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20 <title>Free Culture
</title>
22 <abbrev>"freeculture"</abbrev>
24 <subtitle>HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
25 CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
</subtitle>
27 <pubdate>2004-
03-
25</pubdate>
29 <releaseinfo>Version
2004-
02-
10</releaseinfo>
33 <firstname>Lawrence
</firstname>
34 <surname>Lessig
</surname>
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41 <subjectset scheme=
"libraryofcongress">
43 <subjectterm>Intellectual property
—United States.
</subjectterm>
46 <subjectterm>Mass media
—United States.
</subjectterm>
49 <subjectterm>Technological innovations
—United States.
</subjectterm>
52 <subjectterm>Art
—United States.
</subjectterm>
58 <publishername>The Penguin Press
</publishername>
59 <address><city>New York
</city></address>
64 <holder>Lawrence Lessig
</holder>
70 <imagedata fileref=
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73 <imagedata fileref=
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76 <phrase>Creative Commons, Some rights reserved
</phrase>
82 This version of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is licensed under
83 a Creative Commons license. This license permits non-commercial use of
84 this work, so long as attribution is given. For more information
85 about the license, click the icon above, or visit
86 <ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/
1.0/
</ulink>
91 <title>ABOUT THE AUTHOR
</title>
94 (
<ulink url=
"http://www.lessig.org">http://www.lessig.org
</ulink>),
95 professor of law and a John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar
96 at Stanford Law School, is founder of the Stanford Center for Internet
97 and Society and is chairman of the Creative Commons
98 (
<ulink url=
"http://creativecommons.org">http://creativecommons.org
</ulink>).
99 The author of The Future of Ideas (Random House,
2001) and Code: And
100 Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books,
1999), Lessig is a member of
101 the boards of the Public Library of Science, the Electronic Frontier
102 Foundation, and Public Knowledge. He was the winner of the Free
103 Software Foundation's Award for the Advancement of Free Software,
104 twice listed in BusinessWeek's "e.biz
25," and named one of Scientific
105 American's "
50 visionaries." A graduate of the University of
106 Pennsylvania, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, Lessig
107 clerked for Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of
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130 <biblioid class=
"isbn">1-
59420-
006-
8</biblioid>
133 http://catalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?v3=1&DB=local&CMD=010a+2003063276&CNT=10+records+per+page
135 <biblioid class=
"libraryofcongress">2003063276</biblioid>
139 <dedication id=
"salespoints">
142 You can buy a copy of this book by clicking on one of the links below:
144 <itemizedlist mark=
"number" spacing=
"compact">
145 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.amazon.com/">Amazon
</ulink></para></listitem>
146 <listitem><para><ulink url=
"http://www.barnesandnoble.com/">B
&N
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147 <listitem><para><ulink url=
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151 <!-- PAGE BREAK 2 -->
152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 3 -->
153 <dedication id=
"alsobylessig">
156 ALSO BY LAWRENCE LESSIG
159 The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
162 Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace
165 <!-- PAGE BREAK 4 -->
166 <dedication id=
"frontpublisher">
169 THE PENGUIN PRESS, NEW YORK
172 <!-- PAGE BREAK 5 -->
173 <dedication id=
"frontbookinfo">
180 HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
181 THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
182 AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
189 <!-- PAGE BREAK 6 -->
192 THE PENGUIN PRESS, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
375 Hudson Street New
196 Copyright
© Lawrence Lessig. All rights reserved.
199 Excerpt from an editorial titled "The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity,"
200 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, January
16,
2003. Copyright
201 © 2003 by The New York Times Co. Reprinted with permission.
204 Cartoon in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1711"/> by Paul Conrad, copyright Tribune
205 Media Services, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
208 Diagram in
<xref linkend=
"fig-1761"/> courtesy of the office of FCC
209 Commissioner, Michael J. Copps.
212 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
216 Free culture : how big media uses technology and the law to lock down
217 culture and control creativity / Lawrence Lessig.
226 ISBN
1-
59420-
006-
8 (hardcover)
230 1. Intellectual property
—United States.
2. Mass media
—United States.
233 3. Technological innovations
—United States.
4. Art
—United States. I. Title.
239 343.7309'
9—dc22
242 This book is printed on acid-free paper.
245 Printed in the United States of America
251 Designed by Marysarah Quinn
259 Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
260 this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
261 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means
262 (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise),
263 without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and
264 the above publisher of this book.
267 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the
268 Internet or via any other means without the permission of the
269 publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only
270 authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage
271 electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the
272 author's rights is appreciated.
276 <!-- PAGE BREAK 7 -->
277 <dedication><title></title>
279 To Eric Eldred
—whose work first drew me to this cause, and for whom
287 <title>List of figures
</title>
294 1 CHAPTER ONE: Creators
295 1 CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
296 1 CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
297 1 CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
302 1 CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
306 1 CHAPTER SIX: Founders
307 1 CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
308 1 CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
309 1 CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
310 1 CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
311 2 Why Hollywood Is Right
315 2 Law and Architecture: Reach
316 2 Architecture and Law: Force
317 2 Market: Concentration
320 1 CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
321 1 CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
322 2 Constraining Creators
323 2 Constraining Innovators
324 2 Corrupting Citizens
326 1 CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
327 1 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
331 2 Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
332 2 Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
334 2 1. More Formalities
335 3 Registration and Renewal
338 2 3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
339 2 4. Liberate the Music- -Again
340 2 5. Fire Lots of Lawyers 304
346 <!-- PAGE BREAK 11 -->
348 <preface id=
"preface">
349 <title>PREFACE
</title>
350 <indexterm id=
"idxpoguedavid" class='startofrange'
>
351 <primary>Pogue, David
</primary>
354 At the end of his review of my first book,
<citetitle>Code: And Other
355 Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle>, David Pogue, a brilliant writer and
356 author of countless technical and computer-related texts, wrote this:
360 Unlike actual law, Internet software has no capacity to punish. It
361 doesn't affect people who aren't online (and only a tiny minority
362 of the world population is). And if you don't like the Internet's
363 system, you can always flip off the modem.
<footnote id=
"preface01"><para>
364 David Pogue, "Don't Just Chat, Do Something,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
30 January
2000.
369 Pogue was skeptical of the core argument of the book
—that
370 software, or "code," functioned as a kind of law
—and his review
371 suggested the happy thought that if life in cyberspace got bad, we
372 could always "drizzle, drazzle, druzzle, drome"-like simply flip a
373 switch and be back home. Turn off the modem, unplug the computer, and
374 any troubles that exist in
<emphasis>that
</emphasis> space wouldn't
378 Pogue might have been right in
1999—I'm skeptical, but maybe.
379 But even if he was right then, the point is not right now:
380 <citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle> is about the troubles the Internet
381 causes even after the modem is turned
383 off. It is an argument about how the battles that now rage regarding life
384 on-line have fundamentally affected "people who aren't online." There
385 is no switch that will insulate us from the Internet's effect.
387 <indexterm startref=
"idxpoguedavid" class='endofrange'
/>
389 But unlike
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, the argument here is not much
390 about the Internet itself. It is instead about the consequence of the
391 Internet to a part of our tradition that is much more fundamental,
392 and, as hard as this is for a geek-wanna-be to admit, much more
396 That tradition is the way our culture gets made. As I explain in the
397 pages that follow, we come from a tradition of "free culture"
—not
398 "free" as in "free beer" (to borrow a phrase from the founder of the
399 free software movement
<footnote>
401 Richard M. Stallman,
<citetitle>Free Software, Free Societies
</citetitle> 57 (Joshua Gay, ed.
2002).
402 </para></footnote>), but "free" as in "free speech," "free markets,"
403 "free trade," "free enterprise," "free will," and "free elections." A
404 free culture supports and protects creators and innovators. It does
405 this directly by granting intellectual property rights. But it does so
406 indirectly by limiting the reach of those rights, to guarantee that
407 follow-on creators and innovators remain
<emphasis>as free as
408 possible
</emphasis> from the control of the past. A free culture is
409 not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market
410 in which everything is free. The opposite of a free culture is a
411 "permission culture"
—a culture in which creators get to create
412 only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators from the
416 If we understood this change, I believe we would resist it. Not "we"
417 on the Left or "you" on the Right, but we who have no stake in the
418 particular industries of culture that defined the twentieth century.
419 Whether you are on the Left or the Right, if you are in this sense
420 disinterested, then the story I tell here will trouble you. For the
421 changes I describe affect values that both sides of our political
422 culture deem fundamental.
424 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
426 We saw a glimpse of this bipartisan outrage in the early summer of
427 2003. As the FCC considered changes in media ownership rules that
428 would relax limits on media concentration, an extraordinary coalition
429 generated more than
700,
000 letters to the FCC opposing the change.
430 As William Safire described marching "uncomfortably alongside CodePink
431 Women for Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal
432 Olympia Snowe and conservative Ted Stevens," he formulated perhaps
433 most simply just what was at stake: the concentration of power. And as
435 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
439 Does that sound unconservative? Not to me. The concentration of
440 power
—political, corporate, media, cultural
—should be anathema to
441 conservatives. The diffusion of power through local control, thereby
442 encouraging individual participation, is the essence of federalism and
443 the greatest expression of democracy.
<footnote><para> William Safire,
444 "The Great Media Gulp,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 May
2003.
445 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
450 This idea is an element of the argument of
<citetitle>Free Culture
</citetitle>, though my
451 focus is not just on the concentration of power produced by
452 concentrations in ownership, but more importantly, if because less
453 visibly, on the concentration of power produced by a radical change in
454 the effective scope of the law. The law is changing; that change is
455 altering the way our culture gets made; that change should worry
456 you
—whether or not you care about the Internet, and whether you're on
457 Safire's left or on his right. The inspiration for the title and for
458 much of the argument of this book comes from the work of Richard
459 Stallman and the Free Software Foundation. Indeed, as I reread
460 Stallman's own work, especially the essays in
<citetitle>Free Software, Free
461 Society
</citetitle>, I realize that all of the theoretical insights I develop here
462 are insights Stallman described decades ago. One could thus well argue
463 that this work is "merely" derivative.
466 I accept that criticism, if indeed it is a criticism. The work of a
467 lawyer is always derivative, and I mean to do nothing more in this
468 book than to remind a culture about a tradition that has always been
469 its own. Like Stallman, I defend that tradition on the basis of
470 values. Like Stallman, I believe those are the values of freedom. And
471 like Stallman, I believe those are values of our past that will need
472 to be defended in our future. A free culture has been our past, but it
473 will only be our future if we change the path we are on right now.
476 Like Stallman's arguments for free software, an argument for free
477 culture stumbles on a confusion that is hard to avoid, and even harder
478 to understand. A free culture is not a culture without property; it is not
479 a culture in which artists don't get paid. A culture without property, or
480 in which creators can't get paid, is anarchy, not freedom. Anarchy is not
484 Instead, the free culture that I defend in this book is a balance
485 between anarchy and control. A free culture, like a free market, is
486 filled with property. It is filled with rules of property and contract
487 that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted
488 if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered
489 by extremism in the property rights that define it. That is what I
490 fear about our culture today. It is against that extremism that this
495 <!-- PAGE BREAK 15 -->
497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 16 -->
498 <chapter label=
"0" id=
"c-introduction">
499 <title>INTRODUCTION
</title>
501 On December
17,
1903, on a windy North Carolina beach for just
502 shy of one hundred seconds, the Wright brothers demonstrated that a
503 heavier-than-air, self-propelled vehicle could fly. The moment was electric
504 and its importance widely understood. Almost immediately, there
505 was an explosion of interest in this newfound technology of manned
506 flight, and a gaggle of innovators began to build upon it.
509 At the time the Wright brothers invented the airplane, American
510 law held that a property owner presumptively owned not just the surface
511 of his land, but all the land below, down to the center of the earth,
512 and all the space above, to "an indefinite extent, upwards."
<footnote><para>
513 St. George Tucker,
<citetitle>Blackstone's Commentaries
</citetitle> 3 (South Hackensack, N.J.:
514 Rothman Reprints,
1969),
18.
517 years, scholars had puzzled about how best to interpret the idea that
518 rights in land ran to the heavens. Did that mean that you owned the
519 stars? Could you prosecute geese for their willful and regular trespass?
522 Then came airplanes, and for the first time, this principle of American
523 law
—deep within the foundations of our tradition, and acknowledged
524 by the most important legal thinkers of our past
—mattered. If
525 my land reaches to the heavens, what happens when United flies over
526 my field? Do I have the right to banish it from my property? Am I allowed
527 to enter into an exclusive license with Delta Airlines? Could we
528 set up an auction to decide how much these rights are worth?
530 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
531 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
533 In
1945, these questions became a federal case. When North Carolina
534 farmers Thomas Lee and Tinie Causby started losing chickens
535 because of low-flying military aircraft (the terrified chickens apparently
536 flew into the barn walls and died), the Causbys filed a lawsuit saying
537 that the government was trespassing on their land. The airplanes,
538 of course, never touched the surface of the Causbys' land. But if, as
539 Blackstone, Kent, and Coke had said, their land reached to "an indefinite
540 extent, upwards," then the government was trespassing on their
541 property, and the Causbys wanted it to stop.
543 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
544 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
546 The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Causbys' case. Congress had
547 declared the airways public, but if one's property really extended to the
548 heavens, then Congress's declaration could well have been an unconstitutional
549 "taking" of property without compensation. The Court acknowledged
550 that "it is ancient doctrine that common law ownership of
551 the land extended to the periphery of the universe." But Justice Douglas
552 had no patience for ancient doctrine. In a single paragraph, hundreds of
553 years of property law were erased. As he wrote for the Court,
557 [The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
558 public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,
559 every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless
560 trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize
561 such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways,
562 seriously interfere with their control and development in the public
563 interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only
564 the public has a just claim.
<footnote>
566 United States v. Causby, U.S.
328 (
1946):
256,
261. The Court did find
567 that there could be a "taking" if the government's use of its land
568 effectively destroyed the value of the Causbys' land. This example was
569 suggested to me by Keith Aoki's wonderful piece, "(Intellectual)
570 Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of
571 Authorship,"
<citetitle>Stanford Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1996):
1293,
1333. See also Paul
572 Goldstein,
<citetitle>Real Property
</citetitle> (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1984),
574 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
575 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
580 "Common sense revolts at the idea."
583 This is how the law usually works. Not often this abruptly or
584 impatiently, but eventually, this is how it works. It was Douglas's style not to
585 dither. Other justices would have blathered on for pages to reach the
587 conclusion that Douglas holds in a single line: "Common sense revolts
588 at the idea." But whether it takes pages or a few words, it is the special
589 genius of a common law system, as ours is, that the law adjusts to the
590 technologies of the time. And as it adjusts, it changes. Ideas that were
591 as solid as rock in one age crumble in another.
593 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
594 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
596 Or at least, this is how things happen when there's no one powerful
597 on the other side of the change. The Causbys were just farmers. And
598 though there were no doubt many like them who were upset by the
599 growing traffic in the air (though one hopes not many chickens flew
600 themselves into walls), the Causbys of the world would find it very
601 hard to unite and stop the idea, and the technology, that the Wright
602 brothers had birthed. The Wright brothers spat airplanes into the
603 technological meme pool; the idea then spread like a virus in a chicken
604 coop; farmers like the Causbys found themselves surrounded by "what
605 seemed reasonable" given the technology that the Wrights had produced.
606 They could stand on their farms, dead chickens in hand, and
607 shake their fists at these newfangled technologies all they wanted.
608 They could call their representatives or even file a lawsuit. But in the
609 end, the force of what seems "obvious" to everyone else
—the power of
610 "common sense"
—would prevail. Their "private interest" would not be
611 allowed to defeat an obvious public gain.
614 Edwin Howard Armstrong is one of America's forgotten inventor
615 geniuses. He came to the great American inventor scene just after the
616 titans Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell. But his work in
617 the area of radio technology was perhaps the most important of any
618 single inventor in the first fifty years of radio. He was better educated
619 than Michael Faraday, who as a bookbinder's apprentice had discovered
620 electric induction in
1831. But he had the same intuition about
621 how the world of radio worked, and on at least three occasions,
622 Armstrong invented profoundly important technologies that advanced our
623 understanding of radio.
624 <!-- PAGE BREAK 19 -->
625 <indexterm><primary>Bell, Alexander Graham
</primary></indexterm>
626 <indexterm><primary>Edison, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
627 <indexterm><primary>Faraday, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
630 On the day after Christmas,
1933, four patents were issued to Armstrong
631 for his most significant invention
—FM radio. Until then, consumer radio
632 had been amplitude-modulated (AM) radio. The theorists
633 of the day had said that frequency-modulated (FM) radio could never
634 work. They were right about FM radio in a narrow band of spectrum.
