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15 <book id="index" lang="en">
16 <bookinfo>
17 <title>Free Culture</title>
18
19 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
20
21 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
22 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY</subtitle>
23
24 <pubdate>2004-03-25</pubdate>
25
26 <releaseinfo>Version 2004-02-10</releaseinfo>
27
28 <authorgroup>
29 <author>
30 <firstname>Lawrence</firstname>
31 <surname>Lessig</surname>
32 </author>
33 </authorgroup>
34
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38 <subjectset scheme="libraryofcongress">
39 <subject>
40 <subjectterm>Intellectual property&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
41 </subject>
42 <subject>
43 <subjectterm>Mass media&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
44 </subject>
45 <subject>
46 <subjectterm>Technological innovations&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
47 </subject>
48 <subject>
49 <subjectterm>Art&mdash;United States.</subjectterm>
50 </subject>
51 </subjectset>
52
53
54 <publisher>
55 <publishername>The Penguin Press</publishername>
56 <address><city>New York</city></address>
57 </publisher>
58
59 <copyright>
60 <year>2004</year>
61 <holder>Lawrence Lessig</holder>
62 </copyright>
63 <legalnotice>
64 <para>
65 <inlinemediaobject>
66 <imageobject>
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68 </imageobject>
69 <imageobject>
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71 </imageobject>
72 <textobject>
73 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved</phrase>
74 </textobject>
75 </inlinemediaobject>
76 </para>
77
78 <para>
79 This version of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is licensed under
80 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
81 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
82 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
83 <ulink url="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/</ulink>
84 </para>
85 </legalnotice>
86
87 <abstract>
88 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR</title>
89 <para>
90 LAWRENCE LESSIG
91 (<ulink url="http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org</ulink>),
92 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
93 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
94 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
95 (<ulink url="http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org</ulink>).
96 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House, 2001) and Code: And
97 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999), Lessig is a member of
98 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
99 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
100 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
101 twice listed in BusinessWeek's <quote>e.biz 25,</quote> and named one of Scientific
102 American's <quote>50 visionaries.</quote> A graduate of the University of
103 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
104 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
105 Appeals.
106 </para>
107 </abstract>
108
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126
127 <biblioid class="isbn">1-59420-006-8</biblioid>
128
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132 <biblioid class="libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
133
134 </bookinfo>
135 <!--PAGE BREAK 1-->
136 <dedication id="salespoints">
137 <title></title>
138 <para>
139 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
140 </para>
141 <itemizedlist mark="number" spacing="compact">
142 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon</ulink></para></listitem>
143 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B&amp;N</ulink></para></listitem>
144 <listitem><para><ulink url="http://www.penguin.com/">Penguin</ulink></para></listitem>
145 <!-- <ulink url="">Local Bookstore</ulink> -->
146 </itemizedlist>
147 </dedication>
148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
150 <dedication id="alsobylessig">
151 <title></title>
152 <para>
153 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
154 </para>
155 <para>
156 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
157 </para>
158 <para>
159 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
160 </para>
161 </dedication>
162 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
163 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
164 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
165 <colophon>
166 <para>
167 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New
168 York, New York
169 </para>
170 <para>
171 Copyright &copy; Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
172 </para>
173 <para>
174 Excerpt from an editorial titled <quote>The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,</quote>
175 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, January 16, 2003. Copyright
176 &copy; 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
177 </para>
178 <para>
179 Cartoon in <xref linkend="fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
180 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
181 </para>
182 <para>
183 Diagram in <xref linkend="fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
184 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
185 </para>
186 <para>
187 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
188 </para>
189 <para>
190 Lessig, Lawrence.
191 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
192 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
193 </para>
194 <para>
195 p. cm.
196 </para>
197 <para>
198 Includes index.
199 </para>
200 <para>
201 ISBN 1-59420-006-8 (hardcover)
202 </para>
203
204 <para>
205 1. Intellectual property&mdash;United States. 2. Mass media&mdash;United States.
206 </para>
207 <para>
208 3. Technological innovations&mdash;United States. 4. Art&mdash;United States. I. Title.
209 </para>
210 <para>
211 KF2979.L47
212 </para>
213 <para>
214 343.7309'9&mdash;dc22
215 </para>
216 <para>
217 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
218 </para>
219 <para>
220 Printed in the United States of America
221 </para>
222 <para>
223 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4
224 </para>
225 <para>
226 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
227 </para>
228
229 <para>
230 &translationblock;
231 </para>
232
233 <para>
234 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
235 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
236 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
237 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
238 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
239 the above publisher of this book.
240 </para>
241 <para>
242 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
243 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
244 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
245 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
246 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
247 author's rights is appreciated.
248 </para>
249 </colophon>
250
251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
252 <dedication><title></title>
253 <para>
254 To Eric Eldred&mdash;whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
255 it continues still.
256 </para>
257 </dedication>
258
259 <toc id="toc"></toc>
260
261 <lot>
262 <title>List of figures</title>
263 </lot>
264
265 <!--
266 c PREFACE xiii
267 c INTRODUCTION
268 c "PIRACY"
269 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
270 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
271 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
272 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
273 2 Film
274 2 Recorded Music
275 2 Radio
276 2 Cable TV
277 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
278 2 Piracy I
279 2 Piracy II
280 c "PROPERTY"
281 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
282 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
283 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
284 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
285 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
286 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
287 2 Beginnings
288 2 Law: Duration
289 2 Law: Scope
290 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
291 2 Architecture and Law: Force
292 2 Market: Concentration
293 2 Together
294 c PUZZLES
295 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
296 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
297 2 Constraining Creators
298 2 Constraining Innovators
299 2 Corrupting Citizens
300 c BALANCES
301 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
302 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
303 c CONCLUSION
304 c AFTERWORD
305 1 Us, Now
306 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
307 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
308 1 Them, Soon
309 2 1. More Formalities
310 3 Registration and Renewal
311 3 Marking
312 2 2. Shorter Terms
313 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
314 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
315 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
316 c NOTES
317 c ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
318 c INDEX
319 -->
320
321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
322
323 <preface id="preface">
324 <title>PREFACE</title>
325 <indexterm id="idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'>
326 <primary>Pogue, David</primary>
327 </indexterm>
328 <para>
329 <emphasis role="bold">At the end</emphasis> of his review of my first
330 book, <citetitle>Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle>, David
331 Pogue, a brilliant writer and author of countless technical and
332 computer-related texts, wrote this:
333 </para>
334 <blockquote>
335 <para>
336 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
337 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
338 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
339 system, you can always flip off the modem.<footnote id="preface01"><para>
340 David Pogue, <quote>Don't Just Chat, Do Something,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 30 January 2000.
341 </para></footnote>
342 </para>
343 </blockquote>
344 <para>
345 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book&mdash;that
346 software, or <quote>code,</quote> functioned as a kind of law&mdash;and his review
347 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
348 could always <quote>drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome</quote>-like simply flip a
349 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
350 any troubles that exist in <emphasis>that</emphasis> space wouldn't
351 <quote>affect</quote> us anymore.
352 </para>
353 <para>
354 Pogue might have been right in 1999&mdash;I'm skeptical, but maybe.
355 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
356 <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
357 causes even after the modem is turned
358 <!--PAGE BREAK 12-->
359 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
360 on-line have fundamentally affected <quote>people who aren't online.</quote> There
361 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
362 </para>
363 <indexterm startref="idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'/>
364 <para>
365 But unlike <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
366 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
367 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
368 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
369 important.
370 </para>
371 <para>
372 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
373 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of <quote>free culture</quote>&mdash;not
374 <quote>free</quote> as in <quote>free beer</quote> (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
375 free software movement<footnote>
376 <para>
377 Richard M. Stallman, <citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed. 2002).
378 </para></footnote>), but <quote>free</quote> as in <quote>free speech,</quote> <quote>free markets,</quote>
379 <quote>free trade,</quote> <quote>free enterprise,</quote> <quote>free will,</quote> and <quote>free elections.</quote> A
380 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
381 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
382 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
383 follow-on creators and innovators remain <emphasis>as free as
384 possible</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
385 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
386 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
387 <quote>permission culture</quote>&mdash;a culture in which creators get to create
388 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
389 past.
390 </para>
391 <para>
392 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not <quote>we</quote>
393 on the Left or <quote>you</quote> on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
394 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
395 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
396 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
397 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
398 culture deem fundamental.
399 </para>
400 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
401 <indexterm><primary>Stevens, Ted</primary></indexterm>
402 <para>
403 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
404 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
405 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
406 generated more than 700,000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
407 As William Safire described marching <quote>uncomfortably alongside CodePink
408 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
409 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens,</quote> he formulated perhaps
410 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
411 he asked,
412 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
413 </para>
414 <blockquote>
415 <para>
416 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
417 power&mdash;political, corporate, media, cultural&mdash;should be anathema to
418 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
419 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
420 the greatest expression of democracy.<footnote><para> William Safire,
421 <quote>The Great Media Gulp,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 May 2003.
422 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
423 </para></footnote>
424 </para>
425 </blockquote>
426 <para>
427 This idea is an element of the argument of <citetitle>Free Culture</citetitle>, though my
428 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
429 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
430 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
431 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
432 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
433 you&mdash;whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
434 Safire's left or on his right.
435 </para>
436 <para>
437 <emphasis role="strong">The inspiration</emphasis> for the title and for
438 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
439 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
440 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in <citetitle>Free Software, Free
441 Society</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
442 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
443 that this work is <quote>merely</quote> derivative.
444 </para>
445 <para>
446 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
447 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
448 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
449 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
450 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
451 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
452 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
453 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
454
455 <!--PAGE BREAK 14-->
456 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
457 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
458 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
459 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
460 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
461 what I advance here.
462 </para>
463 <para>
464 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
465 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
466 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
467 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
468 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
469 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
470 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
471 book is written.
472 </para>
473
474 </preface>
475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
476
477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
478 <chapter label="0" id="c-introduction">
479 <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
480 <indexterm id='idxairtraffic' class='startofrange'>
481 <primary>air traffic, land ownership vs.</primary>
482 </indexterm>
483 <indexterm id='idxlandownership' class='startofrange'>
484 <primary>land ownership, air traffic and</primary>
485 </indexterm>
486 <indexterm id='idxproprigtair' class='startofrange'>
487 <primary>property rights</primary>
488 <secondary>air traffic vs.</secondary>
489 </indexterm>
490 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
491 <para>
492 <emphasis role="strong">On December 17</emphasis>, 1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
493 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
494 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
495 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
496 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
497 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
498 </para>
499 <para>
500 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
501 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
502 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
503 and all the space above, to <quote>an indefinite extent, upwards.</quote><footnote><para>
504 St. George Tucker, <citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
505 Rothman Reprints, 1969), 18.
506 </para></footnote>
507 For many
508 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
509 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
510 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
511 </para>
512 <para>
513 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
514 law&mdash;deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
515 by the most important legal thinkers of our past&mdash;mattered. If
516 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
517 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
518 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
519 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
520 </para>
521 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
522 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
523 <para>
524 In 1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
525 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
526 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
527 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
528 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
529 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
530 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to <quote>an indefinite
531 extent, upwards,</quote> then the government was trespassing on their
532 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
533 </para>
534 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
535 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
536 <para>
537 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
538 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
539 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
540 <quote>taking</quote> of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
541 that <quote>it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
542 the land extended to the periphery of the universe.</quote> But Justice Douglas
543 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
544 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
545 </para>
546 <blockquote>
547 <para>
548 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
549 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
550 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
551 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
552 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
553 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
554 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
555 the public has a just claim.<footnote>
556 <para>
557 United States v. Causby, U.S. 328 (1946): 256, 261. The Court did find
558 that there could be a <quote>taking</quote> if the government's use of its land
559 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
560 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, <quote>(Intellectual)
561 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
562 Authorship,</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Law Review</citetitle> 48 (1996): 1293, 1333. See also Paul
563 Goldstein, <citetitle>Real Property</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1984),
564 1112&ndash;13.
565 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
566 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
567 </para></footnote>
568 </para>
569 </blockquote>
570 <para>
571 <quote>Common sense revolts at the idea.</quote>
572 </para>
573 <para>
574 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
575 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
576 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
577 <!--PAGE BREAK 18-->
578 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: <quote>Common sense revolts
579 at the idea.</quote> But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
580 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
581 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
582 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
583 </para>
584 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
585 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
586 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
587 <para>
588 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
589 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
590 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
591 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
592 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
593 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
594 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
595 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
596 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by <quote>what
597 seemed reasonable</quote> given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
598 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
599 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
600 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
601 end, the force of what seems <quote>obvious</quote> to everyone else&mdash;the power of
602 <quote>common sense</quote>&mdash;would prevail. Their <quote>private interest</quote> would not be
603 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
604 </para>
605 <indexterm startref='idxproprigtair' class='endofrange'/>
606 <indexterm startref='idxlandownership' class='endofrange'/>
607 <indexterm startref='idxairtraffic' class='endofrange'/>
608 <indexterm id='idxarmstrongedwin' class='startofrange'>
609 <primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary>
610 </indexterm>
611 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham</primary></indexterm>
612 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
613 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael</primary></indexterm>
614 <para>
615 <emphasis role='strong'>Edwin Howard Armstrong</emphasis> is one of
616 America's forgotten inventor geniuses. He came to the great American
617 inventor scene just after the titans Thomas Edison and Alexander
618 Graham Bell. But his work in the area of radio technology was perhaps
619 the most important of any single inventor in the first fifty years of
620 radio. He was better educated than Michael Faraday, who as a
621 bookbinder's apprentice had discovered electric induction in 1831. But
622 he had the same intuition about how the world of radio worked, and on
623 at least three occasions, Armstrong invented profoundly important
624 technologies that advanced our understanding of radio.
625 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
626 </para>
627 <para>
628 On the day after Christmas, 1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
629 for his most significant invention&mdash;FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
630 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
631 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
632 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
633 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
634 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
635 much less transmitter power and static.
636 </para>
637 <para>
638 On November 5, 1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
639 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
640 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
641 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
642 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
643 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
644 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
645 <quote>This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
646 frequency modulation at two and a half meters.</quote>
647 </para>
648 <para>
649 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
650 </para>
651 <blockquote>
652 <para>
653 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
654 sounded like a glass of water being poured. &hellip; A paper was crumpled
655 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
656 fire. &hellip; Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
657 and guitar number were performed. &hellip; The music was projected with a
658 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio <quote>music
659 box.</quote><footnote><para>
660 Lawrence Lessing, <citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong</citetitle>
661 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company, 1956), 209.
662 </para></footnote>
663 </para>
664 </blockquote>
665 <para>
666 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
667 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
668 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
669 AM radio market. By 1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
670 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
671 a handful of networks.
672 <!--PAGE BREAK 20-->
673 </para>
674 <para>
675 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
676 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
677 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
678 that removed static from <quote>radio.</quote> But when Armstrong demonstrated
679 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
680 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
681 </para>
682 <blockquote>
683 <para>
684 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
685 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
686 revolution&mdash; start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
687 RCA.<footnote><para> See <quote>Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
688 Electronic Era,</quote> First Electronic Church of America, at
689 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
690
691 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #1</ulink>.
692 </para></footnote>
693 </para>
694 </blockquote>
695 <indexterm id='idxlessing' class='startofrange'>
696 <primary>Lessing, Lawrence</primary>
697 </indexterm>
698 <para>
699 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
700 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
701 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
702 described,
703 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David</primary></indexterm>
704 </para>
705 <blockquote>
706 <para>
707 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
708 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
709 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
710 unrestrained, posed &hellip; a complete reordering of radio power
711 &hellip; and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
712 on which RCA had grown to power.<footnote><para>Lessing, 226.
713 </para></footnote>
714 </para>
715 </blockquote>
716 <para>
717 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
718 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
719 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
720 FM radio's deployment generally. In 1936, RCA hired the former head
721 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
722 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM&mdash;principally by moving FM
723 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
724 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
725 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
726 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
727 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
728 </para>
729 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
730 <blockquote>
731 <para>
732 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
733 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
734 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
735 deviousness.<footnote><para>
736 Lessing, 256.
737 </para></footnote>
738 </para>
739 </blockquote>
740 <indexterm startref='idxlessing' class='endofrange'/>
741 <indexterm><primary>AT&amp;T</primary></indexterm>
742 <para>
743 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
744 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
745 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
746 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
747 (This change was strongly supported by AT&amp;T, because the loss of
748 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
749 wired links from AT&amp;T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
750 least temporarily.
751 </para>
752 <para>
753 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
754 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
755 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
756 invalid&mdash;baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
757 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
758 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
759 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
760 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
761 now broke, in 1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
762 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
763 </para>
764 <indexterm startref='idxarmstrongedwin' class='endofrange'/>
765 <para>
766 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
767 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
768 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
769 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
770 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
771 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
772 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
773 course always public spirited; the reality is something
774 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
775 to themselves, would crumble in
776 <!--PAGE BREAK 22-->
777 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
778 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
779 effect of technological change.
780 </para>
781 <para>
782 <emphasis role="strong">There's no</emphasis> single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
783 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
784 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
785 Internet and American Life Project, 58 percent of Americans had access
786 to the Internet in 2002, up from 49 percent two years
787 before.<footnote><para>
788 Amanda Lenhart, <quote>The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
789 Internet Access and the Digital Divide,</quote> Pew Internet and American
790 Life Project, 15 April 2003: 6, available at
791 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #2</ulink>.
792 </para></footnote>
793 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
794 of 2004.
795 </para>
796 <para>
797 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
798 changed things. Some of these changes are technical&mdash;the Internet has
799 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
800 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
801 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
802 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
803 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
804 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
805 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
806 </para>
807 <para>
808 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
809 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
810 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
811 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
812 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
813 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
814 has introduced.
815 </para>
816 <para>
817 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
818 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
819 regulation of each. By <quote>commercial culture</quote> I mean that part of our
820 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
821 <quote>noncommercial culture</quote> I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
822 parks or on
823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
824 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
825 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his <quote>Reader,</quote> or
826 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
827 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel</primary></indexterm>
828 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah</primary></indexterm>
829 </para>
830 <para>
831 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
832 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
833 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
834 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
835 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
836 left this culture <quote>free.</quote> The ordinary ways in which ordinary
837 individuals shared and transformed their culture&mdash;telling
838 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
839 clubs, sharing music, making tapes&mdash;were left alone by the law.
840 </para>
841 <para>
842 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
843 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
844 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
845 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
846 marketplace.<footnote>
847 <para>
848 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
849 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
850 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
851 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
852 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
853 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
854 D. Brandeis, <quote>The Right to Privacy,</quote> Harvard Law Review 4 (1890): 193,
855 198&ndash;200.
856 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
857 </para></footnote>
858 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
859 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
860 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
861 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
862 </para>
863 <para>
864 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
865 been erased.<footnote><para>
866 See Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
867 2001), ch. 13.
868 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
869 </para></footnote>
870 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
871 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
872 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
873 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
874 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
875 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
876 the balance of our history&mdash;between uses of our culture that were
877 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission&mdash;has
878 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
879 culture, more and more a permission culture.
880 </para>
881 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
882 <para>
883 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
884 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
885 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
886 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
887 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
888 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
889 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
890 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
891 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
892 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
893 Causbys.
894 </para>
895 <para>
896 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
897 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
898 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
899 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
900 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
901 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
902 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
903 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
904 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
905 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
906 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
907 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
908 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
909 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
910 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
911 than creators do today&mdash;all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
912 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
913 </para>
914 <para>
915 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
916 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
917 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
918 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
919 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
920 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
921 remakes them.
922 </para>
923 <para>
924 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
926 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
927 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions&mdash;whether <quote>piracy</quote> will
928 be permitted, and whether <quote>property</quote> will be protected. The <quote>war</quote> that
929 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet&mdash;what
930 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
931 calls his <quote>own terrorist war</quote><footnote><para>
932 Amy Harmon, <quote>Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
933 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,</quote> <citetitle>New York
934 Times</citetitle>, 17 January 2002.
935 </para></footnote>&mdash;has been framed as a battle about the
936 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
937 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
938 against it.
939 </para>
940 <para>
941 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
942 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
943 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
944 <quote>creative property.</quote> I believe that <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong, and that the
945 law, properly tuned, should punish <quote>piracy,</quote> whether on or off the
946 Internet.
947 </para>
948 <para>
949 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
950 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
951 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet <quote>pirates</quote> will also rid our
952 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
953 </para>
954 <para>
955 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first 180 years of
956 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
957 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
958 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
959 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,<footnote>
960 <para>
961 Neil W. Netanel, <quote>Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
962 Journal</citetitle> 106 (1996): 283.
963 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
964 </para></footnote>
965 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
966 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
967 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
968 could cultivate and extend our culture.
969 </para>
970 <para>
971 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
972 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
973 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
974 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist&ndash;like,
975 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
976 granted&mdash;but it is not often granted to the critical or the
977 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
978 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
979 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
980 </para>
981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
982 <para>
983 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
984 <quote>centrality of technology</quote> to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
985 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
986 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
987 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
988 against an industry.
989 </para>
990 <para>
991 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
992 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
993 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
994 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
995 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
996 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
997 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
998 </para>
999 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1000 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1001 <para>
1002 <emphasis role="strong">Like the Causbys'</emphasis> battle, this war is, in part, about <quote>property.</quote> The
1003 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1004 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1005 this <quote>property</quote> are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1006 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1007 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1008 of <quote>intellectual property</quote> now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1009 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1010 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1011 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1012 <quote>trespassing</quote> upon legitimate claims of <quote>property.</quote> It is as plain to
1013 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1014 trespass.
1015 </para>
1016 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1017 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1018 <indexterm><primary>Wright brothers</primary></indexterm>
1019 <para>
1020 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1021 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1022 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1023 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1024 war. Unlike
1025 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1026 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1027 on its side.
1028 </para>
1029 <para>
1030 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1031 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1032 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1033 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1034 our <quote>culture</quote> was as <quote>owned</quote> as it is now. And yet there has never
1035 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1036 <emphasis>uses</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1037 accepted as it is now.
1038 </para>
1039 <para>
1040 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1041 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1042 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1043 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1044 </para>
1045 <para>
1046 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1047 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1048 </para>
1049 <para>
1050 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1051 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1052 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1053 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1054 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1055 </para>
1056 <para>
1057 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1058 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1059 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1060 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1061 view?
1062 </para>
1063 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
1064 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
1065 <para>
1066 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1067 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1068 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1069 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of <quote>intellectual
1070 property.</quote> What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1071 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1072 this silliness will be much more profound.
1073 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1074 </para>
1075 <para>
1076 <emphasis role="strong">The struggle</emphasis> that rages just now centers on two ideas: <quote>piracy</quote> and
1077 <quote>property.</quote> My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1078 ideas.
1079 </para>
1080 <para>
1081 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1082 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1083 obscure French theorists&mdash;however natural that is for the weird
1084 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1085 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1086 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1087 </para>
1088 <para>
1089 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1090 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1091 government, pushed by big media to respond to this <quote>something new,</quote> is
1092 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1093 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let <quote>common
1094 sense</quote> resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1095 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1096 law&mdash;and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1097 fundamental about who we have always been.
1098 </para>
1099 <para>
1100 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1101 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1102 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1103 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1104 of one more consequence of this form of corruption&mdash;a consequence
1105 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1106 </para>
1107 </chapter>
1108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1109 <part id="c-piracy">
1110 <title><quote>PIRACY</quote></title>
1111 <partintro>
1112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1113 <indexterm id="idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'>
1114 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
1115 </indexterm>
1116 <para>
1117 <emphasis role="strong">Since the inception</emphasis> of the law regulating creative property, there has
1118 been a war against <quote>piracy.</quote> The precise contours of this concept,
1119 <quote>piracy,</quote> are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1120 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1121 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1122 </para>
1123 <blockquote>
1124 <para>
1125 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1126 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1127 of them for his own use.<footnote><para>
1128 <!-- f1 -->
1129 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777) (Mansfield).
1130 </para></footnote>
1131 </para>
1132 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'/>
1133 </blockquote>
1134 <para>
1135 Today we are in the middle of another <quote>war</quote> against <quote>piracy.</quote> The
1136 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1137 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1138 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1139 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1140 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1142 </para>
1143 <para>
1144 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1145 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1146 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1147 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1148 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will <quote>rob the author of the
1149 profit.</quote>
1150 </para>
1151 <para>
1152 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1153 increasingly to technology to defend their <quote>property</quote> against this
1154 <quote>piracy.</quote> A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1155 raised to believe that <quote>property</quote> should be <quote>free.</quote> Forget tattoos,
1156 never mind body piercing&mdash;our kids are becoming
1157 <emphasis>thieves</emphasis>!
1158 </para>
1159 <para>
1160 There's no doubt that <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong, and that pirates should be
1161 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1162 notion of <quote>piracy</quote> in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1163 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1164 </para>
1165 <para>
1166 The idea goes something like this:
1167 </para>
1168 <blockquote>
1169 <para>
1170 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1171 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1172 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1173 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1174 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1175 piracy.
1176 </para>
1177 </blockquote>
1178 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle</primary></indexterm>
1179 <indexterm><primary>Girl Schouts</primary></indexterm>
1180 <indexterm id='idxifvalue' class='startofrange'>
1181 <primary><quote>if value, then right</quote> theory</primary>
1182 </indexterm>
1183 <para>
1184 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1185 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the <quote>if value, then right</quote>
1186 theory of creative property<footnote><para>
1187 <!-- f2 -->
1188 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, <quote>Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1189 in the Pepsi Generation,</quote> <citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review</citetitle> 65 (1990): 397.
1190 </para></footnote>
1191 &mdash;if there is value, then someone must have a
1192 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1193 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1194 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.<footnote><para>
1195 <!-- f3 -->
1196 Lisa Bannon, <quote>The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1197 Up,</quote> <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 21 August 1996, available at
1198 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #3</ulink>; Jonathan
1199 Zittrain, <quote>Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1200 Speech, No One Wins,</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 24 November 2002.
1201 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
1202 </para></footnote>
1203 There was <quote>value</quote> (the songs) so there must have been a
1204 <quote>right</quote>&mdash;even against the Girl Scouts.
1205 </para>
1206 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP</primary></indexterm>
1207 <para>
1208 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1209 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1210 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1211 of law protecting creative property. But the <quote>if value, then right</quote>
1212 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1213 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1214 </para>
1215 <indexterm startref='idxifvalue' class='endofrange'/>
1216 <para>
1217 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1218 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1219 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1220 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1221 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1222 </para>
1223 <para>
1224 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1225 takes care to draw&mdash;the distinction between republishing someone's
1226 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1227 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1228 copyright law today regulates both.
1229 </para>
1230 <para>
1231 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1232 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1233 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1234 entities could bear the burden of the law&mdash;even the burden of the
1235 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1236 more expense of doing business.
1237 </para>
1238 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1239 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1240 <para>
1241 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1242 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1243 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1244 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1245 <quote>copying,</quote> when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1246 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1247 outweighs any original benefit&mdash;certainly as it affects
1248 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1249 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1250 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1251 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1252 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1253 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1254 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1255 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1257 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the <quote>Rise of the Creative
1258 Class.</quote><footnote>
1259 <para>
1260 <!-- f4 -->
1261 In <citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class</citetitle> (New York:
1262 Basic Books, 2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1263 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1264 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1265 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1266 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1267 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1268
1269 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard</primary></indexterm>
1270 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)</primary></indexterm>
1271 </para></footnote>
1272 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1273 this creative class.
1274 </para>
1275 <para>
1276 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1277 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1278 context the current battles about behavior labeled <quote>piracy.</quote>
1279 </para>
1280 </partintro>
1281
1282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1283 <chapter label="1" id="creators">
1284 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators</title>
1285 <indexterm id="idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'>
1286 <primary>animated cartoons</primary>
1287 </indexterm>
1288 <para>
1289 <emphasis role="strong">In 1928</emphasis>, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1290 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called <citetitle>Plane Crazy</citetitle>.
1291 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1292 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound, <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle> brought
1293 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1294 </para>
1295 <para>
1296 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1297 movie <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1298 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1299 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1300 Disney ran a test in the summer of 1928, the results were unambiguous.
1301 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1302 </para>
1303 <blockquote>
1304 <para>
1305 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1306 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1307 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1308 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1310 </para>
1311 <para>
1312 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1313 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1314 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1315 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1316 synchronization was pretty close.
1317 </para>
1318 <para>
1319 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1320 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1321 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1322 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1323 it was something new!<footnote><para>
1324 <!-- f1 -->
1325 Leonard Maltin, <citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1326 Cartoons</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 34&ndash;35.
1327 </para></footnote>
1328 </para>
1329 </blockquote>
1330 <para>
1331 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1332 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: <quote>I have never been so thrilled
1333 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it.</quote>
1334 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub</primary></indexterm>
1335 </para>
1336 <para>
1337 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1338 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1339 rarely&mdash;except in Disney's hands&mdash;been anything more than
1340 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1341 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1342 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1343 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1344 </para>
1345 <para>
1346 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that 1928 also marks
1347 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1348 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1349 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>.
1350 </para>
1351 <para>
1352 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in 1895. In the era of silent
1353 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1354 uncontrollable laughter from his audience. <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1355 Jr</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1356 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton&mdash;wildly popular
1357 and among the best of its genre.
1358 </para>
1359 <para>
1360 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1361 Willie.
1362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1363 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1364 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,<footnote><para>
1365 <!-- f2 -->
1366 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1367 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #4</ulink>.
1368 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1369 use the music for five songs in <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>: <quote>Steamboat Bill,</quote> <quote>The
1370 Simpleton</quote> (Delille), <quote>Mischief Makers</quote> (Carbonara), <quote>Joyful Hurry No. 1</quote>
1371 (Baron), and <quote>Gawky Rube</quote> (Lakay). A sixth song, <quote>The Turkey in the
1372 Straw,</quote> was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1373 Harry Surden, 10 July 2003, on file with author.
1374 </para></footnote>
1375 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1376 the invention of synchronized sound in <citetitle>The Jazz Singer</citetitle> that we
1377 get <citetitle>Steamboat Willie</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1378 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song <quote>Steamboat Bill,</quote>
1379 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1380 Mouse.
1381 </para>
1382 <para>
1383 This <quote>borrowing</quote> was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1384 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1385 films of his day.<footnote><para>
1386 <!-- f3 -->
1387 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, <quote>The Mouse
1388 that Ate the Public Domain,</quote> Findlaw, 5 March 2002, at
1389 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #5</ulink>.
1390 </para></footnote>
1391 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1392 knockoffs&mdash;slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1393 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1394 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1395 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1396 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1397 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1398 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1399 old.
1400 </para>
1401 <para>
1402 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1403 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1404 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1405 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1406 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1407 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1408 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1409 </para>
1410 <para>
1411 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1412 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1413 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1414 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1415 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1416 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1417 work of others is astonishing when set together: <citetitle>Snow White</citetitle>
1418 (1937), <citetitle>Fantasia</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Pinocchio</citetitle> (1940), <citetitle>Dumbo</citetitle>
1419 (1941), <citetitle>Bambi</citetitle> (1942), <citetitle>Song of the South</citetitle> (1946),
1420 <citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle> (1950), <citetitle>Alice in Wonderland</citetitle> (1951), <citetitle>Robin
1421 Hood</citetitle> (1952), <citetitle>Peter Pan</citetitle> (1953), <citetitle>Lady and the Tramp</citetitle>
1422 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1423 (1955), <citetitle>Mulan</citetitle> (1998), <citetitle>Sleeping Beauty</citetitle> (1959), <citetitle>101
1424 Dalmatians</citetitle> (1961), <citetitle>The Sword in the Stone</citetitle> (1963), and
1425 <citetitle>The Jungle Book</citetitle> (1967)&mdash;not to mention a recent example
1426 that we should perhaps quickly forget, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>
1427 (2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1428 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1429 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1430 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1431 </para>
1432 <indexterm startref="idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'/>
1433 <para>
1434 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1435 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1436 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1437 its importance. We could call this <quote>Disney creativity,</quote> though that
1438 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, <quote>Walt Disney
1439 creativity</quote>&mdash;a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1440 culture around us and makes it something different.
1441 </para>
1442 <para> In 1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1443 relatively fresh. The public domain in 1928 was not very old and was
1444 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1445 thirty years&mdash;for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1446 copyrighted.<footnote><para>
1447 <!-- f4 -->
1448 Until 1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1449 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the <quote>average</quote> term by
1450 determining
1451 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1452 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if 100 copyrights are registered in year
1453 1, and only 15 are renewed, and the renewal term is 28 years, then the
1454 average
1455 term is 32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1456 Web site associated with this book, available at
1457 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #6</ulink>.
1458 </para></footnote>
1459 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1460 copyright holders of a creative work had an <quote>exclusive right</quote> to control
1461 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1462 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1463 </para>
1464 <para>
1465 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1466 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1467 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a <quote>lawyer-free
1468 zone.</quote> Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1469 for Disney to use and build upon in 1928. It was free for
1470 anyone&mdash; whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1471 approved or not&mdash;to use and build upon.
1472 </para>
1473 <para>
1474 This is the ways things always were&mdash;until quite recently. For most
1475 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1476 until 1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1477 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1478
1479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1480 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1481 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the 1960s and 1970s
1482 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1483 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1484 content from before the Great Depression.
1485 </para>
1486 <para>
1487 <emphasis role="strong">Of course</emphasis>, Walt Disney had no monopoly on <quote>Walt Disney creativity.</quote>
1488 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1489 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1490 universal.
1491 </para>
1492 <para>
1493 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1494 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture: <citetitle>manga</citetitle>, or
1495 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some 40 percent of
1496 publications are comics, and 30 percent of publication revenue derives
1497 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1498 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1499 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1500 </para>
1501 <para>
1502 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1503 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1504 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1505 the stories that these <quote>graphic novels</quote> tell. For the Japanese, manga
1506 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are <quote>men in tights.</quote>
1507 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1508 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1509 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1510 interestingly different way.
1511 </para>
1512 <para>
1513 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1514 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1515 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1516 </para>
1517 <para>
1518 This is the phenomenon of <citetitle>doujinshi</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1519 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1520 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is <emphasis>just</emphasis> a
1521 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1522 transforming it either subtly or
1523 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1524 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1525 develop it differently&mdash;with a different story line. Or the comic can
1526 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1527 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently <quote>different.</quote> But they
1528 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1529 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1530 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1531 </para>
1532 <para>
1533 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1534 huge. More than 33,000 <quote>circles</quote> of creators from across Japan produce
1535 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than 450,000 Japanese come
1536 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1537 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1538 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1539 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1540 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1541 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1542 </para>
1543 <para>
1544 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1545 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1546 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1547 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1548 one. Doujinshi are plainly <quote>derivative works.</quote> There is no general
1549 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1550 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1551 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with <citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1552 Jr</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that <quote>taking</quote> without
1553 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1554 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1555 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1556 </para>
1557 <indexterm id="idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'>
1558 <primary>Winick, Judd</primary>
1559 </indexterm>
1560 <para>
1561 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1562 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1563 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, <quote>The
1564 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1565 in Japan now. &hellip; American comics were born out of copying each
1566 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1567 other. &hellip; That's how [the artists] learn to draw&mdash;by going into comic
1568 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them</quote>
1569 and building from them.<footnote><para>
1570 <!-- f5 -->
1571 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud, <citetitle>Reinventing Comics</citetitle> (New
1572 York: Perennial, 2000).
1573 </para></footnote>
1574 </para>
1575 <indexterm><primary>Superman comics</primary></indexterm>
1576 <para>
1577 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1578 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1579 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, <quote>there are these rules
1580 and you have to stick to them.</quote> There are things Superman <quote>cannot</quote>
1581 do. <quote>As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1582 which are fifty years old.</quote>
1583 </para>
1584 <indexterm startref="idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'/>
1585 <para>
1586 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1587 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1588 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1589 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1590 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1591 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1592 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.<footnote><para>
1593 <!-- f6 -->
1594 See Salil K. Mehra, <quote>Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1595 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?</quote> <citetitle>Rutgers Law
1596 Review</citetitle> 55 (2002): 155, 182. <quote>[T]here might be a collective economic
1597 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1598 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1599 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1600 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1601 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved.</quote>
1602 </para></footnote>
1603 </para>
1604 <para>
1605 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1606 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1607 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1608 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1609 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1610 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1611 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1612 a more general pattern of blocking this <quote>free taking</quote> by the doujinshi
1613 culture?
1614 </para>
1615 <para>
1616 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1617 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1618 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. <quote>We don't have enough
1619 lawyers,</quote> he told me one afternoon. There <quote>just aren't enough resources
1620 to prosecute cases like this.</quote>
1621 </para>
1622 <para>
1623 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1624 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1625 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1626 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1627 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1628 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1629 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1630 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1631 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1632 their clients or hurt them?
1633 </para>
1634 <para>
1635 <emphasis role='strong'>Let's pause</emphasis> for a moment.
1636 </para>
1637 <para>
1638 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1639 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1640 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1641 </para>
1642 <para>
1643 We live in a world that celebrates <quote>property.</quote> I am one of those
1644 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1645 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1646 <quote>intellectual property.</quote><footnote><para>
1647 <!-- f7 -->
1648 The term <citetitle>intellectual property</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1649 Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 11 (New York: New York
1650 University Press, 2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
1651 (New York: Random House, 2001), 293 n. 26. The term accurately
1652 describes a set of <quote>property</quote> rights&mdash;copyright, patents,
1653 trademark, and trade-secret&mdash;but the nature of those rights is
1654 very different.
1655 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
1656 </para></footnote>
1657 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1658 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1659 property.
1660 </para>
1661 <para>
1662 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1663 plenty of value out there that <quote>property</quote> doesn't capture. I don't
1664 mean <quote>money can't buy you love,</quote> but rather, value that is plainly
1665 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1666 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1667 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1668 condemning that taking as wrong&mdash; even though trivial, even if
1669 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1670 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1671 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1672 Disney's use would have been considered <quote>fair.</quote> There was nothing
1673 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1674 the public domain.
1675 </para>
1676 <para>
1677 Thus, even though the things that Disney took&mdash;or more generally,
1678 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity&mdash;are
1679 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1680
1681 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1682 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1683 freedom is good.
1684 </para>
1685 <para>
1686 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1687 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1688 work&mdash;or even one copy&mdash;without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1689 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1690 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1691 form, whether large or small.
1692 </para>
1693 <para>
1694 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1695 say that the copycat comic artists are <quote>stealing.</quote> This form of Walt
1696 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1697 particular find it hard to say why.
1698 </para>
1699 <para>
1700 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1701 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1702 without asking or paying for the privilege. (<quote>Excuse me, Professor
1703 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1704 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?</quote>) Acting companies
1705 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1706 permission from anyone. (Does <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> believe
1707 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1708 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1709 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1710 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late 1990s;
1711 two volcano disaster films in 1997.
1712 </para>
1713 <para>
1714 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1715 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1716 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1717 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1718 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1719 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1720 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking&mdash;free
1721 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1722 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1723 </para>
1724 <para>
1725 The hard question is therefore not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> a
1726 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1727 question instead is <quote><emphasis>How</emphasis> free is this culture?</quote>
1728 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1729 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1730 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1731 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1732 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1733 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1734 a studio or not?
1735 </para>
1736 <para>
1737 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1738 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1739 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1740 </para>
1741
1742 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1743 </chapter>
1744 <chapter label="2" id="mere-copyists">
1745 <title>CHAPTER TWO: <quote>Mere Copyists</quote></title>
1746 <indexterm id="idxphotography" class='startofrange'>
1747 <primary>photography</primary>
1748 </indexterm>
1749 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis</primary></indexterm>
1750 <para>
1751 <emphasis role='strong'>In 1839</emphasis>, Louis Daguerre invented
1752 the first practical technology for producing what we would call
1753 <quote>photographs.</quote> Appropriately enough, they were called
1754 <quote>daguerreotypes.</quote> The process was complicated and
1755 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1756 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1757 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1758 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1759 </para>
1760 <para>
1761 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1762 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1763 <quote>automatic pictures.</quote> William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1764 making <quote>negatives.</quote> But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1765 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1766 the 1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1767 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1768 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1769 amateurs.
1770 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William</primary></indexterm>
1771 </para>
1772 <indexterm id="idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'>
1773 <primary>Eastman, George</primary>
1774 </indexterm>
1775 <para>
1776 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1777 didn't happen until 1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1779 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1780 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1781 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1782 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1783 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1784 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1785 population of photographers.
1786 </para>
1787 <para>
1788 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1789 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1790 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. <quote>You press the button and we
1791 do the rest.</quote><footnote><para>
1792 <!-- f1 -->
1793 Reese V. Jenkins, <citetitle>Images and Enterprise</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 112.
1794 </para></footnote> As he described in <citetitle>The Kodak Primer</citetitle>:
1795 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)</primary></indexterm>
1796 </para>
1797 <blockquote>
1798 <para>
1799 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1800 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1801 that only an expert can do. &hellip; We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1802 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1803 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1804 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1805 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1806 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1807 chemicals.<footnote>
1808 <para>
1809 <!-- f2 -->
1810 Brian Coe, <citetitle>The Birth of Photography</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1811 1977), 53.
1812 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1813 </para></footnote>
1814 </para>
1815 </blockquote>
1816 <para>
1817 For $25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1818 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1819 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1820 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1821 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1822 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in 1888; one
1823 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1824 From 1888 through 1909, while industrial production was rising by 4.7
1825 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by 11
1826 percent.<footnote><para>
1827 <!-- f3 -->
1828 Jenkins, 177.
1829 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1830 an average annual increase of over 17 percent.<footnote><para>
1831 <!-- f4 -->
1832 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p. 178.
1833 </para></footnote>
1834 </para>
1835 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian</primary></indexterm>
1836 <para>
1837
1838 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1839 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1840 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1841 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1842 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1843 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, <quote>For the
1844 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1845 permanent record of his family and its activities. &hellip; For the first
1846 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1847 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1848 interpretation or bias.</quote><footnote><para>
1849 <!-- f5 -->
1850 Coe, 58.
1851 </para></footnote>
1852 </para>
1853 <para>
1854 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1855 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1856 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1857 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1858 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1859 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its <quote>quality</quote>;
1860 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1861 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1862 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1863 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1864 have before.
