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9051 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9052 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9053 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9054 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9055 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9056 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9059 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9060 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9061 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9062 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9063 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9064 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9065 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9068 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9069 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9070 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9071 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9072 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9073 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9074 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9075 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9076 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9077 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9078 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9080 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9082 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9083 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9084 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9085 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9086 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9087 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9088 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9089 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9090 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9091 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9092 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9095 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9096 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9097 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9100 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9101 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9102 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9103 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9104 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9105 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9108 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9109 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9110 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9111 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9113 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9116 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9117 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9118 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9119 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9120 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9121 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9122 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9123 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9124 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9125 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9128 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9129 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9131 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9132 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9133 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9134 the kind of content the users liked.
9137 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9138 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9139 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9140 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9141 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9142 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9143 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9144 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9145 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9146 they had already bought.
9148 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9149 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9152 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9153 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9154 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9155 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9156 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9157 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9158 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9159 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9162 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9165 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9166 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9167 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9168 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9169 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9170 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9171 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9175 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9176 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9177 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9180 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9181 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9182 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9183 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9185 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9186 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9187 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9189 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9190 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9191 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9192 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9193 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9195 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles
9196 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9197 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9198 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9199 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9200 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles
9201 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9203 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9204 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9205 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9206 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9207 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9208 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9209 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9210 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9211 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9212 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9213 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9214 discussion with BMW:
9215 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9216 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9219 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9221 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9222 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9223 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9224 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9225 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9226 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9227 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9230 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s,"
<citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9232 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9233 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9234 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9239 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9240 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9241 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9242 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9243 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9244 constantly threatened by litigation.
9248 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9249 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9250 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a
9251 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9252 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9253 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9254 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9255 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9256 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9257 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9258 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9259 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9260 much less creativity.
9263 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9264 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9265 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9266 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9267 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9268 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9269 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9270 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9271 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9272 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9275 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9276 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9277 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9278 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9279 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9280 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9281 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9282 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9283 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9284 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9285 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9286 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9287 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9288 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9289 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9290 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9291 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9292 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9293 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9294 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9297 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9298 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9299 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9300 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9301 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9302 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9303 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9304 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9307 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9308 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9309 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9310 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9311 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9312 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9313 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9314 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9316 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9317 "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device capable of
9318 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9319 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9320 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9321 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9322 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9324 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9328 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9329 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9330 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9331 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9334 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9338 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9339 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9340 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9342 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9343 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9345 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9346 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9348 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9351 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9352 innovation
—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9356 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9357 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9358 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9359 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9362 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9363 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9364 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9365 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9366 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9368 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9369 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9370 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9372 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9373 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9374 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9375 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9376 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9379 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9380 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9381 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9382 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9383 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9386 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9388 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9389 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9390 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9391 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9392 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9393 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9394 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9395 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9396 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9397 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9398 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9399 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9402 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9403 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9404 here.
<footnote><para>
9406 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9407 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9408 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9409 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9410 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9411 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9412 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9413 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9414 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9415 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9416 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9417 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34,
9419 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9420 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9422 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9423 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9428 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9429 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9430 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9431 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9432 version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9433 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9434 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9435 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9436 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9437 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9440 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9441 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9442 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9443 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9444 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9445 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9446 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9447 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9451 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9452 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9453 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9454 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9455 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9456 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9460 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9461 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9462 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9463 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9464 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9465 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9466 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9467 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9468 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9469 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9470 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9475 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9476 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9477 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9478 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9479 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9480 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9485 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9486 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9487 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9488 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9489 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9490 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9491 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9492 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9493 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9494 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9495 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9496 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9497 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9504 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9505 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9506 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9507 legislation"
<footnote><para>
9511 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9514 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9515 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9516 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9517 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9518 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9522 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9523 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9525 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9526 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9527 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9528 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9529 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9530 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9531 of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9532 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9533 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9534 burdens terrestrial radio.
9537 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9538 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9539 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9540 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9541 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9544 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9545 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9546 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9547 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9548 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9549 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9550 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9551 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9552 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9553 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9554 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9555 Distribution,"
<citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9556 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9557 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9558 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9559 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9560 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9561 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9562 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9564 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9568 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9569 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9570 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9571 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9573 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9574 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9576 name of the service;
9579 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9582 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9585 date of transmission;
9588 time of transmission;
9591 time zone of origination of transmission;
9594 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9597 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9600 sound recording title;
9603 ISRC code of the recording;
9606 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9609 featured recording artist;
9618 UPC code of the retail album;
9624 copyright owner information;
9627 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9630 name of the service or entity;
9636 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9639 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9642 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9645 unique user identifier;
9648 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9653 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9654 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9655 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9656 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9657 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9658 that terrestrial radio does not.
9661 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9662 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9663 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9665 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9667 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9668 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9669 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9673 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9674 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9675 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9676 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9677 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9678 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… "How do you come up with a
9680 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9681 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio?
9683 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who
9684 want to pay, and that should establish the market rate, and if you
9685 set the rate so high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out
9686 of business.
…"
9689 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9690 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9691 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9692 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9697 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9698 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9699 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9700 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9701 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9702 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9703 effective to prevent it.
9706 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9707 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9709 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9711 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9712 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9715 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9716 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9717 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9720 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9721 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9722 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9723 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9724 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9725 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9726 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9727 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9728 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9730 According to the RIAA,
9731 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9732 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9735 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9736 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9738 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9739 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9740 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9742 response by the other.
9745 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9746 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9747 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9748 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9749 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9750 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9751 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9752 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9753 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9754 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9755 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9756 was.
<footnote><para>
9758 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
<citetitle>Los
9759 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
9761 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9762 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9763 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9764 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9765 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9766 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9770 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9771 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9772 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9773 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9774 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9775 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9776 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9777 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9778 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9780 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9781 Prohibition,"
<citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9785 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9786 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9788 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9789 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9790 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9792 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9793 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9794 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9795 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9796 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9798 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9799 Compliance,"
<citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9800 compliance literature).