635 But Armstrong discovered that frequency-modulated radio in a wide
636 band of spectrum would deliver an astonishing fidelity of sound, with
637 much less transmitter power and static.
640 On November
5,
1935, he demonstrated the technology at a meeting of
641 the Institute of Radio Engineers at the Empire State Building in New
642 York City. He tuned his radio dial across a range of AM stations,
643 until the radio locked on a broadcast that he had arranged from
644 seventeen miles away. The radio fell totally silent, as if dead, and
645 then with a clarity no one else in that room had ever heard from an
646 electrical device, it produced the sound of an announcer's voice:
647 "This is amateur station W2AG at Yonkers, New York, operating on
648 frequency modulation at two and a half meters."
651 The audience was hearing something no one had thought possible:
655 A glass of water was poured before the microphone in Yonkers; it
656 sounded like a glass of water being poured.
… A paper was crumpled
657 and torn; it sounded like paper and not like a crackling forest
658 fire.
… Sousa marches were played from records and a piano solo
659 and guitar number were performed.
… The music was projected with a
660 live-ness rarely if ever heard before from a radio "music
661 box."
<footnote><para>
662 Lawrence Lessing,
<citetitle>Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong
</citetitle>
663 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Company,
1956),
209.
668 As our own common sense tells us, Armstrong had discovered a vastly
669 superior radio technology. But at the time of his invention, Armstrong
670 was working for RCA. RCA was the dominant player in the then dominant
671 AM radio market. By
1935, there were a thousand radio stations across
672 the United States, but the stations in large cities were all owned by
673 a handful of networks.
677 RCA's president, David Sarnoff, a friend of Armstrong's, was eager
678 that Armstrong discover a way to remove static from AM radio. So
679 Sarnoff was quite excited when Armstrong told him he had a device
680 that removed static from "radio." But when Armstrong demonstrated
681 his invention, Sarnoff was not pleased.
682 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
686 I thought Armstrong would invent some kind of a filter to remove
687 static from our AM radio. I didn't think he'd start a
688 revolution
— start up a whole damn new industry to compete with
689 RCA.
<footnote><para> See "Saints: The Heroes and Geniuses of the
690 Electronic Era," First Electronic Church of America, at
691 www.webstationone.com/fecha, available at
693 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
1</ulink>.
698 Armstrong's invention threatened RCA's AM empire, so the company
699 launched a campaign to smother FM radio. While FM may have been a
700 superior technology, Sarnoff was a superior tactician. As one author
702 <indexterm><primary>Sarnoff, David
</primary></indexterm>
706 The forces for FM, largely engineering, could not overcome the weight
707 of strategy devised by the sales, patent, and legal offices to subdue
708 this threat to corporate position. For FM, if allowed to develop
709 unrestrained, posed
… a complete reordering of radio power
710 … and the eventual overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system
711 on which RCA had grown to power.
<footnote><para>Lessing,
226.
716 RCA at first kept the technology in house, insisting that further
717 tests were needed. When, after two years of testing, Armstrong grew
718 impatient, RCA began to use its power with the government to stall
719 FM radio's deployment generally. In
1936, RCA hired the former head
720 of the FCC and assigned him the task of assuring that the FCC assign
721 spectrum in a way that would castrate FM
—principally by moving FM
722 radio to a different band of spectrum. At first, these efforts failed. But
723 when Armstrong and the nation were distracted by World War II,
724 RCA's work began to be more successful. Soon after the war ended, the
725 FCC announced a set of policies that would have one clear effect: FM
726 radio would be crippled. As Lawrence Lessing described it,
728 <!-- PAGE BREAK 21 -->
731 The series of body blows that FM radio received right after the
732 war, in a series of rulings manipulated through the FCC by the
733 big radio interests, were almost incredible in their force and
734 deviousness.
<footnote><para>
739 <indexterm><primary>AT
&T
</primary></indexterm>
741 To make room in the spectrum for RCA's latest gamble, television,
742 FM radio users were to be moved to a totally new spectrum band. The
743 power of FM radio stations was also cut, meaning FM could no longer
744 be used to beam programs from one part of the country to another.
745 (This change was strongly supported by AT
&T, because the loss of
746 FM relaying stations would mean radio stations would have to buy
747 wired links from AT
&T.) The spread of FM radio was thus choked, at
751 Armstrong resisted RCA's efforts. In response, RCA resisted
752 Armstrong's patents. After incorporating FM technology into the
753 emerging standard for television, RCA declared the patents
754 invalid
—baselessly, and almost fifteen years after they were
755 issued. It thus refused to pay him royalties. For six years, Armstrong
756 fought an expensive war of litigation to defend the patents. Finally,
757 just as the patents expired, RCA offered a settlement so low that it
758 would not even cover Armstrong's lawyers' fees. Defeated, broken, and
759 now broke, in
1954 Armstrong wrote a short note to his wife and then
760 stepped out of a thirteenth-story window to his death.
763 This is how the law sometimes works. Not often this tragically, and
764 rarely with heroic drama, but sometimes, this is how it works. From
765 the beginning, government and government agencies have been subject to
766 capture. They are more likely captured when a powerful interest is
767 threatened by either a legal or technical change. That powerful
768 interest too often exerts its influence within the government to get
769 the government to protect it. The rhetoric of this protection is of
770 course always public spirited; the reality is something
771 different. Ideas that were as solid as rock in one age, but that, left
772 to themselves, would crumble in
774 another, are sustained through this subtle corruption of our political
775 process. RCA had what the Causbys did not: the power to stifle the
776 effect of technological change.
779 There's no single inventor of the Internet. Nor is there any good date
780 upon which to mark its birth. Yet in a very short time, the Internet
781 has become part of ordinary American life. According to the Pew
782 Internet and American Life Project,
58 percent of Americans had access
783 to the Internet in
2002, up from
49 percent two years
784 before.
<footnote><para>
785 Amanda Lenhart, "The Ever-Shifting Internet Population: A New Look at
786 Internet Access and the Digital Divide," Pew Internet and American
787 Life Project,
15 April
2003:
6, available at
788 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
2</ulink>.
790 That number could well exceed two thirds of the nation by the end
794 As the Internet has been integrated into ordinary life, it has
795 changed things. Some of these changes are technical
—the Internet has
796 made communication faster, it has lowered the cost of gathering data,
797 and so on. These technical changes are not the focus of this book. They
798 are important. They are not well understood. But they are the sort of
799 thing that would simply go away if we all just switched the Internet off.
800 They don't affect people who don't use the Internet, or at least they
801 don't affect them directly. They are the proper subject of a book about
802 the Internet. But this is not a book about the Internet.
805 Instead, this book is about an effect of the Internet beyond the
806 Internet itself: an effect upon how culture is made. My claim is that
807 the Internet has induced an important and unrecognized change in that
808 process. That change will radically transform a tradition that is as
809 old as the Republic itself. Most, if they recognized this change,
810 would reject it. Yet most don't even see the change that the Internet
814 We can glimpse a sense of this change by distinguishing between
815 commercial and noncommercial culture, and by mapping the law's
816 regulation of each. By "commercial culture" I mean that part of our
817 culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold. By
818 "noncommercial culture" I mean all the rest. When old men sat around
820 <!-- PAGE BREAK 23 -->
821 street corners telling stories that kids and others consumed, that was
822 noncommercial culture. When Noah Webster published his "Reader," or
823 Joel Barlow his poetry, that was commercial culture.
824 <indexterm><primary>Barlow, Joel
</primary></indexterm>
825 <indexterm><primary>Webster, Noah
</primary></indexterm>
828 At the beginning of our history, and for just about the whole of our
829 tradition, noncommercial culture was essentially unregulated. Of
830 course, if your stories were lewd, or if your song disturbed the
831 peace, then the law might intervene. But the law was never directly
832 concerned with the creation or spread of this form of culture, and it
833 left this culture "free." The ordinary ways in which ordinary
834 individuals shared and transformed their culture
—telling
835 stories, reenacting scenes from plays or TV, participating in fan
836 clubs, sharing music, making tapes
—were left alone by the law.
839 The focus of the law was on commercial creativity. At first slightly,
840 then quite extensively, the law protected the incentives of creators by
841 granting them exclusive rights to their creative work, so that they could
842 sell those exclusive rights in a commercial
843 marketplace.
<footnote>
845 This is not the only purpose of copyright, though it is the overwhelmingly
846 primary purpose of the copyright established in the federal constitution.
847 State copyright law historically protected not just the commercial interest in
848 publication, but also a privacy interest. By granting authors the exclusive
849 right to first publication, state copyright law gave authors the power to
850 control the spread of facts about them. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis
851 D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review
4 (
1890):
193,
853 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
855 This is also, of course, an important part of creativity and culture,
856 and it has become an increasingly important part in America. But in no
857 sense was it dominant within our tradition. It was instead just one
858 part, a controlled part, balanced with the free.
861 This rough divide between the free and the controlled has now
862 been erased.
<footnote><para>
863 See Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Prometheus Books,
865 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
867 The Internet has set the stage for this erasure and, pushed by big
868 media, the law has now affected it. For the first time in our
869 tradition, the ordinary ways in which individuals create and share
870 culture fall within the reach of the regulation of the law, which has
871 expanded to draw within its control a vast amount of culture and
872 creativity that it never reached before. The technology that preserved
873 the balance of our history
—between uses of our culture that were
874 free and uses of our culture that were only upon permission
—has
875 been undone. The consequence is that we are less and less a free
876 culture, more and more a permission culture.
878 <!-- PAGE BREAK 24 -->
880 This change gets justified as necessary to protect commercial
881 creativity. And indeed, protectionism is precisely its
882 motivation. But the protectionism that justifies the changes that I
883 will describe below is not the limited and balanced sort that has
884 defined the law in the past. This is not a protectionism to protect
885 artists. It is instead a protectionism to protect certain forms of
886 business. Corporations threatened by the potential of the Internet to
887 change the way both commercial and noncommercial culture are made and
888 shared have united to induce lawmakers to use the law to protect
889 them. It is the story of RCA and Armstrong; it is the dream of the
893 For the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many
894 to participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture
895 that reaches far beyond local boundaries. That power has changed the
896 marketplace for making and cultivating culture generally, and that
897 change in turn threatens established content industries. The Internet
898 is thus to the industries that built and distributed content in the
899 twentieth century what FM radio was to AM radio, or what the truck was
900 to the railroad industry of the nineteenth century: the beginning of
901 the end, or at least a substantial transformation. Digital
902 technologies, tied to the Internet, could produce a vastly more
903 competitive and vibrant market for building and cultivating culture;
904 that market could include a much wider and more diverse range of
905 creators; those creators could produce and distribute a much more
906 vibrant range of creativity; and depending upon a few important
907 factors, those creators could earn more on average from this system
908 than creators do today
—all so long as the RCAs of our day don't
909 use the law to protect themselves against this competition.
912 Yet, as I argue in the pages that follow, that is precisely what is
913 happening in our culture today. These modern-day equivalents of the
914 early twentieth-century radio or nineteenth-century railroads are
915 using their power to get the law to protect them against this new,
916 more efficient, more vibrant technology for building culture. They are
917 succeeding in their plan to remake the Internet before the Internet
921 It doesn't seem this way to many. The battles over copyright and the
922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 25 -->
923 Internet seem remote to most. To the few who follow them, they seem
924 mainly about a much simpler brace of questions
—whether "piracy" will
925 be permitted, and whether "property" will be protected. The "war" that
926 has been waged against the technologies of the Internet
—what
927 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) president Jack Valenti
928 calls his "own terrorist war"
<footnote><para>
929 Amy Harmon, "Black Hawk Download: Moving Beyond Music, Pirates
930 Use New Tools to Turn the Net into an Illicit Video Club,"
<citetitle>New York
931 Times
</citetitle>,
17 January
2002.
932 </para></footnote>—has been framed as a battle about the
933 rule of law and respect for property. To know which side to take in this
934 war, most think that we need only decide whether we're for property or
938 If those really were the choices, then I would be with Jack Valenti
939 and the content industry. I, too, am a believer in property, and
940 especially in the importance of what Mr. Valenti nicely calls
941 "creative property." I believe that "piracy" is wrong, and that the
942 law, properly tuned, should punish "piracy," whether on or off the
946 But those simple beliefs mask a much more fundamental question
947 and a much more dramatic change. My fear is that unless we come to see
948 this change, the war to rid the world of Internet "pirates" will also rid our
949 culture of values that have been integral to our tradition from the start.
952 These values built a tradition that, for at least the first
180 years of
953 our Republic, guaranteed creators the right to build freely upon their
954 past, and protected creators and innovators from either state or private
955 control. The First Amendment protected creators against state control.
956 And as Professor Neil Netanel powerfully argues,
<footnote>
958 Neil W. Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"
<citetitle>Yale Law
959 Journal
</citetitle> 106 (
1996):
283.
960 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
962 copyright law, properly balanced, protected creators against private
963 control. Our tradition was thus neither Soviet nor the tradition of
964 patrons. It instead carved out a wide berth within which creators
965 could cultivate and extend our culture.
968 Yet the law's response to the Internet, when tied to changes in the
969 technology of the Internet itself, has massively increased the
970 effective regulation of creativity in America. To build upon or
971 critique the culture around us one must ask, Oliver Twist
–like,
972 for permission first. Permission is, of course, often
973 granted
—but it is not often granted to the critical or the
974 independent. We have built a kind of cultural nobility; those within
975 the noble class live easily; those outside it don't. But it is
976 nobility of any form that is alien to our tradition.
978 <!-- PAGE BREAK 26. FIXME: Should "Is it" be "It is" ? -->
980 The story that follows is about this war. Is it not about the
981 "centrality of technology" to ordinary life. I don't believe in gods,
982 digital or otherwise. Nor is it an effort to demonize any individual
983 or group, for neither do I believe in a devil, corporate or
984 otherwise. It is not a morality tale. Nor is it a call to jihad
988 It is instead an effort to understand a hopelessly destructive war
989 inspired by the technologies of the Internet but reaching far beyond
990 its code. And by understanding this battle, it is an effort to map
991 peace. There is no good reason for the current struggle around
992 Internet technologies to continue. There will be great harm to our
993 tradition and culture if it is allowed to continue unchecked. We must
994 come to understand the source of this war. We must resolve it soon.
996 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
997 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
999 Like the Causbys' battle, this war is, in part, about "property." The
1000 property of this war is not as tangible as the Causbys', and no
1001 innocent chicken has yet to lose its life. Yet the ideas surrounding
1002 this "property" are as obvious to most as the Causbys' claim about the
1003 sacredness of their farm was to them. We are the Causbys. Most of us
1004 take for granted the extraordinarily powerful claims that the owners
1005 of "intellectual property" now assert. Most of us, like the Causbys,
1006 treat these claims as obvious. And hence we, like the Causbys, object
1007 when a new technology interferes with this property. It is as plain to
1008 us as it was to them that the new technologies of the Internet are
1009 "trespassing" upon legitimate claims of "property." It is as plain to
1010 us as it was to them that the law should intervene to stop this
1013 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1014 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1016 And thus, when geeks and technologists defend their Armstrong or
1017 Wright brothers technology, most of us are simply unsympathetic.
1018 Common sense does not revolt. Unlike in the case of the unlucky
1019 Causbys, common sense is on the side of the property owners in this
1021 <!--PAGE BREAK 27-->
1022 the lucky Wright brothers, the Internet has not inspired a revolution
1026 My hope is to push this common sense along. I have become increasingly
1027 amazed by the power of this idea of intellectual property and, more
1028 importantly, its power to disable critical thought by policy makers
1029 and citizens. There has never been a time in our history when more of
1030 our "culture" was as "owned" as it is now. And yet there has never
1031 been a time when the concentration of power to control the
1032 <emphasis>uses
</emphasis> of culture has been as unquestioningly
1033 accepted as it is now.
1036 The puzzle is, Why? Is it because we have come to understand a truth
1037 about the value and importance of absolute property over ideas and
1038 culture? Is it because we have discovered that our tradition of
1039 rejecting such an absolute claim was wrong?
1042 Or is it because the idea of absolute property over ideas and culture
1043 benefits the RCAs of our time and fits our own unreflective intuitions?
1046 Is the radical shift away from our tradition of free culture an instance
1047 of America correcting a mistake from its past, as we did after a bloody
1048 war with slavery, and as we are slowly doing with inequality? Or is the
1049 radical shift away from our tradition of free culture yet another example
1050 of a political system captured by a few powerful special interests?