1865 </para>
1866 <para>
1867 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1868 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1869 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1870 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1871 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1872 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1873 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1874 he wanted. Their answer was no.<footnote><para>
1875 <!-- f6 -->
1876 For illustrative cases, see, for example, <citetitle>Pavesich</citetitle>
1877 v. <citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co</citetitle>., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905);
1878 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Chinn</citetitle>, 123090 S.W. 364, 366
1879 (Ky. 1909); <citetitle>Corliss</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Walker</citetitle>, 64 F. 280 (Mass.
1880 Dist. Ct. 1894).
1881 </para></footnote>
1882 </para>
1883 <para>
1884 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1885 familiar. The photographer was <quote>taking</quote> something from the person or
1886 building whose photograph he shot&mdash;pirating something of
1887 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1888 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1889 draw
1890 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1891 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1892 that they thought valuable.
1893 </para>
1894 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1895 <para>
1896 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1897 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1898 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1899 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1900 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.<footnote>
1901 <para>
1902 <!-- f7 -->
1903 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, <quote>The Right to Privacy,</quote>
1904 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review</citetitle> 4 (1890): 193.
1905 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.</primary></indexterm>
1906 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.</primary></indexterm>
1907 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1908 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1909 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1910 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1911 </para>
1912 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of</primary></indexterm>
1913 <para>
1914 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1915 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1916 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1917 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1918 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1919 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1920 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1921 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1922 clearing the rights to do the capturing.<footnote><para>
1923 <!-- f8 -->
1924 See Melville B. Nimmer, <quote>The Right of Publicity,</quote> <citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1925 Problems</citetitle> 19 (1954): 203; William L. Prosser, <quote>Privacy,</quote> <citetitle>California Law
1926 Review</citetitle> 48 (1960) 398&ndash;407; <citetitle>White</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1927 Inc</citetitle>., 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951
1928 (1993).
1929 </para></footnote>)
1930 </para>
1931 <para>
1932 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1933 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1934 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1935 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1936 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1937 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1938 Kodak would be benefiting from the <quote>theft</quote> committed by the
1939 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1940 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1941 from the <quote>image-right</quote> infringement of its photographers. We could
1942 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1943 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1944 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1945 </para>
1946 <para>
1947
1948 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1949 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1950 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1951 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1952 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1953 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1954 technology as they did&mdash;since professionals could have more
1955 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1956 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1957 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1958 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1959 realized.
1960 </para>
1961 <para>
1962 <emphasis role='strong'>If you drive</emphasis> through San
1963 Francisco's Presidio, you might see two gaudy yellow school buses
1964 painted over with colorful and striking images, and the logo
1965 <quote>Just Think!</quote> in place of the name of a school. But
1966 there's little that's <quote>just</quote> cerebral in the projects
1967 that these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies
1968 that teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even
1969 the film of your VCR. Rather the <quote>film</quote> of digital
1970 cameras. Just Think! is a project that enables kids to make films, as
1971 a way to understand and critique the filmed culture that they find all
1972 around them. Each year, these busses travel to more than thirty
1973 schools and enable three hundred to five hundred children to learn
1974 something about media by doing something with media. By doing, they
1975 think. By tinkering, they learn.
1976 </para>
1977 <indexterm startref="idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'/>
1978 <indexterm startref="idxphotography" class='endofrange'/>
1979 <para>
1980 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1981 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1982 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, <quote>Five years ago, a good
1983 real-time digital video editing system cost $25,000. Today you can get
1984 professional quality for $595.</quote><footnote><para>
1985 <!-- f9 -->
1986 H. Edward Goldberg, <quote>Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1987 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,</quote>
1988 cadalyst, February 2002, available at
1989 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #7</ulink>.
1990 </para></footnote>
1991 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1992 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1993 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1994 learning more and more of something teachers call <quote>media literacy.</quote>
1995 </para>
1996 <para>
1997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1998 <quote>Media literacy,</quote> as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1999 Think!, puts it, <quote>is the ability &hellip; to understand, analyze, and
2000 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
2001 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
2002 the way people access it.</quote>
2003 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave</primary></indexterm>
2004 </para>
2005 <para>
2006 This may seem like an odd way to think about <quote>literacy.</quote> For most
2007 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
2008 and noticing split infinitives are the things that <quote>literate</quote> people know
2009 about.
2010 </para>
2011 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
2012 <para>
2013 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average 390 hours of
2014 television commercials per year, or between 20,000 and 45,000
2015 commercials generally,<footnote><para>
2016 <!-- f10 -->
2017 Judith Van Evra, <citetitle>Television and Child Development</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
2018 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990); <quote>Findings on Family and TV
2019 Study,</quote> <citetitle>Denver Post</citetitle>, 25 May 1997, B6.
2020 </para></footnote>
2021 it is increasingly important to understand the <quote>grammar</quote> of media. For
2022 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2023 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2024 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2025 (at least at first) terrible media.
2026 </para>
2027 <para>
2028 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2029 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2030 has written understands how difficult writing is&mdash;how difficult
2031 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2032 language to be understandable&mdash;few of us have any real sense of
2033 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2034 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2035 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2036 </para>
2037 <para>
2038 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2039 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2040 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2041 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2042 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2043 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2044 </para>
2045 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael</primary></indexterm>
2046 <para>
2047 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2048 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2049 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2050
2051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2052 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2053 about <quote>the placement of objects, color, &hellip; rhythm, pacing, and
2054 texture.</quote><footnote>
2055 <para>
2056 <!-- f11 -->
2057 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish, 13 December
2058 2002.
2059 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2060 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth</primary></indexterm>
2061 </para></footnote>
2062 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2063 <quote>played</quote> as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2064 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2065 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2066 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2067 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2068 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2069 to a wildly successful author.<footnote><para>
2070 <!-- f12 -->
2071 See Scott Steinberg, <quote>Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs,</quote> E!online, 4
2072 November 2000, available at
2073 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #8</ulink>; <quote>Timeline,</quote> 22 November 2000,
2074 available at
2075 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #9</ulink>.
2076 </para></footnote>
2077 </para>
2078 <indexterm><primary>computer games</primary></indexterm>
2079 <para>
2080 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2081 describes, <quote>people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2082 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2083 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2084 led.</quote> If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2085 </para>
2086 <para>
2087 Yet the push for an expanded literacy&mdash;one that goes beyond text
2088 to include audio and visual elements&mdash;is not about making better
2089 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2090 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2091 </para>
2092 <blockquote>
2093 <para>
2094 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2095 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2096 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2097 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2098 being read-only.
2099 </para>
2100 </blockquote>
2101 <para>
2102 <quote>Read-only.</quote> Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2103 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2104 twentieth century.
2105 </para>
2106 <para>
2107 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2108 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2109 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2110 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2111 literacy,
2112 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2113 and this literacy in particular, is to <quote>empower people to choose the
2114 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2115 express.</quote><footnote>
2116 <para>
2117 <!-- f13 -->
2118 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2119 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2120 </para></footnote> It is to enable students <quote>to communicate in the
2121 language of the twenty-first century.</quote><footnote><para>
2122 <!-- f14 -->
2123 Ibid.
2124 </para></footnote>
2125 </para>
2126 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2127 <para>
2128 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2129 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2130 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2131 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2132 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2133 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2134 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2135 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2136 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2137 students know something about&mdash;gun violence.
2138 </para>
2139 <para>
2140 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2141 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2142 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2143 away. The <quote>kids were showing up at 6 A.M. and leaving at 5 at night,</quote>
2144 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2145 what education should be about&mdash;learning how to express themselves.
2146 </para>
2147 <para>
2148 Using whatever <quote>free web stuff they could find,</quote> and relatively simple
2149 tools to enable the kids to mix <quote>image, sound, and text,</quote> Barish said
2150 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2151 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2152 close to the lives of these students. The project <quote>gave them a tool
2153 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2154 it,</quote> Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2155 expression&mdash;far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2156 been created using only text. <quote>If you had said to these students, `you
2157 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2158 gone and done something else,</quote> Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2159 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2160 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2161 <emphasis>these</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2162 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2163 </para>
2164 <para>
2165
2166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2167 <quote>But isn't education about teaching kids to write?</quote> I asked. In part,
2168 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2169 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of <quote>constructing
2170 meaning.</quote> To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2171 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2172 part&mdash;and increasingly, not the most powerful part&mdash;of
2173 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2174 our interview,
2175 </para>
2176 <blockquote>
2177 <para>
2178 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2179 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2180 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2181 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2182 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2183 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2184 you say, <quote>Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters.</quote>
2185 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2186 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2187 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, <quote>Well, with all these things that you
2188 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2189 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2190 for me something that reflects that.</quote> Not by giving a kid a video
2191 camera and &hellip; saying, <quote>Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2192 make a little movie.</quote> But instead, really help you take these elements
2193 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2194 about the topic.&hellip;
2195 </para>
2196 <para>
2197 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2198 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2199 bump up against the fact, <quote>I need to explain this and I really need
2200 to write something.</quote> And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2201 they would rewrite a paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 times, till they got it right.
2202 </para>
2203 <para>
2204 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2205 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2206 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2207 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2208 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2209 had a lot of power with this language.
2210 </para>
2211 <!-- FIXME removed a " from the end of the previous paragraph that did
2212 not match with any start quote. -->
2213 </blockquote>
2214 <indexterm><primary>World Trade Center</primary></indexterm>
2215 <para>
2216 <emphasis role='strong'>When two planes</emphasis> crashed into the
2217 World Trade Center, another into the Pentagon, and a fourth into a
2218 Pennsylvania field, all media around the world shifted to this
2219 news. Every moment of just about every day for that week, and for
2220 weeks after, television in particular, and media generally, retold the
2221 story of the events we had just witnessed. The telling was a
2222 retelling, because we had seen the events that were described. The
2223 genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the delayed second
2224 attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole world would be
2225 watching.
2226 </para>
2227 <para>
2228 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2229 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2230 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was <quote>balance,</quote>
2231 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2232 increasingly come to expect it, <quote>news as entertainment,</quote> even if the
2233 entertainment is tragedy.
2234 </para>
2235 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
2236 <indexterm><primary>CBS</primary></indexterm>
2237 <para>
2238 But in addition to this produced news about the <quote>tragedy of September
2239 11,</quote> those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2240 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2241 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2242 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2243 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2244 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2245 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2246 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2247 the term in his book <citetitle>Cyber Rights</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2248 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2249 was also the Internet.
2250 </para>
2251 <para>
2252 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet&mdash;though I do think the
2253 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2254 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2255 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2256 movie
2257 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2258 by a student on the <quote>Just Think!</quote> bus, the visual images could be mixed
2259 with sound or text.
2260 </para>
2261 <para>
2262 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2263 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2264 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2265 tradition&mdash;not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2266 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2267 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2268 spread practically instantaneously.
2269 </para>
2270 <para>
2271 September 11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2272 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2273 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2274 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2275 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2276 cultures, it records private facts in a public way&mdash;it's a kind
2277 of electronic <citetitle>Jerry Springer</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2278 </para>
2279 <indexterm><primary>blogs (Web-logs)</primary></indexterm>
2280 <para>
2281 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2282 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2283 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2284 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2285 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2286 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2287 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2288 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2289 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2290 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2291 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2292 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2293 </para>
2294 <para>
2295 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2296 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2297 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2298 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2299 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2300 people vote
2301 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2302 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2303 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2304 </para>
2305 <indexterm><primary>Tocqueville, Alexis de</primary></indexterm>
2306 <para>
2307 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2308 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2309 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2310 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2311 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2312 most important account of early <quote>Democracy in America.</quote> It wasn't
2313 popular elections that fascinated him&mdash;it was the jury, an
2314 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2315 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2316 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2317 deliberated. Members argued about the <quote>right</quote> result; they tried to
2318 persuade each other of the <quote>right</quote> result, and in criminal cases at
2319 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2320 come to an end.<footnote><para>
2321 <!-- f15 -->
2322 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, <citetitle>Democracy in America</citetitle>,
2323 bk. 1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), ch. 16.
2324 </para></footnote>
2325 </para>
2326 <para>
2327 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2328 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2329 are pushing to create just such an institution.<footnote><para>
2330 <!-- f16 -->
2331 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, <quote>Deliberation Day,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of
2332 Political Philosophy</citetitle> 10 (2) (2002): 129.
2333 </para></footnote>
2334 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2335 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2336 place for <quote>democratic deliberation</quote> to occur.
2337 </para>
2338 <para>
2339 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2340 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2341 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2342 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2343 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2344 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.<footnote><para>
2345 <!-- f17 -->
2346 Cass Sunstein, <citetitle>Republic.com</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
2347 65&ndash;80, 175, 182, 183, 192.
2348 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2349 little beyond what our friends say.
2350 </para>
2351 <indexterm id='idxblogs1' class='startofrange'>
2352 <primary>blogs (Web-logs)</primary>
2353 </indexterm>
2354 <para>
2355 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2356 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2357 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2358 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2359 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2360
2361 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2362 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2363 place.
2364 </para>
2365 <para>
2366 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2367 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2368 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2369 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2370 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2371 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2372 </para>
2373 <para>
2374 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2375 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the 2004 presidential race
2376 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2377 is having an effect.
2378 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard</primary></indexterm>
2379 </para>
2380 <indexterm><primary>Thurmond, Strom</primary></indexterm>
2381 <para>
2382 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2383 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2384 <quote>misspoke</quote> at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2385 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2386 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2387 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2388 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2389 more instances of the same <quote>misspeaking</quote> emerged. Finally, the story
2390 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2391 resign as senate majority leader.<footnote><para>
2392 <!-- f18 -->
2393 Noah Shachtman, <quote>With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot,</quote> New
2394 York Times, 16 January 2003, G5.
2395 </para></footnote>
2396 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent</primary></indexterm>
2397 </para>
2398 <para>
2399 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2400 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2401 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2402 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2403 on.
2404 </para>
2405 <para>
2406 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2407 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2408 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2409 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2410 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2411 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2412 peer-generated rankings.
2413 </para>
2414 <indexterm id="idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'>
2415 <primary>Winer, Dave</primary>
2416 </indexterm>
2417 <para>
2418 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2420 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2421 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2422 difference is the absence of a financial <quote>conflict of interest.</quote> <quote>I think you
2423 have to take the conflict of interest</quote> out of journalism, Winer told me.
2424 <quote>An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2425 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2426 get it out of the way.</quote>
2427 </para>
2428 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2429 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war</primary></indexterm>
2430 <para>
2431 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2432 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2433 from the public than an unconcentrated media can&mdash;as CNN admitted
2434 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2435 its own employees.<footnote><para>
2436 <!-- f19 -->
2437 Telephone interview with David Winer, 16 April 2003.
2438 </para></footnote>
2439 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2440 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2441 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2442 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2443 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2444 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2445 told her that <emphasis>they</emphasis> were writing <quote>the story.</quote>)
2446 </para>
2447 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2448 debate&mdash;<quote>amateur</quote> not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2449 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2450 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2451 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2452 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2453 had seen.<footnote><para>
2454 <!-- f20 -->
2455 John Schwartz, <quote>Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2456 Information Online,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 2 February 2003, A28; Staci
2457 D. Kramer, <quote>Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,</quote>
2458 Online Journalism Review, 2 February 2003, available at
2459 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #10</ulink>.
2460 </para></footnote>
2461 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2462 <quote>triangulate,</quote> as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2463 <quote>communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2464 out of it</quote>&mdash;with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2465 </para>
2466 <para>
2467 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2468 with blogs. <quote>It's going to become an essential skill,</quote> Winer predicts,
2469 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2470 not clear that <quote>journalism</quote> is happy about this&mdash;some journalists
2471 have been told to curtail their blogging.<footnote>
2472 <para>
2473 <!-- f21 -->
2474 <indexterm><primary>CNN</primary></indexterm>
2475 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war</primary></indexterm>
2476 <indexterm><primary>Olafson, Steve</primary></indexterm>
2477 <indexterm><primary>blogs (Web-logs)</primary></indexterm>
2478 See Michael Falcone, <quote>Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?</quote> <citetitle>New
2479 York Times</citetitle>, 29 September 2003, C4. (<quote>Not all news organizations have
2480 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2481 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2482 war on March 9, stopped posting 12 days later at his bosses'
2483 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a <citetitle>Houston Chronicle</citetitle> reporter, was
2484 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2485 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.</quote>)
2486 </para></footnote>
2487 But it is clear that we are still in transition. <quote>A
2488
2489 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2490 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises,</quote> Winer told me.
2491 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2492 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2493 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, <quote>we will
2494 be the last thing that gets shut down.</quote>
2495 </para>
2496 <para>
2497 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because <quote>you
2498 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper.</quote>
2499 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2500 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2501 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2502 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2503 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2504 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2505 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2506 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2507 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2508 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2509 extraordinary to report.
2510 </para>
2511 <indexterm startref='idxblogs1' class='endofrange'/>
2512 <indexterm startref="idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'/>
2513 <indexterm id="idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'>
2514 <primary>Brown, John Seely</primary>
2515 </indexterm>
2516 <indexterm id='idxadvertising1' class='startofrange'>
2517 <primary>advertising</primary>
2518 </indexterm>
2519 <para>
2520 <emphasis role='strong'>John Seely Brown</emphasis> is the chief
2521 scientist of the Xerox Corporation. His work, as his Web site
2522 describes it, is <quote>human learning and &hellip; the creation of
2523 knowledge ecologies for creating &hellip; innovation.</quote>
2524 </para>
2525 <para>
2526 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2527 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2528 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2529 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2530 affect learning.
2531 </para>
2532 <para>
2533 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When <quote>a lot of us grew up,</quote>
2534 he explains, that tinkering was done <quote>on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2535 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on.</quote> But digital technologies
2536 enable a different kind of tinkering&mdash;with abstract ideas though
2537 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2538 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2540 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2541 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2542 or <quote>free collage,</quote> as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2543 the tinkering of many others.
2544 </para>
2545 <para>
2546 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2547 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2548 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2549 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2550 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2551 </para>
2552 <para>
2553 This opportunity creates a <quote>completely new kind of learning platform,</quote>
2554 as Brown describes. <quote>As soon as you start doing that, you &hellip;
2555 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2556 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2557 if they can improve it.</quote> Each effort is a kind of
2558 apprenticeship. <quote>Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform.</quote>
2559 </para>
2560 <para>
2561 In this process, <quote>the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2562 They are code.</quote> Kids are <quote>shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2563 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2564 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2565 platform. &hellip; You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2566 you tinker the more you improve.</quote> The more you improve, the more you
2567 learn.
2568 </para>
2569 <para>
2570 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2571 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2572 it, <quote>the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2573 intelligence.</quote> Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2574 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2575 text. <quote>The Web &hellip; says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2576 you are visual, if you are interested in film &hellip; [then] there is a
2577 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2578 these multiple forms of intelligence.</quote>
2579 </para>
2580 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising1' class='endofrange'/>
2581 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie</primary></indexterm>
2582 <para>
2583 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2584 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2585
2586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2587 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2588 kind of recognition.
2589 </para>
2590 <para>
2591 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2592 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2593 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2594 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2595 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2596 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2597 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2598 </para>
2599 <para>
2600 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2601 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2602 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>)
2603 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the <quote>right to
2604 tinker</quote> as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2605 general.<footnote><para>
2606 <!-- f22 -->
2607 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, <quote>Technological Access
2608 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,</quote> <citetitle>Communications
2609 of the Association for Computer Machinery</citetitle> 43 (2000): 9.
2610 </para></footnote>
2611 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2612 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2613 </para>
2614 <para>
2615 <quote>This is where education in the twenty-first century is going,</quote> Brown
2616 explains. We need to <quote>understand how kids who grow up digital think
2617 and want to learn.</quote>
2618 </para>
2619 <para>
2620 <quote>Yet,</quote> as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2621 evince, <quote>we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2622 natural tendencies of today's digital kids. &hellip; We're building an
2623 architecture that unleashes 60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2624 system that closes down that part of the brain.</quote>
2625 </para>
2626 <indexterm startref="idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'/>
2627 <para>
2628 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2629 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2630 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2631 the law to close down that technology.
2632 </para>
2633 <para>
2634 <quote>No way to run a culture,</quote> as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2635 chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="collectors"/>,
2636 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2637 </para>
2638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2639 </chapter>
2640 <chapter label="3" id="catalogs">
2641 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs</title>
2642 <indexterm><primary>RPI</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</see></indexterm>
2643 <indexterm id="idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'>
2644 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)</primary>
2645 </indexterm>
2646 <para>
2647 <emphasis role='strong'>In the fall</emphasis> of 2002, Jesse Jordan
2648 of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as a freshman at Rensselaer
2649 Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York. His major at RPI was
2650 information technology. Though he is not a programmer, in October
2651 Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search engine technology that
2652 was available on the RPI network.
2653 </para>
2654 <para>
2655 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2656 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2657 to information sciences. More than 65 percent of its five thousand
2658 undergraduates finished in the top 10 percent of their high school
2659 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2660 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2661 </para>
2662 <para>
2663 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2664 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2665 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2666 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2667 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2668 </para>
2669 <para>
2670 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2671 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2672 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2673 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2674 engines can do this even better. The idea of <quote>intranet</quote> search
2675 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2676 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2677 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2678 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2679 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2680 </para>
2681 <para>
2682 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2683 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2684 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2685 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2686 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2687 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2688 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2689 </para>
2690 <para>
2691 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2692 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2693 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2694 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2695 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2696 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2697 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2698 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2699 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2700 on-line.
2701 </para>
2702 <para>
2703 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2704 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2705 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2706 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2707 be on users' computers.
2708 </para>
2709 <para>
2710 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2711 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2712 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2713 might have created; university brochures&mdash;basically anything that
2714 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2715 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2716 computer.
2717 </para>
2718 <para>
2719 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2720 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2721 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and&mdash;so that this
2722 point is absolutely clear&mdash;Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2723 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2724 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2725 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2726 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2727 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2728 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2729 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2730 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2731 supposed to do.
2732 </para>
2733 <para>
2734 On April 3, 2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2735 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2736 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2737 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2738 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2739 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2740 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2741 </para>
2742 <para>
2743 <quote>It was absurd,</quote> he told me. <quote>I don't think I did anything
2744 wrong. &hellip; I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2745 engine that I ran or &hellip; what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2746 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2747 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2748 easier to use</quote>&mdash;again, a <emphasis>search engine</emphasis>,
2749 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2750 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2751 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2752 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2753 with music.
2754 </para>
2755 <indexterm><primary>statutory damages</primary></indexterm>
2756 <para>
2757 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2758 network and had therefore <quote>willfully</quote> violated copyright laws. They
2759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2760 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2761 <quote>willful infringement,</quote> the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2762 call <quote>statutory damages.</quote> These damages permit a copyright owner to
2763 claim $150,000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2764 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2765 Jesse pay them at least $15,000,000.
2766 </para>
2767 <indexterm><primary>Princeton University</primary></indexterm>
2768 <indexterm><primary>Michigan Technical University</primary></indexterm>
2769 <para>
2770 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2771 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2772 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2773 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2774 huge demands for <quote>damages</quote> that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2775 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2776 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $100
2777 <emphasis>billion</emphasis>&mdash;six times the
2778 <emphasis>total</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2779 2001.<footnote><para>
2780
2781 <!-- f1 -->
2782 Tim Goral, <quote>Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-2-P Networks:
2783 Suit Alleges $97.8 Billion in Damages,</quote> <citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC</citetitle> 6
2784 (2003): 5, available at 2003 WL 55179443.
2785 </para></footnote>
2786 </para>
2787 <indexterm startref="idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'/>
2788 <para>
2789 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2790 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2791 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2792 $12,000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2793 $12,000 to dismiss the case.
2794 </para>
2795 <indexterm><primary>Oppenheimer, Matt</primary></indexterm>
2796 <para>
2797 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2798 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2799 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2800 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2801 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2802 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2803 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, <quote>You don't want to pay another
2804 visit to a dentist like me.</quote>) And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2805 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2806 </para>
2807 <para>
2808 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2809 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2810 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2811 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2812 at least $250,000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2813 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2814 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2815 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2816 </para>
2817 <para>
2818 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $250,000 and a chance at winning,
2819 or $12,000 and a settlement.
2820 </para>
2821 <indexterm>
2822 <primary>artists</primary>
2823 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
2824 </indexterm>
2825 <para>
2826 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2827 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2828 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2829 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2830 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $1 million a year.
2831 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2832 artist makes $45,900.<footnote><para>
2833 <!-- f2 -->
2834 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (2001)
2835 (27&ndash;2042&mdash;Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2836 the Arts, <citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon</citetitle> (2000).
2837 </para></footnote>
2838 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2839 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2840 student for running a search engine?<footnote><para>
2841 <!-- f3 -->
2842 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in <quote>KaZaA and Punishment,</quote>
2843 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, A24.
2844 </para></footnote>
2845 </para>
2846 <para>
2847 On June 23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2848 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2849 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $15 million lawsuit became an
2850 activist:
2851 </para>
2852 <blockquote>
2853 <para>
2854 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2855 an activist. &hellip; [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2856 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2857 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2858 </para>
2859 </blockquote>
2860 <para>
2861 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2862 his father told me, Jesse <quote>considers himself very conservative, and so do
2863 I. &hellip; He's not a tree hugger. &hellip; I think it's bizarre that they would
2864 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2865 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record.</quote>
2866 </para>
2867 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2868 </chapter>
2869 <chapter label="4" id="pirates">
2870 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: <quote>Pirates</quote></title>
2871 <indexterm><primary><quote>if value, then right</quote> theory</primary></indexterm>
2872 <para>
2873 <emphasis role='strong'>If <quote>piracy</quote> means</emphasis>
2874 using the creative property of others without their
2875 permission&mdash;if <quote>if value, then right</quote> is
2876 true&mdash;then the history of the content industry is a history of
2877 piracy. Every important sector of <quote>big media</quote>
2878 today&mdash;film, records, radio, and cable TV&mdash;was born of a
2879 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last
2880 generation's pirates join this generation's country club&mdash;until
2881 now.
2882 </para>
2883 <section id="film">
2884 <title>Film</title>
2885 <para>
2886 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.<footnote><para>
2887 <!-- f1 -->
2888 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2889 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 87&ndash;93,
2890 which details Edison's <quote>adventures</quote> with copyright and patent.
2891 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
2892 </para></footnote>
2893 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2894 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2895 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2896 exercised through a monopoly <quote>trust,</quote> the Motion Pictures Patents
2897 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2898 property&mdash;patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2899 this creative property
2900 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2901 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2902 </para>
2903 <para>
2904 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2905 </para>
2906 <blockquote>
2907 <para>
2908 A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2909 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2910 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2911 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2912 summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2913 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2914 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2915 </para>
2916 <para>
2917 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2918 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2919 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2920 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2921 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2922 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2923 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2924 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2925 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2926 license was revoked.<footnote><para>
2927 <!-- f2 -->
2928 J. A. Aberdeen, <citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2929 Picture Producers</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment, 2000) and expanded texts
2930 posted at <quote>The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2931 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws,</quote> available at
2932 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #11</ulink>. For a
2933 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2934 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, <quote>From
2935 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2936 the Propertization of Copyright</quote> (September 2002), University of
2937 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2938 Working Paper No. 159.
2939 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
2940 </para></footnote>
2941 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William</primary></indexterm>
2942 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company</primary></indexterm>
2943 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
2944 </para>
2945 </blockquote>
2946 <para>
2947 The Napsters of those days, the <quote>independents,</quote> were companies like
2948 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2949 resisted. <quote>Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2950 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2951 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred.</quote><footnote><para>
2952 <!-- f3 -->
2953 Marc Wanamaker, <quote>The First Studios,</quote> <citetitle>The Silents Majority</citetitle>, archived at
2954 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #12</ulink>.
2955 </para></footnote>
2956 That led the independents to flee the East
2957 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2958 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2959 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2960 did just that.
2961 </para>
2962 <para>
2963 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2964 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2965 patent holder a truly <quote>limited</quote> monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2966
2967 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2968 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2969 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2970 Edison's creative property.
2971 </para>
2972 </section>
2973 <section id="recordedmusic">
2974 <title>Recorded Music</title>
2975 <para>
2976 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2977 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2978 </para>
2979 <indexterm id="idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'>
2980 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri</primary>
2981 </indexterm>
2982 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil</primary></indexterm>
2983 <para>
2984 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2985 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2986 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2987 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2988 their music. In other words, in 1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2989 1899 hit <quote>Happy Mose,</quote> the law said I would have to pay for the right
2990 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2991 right to perform it publicly.
2992 </para>
2993 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
2994 <para>
2995 But what if I wanted to record <quote>Happy Mose,</quote> using Edison's phonograph
2996 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2997 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2998 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2999 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
3000 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
3001 <quote>public performance</quote> if I recorded the song in my own house (even
3002 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
3003 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
3004 brain are not&mdash;yet&mdash; regulated by copyright law). So if I
3005 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
3006 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
3007 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
3008 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
3009 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
3010 its composer anything.
3011 </para>
3012 <indexterm startref="idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'/>
3013 <para>
3014 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
3015 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
3016 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
3017 put it,
3018 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
3019 </para>
3020 <blockquote>
3021 <para>
3022 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
3023 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
3024 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
3025 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
3026 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
3027 rights.<footnote><para>
3028 <!-- f4 -->
3029 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
3030 S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents, 59th
3031 Cong. 59, 1st sess. (1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
3032 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in <citetitle>Legislative History of the
3033 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
3034 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3035 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred</primary></indexterm>
3036 </para></footnote>
3037 </para>
3038 </blockquote>
3039 <indexterm><primary>Sousa, John Philip</primary></indexterm>
3040 <para>
3041 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
3042 people's works were <quote>sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
3043 genius of American composers,</quote><footnote><para>
3044 <!-- f5 -->
3045 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 223
3046 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3047 </para></footnote>
3048 and the <quote>music publishing industry</quote>
3049 was thereby <quote>at the complete mercy of this one pirate.</quote><footnote><para>
3050 <!-- f6 -->
3051 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 226
3052 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3053 </para></footnote>
3054 As John Philip
3055 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, <quote>When they make money
3056 out of my pieces, I want a share of it.</quote><footnote><para>
3057 <!-- f7 -->
3058 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 23
3059 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3060 </para></footnote>
3061 </para>
3062 <para>
3063 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3064 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3065 player piano argued that <quote>it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3066 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3067 of anything he had before their introduction.</quote> Rather, the machines
3068 increased the sales of sheet music.<footnote><para>
3069 <!-- f8 -->
3070
3071 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 283&ndash;84
3072 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3073 Perforating Company of New York).
3074 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3075 Congress was <quote>to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3076 they represent, and whose servants they are.</quote> <quote>All talk about
3077 `theft,'</quote> the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3078 wrote, <quote>is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3079 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3080 statute.</quote><footnote><para>
3081 <!-- f9 -->
3082 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 376 (prepared
3083 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3084 Graphophone Company Association).
3085 </para></footnote>
3086 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company</primary></indexterm>
3087 </para>
3088 <para>
3089 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3090 <emphasis>and</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3091 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the <quote>mechanical
3092 reproductions</quote> of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3093 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3094 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3095 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3096 recorded once. This is the part of
3097
3098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3099 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3100 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3101 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3102 </para>
3103 <para>
3104 American law ordinarily calls this a <quote>compulsory license,</quote> but I will
3105 refer to it as a <quote>statutory license.</quote> A statutory license is a license
3106 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3107 Copyright Act in 1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3108 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3109 the fee set by the statute.
3110 </para>
3111 <para>
3112 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3113 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3114 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3115 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3116 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3117 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3118 Grisham.
3119 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
3120 </para>
3121 <para>
3122 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3123 thus, in effect, the law <emphasis>subsidizes</emphasis> the recording
3124 industry through a kind of piracy&mdash;by giving recording artists a
3125 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3126 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3127 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3128 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3129 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3130 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3131 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3132 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3133 creativity.<footnote><para>
3134
3135 <!-- f10 -->
3136 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2499, S. 2900, H.R. 243, and
3137 H.R. 11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents, 60th Cong., 1st
3138 sess., 217 (1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3139 in <citetitle>Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3140 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1976).
3141 </para></footnote>
3142 <indexterm><primary>Beatles</primary></indexterm>
3143 </para>
3144 <para>
3145 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3146 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3147 records. As a 1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3148 relates,
3149 </para>
3150 <blockquote>
3151 <para>
3152 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3153 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3154 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3155 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3156 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3157 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3158 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3159 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3160 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before 1909 and
3161 the 1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3162 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3163 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3164 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3165 choice.<footnote><para>
3166 <!-- f11 -->
3167 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R. 2512, House Committee
3168 on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st sess., House Document no. 83, (8
3169 March 1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3170 this report.</para></footnote>
3171 </para>
3172 </blockquote>
3173 <para>
3174 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3175 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3176 </para>
3177 </section>
3178 <section id="radio">
3179 <title>Radio</title>
3180 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments1' class='startofrange'>
3181 <primary>artists</primary>
3182 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
3183 </indexterm>
3184 <para>
3185 Radio was also born of piracy.
3186 </para>
3187 <para>
3188 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3189 <quote>public performance</quote> of the composer's work.<footnote><para>
3190 <!-- f12 -->
3191 See 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, sections 106 and 110. At the beginning,
3192 record companies printed <quote>Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast</quote> and other
3193 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3194 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3195 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3196 station. See <citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Whiteman</citetitle>, 114 F. 2d 86 (2nd
3197 Cir. 1940). See also Randal C. Picker, <quote>From Edison to the Broadcast
3198 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3199 Copyright,</quote> <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 281.
3200 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned</primary></indexterm>
3201 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
3202 </para></footnote>
3203 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3204 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3205 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3206 </para>
3207 <para>
3208 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3209 copy of the <emphasis>composer's</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3210 also performing a copy of the <emphasis>recording artist's</emphasis>
3211 work. It's one thing to have <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> sung on the radio by the
3212 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3213 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3214 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3215 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3216 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3217 music for his work.
3218 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
3219
3220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3221 </para>
3222 <para>
3223 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3224 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3225 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3226 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3227 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3228 of playing the song.
3229 </para>
3230 <indexterm id="idxmadonna" class='startofrange'>
3231 <primary>Madonna</primary>
3232 </indexterm>
3233 <para>
3234 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3235 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3236 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3237 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3238 </para>
3239 <para>
3240 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3241 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3242 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3243 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3244 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3245 <quote>protected</quote> right. The radio station thus gets to
3246 <emphasis>pirate</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3247 her anything.
3248 </para>
3249 <indexterm startref="idxmadonna" class='endofrange'/>
3250 <para>
3251 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3252 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3253 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3254 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3255 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3256 to take something for nothing.
3257 </para>
3258 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments1' class='endofrange'/>
3259 </section>
3260 <section id="cabletv">
3261 <title>Cable TV</title>
3262 <para>
3263
3264 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3265 </para>
3266 <para>
3267 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3268 television in 1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3269 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3270 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3271 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3272 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3273 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3274 did&mdash; Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3275 give away.
3276 </para>
3277 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas</primary></indexterm>
3278 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin</primary></indexterm>
3279 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3280 <para>
3281 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3282 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3283 <quote>unfair and potentially destructive competition.</quote><footnote><para>
3284 <!-- f13 -->
3285 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV: Hearing on S. 1006 Before the
3286 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3287 Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 78 (1966)
3288 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3289 Commission).
3290 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.</primary></indexterm>
3291 </para></footnote>
3292 There may have been a <quote>public interest</quote> in spreading the reach of cable
3293 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3294 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, <quote>Does public
3295 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?</quote><footnote><para>
3296 <!-- f14 -->
3297 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3298 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3299 </para></footnote>
3300 As another broadcaster put it,
3301 </para>
3302 <blockquote>
3303 <para>
3304 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3305 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3306 paid for.<footnote><para>
3307 <!-- f15 -->
3308 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3309 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3310 </para></footnote>
3311 </para>
3312 </blockquote>
3313 <para>
3314 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3315 </para>
3316 <blockquote>
3317 <para>
3318 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3319 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3320 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3321 think there are harsher words which would fit it.<footnote><para>
3322 <!-- f16 -->
3323 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3324 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3325 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3326 </para></footnote>
3327 </para>
3328 </blockquote>
3329 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3330 <para>
3331 These were <quote>free-ride[rs],</quote> Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3332 Heston said, who were <quote>depriving actors of
3333 compensation.</quote><footnote><para>
3334 <!-- f17 -->
3335 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3336 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3337 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton</primary></indexterm>
3338 </para>
3339 </footnote>
3340 </para>
3341 <para>
3342 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3343 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3344 </para>
3345 <blockquote>
3346 <para>
3347 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3348 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3349 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3350 should be permitted to extend that monopoly. &hellip; The
3351
3352 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3353 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3354 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.<footnote><para>
3355 <!-- f18 -->
3356 Copyright Law Revision&mdash;CATV, 216 (statement of Edwin M.
3357 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3358 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3359 </para></footnote>
3360 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin</primary></indexterm>
3361 </para>
3362 </blockquote>
3363 <para>
3364 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3365 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3366 </para>
3367 <para>
3368 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3369 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they <quote>pirated.</quote>
3370 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3371 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3372 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3373 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3374 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3375 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3376 companies thus built their empire in part upon a <quote>piracy</quote> of the value
3377 created by broadcasters' content.
3378 </para>
3379 <para>
3380 <emphasis role='strong'>These separate stories</emphasis> sing a
3381 common theme. If <quote>piracy</quote> means using value from someone
3382 else's creative property without permission from that creator&mdash;as
3383 it is increasingly described today<footnote><para>
3384 <!-- f19 -->
3385 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association, <citetitle>The Engine
3386 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet&mdash;The Myth of Free
3387 Information</citetitle>, available at
3388 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #13</ulink>. <quote>The
3389 threat of piracy&mdash;the use of someone else's creative work without
3390 permission or compensation&mdash;has grown with the Internet.</quote>
3391 </para></footnote>
3392 &mdash; then <emphasis>every</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3393 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3394 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV. &hellip; The list is long and
3395 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3396 last. Every generation&mdash;until now.
3397 </para>
3398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3399 </section>
3400 </chapter>
3401 <chapter label="5" id="piracy">
3402 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: <quote>Piracy</quote></title>
3403 <para>
3404 <emphasis role='strong'>There is piracy</emphasis> of copyrighted
3405 material. Lots of it. This piracy comes in many forms. The most
3406 significant is commercial piracy, the unauthorized taking of other
3407 people's content within a commercial context. Despite the many
3408 justifications that are offered in its defense, this taking is
3409 wrong. No one should condone it, and the law should stop it.
3410 </para>
3411 <para>
3412 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of <quote>taking</quote>
3413 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3414 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3415 taking <quote>piracy,</quote> however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3416 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3417 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3418 has so often done in the past.
3419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3420 </para>
3421 <section id="piracy-i">
3422 <title>Piracy I</title>
3423 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3424 <para>
3425 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3426 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3427 content, copy it, and sell it&mdash;all without the permission of a copyright
3428 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion
3429 every year to physical piracy<footnote><para>
3430 <!-- f1 -->
3431 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), <citetitle>The
3432 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2003</citetitle>, July 2003, available
3433 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #14</ulink>. See
3434 also Ben Hunt, <quote>Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,</quote> <citetitle>Financial
3435 Times</citetitle>, 14 February 2003, 11.
3436 </para></footnote>
3437 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3438 estimates that it loses $3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3439 </para>
3440 <para>
3441 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3442 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3443 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3444 This piracy is wrong.
3445 </para>
3446 <para>
3447 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3448 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3449 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3450 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3451 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3452 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3453 of our existence, treated as right.
3454 </para>
3455 <para>
3456 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3457 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3458 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3459 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3460 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3461 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3462 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3463 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3464 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3465 </para>
3466 <para>
3467 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3468 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3469 <beginpage pagenum="77"/>
3470 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3471 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3472 similar childhood.
3473 </para>
3474 <para>
3475 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3476 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3477 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3478 of intellectual property law.<footnote><para>
3479 <!-- f2 -->
3480 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3481 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The
3482 New Press, 2003), 10&ndash;13, 209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3483 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3484 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3485 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3486 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3487 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3488 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3489 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3490 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3491 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3492 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3493 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3494 TRIPS framework.
3495 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents</primary></indexterm>
3496 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
3497 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3498 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3499 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3500 is wrong.
3501 </para>
3502 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3503 <para>
3504 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3505 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3506 to American CDs at 50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3507 bought those American CDs at $15 a copy. So no one really has any
3508 less money than they otherwise would have had.<footnote><para>
3509 <!-- f3 -->
3510 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3511 Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002),
3512 144&ndash;90. <quote>In some instances &hellip; the impact of piracy on the
3513 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3514 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3515 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3516 pirating were not an option.</quote> Ibid., 149.
3517 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3518 </para></footnote>
3519 </para>
3520 <para>
3521 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3522 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3523 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3524 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3525 <quote>You wouldn't go into Barnes &amp; Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3526 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?</quote>
3527 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes &amp;
3528 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3529 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3530 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3531 piracy of the tangible.
3532 </para>
3533 <para>
3534 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3535 property right of a very special sort, it <emphasis>is</emphasis> a
3536 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3537 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3538 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3539 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3540 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3541 give people the right to <quote>take</quote> copyrighted content whether or not the
3542 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3543
3544 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3545 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3546 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3547 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3548 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3549 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what <quote>property</quote> means.
3550 </para>
3551 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
3552 <para>
3553 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3554 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese <quote>steal</quote>
3555 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3556 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3557 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3558 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3559 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3560 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3561 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3562 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3563 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3564 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3565 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3566 <indexterm>
3567 <primary>Microsoft</primary>
3568 <secondary>Windows operating system of</secondary>
3569 </indexterm>
3570 <indexterm><primary>Windows</primary></indexterm>
3571 </para>
3572 <para>
3573 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3574 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3575 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3576 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3577 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3578 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3579 </para>
3580 <para>
3581 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3582 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3583 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3584 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3585 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3586 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3587 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3588 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3589 what&mdash;at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3590 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3591 violating the law is still wrong.
3592 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3593 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer</primary></indexterm>
3594 <indexterm><primary>Netscape</primary></indexterm>
3595 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
3596 </para>
3597 <para>
3598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3599 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3600 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3601 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3602 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3603 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3604 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3605 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3606 is flat out wrong.
3607 </para>
3608 <para>
3609 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3610 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all <quote>piracy</quote> is. Or
3611 at least, not all <quote>piracy</quote> is wrong if that term is understood in the
3612 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of <quote>piracy</quote> are useful
3613 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3614 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3615 <quote>piracy</quote> in that sense of the term.
3616 </para>
3617 <para>
3618 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3619 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3620 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3621 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3622 </para>
3623 <para>
3624 For (1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3625 controlling industry; and (2) like the original recording industry, it
3626 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (3) unlike cable
3627 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3628 </para>
3629 <para>
3630 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3631 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3632 sharing to survive.