9802 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9803 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9804 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9805 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
9808 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9809 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9810 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9811 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9812 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9813 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9814 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9815 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9816 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9817 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9818 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9819 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9820 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9821 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9822 degree of illegality.
9823 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
9826 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9827 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9828 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9829 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9830 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9831 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9832 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9833 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9834 to consider the alternative.
9838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9839 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9840 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9841 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9842 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9843 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9846 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9847 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9848 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9849 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9850 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9851 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9852 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9853 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9854 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9855 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9856 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9857 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9860 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9861 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9862 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9863 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9864 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9865 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9866 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9867 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9868 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9872 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9875 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9876 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9877 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9878 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9882 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9886 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9887 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9888 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9889 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9890 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9891 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9892 capacities of digital technologies.
9894 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9896 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9897 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9898 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9899 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9900 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9901 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9902 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9903 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9904 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9907 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9908 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9909 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9910 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9911 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9912 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9913 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9914 on people's machines.
9917 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9918 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9919 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9920 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9921 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9922 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9924 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9925 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9926 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9927 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
9931 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
9932 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
9933 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
9934 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
9935 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
9936 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
9937 freedom to move content easily?
9940 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
9941 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
9942 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
9943 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
9944 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
9945 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
9946 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
9947 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
9948 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
9951 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
9952 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
9953 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
9954 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
9955 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
9956 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
9957 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
9960 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
9961 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
9962 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
9963 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
9966 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
9967 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
9969 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
9971 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
9972 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
9973 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
9974 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
9975 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
9976 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
9977 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
9978 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
9980 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
9983 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
9985 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
9989 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
9990 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
9991 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
9992 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
9993 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
9994 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
9995 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
9996 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
9997 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10001 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10002 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10003 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10006 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10007 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10008 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10009 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10010 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10011 an Internet user is revealed.
10014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10015 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10016 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10017 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10018 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10019 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10020 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10021 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10022 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10024 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10025 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10026 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10027 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10028 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10029 Being Sued,"
<citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10030 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10031 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10032 Fan, Either,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10033 Brianna a Criminal?"
<citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10038 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10039 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10040 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10042 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10043 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10044 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10046 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10047 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10048 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10051 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10052 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10053 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10054 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10055 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10056 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10057 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10058 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10059 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10060 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10061 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10063 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10064 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10065 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10066 Colleges,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10067 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
<citetitle>Christian Science
10068 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10069 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10070 Lawsuit Possible,"
<citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10071 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,"
<citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10072 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10073 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10074 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10075 Sharing,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10076 Are Weapons at Universities,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10078 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10079 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10082 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10083 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10084 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10085 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10086 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10087 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10091 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10092 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10094 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10098 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10099 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10100 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10101 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10102 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10103 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10104 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10105 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10106 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10107 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10108 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10109 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10110 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10111 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10112 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10113 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10118 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10119 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10120 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10121 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10122 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10123 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10126 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10130 <part id=
"c-balances">
10131 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10136 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10137 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10138 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10139 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10142 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10143 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10144 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10145 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10146 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10150 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10151 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10152 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10153 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10154 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10155 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10158 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10159 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10160 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10161 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10162 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10163 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10164 made that is happening all around.
10167 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10168 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10169 gasoline onto this fire.
10172 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10173 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10174 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10175 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10178 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10179 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10180 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10181 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10182 success will require.
10186 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10187 <chapter id=
"eldred">
10188 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10190 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10191 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10192 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10193 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10194 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10195 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10199 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10200 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10201 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10202 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10203 them available for free.
10206 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10207 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10208 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10209 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10210 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10212 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10213 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10214 accessible
—today.
10217 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10218 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10219 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10220 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10221 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10222 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10223 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10224 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10225 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10226 commercial publications of public domain works.
10229 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10230 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10231 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10232 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10233 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10234 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10235 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10236 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10237 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10238 generally.
<footnote><para>
10240 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10241 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10242 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10243 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10244 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10245 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10246 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10247 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10248 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10249 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10250 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10251 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10252 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10253 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10254 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10257 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10258 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10259 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10260 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10261 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10262 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10263 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10264 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10265 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10266 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10267 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10268 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10273 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10274 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10275 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10276 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10278 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10279 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10280 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10281 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10282 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10283 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10284 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10289 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10290 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10291 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10292 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10293 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10294 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10298 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10300 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10302 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10303 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10305 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10309 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10310 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10311 their
… Writings.
…
10315 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10316 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10317 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10318 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10319 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10320 specific
—to "promote
… Progress"
—through means that
10321 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10322 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10325 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10326 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10327 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10328 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10329 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10330 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10331 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10332 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10333 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10334 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10337 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10338 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10339 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10340 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10341 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10342 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10343 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10344 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10345 this gravy train going.
10348 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10349 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10350 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10351 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10352 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10353 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10354 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10357 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10358 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10359 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10360 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10361 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10362 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10363 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10364 published by anyone for free.
10367 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10368 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10369 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10370 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10374 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10376 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10377 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10378 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10382 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10383 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10384 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10385 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10388 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10392 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10393 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10394 they support the bill."
10397 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10398 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10399 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10403 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10404 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10405 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10406 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10409 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10410 correct conclusion:
10413 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10414 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10416 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10419 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10421 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10422 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10425 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10426 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10427 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10428 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10429 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10430 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10432 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10433 the copyright term extended.