1053 Does common sense lead to the extremes on this question because common
1054 sense actually believes in these extremes? Or does common sense stand
1055 silent in the face of these extremes because, as with Armstrong versus
1056 RCA, the more powerful side has ensured that it has the more powerful
1059 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
1060 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
1062 I don't mean to be mysterious. My own views are resolved. I believe it
1063 was right for common sense to revolt against the extremism of the
1064 Causbys. I believe it would be right for common sense to revolt
1065 against the extreme claims made today on behalf of "intellectual
1066 property." What the law demands today is increasingly as silly as a
1067 sheriff arresting an airplane for trespass. But the consequences of
1068 this silliness will be much more profound.
1069 <!-- PAGE BREAK 28 -->
1072 The struggle that rages just now centers on two ideas: "piracy" and
1073 "property." My aim in this book's next two parts is to explore these two
1077 My method is not the usual method of an academic. I don't want to
1078 plunge you into a complex argument, buttressed with references to
1079 obscure French theorists
—however natural that is for the weird
1080 sort we academics have become. Instead I begin in each part with a
1081 collection of stories that set a context within which these apparently
1082 simple ideas can be more fully understood.
1085 The two sections set up the core claim of this book: that while the
1086 Internet has indeed produced something fantastic and new, our
1087 government, pushed by big media to respond to this "something new," is
1088 destroying something very old. Rather than understanding the changes
1089 the Internet might permit, and rather than taking time to let "common
1090 sense" resolve how best to respond, we are allowing those most
1091 threatened by the changes to use their power to change the
1092 law
—and more importantly, to use their power to change something
1093 fundamental about who we have always been.
1096 We allow this, I believe, not because it is right, and not because
1097 most of us really believe in these changes. We allow it because the
1098 interests most threatened are among the most powerful players in our
1099 depressingly compromised process of making law. This book is the story
1100 of one more consequence of this form of corruption
—a consequence
1101 to which most of us remain oblivious.
1104 <!-- PAGE BREAK 29 -->
1105 <part id=
"c-piracy">
1106 <title>"PIRACY"</title>
1108 <!-- PAGE BREAK 30 -->
1109 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield1" class='startofrange'
>
1110 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
1113 Since the inception of the law regulating creative property, there has
1114 been a war against "piracy." The precise contours of this concept,
1115 "piracy," are hard to sketch, but the animating injustice is easy to
1116 capture. As Lord Mansfield wrote in a case that extended the reach of
1117 English copyright law to include sheet music,
1121 A person may use the copy by playing it, but he has no right to
1122 rob the author of the profit, by multiplying copies and disposing
1123 of them for his own use.
<footnote><para>
1125 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777) (Mansfield).
1128 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield1" class='endofrange'
/>
1131 Today we are in the middle of another "war" against "piracy." The
1132 Internet has provoked this war. The Internet makes possible the
1133 efficient spread of content. Peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing is among
1134 the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet
1135 enables. Using distributed intelligence, p2p systems facilitate the
1136 easy spread of content in a way unimagined a generation ago.
1137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 31 -->
1140 This efficiency does not respect the traditional lines of copyright.
1141 The network doesn't discriminate between the sharing of copyrighted
1142 and uncopyrighted content. Thus has there been a vast amount of
1143 sharing of copyrighted content. That sharing in turn has excited the
1144 war, as copyright owners fear the sharing will "rob the author of the
1148 The warriors have turned to the courts, to the legislatures, and
1149 increasingly to technology to defend their "property" against this
1150 "piracy." A generation of Americans, the warriors warn, is being
1151 raised to believe that "property" should be "free." Forget tattoos,
1152 never mind body piercing
—our kids are becoming
1153 <emphasis>thieves
</emphasis>!
1156 There's no doubt that "piracy" is wrong, and that pirates should be
1157 punished. But before we summon the executioners, we should put this
1158 notion of "piracy" in some context. For as the concept is increasingly
1159 used, at its core is an extraordinary idea that is almost certainly wrong.
1162 The idea goes something like this:
1166 Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build upon
1167 the creative work of others, I am taking from them something of
1168 value. Whenever I take something of value from someone else, I
1169 should have their permission. The taking of something of value
1170 from someone else without permission is wrong. It is a form of
1174 <indexterm><primary>Dreyfuss, Rochelle
</primary></indexterm>
1176 This view runs deep within the current debates. It is what NYU law
1177 professor Rochelle Dreyfuss criticizes as the "if value, then right"
1178 theory of creative property
<footnote><para>
1180 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, "Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language
1181 in the Pepsi Generation,"
<citetitle>Notre Dame Law Review
</citetitle> 65 (
1990):
397.
1183 —if there is value, then someone must have a
1184 right to that value. It is the perspective that led a composers' rights
1185 organization, ASCAP, to sue the Girl Scouts for failing to pay for the
1186 songs that girls sang around Girl Scout campfires.
<footnote><para>
1188 Lisa Bannon, "The Birds May Sing, but Campers Can't Unless They Pay
1189 Up,"
<citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
21 August
1996, available at
1190 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
3</ulink>; Jonathan
1191 Zittrain, "Calling Off the Copyright War: In Battle of Property vs. Free
1192 Speech, No One Wins,"
<citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
24 November
2002.
1193 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
1195 There was "value" (the songs) so there must have been a
1196 "right"
—even against the Girl Scouts.
1198 <indexterm><primary>ASCAP
</primary></indexterm>
1200 This idea is certainly a possible understanding of how creative
1201 property should work. It might well be a possible design for a system
1202 <!-- PAGE BREAK 32 -->
1203 of law protecting creative property. But the "if value, then right"
1204 theory of creative property has never been America's theory of
1205 creative property. It has never taken hold within our law.
1208 Instead, in our tradition, intellectual property is an instrument. It
1209 sets the groundwork for a richly creative society but remains
1210 subservient to the value of creativity. The current debate has this
1211 turned around. We have become so concerned with protecting the
1212 instrument that we are losing sight of the value.
1215 The source of this confusion is a distinction that the law no longer
1216 takes care to draw
—the distinction between republishing someone's
1217 work on the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on
1218 the other. Copyright law at its birth had only publishing as its concern;
1219 copyright law today regulates both.
1222 Before the technologies of the Internet, this conflation didn't matter
1223 all that much. The technologies of publishing were expensive; that
1224 meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
1225 entities could bear the burden of the law
—even the burden of the
1226 Byzantine complexity that copyright law has become. It was just one
1227 more expense of doing business.
1229 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1230 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1232 But with the birth of the Internet, this natural limit to the reach of
1233 the law has disappeared. The law controls not just the creativity of
1234 commercial creators but effectively that of anyone. Although that
1235 expansion would not matter much if copyright law regulated only
1236 "copying," when the law regulates as broadly and obscurely as it does,
1237 the extension matters a lot. The burden of this law now vastly
1238 outweighs any original benefit
—certainly as it affects
1239 noncommercial creativity, and increasingly as it affects commercial
1240 creativity as well. Thus, as we'll see more clearly in the chapters
1241 below, the law's role is less and less to support creativity, and more
1242 and more to protect certain industries against competition. Just at
1243 the time digital technology could unleash an extraordinary range of
1244 commercial and noncommercial creativity, the law burdens this
1245 creativity with insanely complex and vague rules and with the threat
1246 of obscenely severe penalties. We may
1247 <!-- PAGE BREAK 33 -->
1248 be seeing, as Richard Florida writes, the "Rise of the Creative
1252 In
<citetitle>The Rise of the Creative Class
</citetitle> (New York:
1253 Basic Books,
2002), Richard Florida documents a shift in the nature of
1254 labor toward a labor of creativity. His work, however, doesn't
1255 directly address the legal conditions under which that creativity is
1256 enabled or stifled. I certainly agree with him about the importance
1257 and significance of this change, but I also believe the conditions
1258 under which it will be enabled are much more tenuous.
1260 <indexterm><primary>Florida, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
1261 <indexterm><primary>Rise of the Creative Class, The (Florida)
</primary></indexterm>
1263 Unfortunately, we are also seeing an extraordinary rise of regulation of
1264 this creative class.
1267 These burdens make no sense in our tradition. We should begin by
1268 understanding that tradition a bit more and by placing in their proper
1269 context the current battles about behavior labeled "piracy."
1273 <!-- PAGE BREAK 34 -->
1274 <chapter label=
"1" id=
"creators">
1275 <title>CHAPTER ONE: Creators
</title>
1276 <indexterm id=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='startofrange'
>
1277 <primary>animated cartoons
</primary>
1280 In
1928, a cartoon character was born. An early Mickey Mouse
1281 made his debut in May of that year, in a silent flop called
<citetitle>Plane Crazy
</citetitle>.
1282 In November, in New York City's Colony Theater, in the first widely
1283 distributed cartoon synchronized with sound,
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle> brought
1284 to life the character that would become Mickey Mouse.
1287 Synchronized sound had been introduced to film a year earlier in the
1288 movie
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle>. That success led Walt Disney to copy the
1289 technique and mix sound with cartoons. No one knew whether it would
1290 work or, if it did work, whether it would win an audience. But when
1291 Disney ran a test in the summer of
1928, the results were unambiguous.
1292 As Disney describes that first experiment,
1296 A couple of my boys could read music, and one of them could play
1297 a mouth organ. We put them in a room where they could not see
1298 the screen and arranged to pipe their sound into the room where
1299 our wives and friends were going to see the picture.
1300 <!-- PAGE BREAK 35 -->
1303 The boys worked from a music and sound-effects score. After several
1304 false starts, sound and action got off with the gun. The mouth
1305 organist played the tune, the rest of us in the sound department
1306 bammed tin pans and blew slide whistles on the beat. The
1307 synchronization was pretty close.
1310 The effect on our little audience was nothing less than electric.
1311 They responded almost instinctively to this union of sound and
1312 motion. I thought they were kidding me. So they put me in the audience
1313 and ran the action again. It was terrible, but it was wonderful! And
1314 it was something new!
<footnote><para>
1316 Leonard Maltin,
<citetitle>Of Mice and Magic: A History of American Animated
1317 Cartoons
</citetitle> (New York: Penguin Books,
1987),
34–35.
1322 Disney's then partner, and one of animation's most extraordinary
1323 talents, Ub Iwerks, put it more strongly: "I have never been so thrilled
1324 in my life. Nothing since has ever equaled it."
1325 <indexterm><primary>Iwerks, Ub
</primary></indexterm>
1328 Disney had created something very new, based upon something relatively
1329 new. Synchronized sound brought life to a form of creativity that had
1330 rarely
—except in Disney's hands
—been anything more than
1331 filler for other films. Throughout animation's early history, it was
1332 Disney's invention that set the standard that others struggled to
1333 match. And quite often, Disney's great genius, his spark of
1334 creativity, was built upon the work of others.
1337 This much is familiar. What you might not know is that
1928 also marks
1338 another important transition. In that year, a comic (as opposed to
1339 cartoon) genius created his last independently produced silent film.
1340 That genius was Buster Keaton. The film was
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>.
1343 Keaton was born into a vaudeville family in
1895. In the era of silent
1344 film, he had mastered using broad physical comedy as a way to spark
1345 uncontrollable laughter from his audience.
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1346 Jr
</citetitle>. was a classic of this form, famous among film buffs for its
1347 incredible stunts. The film was classic Keaton
—wildly popular
1348 and among the best of its genre.
1351 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. appeared before Disney's cartoon Steamboat
1353 <!-- PAGE BREAK 36 -->
1354 The coincidence of titles is not coincidental. Steamboat Willie is a
1355 direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill,
<footnote><para>
1357 I am grateful to David Gerstein and his careful history, described at
1358 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
4</ulink>.
1359 According to Dave Smith of the Disney Archives, Disney paid royalties to
1360 use the music for five songs in
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>: "Steamboat Bill," "The
1361 Simpleton" (Delille), "Mischief Makers" (Carbonara), "Joyful Hurry No.
1"
1362 (Baron), and "Gawky Rube" (Lakay). A sixth song, "The Turkey in the
1363 Straw," was already in the public domain. Letter from David Smith to
1364 Harry Surden,
10 July
2003, on file with author.
1366 and both are built upon a common song as a source. It is not just from
1367 the invention of synchronized sound in
<citetitle>The Jazz Singer
</citetitle> that we
1368 get
<citetitle>Steamboat Willie
</citetitle>. It is also from Buster Keaton's invention of
1369 Steamboat Bill, Jr., itself inspired by the song "Steamboat Bill,"
1370 that we get Steamboat Willie, and then from Steamboat Willie, Mickey
1374 This "borrowing" was nothing unique, either for Disney or for the
1375 industry. Disney was always parroting the feature-length mainstream
1376 films of his day.
<footnote><para>
1378 He was also a fan of the public domain. See Chris Sprigman, "The Mouse
1379 that Ate the Public Domain," Findlaw,
5 March
2002, at
1380 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
5</ulink>.
1382 So did many others. Early cartoons are filled with
1383 knockoffs
—slight variations on winning themes; retellings of
1384 ancient stories. The key to success was the brilliance of the
1385 differences. With Disney, it was sound that gave his animation its
1386 spark. Later, it was the quality of his work relative to the
1387 production-line cartoons with which he competed. Yet these additions
1388 were built upon a base that was borrowed. Disney added to the work of
1389 others before him, creating something new out of something just barely
1393 Sometimes this borrowing was slight. Sometimes it was significant.
1394 Think about the fairy tales of the Brothers Grimm. If you're as
1395 oblivious as I was, you're likely to think that these tales are happy,
1396 sweet stories, appropriate for any child at bedtime. In fact, the
1397 Grimm fairy tales are, well, for us, grim. It is a rare and perhaps
1398 overly ambitious parent who would dare to read these bloody,
1399 moralistic stories to his or her child, at bedtime or anytime.
1402 Disney took these stories and retold them in a way that carried them
1403 into a new age. He animated the stories, with both characters and
1404 light. Without removing the elements of fear and danger altogether, he
1405 made funny what was dark and injected a genuine emotion of compassion
1406 where before there was fear. And not just with the work of the
1407 Brothers Grimm. Indeed, the catalog of Disney work drawing upon the
1408 work of others is astonishing when set together:
<citetitle>Snow White
</citetitle>
1409 (
1937),
<citetitle>Fantasia
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Pinocchio
</citetitle> (
1940),
<citetitle>Dumbo
</citetitle>
1410 (
1941),
<citetitle>Bambi
</citetitle> (
1942),
<citetitle>Song of the South
</citetitle> (
1946),
1411 <citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle> (
1950),
<citetitle>Alice in Wonderland
</citetitle> (
1951),
<citetitle>Robin
1412 Hood
</citetitle> (
1952),
<citetitle>Peter Pan
</citetitle> (
1953),
<citetitle>Lady and the Tramp
</citetitle>
1413 <!-- PAGE BREAK 37 -->
1414 (
1955),
<citetitle>Mulan
</citetitle> (
1998),
<citetitle>Sleeping Beauty
</citetitle> (
1959),
<citetitle>101
1415 Dalmatians
</citetitle> (
1961),
<citetitle>The Sword in the Stone
</citetitle> (
1963), and
1416 <citetitle>The Jungle Book
</citetitle> (
1967)
—not to mention a recent example
1417 that we should perhaps quickly forget,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>
1418 (
2003). In all of these cases, Disney (or Disney, Inc.) ripped
1419 creativity from the culture around him, mixed that creativity with his
1420 own extraordinary talent, and then burned that mix into the soul of
1421 his culture. Rip, mix, and burn.
1423 <indexterm startref=
"idxanimadedcartoons" class='endofrange'
/>
1425 This is a kind of creativity. It is a creativity that we should
1426 remember and celebrate. There are some who would say that there is no
1427 creativity except this kind. We don't need to go that far to recognize
1428 its importance. We could call this "Disney creativity," though that
1429 would be a bit misleading. It is, more precisely, "Walt Disney
1430 creativity"
—a form of expression and genius that builds upon the
1431 culture around us and makes it something different.
1433 <para> In
1928, the culture that Disney was free to draw upon was
1434 relatively fresh. The public domain in
1928 was not very old and was
1435 therefore quite vibrant. The average term of copyright was just around
1436 thirty years
—for that minority of creative work that was in fact
1437 copyrighted.
<footnote><para>
1439 Until
1976, copyright law granted an author the possibility of two terms: an
1440 initial term and a renewal term. I have calculated the "average" term by
1442 the weighted average of total registrations for any particular year,
1443 and the proportion renewing. Thus, if
100 copyrights are registered in year
1444 1, and only
15 are renewed, and the renewal term is
28 years, then the
1446 term is
32.2 years. For the renewal data and other relevant data, see the
1447 Web site associated with this book, available at
1448 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
6</ulink>.