3633 </para>
3634 </section>
3635 <section id="piracy-ii">
3636 <title>Piracy II</title>
3637 <para>
3638 The key to the <quote>piracy</quote> that the law aims to quash is a use that <quote>rob[s]
3639 the author of [his] profit.</quote><footnote><para>
3640 <!-- f4 -->
3641 <citetitle>Bach</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Longman</citetitle>, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274 (1777).
3642 </para></footnote>
3643 This means we must determine whether
3644 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3646 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3647 author of his profit.
3648 </para>
3649 <indexterm><primary>innovation</primary></indexterm>
3650 <para>
3651 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3652 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3653 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3654 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well<footnote><para>
3655 <!-- f5 -->
3656 <indexterm><primary>innovation</primary></indexterm>
3657 See Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3658 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle> (New York:
3659 HarperBusiness, 2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3660 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3661 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3662 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3663 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3664 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 89&ndash;92, 139.
3665
3666 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
3667 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3668 put together components that had been developed independently.
3669 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn</primary></indexterm>
3670 </para>
3671 <para>
3672 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July 1999,
3673 Napster amassed over 10 million users within nine months. After
3674 eighteen months, there were close to 80 million registered users of the
3675 system.<footnote><para>
3676 <!-- f6 -->
3677 See Carolyn Lochhead, <quote>Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,</quote> <citetitle>San
3678 Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24 September 2002, A1; <quote>Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,</quote>
3679 <citetitle>New Scientist</citetitle>, 6 July 2002, 42; Benny Evangelista, <quote>Napster Names CEO,
3680 Secures New Financing,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 23 May 2003, C1;
3681 <quote>Napster's Wake-Up Call,</quote> <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 24 June 2000, 23; John Naughton,
3682 <quote>Hollywood at War with the Internet</quote> (London) <citetitle>Times</citetitle>, 26 July 2002, 18.
3683 </para></footnote>
3684 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3685 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3686 boasts over 100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3687 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3688 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3689 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend&mdash;
3690 or your 20,000 best friends.
3691 </para>
3692 <para>
3693 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3694 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3695 September 2002 estimated that 60 million Americans had downloaded
3696 music&mdash;28 percent of Americans older than 12.<footnote><para>
3697
3698 <!-- f7 -->
3699 See Ipsos-Insight, <citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution</citetitle>
3700 (September 2002), reporting that 28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3701 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and 30 percent have
3702 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3703 </para></footnote>
3704 A survey by the NPD group quoted in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>
3705 estimated that 43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3706 exchange content in May 2003.<footnote><para>
3707 <!-- f8 -->
3708 Amy Harmon, <quote>Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,</quote> <citetitle>New
3709 York Times</citetitle>, 6 June 2003, A1.
3710 </para></footnote>
3711 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3712 massive quantity of content is being <quote>taken</quote> on these networks. The
3713 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3714 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3715 </para>
3716 <para>
3717 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3718 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3719 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3720 complicated than one might think. So consider&mdash;a bit more
3721 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3722 do&mdash;the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3723 of harm it entails.
3724 </para>
3725 <para>
3726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3727 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3728 different kinds into four types.
3729 </para>
3730 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
3731 <listitem><para>
3732 <!-- A. -->
3733 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3734 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3735 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3736 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3737 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3738 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3739 users who download instead of purchasing.
3740 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
3741 </para></listitem>
3742 <listitem><para>
3743 <!-- B. -->
3744 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3745 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3746 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3747 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3748 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3749 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3750 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3751 music purchased.
3752 </para></listitem>
3753 <listitem><para>
3754 <!-- C. -->
3755 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3756 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3757 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3758 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3759 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3760 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3761 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend <quote>recalling</quote> old
3762 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3763 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3764 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3765 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero&mdash;the same
3766 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of 1960s 45-rpm records to
3767 a local collector.
3768 </para></listitem>
3769 <listitem><para>
3770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3771 <!-- D. -->
3772 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3773 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3774 wants to give away.
3775 </para></listitem>
3776 </orderedlist>
3777 <para>
3778 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3779 </para>
3780 <para>
3781 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3782 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3783 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3784 harmful.<footnote><para>
3785 <!-- f9 -->
3786 See Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy</citetitle>, 148&ndash;49.
3787 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
3788 </para></footnote>
3789 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3790 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3791 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3792 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3793 answer&mdash;and certainly much more difficult than the current
3794 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3795 </para>
3796 <para>
3797 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3798 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3799 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3800 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3801 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of <quote>theft</quote> that is
3802 <quote>devastating</quote> the industry.
3803 </para>
3804 <para>
3805 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3806 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3807 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3808 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3809 &amp; Young put it, <quote>Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3810 technology, the labels fought it.</quote><footnote><para>
3811 <!-- f10 -->
3812 See Cap Gemini Ernst &amp; Young, <citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3813 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis</citetitle> (2003), 3. This report
3814 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3815 practice of cassette taping in the 1970s, including an advertising
3816 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption <quote>Home taping
3817 is killing music.</quote> At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3818 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3819 behavior. In 1988, 40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3820 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3821 Assessment, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law</citetitle>,
3822 OTA-CIT-422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3823 October 1989), 145&ndash;56. </para></footnote>
3824 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3825 when record sales fell by 11.4 percent in 1981, the industry claimed
3826 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3827 regulating technology was the answer.
3828 </para>
3829 <para>
3830 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3831 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3832 turnaround. <quote>In the end,</quote> Cap Gemini concludes, <quote>the `crisis' &hellip; was
3833 not the fault of the tapers&mdash;who did not [stop after MTV came into
3834 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3835 being]&mdash;but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3836 innovation at the major labels.</quote><footnote><para>
3837 <!-- f11 -->
3838 U.S. Congress, <citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying</citetitle>, 4.
3839 </para></footnote>
3840 </para>
3841 <para>
3842 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3843 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3844 the industry in particular, and society in general&mdash;or at least
3845 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3846 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3847 VCR&mdash;the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3848 harmful. The question is also <emphasis>how</emphasis> harmful type A
3849 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3850 </para>
3851 <para>
3852 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3853 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3854 The <quote>net harm</quote> to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3855 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3856 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3857 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3858 therefore have little <emphasis>static</emphasis> reason to resist
3859 them.
3860
3861 </para>
3862 <para>
3863 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3864 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3865 actually suggest it might be close.
3866 </para>
3867 <para>
3868 In 2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by 8.9 percent,
3869 from 882 million to 803 million units; revenues fell 6.7
3870 percent.<footnote><para>
3871 <!-- f12 -->
3872 See Recording Industry Association of America, <citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics</citetitle>,
3873 available at
3874 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #15</ulink>. A later
3875 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3876 Association of America, <citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy</citetitle>, 25 June 2003,
3877 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3878 #16</ulink>: <quote>In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3879 have fallen by 26 percent from 1.16 billion units in to 860 million
3880 units in 2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3881 of sales, revenues are down 14 percent, from $14.6 billion in to $12.6
3882 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3883 industry worldwide has gone from a $39 billion industry in 2000 down
3884 to a $32 billion industry in 2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3885 shipments).</quote>
3886 </para></footnote>
3887 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3888 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3889 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3890 than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since 1999. That no
3891 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3892 account for at least some of the loss. <quote>From 1999 to 2001, the average
3893 price of a CD rose 7.2 percent, from $13.04 to $14.19.</quote><footnote>
3894 <!-- f13 -->
3895 <para>
3896 Jane Black, <quote>Big Music's Broken Record,</quote> BusinessWeek online, 13
3897 February 2003, available at
3898 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #17</ulink>.
3899 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane</primary></indexterm>
3900 </para>
3901 </footnote>
3902 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3903 the decline. As Jane Black of <citetitle>BusinessWeek</citetitle> notes, <quote>The
3904 soundtrack to the film <citetitle>High Fidelity</citetitle> has a list price of
3905 $18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3906 $19.99.</quote><footnote><para>
3907 <!-- f14 -->
3908 Ibid.
3909 </para></footnote>
3910 </para>
3911 <para>
3912
3913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3914 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3915 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3916 that the RIAA estimates that 803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3917 estimates that 2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3918 although 2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3919 free, sales revenue fell by just 6.7 percent.
3920 </para>
3921 <para>
3922 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3923 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3924 The recording industry constantly asks, <quote>What's the difference between
3925 downloading a song and stealing a CD?</quote>&mdash;but their own numbers
3926 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3927 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3928 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3929 downloads. If every download were a lost sale&mdash;if every use of
3930 Kazaa <quote>rob[bed] the author of [his] profit</quote>&mdash;then the industry
3931 would have suffered a 100 percent drop in sales last year, not a 7
3932 percent drop. If 2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3933 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just 6.7 percent, then there is
3934 a huge difference between <quote>downloading a song and stealing a CD.</quote>
3935 </para>
3936 <para>
3937 These are the harms&mdash;alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3938 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3939 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3940 these costs?
3941 </para>
3942 <para>
3943 One benefit is type C sharing&mdash;making available content that
3944 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3945 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3946 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3947 available.<footnote><para>
3948 <!-- f15 -->
3949 By one estimate, 75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3950 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3951 Law&mdash;Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3952 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 1st sess. (3 April
3953 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3954 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #18</ulink>.
3955 </para></footnote>
3956 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3957 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3958 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3959 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3960 sense <emphasis>to the company</emphasis> to make it available.
3961 </para>
3962 <para>
3963 In real space&mdash;long before the Internet&mdash;the market had a simple
3964 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3965 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3966 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3967 today.<footnote><para>
3968 <!-- f16 -->
3969 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3970 existence, in 2002, there were 7,198 used book dealers in the United States,
3971 an increase of 20 percent since 1993. See Book Hunter Press, <citetitle>The Quiet
3972 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market</citetitle> (2002), available at
3973 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $260 million in sales in 2002. See
3974 National
3975 Association of Recording Merchandisers, <quote>2002 Annual Survey
3976 Results,</quote>
3977 available at
3978 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #20</ulink>.
3979 </para></footnote>
3980 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3981 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3982 content, <emphasis>even if the content is still under
3983 copyright</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3984 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3985 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3986 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3987 the content they sell.
3988 </para>
3989 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard</primary></indexterm>
3990 <para>
3991 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3992 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3993 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3994 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3995 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3996 when someone shares my 1949 recording of Bernstein's <quote>Two Love Songs,</quote>
3997 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3998 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3999 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
4000 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
4001 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
4002 </para>
4003 <para>
4004 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
4005 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
4006 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
4007 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
4008 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
4009 shut as well?
4010 </para>
4011 <para>
4012 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
4013 type D sharing to occur&mdash;the sharing of content that copyright owners
4014 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
4015 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
4016 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
4017 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
4018
4019 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
4020 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
4021 would be a great advertisement for the <quote>real</quote> book. People would read
4022 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
4023 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
4024 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
4025 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
4026 great book!)
4027 </para>
4028 <para>
4029 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
4030 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
4031 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
4032 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
4033 </para>
4034 <para>
4035 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
4036 understandably says, <quote>This is how much we've lost,</quote> we must also ask,
4037 <quote>How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
4038 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
4039 unavailable?</quote>
4040 </para>
4041 <para>
4042 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
4043 chapter, much of the <quote>piracy</quote> that file sharing enables is plainly
4044 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
4045 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="pirates"/>, much of
4046 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
4047 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
4048 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
4049 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
4050 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
4051 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
4052 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
4053 found only with time.
4054 </para>
4055 <para>
4056 <quote>But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
4057 just what you call type A sharing?</quote>
4058 </para>
4059 <para>
4060 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
4061 effect
4062 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
4063 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4064 Napster
4065 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4066 developed
4067 a technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
4068 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4069 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
4070 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4071 <quote>down to zero.</quote><footnote><para>
4072 <!-- f17 -->
4073 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at 34-
4074 35 (N.D. Cal., 11 July 2001), nos. MDL-00-1369 MHP, C 99-5183
4075 MHP, available at
4076
4077 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #21</ulink>. For an
4078 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4079 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster</citetitle> (New
4080 York: Crown Business, 2003), 269&ndash;82.
4081 </para></footnote>
4082 </para>
4083 <para>
4084 If 99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4085 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4086 assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
4087 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of
4088 VCRs or 100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns
4089 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4090 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4091 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4092 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4093 </para>
4094 <para>
4095 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4096 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4097 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4098 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4099 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4100 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4101 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4102 </para>
4103 <indexterm>
4104 <primary>artists</primary>
4105 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
4106 </indexterm>
4107 <para>
4108 So, as we've seen, when <quote>mechanical reproduction</quote> threatened the
4109 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4110 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4111 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4112 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4113 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4114 complained to Congress that their <quote>creative property</quote> was not being
4115 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4116 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4117 benefit was enough.
4118 </para>
4119 <para>
4120 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4121 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4122 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4123 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4124 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4125 price.
4126 </para>
4127 <para>
4128
4129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4130 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4131 pianos, served two important goals&mdash;indeed, the two central goals
4132 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4133 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4134 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4135 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4136 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4137 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4138 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4139 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4140 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4141 Congress chose a path that would assure
4142 <emphasis>compensation</emphasis> without giving the past
4143 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4144 </para>
4145 <indexterm><primary>Betamax</primary></indexterm>
4146 <para>
4147 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4148 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4149 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4150 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4151 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4152 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4153 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4154 <quote>record</quote> button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4155 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4156 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4157 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4158 </para>
4159 <para>
4160 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4161 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4162 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4163 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4164 machine to copy only if there were a special <quote>copy me</quote> signal on the
4165 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4166 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4167 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4168 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4169 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4170 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4171 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4172 for the architecture it chose.
4173 </para>
4174 <para>
4175 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4176 champion. Valenti called VCRs <quote>tapeworms.</quote> He warned, <quote>When there are
4177 20, 30, 40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4178 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4179 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4180 copyright.</quote><footnote><para>
4181 <!-- f18 -->
4182 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4183 S. 1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
4184 and 2nd sess., 459 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4185 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4186 </para></footnote>
4187 <quote>One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4188 creative judgment,</quote> he told Congress, <quote>to understand the devastation
4189 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4190 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4191 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4192 and plain common sense.</quote><footnote><para>
4193 <!-- f19 -->
4194 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 475.
4195 </para></footnote>
4196 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4197 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more<footnote><para>
4198 <!-- f20 -->
4199 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 480 F. Supp. 429,
4200 (C.D. Cal., 1979).
4201 </para></footnote>
4202 &mdash; a use the Court would later hold was not <quote>fair.</quote> By
4203 <quote>allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4204 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4205 copyrightowners,</quote> Valenti testified, Congress would <quote>take from the
4206 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4207 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4208 profit from its reproduction.</quote><footnote><para>
4209 <!-- f21 -->
4210 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders), 485 (testimony
4211 of Jack Valenti).
4212 </para></footnote>
4213 </para>
4214 <para>
4215 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4216 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4217 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction&mdash;leading Judge Alex
4218 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the <quote>Hollywood
4219 Circuit</quote>&mdash;held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4220 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4221 rule, this totally familiar technology&mdash;which Jack Valenti had
4222 called <quote>the Boston Strangler of the American film industry</quote> (worse
4223 yet, it was a <emphasis>Japanese</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4224 American film industry)&mdash;was an illegal
4225 technology.<footnote><para>
4226 <!-- f22 -->
4227 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle>, 659 F. 2d 963 (9th Cir.
4228 1981).
4229 </para></footnote>
4230 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex</primary></indexterm>
4231 </para>
4232 <para>
4233 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4234
4235 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4236 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4237 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4238 Court wrote,
4239 </para>
4240 <blockquote>
4241 <para>
4242 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4243 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4244 market
4245 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4246 authority
4247 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4248 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4249 implicated
4250 by such new technology.<footnote><para>
4251 <!-- f23 -->
4252 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
4253 </para></footnote>
4254 </para>
4255 </blockquote>
4256 <para>
4257 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4258 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4259 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4260 enough, this <quote>taking</quote> notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4261 together, a pattern is clear:
4262 </para>
4263
4264 <informaltable id="t1">
4265 <tgroup cols="4" align="char">
4266 <thead>
4267 <row>
4268 <entry>CASE</entry>
4269 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS <quote>PIRATED</quote></entry>
4270 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS</entry>
4271 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS</entry>
4272 </row>
4273 </thead>
4274 <tbody>
4275 <row>
4276 <entry>Recordings</entry>
4277 <entry>Composers</entry>
4278 <entry>No protection</entry>
4279 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4280 </row>
4281 <row>
4282 <entry>Radio</entry>
4283 <entry>Recording artists</entry>
4284 <entry>N/A</entry>
4285 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4286 </row>
4287 <row>
4288 <entry>Cable TV</entry>
4289 <entry>Broadcasters</entry>
4290 <entry>No protection</entry>
4291 <entry>Statutory license</entry>
4292 </row>
4293 <row>
4294 <entry>VCR</entry>
4295 <entry>Film creators</entry>
4296 <entry>No protection</entry>
4297 <entry>Nothing</entry>
4298 </row>
4299 </tbody>
4300 </tgroup>
4301 </informaltable>
4302
4303 <para>
4304 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4305 way content was distributed.<footnote><para>
4306 <!-- f24 -->
4307 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4308 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4309 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4310 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4311 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4312 1992 (Title 17 of the <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat.
4313 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. §1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4314 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4315 Lessig, <citetitle>Future</citetitle>, 71. See also Picker, <quote>From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,</quote>
4316 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 293&ndash;96.
4317 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
4318 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
4319 </para></footnote>
4320 In each case, throughout our history,
4321 that change meant that someone got a <quote>free ride</quote> on someone else's
4322 work.
4323 </para>
4324 <para>
4325 In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4326 Congress eliminate all free riding. In <emphasis>none</emphasis> of
4327 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4328 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4329 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of <quote>piracy.</quote>
4330 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4331 the behavior of the <quote>pirates.</quote> In each case, Congress allowed some new
4332 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4333 interests at stake.
4334 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4335 </para>
4336 <para>
4337 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4338 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4339 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4340 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4341 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4342 regulated?
4343 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4344 to $15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4345 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4346 permission to record a song?
4347 </para>
4348 <para>
4349 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4350 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4351 copyright <quote>has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4352 over all possible uses of his work.</quote><footnote><para>
4353 <!-- f25 -->
4354 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
4355 (1984).
4356 </para></footnote>
4357 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4358 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4359 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4360 balancing has historically been done <emphasis>after</emphasis> a
4361 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4362 facilitate the distribution of content.
4363 </para>
4364 <para>
4365 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4366 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4367 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4368 should not become a tool for <quote>stealing</quote> from artists. But neither
4369 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4370 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4371 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4372 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4373 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4374 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4375 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4376 public interest that innovation continue.
4377 </para>
4378 <para>
4379
4380 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4381 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4382 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4383 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4384 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4385 efficient. Yet these <quote>potential public benefits,</quote> as John Schwartz
4386 writes in <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, <quote>could be delayed in the P2P
4387 fight.</quote><footnote><para>
4388 <!-- f26 -->
4389 John Schwartz, <quote>New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4390 Echoes Past Efforts,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 22 September 2003, C3.
4391 </para></footnote>
4392 </para>
4393 <para>
4394 <emphasis role='strong'>Yet when anyone</emphasis> begins to talk
4395 about <quote>balance,</quote> the copyright warriors raise a different
4396 argument. <quote>All this hand waving about balance and
4397 incentives,</quote> they say, <quote>misses a fundamental point. Our
4398 content,</quote> the warriors insist, <quote>is our
4399 <emphasis>property</emphasis>. Why should we wait for Congress to
4400 `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to wait before calling
4401 the police when your car has been stolen? And why should Congress
4402 deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do we ask whether
4403 the car thief had a good use for the car before we arrest him?</quote>
4404 </para>
4405 <para>
4406 <quote>It is <emphasis>our property</emphasis>,</quote> the warriors
4407 insist. <quote>And it should be protected just as any other property
4408 is protected.</quote>
4409 </para>
4410 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4411 </section>
4412 </chapter>
4413 </part>
4414 <part id="c-property">
4415 <title><quote>PROPERTY</quote></title>
4416 <partintro>
4417 <para>
4418
4419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4420 <emphasis role='strong'>The copyright warriors</emphasis> are right: A
4421 copyright is a kind of property. It can be owned and sold, and the law
4422 protects against its theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to
4423 hold out for any price he wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand
4424 that partially determine the price she can get.
4425 </para>
4426 <para>
4427 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a <quote>property</quote> right is a
4428 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4429 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4430 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4431 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4432 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4433 when I take the good <emphasis>idea</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4434 table in the backyard&mdash;by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4435 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4436 then?
4437 </para>
4438 <para>
4439 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4440 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4441 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4442 in the ordinary case&mdash;indeed, in practically every case except for a
4443 narrow
4444 range of exceptions&mdash;ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4445 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress&mdash;though I
4446 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4447 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4448 when I copy the way someone else dresses), <quote>He who receives an idea
4449 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4450 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.</quote><footnote><para>
4451 <!-- f1 -->
4452 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813) in
4453 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</citetitle>, vol. 6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4454 Ellery Bergh, eds., 1903), 330, 333&ndash;34.
4455 </para></footnote>
4456 </para>
4457 <para>
4458 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4459 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4460 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4461 expression
4462 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4463 property.
4464 </para>
4465 <para>
4466 But how, and to what extent, and in what form&mdash;the details,
4467 in other words&mdash;matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4468 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4469 <quote>property</quote> in its proper context.<footnote><para>
4470 <!-- f2 -->
4471 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4472 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4473 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4474 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4475 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4476 Adam Mossoff, <quote>What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,</quote>
4477 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review</citetitle> 45 (2003): 373, 429 n. 241.
4478 </para></footnote>
4479 </para>
4480 <para>
4481 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4482 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4483 <quote>copyright material is property</quote> in context. Where did the idea come
4484 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4485 these stories, the significance of this true
4486 statement&mdash;<quote>copyright material is property</quote>&mdash; will be a bit
4487 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4488 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4489 </para>
4490 </partintro>
4491
4492 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4493 <chapter label="6" id="founders">
4494 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders</title>
4495 <indexterm><primary>Henry V</primary></indexterm>
4496 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
4497 <para>
4498 <emphasis role='strong'>William Shakespeare</emphasis> wrote
4499 <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> in 1595. The play was first
4500 published in 1597. It was the eleventh major play that Shakespeare had
4501 written. He would continue to write plays through 1613, and the plays
4502 that he wrote have continued to define Anglo-American culture ever
4503 since. So deeply have the works of a sixteenth-century writer seeped
4504 into our culture that we often don't even recognize their source. I
4505 once overheard someone commenting on Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of
4506 Henry V: <quote>I liked it, but Shakespeare is so full of
4507 clichés.</quote>
4508 </para>
4509 <para>
4510 In 1774, almost 180 years after <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> was written, the
4511 <quote>copy-right</quote> for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4512 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.<footnote><para>
4513 <!-- f1 -->
4514 <indexterm><primary>Jonson, Ben</primary></indexterm>
4515 <indexterm><primary>Dryden, John</primary></indexterm>
4516 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4517 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4518 handsome <quote>definitive editions</quote> of classic works. In addition to <citetitle>Romeo and
4519 Juliet</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4520 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4521 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, <quote>Jacob Tonson,
4522 Bookseller,</quote> <citetitle>American Scholar</citetitle> 61:3 (1992): 424&ndash;31.
4523 </para></footnote>
4524 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4525 the Conger<footnote><para>
4526 <!-- f2 -->
4527 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle> (Nashville:
4528 Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), 151&ndash;52.
4529 </para></footnote>
4530 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4531 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the <quote>copy</quote> of
4532 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4533 that no
4534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4535 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4536 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4537 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4538 </para>
4539 <para>
4540 Now, there's something puzzling about the year 1774 to anyone who
4541 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4542 history of copyright is 1710, the year that the British Parliament
4543 adopted the first <quote>copyright</quote> act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4544 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4545 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4546 works already published by 1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4547 additional years.<footnote><para>
4548 <!-- f3 -->
4549 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4550 <quote>copyright law.</quote> See Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs</citetitle>, 40.
4551 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4552 </para></footnote> Under this law, <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> should have been
4553 free in 1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4554 Tonson's control in 1774?
4555 </para>
4556 <para>
4557 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a <quote>copyright</quote>
4558 was&mdash;indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4559 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4560 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of 1662, had
4561 expired in 1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4562 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4563 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4564 that the publishers, or <quote>Stationers,</quote> had an exclusive right to print
4565 books.
4566 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (1662)</primary></indexterm>
4567 </para>
4568 <para>
4569 There was no <emphasis>positive</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4570 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4571 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4572 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4573 from legislatures <quote>positive law.</quote> We call the words from judges
4574 <quote>common law.</quote> The common law sets the background against which
4575 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4576 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4577 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4578 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4579 </para>
4580 <para>
4581 This question was important to the publishers, or <quote>booksellers,</quote> as
4582 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4583 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4584 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4585
4586 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4587 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4588 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4589 ultimately
4590 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4591 </para>
4592 <para>
4593 The Statute of Anne granted the author or <quote>proprietor</quote> of a book an
4594 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4595 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4596 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4597 copyright <quote>expired,</quote> and the work would then be free and could be
4598 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4599 believed.
4600 </para>
4601 <para>
4602 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4603 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4604 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4605 <emphasis>at all?</emphasis>
4606 </para>
4607 <para>
4608 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4609 strong claim. Take <citetitle>Romeo and Juliet</citetitle> as an example: That play
4610 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4611 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4612 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4613 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4614 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4615 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4616 reason is there to allow someone else to <quote>steal</quote> Shakespeare's work?
4617 </para>
4618 <para>
4619 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4620 about the notion of <quote>copyright</quote> that existed at the time of the
4621 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4622 <quote>booksellers.</quote>
4623 </para>
4624 <para>
4625 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4626 to apply the concept of <quote>copyright</quote> ever more broadly. But in 1710, it
4627 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4628 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4629 others from reprinting a book. In 1710, the <quote>copy-right</quote> was a right
4630 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4631 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4632 generally how
4633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4634 a work could be <emphasis>used</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4635 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4636 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4637 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4638 </para>
4639 <indexterm><primary>Branagh, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
4640 <para>
4641 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4642 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4643 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4644 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4645 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4646 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4647 allowed to make his films. The <quote>copy-right</quote> was only an exclusive
4648 right to print&mdash;no less, of course, but also no more.
4649 </para>
4650 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England</primary></indexterm>
4651 <indexterm><primary>Statute of Monopolies (1656)</primary></indexterm>
4652 <para>
4653 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4654 They had had a long and ugly experience with <quote>exclusive rights,</quote>
4655 especially <quote>exclusive rights</quote> granted by the Crown. The English had
4656 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4657 monopolies&mdash;especially monopolies for works that already
4658 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4659 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4660 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In 1656, it passed the
4661 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4662 inventions. And by 1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4663 monopoly in publishing.
4664 </para>
4665 <para>
4666 Thus the <quote>copy-right,</quote> when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4667 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4668 claim that <quote>it's my property, and I should have it forever,</quote> try
4669 sounding convincing when uttering, <quote>It's my monopoly, and I should
4670 have it forever.</quote>) The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4671 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4672 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4673 </para>
4674 <para>
4675 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4676 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4677 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4678 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4680
4681 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4682 kind&mdash;tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4683 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4684 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as <quote>old patentees
4685 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling</quote>; they were <quote>men who do
4686 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4687 indetted.</quote><footnote><para>
4688
4689 <!-- f4 -->
4690 Philip Wittenberg, <citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4691 Property</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc., 1937), 31.
4692 </para></footnote>
4693 </para>
4694 <para>
4695 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4696 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4697 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4698 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4699 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4700 with that idea.
4701 </para>
4702 <para>
4703 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4704 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4705 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4706 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4707 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4708 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4709 compromise
4710 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4711 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4712 construction and spread of culture.
4713 </para>
4714 <para>
4715 When 1731 (1710 + 21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4716 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4717 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4718 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4719 to control publication. But in 1735 and 1737, they tried to persuade
4720 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4721 they said; they needed more time.
4722 </para>
4723 <para>
4724 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4725 words that echo today,
4726 </para>
4727 <blockquote>
4728 <para>
4729 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4730 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4732 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4733 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4734 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4735 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4736 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4737 Booksellers.<footnote><para>
4738 <!-- f5 -->
4739 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4740 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4741 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4742 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4743 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4744 mentioned (London, 1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4745 al., 8, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
4746 </para></footnote>
4747 </para>
4748 </blockquote>
4749 <para>
4750 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4751 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4752 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4753 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4754 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4755 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4756 creative <quote>property</quote> and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4757 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4758 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4759 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4760 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4761 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4762 way to protect authors.
4763 </para>
4764 <para>
4765 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4766 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4767 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4768 <quote>The publishers &hellip; had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4769 rancher has for cattle.</quote><footnote><para>
4770 <!-- f6 -->
4771 Lyman Ray Patterson, <quote>Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,</quote> <citetitle>Vanderbilt
4772 Law Review</citetitle> 40 (1987): 28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4773 Vaidhyanathan, 37&ndash;48.
4774 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
4775 </para></footnote>
4776 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4777 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4778 </para>
4779 <para>
4780 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4781 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4782 Donaldson.<footnote><para>
4783 <!-- f7 -->
4784 For a compelling account, see David Saunders, <citetitle>Authorship and Copyright</citetitle>
4785 (London: Routledge, 1992), 62&ndash;69.
4786 </para></footnote>
4787 </para>
4788 <para>
4789 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4790 career in Edinburgh in 1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4791 reprints <quote>of standard works whose copyright term had expired,</quote> at least
4792 under the Statute of Anne.<footnote><para>
4793 <!-- f8 -->
4794 Mark Rose, <citetitle>Authors and Owners</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4795 1993), 92.
4796 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
4797 </para></footnote>
4798 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4799 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4800 and became <quote>something of a center for literary Scotsmen.</quote> <quote>[A]mong
4801 them,</quote> Professor Mark Rose writes, was <quote>the young James Boswell
4802 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4803 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson.</quote><footnote><para>
4804 <!-- f9 -->
4805 Ibid., 93.
4806 </para></footnote>
4807 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James</primary></indexterm>
4808 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew</primary></indexterm>
4809 </para>
4810 <para>
4811 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4812 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4813 inexpensive editions <quote>of the most popular English books, in defiance
4814 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4815 Property.</quote><footnote><para>
4816 <!-- f10 -->
4817 Lyman Ray Patterson, <citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective</citetitle>, 167 (quoting
4818 Borwell).
4819 </para></footnote>
4820 His books undercut the Conger prices by 30 to 50 percent, and he
4821 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4822 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4823 </para>
4824 <para>
4825 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block <quote>piracy</quote> like
4826 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the <quote>pirates,</quote>
4827 the most important early victory being <citetitle>Millar</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Taylor</citetitle>.
4828 </para>
4829 <indexterm><primary>Taylor, Robert</primary></indexterm>
4830 <para>
4831 Millar was a bookseller who in 1729 had purchased the rights to James
4832 Thomson's poem <quote>The Seasons.</quote> Millar complied with the requirements of
4833 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4834 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4835 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4836 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.<footnote><para>
4837 <!-- f11 -->
4838 Howard B. Abrams, <quote>The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4839 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,</quote> <citetitle>Wayne Law Review</citetitle> 29
4840 (1983): 1152.
4841 </para></footnote>
4842 </para>
4843 <indexterm id="idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'>
4844 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord</primary>
4845 </indexterm>
4846 <para>
4847 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4848 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4849 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4850 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4851 law would protect the author against subsequent <quote>pirates.</quote>
4852 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4853 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4854 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4855 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4856 </para>
4857 <para>
4858 Considered as a matter of abstract justice&mdash;reasoning as if
4859 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4860 principles&mdash;Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4861 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4862 with in 1710: How best to limit
4863 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4864 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4865 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in 1710, but
4866 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4867 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4868 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4869 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4870 </para>
4871 <indexterm startref="idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'/>
4872 <para>
4873 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4874 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4875 </para>
4876 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas</primary></indexterm>
4877 <para>
4878 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4879 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4880 Thomas Beckett.<footnote><para>
4881 <!-- f12 -->
4882 Ibid., 1156.
4883 </para></footnote>
4884 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4885 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in <citetitle>Millar</citetitle>,
4886 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4887 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4888 Court. In February of 1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4889 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4890 </para>
4891 <para>
4892 As few legal cases ever do, <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle> drew an
4893 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4894 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4895 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4896 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4897 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4898 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4899 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4900 </para>
4901 <para>
4902 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4903 presented to the House and voted upon first by the <quote>law lords,</quote>
4904 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4905 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4906 House of Lords generally voted.
4907 </para>
4908 <para>
4909 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4910 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4912 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4913 (22 to 11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4914 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4915 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4916 passed into the public domain.
4917 </para>
4918 <para>
4919 <quote>The public domain.</quote> Before the case of <citetitle>Donaldson</citetitle>
4920 v. <citetitle>Beckett</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4921 England. Before 1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4922 copyrights were perpetual. After 1774, the public domain was
4923 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4924 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4925 history&mdash;including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4926 and Bunyan&mdash;were free of legal restraint.
4927 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis</primary></indexterm>
4928 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John</primary></indexterm>
4929 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel</primary></indexterm>
4930 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John</primary></indexterm>
4931 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William</primary></indexterm>
4932 </para>
4933 <para>
4934 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4935 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4936 where most of the <quote>pirate publishers</quote> did their work, people
4937 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the <citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser</citetitle>
4938 reported, <quote>No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4939 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4940 decision of which so many individuals were interested.</quote> <quote>Great
4941 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4942 and illuminations.</quote><footnote><para>
4943 <!-- f13 -->
4944 Rose, 97.
4945 </para></footnote>
4946 </para>
4947 <para>
4948 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4949 equally strong in the opposite direction. The <citetitle>Morning Chronicle</citetitle>
4950 reported:
4951 </para>
4952 <blockquote>
4953 <para>
4954 By the above decision &hellip; near 200,000 pounds worth of what was
4955 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4956 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4957 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4958 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4959 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4960 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4961 successors.<footnote><para>
4962 <!-- f14 -->
4963 Ibid.
4964 </para></footnote>
4965 </para>
4966 </blockquote>
4967 <para>
4968 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4969 <quote>Ruined</quote> is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4970 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4971 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4972 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4973 <emphasis>free</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4974 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4975 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4976 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4977 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4978 book from someone. But <emphasis>free</emphasis> in the sense that the
4979 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4980 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4981 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4982 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4983 develop&mdash; chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4984 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a <emphasis>competitive
4985 context</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4986 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4987 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4988 </para>
4989 <para>
4990 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4991 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4992 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4993 protected.
4994 </para>
4995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4996 </chapter>
4997 <chapter label="7" id="recorders">
4998 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders</title>
4999 <para>
5000 <emphasis role='strong'>Jon Else</emphasis> is a filmmaker. He is best
5001 known for his documentaries and has been very successful in spreading
5002 his art. He is also a teacher, and as a teacher myself, I envy the
5003 loyalty and admiration that his students feel for him. (I met, by
5004 accident, two of his students at a dinner party. He was their god.)
5005 </para>
5006 <para>
5007 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
5008 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
5009 today.
5010 </para>
5011 <para>
5012 In 1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
5013 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
5014 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
5015 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
5016 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
5017 stage.
5018 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
5019 </para>
5020 <para>
5021 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
5022 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
5023 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
5024 and the opera company played Wagner, was <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. As Else judged
5025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
5026 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
5027 about the scene.
5028 </para>
5029 <para>
5030 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
5031 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>.
5032 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
5033 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
5034 unless <quote>fair use</quote> or some other privilege applies.
5035 </para>
5036 <para>
5037 Else called <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
5038 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
5039 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
5040 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
5041 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
5042 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
5043 </para>
5044 <para>
5045 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
5046 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
5047 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
5048 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
5049 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
5050 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films</primary></indexterm>
5051 </para>
5052 <para>
5053 Then, as Else told me, <quote>two things happened. First we discovered
5054 &hellip; that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation&mdash;or at
5055 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation.</quote>
5056 And second, Fox <quote>wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
5057 to use this four-point-five seconds of &hellip; entirely unsolicited
5058 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot.</quote>
5059 </para>
5060 <indexterm><primary>Herrera, Rebecca</primary></indexterm>
5061 <para>
5062 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
5063 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
5064 explained to her, <quote>There must be some mistake here. &hellip; We're
5065 asking for your educational rate on this.</quote> That was the educational
5066 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
5067 confirm what he had been told.
5068 </para>
5069 <para>
5070 <quote>I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight,</quote> he told me. <quote>Yes, you
5071 have your facts straight,</quote> she said. It would cost $10,000 to use the
5072 clip of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
5073 about
5074
5075 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
5076 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, <quote>And
5077 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys.</quote> As an assistant
5078 to Herrera told Else later on, <quote>They don't give a shit. They just want
5079 the money.</quote>
5080 </para>
5081 <para>
5082 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5083 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5084 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5085 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5086 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5087 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5088 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera</primary></indexterm>
5089 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The</primary></indexterm>
5090 </para>
5091 <para>
5092 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5093 copyright to <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5094 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5095 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5096 <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5097 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5098 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5099 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5100 says the owner gets to control.
5101 </para>
5102 <para>
5103 For example, <quote>public performance</quote> is a use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle> that the
5104 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5105 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see <quote>My
5106 Favorite <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>,</quote> then you need to get permission from the copyright
5107 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5108 whatever she wants&mdash;$10 or $1,000,000. That's her right, as set
5109 by the law.
5110 </para>
5111 <para>
5112 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5113 thought is <quote>fair use.</quote><footnote><para>
5114 <!-- f1 -->
5115 For an excellent argument that such use is <quote>fair use,</quote> but that
5116 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is <quote>fair use,</quote> see Richard
5117 A. Posner with William F. Patry, <quote>Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5118 Wake of <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle></quote> (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5119 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5120 </para></footnote>
5121 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5122 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>&mdash;and fair use does
5123 not require the permission of anyone.
5124 </para>
5125 <para>
5126 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5127 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon <quote>fair use.</quote> Here's his reply:
5128 </para>
5129 <blockquote>
5130 <para>
5131 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5132 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5133 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5134 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was <quote>clearly
5135 fair use</quote> in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5136 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5137 </para>
5138 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
5139 <listitem><para>
5140 <!-- 1. -->
5141 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5142 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5143 <quote>visual cue sheet</quote> listing the source and licensing status of each
5144 shot in the film. They take a dim view of <quote>fair use,</quote> and a claim of
5145 <quote>fair use</quote> can grind the application process to a halt.
5146 </para></listitem>
5147 <listitem>
5148 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle></primary></indexterm>
5149 <para>
5150 <!-- 2. -->
5151 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5152 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5153 tracking down and stopping unlicensed <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> usage, just as George
5154 Lucas had a very high profile litigating <citetitle>Star Wars</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5155 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5156 license to four seconds of <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5157 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5158 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5159 principle.
5160 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George</primary></indexterm>
5161 </para></listitem>
5162 <listitem><para>
5163 <!-- 3. -->
5164 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5165 School &hellip; who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5166 that Fox would <quote>depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5167 life,</quote> regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5168 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5169 pockets, me or them.
5170 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5171 </para></listitem>
5172 <listitem><para>
5173 <!-- 4. -->
5174 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5175 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5176 money.
5177 </para></listitem>
5178 </orderedlist>
5179 </blockquote>
5180 <para>
5181 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5182 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5183 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5184 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5185 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5186 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5187 </para>
5188 <para>
5189 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5190 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5191 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5192 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5193 not.
5194 </para>
5195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5196 </chapter>
5197 <chapter label="8" id="transformers">
5198 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers</title>
5199 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul</primary></indexterm>
5200 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex1' class='startofrange'>
5201 <primary>Alben, Alex</primary>
5202 </indexterm>
5203 <indexterm><primary>Microsoft</primary></indexterm>
5204 <para>
5205 <emphasis role='strong'>In 1993</emphasis>, Alex Alben was a lawyer
5206 working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave was an innovative company founded
5207 by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to develop digital
5208 entertainment. Long before the Internet became popular, Starwave began
5209 investing in new technology for delivering entertainment in
5210 anticipation of the power of networks.
5211 </para>
5212 <indexterm id='idxartistsretrospective' class='startofrange'>
5213 <primary>artists</primary>
5214 <secondary>retrospective compilations on</secondary>
5215 </indexterm>
5216 <para>
5217 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5218 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology&mdash;not to distribute
5219 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5220 difficult. In 1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5221 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5222 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5223 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5224 important to his career.
5225 </para>
5226 <para>
5227 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5228 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5229 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5230 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5231 </para>
5232 <para>
5233 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5234 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5235 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5236 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5237 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5238 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5239 </para>
5240 <para>
5241 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. <quote>Our
5242 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5243 Eastwood's films,</quote> Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5244 arose. <quote>No one had ever really done this before,</quote> Alben explained. <quote>No
5245 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5246 actor's career.</quote>
5247 </para>
5248 <para>
5249 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5250 Slade asked, <quote>Well, what will it take?</quote>
5251 </para>
5252 <para>
5253 Alben replied, <quote>Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5254 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5255 else that we want to use in these film clips.</quote> Slade said, <quote>Great! Go
5256 for it.</quote><footnote>
5257 <para>
5258 <!-- f1 -->
5259 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5260 publicity&mdash;rights an artist has to control the commercial
5261 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden <quote>Rip, Mix,
5262 Burn</quote> creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5263 <indexterm>
5264 <primary>artists</primary>
5265 <secondary>publicity rights on images of</secondary>
5266 </indexterm>
5267 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5268 </para></footnote>
5269 </para>
5270 <para>
5271 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5272 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5273 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5274 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5275 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5276 </para>
5277 <para>
5278 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5279 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5280 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5281 </para>
5282 <blockquote>
5283 <para>
5284 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5285 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include&mdash;of
5286 course we were going to use the <quote>Make my day</quote> clip from <citetitle>Dirty
5287 Harry</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5288 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5289 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5290 </para>
5291 <para>
5292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5293 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5294 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5295 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5296 rate at the time was about $600. So we had to identify the
5297 people&mdash;some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5298 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5299 glass&mdash;is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5300 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5301 started calling people.