10436 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10437 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10438 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10441 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10443 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10444 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10445 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10446 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10447 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10448 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10449 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10450 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10452 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10453 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10454 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10455 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10457 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10459 Disney is estimated to have
10460 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10461 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10463 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10464 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10465 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10470 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10471 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10473 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10474 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10475 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10476 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10477 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10479 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10483 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10484 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10485 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10486 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10487 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10488 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10491 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10492 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10496 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10497 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10498 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10500 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10501 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10506 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10507 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10508 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10509 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10510 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10513 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10514 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10515 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10516 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10517 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10518 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10519 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10520 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10521 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10522 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10523 position to second-guess Congress.
10526 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10527 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10528 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10530 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10531 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10532 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10533 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10535 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10539 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10540 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10542 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10543 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10544 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10545 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10546 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10547 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10548 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10549 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10550 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10552 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10553 yield the conclusion that Congress
10554 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10555 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10556 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10557 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10558 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10559 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10560 term of existing copyrights.
10563 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10564 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10565 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10566 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10567 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10568 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10569 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10570 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10571 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10572 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10573 were going to be petty politicians.
10576 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10577 argument in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10578 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10579 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10580 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10581 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10582 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10583 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10584 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10585 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10586 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10587 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10588 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10589 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10590 piracy that affects us all.
10593 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10596 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10597 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10599 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10600 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10601 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10603 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10604 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10605 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10607 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10610 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10612 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10614 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10615 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10616 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10617 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10618 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10619 bought to extend them again.
10622 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10624 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10625 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10627 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10629 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10630 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10631 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10632 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10634 and no longer available as a result.
10637 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10638 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10639 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10640 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10641 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10642 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10643 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10645 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10646 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10647 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10652 Think practically about the consequence of this
10653 extension
—practically,
10654 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10657 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10658 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10659 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10661 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10664 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10665 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10666 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10667 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10668 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10669 list of books still under copyright.
10672 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10673 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10676 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10678 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10679 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10680 being at least a list?
10683 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10684 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10686 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10688 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10689 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10692 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10693 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10697 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10698 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10699 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10700 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10701 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10702 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10703 what tangible property.
10706 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10707 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10708 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10711 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10712 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10714 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10715 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10716 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10717 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10718 know quite well who owns what property.
10721 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10722 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10724 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10725 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10726 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10727 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10728 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10729 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10730 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10733 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10734 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10736 for other creative works is much more dire.
10738 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10739 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
10741 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10742 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10743 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10744 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
10745 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10746 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10747 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10748 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10749 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10750 films."
<footnote><para>
10752 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10753 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10754 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10755 Down Copyright Extension,"
<citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
10758 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10761 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10762 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10763 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10764 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10767 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10770 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10771 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10772 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10773 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10774 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10775 work available for distribution.
10778 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10779 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10780 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10781 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10782 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10783 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10785 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10786 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
10787 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10788 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10789 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
10790 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10795 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10797 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10798 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10799 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10800 locate the copyright owner.
10803 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10804 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10805 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10806 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10807 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10808 to these films is exceptionally high.
10811 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10812 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10813 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10814 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10815 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10816 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10817 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10818 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10819 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10822 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10824 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10825 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10827 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10828 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10829 the copyright expires.
10832 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10833 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10834 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10836 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10840 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10841 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10842 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10843 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10845 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10849 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10850 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10852 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10853 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10854 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10856 the commercial life ends.
10859 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10860 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10861 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10863 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10865 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10866 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10867 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10868 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10869 have, we need to have access to this history.
10872 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10874 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10875 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10876 this context do no good.
10879 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10880 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10881 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10882 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10883 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10884 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10885 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10886 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10887 was independent of copyright law.
10890 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10891 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10892 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10893 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10894 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10895 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10896 market didn't have more to offer.
10899 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10900 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10901 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10902 would not have interfered with anything.
10905 But this situation has now changed.
10908 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10909 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10910 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10911 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10912 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10913 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10914 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10915 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10916 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10917 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10920 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10921 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10922 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10923 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10924 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
10925 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
10926 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
10927 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
10928 written for a radically different context.
10931 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
10932 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
10933 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
10934 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
10935 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
10936 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
10937 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
10938 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
10939 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
10942 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
10943 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
10944 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
10948 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
10949 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
10950 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
10951 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
10952 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
10953 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
10954 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
10955 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
10956 commercial market to do our library work for us.
10959 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
10960 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
10961 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
10962 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
10964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
10965 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
10966 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
10967 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
10968 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
10969 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
10971 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
10972 December
2002, available at
10973 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
10978 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
10979 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
10980 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
10981 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
10982 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
10983 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
10986 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
10987 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
10988 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
10989 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
10990 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
10993 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
10994 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
10995 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
10996 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
10997 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
10998 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
10999 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11000 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11001 power to extend existing terms.
11004 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11005 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11006 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11007 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11010 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11011 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11013 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11014 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11015 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11016 overstepped its bounds.
11019 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11020 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11021 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11022 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11023 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11026 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11027 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11028 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11029 briefs and preparing for argument.
11032 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11033 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11034 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11035 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11036 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11037 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11038 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11039 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11042 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11043 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11044 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11047 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11049 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11050 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11051 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11052 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11054 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11055 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11056 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11057 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11059 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11060 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11061 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11063 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11064 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11065 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11066 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11067 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11068 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11069 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11070 most powerful media companies in the world."
11073 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11074 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11075 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11076 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11077 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11078 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11079 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11080 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11082 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11083 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11085 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11086 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11087 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11089 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11090 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11091 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11094 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11095 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11096 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11097 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11098 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11099 why it was unconstitutional.