1450 That means that for thirty years, on average, the authors or
1451 copyright holders of a creative work had an "exclusive right" to control
1452 certain uses of the work. To use this copyrighted work in limited ways
1453 required the permission of the copyright owner.
1456 At the end of a copyright term, a work passes into the public domain.
1457 No permission is then needed to draw upon or use that work. No
1458 permission and, hence, no lawyers. The public domain is a "lawyer-free
1459 zone." Thus, most of the content from the nineteenth century was free
1460 for Disney to use and build upon in
1928. It was free for
1461 anyone
— whether connected or not, whether rich or not, whether
1462 approved or not
—to use and build upon.
1465 This is the ways things always were
—until quite recently. For most
1466 of our history, the public domain was just over the horizon. From
1467 until
1978, the average copyright term was never more than thirty-two
1468 years, meaning that most culture just a generation and a half old was
1470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 38 -->
1471 free for anyone to build upon without the permission of anyone else.
1472 Today's equivalent would be for creative work from the
1960s and
1970s
1473 to now be free for the next Walt Disney to build upon without
1474 permission. Yet today, the public domain is presumptive only for
1475 content from before the Great Depression.
1478 Of course, Walt Disney had no monopoly on "Walt Disney creativity."
1479 Nor does America. The norm of free culture has, until recently, and
1480 except within totalitarian nations, been broadly exploited and quite
1484 Consider, for example, a form of creativity that seems strange to many
1485 Americans but that is inescapable within Japanese culture:
<citetitle>manga
</citetitle>, or
1486 comics. The Japanese are fanatics about comics. Some
40 percent of
1487 publications are comics, and
30 percent of publication revenue derives
1488 from comics. They are everywhere in Japanese society, at every
1489 magazine stand, carried by a large proportion of commuters on Japan's
1490 extraordinary system of public transportation.
1493 Americans tend to look down upon this form of culture. That's an
1494 unattractive characteristic of ours. We're likely to misunderstand
1495 much about manga, because few of us have ever read anything close to
1496 the stories that these "graphic novels" tell. For the Japanese, manga
1497 cover every aspect of social life. For us, comics are "men in tights."
1498 And anyway, it's not as if the New York subways are filled with
1499 readers of Joyce or even Hemingway. People of different cultures
1500 distract themselves in different ways, the Japanese in this
1501 interestingly different way.
1504 But my purpose here is not to understand manga. It is to describe a
1505 variant on manga that from a lawyer's perspective is quite odd, but
1506 from a Disney perspective is quite familiar.
1509 This is the phenomenon of
<citetitle>doujinshi
</citetitle>. Doujinshi are also comics, but
1510 they are a kind of copycat comic. A rich ethic governs the creation of
1511 doujinshi. It is not doujinshi if it is
<emphasis>just
</emphasis> a
1512 copy; the artist must make a contribution to the art he copies, by
1513 transforming it either subtly or
1514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 39 -->
1515 significantly. A doujinshi comic can thus take a mainstream comic and
1516 develop it differently
—with a different story line. Or the comic can
1517 keep the character in character but change its look slightly. There is no
1518 formula for what makes the doujinshi sufficiently "different." But they
1519 must be different if they are to be considered true doujinshi. Indeed,
1520 there are committees that review doujinshi for inclusion within shows
1521 and reject any copycat comic that is merely a copy.
1524 These copycat comics are not a tiny part of the manga market. They are
1525 huge. More than
33,
000 "circles" of creators from across Japan produce
1526 these bits of Walt Disney creativity. More than
450,
000 Japanese come
1527 together twice a year, in the largest public gathering in the country,
1528 to exchange and sell them. This market exists in parallel to the
1529 mainstream commercial manga market. In some ways, it obviously
1530 competes with that market, but there is no sustained effort by those
1531 who control the commercial manga market to shut the doujinshi market
1532 down. It flourishes, despite the competition and despite the law.
1535 The most puzzling feature of the doujinshi market, for those trained
1536 in the law, at least, is that it is allowed to exist at all. Under
1537 Japanese copyright law, which in this respect (on paper) mirrors
1538 American copyright law, the doujinshi market is an illegal
1539 one. Doujinshi are plainly "derivative works." There is no general
1540 practice by doujinshi artists of securing the permission of the manga
1541 creators. Instead, the practice is simply to take and modify the
1542 creations of others, as Walt Disney did with
<citetitle>Steamboat Bill,
1543 Jr
</citetitle>. Under both Japanese and American law, that "taking" without
1544 the permission of the original copyright owner is illegal. It is an
1545 infringement of the original copyright to make a copy or a derivative
1546 work without the original copyright owner's permission.
1548 <indexterm id=
"idxwinickjudd" class='startofrange'
>
1549 <primary>Winick, Judd
</primary>
1552 Yet this illegal market exists and indeed flourishes in Japan, and in
1553 the view of many, it is precisely because it exists that Japanese manga
1554 flourish. As American graphic novelist Judd Winick said to me, "The
1555 early days of comics in America are very much like what's going on
1556 in Japan now.
… American comics were born out of copying each
1557 <!-- PAGE BREAK 40 -->
1558 other.
… That's how [the artists] learn to draw
—by going into comic
1559 books and not tracing them, but looking at them and copying them"
1560 and building from them.
<footnote><para>
1562 For an excellent history, see Scott McCloud,
<citetitle>Reinventing Comics
</citetitle> (New
1563 York: Perennial,
2000).
1567 American comics now are quite different, Winick explains, in part
1568 because of the legal difficulty of adapting comics the way doujinshi are
1569 allowed. Speaking of Superman, Winick told me, "there are these rules
1570 and you have to stick to them." There are things Superman "cannot"
1571 do. "As a creator, it's frustrating having to stick to some parameters
1572 which are fifty years old."
1574 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinickjudd" class='endofrange'
/>
1576 The norm in Japan mitigates this legal difficulty. Some say it is
1577 precisely the benefit accruing to the Japanese manga market that
1578 explains the mitigation. Temple University law professor Salil Mehra,
1579 for example, hypothesizes that the manga market accepts these
1580 technical violations because they spur the manga market to be more
1581 wealthy and productive. Everyone would be worse off if doujinshi were
1582 banned, so the law does not ban doujinshi.
<footnote><para>
1584 See Salil K. Mehra, "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain
1585 Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?"
<citetitle>Rutgers Law
1586 Review
</citetitle> 55 (
2002):
155,
182.
"[T]here might be a collective economic
1587 rationality that would lead manga and anime artists to forgo bringing
1588 legal actions for infringement. One hypothesis is that all manga
1589 artists may be better off collectively if they set aside their
1590 individual self-interest and decide not to press their legal
1591 rights. This is essentially a prisoner's dilemma solved."
1595 The problem with this story, however, as Mehra plainly acknowledges,
1596 is that the mechanism producing this laissez faire response is not
1597 clear. It may well be that the market as a whole is better off if
1598 doujinshi are permitted rather than banned, but that doesn't explain
1599 why individual copyright owners don't sue nonetheless. If the law has
1600 no general exception for doujinshi, and indeed in some cases
1601 individual manga artists have sued doujinshi artists, why is there not
1602 a more general pattern of blocking this "free taking" by the doujinshi
1606 I spent four wonderful months in Japan, and I asked this question
1607 as often as I could. Perhaps the best account in the end was offered by
1608 a friend from a major Japanese law firm. "We don't have enough
1609 lawyers," he told me one afternoon. There "just aren't enough resources
1610 to prosecute cases like this."
1613 This is a theme to which we will return: that regulation by law is a
1614 function of both the words on the books and the costs of making those
1615 words have effect. For now, focus on the obvious question that is
1616 begged: Would Japan be better off with more lawyers? Would manga
1617 <!-- PAGE BREAK 41 -->
1618 be richer if doujinshi artists were regularly prosecuted? Would the
1619 Japanese gain something important if they could end this practice of
1620 uncompensated sharing? Does piracy here hurt the victims of the
1621 piracy, or does it help them? Would lawyers fighting this piracy help
1622 their clients or hurt them?
1623 Let's pause for a moment.
1626 If you're like I was a decade ago, or like most people are when they
1627 first start thinking about these issues, then just about now you should
1628 be puzzled about something you hadn't thought through before.
1631 We live in a world that celebrates "property." I am one of those
1632 celebrants. I believe in the value of property in general, and I also
1633 believe in the value of that weird form of property that lawyers call
1634 "intellectual property."
<footnote><para>
1636 The term
<citetitle>intellectual property
</citetitle> is of relatively recent origin. See
1637 Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
11 (New York: New York
1638 University Press,
2001). See also Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
1639 (New York: Random House,
2001),
293 n.
26. The term accurately
1640 describes a set of "property" rights
—copyright, patents,
1641 trademark, and trade-secret
—but the nature of those rights is
1643 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
1645 A large, diverse society cannot survive without property; a large,
1646 diverse, and modern society cannot flourish without intellectual
1650 But it takes just a second's reflection to realize that there is
1651 plenty of value out there that "property" doesn't capture. I don't
1652 mean "money can't buy you love," but rather, value that is plainly
1653 part of a process of production, including commercial as well as
1654 noncommercial production. If Disney animators had stolen a set of
1655 pencils to draw Steamboat Willie, we'd have no hesitation in
1656 condemning that taking as wrong
— even though trivial, even if
1657 unnoticed. Yet there was nothing wrong, at least under the law of the
1658 day, with Disney's taking from Buster Keaton or from the Brothers
1659 Grimm. There was nothing wrong with the taking from Keaton because
1660 Disney's use would have been considered "fair." There was nothing
1661 wrong with the taking from the Grimms because the Grimms' work was in
1665 Thus, even though the things that Disney took
—or more generally,
1666 the things taken by anyone exercising Walt Disney creativity
—are
1667 valuable, our tradition does not treat those takings as wrong. Some
1669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 42 -->
1670 things remain free for the taking within a free culture, and that
1674 The same with the doujinshi culture. If a doujinshi artist broke into
1675 a publisher's office and ran off with a thousand copies of his latest
1676 work
—or even one copy
—without paying, we'd have no hesitation in
1677 saying the artist was wrong. In addition to having trespassed, he would
1678 have stolen something of value. The law bans that stealing in whatever
1679 form, whether large or small.
1682 Yet there is an obvious reluctance, even among Japanese lawyers, to
1683 say that the copycat comic artists are "stealing." This form of Walt
1684 Disney creativity is seen as fair and right, even if lawyers in
1685 particular find it hard to say why.
1688 It's the same with a thousand examples that appear everywhere once you
1689 begin to look. Scientists build upon the work of other scientists
1690 without asking or paying for the privilege. ("Excuse me, Professor
1691 Einstein, but may I have permission to use your theory of relativity
1692 to show that you were wrong about quantum physics?") Acting companies
1693 perform adaptations of the works of Shakespeare without securing
1694 permission from anyone. (Does
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> believe
1695 Shakespeare would be better spread within our culture if there were a
1696 central Shakespeare rights clearinghouse that all productions of
1697 Shakespeare must appeal to first?) And Hollywood goes through cycles
1698 with a certain kind of movie: five asteroid films in the late
1990s;
1699 two volcano disaster films in
1997.
1702 Creators here and everywhere are always and at all times building
1703 upon the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now.
1704 That building is always and everywhere at least partially done without
1705 permission and without compensating the original creator. No society,
1706 free or controlled, has ever demanded that every use be paid for or that
1707 permission for Walt Disney creativity must always be sought. Instead,
1708 every society has left a certain bit of its culture free for the taking
—free
1709 societies more fully than unfree, perhaps, but all societies to some degree.
1710 <!-- PAGE BREAK 43 -->
1713 The hard question is therefore not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> a
1714 culture is free. All cultures are free to some degree. The hard
1715 question instead is "
<emphasis>How
</emphasis> free is this culture?"
1716 How much, and how broadly, is the culture free for others to take and
1717 build upon? Is that freedom limited to party members? To members of
1718 the royal family? To the top ten corporations on the New York Stock
1719 Exchange? Or is that freedom spread broadly? To artists generally,
1720 whether affiliated with the Met or not? To musicians generally,
1721 whether white or not? To filmmakers generally, whether affiliated with
1725 Free cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to
1726 build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less. Ours was a
1727 free culture. It is becoming much less so.
1730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 44 -->
1732 <chapter label=
"2" id=
"mere-copyists">
1733 <title>CHAPTER TWO: "Mere Copyists"
</title>
1734 <indexterm id=
"idxphotography" class='startofrange'
>
1735 <primary>photography
</primary>
1738 In
1839, Louis Daguerre invented the first practical technology for
1739 producing what we would call "photographs." Appropriately enough, they
1740 were called "daguerreotypes." The process was complicated and
1741 expensive, and the field was thus limited to professionals and a few
1742 zealous and wealthy amateurs. (There was even an American Daguerre
1743 Association that helped regulate the industry, as do all such
1744 associations, by keeping competition down so as to keep prices up.)
1745 <indexterm><primary>Daguerre, Louis
</primary></indexterm>
1748 Yet despite high prices, the demand for daguerreotypes was strong.
1749 This pushed inventors to find simpler and cheaper ways to make
1750 "automatic pictures." William Talbot soon discovered a process for
1751 making "negatives." But because the negatives were glass, and had to
1752 be kept wet, the process still remained expensive and cumbersome. In
1753 the
1870s, dry plates were developed, making it easier to separate the
1754 taking of a picture from its developing. These were still plates of
1755 glass, and thus it was still not a process within reach of most
1757 <indexterm><primary>Talbot, William
</primary></indexterm>
1759 <indexterm id=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='startofrange'
>
1760 <primary>Eastman, George
</primary>
1763 The technological change that made mass photography possible
1764 didn't happen until
1888, and was the creation of a single man. George
1765 <!-- PAGE BREAK 45 -->
1766 Eastman, himself an amateur photographer, was frustrated by the
1767 technology of photographs made with plates. In a flash of insight (so
1768 to speak), Eastman saw that if the film could be made to be flexible,
1769 it could be held on a single spindle. That roll could then be sent to
1770 a developer, driving the costs of photography down substantially. By
1771 lowering the costs, Eastman expected he could dramatically broaden the
1772 population of photographers.
1775 Eastman developed flexible, emulsion-coated paper film and placed
1776 rolls of it in small, simple cameras: the Kodak. The device was
1777 marketed on the basis of its simplicity. "You press the button and we
1778 do the rest."
<footnote><para>
1780 Reese V. Jenkins,
<citetitle>Images and Enterprise
</citetitle> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975),
112.
1781 </para></footnote> As he described in
<citetitle>The Kodak Primer
</citetitle>:
1782 <indexterm><primary>Kodak Primer, The (Eastman)
</primary></indexterm>
1786 The principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that
1787 any person whomsoever can do in making a photograph, from the work
1788 that only an expert can do.
… We furnish anybody, man, woman or
1789 child, who has sufficient intelligence to point a box straight and
1790 press a button, with an instrument which altogether removes from the
1791 practice of photography the necessity for exceptional facilities or,
1792 in fact, any special knowledge of the art. It can be employed without
1793 preliminary study, without a darkroom and without
1794 chemicals.
<footnote>
1797 Brian Coe,
<citetitle>The Birth of Photography
</citetitle> (New York: Taplinger Publishing,
1799 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1804 For $
25, anyone could make pictures. The camera came preloaded
1805 with film, and when it had been used, the camera was returned to an
1806 Eastman factory, where the film was developed. Over time, of course,
1807 the cost of the camera and the ease with which it could be used both
1808 improved. Roll film thus became the basis for the explosive growth of
1809 popular photography. Eastman's camera first went on sale in
1888; one
1810 year later, Kodak was printing more than six thousand negatives a day.
1811 From
1888 through
1909, while industrial production was rising by
4.7
1812 percent, photographic equipment and material sales increased by
11
1813 percent.
<footnote><para>
1816 </para></footnote> Eastman Kodak's sales during the same period experienced
1817 an average annual increase of over
17 percent.
<footnote><para>
1819 Based on a chart in Jenkins, p.
178.
1822 <indexterm><primary>Coe, Brian
</primary></indexterm>
1825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 46 -->
1826 The real significance of Eastman's invention, however, was not
1827 economic. It was social. Professional photography gave individuals a
1828 glimpse of places they would never otherwise see. Amateur photography
1829 gave them the ability to record their own lives in a way they had
1830 never been able to do before. As author Brian Coe notes, "For the
1831 first time the snapshot album provided the man on the street with a
1832 permanent record of his family and its activities.