5302 </para>
5303 </blockquote>
5304 <indexterm><primary>Sutherland, Donald</primary></indexterm>
5305 <para>
5306 Some actors were glad to help&mdash;Donald Sutherland, for example,
5307 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5308 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5309 <quote>Hey, can I pay you $600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5310 know, $1,200?</quote> And they would say, <quote>Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5311 to get $1,200.</quote> And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5312 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5313 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5314 career.
5315 </para>
5316 <para>
5317 It was one <emphasis>year</emphasis> later&mdash;<quote>and even then we
5318 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear.</quote>
5319 </para>
5320 <para>
5321 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5322 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5323 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5324 </para>
5325 <blockquote>
5326 <para>
5327 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5328 hands and said, <quote>Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5329 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5330 actors.</quote> But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5331 constituent parts and said, <quote>Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5332 directors, &hellip; this many musicians,</quote> and we just went at it very
5333 systematically and cleared the rights.
5334 </para>
5335 </blockquote>
5336 <para>
5337
5338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5339 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5340 loved it, and it sold very well.
5341 </para>
5342 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter</primary></indexterm>
5343 <para>
5344 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5345 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5346 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, <quote>There is
5347 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5348 at all.</quote><footnote><para>
5349 <!-- f2 -->
5350 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management, <citetitle>Seven
5351 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition</citetitle>, available at
5352 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #22</ulink>.
5353 </para></footnote>
5354 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5355 has to be made?
5356 </para>
5357 <para>
5358 For, as he acknowledged, <quote>very few &hellip; have the time and resources,
5359 and the will to do this,</quote> and thus, very few such works would ever be
5360 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5361 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5362 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5363 </para>
5364 <blockquote>
5365 <para>
5366 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5367 he or she gets paid very well. &hellip; And then when 30 seconds of
5368 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5369 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person &hellip; should be
5370 compensated for that.
5371 </para>
5372 </blockquote>
5373 <para>
5374 Or at least, is this <emphasis>how</emphasis> the artist should be
5375 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5376 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5377 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5378 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5379 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5380 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5381 made to be more clean?
5382 </para>
5383 <blockquote>
5384 <para>
5385 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5386 mechanism&mdash;where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5387 subject to estranged former spouses&mdash;you'd see a lot more of this
5388 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5389 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5390 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5391 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5392 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5393 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5394 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5395 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5396 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5397 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5398 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, <quote>Oh, I
5399 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5400 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5401 money,</quote> then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5402 </para>
5403 </blockquote>
5404 <para>
5405 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5406 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5407 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5408 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5409 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5410 </para>
5411 <indexterm startref='idxartistsretrospective' class='endofrange'/>
5412 <para>
5413 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5414 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5415 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5416 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5417 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5418 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5419 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5420 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5421 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5422 <quote>Does this still make sense?</quote>
5423 </para>
5424 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex1' class='endofrange'/>
5425 <para>
5426 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5427 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5428 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5429 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5430
5431 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5432 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5433 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5434 </para>
5435 <para>
5436 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5437 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode.
5438 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5439 judges loved every minute of it.
5440 </para>
5441 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David</primary></indexterm>
5442 <para>
5443 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5444 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5445 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5446 room of over 250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5447 began his talk with a question: <quote>Do you know how many federal laws
5448 were just violated in this room?</quote>
5449 </para>
5450 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David</primary></indexterm>
5451 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
5452 <para>
5453 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5454 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5455 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5456 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5457 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of 250 judges and a gaggle
5458 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5459 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5460 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5461 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5462 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5463 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5464 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5465 couldn't easily do them legally.
5466 </para>
5467 <para>
5468 We live in a <quote>cut and paste</quote> culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5469 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5470 and paste architecture of the Internet created&mdash;in a second you can
5471 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5472 planted in your presentation.
5473 </para>
5474 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos</primary></indexterm>
5475 <para>
5476 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5477 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5478 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5479 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5480 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5481 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5482 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5483 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5484 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5485 </para>
5486 <para>
5487 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5488 wanted to be <quote>legal,</quote> the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5489 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5490 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5491 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5492 </para>
5493 <para>
5494 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5495 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5496 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5497 necessarily requiring that the <quote>free</quote> use be free as in <quote>free beer.</quote>
5498 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5499 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5500 along: a rule, for example, that says <quote>the royalty owed the copyright
5501 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5502 will be a flat 1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5503 copyright owner.</quote> Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5504 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5505 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5506 registers the work.
5507 </para>
5508 <para>
5509 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5510 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5511 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5512 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5513 </para>
5514 <para>
5515 <emphasis role='strong'>In February 2003</emphasis>, DreamWorks
5516 studios announced an agreement with Mike Myers, the comic genius of
5517 <citetitle>Saturday Night Live</citetitle> and
5518 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5519 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5520 would work together to form a <quote>unique filmmaking pact.</quote> Under the
5521 agreement, DreamWorks <quote>will acquire the rights to existing motion
5522 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and&mdash;with the use
5523 of stateof-the-art digital technology&mdash;insert Myers and other
5524 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5525 entertainment.</quote>
5526 </para>
5527 <para>
5528 The announcement called this <quote>film sampling.</quote> As Myers explained,
5529 <quote>Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5530 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5531 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5532 to take that same concept and apply it to film.</quote> Steven Spielberg is
5533 quoted as saying, <quote>If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5534 new audiences, it is Mike.</quote>
5535 </para>
5536 <para>
5537 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5538 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5539 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5540 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5541 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5542 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5543 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5544 privilege reserved for the funny and famous&mdash;and presumably rich.
5545 </para>
5546 <para>
5547 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5548 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of <quote>fair use.</quote>
5549 Much of <quote>sampling</quote> should be considered <quote>fair use.</quote> But few would
5550 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5551 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5552 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5553 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5554 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5555 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5556 process is a process of paying lawyers&mdash;again a privilege, or perhaps a
5557 curse, reserved for the few.
5558 </para>
5559 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5560 </chapter>
5561 <chapter label="9" id="collectors">
5562 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors</title>
5563 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital1' class='startofrange'>
5564 <primary>archives, digital</primary>
5565 </indexterm>
5566 <para>
5567 <emphasis role='strong'>In April 1996</emphasis>, millions of
5568 <quote>bots</quote>&mdash;computer codes designed to
5569 <quote>spider,</quote> or automatically search the Internet and copy
5570 content&mdash;began running across the Net. Page by page, these bots
5571 copied Internet-based information onto a small set of computers
5572 located in a basement in San Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots
5573 finished the whole of the Internet, they started again. Over and over
5574 again, once every two months, these bits of code took copies of the
5575 Internet and stored them.
5576 </para>
5577 <para>
5578 By October 2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5579 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5580 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5581 the world. Using a technology called <quote>the Way Back Machine,</quote> you could
5582 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to 1996, as
5583 well as when those pages changed.
5584 </para>
5585 <indexterm id='idxorwellgeorge' class='startofrange'>
5586 <primary>Orwell, George</primary>
5587 </indexterm>
5588 <para>
5589 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5590 appreciated. In the dystopia described in <citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5591 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5592 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5593 reports.
5594 </para>
5595 <para>
5596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5597 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5598 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5599 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5600 </para>
5601 <para>
5602 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5603 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5604 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5605 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5606 library&mdash;constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5607 </para>
5608 <indexterm startref='idxorwellgeorge' class='endofrange'/>
5609 <para>
5610 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5611 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5612 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5613 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5614 what others might prefer you forget.<footnote><para>
5615 <!-- f1 -->
5616 <indexterm><primary>Iraq war</primary></indexterm>
5617 <indexterm><primary>White House press releases</primary></indexterm>
5618 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5619 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May 13, 2003,
5620 press release stated, <quote>Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended.</quote> That was
5621 later changed, without notice, to <quote>Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5622 Have Ended.</quote> E-mail from Brewster Kahle, 1 December 2003.
5623 </para></footnote>
5624 </para>
5625 <indexterm><primary>history, records of</primary></indexterm>
5626 <para>
5627 <emphasis role='strong'>We take it</emphasis> for granted that we can
5628 go back to see what we remember reading. Think about newspapers. If
5629 you wanted to study the reaction of your hometown newspaper to the
5630 race riots in Watts in 1965, or to Bull Connor's water cannon in 1963,
5631 you could go to your public library and look at the newspapers. Those
5632 papers probably exist on microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in
5633 paper, too. Either way, you are free, using a library, to go back and
5634 remember&mdash;not just what it is convenient to remember, but
5635 remember something close to the truth.
5636 </para>
5637 <para>
5638 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5639 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We <emphasis>all</emphasis>
5640 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5641 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5642 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5643 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5644 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5645 </para>
5646 <para>
5647 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5648 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5649 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5650 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5652 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5653 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5654 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet&mdash;the
5655 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5656 </para>
5657 <para>
5658 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5659 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5660 researcher. In the 1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5661 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5662 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5663 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5664 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of 2002, the archive had over 10
5665 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5666 </para>
5667 <indexterm><primary>Vanderbilt University</primary></indexterm>
5668 <para>
5669 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5670 human history. At the end of 2002, it held <quote>two hundred and thirty
5671 terabytes of material</quote>&mdash;and was <quote>ten times larger than the
5672 Library of Congress.</quote> And this was just the first of the archives that
5673 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5674 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5675 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5676 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5677 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5678 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University&mdash;thanks to a
5679 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5680 is available to scholars for a very low fee. <quote>But other than that,
5681 [television] is almost unavailable,</quote> Kahle told me. <quote>If you were
5682 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5683 just a graduate student?</quote> As Kahle put it,
5684 </para>
5685 <blockquote>
5686 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan</primary></indexterm>
5687 <para>
5688 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5689 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5690 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5691 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5692 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5693
5694 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5695 <citetitle>60 Minutes</citetitle> episode that came out after it &hellip; it would be almost
5696 impossible. &hellip; Those materials are almost unfindable. &hellip;
5697 </para>
5698 </blockquote>
5699 <para>
5700 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5701 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5702 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5703 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5704 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5705 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5706 </para>
5707 <para>
5708 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5709 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5710 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5711 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5712 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5713 work.
5714 </para>
5715 <para>
5716 These rules applied to film as well. But in 1915, the Library
5717 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5718 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5719 borrow back the deposits&mdash;for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5720 1915 alone, there were more than 5,475 films deposited and <quote>borrowed
5721 back.</quote> Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5722 held by any library. The copy exists&mdash;if it exists at
5723 all&mdash;in the library archive of the film company.<footnote><para>
5724 <!-- f2 -->
5725 Doug Herrick, <quote>Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5726 the Library of Congress,</quote> <citetitle>Film Library Quarterly</citetitle> 13 nos. 2&ndash;3
5727 (1980): 5; Anthony Slide, <citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5728 Preservation in the United States</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &amp;
5729 Co., 1992), 36.
5730 </para></footnote>
5731 </para>
5732 <para>
5733 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5734 were originally not copyrighted&mdash;there was no way to capture the
5735 broadcasts, so there was no fear of <quote>theft.</quote> But as technology enabled
5736 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5737 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5738 <quote>copyrighted.</quote> But those copies were simply kept by the
5739 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5740 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5741 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5742 </para>
5743 <para>
5744 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September 11, 2001, he and
5745 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5746 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5747 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5748 September 11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5749 stations from around the world and, beginning October 11, 2001, made
5750 their coverage during the week of September 11 available free on-line.
5751 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5752 events of that day.
5753 </para>
5754 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive</primary></indexterm>
5755 <indexterm>
5756 <primary>archive.org</primary>
5757 <seealso>Internet Archive</seealso>
5758 </indexterm>
5759 <para>
5760 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5761 archive of film includes close to 45,000 <quote>ephemeral films</quote> (meaning
5762 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5763 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5764 1,300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5765 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5766 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5767 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5768 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5769 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5770 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5771 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5772 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the <quote>Duck and Cover</quote> film
5773 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5774 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5775 few minutes&mdash;for free.
5776 </para>
5777 <para>
5778 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5779 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5780 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5781 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5782 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5783 to find them.
5784 </para>
5785 <para>
5786 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5787 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5788 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5789 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5790 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5791 has&mdash;a noncommercial life.
5792 </para>
5793 <para>
5794 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5795 of creative property goes through different <quote>lives.</quote> In its first
5796 life, if the
5797
5798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5799 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5800 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5801 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5802 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5803 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5804 </para>
5805 <para>
5806 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5807 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5808 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5809 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5810 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5811 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5812 longer sold.
5813 </para>
5814 <para>
5815 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5816 very quickly (the average today is after about a year<footnote><para>
5817 <!-- f3 -->
5818 Dave Barns, <quote>Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5819 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>,
5820 5 September 1997, at Metro Lake 1L. Of books published between 1927
5821 and 1946, only 2.2 percent were in print in 2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5822 <quote>The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,</quote> <citetitle>Boston
5823 College Law Review</citetitle> 44 (2003): 593 n. 51.
5824 </para></footnote>). After
5825 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5826 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5827 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5828 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5829 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5830 </para>
5831 <para>
5832 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5833 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5834 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5835 centuries. For these&mdash;television, movies, music, radio, the
5836 Internet&mdash;there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5837 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes &amp;
5838 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5839 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5840 disappears.
5841 </para>
5842 <para>
5843 <emphasis role='strong'>For most of</emphasis> the twentieth century,
5844 it was economics that made this so. It would have been insanely
5845 expensive to collect and make accessible all television and film and
5846 music: The cost of analog copies is extraordinarily high. So even
5847 though the law in principle would have restricted the ability of a
5848 Brewster Kahle to copy culture generally, the
5849 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5850 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5851 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5852 little practical effect.
5853 </para>
5854 <para>
5855 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5856 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5857 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5858 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5859 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5860 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5861 </para>
5862 <para>
5863 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5864 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5865 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5866 Kahle describes,
5867 </para>
5868 <blockquote>
5869 <indexterm>
5870 <primary>books</primary>
5871 <secondary>total number of</secondary>
5872 </indexterm>
5873 <para>
5874 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5875 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5876 movies, &hellip; and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5877 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5878 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5879 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5880 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5881 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5882 &hellip; thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5883 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5884 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5885 </para>
5886 </blockquote>
5887 <para>
5888 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5889 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5890 libraries or archives could be. <emphasis>When</emphasis> the
5891 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5892 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5893 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5894 will draw upon it to understand it;
5895 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5896 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5897 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5898 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past&mdash;a
5899 future <emphasis>for</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5900 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5901 </para>
5902 <para>
5903 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5904 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5905 call these <quote>archives,</quote> as warm as the idea of a <quote>library</quote> might seem,
5906 the <quote>content</quote> that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5907 someone's <quote>property.</quote> And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5908 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5909 </para>
5910 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital1' class='endofrange'/>
5911 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5912 </chapter>
5913 <chapter label="10" id="property-i">
5914 <title>CHAPTER TEN: <quote>Property</quote></title>
5915 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon</primary></indexterm>
5916 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
5917 <para>
5918 <emphasis role='strong'>Jack Valenti</emphasis> has been the president
5919 of the Motion Picture Association of America since 1966. He first came
5920 to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon Johnson's
5921 administration&mdash;literally. The famous picture of Johnson's
5922 swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of President
5923 Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty years of
5924 running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps the most
5925 prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5926 </para>
5927 <para>
5928 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5929 Association. It was formed in 1922 as a trade association whose goal
5930 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5931 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5932 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5933 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5934 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5935 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5936 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5937 Warner Brothers.
5938 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.</primary></indexterm>
5939 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment</primary></indexterm>
5940 <indexterm><primary>MGM</primary></indexterm>
5941 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5942 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox</primary></indexterm>
5943 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures</primary></indexterm>
5944 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers</primary></indexterm>
5945 </para>
5946 <para>
5947 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5948 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5949 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5950 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5951 political skill of a Southerner&mdash;the ability to appear simple and
5952 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5953 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5954 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5955 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5956 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5957 Washingtonian way.
5958 </para>
5959 <para>
5960 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5961 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5962 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5963 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5964 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5965 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5966 redefine the meaning of <quote>creative property.</quote>
5967 </para>
5968 <para>
5969 In 1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5970 perfectly:
5971 </para>
5972 <blockquote>
5973 <para>
5974 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5975 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5976 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5977 theme which animates this entire debate: <emphasis>Creative property
5978 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5979 other property owners in the nation</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5980 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5981 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.<footnote><para>
5982 <!-- f1 -->
5983 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R.
5984 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the
5985 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5986 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5987 Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982): 65 (testimony of Jack
5988 Valenti).
5989 </para></footnote>
5990 </para>
5991 </blockquote>
5992 <para>
5993 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5994 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5995 <quote>central theme</quote> to which <quote>reasonable men and women</quote> will return is
5996 this:
5997 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5998 <quote>Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5999 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation.</quote>
6000 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
6001 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
6002 </para>
6003 <para>
6004 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
6005 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
6006 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
6007 extreme a claim made by <emphasis>anyone</emphasis> who is serious in
6008 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
6009 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
6010 it comes to the nature and scope of <quote>creative property.</quote> His views
6011 have <emphasis>no</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
6012 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
6013 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
6014 </para>
6015 <para>
6016 While <quote>creative property</quote> is certainly <quote>property</quote> in a nerdy and
6017 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,<footnote><para>
6018 <!-- f2 -->
6019 Lawyers speak of <quote>property</quote> not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
6020 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
6021 object. Thus, my <quote>property right</quote> to my car gives me the right to
6022 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at 150 miles an hour. For
6023 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of <quote>property</quote> to
6024 <quote>lawyer talk,</quote> see Bruce Ackerman, <citetitle>Private Property and the
6025 Constitution</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 26&ndash;27.
6026 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
6027 <quote>creative property owners</quote> have been <quote>accorded the same rights and
6028 protection resident in all other property owners.</quote> Indeed, if creative
6029 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
6030 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
6031 in our tradition.
6032 </para>
6033 <para>
6034 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
6035 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
6036 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
6037 overturned in 1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
6038 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
6039 culture would develop.
6040 </para>
6041 <para>
6042 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
6043 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
6044 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
6045 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
6046 differently from the rights resident in all other property
6047 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
6048 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
6049 the same would be to
6050
6051 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
6052 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
6053 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
6054 perfect control.
6055 </para>
6056 <para>
6057 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
6058 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
6059 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
6060 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
6061 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
6062 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
6063 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old.
6064 </para>
6065 <para>
6066 <emphasis role='strong'>To get</emphasis> just a hint that there is
6067 something fundamentally wrong in Valenti's argument, we need look no
6068 further than the United States Constitution itself.
6069 </para>
6070 <para>
6071 The framers of our Constitution loved <quote>property.</quote> Indeed, so strongly
6072 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
6073 important requirement. If the government takes your property&mdash;if
6074 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
6075 farm&mdash;it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's <quote>Takings
6076 Clause,</quote> to pay you <quote>just compensation</quote> for that taking. The
6077 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
6078 sacred. It cannot <emphasis>ever</emphasis> be taken from the property
6079 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
6080 </para>
6081 <para>
6082 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
6083 Valenti calls <quote>creative property.</quote> In the clause granting Congress the
6084 power to create <quote>creative property,</quote> the Constitution
6085 <emphasis>requires</emphasis> that after a <quote>limited time,</quote> Congress
6086 take back the rights that it has granted and set the <quote>creative
6087 property</quote> free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
6088 the expiration of a copyright term <quote>takes</quote> your copyright and turns it
6089 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
6090 pay <quote>just compensation</quote> for this <quote>taking.</quote> Instead, the same
6091 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
6092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
6093 requires that you lose your <quote>creative property</quote> right without any
6094 compensation at all.
6095 </para>
6096 <para>
6097 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
6098 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
6099 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
6100 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
6101 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
6102 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
6103 itself.
6104 </para>
6105 <para>
6106 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
6107 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
6108 The Constitution of 1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
6109 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
6110 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
6111 president (as it did in 1800). The framers were no doubt
6112 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
6113 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
6114 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
6115 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6116 </para>
6117 <para>
6118 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6119 least try to understand <emphasis>why</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6120 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6121 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6122 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6123 domain?
6124 </para>
6125 <para>
6126 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6127 history of these <quote>creative property</quote> rights, and the control that they
6128 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6129 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6130 should be at the core of this war: Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis>
6131 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6132 <emphasis>whether</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6133 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6134 ought to be. Not <emphasis>whether</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6135 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6136 also control how culture develops.
6137 </para>
6138 <para>
6139
6140 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6141 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6142 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6143 than the narrow language of the law allows. In <citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6144 Cyberspace</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6145 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6146 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6147 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6148 </para>
6149 <figure id="fig-1331">
6150 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.</title>
6151 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6152 </figure>
6153 <para>
6154 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6155 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6156 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6157 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6158 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6159 be regulated&mdash; either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6160 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6161 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6162 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6163 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6164 Web, you can be punished
6165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6166 with a $150,000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6167 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6168 <indexterm><primary>Madonna</primary></indexterm>
6169 </para>
6170 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6171 <para>
6172 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6173 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6174 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6175 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6176 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6177 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6178 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6179 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6180 the source of the enforcement.
6181 </para>
6182 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6183 <para>
6184 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6185 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6186 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6187 norms&mdash;it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6188 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6189 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6190 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6191 individual or group might behave.
6192 </para>
6193 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6194 <para>
6195 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6196 <quote>architecture</quote>&mdash;the physical world as one finds it&mdash;is a
6197 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6198 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6199 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6200 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6201 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6202 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6203 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6204 theft, but by nature, by <quote>architecture.</quote> If a 500-pound boulder
6205 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6206 constraint. If a $500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6207 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6208 </para>
6209 <para>
6210
6211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6212 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6213 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6214 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6215 undermined by another.
6216 </para>
6217 <para>
6218 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6219 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6220 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6221 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6222 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6223 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6224 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6225 </para>
6226 <indexterm id="idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'>
6227 <primary>driving speed, constraints on</primary>
6228 </indexterm>
6229 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6230 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6231 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6232 <para>
6233 So, for example, consider the <quote>freedom</quote> to drive a car at a high
6234 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6235 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6236 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6237 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6238 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6239 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6240 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6241 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6242 the freedom to speed. Drive at 50 mph by a school in your own
6243 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6244 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6245 </para>
6246 <para>
6247 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6248 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6249 special role in affecting the three.<footnote><para>
6250 <!-- f3 -->
6251 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6252 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6253 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6254 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6255 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig, <citetitle>Code: And
6256 Other Laws of Cyberspace</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books, 1999): 90&ndash;95;
6257 Lawrence Lessig, <quote>The New Chicago School,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies</citetitle>,
6258 June 1998.
6259 </para></footnote>
6260 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6261 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6262 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6263 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6264 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6265 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6266 used to require that other laws be more
6267 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6268 strict&mdash;a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6269 limit, for example&mdash;so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6270 driving.
6271 </para>
6272 <indexterm startref="idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'/>
6273
6274 <figure id="fig-1361">
6275 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.</title>
6276 <graphic fileref="images/1361.png"></graphic>
6277 </figure>
6278 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6279 <para>
6280 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6281 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6282 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6283 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6284 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6285 another.<footnote>
6286 <para>
6287 <!-- f4 -->
6288 Some people object to this way of talking about <quote>liberty.</quote> They object
6289 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6290 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6291 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6292 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6293 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6294 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6295 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6296 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6297 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6298 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6299 of liberty. As I argued in <citetitle>Code</citetitle>, we come from a
6300 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6301 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6302 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6303 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6304 <citetitle>On Liberty</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6305 1978), 19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6306 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, <quote>The
6307 Right to Work,</quote> in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6308 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays</citetitle> (London:
6309 Routledge: 1997), 62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6310 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6311 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6312 places easier; 42 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
6313 12101 (2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6314 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6315 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6316 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6317 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)</primary></indexterm>
6318 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.</primary></indexterm>
6319 <indexterm><primary>architecture, constraint effected through</primary></indexterm>
6320 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6321 </para></footnote>
6322 </para>
6323 <section id="hollywood">
6324 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right</title>
6325 <para>
6326 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6327 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6328 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6329 rallying makes sense.
6330 </para>
6331 <para>
6332 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6333 Internet:
6334 </para>
6335 <figure id="fig-1371">
6336 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6337 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6338 </figure>
6339 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
6340 <indexterm><primary>norms, regulatory influence of</primary></indexterm>
6341 <para>
6342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6343 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6344 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6345 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6346 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6347 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6348 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6349 recognize&mdash;kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6350 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6351 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6352 this form of infringement.
6353 </para>
6354 <para>
6355 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6356 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6357 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6358 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6359 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6360 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6361 </para>
6362 <para>
6363 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6364 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6365 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6366 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6367 Iraq
6368 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6369 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6370 looting that results.
6371 </para>
6372 <figure id="fig-1381">
6373 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.</title>
6374 <graphic fileref="images/1381.png"></graphic>
6375 </figure>
6376 <para>
6377 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6378 warriors. Indeed, in a <quote>White Paper</quote> prepared by the Commerce
6379 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in 1995,
6380 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6381 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6382 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (1) Congress should
6383 strengthen intellectual property law, (2) businesses should adopt
6384 innovative marketing techniques, (3) technologists should push to
6385 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (4) educators should
6386 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6387 </para>
6388 <indexterm><primary>steel industry</primary></indexterm>
6389 <para>
6390 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed&mdash;if it was to
6391 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6392 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6393 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6394 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6395 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6396 life. Homeowners living in a
6397
6398 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6399 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6400 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6401 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6402 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6403 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6404 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6405 </para>
6406 <para>
6407 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6408 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6409 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6410 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6411 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6412 Brown describes it, its <quote>architecture of revenue.</quote>
6413 </para>
6414 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry</primary></indexterm>
6415 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
6416 <para>
6417 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6418 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6419 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6420 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6421 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as 20
6422 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6423 of digital cameras.<footnote><para>
6424 <!-- f5 -->
6425 See Geoffrey Smith, <quote>Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?</quote>
6426 BusinessWeek online, 2 August 1999, available at
6427 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #23</ulink>. For a more
6428 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6429 R. Schoenberger, <quote>Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?</quote> Forbes.com, 6
6430 October 2003, available at
6431 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #24</ulink>.
6432 </para></footnote>
6433
6434 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6435 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6436 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6437 <emphasis>for the purpose of</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6438 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6439 weakened the <quote>stickiness</quote> of television advertising (if a boring
6440 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6441 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6442 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6443 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6444 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6445 </para>
6446 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid</primary></indexterm>
6447 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
6448 <para>
6449 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6450 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6451 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6453 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6454 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6455 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6456 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, <quote>established companies
6457 have an interest in excluding future competitors.</quote><footnote><para>
6458 <!-- f6 -->
6459 Fred Warshofsky, <citetitle>The Patent Wars</citetitle> (New York: Wiley, 1994), 170&ndash;71.
6460 </para></footnote>
6461 And relative to a
6462 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6463 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6464 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6465 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6466 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6467 Brezhnev.
6468 </para>
6469 <para>
6470 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6471 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6472 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6473 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6474 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6475 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6476 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6477 opportunities for innovation and change.
6478 </para>
6479 <para>
6480 In the context of laws regulating speech&mdash;which include,
6481 obviously, copyright law&mdash;that duty is even stronger. When the
6482 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6483 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6484 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6485 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6486 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6487 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: <quote>Congress
6488 shall make no law &hellip; abridging the freedom of speech.</quote> So when
6489 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would <quote>abridge</quote> the freedom
6490 of speech, it should ask&mdash; carefully&mdash;whether such
6491 regulation is justified.
6492 </para>
6493 <para>
6494 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6496 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6497 <quote>justified.</quote> My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6498 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6499 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6500 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6501 </para>
6502 <para>
6503 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6504 </para>
6505 <indexterm id="idxddt" class='startofrange'>
6506 <primary>DDT</primary>
6507 </indexterm>
6508 <para>
6509 In 1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In 1948, Swiss
6510 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6511 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the 1950s, the
6512 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6513 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6514 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann</primary></indexterm>
6515 </para>
6516 <para>
6517 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6518 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6519 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6520 </para>
6521 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel</primary></indexterm>
6522 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)</primary></indexterm>
6523 <para>
6524 But in 1962, Rachel Carson published <citetitle>Silent Spring</citetitle>, which argued that
6525 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6526 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6527 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6528 </para>
6529 <para>
6530 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6531 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6532 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6533 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6534 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6535 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6536 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6537 </para>
6538 <indexterm><primary>Boyle, James</primary></indexterm>
6539 <para>
6540 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6541 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an <quote>environmentalism</quote> for
6542 culture.<footnote><para>
6543 <!-- f7 -->
6544 See, for example, James Boyle, <quote>A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6545 Environmentalism for the Net?</quote> <citetitle>Duke Law Journal</citetitle> 47 (1997): 87.
6546 </para></footnote>
6547 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6548 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6549 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6550 <quote>for free.</quote> The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6551 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6552 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6553 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6554 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6555 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6556 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6557 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6558 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6559 </para>
6560 <para>
6561 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6562 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6563 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6564 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6565 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6566 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6567 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6568 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6569 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6570 </para>
6571 <para>
6572 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6573 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6574 be lost.
6575 </para>
6576 <indexterm startref="idxddt" class='endofrange'/>
6577 </section>
6578 <section id="beginnings">
6579 <title>Beginnings</title>
6580 <para>
6581 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6582 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of <quote>creative
6583 property</quote> rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6584 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6585 </para>
6586 <para>
6587 The power to establish <quote>creative property</quote> rights is granted to
6588 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6589 odd. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of our Constitution states that:
6590 </para>
6591 <para>
6592 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6593 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6594 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6595
6596 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6597 We can call this the <quote>Progress Clause,</quote> for notice what this clause
6598 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6599 <quote>creative property rights.</quote> It says that Congress has the power
6600 <emphasis>to promote progress</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6601 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6602 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6603 </para>
6604 <para>
6605 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6606 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="founders"/>,
6607 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6608 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6609 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6610 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6611 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6612 copyrights extend <quote>to Authors</quote> only.
6613 </para>
6614 <para>
6615 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6616 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6617 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6618 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6619 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6620 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6621 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6622 to reinforce the power of the states&mdash;including the Senate, whose
6623 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6624 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6625 case, a <emphasis>structure</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6626 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6627 concentrations of power.
6628 </para>
6629 <para>
6630 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call <quote>copyright</quote>
6631 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6632 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6633 <quote>copyright</quote> in context: We need to see how it has changed in the 210
6634 years since they first struck its design.
6635 </para>
6636 <para>
6637 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6638 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6639 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6640 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6641 started here:
6642 </para>
6643 <figure id="fig-1441">
6644 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.</title>
6645 <graphic fileref="images/1331.png"></graphic>
6646 </figure>
6647 <para>
6648 We will end here:
6649 </para>
6650 <figure id="fig-1442">
6651 <title><quote>Copyright</quote> today.</title>
6652 <graphic fileref="images/1442.png"></graphic>
6653 </figure>
6654 <para>
6655 Let me explain how.
6656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6657 </para>
6658 </section>
6659 <section id="lawduration">
6660 <title>Law: Duration</title>
6661 <para>
6662 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6663 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6664 the English had confronted in 1774. Many states had passed laws
6665 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6666 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6667 authorship.<footnote>
6668 <para>
6669 <!-- f8 -->
6670 William W. Crosskey, <citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6671 the United States</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press, 1953), vol. 1,
6672 485&ndash;86: <quote>extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6673 Law of the Land,' <emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6674 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law</emphasis></quote>
6675 (emphasis added).
6676 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6677 </para></footnote>
6678 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6679 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6680 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6681 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6682 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6683 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6684 </para>
6685 <para>
6686 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6687 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6688 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6689 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6690 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6691 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6692 </para>
6693 <para>
6694 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6695 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6696 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6697 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6698 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6699 </para>
6700 <para>
6701 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6702 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6703 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6704 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6705 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6706 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6707 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6708 <!-- f9 -->
6709 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6710 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6711 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6712 of an Industry, 1630&ndash;1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6713 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6714 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6715 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7&ndash;10 (2002),
6716 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
6717 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6718 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6719 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6720 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6721 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6722 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6723 </para>
6724 <para>
6725 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6726 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6728 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6729 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6730 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6731 copyright, either.
6732 </para>
6733 <para>
6734 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6735 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6736 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6737 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6738 domain.<footnote><para>
6739 <!-- f10 -->
6740 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6741 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6742 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6743 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, <quote>Study No. 31: Renewal of Copyright,</quote>
6744 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6745 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6746 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, <quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,</quote>
6747 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review</citetitle> 70 (2003): 471, 498&ndash;501, and
6748 accompanying figures. </para></footnote>
6749 </para>
6750 <para>
6751 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6752 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6753 out of print after one year.<footnote><para>
6754 <!-- f11 -->
6755 See Ringer, ch. 9, n. 2. </para></footnote> When that happens, the
6756 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6757 no longer <emphasis>effectively</emphasis> controlled by
6758 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6759 is to sell the books as used books; that use&mdash;because it does not
6760 involve publication&mdash;is effectively free.
6761 </para>
6762 <para>
6763 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6764 changed once. In 1831, the term was increased from a maximum of 28
6765 years to a maximum of 42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6766 from 14 years to 28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6767 the term increased once again. In 1909, Congress extended the renewal
6768 term of 14 years to 28 years, setting a maximum term of 56 years.
6769 </para>
6770 <para>
6771 Then, beginning in 1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6772 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6773 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6774 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6775 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6776 In 1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6777 And in 1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6778 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6779 </para>
6780 <para>
6781 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6782 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6783 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6784 years, or 70 percent of the time since 1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6785
6786 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6787 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6788 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6789 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6790 </para>
6791 <para>
6792 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6793 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6794 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6795 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6796 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6797 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6798 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6799 value.
6800 </para>
6801 <para>
6802 The United States abandoned this sensible system in 1976. For
6803 all works created after 1978, there was only one copyright term&mdash;the
6804 maximum term. For <quote>natural</quote> authors, that term was life plus fifty
6805 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in 1992,
6806 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6807 before 1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6808 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6809 was ninety-five years.
6810 </para>
6811 <para>
6812 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6813 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6814 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6815 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6816 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6817 that terms be <quote>limited,</quote> we have no evidence that anything will limit
6818 them.
6819 </para>
6820 <para>
6821 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6822 dramatic. In 1973, more than 85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6823 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6824 in 1973 was just 32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6825 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6826 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from 32.2 years to 95
6827 years.<footnote><para>
6828 <!-- f12 -->
6829 These statistics are understated. Between the years 1910 and 1962 (the
6830 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6831 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6832 Posner, <quote>Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,</quote> loc. cit.
6833 </para></footnote>
6834 </para>
6835 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6836 </section>
6837 <section id="lawscope">
6838 <title>Law: Scope</title>
6839 <para>
6840 The <quote>scope</quote> of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6841 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6842 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6843 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6844 </para>
6845 <para>
6846 In 1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only <quote>maps,
6847 charts, and books.</quote> That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6848 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6849 the author the exclusive right to <quote>publish</quote> copyrighted works. That
6850 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6851 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6852 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6853 did not extend to what lawyers call <quote>derivative works.</quote> It would not,
6854 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6855 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6856 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6857 </para>
6858 <para>
6859 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6860 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6861 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6862 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6863 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6864 work not only the exclusive right to <quote>publish</quote> the work, but also the
6865 exclusive right of control over any <quote>copies</quote> of that work. And most
6866 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6867 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6868 <quote>derivative work</quote> that might grow out of the original work. In this
6869 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6870 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6871 on the initial creative work.
6872 </para>
6873 <para>
6874 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6875 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6876 complete removal of the renewal requirement in 1992. In addition
6877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6878 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6879 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6880 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6881 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6882 famous &copy; or the word <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>. And for most
6883 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6884 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6885 secured.
6886 </para>
6887 <para>
6888 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6889 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6890 in the first ten years of the Republic, 95 percent of works eligible
6891 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6892 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6893 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6894 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6895 copyrighted&mdash;that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6896 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6897 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6898 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6899 original author.
6900 </para>
6901 <para>
6902 All of these <quote>formalities</quote> were abolished in the American system when
6903 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6904 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6905 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6906 a &copy;; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6907 copy available for others to copy.
6908 </para>
6909 <para>
6910 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6911 differences.
6912 </para>
6913 <para>
6914 If, in 1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the 5 percent who
6915 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6916 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6917 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6918 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In 1790, there were
6919 174 publishers in the United States.<footnote><para>
6920 <!-- f13 -->
6921 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, <quote>Poets, Pirates, and the
6922 Creation of American Literature,</quote> 29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6923 International Law and Politics</citetitle> 255 (1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6924 Federal Copyright Records, 1790&ndash;1800 (U.S. G.P.O., 1987).
6925
6926 </para></footnote>
6927 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6928 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6929 the United States&mdash;publishers.
6930 </para>
6931 <para>
6932 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6933 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6934 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6935 was totally unregulated by the 1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6936 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6937 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6938 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6939 were restrained.
6940 </para>
6941 <para>
6942 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6943 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6944 every note to your spouse, every doodle, <emphasis>every</emphasis>
6945 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form&mdash;all of this is
6946 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6947 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6948 protect it.
6949 </para>
6950 <para>
6951 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6952 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6953 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6954 </para>
6955 <para>
6956 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6957 control
6958 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6959 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of <quote>derivative
6960 rights.</quote> If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6961 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6962 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6963 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6964 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6965 exclusive
6966 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6967 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6968 </para>
6969 <para>
6970 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6971 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6972 expansion
6973 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6974 copyright.
6975 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6976 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6977 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6978 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6979 </para>
6980 <para>
6981 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6982 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6983 within a free culture&mdash;at least, it's astonishing when you
6984 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6985 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6986 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6987 <emphasis>that</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6988 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6989 all&mdash;they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6990 not protect derivative rights at all.<footnote><para>
6991 <!-- f14 -->
6992 Jonathan Zittrain, <quote>The Copyright Cage,</quote> <citetitle>Legal
6993 Affairs</citetitle>, July/August 2003, available at
6994 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #26</ulink>.
6995 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
6996 </para></footnote>
6997 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6998 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6999 the wrong of direct piracy.
7000 </para>
7001 <para>
7002 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
7003 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
7004 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
7005 of my book.<footnote><para>
7006 <!-- f15 -->
7007 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
7008 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
7009 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere <quote>copies</quote> and
7010 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, <quote>The Freedom of Imagination:
7011 Copyright's Constitutionality,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law
7012 Journal</citetitle> 112 (2002): 1&ndash;60 (see especially
7013 pp. 53&ndash;59).
7014 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb</primary></indexterm>
7015 </para></footnote>
7016 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
7017 </para>
7018 <para>
7019 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
7020 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
7021 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
7022 called <quote>Mickey Mouse,</quote> why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
7023 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
7024 created?
7025 </para>
7026 <para>
7027 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
7028 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
7029 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
7030 the rights originally granted.
7031 </para>
7032 </section>
7033 <section id="lawreach">
7034 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach</title>
7035 <para>
7036 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
7037 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
7038 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
7039 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.<footnote><para>
7040 <!-- f16 -->
7041 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
7042 certainly regulates more than <quote>copies</quote>&mdash;a public performance of a
7043 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
7044 per se doesn't make a copy; 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
7045 106(4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a <quote>copy</quote>; 17
7046 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section 112(a). But the presumption under the
7047 existing law (which regulates <quote>copies;</quote> 17 <citetitle>United States Code</citetitle>, section
7048 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
7049 </para></footnote>
7050 </para>
7051 <para>
7052 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
7053 <quote>Copies.</quote> That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
7054 <emphasis>copy</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
7055 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that <quote>creative
7056 property</quote> deserves the <quote>same rights</quote> as all other property, it is the
7057 <emphasis>obvious</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
7058 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
7059 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
7060 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
7061 copies should <emphasis>not</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
7062 law. More precisely, they should not <emphasis>always</emphasis> be
7063 the trigger for copyright law.
7064 </para>
7065 <para>
7066 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
7067 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
7068 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
7069 the law of copyright automatically applies,<footnote><para>
7070 <!-- f17 -->
7071 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
7072 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
7073 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
7074 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
7075 technology.
7076 </para></footnote>
7077 because it is clear that the
7078 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
7079 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
7080 </para>
7081 <para>
7082 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
7083 empty circle.
7084 </para>
7085 <figure id="fig-1521">
7086 <title>All potential uses of a book.</title>
7087 <graphic fileref="images/1521.png"></graphic>
7088 </figure>
7089 <para>
7090 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
7091 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
7092 all its potential <emphasis>uses</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
7093 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
7094 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
7095 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
7096 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
7097 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
7098 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
7099 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
7100 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
7101 acts do not make a copy.
7102 </para>
7103 <figure id="fig-1531">
7104 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.</title>
7105 <graphic fileref="images/1531.png"></graphic>
7106 </figure>
7107 <para>
7108 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
7109 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
7110 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
7111 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
7112 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
7113 diagram on next page).
7114 </para>
7115 <para>
7116 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
7117 that remain unregulated because the law considers these <quote>fair uses.</quote>
7118 </para>
7119 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
7120 <figure id="fig-1541">
7121 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.</title>
7122 <graphic fileref="images/1541.png"></graphic>
7123 </figure>
7124 <para>
7125 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
7126 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
7127 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
7128 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
7129 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7130 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7131 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such <quote>fair uses</quote>
7132 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7133 </para>
7134 <figure id="fig-1542">
7135 <title>Unregulated copying considered <quote>fair uses.</quote></title>
7136 <graphic fileref="images/1542.png"></graphic>
7137 </figure>
7138 <para> </para>
7139 <figure id="fig-1551">
7140 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.</title>
7141 <graphic fileref="images/1551.png"></graphic>
7142 </figure>
7143 <para>
7144 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7145 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7146 sorts: (1) unregulated uses, (2) regulated uses, and (3) regulated uses that
7147 are nonetheless deemed <quote>fair</quote> regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7148 </para>
7149 <para>
7150 Enter the Internet&mdash;a distributed, digital network where every use
7151 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.<footnote><para>
7152 <!-- f18 -->
7153 I don't mean <quote>nature</quote> in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7154 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7155 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7156 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7157 of copies remain.
7158 </para></footnote>
7159 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7160 digital network, the scope of category 1 changes dramatically. Uses
7161 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7162 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7163 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7164 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7165 a copy&mdash;category 1 gets sucked into category 2. And those who
7166 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7167 exclusively to category 3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7168 shift.
7169 </para>
7170 <para>
7171 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7172 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7173 be no plausible <emphasis>copyright</emphasis>-related argument that
7174 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7175 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7176 the book once, ten times, or every
7177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7178 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7179 use&mdash;reading&mdash; could be regulated by copyright law because
7180 none of those uses produced a copy.