11102 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11105 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11106 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11107 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11108 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11109 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11110 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11111 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11112 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11113 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11114 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11115 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11116 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11117 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11118 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11121 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11122 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11123 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11124 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11125 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11126 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11127 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11128 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11129 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11130 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11131 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11132 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11133 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11134 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11137 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11138 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11139 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11140 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11141 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11142 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11145 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11146 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11149 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11150 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11151 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11152 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11153 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11154 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11155 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11156 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11157 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11158 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11159 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11162 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11163 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11164 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11165 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11166 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11167 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11170 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11171 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11172 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11173 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11176 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11177 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11178 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11179 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11180 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11182 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11183 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11184 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11185 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11186 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11187 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11188 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11189 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11190 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11193 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11194 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11195 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11196 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11197 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11198 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11199 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11200 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11203 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11204 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11205 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11208 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11209 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11210 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11211 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11212 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11213 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11214 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11215 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11216 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11217 confidence in our argument.
11218 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11221 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11222 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11223 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11224 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11228 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11229 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11230 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11231 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11232 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11233 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11237 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11238 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11239 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11240 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11241 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11242 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11244 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11245 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11247 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11248 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11249 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11250 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11252 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11253 Mouse Joins the Fray,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11257 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11258 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11259 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11262 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11263 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11264 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11265 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11266 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11267 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11268 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11269 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11270 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11271 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11274 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11275 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11276 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11277 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11278 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11279 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11280 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11283 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One
11284 camp we called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest."
11285 The Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11286 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11287 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11288 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line of cases that said that
11289 an enumerated power had to be interpreted to assure that Congress's
11292 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11294 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11295 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11296 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11299 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11300 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11301 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11302 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11303 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11306 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11307 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11308 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11309 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11310 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11311 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11312 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11313 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11316 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11318 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11319 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11320 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11321 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11322 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11323 these retrospective extensions.
11326 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11327 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11328 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11329 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11330 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11331 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11334 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus
11335 had to be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open
11336 these five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11338 argument that animated our claim rested on the Conservatives'
11339 most important jurisprudential innovation
—the argument that Judge
11340 Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals, that Congress's power
11341 must be interpreted so that its enumerated powers have limits.
11344 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11345 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11346 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11348 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11349 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11350 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11351 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11352 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11353 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to
11354 regulate commerce was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to
11355 regulate copyright be limited.
11358 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11359 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11360 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11361 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11362 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11365 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11366 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
11367 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11369 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11372 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11374 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11375 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11376 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11378 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11380 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11381 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11383 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11384 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11385 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11387 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11388 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11391 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11392 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11395 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11396 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11397 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11398 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11400 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11401 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11404 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11406 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11407 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11408 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11409 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11410 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11413 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11414 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11415 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11416 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11417 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11419 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11421 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11422 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11423 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11424 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11425 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11426 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11427 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11428 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11429 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11430 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11431 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11434 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11435 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11438 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11439 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11440 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11441 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11443 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11444 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11445 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11446 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11447 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11448 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11449 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11450 family of the Justices.
11453 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11454 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11455 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11456 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11459 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11460 The history was bothering her.
11464 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11465 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11466 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11467 practice that began with the very first act.
11471 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11472 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11473 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11477 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11478 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11480 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11485 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11486 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11487 Kennedy, who observed,
11491 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11492 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11493 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11494 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11495 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11499 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11505 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11506 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11507 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11508 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11509 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11512 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11514 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11515 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11516 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11517 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11518 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11521 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11522 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11523 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11526 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11527 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11529 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11533 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11534 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11537 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11538 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11540 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11541 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11542 into the Copyright Clause.
11546 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11547 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11548 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11552 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11553 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11554 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11555 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11560 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11561 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11562 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11563 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11564 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11565 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11566 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11567 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11568 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11569 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11573 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11574 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11576 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11577 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11581 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11582 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11583 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11584 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11585 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11586 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11587 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11588 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11589 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11590 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11591 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11592 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11593 law that it had established elsewhere.
11596 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11597 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11598 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11599 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11600 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11603 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11604 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11605 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11608 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11609 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11610 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11614 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11615 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11616 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11617 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11618 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11622 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11623 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11624 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11625 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11628 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11629 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11630 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11631 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11634 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11635 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11636 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11637 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11638 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11639 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11640 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11641 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11642 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11645 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11646 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11647 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11648 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11649 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11650 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11651 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11652 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11653 the system we have.
11655 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11657 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11658 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11659 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11660 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11661 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11662 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11663 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11664 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11665 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11667 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11670 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11671 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11672 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11673 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11674 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11675 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11676 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11677 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11678 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11681 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11682 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11683 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11684 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11685 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11688 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11689 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11690 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11693 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11694 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11695 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11696 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11697 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11698 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11699 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11700 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11701 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11702 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11706 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11707 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11708 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11709 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11712 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11713 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11714 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11715 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11716 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11717 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11721 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11723 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11726 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11728 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11729 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11730 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11731 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11732 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11733 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11734 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11735 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11736 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11739 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11740 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11741 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11742 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11743 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11744 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11745 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11746 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11747 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11748 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11749 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11750 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11751 effort to persuade; but I
11752 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11753 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11754 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11755 should decide the issue.
11757 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11759 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11760 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11762 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11765 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11766 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11767 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11768 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11771 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11772 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11773 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11774 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11778 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11779 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11780 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11781 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11782 issue should not be raised until it is.
11783 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11786 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11787 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11788 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11789 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11790 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11791 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11792 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11793 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11794 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11795 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11796 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11799 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11800 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11801 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11802 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11803 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11807 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11808 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11809 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11810 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11811 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11812 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11816 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11817 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11818 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
11819 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit
11820 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
11821 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11823 <figure id=
"fig-18">
11824 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
11825 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
11826 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11829 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11830 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11831 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11832 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11833 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11834 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11835 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11837 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11839 <chapter id=
"eldred-ii">
11840 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11842 The day
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11843 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was
11844 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11845 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11846 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11847 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11848 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11850 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11852 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11853 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11854 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11855 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11856 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11857 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11858 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11859 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11862 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11863 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11864 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11865 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11866 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11867 the work passed into the public domain.