… For the first
1833 time in history there exists an authentic visual record of the
1834 appearance and activities of the common man made without [literary]
1835 interpretation or bias."
<footnote><para>
1841 In this way, the Kodak camera and film were technologies of
1842 expression. The pencil or paintbrush was also a technology of
1843 expression, of course. But it took years of training before they could
1844 be deployed by amateurs in any useful or effective way. With the
1845 Kodak, expression was possible much sooner and more simply. The
1846 barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality";
1847 professionals would discount it as irrelevant. But watch a child study
1848 how best to frame a picture and you get a sense of the experience of
1849 creativity that the Kodak enabled. Democratic tools gave ordinary
1850 people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could
1854 What was required for this technology to flourish? Obviously,
1855 Eastman's genius was an important part. But also important was the
1856 legal environment within which Eastman's invention grew. For early in
1857 the history of photography, there was a series of judicial decisions
1858 that could well have changed the course of photography substantially.
1859 Courts were asked whether the photographer, amateur or professional,
1860 required permission before he could capture and print whatever image
1861 he wanted. Their answer was no.
<footnote><para>
1863 For illustrative cases, see, for example,
<citetitle>Pavesich
</citetitle>
1864 v.
<citetitle>N.E. Life Ins. Co
</citetitle>.,
50 S.E.
68 (Ga.
1905);
1865 <citetitle>Foster-Milburn Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Chinn
</citetitle>,
123090 S.W.
364,
366
1866 (Ky.
1909);
<citetitle>Corliss
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Walker
</citetitle>,
64 F.
280 (Mass.
1871 The arguments in favor of requiring permission will sound surprisingly
1872 familiar. The photographer was "taking" something from the person or
1873 building whose photograph he shot
—pirating something of
1874 value. Some even thought he was taking the target's soul. Just as
1875 Disney was not free to take the pencils that his animators used to
1877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 47 -->
1878 Mickey, so, too, should these photographers not be free to take images
1879 that they thought valuable.
1881 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1883 On the other side was an argument that should be familiar, as well.
1884 Sure, there may be something of value being used. But citizens should
1885 have the right to capture at least those images that stand in public view.
1886 (Louis Brandeis, who would become a Supreme Court Justice, thought
1887 the rule should be different for images from private spaces.
<footnote>
1890 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy,"
1891 <citetitle>Harvard Law Review
</citetitle> 4 (
1890):
193.
1892 <indexterm><primary>Brandeis, Louis D.
</primary></indexterm>
1893 <indexterm><primary>Warren, Samuel D.
</primary></indexterm>
1894 </para></footnote>) It may be that this means that the photographer
1895 gets something for nothing. Just as Disney could take inspiration from
1896 <citetitle>Steamboat Bill, Jr
</citetitle>. or the Brothers Grimm, the photographer should be
1897 free to capture an image without compensating the source.
1900 Fortunately for Mr. Eastman, and for photography in general, these
1901 early decisions went in favor of the pirates. In general, no
1902 permission would be required before an image could be captured and
1903 shared with others. Instead, permission was presumed. Freedom was the
1904 default. (The law would eventually craft an exception for famous
1905 people: commercial photographers who snap pictures of famous people
1906 for commercial purposes have more restrictions than the rest of
1907 us. But in the ordinary case, the image can be captured without
1908 clearing the rights to do the capturing.
<footnote><para>
1910 See Melville B. Nimmer, "The Right of Publicity,"
<citetitle>Law and Contemporary
1911 Problems
</citetitle> 19 (
1954):
203; William L. Prosser,
"Privacy," <citetitle>California Law
1912 Review
</citetitle> 48 (
1960)
398–407;
<citetitle>White
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Samsung Electronics America,
1913 Inc
</citetitle>.,
971 F.
2d
1395 (
9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S.
951
1918 We can only speculate about how photography would have developed had
1919 the law gone the other way. If the presumption had been against the
1920 photographer, then the photographer would have had to demonstrate
1921 permission. Perhaps Eastman Kodak would have had to demonstrate
1922 permission, too, before it developed the film upon which images were
1923 captured. After all, if permission were not granted, then Eastman
1924 Kodak would be benefiting from the "theft" committed by the
1925 photographer. Just as Napster benefited from the copyright
1926 infringements committed by Napster users, Kodak would be benefiting
1927 from the "image-right" infringement of its photographers. We could
1928 imagine the law then requiring that some form of permission be
1929 demonstrated before a company developed pictures. We could imagine a
1930 system developing to demonstrate that permission.
1934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 48 -->
1935 But though we could imagine this system of permission, it would be
1936 very hard to see how photography could have flourished as it did if
1937 the requirement for permission had been built into the rules that
1938 govern it. Photography would have existed. It would have grown in
1939 importance over time. Professionals would have continued to use the
1940 technology as they did
—since professionals could have more
1941 easily borne the burdens of the permission system. But the spread of
1942 photography to ordinary people would not have occurred. Nothing like
1943 that growth would have been realized. And certainly, nothing like that
1944 growth in a democratic technology of expression would have been
1945 realized. If you drive through San Francisco's Presidio, you might
1946 see two gaudy yellow school buses painted over with colorful and
1947 striking images, and the logo "Just Think!" in place of the name of a
1948 school. But there's little that's "just" cerebral in the projects that
1949 these busses enable. These buses are filled with technologies that
1950 teach kids to tinker with film. Not the film of Eastman. Not even the
1951 film of your VCR. Rather the "film" of digital cameras. Just Think!
1952 is a project that enables kids to make films, as a way to understand
1953 and critique the filmed culture that they find all around them. Each
1954 year, these busses travel to more than thirty schools and enable three
1955 hundred to five hundred children to learn something about media by
1956 doing something with media. By doing, they think. By tinkering, they
1959 <indexterm startref=
"idxeastmangeorge" class='endofrange'
/>
1960 <indexterm startref=
"idxphotography" class='endofrange'
/>
1962 These buses are not cheap, but the technology they carry is
1963 increasingly so. The cost of a high-quality digital video system has
1964 fallen dramatically. As one analyst puts it, "Five years ago, a good
1965 real-time digital video editing system cost $
25,
000. Today you can get
1966 professional quality for $
595."
<footnote><para>
1968 H. Edward Goldberg, "Essential Presentation Tools: Hardware and
1969 Software You Need to Create Digital Multimedia Presentations,"
1970 cadalyst, February
2002, available at
1971 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
7</ulink>.
1973 These buses are filled with technology that would have cost hundreds
1974 of thousands just ten years ago. And it is now feasible to imagine not
1975 just buses like this, but classrooms across the country where kids are
1976 learning more and more of something teachers call "media literacy."
1979 <!-- PAGE BREAK 49 -->
1980 "Media literacy," as Dave Yanofsky, the executive director of Just
1981 Think!, puts it, "is the ability
… to understand, analyze, and
1982 deconstruct media images. Its aim is to make [kids] literate about the
1983 way media works, the way it's constructed, the way it's delivered, and
1984 the way people access it."
1985 <indexterm><primary>Yanofsky, Dave
</primary></indexterm>
1988 This may seem like an odd way to think about "literacy." For most
1989 people, literacy is about reading and writing. Faulkner and Hemingway
1990 and noticing split infinitives are the things that "literate" people know
1994 Maybe. But in a world where children see on average
390 hours of
1995 television commercials per year, or between
20,
000 and
45,
000
1996 commercials generally,
<footnote><para>
1998 Judith Van Evra,
<citetitle>Television and Child Development
</citetitle> (Hillsdale, N.J.:
1999 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1990); "Findings on Family and TV
2000 Study,"
<citetitle>Denver Post
</citetitle>,
25 May
1997, B6.
2002 it is increasingly important to understand the "grammar" of media. For
2003 just as there is a grammar for the written word, so, too, is there one
2004 for media. And just as kids learn how to write by writing lots of
2005 terrible prose, kids learn how to write media by constructing lots of
2006 (at least at first) terrible media.
2009 A growing field of academics and activists sees this form of literacy
2010 as crucial to the next generation of culture. For though anyone who
2011 has written understands how difficult writing is
—how difficult
2012 it is to sequence the story, to keep a reader's attention, to craft
2013 language to be understandable
—few of us have any real sense of
2014 how difficult media is. Or more fundamentally, few of us have a sense
2015 of how media works, how it holds an audience or leads it through a
2016 story, how it triggers emotion or builds suspense.
2019 It took filmmaking a generation before it could do these things well.
2020 But even then, the knowledge was in the filming, not in writing about
2021 the film. The skill came from experiencing the making of a film, not
2022 from reading a book about it. One learns to write by writing and then
2023 reflecting upon what one has written. One learns to write with images
2024 by making them and then reflecting upon what one has created.
2026 <indexterm><primary>Crichton, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
2028 This grammar has changed as media has changed. When it was just film,
2029 as Elizabeth Daley, executive director of the University of Southern
2030 California's Annenberg Center for Communication and dean of the
2032 <!-- PAGE BREAK 50 -->
2033 USC School of Cinema-Television, explained to me, the grammar was
2034 about "the placement of objects, color,
… rhythm, pacing, and
2038 Interview with Elizabeth Daley and Stephanie Barish,
13 December
2040 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2041 <indexterm><primary>Daley, Elizabeth
</primary></indexterm>
2043 But as computers open up an interactive space where a story is
2044 "played" as well as experienced, that grammar changes. The simple
2045 control of narrative is lost, and so other techniques are necessary. Author
2046 Michael Crichton had mastered the narrative of science fiction.
2047 But when he tried to design a computer game based on one of his
2048 works, it was a new craft he had to learn. How to lead people through
2049 a game without their feeling they have been led was not obvious, even
2050 to a wildly successful author.
<footnote><para>
2052 See Scott Steinberg, "Crichton Gets Medieval on PCs," E!online,
4
2053 November
2000, available at
2054 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
8</ulink>; "Timeline,"
22 November
2000,
2056 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
9</ulink>.
2059 <indexterm><primary>computer games
</primary></indexterm>
2061 This skill is precisely the craft a filmmaker learns. As Daley
2062 describes, "people are very surprised about how they are led through a
2063 film. [I]t is perfectly constructed to keep you from seeing it, so you
2064 have no idea. If a filmmaker succeeds you do not know how you were
2065 led." If you know you were led through a film, the film has failed.
2068 Yet the push for an expanded literacy
—one that goes beyond text
2069 to include audio and visual elements
—is not about making better
2070 film directors. The aim is not to improve the profession of
2071 filmmaking at all. Instead, as Daley explained,
2075 From my perspective, probably the most important digital divide
2076 is not access to a box. It's the ability to be empowered with the
2077 language that that box works in. Otherwise only a very few people
2078 can write with this language, and all the rest of us are reduced to
2083 "Read-only." Passive recipients of culture produced elsewhere.
2084 Couch potatoes. Consumers. This is the world of media from the
2088 The twenty-first century could be different. This is the crucial
2089 point: It could be both read and write. Or at least reading and better
2090 understanding the craft of writing. Or best, reading and understanding
2091 the tools that enable the writing to lead or mislead. The aim of any
2093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 51 -->
2094 and this literacy in particular, is to "empower people to choose the
2095 appropriate language for what they need to create or
2099 Interview with Daley and Barish.
2100 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2101 </para></footnote> It is to enable students "to communicate in the
2102 language of the twenty-first century."
<footnote><para>
2107 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2109 As with any language, this language comes more easily to some than to
2110 others. It doesn't necessarily come more easily to those who excel in
2111 written language. Daley and Stephanie Barish, director of the
2112 Institute for Multimedia Literacy at the Annenberg Center, describe
2113 one particularly poignant example of a project they ran in a high
2114 school. The high school was a very poor inner-city Los Angeles
2115 school. In all the traditional measures of success, this school was a
2116 failure. But Daley and Barish ran a program that gave kids an
2117 opportunity to use film to express meaning about something the
2118 students know something about
—gun violence.
2121 The class was held on Friday afternoons, and it created a relatively
2122 new problem for the school. While the challenge in most classes was
2123 getting the kids to come, the challenge in this class was keeping them
2124 away. The "kids were showing up at
6 A.M. and leaving at
5 at night,"
2125 said Barish. They were working harder than in any other class to do
2126 what education should be about
—learning how to express themselves.
2129 Using whatever "free web stuff they could find," and relatively simple
2130 tools to enable the kids to mix "image, sound, and text," Barish said
2131 this class produced a series of projects that showed something about
2132 gun violence that few would otherwise understand. This was an issue
2133 close to the lives of these students. The project "gave them a tool
2134 and empowered them to be able to both understand it and talk about
2135 it," Barish explained. That tool succeeded in creating
2136 expression
—far more successfully and powerfully than could have
2137 been created using only text. "If you had said to these students, `you
2138 have to do it in text,' they would've just thrown their hands up and
2139 gone and done something else," Barish described, in part, no doubt,
2140 because expressing themselves in text is not something these students
2141 can do well. Yet neither is text a form in which
2142 <emphasis>these
</emphasis> ideas can be expressed well. The power of
2143 this message depended upon its connection to this form of expression.
2147 <!-- PAGE BREAK 52 -->
2148 "But isn't education about teaching kids to write?" I asked. In part,
2149 of course, it is. But why are we teaching kids to write? Education,
2150 Daley explained, is about giving students a way of "constructing
2151 meaning." To say that that means just writing is like saying teaching
2152 writing is only about teaching kids how to spell. Text is one
2153 part
—and increasingly, not the most powerful part
—of
2154 constructing meaning. As Daley explained in the most moving part of
2159 What you want is to give these students ways of constructing
2160 meaning. If all you give them is text, they're not going to do it.
2161 Because they can't. You know, you've got Johnny who can look at a
2162 video, he can play a video game, he can do graffiti all over your
2163 walls, he can take your car apart, and he can do all sorts of other
2164 things. He just can't read your text. So Johnny comes to school and
2165 you say, "Johnny, you're illiterate. Nothing you can do matters."
2166 Well, Johnny then has two choices: He can dismiss you or he [can]
2167 dismiss himself. If his ego is healthy at all, he's going to dismiss
2168 you. [But i]nstead, if you say, "Well, with all these things that you
2169 can do, let's talk about this issue. Play for me music that you think
2170 reflects that, or show me images that you think reflect that, or draw
2171 for me something that reflects that." Not by giving a kid a video
2172 camera and
… saying, "Let's go have fun with the video camera and
2173 make a little movie." But instead, really help you take these elements
2174 that you understand, that are your language, and construct meaning
2175 about the topic.
…
2178 That empowers enormously. And then what happens, of
2179 course, is eventually, as it has happened in all these classes, they
2180 bump up against the fact, "I need to explain this and I really need
2181 to write something." And as one of the teachers told Stephanie,
2182 they would rewrite a paragraph
5,
6,
7,
8 times, till they got it right.
2185 Because they needed to. There was a reason for doing it. They
2186 needed to say something, as opposed to just jumping through
2187 your hoops. They actually needed to use a language that they
2188 <!-- PAGE BREAK 53 -->
2189 didn't speak very well. But they had come to understand that they
2190 had a lot of power with this language."
2194 When two planes crashed into the World Trade Center, another into the
2195 Pentagon, and a fourth into a Pennsylvania field, all media around the
2196 world shifted to this news. Every moment of just about every day for
2197 that week, and for weeks after, television in particular, and media
2198 generally, retold the story of the events we had just witnessed. The
2199 telling was a retelling, because we had seen the events that were
2200 described. The genius of this awful act of terrorism was that the
2201 delayed second attack was perfectly timed to assure that the whole
2202 world would be watching.
2205 These retellings had an increasingly familiar feel. There was music
2206 scored for the intermissions, and fancy graphics that flashed across
2207 the screen. There was a formula to interviews. There was "balance,"
2208 and seriousness. This was news choreographed in the way we have
2209 increasingly come to expect it, "news as entertainment," even if the
2210 entertainment is tragedy.
2212 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
2213 <indexterm><primary>CBS
</primary></indexterm>
2215 But in addition to this produced news about the "tragedy of September
2216 11," those of us tied to the Internet came to see a very different
2217 production as well. The Internet was filled with accounts of the same
2218 events. Yet these Internet accounts had a very different flavor. Some
2219 people constructed photo pages that captured images from around the
2220 world and presented them as slide shows with text. Some offered open
2221 letters. There were sound recordings. There was anger and frustration.
2222 There were attempts to provide context. There was, in short, an
2223 extraordinary worldwide barn raising, in the sense Mike Godwin uses
2224 the term in his book
<citetitle>Cyber Rights
</citetitle>, around a news event that had
2225 captured the attention of the world. There was ABC and CBS, but there
2226 was also the Internet.