7181 </para>
7182 <para>
7183 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7184 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7185 only once or only once a month, then <emphasis>copyright
7186 law</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7187 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7188 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7189 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7190 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7191 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7192 copyright owner's wish.
7193 </para>
7194 <para>
7195 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7196 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7197 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7198 points also become clear:
7199 </para>
7200 <para>
7201 First, making category 1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7202 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7203 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7204 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7205 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7206 part of free culture before the Internet.
7207 </para>
7208 <para>
7209 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7210 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7211 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7212 <emphasis>any</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7213 using a machine. <quote>Copy and paste</quote> and <quote>cut and paste</quote> become
7214 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7215 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7216 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7217 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7218 creative work.
7219 </para>
7220 <para>
7221 Third, this shift from category 1 to category 2 puts an extraordinary
7222
7223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7224 burden on category 3 (<quote>fair use</quote>) that fair use never before had to
7225 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7226 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7227 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7228 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7229 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7230 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7231 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7232 regulated.
7233 </para>
7234 <para>
7235 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7236 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7237 depend upon fair use&mdash;never even addressing the earlier question
7238 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7239 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7240 <emphasis>unregulated</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7241 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7242 enough.
7243 </para>
7244 <indexterm id='idxadvertising2' class='startofrange'>
7245 <primary>advertising</primary>
7246 </indexterm>
7247 <para>
7248 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7249 in the business of making <quote>trailer</quote> advertisements for movies available
7250 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7251 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7252 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7253 </para>
7254 <para>
7255 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in 1997, it began
7256 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7257 previews. The idea was to expand their <quote>selling by sampling</quote>
7258 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7259 <quote>browsing.</quote> Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7260 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7261 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7262 </para>
7263 <para>
7264 In 1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7265 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7266 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7267 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7268 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7269 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter&mdash;he had built a
7270 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7271 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7272 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7273 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7274 <quote>fair use</quote> rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7275 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7276 their rights.
7277 </para>
7278 <para>
7279 Disney countersued&mdash;for $100 million in damages. Those damages
7280 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had <quote>willfully
7281 infringed</quote> on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7282 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7283 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7284 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7285 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7286 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $100 million.
7287 </para>
7288 <para>
7289 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7290 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7291 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7292 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7293 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7294 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7295 Disney's permission.
7296 </para>
7297 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising2' class='endofrange'/>
7298 <para>
7299 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7300 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7301 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7302 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7303 was in the marketplace, the <quote>first-sale doctrine</quote> would free the
7304 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7305 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7306 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7307 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7308 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7309 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7310 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7311 </para>
7312 <indexterm><primary>Barnes &amp; Noble</primary></indexterm>
7313 <para>
7314 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7315 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7316 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes &amp; Noble has the
7317 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7318 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7319 abuse. If Barnes &amp; Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7320 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7321 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7322 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7323 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7324 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7325 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7326 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7327 happening are quite slight.
7328 </para>
7329 <para>
7330 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7331 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7332 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7333 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7334 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7335 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7336 </para>
7337 </section>
7338 <section id="lawforce">
7339 <title>Architecture and Law: Force</title>
7340 <para>
7341 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7342 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7343 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7344 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7345 </para>
7346 <para>
7347 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7348 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7349 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7350 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7351 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7352 your freedom.
7353 </para>
7354 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca</primary></indexterm>
7355 <indexterm id="idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7356 <primary>Marx Brothers</primary>
7357 </indexterm>
7358 <indexterm id="idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'>
7359 <primary>Warner Brothers</primary>
7360 </indexterm>
7361 <para>
7362 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7363 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7364 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7365 <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7366 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7367 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7368 plan.<footnote><para>
7369 <!-- f19 -->
7370 See David Lange, <quote>Recognizing the Public Domain,</quote> <citetitle>Law and
7371 Contemporary Problems</citetitle> 44 (1981): 172&ndash;73.
7372 </para></footnote>
7373 </para>
7374 <para>
7375 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7376 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers <quote>were brothers long before
7377 you were.</quote><footnote><para>
7378 <!-- f20 -->
7379 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan, <citetitle>Copyrights and
7380 Copywrongs</citetitle>, 1&ndash;3.
7381 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
7382 </para></footnote>
7383 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7384 <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7385 trying to control <citetitle>Casablanca</citetitle>, then the Marx
7386 Brothers would insist on control over <citetitle>brothers</citetitle>.
7387 </para>
7388 <para>
7389 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7390 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7391 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7392 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7393 </para>
7394 <para>
7395 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7396 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7397 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7398 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7399 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7400 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7401 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7402 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7403 </para>
7404 <indexterm startref="idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7405 <indexterm startref="idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'/>
7406
7407 <indexterm id="idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'>
7408 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader</primary>
7409 </indexterm>
7410 <para>
7411 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7412 </para>
7413 <para>
7414 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7415 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7416 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7417 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7418 technology.
7419 </para>
7420 <para>
7421 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7422 Reader.
7423 </para>
7424 <para>
7425 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7426 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7427 public domain: <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, for example, is in
7428 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7429 public domain: My own book <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>
7430 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7431 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7432 copy of
7433 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7434 <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7435 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7436 </para>
7437 <figure id="fig-1611">
7438 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader</title>
7439 <graphic fileref="images/1611.png"></graphic>
7440 </figure>
7441 <para>
7442 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7443 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7444 </para>
7445 <figure id="fig-1612">
7446 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.</title>
7447 <graphic fileref="images/1612.png"></graphic>
7448 </figure>
7449 <para>
7450 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7451 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7452 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7453 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7454 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7455 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle>
7456 read aloud through the computer.
7457 </para>
7458 <para>
7459 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7460 translation): Aristotle's <citetitle>Politics</citetitle>.
7461 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle</primary></indexterm>
7462 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics</citetitle>, (Aristotle)</primary></indexterm>
7463 </para>
7464 <figure id="fig-1621">
7465 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s <quote>Politics</quote></title>
7466 <graphic fileref="images/1621.png"></graphic>
7467 </figure>
7468 <para>
7469 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7470 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7471 the book.
7472 </para>
7473 <figure id="fig-1622">
7474 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s <quote>Politics</quote>.</title>
7475 <graphic fileref="images/1622.png"></graphic>
7476 </figure>
7477 <para>
7478 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7479 original e-book version of my last book, <citetitle>The Future of
7480 Ideas</citetitle>:
7481 </para>
7482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7483 <figure id="fig-1631">
7484 <title>List of the permissions for <quote>The Future of Ideas</quote>.</title>
7485 <graphic fileref="images/1631.png"></graphic>
7486 </figure>
7487 <para>
7488 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7489 </para>
7490 <para>
7491 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7492 <quote>permissions</quote>&mdash; as if the publisher has the power to control how
7493 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7494 certainly does have the power&mdash;up to the limits of the copyright
7495 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7496 power.<footnote><para>
7497 <!-- f21 -->
7498 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7499 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7500 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7501 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7502 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7503 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7504 subsequently acquired the book.
7505 </para></footnote>
7506 When my e-book of <citetitle>Middlemarch</citetitle> says I have the
7507 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7508 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7509 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7510 control that the law would enable.
7511 </para>
7512 <para>
7513 The control comes instead from the code&mdash;from the technology
7514 within which the e-book <quote>lives.</quote> Though the e-book says that these are
7515 permissions, they are not the sort of <quote>permissions</quote> that most of us
7516 deal with. When a teenager gets <quote>permission</quote> to stay out till
7517 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7518 till 2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7519 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7520 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7521 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7522 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7523 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7524 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7525 aloud&mdash;it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7526 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7527 won't read aloud.
7528 </para>
7529 <para>
7530 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7531 These are <emphasis>controls</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7532 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7533 you tried to type <quote>Warner Brothers,</quote> erased <quote>Brothers</quote> from the
7534 sentence.
7535 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers</primary></indexterm>
7536 </para>
7537 <para>
7538 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7539 <emphasis>law</emphasis> as copyright <emphasis>code</emphasis>. The
7540 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7541 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7542 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7543 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7544 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7545 </para>
7546 <para>
7547 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7548 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7549 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7550 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7551 to defeat these protections as well?
7552 </para>
7553 <para>
7554 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7555 eBook Reader.
7556 </para>
7557 <para>
7558 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7559 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7560 on the Adobe site was a copy of <citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7561 Wonderland</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7562 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7563 following report:
7564 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)</primary></indexterm>
7565 </para>
7566 <figure id="fig-1641">
7567 <title>List of the permissions for <quote>Alice's Adventures in
7568 Wonderland</quote>.</title>
7569 <graphic fileref="images/1641.png"></graphic>
7570 </figure>
7571 <beginpage pagenum="164"/>
7572 <para>
7573 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7574 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7575 <quote>permissions</quote> indicated, not allowed to <quote>read aloud</quote>!
7576 </para>
7577 <para>
7578 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7579 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7580 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7581 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7582 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7583 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7584 </para>
7585 <para>
7586 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7587 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7588 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7589 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7590 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7591 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7592 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7593 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7594 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7595 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7596 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7597 </para>
7598 <para>
7599 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7600 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7601 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7602 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7603 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7604 often crazy.
7605 </para>
7606 <indexterm startref="idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'/>
7607 <para>
7608 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7609 story of mine that makes the same point.
7610 </para>
7611 <indexterm id="idxaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7612 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7613 </indexterm>
7614 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'>
7615 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7616 </indexterm>
7617 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'>
7618 <primary>Sony</primary>
7619 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7620 </indexterm>
7621 <para>
7622 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named <quote>Aibo.</quote> The Aibo
7623 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7624 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7625 </para>
7626 <para>
7627 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7628 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7629 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7630 <beginpage pagenum="165"/>
7631 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7632 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7633 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7634 </para>
7635 <para>
7636 <quote>Teach</quote> here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7637 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7638 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7639 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7640 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7641 their computer <quote>dog</quote> to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7642 </para>
7643 <indexterm><primary>hacks</primary></indexterm>
7644 <para>
7645 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7646 <citetitle>hack</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7647 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7648 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7649 them, <citetitle>hack</citetitle> is a much more positive
7650 term. <citetitle>Hack</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7651 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7652 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7653 old computer doesn't run, or <quote>drive,</quote> the printer. If you discovered
7654 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7655 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7656 you just bought.
7657 </para>
7658 <para>
7659 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7660 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7661 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7662 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7663 ethically.
7664 </para>
7665 <para>
7666 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7667 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7668 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7669 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7670 than Sony had built.
7671 </para>
7672 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7673 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'/>
7674 <indexterm startref="idxaibo1" class='endofrange'/>
7675 <para>
7676 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7677 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7678 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7679 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7680 the
7681
7682 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7683 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7684 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7685 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7686 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7687 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7688 thought, <emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7689 a robot dog to dance?</emphasis>
7690 </para>
7691 <para>
7692 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show&mdash;
7693 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7694 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7695 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7696 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7697 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7698 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7699 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7700 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7701 </para>
7702 <para>
7703 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April 2001.<footnote><para>
7704 <!-- f22 -->
7705 See Pamela Samuelson, <quote>Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,</quote>
7706 <citetitle>Science</citetitle> 293 (2001): 2028; Brendan I. Koerner, <quote>Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7707 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks,</quote> <citetitle>American Prospect</citetitle>,
7708 January 2002; <quote>Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7709 DMCA,</quote> <citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter</citetitle>, 11 December 2001; Bill
7710 Holland, <quote>Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,</quote> <citetitle>Billboard</citetitle>,
7711 May 2001; Janelle Brown, <quote>Is the RIAA Running Scared?</quote> Salon.com,
7712 April 2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, <quote>Frequently Asked
7713 Questions about <citetitle>Felten and USENIX</citetitle> v. <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> Legal Case,</quote> available at
7714 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #27</ulink>.
7715 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
7716 </para></footnote>
7717 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7718 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7719 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7720 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7721 </para>
7722 <para>
7723 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7724 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7725 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7726 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7727 <quote>this music cannot be copied,</quote> and have a computer respect that
7728 command. The technology was to be part of a <quote>trusted system</quote> of
7729 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7730 Internet much more.
7731 </para>
7732 <para>
7733 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7734 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7735 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7736 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7737 </para>
7738 <para>
7739 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7740 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7741 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7742 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7743 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7744 </para>
7745 <para>
7746 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7747 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7748 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7749 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7750 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7751 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7752 </para>
7753 <para>
7754 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7755 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7756 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7757 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7758 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7759 constituted, succeed.
7760 </para>
7761 <indexterm id="idxaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7762 <primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary>
7763 </indexterm>
7764 <indexterm id="idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'>
7765 <primary>robotic dog</primary>
7766 </indexterm>
7767 <indexterm id="idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'>
7768 <primary>Sony</primary>
7769 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7770 </indexterm>
7771 <para>
7772 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7773 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7774 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7775 wrote:
7776 </para>
7777 <blockquote>
7778 <para>
7779 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7780 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7781 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7782 </para>
7783 </blockquote>
7784 <indexterm startref="idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7785 <indexterm startref="idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'/>
7786 <indexterm startref="idxaibo2" class='endofrange'/>
7787 <para>
7788 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7789 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7790 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7791 </para>
7792 <blockquote>
7793 <para>
7794 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7795 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7796 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7797 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7798 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (<quote>DMCA</quote>).
7799 </para>
7800 </blockquote>
7801 <para>
7802 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7803 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7804 spreading such information an offense.
7805 </para>
7806 <para>
7807 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7808 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7809 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7810 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7811 technologies&mdash; technologies to control the replication and
7812 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7813 <emphasis>code</emphasis> to modify the original
7814 <emphasis>code</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7815 protection for copyright owners.
7816 </para>
7817 <para>
7818 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7819 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7820 <emphasis>legal code</emphasis> intended to buttress
7821 <emphasis>software code</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7822 support the <emphasis>legal code of copyright</emphasis>.
7823 </para>
7824 <para>
7825 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7826 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7827 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7828 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7829 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7830 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7831 have been a copyright violation.
7832 </para>
7833 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7834 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7835 <indexterm>
7836 <primary>Sony</primary>
7837 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7838 </indexterm>
7839 <para>
7840 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7841 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7842 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7843 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7844 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7845 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7846 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7847 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7848 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7849 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7850 </para>
7851 <para>
7852 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7853 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7854 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7855 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7856 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7857 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7858 </para>
7859 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7860 <para>
7861 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7862 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7863 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7864 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7865 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7866 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka <quote><citetitle>Mr. Rogers</citetitle>,</quote>
7867 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7868 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7869 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7870 </para>
7871 <blockquote>
7872 <para>
7873 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7874 <quote>Neighborhood</quote> at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7875 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7876 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7877 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7878 <quote>Neighborhood</quote> off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the <quote>Neighborhood</quote>
7879 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7880 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7881 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7882 broadcasting has always been <quote>You are an important person just the way
7883 you are. You can make healthy decisions.</quote> Maybe I'm going on too long,
7884 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7885 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7886 important.<footnote><para>
7887 <!-- f23 -->
7888 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc</citetitle>., 464 U.S. 417,
7889 455 fn. 27 (1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7890 James Lardner, <citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7891 the VCR</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 270&ndash;71.
7892 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred</primary></indexterm>
7893 </para></footnote>
7894 </para>
7895 </blockquote>
7896 <para>
7897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7898 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7899 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7900 the VCR responsible.
7901 </para>
7902 <para>
7903 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7904 the DMCA.
7905 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7906 </para>
7907 <para>
7908 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7909 </para>
7910 <para>
7911 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7912 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7913 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7914 pirating of copyrighted material&mdash;a bad end. Or they can be used
7915 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7916 would be considered fair use&mdash;a good end.
7917 </para>
7918 <indexterm id='idxhandguns' class='startofrange'>
7919 <primary>handguns</primary>
7920 </indexterm>
7921 <para>
7922 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7924 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7925 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7926 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7927 and bad uses.
7928 </para>
7929 <figure id="fig-1711">
7930 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.</title>
7931 <graphic fileref="images/1711.png"></graphic>
7932 </figure>
7933 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul</primary></indexterm>
7934 <para>
7935 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7936 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7937 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash: <emphasis>No one ever
7938 died from copyright circumvention</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7939 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7940 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7941 </para>
7942 <indexterm startref='idxhandguns' class='endofrange'/>
7943 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7944 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog</primary></indexterm>
7945 <indexterm>
7946 <primary>Sony</primary>
7947 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by</secondary>
7948 </indexterm>
7949 <para>
7950 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7951 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7952 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7953 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7954 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7955 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7956 </para>
7957 <para>
7958 This is how <emphasis>code</emphasis> becomes
7959 <emphasis>law</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7960 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7961 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7962 law&mdash;increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7963 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7964 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7965 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect&mdash;at
7966 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7967 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7968 </para>
7969 <para>
7970 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7971 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7972 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7973 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7974 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7975 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7976 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7977 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7978 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7979 </para>
7980 <para>
7981
7982 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7983 For example, imagine you were part of a <citetitle>Star Trek</citetitle> fan club. You
7984 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7985 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7986 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7987 simply continue it.<footnote><para>
7988 <!-- f24 -->
7989 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, <quote>Legal Fictions,
7990 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,</quote> <citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7991 Entertainment Law Journal</citetitle> 17 (1997): 651.
7992 </para></footnote>
7993 </para>
7994 <para>
7995 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7996 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7997 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7998 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7999 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
8000 </para>
8001 <para>
8002 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
8003 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
8004 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
8005 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
8006 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
8007 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
8008 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
8009 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
8010 </para>
8011 <para>
8012 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
8013 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
8014 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
8015 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
8016 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
8017 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
8018 </para>
8019 </section>
8020 <section id="marketconcentration">
8021 <title>Market: Concentration</title>
8022 <para>
8023 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically&mdash;tripled in
8024 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
8025 well&mdash;from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
8026 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
8027 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
8028 find better ways
8029 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
8030 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
8031 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
8032 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
8033 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
8034 market for creative work, has become the single most important
8035 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
8036 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
8037 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
8038 control.
8039 </para>
8040 <para>
8041 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
8042 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
8043 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
8044 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
8045 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
8046 </para>
8047 <para>
8048 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
8049 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
8050 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
8051 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
8052 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
8053 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
8054 announced in June 2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
8055 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
8056 of the media.
8057 </para>
8058 <para>
8059 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
8060 nature.
8061 </para>
8062 <para>
8063 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
8064 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
8065 ownership, <quote>five companies control 85 percent of our media sources.</quote><footnote><para>
8066 <!-- f25 -->
8067 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
8068 Transportation Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (22 May 2003)
8069 (statement of Senator John McCain). </para></footnote>
8070 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
8071 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control 84.8 percent of the
8072 U.S. music market.<footnote><para>
8073 <!-- f26 -->
8074 Lynette Holloway, <quote>Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
8075 Slide,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 23 December 2002.
8076 </para></footnote>
8077 The <quote>five largest cable companies pipe
8078 programming to 74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide.</quote><footnote><para>
8079 <!-- f27 -->
8080 Molly Ivins, <quote>Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,</quote> <citetitle>Charleston Gazette</citetitle>,
8081 31 May 2003.
8082 </para></footnote>
8083 <indexterm><primary>BMG</primary></indexterm>
8084 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
8085 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John</primary></indexterm>
8086 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
8087 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group</primary></indexterm>
8088 </para>
8089 <para>
8090 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
8091 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
8092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
8093 seventy-five stations. Today <emphasis>one</emphasis> company owns
8094 more than 1,200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
8095 total number of radio owners dropped by 34 percent. Today, in most
8096 markets, the two largest broadcasters control 74 percent of that
8097 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control 90 percent of
8098 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
8099 </para>
8100 <para>
8101 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
8102 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
8103 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
8104 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
8105 the United States. The top ten film studios receive 99 percent of all
8106 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for 85 percent
8107 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
8108 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
8109 protected&mdash; by the market.
8110 </para>
8111 <para>
8112 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
8113 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
8114 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
8115 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
8116 </para>
8117 <blockquote>
8118 <para>
8119 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
8120 unmatched in its integration. They supply content&mdash;Fox movies
8121 &hellip; Fox TV shows &hellip; Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
8122 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
8123 advertisers&mdash;in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
8124 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
8125 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
8126 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
8127 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
8128 the same function in the United States.<footnote><para>
8129 <!-- f28 -->
8130 James Fallows, <quote>The Age of Murdoch,</quote> <citetitle>Atlantic Monthly</citetitle> (September
8131 2003): 89.
8132 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James</primary></indexterm>
8133 </para></footnote>
8134 </para>
8135 </blockquote>
8136 <para>
8137 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
8138 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
8139 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8140 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8141 </para>
8142 <figure id="fig-1761">
8143 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.</title>
8144 <graphic fileref="images/1761.png"></graphic>
8145 </figure>
8146 <para>
8147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8148 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8149 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8150 distribute content?
8151 </para>
8152 <para>
8153 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8154 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8155 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8156 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8157 </para>
8158 <para>
8159 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8160 integration may matter.
8161 </para>
8162 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman</primary></indexterm>
8163 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8164 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8165 <para>
8166 In 1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle>. He took
8167 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8168 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8169 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8170 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8171 </para>
8172 <para>
8173 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8174 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8175 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8176 control.<footnote><para>
8177 <!-- f29 -->
8178 Leonard Hill, <quote>The Axis of Access,</quote> remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8179 Forum, <quote>Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry,</quote> St. Louis,
8180 Missouri, 3 April 2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8181 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #28</ulink>;
8182 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8183 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #29</ulink>).
8184 </para></footnote>
8185 </para>
8186 <para>
8187
8188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8189 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8190 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8191 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8192 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as 1992,
8193 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8194 television&mdash;75 percent of it&mdash;was <quote>independent</quote> of the
8195 networks.
8196 </para>
8197 <para>
8198 In 1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8199 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In 1985,
8200 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8201 2002, only five independent television studios remained. <quote>In 1992,
8202 only 15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8203 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8204 controlled companies more than quintupled to 77 percent.</quote> <quote>In 1992, 16
8205 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8206 year there was one.</quote><footnote><para>
8207 <!-- f30 -->
8208 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8209 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 108th Cong., 1st
8210 sess. (2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8211 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8212 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8213 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8214 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia, 27 February
8215 2003.
8216 </para></footnote>
8217 In 2002, 75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8218 that ran it. <quote>In the ten-year period between 1992 and 2002, the number
8219 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8220 increased over 200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8221 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8222 63%.</quote><footnote><para>
8223 <!-- f31 -->
8224 Ibid.
8225 </para></footnote>
8226 </para>
8227 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family</primary></indexterm>
8228 <para>
8229 Today, another Norman Lear with another <citetitle>All in the Family</citetitle> would
8230 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8231 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8232 owned by the network.
8233 </para>
8234 <para>
8235 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8236 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8237 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8238 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry</primary></indexterm>
8239 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill</primary></indexterm>
8240 </para>
8241 <blockquote>
8242 <para>
8243 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8244 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8245 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8246 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8248 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8249 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8250 handful.<footnote><para>
8251 <!-- f32 -->
8252 <quote>Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,</quote> <citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers</citetitle>, Bill
8253 Moyers, 25 April 2003, edited transcript available at
8254 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #31</ulink>.
8255 </para></footnote>
8256 </para>
8257 </blockquote>
8258 <para>
8259 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8260 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8261 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8262 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8263 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8264 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8265 question without risk of consequence&mdash;not necessarily banishment
8266 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8267 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8268 democracy.
8269 </para>
8270 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.</primary></indexterm>
8271 <para>
8272 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8273 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the <quote>Innovator's
8274 Dilemma</quote>: the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8275 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8276 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8277 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.<footnote><para>
8278 <!-- f33 -->
8279 Clayton M. Christensen, <citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8280 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business</citetitle>
8281 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). Christensen
8282 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8283 Kim B. Clark, <quote>The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8284 Concepts in Technological Evolution,</quote> <citetitle>Research Policy</citetitle> 14 (1985):
8285 235&ndash;51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8286 Kaplan, <citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8287 Underperform the Market&mdash;and How to Successfully Transform Them</citetitle>
8288 (New York: Currency/Doubleday, 2001). </para></footnote>
8289
8290 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8291 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8292 sprinting.
8293 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.</primary></indexterm>
8294 </para>
8295 <para>
8296 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8297 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8298 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8299 measure.
8300 </para>
8301 <para>
8302 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8303 suggest the concern.
8304 </para>
8305 <para>
8306 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8307 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8308 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8309 </para>
8310 <para>
8311 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8312 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8313 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8314
8315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8316 wrecked by drugs&mdash;though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8317 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8318 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8319 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8320 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8321 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8322 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8323 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8324 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8325 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8326 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8327 outweigh these costs.
8328 </para>
8329 <para>
8330 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8331 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8332 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8333 these issues.
8334 </para>
8335 <indexterm id='idxadvertising3' class='startofrange'>
8336 <primary>advertising</primary>
8337 </indexterm>
8338 <para>
8339 Beginning in 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8340 a media campaign as part of the <quote>war on drugs.</quote> The campaign produced
8341 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8342 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8343 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8344 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8345 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8346 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8347 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8348 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8349 </para>
8350 <para>
8351 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8352 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8353 </para>
8354 <para>
8355 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8356 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8357 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8358 war. Can you do it?
8359 </para>
8360 <para>
8361 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8362 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8363 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8364 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8365 message will be heard then?
8366 </para>
8367 <para>
8368 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8369 <quote>controversial</quote> ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8370 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8371 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8372 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8373 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8374 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8375 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8376 rights of the stations to be this biased.<footnote><para>
8377 <!-- f34 -->
8378 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February 2003, sought to place ads
8379 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8380 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as <quote>against
8381 [their] policy.</quote> The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8382 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8383 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8384 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8385 Neal Levine, 15 October 2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8386 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, <quote>On the Issue of
8387 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,</quote> <citetitle>New
8388 York Times</citetitle>, 13 March 2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8389 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8390 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, <quote>Ad
8391 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8392 Radio,</quote> <citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review</citetitle> 6 (1988): 449&ndash;79, and for a
8393 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8394 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association</citetitle> v. <citetitle>FCC</citetitle>, 184 F. 3d 872
8395 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8396 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8397 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8398 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, <quote>Antidiesel Group Fuming
8399 After Muni Rejects Ad,</quote> SFGate.com, 16 June 2003, available at
8400 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #32</ulink>. The ground
8401 was that the criticism was <quote>too controversial.</quote>
8402 <indexterm><primary>ABC</primary></indexterm>
8403 <indexterm><primary>Comcast</primary></indexterm>
8404 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project</primary></indexterm>
8405 <indexterm><primary>NBC</primary></indexterm>
8406 <indexterm><primary>WJOA</primary></indexterm>
8407 <indexterm><primary>WRC</primary></indexterm>
8408 <indexterm><primary>advertising</primary></indexterm>
8409 </para></footnote>
8410 </para>
8411 <para>
8412 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well&mdash;if we lived
8413 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8414 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8415 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8416 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8417 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8418 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8419 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8420 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8421 </para>
8422 <indexterm startref='idxadvertising3' class='endofrange'/>
8423 </section>
8424 <section id="together">
8425 <title>Together</title>
8426 <para>
8427 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8428 copyright warriors that the government should <quote>protect my property.</quote>
8429 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8430 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8431 </para>
8432 <para>
8433 But when we see how dramatically this <quote>property</quote> has changed&mdash;
8434 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8435 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8436 cultivate our culture is dramatically different&mdash;the claim begins
8437 to seem
8438
8439 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8440 less innocent and obvious. Given (1) the power of technology to
8441 supplement the law's control, and (2) the power of concentrated
8442 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8443 the massively expanded <quote>property</quote> rights granted by copyright
8444 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8445 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8446 be redefined.
8447 </para>
8448 <para>
8449 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8450 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8451 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8452 our culture today.
8453 </para>
8454 <para>
8455 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8456 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8457 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8458 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8459 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8460 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8461 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8462 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8463 traditionally defined copyright's regulation&mdash;a weakening of that
8464 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8465 </para>
8466 <para>
8467 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8468 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8469 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8470 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8471 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8472 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8473 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8474 future. And these changes have to be <emphasis>reductions</emphasis>
8475 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8476 in control that technology and the market enable.
8477 </para>
8478 <para>
8479 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8480 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8482 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8483 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8484 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8485 more of the development of our culture than now</emphasis>.
8486 </para>
8487 <para>
8488 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8489 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8490 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8491 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8492 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8493 were independent of the networks. <emphasis>Never</emphasis> has
8494 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8495 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8496 regulation&mdash;a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8497 energy of a nation at the founding&mdash;is now a massive regulation
8498 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8499 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8500 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8501 known.<footnote><para>
8502 <!-- f35 -->
8503 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his <quote>four surrenders</quote> of
8504 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan, 159&ndash;60.
8505 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva</primary></indexterm>
8506 </para></footnote>
8507 </para>
8508 <para>
8509 <emphasis role='strong'>This has been</emphasis> a long chapter. Its
8510 point can now be briefly stated.
8511 </para>
8512 <para>
8513 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8514 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8515 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8516 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8517 that copyright law has undergone. In 1790, the law looked like this:
8518 </para>
8519
8520 <informaltable id="t2">
8521 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8522 <thead>
8523 <row>
8524 <entry></entry>
8525 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8526 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8527 </row>
8528 </thead>
8529 <tbody>
8530 <row>
8531 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8532 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8533 <entry>Free</entry>
8534 </row>
8535 <row>
8536 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8537 <entry>Free</entry>
8538 <entry>Free</entry>
8539 </row>
8540 </tbody>
8541 </tgroup>
8542 </informaltable>
8543
8544 <para>
8545 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8546 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8547 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8548
8549 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8550 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8551 noncommercial work was also free.
8552 </para>
8553 <para>
8554 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8555 </para>
8556
8557 <informaltable id="t3">
8558 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8559 <thead>
8560 <row>
8561 <entry></entry>
8562 <entry>PUBLISH</entry>
8563 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8564 </row>
8565 </thead>
8566 <tbody>
8567 <row>
8568 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8569 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8570 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8571 </row>
8572 <row>
8573 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8574 <entry>Free</entry>
8575 <entry>Free</entry>
8576 </row>
8577 </tbody>
8578 </tgroup>
8579 </informaltable>
8580
8581 <para>
8582 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law&mdash;if
8583 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8584 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8585 transformation were still essentially free.
8586 </para>
8587 <para>
8588 In 1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8589 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8590 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8591 expanded. Thus by 1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8592 we could say the law began to look like this:
8593 </para>
8594
8595 <informaltable id="t4">
8596 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8597 <thead>
8598 <row>
8599 <entry></entry>
8600 <entry>COPY</entry>
8601 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8602 </row>
8603 </thead>
8604 <tbody>
8605 <row>
8606 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8607 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8608 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8609 </row>
8610 <row>
8611 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8612 <entry>&copy;/Free</entry>
8613 <entry>Free</entry>
8614 </row>
8615 </tbody>
8616 </tgroup>
8617 </informaltable>
8618
8619 <para>
8620 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8621 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8622 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8623 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8624 that the law now looks like this:
8625 </para>
8626
8627 <informaltable id="t5">
8628 <tgroup cols="3" align="char">
8629 <thead>
8630 <row>
8631 <entry></entry>
8632 <entry>COPY</entry>
8633 <entry>TRANSFORM</entry>
8634 </row>
8635 </thead>
8636 <tbody>
8637 <row>
8638 <entry>Commercial</entry>
8639 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8640 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8641 </row>
8642 <row>
8643 <entry>Noncommercial</entry>
8644 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8645 <entry>&copy;</entry>
8646 </row>
8647 </tbody>
8648 </tgroup>
8649 </informaltable>
8650
8651 <para>
8652 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8653 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8654 creativity&mdash;
8655 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8656 commercial or not, transformative or not&mdash;with the same rules
8657 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8658 </para>
8659 <para>
8660 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8661 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8662 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8663 these domains actually does any good.
8664 </para>
8665 <para>
8666 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8667 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8668 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8669 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8670 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8671 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/> and
8672 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="transformers"/>, one
8673 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8674 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8675 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8676 </para>
8677 <para>
8678 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8679 course copyright is a kind of <quote>property,</quote> and of course, as with any
8680 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8681 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8682 property rights<footnote><para>
8683 <!-- f36 -->
8684 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8685 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8686 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, <quote>The
8687 Disintegration of Property,</quote> in <citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property</citetitle>, J. Roland
8688 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8689 Press, 1980).
8690 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement</primary></indexterm>
8691 </para></footnote>)
8692 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8693 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8694 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8695 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the <quote>copyright</quote>
8696 did not control <emphasis>at all</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8697 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8698 free, and for almost 180 years our country consistently protected a
8699 vibrant and rich free culture.
8700 </para>
8701 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital</primary></indexterm>
8702 <para>
8703 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8704 limits on the scope of the interests protected by <quote>property.</quote> The very
8705 birth of <quote>copyright</quote> as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8706 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8707 story of chapter 6). The tradition of <quote>fair use</quote> is animated by a
8708 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8709 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8710 chapter 7). Adding
8711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8712 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8713 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8714 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8715 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8716 the soul of a culture (chapter 9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8717 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8718 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8719 dominates the debate today.
8720 </para>
8721 <para>
8722 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8723 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8724 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8725 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8726 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8727 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8728 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8729 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8730 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8731 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8732 lawyer.
8733 </para>
8734 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8735 </section>
8736 </chapter>
8737 </part>
8738 <part id="c-puzzles">
8739 <title>PUZZLES</title>
8740
8741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8742 <chapter label="11" id="chimera">
8743 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera</title>
8744 <indexterm id="idxchimera" class='startofrange'>
8745 <primary>chimeras</primary>
8746 </indexterm>
8747 <indexterm id="idxwells" class='startofrange'>
8748 <primary>Wells, H. G.</primary>
8749 </indexterm>
8750 <indexterm id="idxtcotb" class='startofrange'>
8751 <primary><quote>Country of the Blind, The</quote> (Wells)</primary>
8752 </indexterm>
8753
8754 <para>
8755 <emphasis role='strong'>In a well-known</emphasis> short story by
8756 H. G. Wells, a mountain climber named Nunez trips (literally, down an
8757 ice slope) into an unknown and isolated valley in the Peruvian
8758 Andes.<footnote><para>
8759 <!-- f1. -->
8760 H. G. Wells, <quote>The Country of the Blind</quote> (1904, 1911). See H. G. Wells,
8761 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8762 York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
8763 </para></footnote>
8764 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with <quote>sweet water, pasture,
8765 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8766 that bore an excellent fruit.</quote> But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8767 takes this as an opportunity. <quote>In the Country of the Blind,</quote> he tells
8768 himself, <quote>the One-Eyed Man is King.</quote> So he resolves to live with the
8769 villagers to explore life as a king.
8770 </para>
8771 <para>
8772 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8773 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8774 <quote>blind.</quote> They don't have the word <citetitle>blind</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8775 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8776 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8777 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. <quote>`You
8778 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8779 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8780 alone!'</quote>
8781 </para>
8782 <para>
8783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8784 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8785 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8786 affection, a young woman who to him seems <quote>the most beautiful thing in
8787 the whole of creation,</quote> understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8788 description of what he sees <quote>seemed to her the most poetical of
8789 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8790 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8791 indulgence.</quote> <quote>She did not believe,</quote> Wells tells us, and <quote>she could
8792 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted.</quote>
8793 </para>
8794 <para>
8795 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his <quote>mysteriously delighted</quote>
8796 love, the father and the village object. <quote>You see, my dear,</quote> her
8797 father instructs, <quote>he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8798 anything right.</quote> They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8799 </para>
8800 <para>
8801 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. <quote>His brain
8802 is affected,</quote> he reports.
8803 </para>
8804 <para>
8805 <quote>What affects it?</quote> the father asks. <quote>Those queer things that are
8806 called the eyes &hellip; are diseased &hellip; in such a way as to affect
8807 his brain.</quote>
8808 </para>
8809 <para>
8810 The doctor continues: <quote>I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8811 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8812 simple and easy surgical operation&mdash;namely, to remove these
8813 irritant bodies [the eyes].</quote>
8814 </para>
8815 <para>
8816 <quote>Thank Heaven for science!</quote> says the father to the doctor. They inform
8817 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8818 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8819 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8820 </para>
8821 <para>
8822 <emphasis role='strong'>It sometimes</emphasis> happens that the eggs
8823 of twins fuse in the mother's womb. That fusion produces a
8824 <quote>chimera.</quote> A chimera is a single creature with two sets
8825 of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be different from the
8826 DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8827
8828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8829 plot for murder mysteries. <quote>But the DNA shows with 100 percent
8830 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8831 scene. &hellip;</quote>
8832 </para>
8833 <indexterm startref="idxtcotb" class='endofrange'/>
8834 <indexterm startref="idxwells" class="endofrange"/>
8835 <para>
8836 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8837 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8838 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8839 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8840 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8841 understanding of a <quote>person</quote> should reflect this reality.
8842 </para>
8843 <para>
8844 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8845 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8846 unfairly enough, <quote>the copyright wars,</quote> the more I think we're dealing
8847 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question <quote>What is
8848 p2p file sharing?</quote> both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8849 wrong. One side says, <quote>File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8850 others' records&mdash;the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8851 thirty years without any question at all.</quote> That's true, at least in
8852 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8853 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8854 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8855 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8856 </para>
8857 <para>
8858 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8859 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8860 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8861 <quote>friends</quote> beyond recognition to say <quote>my ten thousand best friends</quote> can
8862 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8863 what <quote>we have always been allowed to do,</quote> we have not always been
8864 allowed to share music with <quote>our ten thousand best friends.</quote>
8865 </para>
8866 <para>
8867 Likewise, when the other side says, <quote>File sharing is just like walking
8868 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8869 with it,</quote> that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8870 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8871 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8872 from Tower.
8873 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
8874 </para>
8875 <para>
8876
8877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8878 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8879 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8880 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8881 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8882 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8883 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8884 $1,000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8885 CD, I'm liable for $1,500,000 in damages.)
8886 </para>
8887 <para>
8888 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8889 that it is both&mdash;both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8890 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8891 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8892 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8893 </para>
8894 <para>
8895 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8896 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8897 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8898 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8899 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8900 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8901 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8902 implemented.<footnote><para>
8903 <!-- f2. -->
8904 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by</primary></indexterm>
8905 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8906 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8907 <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> 27 June 2003,
8908 available at
8909 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8910 #33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8911 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8912 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8913 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, <quote>House Bill Aims to Up
8914 Stakes on Piracy,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 17 July 2003, available at
8915 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #34</ulink>. Civil
8916 penalties are currently set at $150,000 per copied song. For a recent
8917 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8918 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than 600 songs
8919 through a family computer, see <citetitle>RIAA</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8920 re. Verizon Internet Services)</citetitle>, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24
8921 (D.D.C. 2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $90
8922 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8923 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8924 $12,000 to $17,500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8925 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $98
8926 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8927 Elizabeth Young, <quote>Downloading Could Lead to Fines,</quote> redandblack.com,
8928 August 2003, available at
8929 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #35</ulink>. For an
8930 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8931 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8932 identities, see James Collins, <quote>RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8933 Name Students,</quote> <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 8 August 2003, D3, available at
8934 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #36</ulink>.
8935 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.</primary></indexterm>
8936 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
8937 </para></footnote>
8938
8939 </para>
8940 <indexterm startref="idxchimera" class='endofrange'/>
8941 <para>
8942 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8943 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8944 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8945 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8946 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8947 </para>
8948 <para>
8949 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8950 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8951 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8952 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8953 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8954 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe <emphasis>either</emphasis> extreme
8955 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8956 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8957 </para>
8958 <para>
8959
8960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8961 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8962 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8963 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8964 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8965 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8966 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8967 </para>
8968 <para>
8969 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to <quote>steal</quote> music. My
8970 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8971 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8972 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8973 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8974 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8975 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8976 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8977 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8978 protection for copyrighted material,
8979 </para>
8980 <blockquote>
8981 <para>
8982 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8983 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8984 </para>
8985 <para>
8986 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8987 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8988 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8989 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8990 produce a totally different industry model.
8991 </para>
8992 <para>
8993 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8994 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8995 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8996 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8997 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8998 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8999 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
9000 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
9001 interests.<footnote><para>
9002 <!-- f3. -->
9003 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
9004 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
9005 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
9006 House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Peter
9007 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
9008 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
9009 Congressional Testimony File. </para></footnote>
9010 </para>
9011 </blockquote>
9012 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
9013 <para>
9014 In April 2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
9015 one of <quote>the major labels.</quote> Its position on these matters has now
9016 changed.
9017 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal</primary></indexterm>
9018 </para>
9019 <para>
9020 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
9021 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
9022 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
9023 </para>
9024
9025 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
9026 </chapter>
9027 <chapter label="12" id="harms">
9028 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms</title>
9029 <para>
9030 <emphasis role='strong'>To fight</emphasis> <quote>piracy,</quote> to
9031 protect <quote>property,</quote> the content industry has launched a
9032 war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now brought the
9033 government into this war. As with any war, this one will have both
9034 direct and collateral damage. As with any war of prohibition, these
9035 damages will be suffered most by our own people.
9036 </para>
9037 <para>
9038 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
9039 particular, the consequences for <quote>free culture.</quote> But my aim now is to
9040 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
9041 justified?
9042 </para>
9043 <para>
9044 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
9045 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
9046 power of the property called <quote>intellectual property</quote> is at its greatest in
9047 our history.
9048 </para>
9049 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
9050 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
9051 <para>
9052 Yet <quote>common sense</quote> does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
9053 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
9054 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
9055 rejection of <quote>piracy</quote> still has play.
9056 </para>
9057 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary></indexterm>
9058 <para>
9059 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
9060 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
9061 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
9062 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
9063 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
9064 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
9065 </para>
9066 <section id="constrain">
9067 <title>Constraining Creators</title>
9068 <para>
9069 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
9070 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
9071 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
9072 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
9073 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
9074 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
9075 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
9076 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
9077 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
9078 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
9079 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
9080 weave together a string&mdash;a mash-up&mdash; of songs from your
9081 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
9082 </para>
9083 <para>
9084 This digital <quote>capturing and sharing</quote> is in part an extension of the
9085 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
9086 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
9087 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
9088 of digital <quote>capturing and sharing</quote> promises a world of extraordinarily
9089 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
9090 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
9091 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
9092 the culture all around.
9093 </para>
9094 <para>
9095 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
9096 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
9097
9098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
9099
9100 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
9101 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
9102 storytelling extended across the globe.
9103 </para>
9104 <para>
9105 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
9106 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
9107 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
9108 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
9109 that catalog cartoons from the 1960s; sites that mix images and sound
9110 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
9111 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
9112 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
9113 work is presumptively illegal.