11870 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11871 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11872 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11875 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11876 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11877 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11878 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11879 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11880 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11881 everything else, let the content go.
11883 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11885 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11886 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11887 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11888 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11889 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11890 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11891 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11892 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11893 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11894 the stupid harm of the present system.
11897 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11898 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11899 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11900 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11901 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11902 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11903 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11904 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11905 where copyright owners could be identified.
11907 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11908 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11910 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11911 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
11912 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11913 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11914 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11916 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11917 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11918 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
11919 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
11920 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
11921 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
11922 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
11923 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
11924 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
11925 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
11926 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
11927 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
11928 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
11929 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
11930 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
11931 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
11932 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
11933 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
11934 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
11935 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
11936 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
11937 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
11938 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
11939 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
11942 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
11943 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
11944 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
11945 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
11946 know what's protected and what's not.
11948 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11950 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
11951 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
11952 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
11953 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
11954 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
11955 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
11956 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
11957 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
11960 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
11961 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
11962 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
11963 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
11964 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
11965 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
11968 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
11969 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
11970 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
11971 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
11973 imposed upon creators.
11976 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
11977 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
11979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
11980 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
11981 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
11982 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
11983 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
11984 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
11988 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
11989 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
11990 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
11991 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
11992 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
11993 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
11997 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
11998 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
11999 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12000 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12001 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12002 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12003 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12004 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12005 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12006 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12007 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12008 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12009 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12010 system of protection for property generally.
12013 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12014 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12015 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12016 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12017 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12018 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12019 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12020 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12022 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12023 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12024 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12025 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12028 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12029 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12030 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12031 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12032 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12033 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12034 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12035 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12038 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12039 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12040 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12041 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12042 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12043 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12044 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12047 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12048 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12049 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12050 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12051 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12054 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12055 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12056 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12057 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12058 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12061 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12062 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12063 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12067 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12068 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12069 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12071 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12072 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12073 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12074 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12075 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12076 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12077 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12078 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12079 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12080 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12081 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12083 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12085 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12086 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12087 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12088 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12091 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12092 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12093 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12094 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12095 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12096 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12097 something good might happen here.
12098 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12101 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12102 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12103 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12104 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12105 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12106 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12109 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12110 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12111 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12113 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12114 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12115 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12116 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12117 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12118 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12119 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12120 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12121 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12122 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12123 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12124 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12125 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12126 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12127 film is a valid derivative use.
12130 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12131 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12132 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12133 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12134 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12135 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12138 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12139 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12140 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12141 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12142 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12143 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12144 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12148 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12149 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12150 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12151 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12156 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12157 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12158 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12159 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12160 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12161 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12162 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12163 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12164 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12165 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12168 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12169 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12170 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12171 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12172 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12173 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12174 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12175 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12176 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12179 What does this industry really want?
12182 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12183 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12184 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12185 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12186 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12187 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12188 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12189 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12193 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12194 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12195 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12196 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12197 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12201 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12202 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12205 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12206 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12207 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12208 and to share its own creation.
12210 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12211 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12213 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12214 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12215 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12216 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12217 block the progress of others.
12220 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12221 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12222 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12223 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12224 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12225 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12226 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12228 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12231 <chapter id=
"c-conclusion">
12232 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12234 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12235 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12236 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12237 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12238 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12241 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12242 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12243 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12244 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12245 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12246 the disease almost invisible.
12249 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12250 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12251 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12252 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12254 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12255 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12256 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12257 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12259 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12261 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12262 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12266 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12267 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12268 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12269 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12270 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12271 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12272 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12275 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12276 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12277 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12278 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12279 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12280 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12281 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12282 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12286 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12287 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12288 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12289 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12290 costs significantly below the market price.
12293 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12294 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12295 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12296 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12297 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12298 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12299 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12302 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12303 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12304 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12305 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12309 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12310 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12311 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12312 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12313 imports."
<footnote><para>
12315 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12316 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12317 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12318 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12319 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12320 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12321 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12322 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12323 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12326 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12327 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12328 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12329 possible trade sanctions.
12330 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12331 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12332 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12333 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12334 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12335 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12336 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12337 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12338 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12339 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12340 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12342 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12343 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12344 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12345 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12348 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12349 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12350 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12351 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12352 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12353 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12354 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12355 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12358 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12359 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12360 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12361 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12362 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12363 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12366 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12367 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12368 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12369 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12370 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12371 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12375 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12376 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12379 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12381 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12382 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12383 May
1999, A1, available at
12384 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12385 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12386 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12387 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12388 Medicines,"
<citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12389 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12390 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12391 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12392 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,"
<citetitle>Widener Law
12393 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12396 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12397 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12398 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12399 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12402 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12403 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12404 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12405 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12406 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12407 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12408 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12409 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12412 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12413 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12414 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12415 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12416 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12417 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12420 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12421 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12422 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12423 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12424 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12425 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12428 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12429 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12430 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12431 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12432 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12433 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12434 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12435 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12436 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12437 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12438 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12439 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12440 idea called "intellectual property."
12443 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12444 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12445 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12446 What is the argument?
12449 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12450 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12451 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12452 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12453 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12454 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12455 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12456 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12457 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12458 were balanced in just this sense.
12461 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12462 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12463 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12464 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12465 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12466 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12467 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12468 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12469 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12470 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12471 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12472 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12475 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12476 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12477 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12478 this common sense open its eyes.