2229 I don't mean simply to praise the Internet
—though I do think the
2230 people who supported this form of speech should be praised. I mean
2231 instead to point to a significance in this form of speech. For like a
2232 Kodak, the Internet enables people to capture images. And like in a
2234 <!-- PAGE BREAK 54 -->
2235 by a student on the "Just Think!" bus, the visual images could be mixed
2239 But unlike any technology for simply capturing images, the Internet
2240 allows these creations to be shared with an extraordinary number of
2241 people, practically instantaneously. This is something new in our
2242 tradition
—not just that culture can be captured mechanically,
2243 and obviously not just that events are commented upon critically, but
2244 that this mix of captured images, sound, and commentary can be widely
2245 spread practically instantaneously.
2248 September
11 was not an aberration. It was a beginning. Around the
2249 same time, a form of communication that has grown dramatically was
2250 just beginning to come into public consciousness: the Web-log, or
2251 blog. The blog is a kind of public diary, and within some cultures,
2252 such as in Japan, it functions very much like a diary. In those
2253 cultures, it records private facts in a public way
—it's a kind
2254 of electronic
<citetitle>Jerry Springer
</citetitle>, available anywhere in the world.
2257 But in the United States, blogs have taken on a very different
2258 character. There are some who use the space simply to talk about
2259 their private life. But there are many who use the space to engage in
2260 public discourse. Discussing matters of public import, criticizing
2261 others who are mistaken in their views, criticizing politicians about
2262 the decisions they make, offering solutions to problems we all see:
2263 blogs create the sense of a virtual public meeting, but one in which
2264 we don't all hope to be there at the same time and in which
2265 conversations are not necessarily linked. The best of the blog entries
2266 are relatively short; they point directly to words used by others,
2267 criticizing with or adding to them. They are arguably the most
2268 important form of unchoreographed public discourse that we have.
2271 That's a strong statement. Yet it says as much about our democracy as
2272 it does about blogs. This is the part of America that is most
2273 difficult for those of us who love America to accept: Our democracy
2274 has atrophied. Of course we have elections, and most of the time the
2275 courts allow those elections to count. A relatively small number of
2277 <!-- PAGE BREAK 55 -->
2278 in those elections. The cycle of these elections has become totally
2279 professionalized and routinized. Most of us think this is democracy.
2282 But democracy has never just been about elections. Democracy
2283 means rule by the people, but rule means something more than mere
2284 elections. In our tradition, it also means control through reasoned
2285 discourse. This was the idea that captured the imagination of Alexis
2286 de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French lawyer who wrote the
2287 most important account of early "Democracy in America." It wasn't
2288 popular elections that fascinated him
—it was the jury, an
2289 institution that gave ordinary people the right to choose life or
2290 death for other citizens. And most fascinating for him was that the
2291 jury didn't just vote about the outcome they would impose. They
2292 deliberated. Members argued about the "right" result; they tried to
2293 persuade each other of the "right" result, and in criminal cases at
2294 least, they had to agree upon a unanimous result for the process to
2295 come to an end.
<footnote><para>
2297 See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville,
<citetitle>Democracy in America
</citetitle>,
2298 bk.
1, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam Books,
2000), ch.
16.
2302 Yet even this institution flags in American life today. And in its
2303 place, there is no systematic effort to enable citizen deliberation. Some
2304 are pushing to create just such an institution.
<footnote><para>
2306 Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, "Deliberation Day,"
<citetitle>Journal of
2307 Political Philosophy
</citetitle> 10 (
2) (
2002):
129.
2309 And in some towns in New England, something close to deliberation
2310 remains. But for most of us for most of the time, there is no time or
2311 place for "democratic deliberation" to occur.
2314 More bizarrely, there is generally not even permission for it to
2315 occur. We, the most powerful democracy in the world, have developed a
2316 strong norm against talking about politics. It's fine to talk about
2317 politics with people you agree with. But it is rude to argue about
2318 politics with people you disagree with. Political discourse becomes
2319 isolated, and isolated discourse becomes more extreme.
<footnote><para>
2321 Cass Sunstein,
<citetitle>Republic.com
</citetitle> (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001),
2322 65–80,
175,
182,
183,
192.
2323 </para></footnote> We say what our friends want to hear, and hear very
2324 little beyond what our friends say.
2327 Enter the blog. The blog's very architecture solves one part of this
2328 problem. People post when they want to post, and people read when they
2329 want to read. The most difficult time is synchronous time.
2330 Technologies that enable asynchronous communication, such as e-mail,
2331 increase the opportunity for communication. Blogs allow for public
2333 <!-- PAGE BREAK 56 -->
2334 discourse without the public ever needing to gather in a single public
2338 But beyond architecture, blogs also have solved the problem of
2339 norms. There's no norm (yet) in blog space not to talk about politics.
2340 Indeed, the space is filled with political speech, on both the right and
2341 the left. Some of the most popular sites are conservative or libertarian,
2342 but there are many of all political stripes. And even blogs that are not
2343 political cover political issues when the occasion merits.
2346 The significance of these blogs is tiny now, though not so tiny. The
2347 name Howard Dean may well have faded from the
2004 presidential race
2348 but for blogs. Yet even if the number of readers is small, the reading
2349 is having an effect.
2350 <indexterm><primary>Dean, Howard
</primary></indexterm>
2353 One direct effect is on stories that had a different life cycle in the
2354 mainstream media. The Trent Lott affair is an example. When Lott
2355 "misspoke" at a party for Senator Strom Thurmond, essentially praising
2356 Thurmond's segregationist policies, he calculated correctly that this
2357 story would disappear from the mainstream press within forty-eight
2358 hours. It did. But he didn't calculate its life cycle in blog
2359 space. The bloggers kept researching the story. Over time, more and
2360 more instances of the same "misspeaking" emerged. Finally, the story
2361 broke back into the mainstream press. In the end, Lott was forced to
2362 resign as senate majority leader.
<footnote><para>
2364 Noah Shachtman, "With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot," New
2365 York Times,
16 January
2003, G5.
2367 <indexterm><primary>Lott, Trent
</primary></indexterm>
2370 This different cycle is possible because the same commercial pressures
2371 don't exist with blogs as with other ventures. Television and
2372 newspapers are commercial entities. They must work to keep attention.
2373 If they lose readers, they lose revenue. Like sharks, they must move
2377 But bloggers don't have a similar constraint. They can obsess, they
2378 can focus, they can get serious. If a particular blogger writes a
2379 particularly interesting story, more and more people link to that
2380 story. And as the number of links to a particular story increases, it
2381 rises in the ranks of stories. People read what is popular; what is
2382 popular has been selected by a very democratic process of
2383 peer-generated rankings.
2385 <indexterm id=
"idxwinerdave" class='startofrange'
>
2386 <primary>Winer, Dave
</primary>
2389 There's a second way, as well, in which blogs have a different cycle
2390 <!-- PAGE BREAK 57 -->
2391 from the mainstream press. As Dave Winer, one of the fathers of this
2392 movement and a software author for many decades, told me, another
2393 difference is the absence of a financial "conflict of interest." "I think you
2394 have to take the conflict of interest" out of journalism, Winer told me.
2395 "An amateur journalist simply doesn't have a conflict of interest, or the
2396 conflict of interest is so easily disclosed that you know you can sort of
2397 get it out of the way."
2399 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2401 These conflicts become more important as media becomes more
2402 concentrated (more on this below). A concentrated media can hide more
2403 from the public than an unconcentrated media can
—as CNN admitted
2404 it did after the Iraq war because it was afraid of the consequences to
2405 its own employees.
<footnote><para>
2407 Telephone interview with David Winer,
16 April
2003.
2409 It also needs to sustain a more coherent account. (In the middle of
2410 the Iraq war, I read a post on the Internet from someone who was at
2411 that time listening to a satellite uplink with a reporter in Iraq. The
2412 New York headquarters was telling the reporter over and over that her
2413 account of the war was too bleak: She needed to offer a more
2414 optimistic story. When she told New York that wasn't warranted, they
2415 told her that
<emphasis>they
</emphasis> were writing "the story.")
2417 <para> Blog space gives amateurs a way to enter the
2418 debate
—"amateur" not in the sense of inexperienced, but in the
2419 sense of an Olympic athlete, meaning not paid by anyone to give their
2420 reports. It allows for a much broader range of input into a story, as
2421 reporting on the Columbia disaster revealed, when hundreds from across
2422 the southwest United States turned to the Internet to retell what they
2423 had seen.
<footnote><para>
2425 John Schwartz, "Loss of the Shuttle: The Internet; A Wealth of
2426 Information Online,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
2 February
2003, A28; Staci
2427 D. Kramer, "Shuttle Disaster Coverage Mixed, but Strong Overall,"
2428 Online Journalism Review,
2 February
2003, available at
2429 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
10</ulink>.
2431 And it drives readers to read across the range of accounts and
2432 "triangulate," as Winer puts it, the truth. Blogs, Winer says, are
2433 "communicating directly with our constituency, and the middle man is
2434 out of it"
—with all the benefits, and costs, that might entail.
2437 Winer is optimistic about the future of journalism infected
2438 with blogs. "It's going to become an essential skill," Winer predicts,
2439 for public figures and increasingly for private figures as well. It's
2440 not clear that "journalism" is happy about this
—some journalists
2441 have been told to curtail their blogging.
<footnote>
2444 See Michael Falcone, "Does an Editor's Pencil Ruin a Web Log?"
<citetitle>New
2445 York Times
</citetitle>,
29 September
2003, C4. ("Not all news organizations have
2446 been as accepting of employees who blog. Kevin Sites, a CNN
2447 correspondent in Iraq who started a blog about his reporting of the
2448 war on March
9, stopped posting
12 days later at his bosses'
2449 request. Last year Steve Olafson, a
<citetitle>Houston Chronicle
</citetitle> reporter, was
2450 fired for keeping a personal Web log, published under a pseudonym,
2451 that dealt with some of the issues and people he was covering.")
2452 <indexterm><primary>CNN
</primary></indexterm>
2454 But it is clear that we are still in transition. "A
2456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 58 -->
2457 lot of what we are doing now is warm-up exercises," Winer told me.
2458 There is a lot that must mature before this space has its mature effect.
2459 And as the inclusion of content in this space is the least infringing use
2460 of the Internet (meaning infringing on copyright), Winer said, "we will
2461 be the last thing that gets shut down."
2464 This speech affects democracy. Winer thinks that happens because "you
2465 don't have to work for somebody who controls, [for] a gatekeeper."
2466 That is true. But it affects democracy in another way as well. As
2467 more and more citizens express what they think, and defend it in
2468 writing, that will change the way people understand public issues. It
2469 is easy to be wrong and misguided in your head. It is harder when the
2470 product of your mind can be criticized by others. Of course, it is a
2471 rare human who admits that he has been persuaded that he is wrong. But
2472 it is even rarer for a human to ignore when he has been proven wrong.
2473 The writing of ideas, arguments, and criticism improves democracy.
2474 Today there are probably a couple of million blogs where such writing
2475 happens. When there are ten million, there will be something
2476 extraordinary to report.
2478 <indexterm startref=
"idxwinerdave" class='endofrange'
/>
2479 <indexterm id=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='startofrange'
>
2480 <primary>Brown, John Seely
</primary>
2483 John Seely Brown is the chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation.
2484 His work, as his Web site describes it, is "human learning and
… the
2485 creation of knowledge ecologies for creating
… innovation."
2488 Brown thus looks at these technologies of digital creativity a bit
2489 differently from the perspectives I've sketched so far. I'm sure he
2490 would be excited about any technology that might improve
2491 democracy. But his real excitement comes from how these technologies
2495 As Brown believes, we learn by tinkering. When "a lot of us grew up,"
2496 he explains, that tinkering was done "on motorcycle engines, lawnmower
2497 engines, automobiles, radios, and so on." But digital technologies
2498 enable a different kind of tinkering
—with abstract ideas though
2499 in concrete form. The kids at Just Think! not only think about how a
2500 commercial portrays a politician; using digital technology, they can
2501 <!-- PAGE BREAK 59 -->
2502 take the commercial apart and manipulate it, tinker with it to see how
2503 it does what it does. Digital technologies launch a kind of bricolage,
2504 or "free collage," as Brown calls it. Many get to add to or transform
2505 the tinkering of many others.
2508 The best large-scale example of this kind of tinkering so far is free
2509 software or open-source software (FS/OSS). FS/OSS is software whose
2510 source code is shared. Anyone can download the technology that makes a
2511 FS/OSS program run. And anyone eager to learn how a particular bit of
2512 FS/OSS technology works can tinker with the code.
2515 This opportunity creates a "completely new kind of learning platform,"
2516 as Brown describes. "As soon as you start doing that, you
…
2517 unleash a free collage on the community, so that other people can
2518 start looking at your code, tinkering with it, trying it out, seeing
2519 if they can improve it." Each effort is a kind of
2520 apprenticeship. "Open source becomes a major apprenticeship platform."
2523 In this process, "the concrete things you tinker with are abstract.
2524 They are code." Kids are "shifting to the ability to tinker in the
2525 abstract, and this tinkering is no longer an isolated activity that
2526 you're doing in your garage. You are tinkering with a community
2527 platform.
… You are tinkering with other people's stuff. The more
2528 you tinker the more you improve." The more you improve, the more you
2532 This same thing happens with content, too. And it happens in the same
2533 collaborative way when that content is part of the Web. As Brown puts
2534 it, "the Web [is] the first medium that truly honors multiple forms of
2535 intelligence." Earlier technologies, such as the typewriter or word
2536 processors, helped amplify text. But the Web amplifies much more than
2537 text. "The Web
… says if you are musical, if you are artistic, if
2538 you are visual, if you are interested in film
… [then] there is a
2539 lot you can start to do on this medium. [It] can now amplify and honor
2540 these multiple forms of intelligence."
2542 <indexterm><primary>Barish, Stephanie
</primary></indexterm>
2544 Brown is talking about what Elizabeth Daley, Stephanie Barish, and
2545 Just Think! teach: that this tinkering with culture teaches as well
2547 <!-- PAGE BREAK 60 -->
2548 as creates. It develops talents differently, and it builds a different
2549 kind of recognition.
2552 Yet the freedom to tinker with these objects is not guaranteed.
2553 Indeed, as we'll see through the course of this book, that freedom is
2554 increasingly highly contested. While there's no doubt that your father
2555 had the right to tinker with the car engine, there's great doubt that
2556 your child will have the right to tinker with the images she finds all
2557 around. The law and, increasingly, technology interfere with a
2558 freedom that technology, and curiosity, would otherwise ensure.
2561 These restrictions have become the focus of researchers and scholars.
2562 Professor Ed Felten of Princeton (whom we'll see more of in chapter
2563 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>)
2564 has developed a powerful argument in favor of the "right to
2565 tinker" as it applies to computer science and to knowledge in
2566 general.
<footnote><para>
2568 See, for example, Edward Felten and Andrew Appel, "Technological Access
2569 Control Interferes with Noninfringing Scholarship,"
<citetitle>Communications
2570 of the Association for Computer Machinery
</citetitle> 43 (
2000):
9.
2572 But Brown's concern is earlier, or younger, or more fundamental. It is
2573 about the learning that kids can do, or can't do, because of the law.
2576 "This is where education in the twenty-first century is going," Brown
2577 explains. We need to "understand how kids who grow up digital think
2581 "Yet," as Brown continued, and as the balance of this book will
2582 evince, "we are building a legal system that completely suppresses the
2583 natural tendencies of today's digital kids.
… We're building an
2584 architecture that unleashes
60 percent of the brain [and] a legal
2585 system that closes down that part of the brain."
2587 <indexterm startref=
"idxbrownjohnseely" class='endofrange'
/>
2589 We're building a technology that takes the magic of Kodak, mixes
2590 moving images and sound, and adds a space for commentary and an
2591 opportunity to spread that creativity everywhere. But we're building
2592 the law to close down that technology.
2595 "No way to run a culture," as Brewster Kahle, whom we'll meet in
2596 chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"collectors"/>,
2597 quipped to me in a rare moment of despondence.
2599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 61 -->
2601 <chapter label=
"3" id=
"catalogs">
2602 <title>CHAPTER THREE: Catalogs
</title>
2603 <indexterm><primary>RPI
</primary><see>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</see></indexterm>
2604 <indexterm id=
"idxrensselaer" class='startofrange'
>
2605 <primary>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
</primary>
2608 In the fall of
2002, Jesse Jordan of Oceanside, New York, enrolled as
2609 a freshman at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, New York.