9114 </para>
9115 <para>
9116 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
9117 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
9118 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
9119 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
9120 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
9121 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter 3 was just one) were threatened
9122 with a $98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
9123 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com&mdash;which defrauded investors of
9124 $11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
9125 of over $200 billion&mdash;received a fine of a mere $750
9126 million.<footnote><para>
9127 <!-- f1. -->
9128 See Lynne W. Jeter, <citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom</citetitle>
9129 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley &amp; Sons, 2003), 176, 204; for details of
9130 the settlement, see MCI press release, <quote>MCI Wins U.S. District Court
9131 Approval for SEC Settlement</quote> (7 July 2003), available at
9132 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #37</ulink>.
9133 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
9134 </para></footnote>
9135 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
9136 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
9137 no more than $250,000 in damages for pain and
9138 suffering.<footnote>
9139 <para>
9140 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
9141 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July 2003. For
9142 an overview, see Tanya Albert, <quote>Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
9143 Say Tort Reformers,</quote> amednews.com, 28 July 2003, available at
9144 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #38</ulink>,
9145 and <quote>Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps,</quote> CBSNews.com, 9 July 2003,
9146 available at
9147 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
9148 recent months.
9149 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.</primary></indexterm>
9150 </para></footnote>
9151 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
9152 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
9153 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9154 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom</primary></indexterm>
9155 </para>
9156 <indexterm><primary>art, underground</primary></indexterm>
9157 <para>
9158 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9159 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9160 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9161 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9162 Disneys <quote>pirates.</quote> We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9163 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9164 designed to
9165
9166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9167 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9168 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9169 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9170 we will begin to see a world of underground art&mdash;not because the
9171 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9172 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9173 fraught. Already, exhibits of <quote>illegal art</quote> tour the United
9174 States.<footnote><para>
9175 <!-- f3. -->
9176
9177 See Danit Lidor, <quote>Artists Just Wanna Be Free,</quote> <citetitle>Wired</citetitle>, 7 July
9178 2003, available at
9179 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9180 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #41</ulink>.
9181 </para></footnote>
9182 In what does their <quote>illegality</quote> consist?
9183 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9184 critical or reflective.
9185 </para>
9186 <indexterm><primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by</primary></indexterm>
9187 <para>
9188 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9189 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9190 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. But an
9191 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9192 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9193 discovered in 2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9194 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9195 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9196 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9197 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9198 </para>
9199 <indexterm><primary>images, ownership of</primary></indexterm>
9200 <para>
9201 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9202 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9203 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9204 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9205 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9206 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9207 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9208 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9209 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9210 </para>
9211 <para>
9212 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9213 described in chapter
9214 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="recorders"/>, in
9215 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9216 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9217 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9218 use.
9219 </para>
9220 <para>
9221
9222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9223 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9224 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9225 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad&mdash;in
9226 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9227 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9228 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9229 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9230 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9231 </para>
9232 <para>
9233 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9234 <quote>breathing room</quote> between regulation by the law and the access the law
9235 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9236 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9237 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9238 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9239 journalists&mdash; these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9240 these rules have little relationship to the <quote>law</quote> with which judges
9241 comfort themselves.
9242 </para>
9243 <para>
9244 For in a world that threatens $150,000 for a single willful
9245 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9246 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9247 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9248 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak&mdash;in that
9249 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9250 <quote>copyright</quote> silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9251 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9252 culture that is free.
9253 </para>
9254 <para>
9255 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9256 </para>
9257 <blockquote>
9258 <para>
9259 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9260 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9261 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9262 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made &hellip; you're not
9263 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9265 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, <quote>This has been
9266 cleared.</quote> You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9267 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9268 </para>
9269 </blockquote>
9270 </section>
9271 <section id="innovators">
9272 <title>Constraining Innovators</title>
9273 <para>
9274 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9275 story&mdash;creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9276 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9277 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9278 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9279 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9280 </para>
9281 <para>
9282 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9283 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9284 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9285 one at that, 188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9286 other aspect by substituting <quote>free market</quote> every place I've spoken of
9287 <quote>free culture.</quote> The point is the same, even if the interests
9288 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9289 </para>
9290 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
9291 <para>
9292 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9293 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9294 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary&mdash;at
9295 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9296 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9297 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9298 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9299 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9300 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9301 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9302 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9303 </para>
9304 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9305 <para>
9306 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9307 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9308 strategy that I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select:
9309 labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9310 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9311 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9312 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9313 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9314 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9315 lesson. That lesson&mdash;what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9316 <quote>nuclear pall</quote> that has fallen over the Valley&mdash;has been learned.
9317 </para>
9318 <para>
9319 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9320 I told in <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9321 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9322 </para>
9323 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael</primary></indexterm>
9324 <para>
9325 In 1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9326 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9327 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9328 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9329 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9330 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9331 </para>
9332 <para>
9333 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9334 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9335 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9336 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9337 Raitt. And so on.
9338 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
9339 </para>
9340 <para>
9341 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9342 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9343 preference data. In January 2000, the company launched a service
9344 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9345 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9346 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9347 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9348 wherever you were&mdash;at work or at home&mdash;you could get access
9349 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9350 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9351 </para>
9352 <para>
9353 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9354 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9355
9356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9357 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9358 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9359 the kind of content the users liked.
9360 </para>
9361 <para>
9362 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy 50,000
9363 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9364 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9365 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9366 therefore purchased 50,000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9367 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9368 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9369 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was 50,000
9370 copies, it was 50,000 copies directed at giving customers something
9371 they had already bought.
9372 </para>
9373 <indexterm id="idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'>
9374 <primary>Vivendi Universal</primary>
9375 </indexterm>
9376 <para>
9377 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9378 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9379 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9380 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9381 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9382 MP3.com of $118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9383 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $54 million. Vivendi
9384 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9385 </para>
9386 <para>
9387 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9388 </para>
9389 <para>
9390 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9391 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9392 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9393 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9394 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9395 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9396 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9397 demanded.
9398 </para>
9399 <para>
9400 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9401 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9402 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9403 clients in this
9404 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9405 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9406 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9407 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9408 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9409 </para>
9410 <indexterm startref="idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'/>
9411 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John</primary></indexterm>
9412 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank</primary></indexterm>
9413 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad</primary></indexterm>
9414 <para>
9415 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April 2003,
9416 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9417 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9418 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9419 (Hank Barry).<footnote><para>
9420 <!-- f4. -->
9421 See Joseph Menn, <quote>Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9422 Times</citetitle>, 23 April 2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9423 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, <quote>The Music
9424 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized,</quote> Salon.com, 1 June 2001, available
9425 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #42</ulink>.
9426 See also Jon Healey, <quote>Online Music Services Besieged,</quote> <citetitle>Los Angeles
9427 Times</citetitle>, 28 May 2001.
9428 </para></footnote>
9429 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9430 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9431 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9432 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9433 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9434 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9435 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9436 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9437 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9438 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9439 <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9440 discussion with BMW:
9441 <indexterm><primary>EMI</primary></indexterm>
9442 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group</primary></indexterm>
9443 </para>
9444 <blockquote>
9445 <indexterm><primary>BMW</primary></indexterm>
9446 <para>
9447 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9448 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9449 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9450 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9451 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9452 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9453 United States with bona fide MP3 players. &hellip; <footnote>
9454 <para>
9455 <!-- f5. -->
9456 Rafe Needleman, <quote>Driving in Cars with MP3s,</quote> <citetitle>Business 2.0</citetitle>, 16 June
9457 2003, available at
9458 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #43</ulink>. I am grateful
9459 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9460 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe</primary></indexterm>
9461 </para></footnote>
9462 </para>
9463 </blockquote>
9464 <para>
9465 This is the world of the mafia&mdash;filled with <quote>your money or your
9466 life</quote> offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9467 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9468 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9469 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9470 constantly threatened by litigation.
9471 </para>
9472 <para>
9473
9474 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9475 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9476 enterprises. The point is the definition of <quote>illegal.</quote> The law is a
9477 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9478 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9479 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9480 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9481 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9482 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9483 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9484 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9485 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9486 much less creativity.
9487 </para>
9488 <indexterm><primary>market constraints</primary></indexterm>
9489 <para>
9490 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9491 use. Whatever the <quote>real</quote> law is, realism about the effect of law in
9492 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9493 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9494 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9495 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9496 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9497 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9498 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9499 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9500 </para>
9501 <para>
9502 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9503 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9504 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9505 culture&mdash;a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9506 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9507 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9508 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9509 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9510 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9511 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9512 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9513 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9515 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9516 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9517 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9518 result.
9519 </para>
9520 <para>
9521 <emphasis role='strong'>The uncertainty</emphasis> of the law is one
9522 burden on innovation. There is a second burden that operates more
9523 directly. This is the effort by many in the content industry to use
9524 the law to directly regulate the technology of the Internet so that it
9525 better protects their content.
9526 </para>
9527 <para>
9528 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9529 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9530 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9531 this feature is a <quote>bug.</quote> The efficient spread of content means that
9532 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9533 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9534 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables <quote>piracy,</quote> then,
9535 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9536 </para>
9537 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
9538 <para>
9539 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9540 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9541 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9542 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.<footnote><para>
9543 <!-- f6. --> <quote>Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> GartnerG2 and
9544 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9545 (2003), 33&ndash;35, available at
9546 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9547 </para></footnote>
9548 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9549 <quote>broadcast flag</quote> that would be required on any device capable of
9550 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9551 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9552 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9553 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9554 copyright violators and disable their machines.<footnote><para>
9555 <!-- f7. -->
9556 GartnerG2, 26&ndash;27.
9557 </para></footnote>
9558 </para>
9559 <para>
9560 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9561 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9562 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9563 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9564 and costs on
9565 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9566 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9567 those requirements.
9568 </para>
9569 <para>
9570 In March 2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9571 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9572 would impose.<footnote><para>
9573 <!-- f8. -->
9574 See David McGuire, <quote>Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy,</quote> Newsbytes,
9575 February 2002 (Entertainment).
9576 </para></footnote>
9577 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9578 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9579 harm than good.
9580 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
9581 </para>
9582 <para>
9583 <emphasis role='strong'>There is one</emphasis> more obvious way in
9584 which this war has harmed innovation&mdash;again, a story that will be
9585 quite familiar to the free market crowd.
9586 </para>
9587 <para>
9588 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9589 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9590 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9591 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9592 </para>
9593 <para>
9594 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9595 linkend="property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9596 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9597 Jessica Litman in her book <citetitle>Digital
9598 Copyright</citetitle>,<footnote><para>
9599 <!-- f9. -->
9600 Jessica Litman, <citetitle>Digital Copyright</citetitle> (Amherst,
9601 N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001).
9602 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica</primary></indexterm>
9603 </para></footnote>
9604 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter 10 details,
9605 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9606 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9607 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9608 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9609 </para>
9610 <para>
9611 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9612 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9613 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9614 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9615 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9616 </para>
9617 <para>
9618 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.<footnote><para>
9619 <!-- f10. -->
9620 <indexterm><primary>Grokster, Ltd.</primary></indexterm>
9621 The only circuit court exception is found in <citetitle>Recording Industry
9622 Association of America (RIAA)</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems</citetitle>, 180 F. 3d
9623 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9624 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9625 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9626 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9627 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9628 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9629 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc</citetitle>. v. <citetitle>Grokster, Ltd</citetitle>., 259 F. Supp. 2d
9630 1029 (C.D. Cal., 2003), where the court found the link between the
9631 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9632 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9633 liability.
9634 </para></footnote>
9635 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9636 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9637 here.<footnote><para>
9638 <!-- f11. -->
9639 <indexterm><primary>Tauzin, Billy</primary></indexterm>
9640 For example, in July 2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9641 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211), which would immunize
9642 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9643 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9644 August 2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9645 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9646 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a <quote>broadcast flag</quote> that
9647 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9648 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9649 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9650 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, <quote>Copyright and
9651 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,</quote> 27 June 2003, 33&ndash;34,
9652 available at
9653 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #44</ulink>.
9654 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.</primary></indexterm>
9655 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz</primary></indexterm>
9656 <indexterm><primary>broadcast flag</primary></indexterm>
9657 </para></footnote>
9658 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9659 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9660 </para>
9661 <indexterm>
9662 <primary>artists</primary>
9663 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
9664 </indexterm>
9665 <para>
9666
9667 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9668 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
9669 linkend="pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9670 artist doesn't get paid for that <quote>radio performance</quote> unless he or she
9671 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9672 version of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote>&mdash;to memorialize her famous
9673 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden&mdash;
9674 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9675 copyright owners of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> would get some money, whereas
9676 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9677 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.</primary></indexterm>
9678 </para>
9679 <para>
9680 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9681 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9682 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9683 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9684 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9685 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9686 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9687 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9688 recording artists.
9689 </para>
9690 <para>
9691 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9692 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9693 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9694 spectrum. Thus, I can <quote>tune in</quote> to an Internet radio station in
9695 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9696 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9697 metropolitan area.
9698 </para>
9699 <para>
9700 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9701 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9702 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9703 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9704 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9705 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9706 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9707 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9708 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9709 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9710 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9711 </para>
9712 <indexterm><primary>Armstrong, Edwin Howard</primary></indexterm>
9713 <para>
9714
9715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9716 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9717 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9718 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9719 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9720 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9721 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9722 FM radio,
9723 </para>
9724 <blockquote>
9725 <para>
9726 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9727 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9728 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9729 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9730 than by technical restrictions. &hellip; Armstrong likened the situation
9731 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9732 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9733 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9734 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9735 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9736 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9737 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9738 shackles.<footnote><para>
9739 <!-- f12. -->
9740 Lessing, 239.
9741 </para></footnote>
9742 </para>
9743 </blockquote>
9744 <para>
9745 This potential for FM radio was never realized&mdash;not
9746 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9747 underestimated the power of <quote>vested interests, habits, customs and
9748 legislation</quote><footnote><para>
9749 <!-- f13. -->
9750 Ibid., 229.
9751 </para></footnote>
9752 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9753 </para>
9754 <para>
9755 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9756 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9757 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9758 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9759 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9760 radio?
9761 </para>
9762 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments2' class='startofrange'>
9763 <primary>artists</primary>
9764 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
9765 </indexterm>
9766 <para>
9767 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9768 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9769
9770 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9771 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9772 of Internet radio in 1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9773 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9774 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9775 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9776 of <quote>Happy Birthday</quote> on the air, <emphasis>Internet radio
9777 does</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9778 radio&mdash;the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9779 burdens terrestrial radio.
9780 </para>
9781 <para>
9782 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9783 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9784 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9785 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9786 over $1 million a year.<footnote>
9787 <para>
9788 <!-- f14. -->
9789 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9790 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9791 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9792 iLaw (Stanford), 3 July 2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9793 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9794 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9795 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9, CARP
9796 DTRA 1 and 2, available at
9797 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #45</ulink>.
9798 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9799 C. Picker, <quote>Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9800 Distribution,</quote> <citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin</citetitle> (Summer/Fall 2002): 461: <quote>This was
9801 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9802 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9803 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9804 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9805 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way.</quote>
9806 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)</primary></indexterm>
9807 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.</primary></indexterm>
9808 </para></footnote>
9809 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9810 equivalent fee.
9811 </para>
9812 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments2' class='endofrange'/>
9813 <para>
9814 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9815 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9816 station) would have to collect the following data from <emphasis>every
9817 listening transaction</emphasis>:
9818 </para>
9819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9820 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
9821 <listitem><para>
9822 name of the service;
9823 </para></listitem>
9824 <listitem><para>
9825 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9826 </para></listitem>
9827 <listitem><para>
9828 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9829 </para></listitem>
9830 <listitem><para>
9831 date of transmission;
9832 </para></listitem>
9833 <listitem><para>
9834 time of transmission;
9835 </para></listitem>
9836 <listitem><para>
9837 time zone of origination of transmission;
9838 </para></listitem>
9839 <listitem><para>
9840 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9841 </para></listitem>
9842 <listitem><para>
9843 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9844 </para></listitem>
9845 <listitem><para>
9846 sound recording title;
9847 </para></listitem>
9848 <listitem><para>
9849 ISRC code of the recording;
9850 </para></listitem>
9851 <listitem><para>
9852 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9853 </para></listitem>
9854 <listitem><para>
9855 featured recording artist;
9856 </para></listitem>
9857 <listitem><para>
9858 retail album title;
9859 </para></listitem>
9860 <listitem><para>
9861 recording label;
9862 </para></listitem>
9863 <listitem><para>
9864 UPC code of the retail album;
9865 </para></listitem>
9866 <listitem><para>
9867 catalog number;
9868 </para></listitem>
9869 <listitem><para>
9870 copyright owner information;
9871 </para></listitem>
9872 <listitem><para>
9873 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9874 </para></listitem>
9875 <listitem><para>
9876 name of the service or entity;
9877 </para></listitem>
9878 <listitem><para>
9879 channel or program;
9880 </para></listitem>
9881 <listitem><para>
9882 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9883 </para></listitem>
9884 <listitem><para>
9885 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9886 </para></listitem>
9887 <listitem><para>
9888 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9889 </para></listitem>
9890 <listitem><para>
9891 unique user identifier;
9892 </para></listitem>
9893 <listitem><para>
9894 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9895 </para></listitem>
9896 </orderedlist>
9897
9898 <para>
9899 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9900 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9901 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9902 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9903 Internet radio has to pay a <emphasis>type of copyright fee</emphasis>
9904 that terrestrial radio does not.
9905 </para>
9906 <para>
9907 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9908 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9909 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9910 </para>
9911 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
9912 <indexterm id='idxalbenalex2' class='startofrange'>
9913 <primary>Alben, Alex</primary>
9914 </indexterm>
9915 <para>
9916 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9917 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9918 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9919 </para>
9920 <blockquote>
9921 <para>
9922 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9923 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9924 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9925 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9926 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9927 webcasters asked the RIAA, &hellip; <quote>How do you come up with a
9928
9929 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9930 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9931 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9932 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9933 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9934 business. &hellip;</quote>
9935 </para>
9936 <indexterm>
9937 <primary>artists</primary>
9938 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
9939 </indexterm>
9940 <para>
9941 And the RIAA experts said, <quote>Well, we don't really model this as an
9942 industry with thousands of webcasters, <emphasis>we think it should be
9943 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9944 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market</emphasis>.</quote> (Emphasis
9945 added.)
9946 </para>
9947 </blockquote>
9948 <indexterm startref='idxalbenalex2' class='endofrange'/>
9949 <para>
9950 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9951 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9952 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9953 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9954 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9955 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9956 effective to prevent it.
9957 </para>
9958 </section>
9959 <section id="corruptingcitizens">
9960 <title>Corrupting Citizens</title>
9961 <para>
9962 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9963 dinosaurs
9964 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9965 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9966 </para>
9967 <para>
9968 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9969 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9970 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9971 </para>
9972 <para>
9973 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9974 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9975 large number of citizens. According to <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>, 43 million
9976 Americans downloaded music in May 2002.<footnote><para>
9977 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, <quote>The Music Downloading Deluge,</quote> Pew
9978 Internet and American Life Project (24 April 2001), available at
9979 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #46</ulink>.
9980 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 37 million
9981 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early 2001.
9982 </para></footnote>
9983 According to the RIAA,
9984 the behavior of those 43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9985 set of rules that transform 20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9986
9987 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9988 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9989 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9990 increasingly
9991 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9992 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9993 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9994 extreme
9995 response by the other.
9996 </para>
9997 <para>
9998 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9999 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
10000 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
10001 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
10002 ($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
10003 paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal fees)
10004 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
10005 ($12,000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
10006 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September 2003, the RIAA
10007 sued 261 individuals&mdash;including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
10008 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
10009 was.<footnote><para>
10010 <!-- f16. -->
10011 Alex Pham, <quote>The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,</quote> <citetitle>Los
10012 Angeles Times</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, Business.
10013 </para></footnote>
10014 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
10015 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
10016 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $2,000
10017 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
10018 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
10019 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
10020 they oppose.
10021 </para>
10022 <para>
10023 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
10024 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
10025 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
10026 consumption of alcohol was 1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
10027 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just 30 percent
10028 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
10029 consumption was up to 70 percent of the preprohibition
10030 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
10031 number were criminals.<footnote><para>
10032 <!-- f17. -->
10033 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, <quote>Alcohol Consumption During
10034 Prohibition,</quote> <citetitle>American Economic Review</citetitle> 81, no. 2 (1991): 242.
10035 </para></footnote>
10036 We have
10037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
10038 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
10039 narcotics that 7 percent (or 16 million) Americans now use.<footnote><para>
10040 <!-- f18. -->
10041 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
10042 Reform Committee, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (5 March 2003) (statement of
10043 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
10044 </para></footnote>
10045 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in 1979 of 14 percent of
10046 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
10047 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
10048 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
10049 cheat.<footnote><para>
10050 <!-- f19. -->
10051 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, <quote>Tax
10052 Compliance,</quote> <citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature</citetitle> 36 (1998): 818 (survey of
10053 compliance literature).
10054 </para></footnote>
10055 We pride ourselves on our <quote>free society,</quote> but an endless array of
10056 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
10057 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
10058 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition</primary></indexterm>
10059 </para>
10060 <para>
10061 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
10062 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
10063 students about the importance of <quote>ethics.</quote> As my colleague Charlie
10064 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
10065 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
10066 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
10067 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
10068 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
10069 teach them how to behave ethically&mdash;how to say no to bribes, or
10070 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
10071 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
10072 Americans&mdash;more significantly in some parts of America than in
10073 others, but still, everywhere in America today&mdash;can't live their
10074 lives both normally and legally, since <quote>normally</quote> entails a certain
10075 degree of illegality.
10076 <indexterm><primary>law schools</primary></indexterm>
10077 </para>
10078 <para>
10079 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
10080 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
10081 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
10082 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
10083 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
10084 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
10085 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
10086 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
10087 to consider the alternative.
10088 </para>
10089 <para>
10090
10091 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
10092 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
10093 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
10094 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
10095 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
10096 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
10097 </para>
10098 <para>
10099 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
10100 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
10101 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
10102 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
10103 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
10104 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
10105 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
10106 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
10107 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
10108 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
10109 introduced this different idea of <quote>sharing.</quote> We need to be able to
10110 call these twenty million Americans <quote>citizens,</quote> not <quote>felons.</quote>
10111 </para>
10112 <para>
10113 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
10114 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
10115 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
10116 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
10117 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
10118 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
10119 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
10120 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
10121 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
10122 a nation of felons?
10123 </para>
10124 <para>
10125 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
10126 </para>
10127 <para>
10128 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
10129 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
10130 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
10131 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
10132 used
10133
10134 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
10135 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That <quote>use</quote> of the
10136 recordings is free.
10137 </para>
10138 <para>
10139 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
10140 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
10141 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am <quote>free</quote> to copy,
10142 or <quote>rip,</quote> music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
10143 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that <quote>freedom</quote> was a
10144 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the <quote>Rip, Mix, Burn</quote>
10145 capacities of digital technologies.
10146 </para>
10147 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda</primary></indexterm>
10148 <para>
10149 This <quote>use</quote> of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
10150 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
10151 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
10152 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
10153 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
10154 Others&mdash;the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
10155 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
10156 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
10157 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
10158 </para>
10159 <para>
10160 This use is enabled by unprotected media&mdash;either CDs or records.
10161 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
10162 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
10163 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
10164 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
10165 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
10166 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
10167 on people's machines.
10168 </para>
10169 <para>
10170 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
10171 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
10172 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
10173 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
10174 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
10175 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
10176
10177 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
10178 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
10179 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
10180 plastic or were part of a massively complex <quote>digital rights
10181 management</quote> system.
10182 </para>
10183 <para>
10184 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10185 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10186 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10187 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10188 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10189 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10190 freedom to move content easily?
10191 </para>
10192 <para>
10193 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10194 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10195 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10196 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10197 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10198 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10199 alternative&mdash;namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10200 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10201 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10202 </para>
10203 <para>
10204 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10205 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10206 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10207 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10208 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10209 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10210 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10211 </para>
10212 <para>
10213 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10214 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10215 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10216 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10217 </para>
10218 <para>
10219 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10220 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10221
10222 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10223
10224 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10225 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10226 </para>
10227 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation</primary></indexterm>
10228 <indexterm id='idxisps' class='startofrange'>
10229 <primary>ISPs (Internet service providers), user identities revealed by</primary>
10230 </indexterm>
10231 <para>
10232 <emphasis role='strong'>There's one more</emphasis> aspect to this
10233 corruption that is particularly important to civil liberties, and
10234 follows directly from any war of prohibition. As Electronic Frontier
10235 Foundation attorney Fred von Lohmann describes, this is the
10236 <quote>collateral damage</quote> that <quote>arises whenever you turn
10237 a very large percentage of the population into criminals.</quote> This
10238 is the collateral damage to civil liberties generally.
10239 </para>
10240 <para>
10241 <quote>If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker,</quote> von Lohmann
10242 explains,
10243 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10244 </para>
10245 <blockquote>
10246 <para>
10247 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10248 evaporate to one degree or another. &hellip; If you're a copyright
10249 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10250 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10251 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10252 access? &hellip; Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, <quote>Oh, well,
10253 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker.</quote> Well, what this campaign
10254 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10255 American Internet-using population into <quote>lawbreakers.</quote>
10256 </para>
10257 </blockquote>
10258 <para>
10259 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10260 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10261 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10262 </para>
10263 <para>
10264 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in 2003 as the RIAA
10265 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10266 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10267 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10268 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10269 an Internet user is revealed.
10270 </para>
10271 <para>
10272 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10273 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10274 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10275 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10276 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10277 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10278 the family could be liable for $2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10279 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10280 Jesse Jordan.<footnote><para>
10281 <!-- f20. -->
10282 See Frank Ahrens, <quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10283 Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,</quote>
10284 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, <quote>Worried Parents
10285 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10286 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10287 Being Sued,</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 30 August 2003, C1; Jefferson
10288 Graham, <quote>Recording Industry Sues Parents,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 15 September
10289 2003, 4D; John Schwartz, <quote>She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10290 Fan, Either,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 25 September 2003, C1; Margo Varadi, <quote>Is
10291 Brianna a Criminal?</quote> <citetitle>Toronto Star</citetitle>, 18 September 2003, P7.
10292 </para></footnote>
10293
10294 </para>
10295 <para>
10296 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10297 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10298 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.<footnote><para>
10299 <!-- f21. -->
10300 See <quote>Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10301 Some Methods Used,</quote> CNN.com, available at
10302 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #47</ulink>.
10303 </para></footnote>
10304 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10305 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10306 one of those MP3s will have the same <quote>fingerprint.</quote>
10307 </para>
10308 <para>
10309 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10310 friend gives a CD to your daughter&mdash;a collection of songs just
10311 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10312 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10313 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10314 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10315 network is <quote>cooperating</quote> with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10316 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10317 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10318 as a <quote>criminal.</quote> And under the rules that universities are beginning
10319 to deploy,<footnote><para>
10320 <!-- f22. -->
10321 See Jeff Adler, <quote>Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,</quote>
10322 <citetitle>Boston Globe</citetitle>, 18 May 2003, City Weekly, 1; Frank Ahrens, <quote>Four
10323 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10324 Colleges,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 4 April 2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10325 <quote>Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,</quote> <citetitle>Christian Science
10326 Monitor</citetitle>, 2 September 2003, 20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, <quote>Music
10327 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10328 Lawsuit Possible,</quote> <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 16 July 2003, 1C; Beth Cox, <quote>RIAA
10329 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,</quote> <citetitle>Internet News</citetitle>, 30 January
10330 2003, available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10331 #48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, <quote>Download Warning 101: Freshman
10332 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10333 Sharing,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 11 August 2003, E11; <quote>Raid, Letters
10334 Are Weapons at Universities,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 26 September 2000, 3D.
10335 </para></footnote>
10336 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10337 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10338 </para>
10339 <indexterm startref='idxisps' class='endofrange'/>
10340 <para>
10341 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10342 a lawyer for her (at $300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10343 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10344 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10345 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10346 this <quote>contraband</quote> as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10347 college students
10348
10349 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10350 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10351 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10352 Says von Lohmann,
10353 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred</primary></indexterm>
10354 </para>
10355 <blockquote>
10356 <para>
10357 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10358 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10359 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10360 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10361 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10362 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10363 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10364 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10365 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10366 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10367 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10368 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10369 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10370 larger number of Americans than drug use. &hellip; If forty to sixty
10371 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10372 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10373 million of them.
10374 </para>
10375 </blockquote>
10376 <para>
10377 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered <quote>criminals</quote> under
10378 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective&mdash;
10379 securing rights to authors&mdash;without these millions being
10380 considered <quote>criminals,</quote> who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10381 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10382 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10383 </para>
10384
10385 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10386 </section>
10387 </chapter>
10388 </part>
10389 <part id="c-balances">
10390 <title>BALANCES</title>
10391 <partintro>
10392
10393 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10394 <para>
10395 <emphasis role='strong'>So here's</emphasis> the picture: You're
10396 standing at the side of the road. Your car is on fire. You are angry
10397 and upset because in part you helped start the fire. Now you don't
10398 know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket, filled with
10399 gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10400 </para>
10401 <para>
10402 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10403 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10404 stop&mdash;or before she understands just why she should
10405 stop&mdash;the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10406 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10407 everything around.
10408 </para>
10409 <para>
10410 <emphasis role='strong'>A war</emphasis> about copyright rages all
10411 around&mdash;and we're all focusing on the wrong thing. No doubt,
10412 current technologies threaten existing businesses. No doubt they may
10413 threaten artists. But technologies change. The industry and
10414 technologists have plenty of ways to use technology to protect
10415 themselves against the current threats of the Internet. This is a fire
10416 that if let alone would burn itself out.
10417 </para>
10418 <para>
10419 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10420 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10421 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10422 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10423 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10424 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10425 made that is happening all around.
10426 </para>
10427 <para>
10428 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10429 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10430 gasoline onto this fire.
10431 </para>
10432 <para>
10433 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10434 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10435 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10436 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10437 </para>
10438 <para>
10439 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10440 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10441 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10442 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10443 success will require.
10444 </para>
10445 </partintro>
10446
10447 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10448 <chapter label="13" id="eldred">
10449 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred</title>
10450 <indexterm id="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'>
10451 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel</primary>
10452 </indexterm>
10453 <para>
10454 <emphasis role='strong'>In 1995</emphasis>, a father was frustrated
10455 that his daughters didn't seem to like Hawthorne. No doubt there was
10456 more than one such father, but at least one did something about
10457 it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer programmer living in New
10458 Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the Web. An electronic version,
10459 Eldred thought, with links to pictures and explanatory text, would
10460 make this nineteenth-century author's work come alive.
10461 </para>
10462 <para>
10463 It didn't work&mdash;at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10464 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10465 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10466 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10467 them available for free.
10468 </para>
10469 <para>
10470 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10471 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10472 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10473 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10474 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10476 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10477 many others, into a form more accessible&mdash;technically
10478 accessible&mdash;today.
10479 </para>
10480 <para>
10481 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10482 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's <citetitle>Scarlet Letter</citetitle> had passed into the
10483 public domain in 1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10484 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10485 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10486 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10487 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10488 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (<citetitle>Cinderella</citetitle>), sometimes not
10489 (<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame</citetitle>, <citetitle>Treasure Planet</citetitle>). These are all
10490 commercial publications of public domain works.
10491 </para>
10492 <indexterm startref="idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'/>
10493 <para>
10494 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10495 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10496 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10497 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10498 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10499 call the <quote>noncommercial publishing industry,</quote> which before the
10500 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10501 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10502 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10503 generally.<footnote><para>
10504 <!-- f1. -->
10505 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10506 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10507 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers&mdash;people who
10508 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10509 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10510 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10511 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10512 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10513 Decency Act of 1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10514 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10515 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10516 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10517 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10518 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10519 protect noncommercial pornographers.</para></footnote>
10520 </para>
10521 <para>
10522 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In 1998, Robert Frost's
10523 collection of poems <citetitle>New Hampshire</citetitle> was slated to
10524 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10525 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10526 in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
10527 linkend="property-i"/>, in 1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10528 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights&mdash;this time by
10529 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10530 than 1923 to his collection until 2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10531 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10532 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10533 more than 1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10534 </para>
10535 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary</primary></indexterm>
10536 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny</primary></indexterm>
10537 <para>
10538
10539 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10540 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10541 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10542 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10543 <quote>copyrights should be forever.</quote><footnote><para>
10544 <!-- f2. -->
10545 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Mary</primary></indexterm>
10546 <indexterm><primary>Bono, Sonny</primary></indexterm>
10547 The full text is: <quote>Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10548 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10549 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10550 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10551 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10552 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10553 Congress,</quote> 144 Cong. Rec. H9946, 9951-2 (October 7, 1998).
10554 </para></footnote>
10555
10556 </para>
10557 <para>
10558 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10559 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10560 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10561 second law passed in 1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10562 of publishing would make Eldred a felon&mdash;whether or not anyone
10563 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10564 to undertake.
10565 </para>
10566 <para>
10567 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10568 constitutional
10569 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10570 interpretation.
10571 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10572 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10573 importantly
10574 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10575 </para>
10576 <blockquote>
10577 <para>
10578 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science &hellip;
10579 by securing for limited Times to Authors &hellip; exclusive Right to
10580 their &hellip; Writings. &hellip;
10581 </para>
10582 </blockquote>
10583 <para>
10584 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10585 clause of Article I, section 8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10586 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10587 something&mdash;for example, to regulate <quote>commerce among the several
10588 states</quote> or <quote>declare War.</quote> But here, the <quote>something</quote> is something quite
10589 specific&mdash;to <quote>promote &hellip; Progress</quote>&mdash;through means that
10590 are also specific&mdash; by <quote>securing</quote> <quote>exclusive Rights</quote> (i.e.,
10591 copyrights) <quote>for limited Times.</quote>
10592 </para>
10593 <para>
10594 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10595 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10596 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10597 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be <quote>limited</quote> will have
10598 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10599 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10600 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10601 what the Constitution plainly forbids&mdash;perpetual terms <quote>on the
10602 installment plan,</quote> as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10603 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
10604 </para>
10605 <para>
10606 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10607 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10608 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10609 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10610 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10611 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10612 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10613 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10614 this gravy train going.
10615 </para>
10616 <para>
10617 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10618 government. <quote>Corruption</quote> not in the sense that representatives are
10619 bribed. Rather, <quote>corruption</quote> in the sense that the system induces the
10620 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10621 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10622 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10623 do&mdash;and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10624 </para>
10625 <para>
10626 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10627 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10628 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10629 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in 1963. His poetry
10630 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10631 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10632 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10633 published by anyone for free.
10634 </para>
10635 <para>
10636 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $100,000 a year from
10637 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10638 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10639 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10640 report:
10641 </para>
10642 <para>
10643 <quote>Next year,</quote> the adviser announces, <quote>our copyrights in works A, B,
10644
10645 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10646 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10647 receiving the annual royalty check of $100,000 from the publishers of
10648 those works.</quote>
10649 </para>
10650 <para>
10651 <quote>There's a proposal in Congress, however,</quote> she continues, <quote>that
10652 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10653 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10654 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes.</quote>
10655 </para>
10656 <para>
10657 <quote>Hope?</quote> a fellow board member says. <quote>Can't we be doing something
10658 about it?</quote>
10659 </para>
10660 <para>
10661 <quote>Well, obviously, yes,</quote> the adviser responds. <quote>We could contribute
10662 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10663 they support the bill.</quote>
10664 </para>
10665 <para>
10666 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10667 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. <quote>How much
10668 would we get if this extension were passed?</quote> you ask the adviser. <quote>How
10669 much is it worth?</quote>
10670 </para>
10671 <para>
10672 <quote>Well,</quote> the adviser says, <quote>if you're confident that you will continue
10673 to get at least $100,000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10674 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (6 percent),
10675 then this law would be worth $1,146,000 to the estate.</quote>
10676 </para>
10677 <para>
10678 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10679 correct conclusion:
10680 </para>
10681 <para>
10682 <quote>So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10683 $1,000,000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10684 contributions
10685 would assure that the bill was passed?</quote>
10686 </para>
10687 <para>
10688 <quote>Absolutely,</quote> the adviser responds. <quote>It is worth it to you to
10689 contribute
10690 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10691 copyrights. Which for us means over $1,000,000.</quote>
10692 </para>
10693 <para>
10694 You quickly get the point&mdash;you as the member of the board and, I
10695 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10696 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10697 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10698 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10699 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10700 copyrights
10701 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10702 the copyright term extended.
10703 </para>
10704 <para>
10705 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10706 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10707 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10708 </para>
10709 <para>
10710 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10711 Copyright
10712 Term Extension Act, this <quote>theory</quote> about incentives was proved
10713 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10714 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10715 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10716 contributions.<footnote><para>
10717 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, <quote>Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10718 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years,</quote>
10719 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune</citetitle>, 17 October 1998, 22.
10720 </para></footnote>
10721 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10722 $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10723 than $200,000 in campaign contributions.<footnote><para>
10724 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, <quote>Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10725 Age,</quote> available at
10726 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #49</ulink>.
10727 </para></footnote>
10728 Disney is estimated to have
10729 contributed more than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the
10730 cycle.<footnote><para>
10731 <!-- f5. -->
10732 Alan K. Ota, <quote>Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,</quote>
10733 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week</citetitle>, 8 August 1990, available at
10734 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #50</ulink>.
10735 </para></footnote>
10736
10737 </para>
10738 <para>
10739 <emphasis role='strong'>Constitutional law</emphasis> is not oblivious
10740 to the obvious. Or at least, it need not be. So when I was considering
10741 Eldred's complaint, this reality about the never-ending incentives to
10742 increase the copyright term was central to my thinking. In my view, a
10743 pragmatic court committed to interpreting and applying the
10744 Constitution of our framers would see that if Congress has the power
10745 to extend existing terms, then there would be no effective
10746 constitutional requirement that terms be <quote>limited.</quote> If
10747 they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again and
10748 again.
10749 </para>
10750 <para>
10751 It was also my judgment that <emphasis>this</emphasis> Supreme Court
10752 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10753 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10754 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10755 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10756 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10757 Supreme Court's
10758
10759 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10760 decision in 1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10761 guns near schools.
10762 </para>
10763 <para>
10764 Since 1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10765 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10766 power to regulate only <quote>commerce among the several states</quote> (aka
10767 <quote>interstate
10768 commerce</quote>), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10769 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10770 interstate
10771 commerce.
10772 </para>
10773 <para>
10774 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10775 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10776 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10777 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10778 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10779 </para>
10780 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
10781 <para>
10782 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10783 that in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The government had
10784 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10785 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10786 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10787 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10788 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10789 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10790 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10791 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10792 position to second-guess Congress.
10793 </para>
10794 <para>
10795 <quote>We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,</quote>
10796 the Chief Justice wrote.<footnote><para>
10797 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
10798 </para></footnote>
10799 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10800 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10801 Congress's power. The decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10802 later in <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>.<footnote><para>
10803 <!-- f7. -->
10804 <citetitle>United States</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Morrison</citetitle>, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10805 </para></footnote>
10806 </para>
10807 <para>
10808 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10809 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.<footnote><para>
10810 <!-- f8. -->
10811 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10812 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10813 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10814 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10815 regulate commerce&mdash;the limitation to interstate commerce
10816 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10817 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10818 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights&mdash;the
10819 limitation to <quote>limited times</quote> notwithstanding.
10820 </para></footnote>
10821 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10822 yield the conclusion that Congress
10823 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10824 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10825 term, then there would be no <quote>stopping point</quote> to Congress's power over
10826 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10827 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10828 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10829 term of existing copyrights.
10830 </para>
10831 <para>
10832 <emphasis>If</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
10833 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> stood for
10834 politics&mdash;a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10835 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10836 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10837 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10838 demonstrating the <quote>fidelity</quote> in such an interpretation of the
10839 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10840 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10841 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10842 were going to be petty politicians.
10843 </para>
10844 <para>
10845 <emphasis role='strong'>Now let's pause</emphasis> for a moment to
10846 make sure we understand what the argument in
10847 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10848 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10849 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10850 piracy&mdash;piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10851 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10852 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10853 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10854 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10855 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10856 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10857 power&mdash;expressed through the power of lobbyists' money&mdash;to
10858 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10859 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10860 piracy that affects us all.
10861 </para>
10862 <para>
10863 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10864
10865 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10866 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10867 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than <quote>legal piracy.</quote><footnote><para>
10868 <!-- f9. -->
10869 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
10870 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), n.10, available
10871 at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #51</ulink>.
10872 </para></footnote>
10873 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10874 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10875 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10876 charter.
10877 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association</primary></indexterm>
10878 </para>
10879 <para>
10880 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10881 copyright
10882 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10883 influence
10884 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10885 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10886 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10887 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10888 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10889 bought to extend them again.
10890 </para>
10891 <para>
10892 <emphasis role='strong'>It is valuable</emphasis> copyrights that are
10893 responsible for terms being extended. Mickey Mouse and
10894 <quote>Rhapsody in Blue.</quote> These works are too valuable for
10895 copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our society from
10896 copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains Disney's.
10897 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works from
10898 the 1920s and 1930s that have continuing commercial value. The real
10899 harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The real
10900 harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially exploited,
10901 and no longer available as a result.
10902 </para>
10903 <para>
10904 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (1923 to
10905 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10906 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10907 copyright holders for that 2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10908 But the law and its effect were not limited to that 2 percent. The law
10909 extended the terms of copyright generally.<footnote><para>
10910 <!-- f10. --> The figure of 2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10911 Congressional
10912 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10913 of Petitioners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 7, available at
10914 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #52</ulink>.
10915 </para></footnote>
10916
10917 </para>
10918 <para>
10919 Think practically about the consequence of this
10920 extension&mdash;practically,
10921 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10922
10923 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10924 work. In 1930, 10,047 books were published. In 2000, 174 of those
10925 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10926 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10927 remaining
10928 9,873. What would you have to do?
10929 </para>
10930 <indexterm><primary>archives, digital</primary></indexterm>
10931 <para>
10932 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the 9,873 books were
10933 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10934 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10935 titles and authors of the 9,873 books with the copyright registration
10936 and renewal records for works published in 1930. That will produce a
10937 list of books still under copyright.
10938 </para>
10939 <para>
10940 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10941 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10942 </para>
10943 <para>
10944 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10945 owners
10946 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10947 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10948 being at least a list?