12481 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12482 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12483 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12484 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12485 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12486 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12487 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12488 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12489 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12490 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12491 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12492 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12495 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12496 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12497 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12498 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12499 August
2003, E1, available at
12500 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12501 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,"
<citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12502 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12503 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12504 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,"
<citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12505 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12506 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12508 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12509 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12510 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12511 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12512 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12513 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12514 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12515 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12516 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12517 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12518 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12519 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12520 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12521 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12522 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12523 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12524 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12525 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12526 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12527 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12528 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12531 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12532 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12533 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12534 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12535 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12538 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12539 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12542 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12543 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12544 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12545 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12549 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12550 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12551 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12552 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12553 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12554 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12555 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12556 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12557 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12558 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12559 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12560 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12561 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12562 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12563 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12564 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12565 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12567 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12568 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12569 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12570 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12573 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12574 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12575 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12576 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12579 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12580 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12581 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12582 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12583 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12584 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12585 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12586 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12587 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12590 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12591 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12592 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12593 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12594 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12595 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM
12596 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12597 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12598 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12599 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12601 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12602 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12603 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12604 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12605 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12606 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12607 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,"
<citetitle>Government Policy
12608 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12609 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12610 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12611 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12612 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12613 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12614 May
2001), available at
12615 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12617 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12618 <indexterm><primary>"copyleft" licenses
</primary></indexterm>
12619 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12620 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12623 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12624 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12625 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12626 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12627 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12629 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12630 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12631 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12632 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12633 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12634 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12635 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12636 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12637 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12638 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12641 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12642 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12643 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12644 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12645 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12646 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12647 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12649 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12650 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12652 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12653 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
12656 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12657 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12658 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12659 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12660 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12661 its lobbying efforts.
12664 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12665 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12666 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12667 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12668 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12669 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12670 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12674 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12676 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12678 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12679 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12680 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12681 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12682 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12683 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12684 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12685 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12688 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12689 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12690 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12691 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12692 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12693 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12694 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12695 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12696 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12697 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12698 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12701 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12702 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12703 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12704 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12705 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12706 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12707 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
12708 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12709 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12710 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12711 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
12712 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12715 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12716 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12717 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12719 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12720 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12721 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12722 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12723 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12727 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12728 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12729 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12730 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12731 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12732 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12733 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12734 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12735 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12738 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12739 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12741 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12742 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12744 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
12745 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12747 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12748 choice now is whether that information society will be
12749 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
12753 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12754 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12755 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12756 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12760 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12761 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12762 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12763 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12764 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12765 say anything wrong. But in the world
12766 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12767 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12768 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12772 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12773 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12774 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12775 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12776 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12777 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12778 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12779 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12782 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12783 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12784 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12785 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12786 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12787 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12790 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12791 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12792 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12793 our own country's history).
12796 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12797 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12798 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12799 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12800 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12801 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12802 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12803 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12804 democracy in the world, become?
12807 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12808 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12809 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12810 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12811 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12812 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12814 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12816 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12817 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12818 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12819 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12820 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12821 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12822 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12823 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12824 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12825 hearings and a different result.
12826 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
12827 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
12830 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12831 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12832 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12833 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12834 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12835 concentration in the media.
12838 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12839 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12840 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12841 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12842 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12845 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12846 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12847 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12848 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12849 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12850 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12851 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12855 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12856 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12857 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12858 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12859 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12862 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12863 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12864 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12865 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12866 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12867 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12870 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12873 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12875 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12876 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12878 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12880 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12881 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12883 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12884 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12885 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,"
<citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
12886 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12887 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12888 Defendants,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12889 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,"
<citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
12891 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12893 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12894 music.
<footnote><para>
12896 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,"
12897 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12898 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12900 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12901 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12903 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12904 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12905 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12906 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12908 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12909 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12910 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12911 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12912 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12913 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12914 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12915 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12916 kids who use a computer to share content.
12918 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12919 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12920 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
12921 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
12923 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
12924 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
12925 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
12926 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
12927 24 August
2003, available at
12928 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
12930 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
12931 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
12932 content and free licenses in that Latin American
12933 country.
<footnote><para>
12935 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
12937 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
12939 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
12940 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
12941 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
12942 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
12943 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
12944 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
12945 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
12946 day into the Causbys.
12949 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
12950 potential is ever to be realized.
12952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
12956 <chapter id=
"c-afterword">
12957 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
12960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
12961 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
12962 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
12963 maps what might be done.
12966 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
12967 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
12968 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
12969 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
12972 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
12973 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
12974 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
12975 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
12979 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
12980 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
12981 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
12982 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
12983 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
12985 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
12987 <section id=
"usnow">
12988 <title>US, NOW
</title>
12990 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
12991 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
12992 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
12993 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
12996 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
12997 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
12998 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
12999 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
13000 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13001 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13002 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13003 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13006 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13007 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13008 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13009 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13013 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13014 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13018 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13019 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13020 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13021 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13022 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13023 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13024 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13025 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13026 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13027 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13028 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13029 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13032 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13033 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
13034 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13035 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13036 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13040 <section id=
"examples">
13041 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13043 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13044 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13045 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13046 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13047 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13048 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13049 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13053 What made it assured?
13055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13057 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13058 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13059 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13060 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13061 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13062 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13063 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13064 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13065 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13066 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13067 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13068 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13069 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13070 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13072 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13074 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13075 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13076 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13077 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13078 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13079 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13080 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13081 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13082 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13085 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13086 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13087 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13088 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13089 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13090 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13091 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13095 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13096 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13097 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13098 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13101 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13102 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),"
<citetitle>Stanford Technology
13103 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13105 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13106 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13107 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13108 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13109 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13110 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13111 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13113 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13114 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13115 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13116 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13119 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13120 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13121 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13122 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13123 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13124 care much about controlling their software.
13125 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13127 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13129 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13130 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13131 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13132 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13133 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13137 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13138 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13139 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13140 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13141 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13142 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13143 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13144 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13145 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13149 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13150 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13151 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13152 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13153 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13154 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13155 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13158 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13159 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13160 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13161 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13162 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13163 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13164 fundamentally weakened.