2610 His major at RPI was information technology. Though he is not a
2611 programmer, in October Jesse decided to begin to tinker with search
2612 engine technology that was available on the RPI network.
2615 RPI is one of America's foremost technological research institutions.
2616 It offers degrees in fields ranging from architecture and engineering
2617 to information sciences. More than
65 percent of its five thousand
2618 undergraduates finished in the top
10 percent of their high school
2619 class. The school is thus a perfect mix of talent and experience to
2620 imagine and then build, a generation for the network age.
2623 RPI's computer network links students, faculty, and administration to
2624 one another. It also links RPI to the Internet. Not everything
2625 available on the RPI network is available on the Internet. But the
2626 network is designed to enable students to get access to the Internet,
2627 as well as more intimate access to other members of the RPI community.
2630 Search engines are a measure of a network's intimacy. Google
2631 <!-- PAGE BREAK 62 -->
2632 brought the Internet much closer to all of us by fantastically
2633 improving the quality of search on the network. Specialty search
2634 engines can do this even better. The idea of "intranet" search
2635 engines, search engines that search within the network of a particular
2636 institution, is to provide users of that institution with better
2637 access to material from that institution. Businesses do this all the
2638 time, enabling employees to have access to material that people
2639 outside the business can't get. Universities do it as well.
2642 These engines are enabled by the network technology itself.
2643 Microsoft, for example, has a network file system that makes it very
2644 easy for search engines tuned to that network to query the system for
2645 information about the publicly (within that network) available
2646 content. Jesse's search engine was built to take advantage of this
2647 technology. It used Microsoft's network file system to build an index
2648 of all the files available within the RPI network.
2651 Jesse's wasn't the first search engine built for the RPI network.
2652 Indeed, his engine was a simple modification of engines that others
2653 had built. His single most important improvement over those engines
2654 was to fix a bug within the Microsoft file-sharing system that could
2655 cause a user's computer to crash. With the engines that existed
2656 before, if you tried to access a file through a Windows browser that
2657 was on a computer that was off-line, your computer could crash. Jesse
2658 modified the system a bit to fix that problem, by adding a button that
2659 a user could click to see if the machine holding the file was still
2663 Jesse's engine went on-line in late October. Over the following six
2664 months, he continued to tweak it to improve its functionality. By
2665 March, the system was functioning quite well. Jesse had more than one
2666 million files in his directory, including every type of content that might
2667 be on users' computers.
2670 Thus the index his search engine produced included pictures, which
2671 students could use to put on their own Web sites; copies of notes or
2672 research; copies of information pamphlets; movie clips that students
2673 might have created; university brochures
—basically anything that
2674 <!-- PAGE BREAK 63 -->
2675 users of the RPI network made available in a public folder of their
2679 But the index also included music files. In fact, one quarter of the
2680 files that Jesse's search engine listed were music files. But that
2681 means, of course, that three quarters were not, and
—so that this
2682 point is absolutely clear
—Jesse did nothing to induce people to
2683 put music files in their public folders. He did nothing to target the
2684 search engine to these files. He was a kid tinkering with a
2685 Google-like technology at a university where he was studying
2686 information science, and hence, tinkering was the aim. Unlike Google,
2687 or Microsoft, for that matter, he made no money from this tinkering;
2688 he was not connected to any business that would make any money from
2689 this experiment. He was a kid tinkering with technology in an
2690 environment where tinkering with technology was precisely what he was
2694 On April
3,
2003, Jesse was contacted by the dean of students at
2695 RPI. The dean informed Jesse that the Recording Industry Association
2696 of America, the RIAA, would be filing a lawsuit against him and three
2697 other students whom he didn't even know, two of them at other
2698 universities. A few hours later, Jesse was served with papers from
2699 the suit. As he read these papers and watched the news reports about
2700 them, he was increasingly astonished.
2703 "It was absurd," he told me. "I don't think I did anything
2704 wrong.
… I don't think there's anything wrong with the search
2705 engine that I ran or
… what I had done to it. I mean, I hadn't
2706 modified it in any way that promoted or enhanced the work of
2707 pirates. I just modified the search engine in a way that would make it
2708 easier to use"
—again, a
<emphasis>search engine
</emphasis>,
2709 which Jesse had not himself built, using the Windows filesharing
2710 system, which Jesse had not himself built, to enable members of the
2711 RPI community to get access to content, which Jesse had not himself
2712 created or posted, and the vast majority of which had nothing to do
2716 But the RIAA branded Jesse a pirate. They claimed he operated a
2717 network and had therefore "willfully" violated copyright laws. They
2718 <!-- PAGE BREAK 64 -->
2719 demanded that he pay them the damages for his wrong. For cases of
2720 "willful infringement," the Copyright Act specifies something lawyers
2721 call "statutory damages." These damages permit a copyright owner to
2722 claim $
150,
000 per infringement. As the RIAA alleged more than one
2723 hundred specific copyright infringements, they therefore demanded that
2724 Jesse pay them at least $
15,
000,
000.
2727 Similar lawsuits were brought against three other students: one other
2728 student at RPI, one at Michigan Technical University, and one at
2729 Princeton. Their situations were similar to Jesse's. Though each case
2730 was different in detail, the bottom line in each was exactly the same:
2731 huge demands for "damages" that the RIAA claimed it was entitled to.
2732 If you added up the claims, these four lawsuits were asking courts in
2733 the United States to award the plaintiffs close to $
100
2734 <emphasis>billion
</emphasis>—six times the
2735 <emphasis>total
</emphasis> profit of the film industry in
2736 2001.
<footnote><para>
2739 Tim Goral, "Recording Industry Goes After Campus P-
2-P Networks:
2740 Suit Alleges $
97.8 Billion in Damages,"
<citetitle>Professional Media Group LCC
</citetitle> 6
2741 (
2003):
5, available at
2003 WL
55179443.
2744 <indexterm startref=
"idxrensselaer" class='endofrange'
/>
2746 Jesse called his parents. They were supportive but a bit frightened.
2747 An uncle was a lawyer. He began negotiations with the RIAA. They
2748 demanded to know how much money Jesse had. Jesse had saved
2749 $
12,
000 from summer jobs and other employment. They demanded
2750 $
12,
000 to dismiss the case.
2753 The RIAA wanted Jesse to admit to doing something wrong. He
2754 refused. They wanted him to agree to an injunction that would
2755 essentially make it impossible for him to work in many fields of
2756 technology for the rest of his life. He refused. They made him
2757 understand that this process of being sued was not going to be
2758 pleasant. (As Jesse's father recounted to me, the chief lawyer on the
2759 case, Matt Oppenheimer, told Jesse, "You don't want to pay another
2760 visit to a dentist like me.") And throughout, the RIAA insisted it
2761 would not settle the case until it took every penny Jesse had saved.
2764 Jesse's family was outraged at these claims. They wanted to fight.
2765 But Jesse's uncle worked to educate the family about the nature of the
2766 American legal system. Jesse could fight the RIAA. He might even
2767 win. But the cost of fighting a lawsuit like this, Jesse was told, would be
2768 at least $
250,
000. If he won, he would not recover that money. If he
2769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 65 -->
2770 won, he would have a piece of paper saying he had won, and a piece of
2771 paper saying he and his family were bankrupt.
2774 So Jesse faced a mafia-like choice: $
250,
000 and a chance at winning,
2775 or $
12,
000 and a settlement.
2778 The recording industry insists this is a matter of law and morality.
2779 Let's put the law aside for a moment and think about the morality.
2780 Where is the morality in a lawsuit like this? What is the virtue in
2781 scapegoatism? The RIAA is an extraordinarily powerful lobby. The
2782 president of the RIAA is reported to make more than $
1 million a year.
2783 Artists, on the other hand, are not well paid. The average recording
2784 artist makes $
45,
900.
<footnote><para>
2786 Occupational Employment Survey, U.S. Dept. of Labor (
2001)
2787 (
27–2042—Musicians and Singers). See also National Endowment for
2788 the Arts,
<citetitle>More Than One in a Blue Moon
</citetitle> (
2000).
2790 There are plenty of ways for the RIAA to affect
2791 and direct policy. So where is the morality in taking money from a
2792 student for running a search engine?
<footnote><para>
2794 Douglas Lichtman makes a related point in "KaZaA and Punishment,"
2795 <citetitle>Wall Street Journal
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, A24.
2799 On June
23, Jesse wired his savings to the lawyer working for the
2800 RIAA. The case against him was then dismissed. And with this, this
2801 kid who had tinkered a computer into a $
15 million lawsuit became an
2806 I was definitely not an activist [before]. I never really meant to be
2807 an activist.
… [But] I've been pushed into this. In no way did I
2808 ever foresee anything like this, but I think it's just completely
2809 absurd what the RIAA has done.
2813 Jesse's parents betray a certain pride in their reluctant activist. As
2814 his father told me, Jesse "considers himself very conservative, and so do
2815 I.
… He's not a tree hugger.
… I think it's bizarre that they would
2816 pick on him. But he wants to let people know that they're sending the
2817 wrong message. And he wants to correct the record."
2819 <!-- PAGE BREAK 66 -->
2821 <chapter label=
"4" id=
"pirates">
2822 <title>CHAPTER FOUR: "Pirates"
</title>
2824 If "piracy" means using the creative property of others without
2825 their permission
—if "if value, then right" is true
—then the history of
2826 the content industry is a history of piracy. Every important sector of
2827 "big media" today
—film, records, radio, and cable TV
—was born of a
2828 kind of piracy so defined. The consistent story is how last generation's
2829 pirates join this generation's country club
—until now.
2834 The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing pirates.
<footnote><para>
2836 I am grateful to Peter DiMauro for pointing me to this extraordinary
2837 history. See also Siva Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
87–93,
2838 which details Edison's "adventures" with copyright and patent.
2839 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
2841 Creators and directors migrated from the East Coast to California in
2842 the early twentieth century in part to escape controls that patents
2843 granted the inventor of filmmaking, Thomas Edison. These controls were
2844 exercised through a monopoly "trust," the Motion Pictures Patents
2845 Company, and were based on Thomas Edison's creative
2846 property
—patents. Edison formed the MPPC to exercise the rights
2847 this creative property
2848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 67 -->
2849 gave him, and the MPPC was serious about the control it demanded.
2852 As one commentator tells one part of the story,
2856 A January
1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with
2857 the license. By February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to
2858 themselves as independents protested the trust and carried on
2859 business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. In the
2860 summer of
1909 the independent movement was in full-swing,
2861 with producers and theater owners using illegal equipment and
2862 imported film stock to create their own underground market.
2865 With the country experiencing a tremendous expansion in the number of
2866 nickelodeons, the Patents Company reacted to the independent movement
2867 by forming a strong-arm subsidiary known as the General Film Company
2868 to block the entry of non-licensed independents. With coercive tactics
2869 that have become legendary, General Film confiscated unlicensed
2870 equipment, discontinued product supply to theaters which showed
2871 unlicensed films, and effectively monopolized distribution with the
2872 acquisition of all U.S. film exchanges, except for the one owned by
2873 the independent William Fox who defied the Trust even after his
2874 license was revoked.
<footnote><para>
2876 J. A. Aberdeen,
<citetitle>Hollywood Renegades: The Society of Independent Motion
2877 Picture Producers
</citetitle> (Cobblestone Entertainment,
2000) and expanded texts
2878 posted at "The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents
2879 Company vs. the Independent Outlaws," available at
2880 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
11</ulink>. For a
2881 discussion of the economic motive behind both these limits and the
2882 limits imposed by Victor on phonographs, see Randal C. Picker, "From
2883 Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and
2884 the Propertization of Copyright" (September
2002), University of
2885 Chicago Law School, James M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
2886 Working Paper No.
159.
</para></footnote>
2887 <indexterm><primary>Fox, William
</primary></indexterm>
2888 <indexterm><primary>General Film Company
</primary></indexterm>
2889 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
2893 The Napsters of those days, the "independents," were companies like
2894 Fox. And no less than today, these independents were vigorously
2895 resisted. "Shooting was disrupted by machinery stolen, and
2896 `accidents' resulting in loss of negatives, equipment, buildings and
2897 sometimes life and limb frequently occurred."
<footnote><para>
2899 Marc Wanamaker, "The First Studios,"
<citetitle>The Silents Majority
</citetitle>, archived at
2900 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
12</ulink>.
2902 That led the independents to flee the East
2903 Coast. California was remote enough from Edison's reach that
2904 filmmakers there could pirate his inventions without fear of the
2905 law. And the leaders of Hollywood filmmaking, Fox most prominently,
2909 Of course, California grew quickly, and the effective enforcement
2910 of federal law eventually spread west. But because patents grant the
2911 patent holder a truly "limited" monopoly (just seventeen years at that
2913 <!-- PAGE BREAK 68 -->
2914 time), by the time enough federal marshals appeared, the patents had
2915 expired. A new industry had been born, in part from the piracy of
2916 Edison's creative property.
2919 <section id=
"recordedmusic">
2920 <title>Recorded Music
</title>
2922 The record industry was born of another kind of piracy, though to see
2923 how requires a bit of detail about the way the law regulates music.
2925 <indexterm id=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='startofrange'
>
2926 <primary>Fourneaux, Henri
</primary>
2928 <indexterm><primary>Russel, Phil
</primary></indexterm>
2930 At the time that Edison and Henri Fourneaux invented machines
2931 for reproducing music (Edison the phonograph, Fourneaux the player
2932 piano), the law gave composers the exclusive right to control copies of
2933 their music and the exclusive right to control public performances of
2934 their music. In other words, in
1900, if I wanted a copy of Phil Russel's
2935 1899 hit "Happy Mose," the law said I would have to pay for the right
2936 to get a copy of the musical score, and I would also have to pay for the
2937 right to perform it publicly.
2939 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
2941 But what if I wanted to record "Happy Mose," using Edison's phonograph
2942 or Fourneaux's player piano? Here the law stumbled. It was clear
2943 enough that I would have to buy any copy of the musical score that I
2944 performed in making this recording. And it was clear enough that I
2945 would have to pay for any public performance of the work I was
2946 recording. But it wasn't totally clear that I would have to pay for a
2947 "public performance" if I recorded the song in my own house (even
2948 today, you don't owe the Beatles anything if you sing their songs in
2949 the shower), or if I recorded the song from memory (copies in your
2950 brain are not
—yet
— regulated by copyright law). So if I
2951 simply sang the song into a recording device in the privacy of my own
2952 home, it wasn't clear that I owed the composer anything. And more
2953 importantly, it wasn't clear whether I owed the composer anything if I
2954 then made copies of those recordings. Because of this gap in the law,
2955 then, I could effectively pirate someone else's song without paying
2956 its composer anything.
2958 <indexterm startref=
"idxfourneauxhenri" class='endofrange'
/>
2960 The composers (and publishers) were none too happy about
2961 <!-- PAGE BREAK 69 -->
2962 this capacity to pirate. As South Dakota senator Alfred Kittredge
2964 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2968 Imagine the injustice of the thing. A composer writes a song or an
2969 opera. A publisher buys at great expense the rights to the same and
2970 copyrights it. Along come the phonographic companies and companies who
2971 cut music rolls and deliberately steal the work of the brain of the
2972 composer and publisher without any regard for [their]
2973 rights.
<footnote><para>
2975 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on
2976 S.
6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the ( Joint) Committees on Patents,
59th
2977 Cong.
59,
1st sess. (
1906) (statement of Senator Alfred B. Kittredge,
2978 of South Dakota, chairman), reprinted in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
2979 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman, eds. (South
2980 Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
2981 <indexterm><primary>Kittredge, Alfred
</primary></indexterm>
2986 The innovators who developed the technology to record other
2987 people's works were "sponging upon the toil, the work, the talent, and
2988 genius of American composers,"
<footnote><para>
2990 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
223
2991 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
2993 and the "music publishing industry"
2994 was thereby "at the complete mercy of this one pirate."
<footnote><para>
2996 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
226
2997 (statement of Nathan Burkan, attorney for the Music Publishers Association).
3000 Sousa put it, in as direct a way as possible, "When they make money
3001 out of my pieces, I want a share of it."
<footnote><para>
3003 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
23
3004 (statement of John Philip Sousa, composer).
3008 These arguments have familiar echoes in the wars of our day. So, too,
3009 do the arguments on the other side. The innovators who developed the
3010 player piano argued that "it is perfectly demonstrable that the
3011 introduction of automatic music players has not deprived any composer
3012 of anything he had before their introduction." Rather, the machines
3013 increased the sales of sheet music.