10949 </para>
10950 <para>
10951 But there is no list. There may be a name from 1930, and then in
10952 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10953 practically
10954 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10955 thousands
10956 of such records&mdash;especially since the person who registered is
10957 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about 1930!
10958 </para>
10959 <para>
10960 <quote>But there isn't a list of who owns property generally,</quote> the
10961 apologists for the system respond. <quote>Why should there be a list of
10962 copyright owners?</quote>
10963 </para>
10964 <para>
10965 Well, actually, if you think about it, there <emphasis>are</emphasis>
10966 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10967 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10968 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10969 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10970 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10971 what tangible property.
10972 </para>
10973 <para>
10974 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10975 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10976 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10977
10978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10979 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10980 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10981 happen
10982 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10983 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10984 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10985 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10986 know quite well who owns what property.
10987 </para>
10988 <para>
10989 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10990 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10991 already
10992 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10993 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10994 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10995 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10996 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10997 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10998 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10999 </para>
11000 <para>
11001 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
11002 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
11003 consequence
11004 for other creative works is much more dire.
11005 </para>
11006 <indexterm id='idxageemichael' class='startofrange'>
11007 <primary>Agee, Michael</primary>
11008 </indexterm>
11009 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
11010 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films</primary></indexterm>
11011 <para>
11012 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
11013 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
11014 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
11015 made between 1921 and 1951. Only one of these films, <citetitle>The Lucky Dog</citetitle>, is
11016 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after 1923
11017 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
11018 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
11019 money. According to one estimate, <quote>Roach has sold about 60,000
11020 videocassettes and 50,000 DVDs of the duo's silent
11021 films.</quote><footnote><para>
11022 <!-- f11. -->
11023 See David G. Savage, <quote>High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,</quote>
11024 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times</citetitle>, 6 October 2002; David Streitfeld, <quote>Classic Movies,
11025 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
11026 Down Copyright Extension,</quote> <citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune</citetitle>, 9 October 2002.
11027 </para></footnote>
11028
11029 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The</primary></indexterm>
11030 </para>
11031 <para>
11032 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
11033 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
11034 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
11035 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
11036 </para>
11037 <para>
11038 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
11039
11040 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
11041 any continuing commercial value. The rest&mdash;to the extent it
11042 survives at all&mdash;sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
11043 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
11044 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
11045 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
11046 work available for distribution.
11047 </para>
11048 <para>
11049 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
11050 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
11051 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
11052 it cost more than $10,000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
11053 film in 1993, it can now cost as little as $100 to digitize one hour of
11054 mm film.<footnote><para>
11055 <!-- f12. -->
11056 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
11057 Supporting the Petitoners, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11058 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01- 618), 12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
11059 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive, <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle>
11060 v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, available at
11061 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #53</ulink>.
11062 </para></footnote>
11063
11064 </para>
11065 <para>
11066 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
11067 important.
11068 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
11069 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
11070 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
11071 locate the copyright owner.
11072 </para>
11073 <para>
11074 Or more accurately, <emphasis>owners</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
11075 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
11076 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
11077 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
11078 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
11079 to these films is exceptionally high.
11080 </para>
11081 <para>
11082 <quote>But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
11083 copyright owner when she shows up?</quote> Sure, if you want to commit a
11084 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
11085 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
11086 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
11087 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
11088 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
11089 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
11090 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
11091 </para>
11092 <para>
11093 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
11094
11095 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
11096 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
11097 benefit
11098 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
11099 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
11100 the copyright expires.
11101 </para>
11102 <indexterm startref='idxageemichael' class='endofrange'/>
11103 <para>
11104 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
11105 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
11106 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
11107 canisters
11108 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
11109 than dust.
11110 </para>
11111 <para>
11112 <emphasis role='strong'>Of all the</emphasis> creative work produced
11113 by humans anywhere, a tiny fraction has continuing commercial
11114 value. For that tiny fraction, the copyright is a crucially important
11115 legal device. For that tiny fraction, the copyright creates incentives
11116 to produce and distribute the creative work. For that tiny fraction,
11117 the copyright acts as an <quote>engine of free expression.</quote>
11118 </para>
11119 <para>
11120 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
11121 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
11122 indicated,
11123 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
11124 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
11125 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
11126 distributors,
11127 the commercial life ends.
11128 </para>
11129 <para>
11130 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
11131 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes &amp; Noble, and
11132 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
11133 between
11134 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
11135 Friday
11136 night watching a 1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
11137 of culture is important and valuable&mdash;for entertainment but also, and
11138 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
11139 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
11140 have, we need to have access to this history.
11141 </para>
11142 <para>
11143 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
11144
11145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
11146 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
11147 this context do no good.
11148 </para>
11149 <para>
11150 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
11151 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
11152 <emphasis>copyright-related use</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
11153 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
11154 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
11155 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
11156 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
11157 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
11158 was independent of copyright law.
11159 </para>
11160 <para>
11161 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
11162 a film&mdash;the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs&mdash;were
11163 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
11164 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
11165 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
11166 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
11167 market didn't have more to offer.
11168 </para>
11169 <para>
11170 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
11171 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
11172 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
11173 would not have interfered with anything.
11174 </para>
11175 <para>
11176 But this situation has now changed.
11177 </para>
11178 <indexterm id='idxarchivesdigital2' class='startofrange'>
11179 <primary>archives, digital</primary>
11180 </indexterm>
11181 <para>
11182 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
11183 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
11184 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
11185 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
11186 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
11187 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
11188 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
11189 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
11190 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
11191 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
11192 </para>
11193 <para>
11194 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
11195 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
11196 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
11197 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
11198 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11199 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11200 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11201 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11202 written for a radically different context.
11203 </para>
11204 <para>
11205 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11206 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11207 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11208 <emphasis>copyright</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11209 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11210 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11211 context, copyright is serving no purpose <emphasis>at all</emphasis>
11212 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11213 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11214 </para>
11215 <para>
11216 You may well ask, <quote>But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11217 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11218 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11219 culture widely?</quote>
11220 </para>
11221 <para>
11222 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11223 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes &amp; Noble
11224 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11225 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11226 of a library is to serve what <quote>the market</quote> would demand. But if you
11227 think the role of a library is bigger than this&mdash;if you think its
11228 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11229 particular bit of that culture or not&mdash;then we can't count on the
11230 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11231 </para>
11232 <indexterm startref='idxarchivesdigital2' class='endofrange'/>
11233 <para>
11234 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11235 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11236 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11237 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11238
11239 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11240 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11241 culture, 94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11242 and 1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11243 commercial market, if access is a value, then 6 percent is a failure
11244 to provide that value.<footnote><para>
11245 <!-- f13. -->
11246 Jason Schultz, <quote>The Myth of the 1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,</quote> 20
11247 December 2002, available at
11248 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #54</ulink>.
11249 </para></footnote>
11250
11251 </para>
11252 <para>
11253 <emphasis role='strong'>In January 1999</emphasis>, we filed a lawsuit
11254 on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
11255 asking the court to declare the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
11256 Act unconstitutional. The two central claims that we made were (1)
11257 that extending existing terms violated the Constitution's
11258 <quote>limited Times</quote> requirement, and (2) that extending terms
11259 by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11260 </para>
11261 <para>
11262 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11263 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11264 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11265 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11266 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11267 </para>
11268 <para>
11269 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11270 copyrights be for <quote>limited Times</quote> only. His argument was as elegant as
11271 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11272 <quote>stopping point</quote> to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11273 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11274 terms that are <quote>limited.</quote> Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11275 to interpret the term <quote>limited Times</quote> to give it meaning. And the best
11276 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11277 power to extend existing terms.
11278 </para>
11279 <para>
11280 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11281 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11282 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11283 whole, where the court will sit <quote>en banc</quote> to hear the case.
11284 </para>
11285 <indexterm><primary>Tatel, David</primary></indexterm>
11286 <para>
11287 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11288 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11289
11290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11291 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11292 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11293 overstepped its bounds.
11294 </para>
11295 <para>
11296 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11297 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11298 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11299 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11300 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11301 </para>
11302 <para>
11303 But in February 2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11304 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11305 was set for October of 2002. The summer would be spent writing
11306 briefs and preparing for argument.
11307 </para>
11308 <para>
11309 <emphasis role='strong'>It is over</emphasis> a year later as I write
11310 these words. It is still astonishingly hard. If you know anything at
11311 all about this story, you know that we lost the appeal. And if you
11312 know something more than just the minimum, you probably think there
11313 was no way this case could have been won. After our defeat, I received
11314 literally thousands of missives by well-wishers and supporters,
11315 thanking me for my work on behalf of this noble but doomed cause. And
11316 none from this pile was more significant to me than the e-mail from my
11317 client, Eric Eldred.
11318 </para>
11319 <para>
11320 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11321 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11322 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11323 mistake lost it.
11324 </para>
11325 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11326 <para>
11327 <emphasis role='strong'>The mistake</emphasis> was made early, though
11328 it became obvious only at the very end. Our case had been supported
11329 from the very beginning by an extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart,
11330 and by the law firm he had moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and
11331 Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of heat
11332 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11333 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11334 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11335 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11336 </para>
11337 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11338 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan</primary></indexterm>
11339 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey</primary></indexterm>
11340 <para>
11341 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11342 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11343 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11344 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11345 told me, if we could make the issue seem <quote>important</quote> to the Supreme
11346 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11347 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against <quote>the
11348 most powerful media companies in the world.</quote>
11349 </para>
11350 <para>
11351 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11352 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11353 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11354 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11355 <quote>right</quote> as in <quote>true,</quote> I thought, but it is <quote>wrong</quote> as in <quote>it just shouldn't be
11356 that way.</quote> As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11357 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11358 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11359 interpretation
11360 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11361 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11362 unconstitutional,
11363 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11364 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11365 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11366 Constitution,
11367 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11368 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11369 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11370 </para>
11371 <para>
11372 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11373 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11374 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11375 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11376 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11377 why it was unconstitutional.
11378 </para>
11379 <para>
11380 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11381
11382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11383 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11384 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11385 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11386 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11387 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11388 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11389 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11390 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11391 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11392 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11393 <emphasis>law</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11394 the widest range of credible critics&mdash;credible not because they
11395 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11396 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11397 </para>
11398 <para>
11399 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11400 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11401 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11402 Congress. In November 1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11403 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11404 <quote>Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11405 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11406 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11407 to get bogged down?</quote> The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11408 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11409 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11410 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11411 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11412 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis</primary></indexterm>
11413 </para>
11414 <para>
11415 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11416 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11417 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11418 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11419 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11420 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11421 </para>
11422 <para>
11423 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11424 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11425
11426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11427 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11428 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11429 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11430 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11431 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11432 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11433 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11434 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11435 <indexterm><primary>Intel</primary></indexterm>
11436 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
11437 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum</primary></indexterm>
11438 </para>
11439 <para>
11440 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11441 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11442 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11443 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11444 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries</primary></indexterm>
11445 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union</primary></indexterm>
11446 </para>
11447 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios</primary></indexterm>
11448 <para>
11449 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11450 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11451 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11452 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11453 clear.
11454 </para>
11455 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George</primary></indexterm>
11456 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth</primary></indexterm>
11457 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James</primary></indexterm>
11458 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11459 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton</primary></indexterm>
11460 <para>
11461 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11462 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11463 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11464 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11465 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11466 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11467 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11468 nothing more than <quote>rent-seeking</quote>&mdash;the fancy term economists use
11469 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11470 </para>
11471 <para>
11472 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11473 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11474 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11475 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11476 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11477 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11478 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11479 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11480
11481 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11482 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11483 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11484 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11485 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan</primary></indexterm>
11486 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen</primary></indexterm>
11487 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11488 </para>
11489 <para>
11490 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11491 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11492 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11493 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11494 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11495 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11496 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11497 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11498 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11499 confidence in our argument.
11500 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11501 </para>
11502 <para>
11503 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11504 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these <quote>friends</quote> included
11505 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11506 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11507 copyright holders.
11508 </para>
11509 <para>
11510 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11511 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either&mdash;they
11512 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11513 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11514 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11515 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11516 wanted to control.
11517 </para>
11518 <para>
11519 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11520 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11521 Dr. Seuss's work&mdash; better than allowing it to fall into the
11522 public domain&mdash;because if this creativity were in the public
11523 domain, then people could use it to <quote>glorify drugs or to create
11524 pornography.</quote><footnote><para>
11525 <!-- f14. -->
11526 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al., <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, 537
11527 U.S. (2003) (No. 01-618), 19.
11528 </para></footnote>
11529 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11530 <quote>protection</quote> of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11531 to license <citetitle>Porgy and Bess</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11532 Americans in the cast.<footnote><para>
11533 <!-- f15. -->
11534 Dinitia Smith, <quote>Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11535 Mouse Joins the Fray,</quote> <citetitle>New York Times</citetitle>, 28 March 1998, B7.
11536 </para></footnote>
11537 That's
11538 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11539 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11540 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11541 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George</primary></indexterm>
11542 </para>
11543 <para>
11544 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11545 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11546 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11547 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11548 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, <quote>Give us twenty years
11549 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11550 better with them than anyone else.</quote> Congress of course likes to reward
11551 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11552 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11553 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11554 </para>
11555 <para>
11556 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11557 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11558 copyrights&mdash;extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11559 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11560 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11561 </para>
11562 <para>
11563 <emphasis role='strong'>Between February</emphasis> and October, there
11564 was little I did beyond preparing for this case. Early on, as I said,
11565 I set the strategy.
11566 </para>
11567 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.</primary></indexterm>
11568 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day</primary></indexterm>
11569 <para>
11570 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11571 called <quote>the Conservatives.</quote> The other we called <quote>the Rest.</quote> The
11572 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11573 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11574 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11575 five who had supported the <citetitle>Lopez/Morrison</citetitle> line
11576 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11577 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11578 </para>
11579 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11580 <indexterm id='idxginsburg' class='startofrange'>
11581 <primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader</primary>
11582 </indexterm>
11583 <para>
11584 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11585 Congress's power. These four&mdash;Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11586 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer&mdash;had repeatedly argued that
11587 the Constitution
11588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11589 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11590 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11591 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11592 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11593 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11594 </para>
11595 <para>
11596 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11597 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11598 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11599 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11600 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11601 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11602 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11603 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11604 sense.
11605 </para>
11606 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11607 <para>
11608 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11609 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11610 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11611 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11612 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11613 these retrospective extensions.
11614 </para>
11615 <indexterm startref='idxginsburg' class='endofrange'/>
11616 <para>
11617 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11618 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11619 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11620 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11621 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11622 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11623 </para>
11624 <para>
11625 This analysis of <quote>the Rest</quote> showed most clearly where our focus had to
11626 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11627 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11628 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11629 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation&mdash;the
11630 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11631 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11632 powers have limits.
11633 </para>
11634 <para>
11635 This then was the core of our strategy&mdash;a strategy for which I am
11636 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11637 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>
11638 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11639 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11640 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11641 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11642 supposed to be <quote>limited.</quote> Our aim would be to get the Court to
11643 reconcile <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> with
11644 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11645 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11646 be limited.
11647 </para>
11648 <para>
11649 <emphasis role='strong'>The argument</emphasis> on the government's
11650 side came down to this: Congress has done it before. It should be
11651 allowed to do it again. The government claimed that from the very
11652 beginning, Congress has been extending the term of existing
11653 copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court should not now say
11654 that practice is unconstitutional.
11655 </para>
11656 <para>
11657 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11658 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in 1831
11659 and in 1909. And of course, in 1962, Congress began extending
11660 existing
11661 terms regularly&mdash;eleven times in forty years.
11662 </para>
11663 <para>
11664 But this <quote>consistency</quote> should be kept in perspective. Congress
11665 extended
11666 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11667 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11668 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11669 existing
11670 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11671 restraint
11672 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11673 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11674 hesitated
11675 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11676 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11677 </para>
11678 <para>
11679 <emphasis role='strong'>Oral argument</emphasis> was scheduled for the
11680 first week in October. I arrived in D.C. two weeks before the
11681 argument. During those two weeks, I was repeatedly
11682 <quote>mooted</quote> by lawyers who had volunteered to
11683
11684 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11685 help in the case. Such <quote>moots</quote> are basically practice rounds, where
11686 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11687 </para>
11688 <para>
11689 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11690 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11691 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11692 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11693 Congress
11694 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11695 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11696 this central idea.
11697 </para>
11698 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11699 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
11700 <para>
11701 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11702 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11703 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11704 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11705 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
11706 </para>
11707 <para>
11708 <quote>I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11709 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11710 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11711 the harm&mdash;passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11712 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning.</quote>
11713 </para>
11714 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11715 <para>
11716 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11717 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11718 right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11719 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11720 does the right thing&mdash;not because of politics but because it is right. As
11721 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11722 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11723 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11724 </para>
11725 <para>
11726 <emphasis role='strong'>The night before</emphasis> the argument, a
11727 line of people began to form in front of the Supreme Court. The case
11728 had become a focus of the press and of the movement to free
11729 culture. Hundreds stood in line
11730
11731 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11732 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11733 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11734 </para>
11735 <para>
11736 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11737 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11738 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11739 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11740 congressmen
11741 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11742 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11743 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11744 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11745 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11746 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11747 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11748 family of the Justices.
11749 </para>
11750 <para>
11751 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11752 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11753 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11754 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11755 </para>
11756 <indexterm><primary>O'Connor, Sandra Day</primary></indexterm>
11757 <para>
11758 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11759 The history was bothering her.
11760 </para>
11761 <blockquote>
11762 <para>
11763 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11764 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11765 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11766 practice that began with the very first act.
11767 </para>
11768 </blockquote>
11769 <para>
11770 She was quite willing to concede <quote>that this flies directly in the face
11771 of what the framers had in mind.</quote> But my response again and again
11772 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11773 </para>
11774 <blockquote>
11775 <para>
11776 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11777 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11778 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11779 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11780 is yes.
11781 </para>
11782 </blockquote>
11783 <para>
11784 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11785 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11786 Kennedy, who observed,
11787 </para>
11788 <blockquote>
11789 <para>
11790 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11791 the '76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11792 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11793 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11794 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11795 </para>
11796 </blockquote>
11797 <para>
11798 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11799 student,
11800 I answered,
11801 </para>
11802 <blockquote>
11803 <para>
11804 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11805 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11806 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11807 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11808 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11809 </para>
11810 </blockquote>
11811 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
11812 <para>
11813 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11814 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11815 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11816 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11817 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11818 </para>
11819 <para>
11820 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11821 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> ruling,
11822 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11823 </para>
11824 <para>
11825 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11826 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11827
11828 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11829 </para>
11830 <blockquote>
11831 <para>
11832 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11833 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11834 </para>
11835 <para>
11836 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11837 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11838 domain
11839 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11840 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11841 into the Copyright Clause.
11842 </para>
11843 </blockquote>
11844 <indexterm><primary>Olson, Theodore B.</primary></indexterm>
11845 <para>
11846 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11847 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11848 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11849 </para>
11850 <blockquote>
11851 <para>
11852 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11853 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11854 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11855 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11856 time.
11857 </para>
11858 </blockquote>
11859 <para>
11860 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11861 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11862 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11863 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11864 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11865 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11866 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11867 Patent Clause&mdash; indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11868 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11869 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11870 Court to my side.
11871 </para>
11872 <para>
11873 <emphasis role='strong'>As I left</emphasis> the court that day, I
11874 knew there were a hundred points I wished I could remake. There were a
11875 hundred questions I wished I had
11876
11877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11878 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11879 optimistic.
11880 </para>
11881 <para>
11882 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11883 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11884 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11885 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11886 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11887 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11888 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11889 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11890 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11891 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11892 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court&mdash;in particular,
11893 the Conservatives&mdash;would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11894 law that it had established elsewhere.
11895 </para>
11896 <para>
11897 <emphasis role='strong'>The morning</emphasis> of January 15, 2003, I
11898 was five minutes late to the office and missed the 7:00 A.M. call from
11899 the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to the message, I could tell in an
11900 instant that she had bad news to report.The Supreme Court had affirmed
11901 the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven justices had voted in the
11902 majority. There were two dissents.
11903 </para>
11904 <para>
11905 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11906 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11907 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11908 </para>
11909 <para>
11910 My <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11911 money in the world against <emphasis>reasoning</emphasis>. And here
11912 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11913 reasoning.
11914 </para>
11915 <para>
11916 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11917 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11918 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11919 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11920 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11921 </para>
11922 <indexterm><primary>Ginsburg, Ruth Bader</primary></indexterm>
11923 <para>
11924
11925 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11926 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11927 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11928 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11929 </para>
11930 <para>
11931 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable&mdash;for her, and for Justice
11932 Souter. Neither believes in <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11933 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11934 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11935 </para>
11936 <para>
11937 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11938 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11939 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11940 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11941 reconcile the two simply <emphasis>by not addressing the
11942 argument</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11943 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11944 followed from the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11945 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11946 </para>
11947 <para>
11948 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11949 they would respect? By what right did they&mdash;the silent
11950 five&mdash;get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11951 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11952 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11953 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11954 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11955 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11956 the system we have.
11957 </para>
11958 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11959 <para>
11960 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11961 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11962 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11963 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11964 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11965 the Court discounted the parallel&mdash;without explaining how the
11966 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11967 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11968 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11969 </para>
11970 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen</primary></indexterm>
11971 <para>
11972 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11973 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11974 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11975 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11976 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author 99.8
11977 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11978 that the actual number was 99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11979 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11980 <quote>limited,</quote> and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11981 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11982 </para>
11983 <para>
11984 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11985 because neither believed in the <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11986 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11987 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11988 Sentelle. It was <citetitle>Hamlet</citetitle> without the Prince.
11989 </para>
11990 <para>
11991 <emphasis role='strong'>Defeat brings depression</emphasis>. They say
11992 it is a sign of health when depression gives way to anger. My anger
11993 came quickly, but it didn't cure the depression. This anger was of two
11994 sorts.
11995 </para>
11996 <indexterm><primary>originalism</primary></indexterm>
11997 <para>
11998 It was first anger with the five <quote>Conservatives.</quote> It would have been
11999 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> didn't
12000 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
12001 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
12002 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
12003 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
12004 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is <quote>originalism</quote>&mdash;to
12005 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
12006 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
12007 <citetitle>Lopez</citetitle> and many other <quote>originalist</quote> rulings. Where was their
12008 <quote>originalism</quote> now?
12009 </para>
12010 <para>
12011 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
12012 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
12013 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
12014 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
12015
12016 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
12017 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
12018 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
12019 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
12020 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
12021 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
12022 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
12023 own principles.
12024 </para>
12025 <para>
12026 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
12027 myself.
12028 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
12029 the law as it is.
12030 </para>
12031 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
12032 <para>
12033 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
12034 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
12035 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
12036 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
12037 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
12038 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
12039 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
12040 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
12041 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
12042 </para>
12043 <para>
12044 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
12045 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
12046 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
12047 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
12048 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
12049 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
12050 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
12051 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
12052 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
12053 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
12054 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
12055 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
12056 effort to persuade; but I
12057 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
12058 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
12059 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
12060 should decide the issue.
12061 </para>
12062 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
12063 <para>
12064 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
12065 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
12066 Kathleen Sullivan?
12067 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles</primary></indexterm>
12068 </para>
12069 <para>
12070 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
12071 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
12072 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
12073 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
12074 </para>
12075 <para>
12076 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
12077 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
12078 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
12079 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
12080 have persuaded.
12081 </para>
12082 <para>
12083 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
12084 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
12085 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
12086 case was a mistake. <quote>The Court is not ready,</quote> Peter Jaszi said; this
12087 issue should not be raised until it is.
12088 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12089 </para>
12090 <para>
12091 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
12092 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
12093 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
12094 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
12095 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
12096 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
12097 this case&mdash;a decision I had made four years before&mdash;was wrong.
12098 </para>
12099 <para>
12100 <emphasis role='strong'>While the reaction</emphasis> to the Sonny
12101 Bono Act itself was almost unanimously negative, the reaction to the
12102 Court's decision was mixed. No one, at least in the press, tried to
12103 say that extending the term of copyright was a good idea. We had won
12104 that battle over ideas. Where
12105
12106 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
12107 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
12108 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
12109 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
12110 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
12111 harmful law. <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
12112 </para>
12113 <blockquote>
12114 <para>
12115 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
12116 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
12117 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
12118 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
12119 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
12120 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
12121 </para>
12122 </blockquote>
12123 <para>
12124 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
12125 hilarious images&mdash;of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
12126 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
12127 (<xref linkend="fig-18"/>). The <quote>powerful and wealthy</quote> line is a bit
12128 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
12129 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
12130 </para>
12131 <figure id="fig-18">
12132 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon</title>
12133 <graphic fileref="images/18.png"></graphic>
12134 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben</primary></indexterm>
12135 </figure>
12136 <para>
12137 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
12138 quote from <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle>. That <quote>grand experiment</quote> we call the
12139 <quote>public domain</quote> is over? When I can make light of it, I think, <quote>Honey,
12140 I shrunk the Constitution.</quote> But I can rarely make light of it. We had
12141 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
12142 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
12143 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
12144 </para>
12145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
12146 </chapter>
12147 <chapter label="14" id="eldred-ii">
12148 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II</title>
12149 <para>
12150 <emphasis role='strong'>The day</emphasis>
12151 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I
12152 was to travel to Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
12153 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> was denied&mdash;meaning the case was
12154 really finally over&mdash;fate would have it that I was giving a
12155 speech to technologists at Disney World.) This was a particularly
12156 long flight to my least favorite city. The drive into the city from
12157 Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I opened up my computer and
12158 wrote an op-ed piece.
12159 </para>
12160 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don</primary></indexterm>
12161 <para>
12162 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
12163 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
12164 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
12165 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
12166 Justice Kennedy: <quote>For all these years the act has impeded progress in
12167 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
12168 that.</quote> And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
12169 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
12170 </para>
12171 <para>
12172 <citetitle>The New York Times</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
12173 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
12174 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
12175 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
12176 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
12177 the work passed into the public domain.
12178 </para>
12179 <para>
12180 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
12181 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
12182 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
12183 </para>
12184 <para>
12185 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
12186 is either the <quote>Public Domain Enhancement Act</quote> or the <quote>Copyright
12187 Term Deregulation Act.</quote> Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
12188 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
12189 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
12190 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $1. But for
12191 everything else, let the content go.
12192 </para>
12193 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12194 <para>
12195 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
12196 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
12197 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
12198 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
12199 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
12200 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
12201 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
12202 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
12203 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
12204 the stupid harm of the present system.
12205 </para>
12206 <para>
12207 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
12208 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
12209 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
12210 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
12211 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
12212 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
12213 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
12214 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
12215 where copyright owners could be identified.
12216 </para>
12217 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12218 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12219 <para>
12220 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
12221 As I described in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
12222 linkend="property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
12223 removed in 1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
12224 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.<footnote><para>
12225 <!-- f1. -->
12226 <indexterm><primary>German copyright law</primary></indexterm>
12227 Until the 1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
12228 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
12229 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12230 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the 1908 act,
12231 every text of the Convention has provided that <quote>the enjoyment and the
12232 exercise</quote> of rights guaranteed by the Convention <quote>shall not be subject
12233 to any formality.</quote> The prohibition against formalities is presently
12234 embodied in Article 5(2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12235 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12236 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12237 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12238 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12239 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12240 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12241 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12242 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>International
12243 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12244 Press, 2001), 153&ndash;54. </para></footnote>
12245 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a <quote>natural right.</quote> Natural
12246 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12247 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12248 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12249 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12250 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12251 </para>
12252 <para>
12253 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12254 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12255 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12256 <quote>Walt Disney creativity</quote> is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12257 know what's protected and what's not.
12258 </para>
12259 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (1908)</primary></indexterm>
12260 <para>
12261 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12262 Berlin in 1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12263 Convention in 1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12264 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12265 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12266 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12267 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an <citetitle>i</citetitle> or cross a
12268 <citetitle>t</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12269 </para>
12270 <para>
12271 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12272 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12273 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12274 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12275 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12276 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12277 </para>
12278 <para>
12279 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12280 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12281 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12282 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12283 burden
12284 imposed upon creators.
12285 </para>
12286 <para>
12287 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in 1908, there was
12288 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12289
12290 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12291 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12292 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12293 the government. He has a property right over the table <quote>naturally,</quote>
12294 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12295 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12296 table.
12297 </para>
12298 <para>
12299 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12300 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12301 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12302 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12303 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12304 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12305 spread.
12306 </para>
12307 <para>
12308 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12309 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12310 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12311 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12312 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12313 important reason to secure registration&mdash;both because it makes
12314 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12315 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12316 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12317 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12318 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12319 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12320 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12321 system of protection for property generally.
12322 </para>
12323 <para>
12324 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12325 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12326 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12327 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12328 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12329 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12330 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12331 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12332
12333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12334 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12335 <emphasis>lawyer</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12336 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle</primary></indexterm>
12337 </para>
12338 <para>
12339 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12340 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12341 didn't <quote>get.</quote> Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12342 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12343 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, <quote>short,</quote> then this
12344 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12345 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12346 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12347 </para>
12348 <para>
12349 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12350 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12351 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12352 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12353 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12354 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12355 seen before <emphasis>because there are no formalities</emphasis>.
12356 </para>
12357 <para>
12358 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12359 it is worth $1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12360 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12361 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12362 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12363 </para>
12364 <para>
12365 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12366 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12367 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12368 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12369 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $1 to you.
12370 </para>
12371 <para>
12372 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12373 registering the work mean that the $1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12374 hassle worth more than $1? Isn't that the real problem with
12375 registration?
12376 </para>
12377 <para>
12378 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12379 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12380 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12381
12382 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12383 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12384 address the real problem of <emphasis>governments</emphasis> standing
12385 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12386 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12387 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12388 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12389 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12390 upon historical data, that system would move up to 98 percent of
12391 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12392 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12393 </para>
12394 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve</primary></indexterm>
12395 <para>
12396 <emphasis role='strong'>When Steve Forbes</emphasis> endorsed the
12397 idea, some in Washington began to pay attention. Many people contacted
12398 me pointing to representatives who might be willing to introduce the
12399 Eldred Act. And I had a few who directly suggested that they might be
12400 willing to take the first step.
12401 </para>
12402 <para>
12403 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12404 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12405 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12406 possible. In May 2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12407 introduced. On May 16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, <quote>we are
12408 close.</quote> There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12409 something good might happen here.
12410 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe</primary></indexterm>
12411 </para>
12412 <para>
12413 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12414 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12415 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12416 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12417 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12418 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12419 </para>
12420 <para>
12421 The MPAA argued first that Congress had <quote>firmly rejected the central
12422 concept in the proposed bill</quote>&mdash;that copyrights be renewed. That
12423 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's <quote>firm rejection</quote> had occurred
12424 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12425 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12426 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12427 owners&mdash;apparently those who could not afford the $1 fee. Third,
12428 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12429 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12430 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12431 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12432 off the extended term unless the $1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12433 argued that the bill would impose <quote>enormous</quote> costs, since a
12434 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12435 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12436 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12437 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12438 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12439 film is a valid derivative use.
12440 </para>
12441 <para>
12442 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12443 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12444 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12445 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12446 or not&mdash;a controversial claim in any case&mdash;unless they know
12447 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12448 </para>
12449 <para>
12450 <emphasis role='strong'>At the beginning</emphasis> of this book, I
12451 told two stories about the law reacting to changes in technology. In
12452 the one, common sense prevailed. In the other, common sense was
12453 delayed. The difference between the two stories was the power of the
12454 opposition&mdash;the power of the side that fought to defend the
12455 status quo. In both cases, a new technology threatened old
12456 interests. But in only one case did those interest's have the power to
12457 protect themselves against this new competitive threat.
12458 </para>
12459 <para>
12460 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12461 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12462 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12463 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12464 sense?
12465 </para>
12466 <para>
12467
12468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12469 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12470 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12471 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12472 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12473 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12474 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12475 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12476 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12477 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12478 </para>
12479 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin</primary></indexterm>
12480 <para>
12481 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12482 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12483 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12484 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12485 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12486 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the <quote>Dark
12487 Content</quote> that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12488 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12489 </para>
12490 <para>
12491 What does this industry really want?
12492 </para>
12493 <para>
12494 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12495 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12496 protecting <emphasis>their</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12497 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12498 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12499 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12500 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12501 content that doesn't require <emphasis>their</emphasis> permission
12502 first.
12503 </para>
12504 <para>
12505 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12506 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12507 its aim not the protection of <quote>property</quote> but the rejection of a
12508 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12509 theirs. <emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12510 theirs</emphasis>.
12511 </para>
12512 <para>
12513 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12514 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12515
12516 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12517 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12518 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12519 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12520 and to share its own creation.
12521 </para>
12522 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
12523 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
12524 <para>
12525 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12526 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12527 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12528 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12529 block the progress of others.
12530 </para>
12531 <para>
12532 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12533 <quote>property</quote> in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12534 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12535 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing <quote>permission
12536 society.</quote> The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12537 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12538 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12539 </para>
12540 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12541 </chapter>
12542 </part>
12543 <chapter label="15" id="c-conclusion">
12544 <title>CONCLUSION</title>
12545 <indexterm id="idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='startofrange'>
12546 <primary>antiretroviral drugs</primary>
12547 </indexterm>
12548 <indexterm id="idxhivaidstherapies" class='startofrange'>
12549 <primary>HIV/AIDS therapies</primary>
12550 </indexterm>
12551 <indexterm id="idxafricahivmed" class='startofrange'>
12552 <primary>Africa, medications for HIV patients in</primary>
12553 </indexterm>
12554 <para>
12555 <emphasis role='strong'>There are more</emphasis> than 35 million
12556 people with the AIDS virus worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live
12557 in sub-Saharan Africa. Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen
12558 million Africans is proportional percentage-wise to seven million
12559 Americans. More importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12560 </para>
12561 <para>
12562 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12563 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12564 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12565 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12566 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12567 the disease almost invisible.
12568 </para>
12569 <para>
12570 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12571 United States, they cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per person per
12572 year. Today, some cost $25,000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12573 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12574 population:
12575 $15,000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12576 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.<footnote><para>
12577 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, <quote>Final Report: Integrating
12578 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy</quote> (London, 2002),
12579 available at
12580 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12581 release
12582 issued 9 July 2002, only 230,000 of the 6 million who need drugs in
12583 the developing world receive them&mdash;and half of them are in Brazil.
12584 </para></footnote>
12585 </para>
12586 <para>
12587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12588 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12589 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12590 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12591 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12592 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12593 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12594 </para>
12595 <para>
12596 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12597 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12598 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12599 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12600 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12601 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12602 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12603 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12604 changes.
12605 </para>
12606 <para>
12607 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12608 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12609 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12610 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12611 costs significantly below the market price.
12612 </para>
12613 <para>
12614 In 1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12615 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12616 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12617 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12618 Africa from India. This is called <quote>parallel importation,</quote> and it is
12619 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12620 permitted within the European Union.<footnote>
12621 <para>
12622 <!-- f2. -->
12623 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12624 Owns the Knowledge Economy?</citetitle> (New York: The New Press, 2003), 37.
12625 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
12626 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
12627 </para></footnote>
12628 </para>
12629 <para>
12630 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12631 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12632 characterized it, <quote>The U.S. government pressured South Africa &hellip;
12633 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12634 imports.</quote><footnote><para>
12635 <!-- f3. -->
12636 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12637 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12638 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12639 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 14, available at
12640 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #56</ulink>. For a
12641 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12642 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12643 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep., 1st sess.,
12644 Ser. No. 106-126 (22 July 1999), 150&ndash;57 (statement of James
12645 Love).
12646 </para></footnote>
12647 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12648 government asked South Africa to change the law&mdash;and to add
12649 pressure to that request, in 1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12650 possible trade sanctions.
12651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12652 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12653 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12654 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12655 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12656 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12657 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12658 patent&mdash; pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12659 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12660 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12661 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.<footnote><para>
12662 <!-- f4. -->
12663 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), <citetitle>Patent
12664 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12665 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12666 Organization</citetitle> (Washington, D.C., 2000), 15. </para></footnote>
12667 </para>
12668 <para>
12669 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12670 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12671 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12672 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12673 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12674 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12675 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12676 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12677 </para>
12678 <para>
12679 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12680 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12681 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12682 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12683 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12684 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save 15 to 30 million lives.
12685 </para>
12686 <para>
12687 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12688 profits of United States drug companies&mdash;at least, not substantially. It
12689 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12690 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12691 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12692 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12693 by U.S. companies.
12694 </para>
12695 <para>
12696 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12697 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12698 argument
12699 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12700 about the sanctity of property.<footnote><para>
12701 <!-- f5. -->
12702 See Sabin Russell, <quote>New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12703 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,</quote> <citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle</citetitle>, 24
12704 May 1999, A1, available at
12705 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #57</ulink>
12706 (<quote>compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12707 system of intellectual property protection</quote>); Robert Weissman, <quote>AIDS
12708 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12709 Medicines,</quote> <citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus</citetitle> 4:23 (August 1999), available at
12710 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #58</ulink>
12711 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, <quote>TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12712 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12713 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,</quote> <citetitle>Widener Law
12714 Symposium Journal</citetitle> (Spring 2001): 175.
12715 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12716 </para></footnote>
12717 It was because <quote>intellectual property</quote> would be violated that these
12718 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12719 importance of <quote>intellectual property</quote> that led these government actors
12720 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12721 </para>
12722 <para>
12723 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12724 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12725 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12726 direct cost would be to speed the death of 15 to 30 million Africans,
12727 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the <quote>sanctity</quote> of an
12728 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12729 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12730 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12731 </para>
12732 <para>
12733 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12734 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12735 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12736 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12737 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system&mdash;
12738 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12739 </para>
12740 <para>
12741 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12742 drug companies would love&mdash;they say, and I believe them&mdash;to
12743 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12744 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12745 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12746 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12747 </para>
12748 <para>
12749 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12750 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12751 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, <quote>How
12752 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same
12753 drug would cost an American $1,500?</quote> Because there is no <quote>sound
12754 bite</quote> answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12755 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12756 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12757 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12758 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12759 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12760 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal&mdash;the sanctity of an
12761 idea called <quote>intellectual property.</quote>
12762 </para>
12763 <para>
12764 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12765 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12766 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12767 What is the argument?
12768 </para>
12769 <para>
12770 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12771 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12772 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12773 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12774 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12775 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12776 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12777 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12778 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12779 were balanced in just this sense.
12780 </para>
12781 <para>
12782 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12783 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12784 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12785 our tradition, now reigns in this culture&mdash;bizarrely, and with
12786 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12787 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.
12788 </para>
12789 <indexterm startref="idxafricahivmed" class='endofrange'/>
12790 <indexterm startref="idxhivaidstherapies" class='endofrange'/>
12791 <indexterm startref="idxantiretroviraldrugs" class='endofrange'/>
12792 <para>
12793 <emphasis role='strong'>A simple idea</emphasis> blinds us, and under
12794 the cover of darkness, much happens that most of us would reject if
12795 any of us looked. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in
12796 ideas that we don't even notice how monstrous it is to deny ideas to a
12797 people who are dying without them. So uncritically do we accept the
12798 idea of property in culture that we don't even question when the
12799 control of that property removes our
12800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12801 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12802 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12803 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12804 this common sense open its eyes.
12805 </para>
12806 <para>
12807 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12808 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12809 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12810 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12811 to fight <quote>piracy,</quote> and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12812 the idea of <quote>creative property,</quote> while transforming real creators into
12813 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12814 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12815 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12816 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12817 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12818 produce the <quote>perfect storm</quote> for free culture.
12819 </para>
12820 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald</primary></indexterm>
12821 <indexterm id='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='startofrange'>
12822 <primary>biomedical research</primary>
12823 </indexterm>
12824 <indexterm><primary>Wellcome Trust</primary></indexterm>
12825 <para>
12826 <emphasis role='strong'>In August 2003</emphasis>, a fight broke out
12827 in the United States about a decision by the World Intellectual
12828 Property Organization to cancel a meeting.<footnote><para>
12829 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, <quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>,
12830 August 2003, E1, available at
12831 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #59</ulink>; William New, <quote>Global Group's
12832 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12833 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12834 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #60</ulink>; William New, <quote>U.S. Official
12835 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,</quote> <citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12836 Daily</citetitle>, 19 August 2003, available at
12837 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #61</ulink>.
12838 </para></footnote>
12839 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12840 a meeting to discuss <quote>open and collaborative projects to create public
12841 goods.</quote> These are projects that have been successful in producing
12842 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12843 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12844 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12845 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12846 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12847 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12848 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12849 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12850 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12851 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12852 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12853 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12854 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12855 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12856 in the early 1980s. And it included <quote>open source and free software.</quote>
12857 <indexterm><primary>academic journals</primary></indexterm>
12858 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12859 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
12860 </para>
12861 <indexterm startref='idxbiomedicalresearch' class='endofrange'/>
12862 <para>
12863 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12864 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12865 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12866 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12867 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12868 </para>
12869 <para>
12870 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.<footnote><para>
12871 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12872 meeting.
12873 </para></footnote>
12874 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12875 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12876 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12877 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12878 property issues.
12879 </para>
12880 <para>
12881 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12882 about WIPO. In February 2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12883 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12884 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12885 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12886 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12887 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12888 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12889 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12890 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12891 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12892 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12893 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12894 talk about an <quote>Information Society</quote> unless one also talked about the
12895 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12896 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12897 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12898 stuff of
12899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12900 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12901 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12902 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12903 </para>
12904 <para>
12905 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12906 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12907 thus the meeting about <quote>open and collaborative projects to create
12908 public goods</quote> seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12909 </para>
12910 <para>
12911 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12912 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is <quote>open source
12913 and free software.</quote> Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12914 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12915 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12916 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12917 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12918 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12919 rather than <quote>proprietary software,</quote> for their own internal uses.
12920 </para>
12921 <para>
12922 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12923 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12924 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12925 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12926 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12927 operating system, the most famous bit of <quote>free software</quote>&mdash;and IBM
12928 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support <quote>open source and
12929 free software</quote> is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12930 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12931 Microsoft's.<footnote><para>
12932 <!-- f8. -->
12933 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12934 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12935 <quote>open source</quote> software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12936 principal opposition is to <quote>free software</quote> licensed under a <quote>copyleft</quote>
12937 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12938 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, <quote>The Future
12939 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,</quote> <citetitle>Government Policy
12940 Toward Open Source Software</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12941 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12942 Public Policy Research, 2002), 69, available at
12943 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #62</ulink>. See also
12944 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president, <citetitle>The Commercial Software
12945 Model</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (3
12946 May 2001), available at
12947 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #63</ulink>.