13167 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13168 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13169 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13170 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13171 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13172 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13175 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13176 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13177 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13178 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13179 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13180 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13181 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13182 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13186 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13187 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13188 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13189 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13190 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13191 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13194 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13195 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13196 scientific journals are produced.
13198 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13199 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13202 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13203 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13204 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13205 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13206 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13207 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13208 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13209 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13210 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13211 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13212 and Westlaw are also free
13213 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13214 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13215 Court opinion through their respective services.
13218 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13219 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13220 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13221 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13222 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13223 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13224 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13227 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13228 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13229 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13232 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13233 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13234 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13235 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13236 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13237 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13238 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13239 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13240 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13241 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13244 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13245 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13246 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13247 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13248 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13252 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13253 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13254 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13255 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13257 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13258 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13259 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13260 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13261 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13262 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13263 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13266 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13267 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13268 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13269 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13270 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13271 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13274 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13277 <section id=
"oneidea">
13278 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13279 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13280 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13283 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13284 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13287 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13288 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13289 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13290 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13291 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13292 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13293 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13294 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13295 make this possible.
13298 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13299 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13300 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13301 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13302 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13303 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13304 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13305 human-readable description, and
13306 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13307 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13308 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13309 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13310 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13311 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13312 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13313 certain freedoms are given.
13316 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13317 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13318 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13319 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13320 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13321 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13322 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13323 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13324 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13327 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13328 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13329 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13330 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13331 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13332 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13333 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13334 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13338 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13339 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13340 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13341 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13342 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13343 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13344 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13345 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13346 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13347 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13348 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13351 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13352 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13353 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13354 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13355 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13356 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13357 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13358 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13359 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13360 to begin to build those rules.
13363 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13364 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13365 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13366 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13367 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13370 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13371 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13372 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13373 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13374 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13375 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13376 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13377 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13378 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13379 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13382 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13383 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13384 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13385 was a total success.
13388 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13389 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13391 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13392 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13393 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13394 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13395 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13397 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13398 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13401 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13402 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13403 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13404 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13405 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13406 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13407 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13408 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13409 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13410 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13411 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13412 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13413 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13414 high
<footnote><para>
13416 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13417 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13418 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13419 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13420 </para></footnote>),
13421 these artists release into the creative environment content
13422 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13423 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13426 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13427 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13428 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13429 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13430 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13431 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13432 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13433 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13434 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13438 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13439 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13440 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13441 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13443 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13444 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13445 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13448 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13449 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13450 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13451 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13452 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13453 steps are possible.
13456 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13457 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13458 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13459 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13460 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13461 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13462 creativity to spread more easily.
13464 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13469 <section id=
"themsoon">
13470 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13472 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13473 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13474 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13475 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13476 changes that we need.
13479 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13480 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13481 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13485 <section id=
"formalities">
13486 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13488 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13489 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13490 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13491 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13494 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13495 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13496 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13500 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13501 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13502 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13503 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13509 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13510 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13511 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13512 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13513 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13514 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13515 formalities were getting in the way.
13518 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13519 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13520 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13521 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13522 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13523 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13524 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13525 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13526 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13527 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13530 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13532 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13533 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13534 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13535 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13536 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13537 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13540 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13541 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13542 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13543 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13544 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13545 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13546 developed by others.
13549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13551 <section id=
"registration">
13552 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13554 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13555 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13556 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13557 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13558 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13559 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13560 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13561 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13562 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13563 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13564 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13567 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13568 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13569 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13570 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13571 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13572 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13573 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13576 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13577 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13578 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13579 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13580 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13581 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13582 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13583 with which registration occurs up.
13586 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13587 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13588 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13589 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13590 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13591 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13592 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13593 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13594 formality
—while producing a database
13595 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13596 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13600 <section id=
"marking">
13601 <title>MARKING
</title>
13603 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13604 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13605 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13606 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13607 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13608 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13609 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13610 uniformly across all media.
13613 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13614 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13615 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13619 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13620 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13621 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13622 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13623 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13624 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13625 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13626 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13629 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13630 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13631 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13632 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13633 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13634 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13636 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13637 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13638 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13640 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13641 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13642 stop using the work in any new
13643 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13644 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13645 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13649 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13650 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13651 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13652 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13653 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13656 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13657 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13658 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13659 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13660 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13661 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13662 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13663 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13664 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13665 other important functions.
13668 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13669 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13670 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13671 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13672 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13673 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13676 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13677 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13678 make things unclear.
13681 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13682 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13683 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13684 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13685 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13686 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13692 <section id=
"shortterms">
13693 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13695 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13696 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13700 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13701 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13702 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13703 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13704 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13705 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13708 "A Radical Rethink,"
<citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13710 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13712 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13715 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13716 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13717 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13720 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13723 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13724 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13725 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13726 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13727 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13728 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13732 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
13733 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13734 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13735 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13736 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13737 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13738 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13739 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13740 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13745 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13746 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13747 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13748 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13749 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13750 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13751 pension.
<footnote><para>
13753 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13754 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13756 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13758 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13759 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13761 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
13765 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13766 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13767 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13768 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13769 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13770 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
13771 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13772 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13773 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
13774 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13775 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13776 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13777 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13778 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13781 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
13782 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
13783 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13787 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13788 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13789 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13790 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13793 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13796 <section id=
"freefairuse">
13797 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13799 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13800 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13801 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13802 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13803 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13804 the emergence of that new technology.
13807 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13808 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13809 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13810 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13811 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13812 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13813 though that movie is not "my writing."
13816 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13817 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13818 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13820 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13821 University Press,
1967),
32.
13823 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13824 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13825 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13826 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
13830 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13831 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13832 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13833 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13834 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13839 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13840 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13841 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13842 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13843 Consider each limitation in turn.
13846 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13847 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13848 sense to protect John
13850 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13851 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13852 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13853 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13854 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13855 after the creative work is done.
13856 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13859 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13860 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13861 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13862 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13863 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13864 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13865 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13866 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13867 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13868 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13869 the creative process. Smothers it.
13872 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13873 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13874 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13875 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13876 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13880 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13881 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13882 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13883 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13886 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13887 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13888 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13890 His view is that the law should be written so that
13891 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13894 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13895 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13896 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13897 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13898 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13901 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13902 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13903 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13904 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13905 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13906 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13910 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
13911 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13913 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13914 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13915 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
13916 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
13917 battles around the sharing of music.
13920 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
13921 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
13922 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
13923 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
13924 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
13925 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
13926 innovation on the network.
13929 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
13930 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
13931 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
13932 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
13933 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
13936 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
13937 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
13938 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
13939 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
13940 four different kinds of sharing:
13942 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
13945 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
13946 for purchasing CDs.
13950 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
13951 on the way to purchasing CDs.
13954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
13956 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13957 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
13958 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
13962 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
13963 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
13964 owner plainly endorses.
13968 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
13969 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
13970 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
13971 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
13972 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
13973 significantly weakened.
13976 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13977 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
13978 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
13979 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
13980 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
13984 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
13985 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
13989 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
13990 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
13991 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
13992 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
13993 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
13994 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
13995 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
13996 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
13997 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
13998 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14001 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14002 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14003 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14004 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14005 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14006 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14007 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14008 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14009 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14010 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14011 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14012 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14013 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14016 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14017 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14018 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14019 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14020 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14021 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14022 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14023 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14024 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14025 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14026 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14027 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14028 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14029 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14030 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14031 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14032 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14034 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14035 April
2002, available at
14036 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14041 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14042 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14043 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14044 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14045 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14046 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14047 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14048 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14049 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14050 artists get paid, during
14052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14053 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14054 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14057 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14058 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14059 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14060 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14061 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14062 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14063 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14064 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14065 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14068 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14069 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14070 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14071 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14072 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14073 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14074 way that returns something to the artist.
14077 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14078 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14079 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14080 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14081 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14082 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14083 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14084 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14087 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14088 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14089 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14090 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14091 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14092 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14093 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14097 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14098 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14099 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14100 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14101 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14102 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14103 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14104 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14108 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14109 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14110 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14111 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14112 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14113 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14114 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14115 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14118 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14119 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14120 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14121 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14122 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14123 delivering and accessing content.
14126 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14127 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14130 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14131 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14132 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14133 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14134 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14135 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14136 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14137 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14141 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14142 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14143 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14144 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14145 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14146 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14149 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14150 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14153 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14154 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14155 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14156 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14157 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14158 2004), ch.
6, available at
14159 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14160 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14161 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14162 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14163 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14164 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14165 Broadband?"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14166 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14167 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14169 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14170 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14171 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14172 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14174 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14175 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14176 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14177 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14179 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14180 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14181 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14182 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14183 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14184 debate by about a decade. See
14185 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14186 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14187 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14188 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14190 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14191 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14192 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14193 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14194 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14195 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14196 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14197 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14201 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14202 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14203 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14204 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14205 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14206 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14207 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14208 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14209 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14210 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14211 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14212 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14213 controlling access.
14214 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14217 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14218 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14219 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14220 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14221 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14222 limits on derivative
14224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14225 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14226 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14227 allowed to do with the content itself.
14230 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14231 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14232 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14233 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14234 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14235 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14236 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14237 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14238 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14239 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14240 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14241 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14245 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14246 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14247 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14248 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14249 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14250 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14251 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14252 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14253 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14254 finding ways to compete with "free."
14257 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14258 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14259 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14260 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14261 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14262 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14266 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14271 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14272 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14273 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14274 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14278 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14281 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14284 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14288 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14289 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14294 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14295 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14299 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14300 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14301 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14305 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14306 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14307 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14308 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14309 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14310 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14311 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14312 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14313 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14314 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14315 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14319 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14320 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14321 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14323 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14324 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14325 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14329 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14330 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14332 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14333 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14334 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14335 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14338 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14339 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14340 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14341 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14342 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14343 strong view queers the law.
14346 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14347 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14348 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14349 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14350 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14351 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14352 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14353 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14355 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14356 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14361 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14362 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14363 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14366 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14367 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14368 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14369 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14371 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14372 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14373 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14374 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14375 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14376 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14377 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14378 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14379 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14380 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14382 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14383 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14384 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14385 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14386 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14387 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14389 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14390 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14394 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14395 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14396 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14397 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14398 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14399 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14400 practically never be done.
14403 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14404 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14405 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14406 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14407 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14408 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14409 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14410 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14413 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14414 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14415 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14416 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14417 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14418 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14421 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14422 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14423 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14427 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14428 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14429 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14430 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14431 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14432 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14433 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14436 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14437 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14440 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14441 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14442 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14445 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14446 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14447 keep your lawyers away.
14449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14453 <chapter id=
"c-notes">
14454 <title>NOTES
</title>
14456 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14457 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14458 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14459 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14460 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14461 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14462 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14463 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14464 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14467 <!-- PAGE BREAK 336 -->
14470 <chapter id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14471 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14473 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14474 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14475 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14476 to him that this book is dedicated.
14479 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14480 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14481 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14482 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14483 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14484 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14485 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14486 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14487 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14488 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14489 critical eye on much of this.
14492 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14493 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14494 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14495 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 337 -->
14497 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14498 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14499 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14500 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14503 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14504 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14505 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14506 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14507 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14508 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14509 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14510 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14511 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14512 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14513 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14514 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14515 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14516 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14517 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14518 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14519 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14520 a bunch of great replies.)
14523 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14524 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14525 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14526 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14527 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14528 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14529 throughout this book.
14532 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14533 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14534 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14535 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14537 <!-- PAGE BREAK 338 -->