12948 </para></footnote>
12949 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
12950 <indexterm><primary><quote>copyleft</quote> licenses</primary></indexterm>
12951 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12952 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
12953 </para>
12954 <para>
12955 More important for our purposes, to support <quote>open source and free
12956 software</quote> is not to oppose copyright. <quote>Open source and free software</quote>
12957 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12958 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12959 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12960 by
12961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12962 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12963 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12964 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12965 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12966 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12967 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12968 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12969 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12970 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12971 </para>
12972 <para>
12973 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12974 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12975 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12976 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12977 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12978 <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12979 States government to veto the meeting.<footnote><para>
12980 <!-- f9. -->
12981 Krim, <quote>The Quiet War over Open-Source,</quote> available at <ulink
12982 url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #64</ulink>.
12983 </para></footnote>
12984 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12985 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan</primary></indexterm>
12986 </para>
12987 <para>
12988 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12989 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12990 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12991 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12992 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12993 its lobbying efforts.
12994 </para>
12995 <indexterm><primary>Boland, Lois</primary></indexterm>
12996 <para>
12997 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12998 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12999 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
13000 Office, explained that <quote>open-source software runs counter to the
13001 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights.</quote>
13002 She is quoted as saying, <quote>To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
13003 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
13004 goals of WIPO.</quote>
13005 </para>
13006 <para>
13007 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
13008 </para>
13009 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
13010 <para>
13011 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
13012 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
13013 right called <quote>copyright</quote>. Without it, restrictions imposed by those
13014 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it <quote>runs counter</quote> to the mission
13015 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
13016 in understanding&mdash;the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
13017 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
13018 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
13019 </para>
13020 <indexterm><primary>generic drugs</primary></indexterm>
13021 <para>
13022 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to <quote>promote</quote>
13023 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
13024 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
13025 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
13026 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
13027 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
13028 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
13029 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
13030 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
13031 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
13032 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
13033 </para>
13034 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill</primary></indexterm>
13035 <para>
13036 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
13037 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
13038 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
13039 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
13040 <emphasis>their</emphasis> rights. If they want to <quote>waive</quote> or
13041 <quote>disclaim</quote> their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
13042 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $20 billion to do
13043 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
13044 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
13045 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
13046 to do with <emphasis>their</emphasis> property.
13047 </para>
13048 <indexterm id='idxboland' class='startofrange'>
13049 <primary>Boland, Lois</primary>
13050 </indexterm>
13051 <para>
13052 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
13053 <quote>which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights,</quote> she's
13054 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
13055 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
13056 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
13057 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from <quote>waiving</quote> or
13058 <quote>disclaiming</quote> an intellectual property right. That the interest of
13059 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
13060 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
13061 way possible.
13062 </para>
13063 <para>
13064 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
13065 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called <quote>feudalism.</quote> Under
13066 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
13067 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
13068 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
13069 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
13070 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
13071 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
13072 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
13073 that control.
13074 </para>
13075 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13076 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John</primary></indexterm>
13077 <para>
13078 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
13079 choice we are now making about intellectual property.<footnote><para>
13080 <!-- f10. -->
13081 See Drahos with Braithwaite, <citetitle>Information Feudalism</citetitle>, 210&ndash;20.
13082 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13083 </para></footnote>
13084 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
13085 choice now is whether that information society will be
13086 <emphasis>free</emphasis> or <emphasis>feudal</emphasis>. The trend is
13087 toward the feudal.
13088 </para>
13089 <para>
13090 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
13091 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
13092 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
13093 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
13094 </para>
13095 <blockquote>
13096 <para>
13097 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
13098 it should be (<quote>the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
13099 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
13100 not simply to promote intellectual property rights</quote>), not as it is. If
13101 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
13102 say anything wrong. But in the world
13103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
13104 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
13105 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
13106 </para>
13107 </blockquote>
13108 <para>
13109 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
13110 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
13111 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
13112 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
13113 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
13114 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
13115 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
13116 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
13117 </para>
13118 <indexterm startref='idxboland' class='endofrange'/>
13119 <para>
13120 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
13121 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
13122 <quote>goal</quote> of a government should be <quote>to promote the right balance</quote> of
13123 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
13124 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. <quote>Typical for
13125 an academic,</quote> the poster might well have continued.
13126 </para>
13127 <para>
13128 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
13129 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
13130 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
13131 our own country's history).
13132 </para>
13133 <para>
13134 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
13135 government should be to <quote>seek balance,</quote> then count me with the silly,
13136 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
13137 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
13138 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
13139 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
13140 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
13141 not lies is just na&iuml;ve, then who have we, the most powerful
13142 democracy in the world, become?
13143 </para>
13144 <para>
13145 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
13146 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
13147 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
13148 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
13149 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
13150 been part of our tradition for most of our history&mdash;free culture.
13151 </para>
13152 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace</primary></indexterm>
13153 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William</primary></indexterm>
13154 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted</primary></indexterm>
13155 <para>
13156 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon.
13157 </para>
13158 <para>
13159 <emphasis role='strong'>There are moments</emphasis> of hope in this
13160 struggle. And moments that surprise. When the FCC was considering
13161 relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby further increase the
13162 concentration in media ownership, an extraordinary bipartisan
13163 coalition formed to fight this change. For perhaps the first time in
13164 history, interests as diverse as the NRA, the ACLU, Moveon.org,
13165 William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women for Peace organized to
13166 oppose this change in FCC policy. An astonishing 700,000 letters were
13167 sent to the FCC, demanding more hearings and a different result.
13168 </para>
13169 <para>
13170 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
13171 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
13172 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
13173 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
13174 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
13175 concentration in the media.
13176 </para>
13177 <para>
13178 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
13179 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
13180 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
13181 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
13182 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
13183 </para>
13184 <para>
13185 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
13186 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
13187 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
13188 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
13189 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
13190 range of rights&mdash;property rights of a historically extreme
13191 form&mdash;that makes their bigness bad.
13192 </para>
13193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
13194 <para>
13195 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
13196 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
13197 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
13198 Americans have a long history of fighting <quote>big,</quote> wisely or not. That
13199 we could be motivated to fight <quote>big</quote> again is not something new.
13200 </para>
13201 <para>
13202 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
13203 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
13204 the idea of <quote>intellectual property.</quote> Not because balance is alien to
13205 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
13206 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
13207 called <quote>property</quote> is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
13208 </para>
13209 <para>
13210 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
13211 of our tragedy.
13212 </para>
13213 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob</primary></indexterm>
13214 <para>
13215 <emphasis role='strong'>As I write</emphasis> these final words, the
13216 news is filled with stories about the RIAA lawsuits against almost
13217 three hundred individuals.<footnote><para>
13218 <!-- f11. -->
13219 John Borland, <quote>RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers,</quote> CNET News.com, September
13220 2003, available at
13221 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #65</ulink>; Paul
13222 R. La Monica, <quote>Music Industry Sues Swappers,</quote> CNN/Money, 8 September
13223 2003, available at
13224 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #66</ulink>; Soni
13225 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, <quote>Sued for a Song,
13226 N.Y.C. 12-Yr-Old Among 261 Cited as Sharers,</quote> <citetitle>New York Daily News</citetitle>, 9
13227 September 2003, 3; Frank Ahrens, <quote>RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
13228 Targets; Single Mother in Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
13229 Defendants,</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 10 September 2003, E1; Katie Dean,
13230 <quote>Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,</quote> <citetitle>Wired News</citetitle>, 10 September 2003,
13231 available at
13232 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #67</ulink>.
13233 </para></footnote>
13234 Eminem has just been sued for <quote>sampling</quote> someone else's
13235 music.<footnote><para>
13236 <!-- f12. -->
13237 Jon Wiederhorn, <quote>Eminem Gets Sued &hellip; by a Little Old Lady,</quote>
13238 mtv.com, 17 September 2003, available at
13239 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #68</ulink>.
13240 </para></footnote>
13241 The story about Bob Dylan <quote>stealing</quote> from a Japanese author has just
13242 finished making the rounds.<footnote><para>
13243 <!-- f13. -->
13244 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, <quote>Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
13245 Dylan Songs,</quote> Kansascity.com, 9 July 2003, available at
13246 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #69</ulink>.
13247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
13248 </para></footnote>
13249 An insider from Hollywood&mdash;who insists he must remain
13250 anonymous&mdash;reports <quote>an amazing conversation with these studio
13251 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
13252 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
13253 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
13254 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first.</quote> Congressmen are
13255 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
13256 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
13257 kids who use a computer to share content.
13258 </para>
13259 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee</primary></indexterm>
13260 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie</primary></indexterm>
13261 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons</primary></indexterm>
13262 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto</primary></indexterm>
13263 <indexterm><primary>BBC</primary></indexterm>
13264 <indexterm><primary>Brazil, free culture in</primary></indexterm>
13265 <para>
13266 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13267 that it will build a <quote>Creative Archive,</quote> from which British citizens can
13268 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.<footnote><para>
13269 <!-- f14. --> <quote>BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public,</quote> BBC press release,
13270 24 August 2003, available at
13271 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #70</ulink>.
13272 </para></footnote>
13273 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13274 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13275 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13276 country.<footnote><para>
13277 <!-- f15. -->
13278 <quote>Creative Commons and Brazil,</quote> Creative Commons Weblog, 6 August 2003,
13279 available at
13280 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #71</ulink>.
13281 </para></footnote>
13282 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13283 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13284 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13285 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13286 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13287 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13288 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13289 day into the Causbys.
13290 </para>
13291 <para>
13292 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13293 potential is ever to be realized.
13294
13295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13296
13297 </para>
13298 </chapter>
13299 <chapter label="16" id="c-afterword">
13300 <title>AFTERWORD</title>
13301 <para>
13302
13303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13304 <emphasis role='strong'>At least some</emphasis> who have read this
13305 far will agree with me that something must be done to change where we
13306 are heading. The balance of this book maps what might be done.
13307 </para>
13308 <para>
13309 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13310 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13311 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13312 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13313 </para>
13314 <para>
13315 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13316 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13317 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists&mdash;all to tell this
13318 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13319 is so important.
13320 </para>
13321 <para>
13322 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13323 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13324 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13325 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13326 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13327 </para>
13328 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13329
13330 <section id="usnow">
13331 <title>US, NOW</title>
13332 <para>
13333 <emphasis role='strong'>Common sense</emphasis> is with the copyright
13334 warriors because the debate so far has been framed at the
13335 extremes&mdash;as a grand either/or: either property or anarchy,
13336 either total control or artists won't be paid. If that really is the
13337 choice, then the warriors should win.
13338 </para>
13339 <para>
13340 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13341 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13342 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright&mdash;<quote>All Rights
13343 Reserved</quote>&mdash; and those who reject copyright&mdash;<quote>No Rights
13344 Reserved.</quote> The <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote> sorts believe that you should ask
13345 permission before you <quote>use</quote> a copyrighted work in any way. The <quote>No
13346 Rights Reserved</quote> sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13347 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13348 </para>
13349 <para>
13350 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13351 tilted in the <quote>no rights reserved</quote> direction. Content could be copied
13352 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13353 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13354 the
13355
13356 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13357 original design of the Internet was <quote>no rights reserved.</quote> Content was
13358 <quote>taken</quote> regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13359 unprotected.
13360 </para>
13361 <para>
13362 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13363 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13364 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13365 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13366 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13367 architecture made the effective default <quote>no rights reserved,</quote> the
13368 future architecture will make the effective default <quote>all rights
13369 reserved.</quote> The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13370 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13371 content requires permission. The <quote>cut and paste</quote> world that defines
13372 the Internet today will become a <quote>get permission to cut and paste</quote>
13373 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13374 </para>
13375 <para>
13376 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle&mdash;neither
13377 <quote>all rights reserved</quote> nor <quote>no rights reserved</quote> but <quote>some rights
13378 reserved</quote>&mdash; and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13379 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13380 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13381 before.
13382 </para>
13383
13384 <section id="examples">
13385 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples</title>
13386 <para>
13387 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13388 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13389 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13390 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13391 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13392 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13393 to your neighbors or boss. The <quote>privacy</quote> of your browsing habits was
13394 assured.
13395 </para>
13396 <para>
13397 What made it assured?
13398 </para>
13399 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13400 <para>
13401 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13402 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="property-i"/>, your
13403 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13404 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13405 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13406 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13407 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13408 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13409 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13410 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13411 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13412 (there is no law protecting <quote>privacy</quote> in public places), and in many
13413 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13414 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13415 </para>
13416 <indexterm><primary>Amazon</primary></indexterm>
13417 <para>
13418 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13419 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13420 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13421 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13422 <quote>recently viewed</quote> pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13423 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13424 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any <quote>privacy</quote>
13425 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13426 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet</primary></indexterm>
13427 </para>
13428 <para>
13429 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13430 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13431 people should have the <quote>right</quote> to browse in a library without the
13432 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13433 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13434 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13435 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13436 disappears.
13437 </para>
13438 <para>
13439 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define <quote>privacy</quote>
13440 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13441 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13442 friction did.<footnote><para>
13443 <!-- f1. -->
13444
13445 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, <quote>Fair Information Practices and the
13446 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),</quote> <citetitle>Stanford Technology
13447 Law Review</citetitle> 1 (2001): par. 6&ndash;18, available at
13448
13449 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>
13450 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13451 also Jeffrey Rosen, <citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13452 in an Anxious Age</citetitle> (New York: Random House, 2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13453 between technology and privacy).</para></footnote>
13454 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13455 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13456
13457 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13458 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13459 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13460 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13461 </para>
13462 <para>
13463 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13464 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13465 commercially, the software&mdash;both the source code and the
13466 binaries&mdash; was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13467 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13468 care much about controlling their software.
13469 <indexterm><primary>IBM</primary></indexterm>
13470 </para>
13471 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard</primary></indexterm>
13472 <para>
13473 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13474 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13475 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13476 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13477 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13478 people's work.
13479 </para>
13480 <para>
13481 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13482 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13483 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13484 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13485 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13486 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13487 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13488 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13489 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13490 anything else?
13491 </para>
13492 <para>
13493 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13494 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13495 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13496 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13497 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13498 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13499 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13500 </para>
13501 <para>
13502 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13503 early 1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13504 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13505 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13506 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13507 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13508 fundamentally weakened.
13509 </para>
13510 <indexterm><primary>Torvalds, Linus</primary></indexterm>
13511 <para>
13512 Therefore, in 1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13513 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13514 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's <quote>Linux</quote>
13515 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13516 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13517 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system</primary></indexterm>
13518 </para>
13519 <para>
13520 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13521 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13522 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13523 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13524 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13525 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13526 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13527 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13528 byproduct.
13529 </para>
13530 <para>
13531 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13532 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13533 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13534 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13535 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13536 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13537 </para>
13538 <para>
13539 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13540 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13541 scientific journals are produced.
13542 </para>
13543 <indexterm id="idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'>
13544 <primary>academic journals</primary>
13545 </indexterm>
13546 <para>
13547 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13548 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13549 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13550 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13551 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13552 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13553 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13554 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13555 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13556 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13557 and Westlaw are also free
13558 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13559 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13560 Court opinion through their respective services.
13561 </para>
13562 <para>
13563 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13564 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13565 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13566 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13567 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13568 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13569 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13570 </para>
13571 <para>
13572 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13573 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13574 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13575 </para>
13576 <para>
13577 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13578 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13579 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13580 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13581 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13582 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13583 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13584 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13585 the technology of paper journals (architecture)&mdash;namely, that it
13586 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13587 </para>
13588 <para>
13589 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13590 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13591 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13592 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13593 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13594 granted before.
13595 </para>
13596 <para>
13597 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13598 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13599 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13600 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13601 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13602 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13603 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13604 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13605 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13606 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13607 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13608 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)</primary></indexterm>
13609 </para>
13610 <para>
13611 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13612 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13613 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13614 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13615 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13616 presumptively a good&mdash;especially when it helps spread knowledge
13617 and science.
13618 </para>
13619 <indexterm startref="idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'/>
13620
13621 </section>
13622 <section id="oneidea">
13623 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea</title>
13624 <indexterm id="idxcc" class='startofrange'>
13625 <primary>Creative Commons</primary>
13626 </indexterm>
13627 <para>
13628 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13629 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13630 </para>
13631 <indexterm><primary>Stanford University</primary></indexterm>
13632 <para>
13633 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13634 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13635 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13636 <emphasis>reasonable</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13637 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13638 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13639 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13640 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13641 make this possible.
13642 </para>
13643 <para>
13644 <emphasis>Simple</emphasis>&mdash;which means without a middleman, or
13645 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13646 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13647 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13648 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13649 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13650 shared. These three expressions together&mdash;a legal license, a
13651 human-readable description, and
13652 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13653 machine-readable tags&mdash;constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13654 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13655 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13656 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13657 different than the <quote>All</quote> or <quote>No</quote> extremes. Content is marked with the
13658 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13659 certain freedoms are given.
13660 </para>
13661 <para>
13662 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13663 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13664 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13665 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13666 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13667 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses (<quote>share and share
13668 alike</quote>). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13669 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13670 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13671 </para>
13672 <para>
13673 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13674 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13675 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13676 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13677 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13678 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13679 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13680 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13681 a public domain.
13682 </para>
13683 <para>
13684 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13685 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13686 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13687 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13688 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13689 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13691 of content (<quote>content conducers,</quote> as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13692 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13693 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13694 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia</primary></indexterm>
13695 </para>
13696 <para>
13697 The aim is not to fight the <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote> sorts. The aim is to
13698 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13699 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13700 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13701 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13702 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13703 the background of digital technologies. New rules&mdash;with different
13704 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13705 them&mdash;are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13706 to begin to build those rules.
13707 </para>
13708 <para>
13709 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13710 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13711 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel, <citetitle>Down and Out in
13712 the Magic Kingdom</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13713 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13714 </para>
13715 <para>
13716 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13717 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (1)
13718 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13719 and (2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13720 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (1) will download
13721 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(1)s. Some part of (2)
13722 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13723 them (2)-goods. If there are more (2)-goods than bad-(1)s, the
13724 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13725 <emphasis>increase</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13726 </para>
13727 <para>
13728 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13729 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13730 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13731 was a total success.
13732 </para>
13733 <para>
13734 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13735 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13736 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13737 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled <citetitle>Free for All</citetitle>,
13738 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13739 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13740 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13741 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13742 well.
13743 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)</primary></indexterm>
13744 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter</primary></indexterm>
13745 </para>
13746 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy</primary></indexterm>
13747 <indexterm><primary>rap music</primary></indexterm>
13748 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter</primary></indexterm>
13749 <para>
13750 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13751 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13752 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13753 reasons. Many who use the <quote>sampling license</quote> do so because anything
13754 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13755 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13756 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13757 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13758 art&mdash;they, too, sample from others. Because the
13759 <emphasis>legal</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13760 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13761 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not <quote>allow</quote>
13762 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13763 high<footnote><para>
13764 <!-- f2. -->
13765 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13766 Culture Wars</citetitle> (2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13767 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13768 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #72</ulink>.
13769 </para></footnote>),
13770 these artists release into the creative environment content
13771 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13772 </para>
13773 <para>
13774 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13775 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13776 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13777 you are effectively saying you believe in the <quote>All Rights Reserved</quote>
13778 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13779 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13780 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13781 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13782 this notion of <quote>Some Rights Reserved,</quote> and gives many the chance to
13783 say it to others.
13784 </para>
13785 <para>
13786 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13787 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13788 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13789 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13790
13791 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13792 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13793 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13794 </para>
13795 <para>
13796 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13797 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13798 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13799 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13800 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13801 steps are possible.
13802 </para>
13803 <para>
13804 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13805 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13806 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13807 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13808 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13809 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13810 creativity to spread more easily.
13811 </para>
13812 <indexterm startref="idxcc" class='endofrange'/>
13813
13814 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13815 </section>
13816 </section>
13817 <section id="themsoon">
13818 <title>THEM, SOON</title>
13819 <para>
13820 <emphasis role='strong'>We will</emphasis> not reclaim a free culture
13821 by individual action alone. It will also take important reforms of
13822 laws. We have a long way to go before the politicians will listen to
13823 these ideas and implement these reforms. But that also means that we
13824 have time to build awareness around the changes that we need.
13825 </para>
13826 <para>
13827 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13828 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13829 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13830 to our end.
13831 </para>
13832
13833 <section id="formalities">
13834 <title>1. More Formalities</title>
13835 <para>
13836 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13837 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13838 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13839 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13840 </para>
13841 <para>
13842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13843 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13844 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13845 protected.
13846 </para>
13847 <para>
13848 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13849 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13850 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13851 default is control, and <quote>formalities</quote> are banished.
13852 </para>
13853 <para>
13854 Why?
13855 </para>
13856 <para>
13857 As I suggested in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
13858 linkend="property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13859 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13860 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13861 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13862 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13863 formalities were getting in the way.
13864 </para>
13865 <para>
13866 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13867 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13868 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13869 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13870 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13871 trace&mdash; there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13872 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13873 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13874 past. And thus, the <emphasis>lack</emphasis> of formalities forces
13875 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13876 </para>
13877 <para>
13878 The law should therefore change this requirement<footnote><para>
13879 <!-- f1. -->
13880 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13881 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13882 adopted by other countries as well.</para></footnote>&mdash;but it
13883 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13884 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13885 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13886 </para>
13887 <para>
13888 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13889 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13890 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13891 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13892 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13893 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13894 developed by others.
13895 </para>
13896
13897 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13898
13899 <section id="registration">
13900 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL</title>
13901 <para>
13902 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13903 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13904 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13905 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13906 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13907 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13908 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13909 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13910 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13911 panic&mdash;nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13912 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13913 </para>
13914 <para>
13915 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13916 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13917 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13918 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13919 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13920 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13921 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13922 </para>
13923 <para>
13924 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13925 There are at least 32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13926 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13927 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13928 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13929 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13930 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13931 with which registration occurs up.
13932 </para>
13933 <para>
13934 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13935 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13936 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13937 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13938 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13939 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13940 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13941 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13942 formality&mdash;while producing a database
13943 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13944 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13945 </para>
13946
13947 </section>
13948 <section id="marking">
13949 <title>MARKING</title>
13950 <para>
13951 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13952 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13953 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule&mdash;akin to
13954 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13955 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13956 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13957 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13958 uniformly across all media.
13959 </para>
13960 <para>
13961 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13962 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13963 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13964 use the work.
13965 </para>
13966 <para>
13967 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13968 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13969 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13970 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13971 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13972 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13973 signal from the failure to mark&mdash;not the loss of the copyright, but the
13974 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13975 </para>
13976 <para>
13977 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13978 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13979 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13980 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13981 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13982 doesn't give permission.<footnote><para>
13983 <!-- f2. -->
13984 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13985 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13986 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13987 </para></footnote>
13988 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be <quote>use unless someone
13989 complains.</quote> If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13990 stop using the work in any new
13991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13992 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13993 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13994 their work.
13995 </para>
13996 <para>
13997 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13998 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13999 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
14000 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
14001 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
14002 </para>
14003 <para>
14004 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
14005 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
14006 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
14007 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
14008 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
14009 <emphasis>solely</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
14010 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
14011 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
14012 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
14013 other important functions.
14014 </para>
14015 <para>
14016 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
14017 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
14018 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
14019 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
14020 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
14021 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
14022 </para>
14023 <para>
14024 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
14025 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
14026 make things unclear.
14027 </para>
14028 <para>
14029 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
14030 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
14031 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
14032 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
14033 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
14034 that assertion at the appropriate time.
14035 </para>
14036
14037 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
14038 </section>
14039 </section>
14040 <section id="shortterms">
14041 <title>2. Shorter Terms</title>
14042 <para>
14043 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
14044 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
14045 natural authors.
14046 </para>
14047 <para>
14048 In <citetitle>The Future of Ideas</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
14049 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
14050 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
14051 <citetitle>Eldred</citetitle> v. <citetitle>Ashcroft</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
14052 radical. <citetitle>The Economist</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
14053 copyright term.<footnote><para>
14054
14055 <!-- f3. -->
14056 <quote>A Radical Rethink,</quote> <citetitle>Economist</citetitle>, 366:8308 (25 January 2003): 15,
14057 available at
14058 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #74</ulink>.
14059 </para></footnote>
14060 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
14061 </para>
14062 <para>
14063 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
14064 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
14065 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
14066 terms.
14067 </para>
14068 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14069 <listitem><para>
14070 <!-- (1) -->
14071 <emphasis>Keep it short:</emphasis> The term should be as long as
14072 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
14073 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
14074 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
14075 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
14076 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
14077 </para></listitem>
14078 <listitem><para>
14079 <!-- (2) -->
14080 <emphasis>Keep it simple:</emphasis> The line between the public
14081 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
14082 fuzziness of <quote>fair use,</quote> and the distinction between <quote>ideas</quote> and
14083 <quote>expression.</quote> That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
14084 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
14085 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
14086 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
14087 <quote>lawyer-free zone</quote> makes the complexities of <quote>fair use</quote> and
14088 <quote>idea/expression</quote> less necessary to navigate.
14089 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
14090 </para></listitem>
14091 <listitem><para>
14092 <!-- (3) -->
14093 <emphasis>Keep it alive:</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
14094 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
14095 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
14096 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
14097 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
14098 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
14099 pension.<footnote><para>
14100 <!-- f4. -->
14101 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
14102 and/or Pension, VA Form 21-526 (OMB Approved No. 2900-0001),
14103 available at
14104 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #75</ulink>.
14105 </para></footnote>
14106 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
14107 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
14108 single form.
14109 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions</primary></indexterm>
14110 </para></listitem>
14111 <listitem><para>
14112 <!-- (4) -->
14113 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:</emphasis> Whatever the term of
14114 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
14115 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
14116 in 1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
14117 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
14118 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in 1923 than we
14119 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
14120 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
14121 the number of authors who wrote in 1923. Of course, we can increase
14122 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
14123 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
14124 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
14125 creativity in 1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
14126 we can do about that now. </para></listitem>
14127 </orderedlist>
14128 <para>
14129 These changes together should produce an <emphasis>average</emphasis>
14130 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until 1976,
14131 the average term was just 32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
14132 same.
14133 </para>
14134 <para>
14135 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas <quote>radical.</quote> (After all, I
14136 call them <quote>extremists.</quote>) But again, the term I recommended was longer
14137 than the term under Richard Nixon. How <quote>radical</quote> can it be to ask for
14138 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
14139 </para>
14140
14141 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
14142
14143 </section>
14144 <section id="freefairuse">
14145 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use</title>
14146 <indexterm><primary>land ownership, air traffic and</primary></indexterm>
14147 <indexterm>
14148 <primary>property rights</primary>
14149 <secondary>air traffic vs.</secondary>
14150 </indexterm>
14151 <para>
14152 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
14153 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
14154 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
14155 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
14156 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
14157 the emergence of that new technology.
14158 </para>
14159 <para>
14160 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors <quote>exclusive
14161 right</quote> to <quote>their writings.</quote> Congress has given authors an exclusive
14162 right to <quote>their writings</quote> plus any derivative writings (made by
14163 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
14164 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
14165 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
14166 though that movie is not <quote>my writing.</quote>
14167 </para>
14168 <para>
14169 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in 1870, when it
14170 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
14171 control translations and dramatizations of a work.<footnote><para>
14172 <!-- f5. -->
14173 Benjamin Kaplan, <citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
14174 University Press, 1967), 32.
14175 </para></footnote>
14176 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
14177 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
14178 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
14179 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin</primary></indexterm>
14180 </para>
14181 <blockquote>
14182 <para>
14183 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
14184 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
14185 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
14186 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.<footnote><para>
14187 <!-- f6. --> Ibid., 56.
14188 </para></footnote>
14189 </para>
14190 </blockquote>
14191 <para>
14192 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
14193 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
14194 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
14195 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
14196 Consider each limitation in turn.
14197 </para>
14198 <para>
14199 <emphasis>Term:</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
14200 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
14201 sense to protect John
14202
14203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
14204 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
14205 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
14206 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
14207 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
14208 after the creative work is done.
14209 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John</primary></indexterm>
14210 </para>
14211 <para>
14212 <emphasis>Scope:</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
14213 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
14214 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
14215 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
14216 material. When all <quote>reuse</quote> of creative material was within the control
14217 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
14218 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
14219 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
14220 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
14221 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
14222 the creative process. Smothers it.
14223 </para>
14224 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex</primary></indexterm>
14225 <para>
14226 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
14227 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
14228 foreseeable derivative rights&mdash;turning a book into a movie, or a
14229 poem into a musical score&mdash;it doesn't make sense to require
14230 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
14231 much more sense.
14232 </para>
14233 <para>
14234 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
14235 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
14236 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
14237 Paul Goldstein.<footnote>
14238 <para>
14239 <!-- f7. -->
14240 Paul Goldstein, <citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
14241 Jukebox</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 187&ndash;216.
14242 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul</primary></indexterm>
14243 </para></footnote>
14244 His view is that the law should be written so that
14245 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
14246 </para>
14247 <para>
14248 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
14249 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
14250 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
14251 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
14252 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
14253 </para>
14254 <para>
14255 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
14256 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
14257 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
14258 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
14259 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
14260 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
14261 </para>
14262 </section>
14263
14264 <section id="liberatemusic">
14265 <title>4. Liberate the Music&mdash;Again</title>
14266 <para>
14267 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
14268 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
14269 is, to most people, most pressing&mdash;music. There is no other
14270 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14271 battles around the sharing of music.
14272 </para>
14273 <para>
14274 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14275 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14276 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14277 killer app&mdash;possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14278 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14279 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14280 innovation on the network.
14281 </para>
14282 <para>
14283 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14284 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14285 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14286 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14287 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14288 </para>
14289 <para>
14290 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14291 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14292 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14293 <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber" linkend="piracy"/>, they enable
14294 four different kinds of sharing:
14295 </para>
14296 <orderedlist numeration="upperalpha">
14297 <listitem><para>
14298 <!-- A. -->
14299 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14300 for purchasing CDs.
14301 </para></listitem>
14302 <listitem><para>
14303 <!-- B. -->
14304 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14305 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14306 </para></listitem>
14307 <listitem><para>
14308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14309 <!-- C. -->
14310 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14311 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14312 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14313 </para></listitem>
14314 <listitem><para>
14315 <!-- D. -->
14316 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14317 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14318 owner plainly endorses.
14319 </para></listitem>
14320 </orderedlist>
14321 <para>
14322 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14323 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14324 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14325 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14326 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14327 significantly weakened.
14328 </para>
14329 <para>
14330 As I said in chapter <xref xrefstyle="select: labelnumber"
14331 linkend="piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14332 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14333 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14334 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14335 networks.
14336 </para>
14337 <para>
14338 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14339 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14340 should respond.
14341 </para>
14342 <para>
14343 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14344 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14345 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14346 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14347 is cumbersome and slow&mdash;we in the United States are lucky to have
14348 broadband service at 1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14349 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14350 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14351 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14352 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14353 </para>
14354 <para>
14355 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14356 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14357 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14358 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14359 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14360 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14361 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14362 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14363 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14364 where everywhere you are&mdash;except maybe the desert or the
14365 Rockies&mdash;you can instantaneously be connected to the
14366 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14367 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14368 </para>
14369 <indexterm><primary>cell phones, music streamed over</primary></indexterm>
14370 <para>
14371 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14372 give you access to content on the fly&mdash;such as Internet radio,
14373 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14374 then, is the critical point: When it is <emphasis>extremely</emphasis>
14375 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14376 <emphasis>easier</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14377 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14378 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14379 content</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14380 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14381 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14382 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14383 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14384 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14385 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14386 paying for this content even though <quote>free</quote> content is available in the
14387 form of MP3s across the Web.<footnote><para>
14388 <!-- f8. -->
14389 See, for example, <quote>Music Media Watch,</quote> The J@pan Inc. Newsletter, 3
14390 April 2002, available at
14391 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #76</ulink>.
14392 </para></footnote>
14393
14394 </para>
14395 <para>
14396 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14397 present: It is emphatically temporary. The <quote>problem</quote> with file
14398 sharing&mdash;to the extent there is a real problem&mdash;is a problem
14399 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14400 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14401 makers today to be <quote>solving</quote> this problem in light of a technology
14402 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14403 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14404 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14405 artists get paid, during
14406
14407 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14408 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14409 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14410 </para>
14411 <para>
14412 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different <quote>problems</quote>
14413 here to solve. Let's start with type D content&mdash;uncopyrighted
14414 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14415 <quote>problem</quote> with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14416 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14417 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14418 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14419 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14420 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14421 </para>
14422 <para>
14423 Type C content raises a different <quote>problem.</quote> This is content that was,
14424 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14425 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14426 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14427 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14428 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14429 way that returns something to the artist.
14430 </para>
14431 <para>
14432 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14433 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14434 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14435 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14436 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14437 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14438 from the author's perspective, this <quote>sharing</quote> of his content without
14439 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14440 </para>
14441 <para>
14442 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14443 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14444 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14445 providers would be free, under this rule, to <quote>share</quote> that content,
14446 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14447 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14448 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14449 </para>
14450 <para>
14451
14452 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14453 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14454 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14455 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14456 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14457 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14458 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14459 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14460 trade.
14461 </para>
14462 <para>
14463 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14464 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14465 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14466 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14467 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14468 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14469 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14470 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14471 </para>
14472 <para>
14473 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14474 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14475 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14476 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14477 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14478 delivering and accessing content.
14479 </para>
14480 <para>
14481 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14482 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14483 </para>
14484 <para>
14485 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14486 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14487 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14488 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14489 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14490 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14491 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14492 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14493 </para>
14494 <para>
14495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14496 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14497 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14498 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14499 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14500 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14501 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14502 </para>
14503 <para>
14504 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14505 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.<footnote>
14506 <para>
14507 <!-- f9. -->
14508 <indexterm id='idxartistspayments3' class='startofrange'>
14509 <primary>artists</primary>
14510 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
14511 </indexterm>
14512 William Fisher, <citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities</citetitle> (last
14513 revised: 10 October 2000), available at
14514 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #77</ulink>; William
14515 Fisher, <citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14516 Entertainment</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14517 2004), ch. 6, available at
14518 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #78</ulink>. Professor
14519 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14520 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14521 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, <quote>Impose a
14522 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing,</quote> available at
14523 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, <quote>Who's Holding Back
14524 Broadband?</quote> <citetitle>Washington Post</citetitle>, 8 January 2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14525 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14526 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 26 February 2002,
14527 available at
14528 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine, <citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14529 Use Fee (IPUF)</citetitle>, 3 March 2002, available at
14530 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14531 <quote>Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,</quote> <citetitle>USA Today</citetitle>, 13 May
14532 2002, available at
14533 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, <quote>Getting Copyright Right,</quote>
14534 IEEE Spectrum Online, 1 July 2002, available at
14535 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #83</ulink>; Declan
14536 McCullagh, <quote>Verizon's Copyright Campaign,</quote> CNET News.com, 27 August
14537 2002, available at
14538 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #84</ulink>.
14539 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14540 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14541 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14542 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14543 debate by about a decade. See
14544 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #85</ulink>.
14545 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William</primary></indexterm>
14546 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock</primary></indexterm>
14547 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14548 <indexterm startref='idxartistspayments3' class='endofrange'/>
14549 </para></footnote>
14550 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14551 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14552 would (1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14553 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14554 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14555 develop (2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14556 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (3) artists would be
14557 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (4) an appropriate
14558 tax.
14559 </para>
14560 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)</primary></indexterm>
14561 <para>
14562 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14563 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14564 <citetitle>Promises to Keep</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14565 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14566 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14567 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14568 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14569 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14570 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14571 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14572 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14573 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14574 controlling access.
14575 </para>
14576 <indexterm>
14577 <primary>artists</primary>
14578 <secondary>recording industry payments to</secondary>
14579 </indexterm>
14580 <para>
14581 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14582 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14583 the system supports the widest range of <quote>semiotic democracy</quote>
14584 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14585 other changes I described were accomplished&mdash;in particular, the
14586 limits on derivative
14587
14588 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14589 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14590 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14591 allowed to do with the content itself.
14592 </para>
14593 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks</primary></indexterm>
14594 <para>
14595 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14596 <quote>harm</quote> to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14597 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14598 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14599 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14600 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat <quote>free</quote> by being
14601 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14602 of songs at even the very high price of 99 cents a song. (At 99 cents,
14603 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14604 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14605 Real Networks, offering music at just 79 cents a song. And no doubt
14606 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14607 on-line.
14608 </para>
14609 <indexterm><primary>Asia, commercial piracy in</primary></indexterm>
14610 <para>
14611 This competition has already occurred against the background of <quote>free</quote>
14612 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14613 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14614 that, there is nothing impossible at all about <quote>competing with free.</quote>
14615 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14616 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14617 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14618 theaters are often luxurious&mdash;with <quote>first class</quote> seats, and meals
14619 served while you watch a movie&mdash;as they struggle and succeed in
14620 finding ways to compete with <quote>free.</quote>
14621 </para>
14622 <para>
14623 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14624 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14625 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14626 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14627 innovators&mdash;ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14628 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14629 the law.
14630 </para>
14631 <para>
14632 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14633 </para>
14634 <para>
14635
14636 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14637 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14638 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14639 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14640 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14641 create.
14642 </para>
14643 <para>
14644 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14645 by
14646 </para>
14647 <orderedlist numeration="arabic">
14648 <listitem><para>
14649 <!-- 1. -->
14650 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14651 </para></listitem>
14652 <listitem><para>
14653 <!-- 2. -->
14654 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14655 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14656 statute;
14657 </para></listitem>
14658 <listitem><para>
14659 <!-- 3. -->
14660 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14661 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14662 </para></listitem>
14663 </orderedlist>
14664 <para>
14665 But what if <quote>piracy</quote> doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14666 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14667 consumers continue to <quote>take</quote> content for nothing? Should the law do
14668 something then?
14669 </para>
14670 <para>
14671 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14672 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14673 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14674 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14675 technology that is 95 percent secure and produces a market of size <citetitle>x</citetitle>,
14676 or (b) to have a technology that is 50 percent secure but produces a
14677 market of five times <citetitle>x</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14678 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14679 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14680 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14681 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14682 pirates.
14683 </para>
14684 <para>
14685 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14686 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14687 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14688
14689 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14690 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14691 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14692 </para>
14693 </section>
14694
14695 <section id="firelawyers">
14696 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers</title>
14697 <para>
14698 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14699 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14700 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14701 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14702 </para>
14703 <para>
14704 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14705 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14706 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14707 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14708 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14709 strong view queers the law.
14710 </para>
14711 <para>
14712 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14713 <quote>radical</quote> by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14714 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14715 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14716 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14717 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14718 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14719 Nimmer, thought it obvious.<footnote><para>
14720 <!-- f10. -->
14721 Lawrence Lessig, <quote>Copyright's First Amendment</quote> (Melville B. Nimmer
14722 Memorial Lecture), <citetitle>UCLA Law Review</citetitle> 48 (2001): 1057, 1069&ndash;70.
14723 </para></footnote>
14724
14725 </para>
14726 <para>
14727 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14728 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14729 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14730 </para>
14731 <para>
14732 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14733 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14734 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14735 the legal system are slight.<footnote><para>
14736 <!-- f11. -->
14737 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14738 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14739 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14740 position&mdash;twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14741 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14742 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14743 J. Liebowitz, <citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14744 Drive the Digital Marketplace</citetitle> (New York: Amacom, 2002), (reviewing his
14745 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14746 <quote>Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?</quote> working paper, June 2003,
14747 available at
14748 <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #86</ulink>.
14749 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14750 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14751 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14752 <citetitle>Rethinking</citetitle>, 174&ndash;76.
14753 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan</primary></indexterm>
14754 </para></footnote>
14755 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14756 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14757 them it works.
14758 </para>
14759 <para>
14760 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14761 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14762 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14763 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14764 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14765 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14766 practically never be done.
14767 </para>
14768 <para>
14769 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14770 billed at the largest firms at more than $400 per hour. How much time
14771 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14772 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14773 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14774 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14775 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14776 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14777 </para>
14778 <para>
14779 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14780 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14781 their duty to change the way the law works&mdash;or better, to change the
14782 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14783 top 1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14784 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14785 </para>
14786 <para>
14787 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14788 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14789 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14790 its review.
14791 </para>
14792 <indexterm><primary>Brezhnev, Leonid</primary></indexterm>
14793 <para>
14794 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14795 technology&mdash;the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14796 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14797 technology&mdash;a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14798 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14799 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14800 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14801 </para>
14802 <para>
14803 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture&mdash;but it should
14804 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14805
14806 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14807 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14808 simple pragmatic question: <quote>Will it do good?</quote> When challenged about
14809 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, <quote>Why not?</quote>
14810 </para>
14811 <para>
14812 We should ask, <quote>Why?</quote> Show me why your regulation of culture is
14813 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14814 keep your lawyers away.
14815 </para>
14816 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14817 </section>
14818 </section>
14819 </chapter>
14820 <chapter label="17" id="c-notes">
14821 <title>NOTES</title>
14822 <para>
14823 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14824 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14825 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14826 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14827 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14828 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14829 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14830 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14831 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14832 the material.
14833 </para>
14834 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14835
14836 </chapter>
14837 <chapter label="18" id="c-acknowledgments">
14838 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
14839 <para>
14840 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14841 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14842 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14843 to him that this book is dedicated.
14844 </para>
14845 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark</primary></indexterm>
14846 <para>
14847 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14848 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14849 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14850 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14851 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14852 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14853 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14854 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14855 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14856 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14857 critical eye on much of this.
14858 </para>
14859 <para>
14860 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14861 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14862 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14863 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14864 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14865 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14866 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14867 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14868 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14869 </para>
14870 <para>
14871 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14872 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14873 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14874 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14875 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14876 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14877 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14878 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14879 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14880 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14881 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14882 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14883 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14884 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14885 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, <quote>Wink,</quote> Roger Wood, <quote>Ximmbo da Jazz,</quote>
14886 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14887 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14888 a bunch of great replies.)
14889 </para>
14890 <para>
14891 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14892 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14893 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14894 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14895 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14896 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14897 throughout this book.
14898 </para>
14899 <para>
14900 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14901 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14902 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14903 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14904 </para>
14905 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->
14906
14907 </chapter>
14908 <index></index>
14909 </book>