<footnote><para>
3016 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
283–84
3017 (statement of Albert Walker, representative of the Auto-Music
3018 Perforating Company of New York).
3019 </para></footnote> In any case, the innovators argued, the job of
3020 Congress was "to consider first the interest of [the public], whom
3021 they represent, and whose servants they are." "All talk about
3022 `theft,'" the general counsel of the American Graphophone Company
3023 wrote, "is the merest claptrap, for there exists no property in ideas
3024 musical, literary or artistic, except as defined by
3025 statute."
<footnote><para>
3027 To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright,
376 (prepared
3028 memorandum of Philip Mauro, general patent counsel of the American
3029 Graphophone Company Association).
3031 <indexterm><primary>American Graphophone Company
</primary></indexterm>
3034 The law soon resolved this battle in favor of the composer
3035 <emphasis>and
</emphasis> the recording artist. Congress amended the
3036 law to make sure that composers would be paid for the "mechanical
3037 reproductions" of their music. But rather than simply granting the
3038 composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
3039 reproductions, Congress gave recording artists a right to record the
3040 music, at a price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be
3041 recorded once. This is the part of
3043 <!-- PAGE BREAK 70 -->
3044 copyright law that makes cover songs possible. Once a composer
3045 authorizes a recording of his song, others are free to record the same
3046 song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set by the law.
3049 American law ordinarily calls this a "compulsory license," but I will
3050 refer to it as a "statutory license." A statutory license is a license
3051 whose key terms are set by law. After Congress's amendment of the
3052 Copyright Act in
1909, record companies were free to distribute copies
3053 of recordings so long as they paid the composer (or copyright holder)
3054 the fee set by the statute.
3057 This is an exception within the law of copyright. When John Grisham
3058 writes a novel, a publisher is free to publish that novel only if
3059 Grisham gives the publisher permission. Grisham, in turn, is free to
3060 charge whatever he wants for that permission. The price to publish
3061 Grisham is thus set by Grisham, and copyright law ordinarily says you
3062 have no permission to use Grisham's work except with permission of
3064 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
3067 But the law governing recordings gives recording artists less. And
3068 thus, in effect, the law
<emphasis>subsidizes
</emphasis> the recording
3069 industry through a kind of piracy
—by giving recording artists a
3070 weaker right than it otherwise gives creative authors. The Beatles
3071 have less control over their creative work than Grisham does. And the
3072 beneficiaries of this less control are the recording industry and the
3073 public. The recording industry gets something of value for less than
3074 it otherwise would pay; the public gets access to a much wider range
3075 of musical creativity. Indeed, Congress was quite explicit about its
3076 reasons for granting this right. Its fear was the monopoly power of
3077 rights holders, and that that power would stifle follow-on
3078 creativity.
<footnote><para>
3081 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S.
2499, S.
2900, H.R.
243, and
3082 H.R.
11794 Before the ( Joint) Committee on Patents,
60th Cong.,
1st
3083 sess.,
217 (
1908) (statement of Senator Reed Smoot, chairman), reprinted
3084 in
<citetitle>Legislative History of the
1909 Copyright Act
</citetitle>, E. Fulton Brylawski and
3085 Abe Goldman, eds. (South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints,
1976).
3087 <indexterm><primary>Beatles
</primary></indexterm>
3090 While the recording industry has been quite coy about this recently,
3091 historically it has been quite a supporter of the statutory license for
3092 records. As a
1967 report from the House Committee on the Judiciary
3097 the record producers argued vigorously that the compulsory
3098 <!-- PAGE BREAK 71 -->
3099 license system must be retained. They asserted that the record
3100 industry is a half-billion-dollar business of great economic
3101 importance in the United States and throughout the world; records
3102 today are the principal means of disseminating music, and this creates
3103 special problems, since performers need unhampered access to musical
3104 material on nondiscriminatory terms. Historically, the record
3105 producers pointed out, there were no recording rights before
1909 and
3106 the
1909 statute adopted the compulsory license as a deliberate
3107 anti-monopoly condition on the grant of these rights. They argue that
3108 the result has been an outpouring of recorded music, with the public
3109 being given lower prices, improved quality, and a greater
3110 choice.
<footnote><para>
3112 Copyright Law Revision: Report to Accompany H.R.
2512, House Committee
3113 on the Judiciary,
90th Cong.,
1st sess., House Document no.
83, (
8
3114 March
1967). I am grateful to Glenn Brown for drawing my attention to
3115 this report.
</para></footnote>
3119 By limiting the rights musicians have, by partially pirating their
3120 creative work, the record producers, and the public, benefit.
3123 <section id=
"radio">
3124 <title>Radio
</title>
3126 Radio was also born of piracy.
3129 When a radio station plays a record on the air, that constitutes a
3130 "public performance" of the composer's work.
<footnote><para>
3132 See
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, sections
106 and
110. At the beginning,
3133 record companies printed "Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" and other
3134 messages purporting to restrict the ability to play a record on a
3135 radio station. Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument that a
3136 warning attached to a record might restrict the rights of the radio
3137 station. See
<citetitle>RCA Manufacturing Co
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Whiteman
</citetitle>,
114 F.
2d
86 (
2nd
3138 Cir.
1940). See also Randal C. Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast
3139 Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of
3140 Copyright,"
<citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
281.
3141 <indexterm><primary>Hand, Learned
</primary></indexterm>
3142 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
3144 As I described above, the law gives the composer (or copyright holder)
3145 an exclusive right to public performances of his work. The radio
3146 station thus owes the composer money for that performance.
3149 But when the radio station plays a record, it is not only performing a
3150 copy of the
<emphasis>composer's
</emphasis> work. The radio station is
3151 also performing a copy of the
<emphasis>recording artist's
</emphasis>
3152 work. It's one thing to have "Happy Birthday" sung on the radio by the
3153 local children's choir; it's quite another to have it sung by the
3154 Rolling Stones or Lyle Lovett. The recording artist is adding to the
3155 value of the composition performed on the radio station. And if the
3156 law were perfectly consistent, the radio station would have to pay the
3157 recording artist for his work, just as it pays the composer of the
3159 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
3161 <!-- PAGE BREAK 72 -->
3164 But it doesn't. Under the law governing radio performances, the radio
3165 station does not have to pay the recording artist. The radio station
3166 need only pay the composer. The radio station thus gets a bit of
3167 something for nothing. It gets to perform the recording artist's work
3168 for free, even if it must pay the composer something for the privilege
3169 of playing the song.
3171 <indexterm id=
"idxmadonna" class='startofrange'
>
3172 <primary>Madonna
</primary>
3175 This difference can be huge. Imagine you compose a piece of music.
3176 Imagine it is your first. You own the exclusive right to authorize
3177 public performances of that music. So if Madonna wants to sing your
3178 song in public, she has to get your permission.
3181 Imagine she does sing your song, and imagine she likes it a lot. She
3182 then decides to make a recording of your song, and it becomes a top
3183 hit. Under our law, every time a radio station plays your song, you
3184 get some money. But Madonna gets nothing, save the indirect effect on
3185 the sale of her CDs. The public performance of her recording is not a
3186 "protected" right. The radio station thus gets to
3187 <emphasis>pirate
</emphasis> the value of Madonna's work without paying
3190 <indexterm startref=
"idxmadonna" class='endofrange'
/>
3192 No doubt, one might argue that, on balance, the recording artists
3193 benefit. On average, the promotion they get is worth more than the
3194 performance rights they give up. Maybe. But even if so, the law
3195 ordinarily gives the creator the right to make this choice. By making
3196 the choice for him or her, the law gives the radio station the right
3197 to take something for nothing.
3200 <section id=
"cabletv">
3201 <title>Cable TV
</title>
3204 Cable TV was also born of a kind of piracy.
3207 When cable entrepreneurs first started wiring communities with cable
3208 television in
1948, most refused to pay broadcasters for the content
3209 that they echoed to their customers. Even when the cable companies
3210 started selling access to television broadcasts, they refused to pay
3211 <!-- PAGE BREAK 73 -->
3212 for what they sold. Cable companies were thus Napsterizing
3213 broadcasters' content, but more egregiously than anything Napster ever
3214 did
— Napster never charged for the content it enabled others to
3217 <indexterm><primary>Anello, Douglas
</primary></indexterm>
3218 <indexterm><primary>Burdick, Quentin
</primary></indexterm>
3219 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3221 Broadcasters and copyright owners were quick to attack this theft.
3222 Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, viewed the practice as a kind of
3223 "unfair and potentially destructive competition."
<footnote><para>
3225 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV: Hearing on S.
1006 Before the
3226 Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
3227 Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong.,
2nd sess.,
78 (
1966)
3228 (statement of Rosel H. Hyde, chairman of the Federal Communications
3230 <indexterm><primary>Hyde, Rosel H.
</primary></indexterm>
3232 There may have been a "public interest" in spreading the reach of cable
3233 TV, but as Douglas Anello, general counsel to the National Association
3234 of Broadcasters, asked Senator Quentin Burdick during testimony, "Does public
3235 interest dictate that you use somebody else's property?"
<footnote><para>
3237 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
116 (statement of Douglas A. Anello,
3238 general counsel of the National Association of Broadcasters).
3240 As another broadcaster put it,
3244 The extraordinary thing about the CATV business is that it is the
3245 only business I know of where the product that is being sold is not
3246 paid for.
<footnote><para>
3248 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
126 (statement of Ernest W. Jennes,
3249 general counsel of the Association of Maximum Service Telecasters, Inc.).
3254 Again, the demand of the copyright holders seemed reasonable enough:
3258 All we are asking for is a very simple thing, that people who now
3259 take our property for nothing pay for it. We are trying to stop
3260 piracy and I don't think there is any lesser word to describe it. I
3261 think there are harsher words which would fit it.
<footnote><para>
3263 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
169 (joint statement of Arthur B.
3264 Krim, president of United Artists Corp., and John Sinn, president of
3265 United Artists Television, Inc.).
3269 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3271 These were "free-ride[rs]," Screen Actor's Guild president Charlton
3272 Heston said, who were "depriving actors of
3273 compensation."
<footnote><para>
3275 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
209 (statement of Charlton Heston,
3276 president of the Screen Actors Guild).
3277 <indexterm><primary>Heston, Charlton
</primary></indexterm>
3282 But again, there was another side to the debate. As Assistant Attorney
3283 General Edwin Zimmerman put it,
3287 Our point here is that unlike the problem of whether you have any
3288 copyright protection at all, the problem here is whether copyright
3289 holders who are already compensated, who already have a monopoly,
3290 should be permitted to extend that monopoly.
… The
3292 <!-- PAGE BREAK 74 -->
3293 question here is how much compensation they should have and
3294 how far back they should carry their right to compensation.
<footnote><para>
3296 Copyright Law Revision
—CATV,
216 (statement of Edwin M.
3297 Zimmerman, acting assistant attorney general).
3298 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3300 <indexterm><primary>Zimmerman, Edwin
</primary></indexterm>
3304 Copyright owners took the cable companies to court. Twice the Supreme
3305 Court held that the cable companies owed the copyright owners nothing.
3308 It took Congress almost thirty years before it resolved the question
3309 of whether cable companies had to pay for the content they "pirated."
3310 In the end, Congress resolved this question in the same way that it
3311 resolved the question about record players and player pianos. Yes,
3312 cable companies would have to pay for the content that they broadcast;
3313 but the price they would have to pay was not set by the copyright
3314 owner. The price was set by law, so that the broadcasters couldn't
3315 exercise veto power over the emerging technologies of cable. Cable
3316 companies thus built their empire in part upon a "piracy" of the value
3317 created by broadcasters' content.
3320 These separate stories sing a common theme. If "piracy" means
3321 using value from someone else's creative property without permission
3322 from that creator
—as it is increasingly described
3323 today
<footnote><para>
3325 See, for example, National Music Publisher's Association,
<citetitle>The Engine
3326 of Free Expression: Copyright on the Internet
—The Myth of Free
3327 Information
</citetitle>, available at
3328 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
13</ulink>. "The
3329 threat of piracy
—the use of someone else's creative work without
3330 permission or compensation
—has grown with the Internet."
3332 — then
<emphasis>every
</emphasis> industry affected by copyright
3333 today is the product and beneficiary of a certain kind of
3334 piracy. Film, records, radio, cable TV.
… The list is long and
3335 could well be expanded. Every generation welcomes the pirates from the
3336 last. Every generation
—until now.
3338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 75 -->
3341 <chapter label=
"5" id=
"piracy">
3342 <title>CHAPTER FIVE: "Piracy"
</title>
3344 There is piracy of copyrighted material. Lots of it. This piracy comes
3345 in many forms. The most significant is commercial piracy, the
3346 unauthorized taking of other people's content within a commercial
3347 context. Despite the many justifications that are offered in its
3348 defense, this taking is wrong. No one should condone it, and the law
3352 But as well as copy-shop piracy, there is another kind of "taking"
3353 that is more directly related to the Internet. That taking, too, seems
3354 wrong to many, and it is wrong much of the time. Before we paint this
3355 taking "piracy," however, we should understand its nature a bit more.
3356 For the harm of this taking is significantly more ambiguous than
3357 outright copying, and the law should account for that ambiguity, as it
3358 has so often done in the past.
3359 <!-- PAGE BREAK 76 -->
3361 <section id=
"piracy-i">
3362 <title>Piracy I
</title>
3364 All across the world, but especially in Asia and Eastern Europe, there
3365 are businesses that do nothing but take others people's copyrighted
3366 content, copy it, and sell it
—all without the permission of a copyright
3367 owner. The recording industry estimates that it loses about $
4.6 billion
3368 every year to physical piracy
<footnote><para>
3370 See IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry),
<citetitle>The
3371 Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report
2003</citetitle>, July
2003, available
3372 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
14</ulink>. See
3373 also Ben Hunt, "Companies Warned on Music Piracy Risk,"
<citetitle>Financial
3374 Times
</citetitle>,
14 February
2003,
11.
3376 (that works out to one in three CDs sold worldwide). The MPAA
3377 estimates that it loses $
3 billion annually worldwide to piracy.
3380 This is piracy plain and simple. Nothing in the argument of this
3381 book, nor in the argument that most people make when talking about
3382 the subject of this book, should draw into doubt this simple point:
3383 This piracy is wrong.
3386 Which is not to say that excuses and justifications couldn't be made
3387 for it. We could, for example, remind ourselves that for the first one
3388 hundred years of the American Republic, America did not honor foreign
3389 copyrights. We were born, in this sense, a pirate nation. It might
3390 therefore seem hypocritical for us to insist so strongly that other
3391 developing nations treat as wrong what we, for the first hundred years
3392 of our existence, treated as right.
3395 That excuse isn't terribly strong. Technically, our law did not ban
3396 the taking of foreign works. It explicitly limited itself to American
3397 works. Thus the American publishers who published foreign works
3398 without the permission of foreign authors were not violating any rule.
3399 The copy shops in Asia, by contrast, are violating Asian law. Asian
3400 law does protect foreign copyrights, and the actions of the copy shops
3401 violate that law. So the wrong of piracy that they engage in is not
3402 just a moral wrong, but a legal wrong, and not just an internationally
3403 legal wrong, but a locally legal wrong as well.
3406 True, these local rules have, in effect, been imposed upon these
3407 countries. No country can be part of the world economy and choose
3408 <beginpage pagenum=
"77"/>
3409 not to protect copyright internationally. We may have been born a
3410 pirate nation, but we will not allow any other nation to have a
3414 If a country is to be treated as a sovereign, however, then its laws are
3415 its laws regardless of their source. The international law under which
3416 these nations live gives them some opportunities to escape the burden
3417 of intellectual property law.
<footnote><para>
3419 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:
3420 <citetitle>Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The
3421 New Press,
2003),
10–13,
209. The Trade-Related Aspects of
3422 Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement obligates member
3423 nations to create administrative and enforcement mechanisms for
3424 intellectual property rights, a costly proposition for developing
3425 countries. Additionally, patent rights may lead to higher prices for
3426 staple industries such as agriculture. Critics of TRIPS question the
3427 disparity between burdens imposed upon developing countries and
3428 benefits conferred to industrialized nations. TRIPS does permit
3429 governments to use patents for public, noncommercial uses without
3430 first obtaining the patent holder's permission. Developing nations may
3431 be able to use this to gain the benefits of foreign patents at lower
3432 prices. This is a promising strategy for developing nations within the
3434 <indexterm><primary>agricultural patents
</primary></indexterm>
3435 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
3436 </para></footnote> In my view, more developing nations should take
3437 advantage of that opportunity, but when they don't, then their laws
3438 should be respected. And under the laws of these nations, this piracy
3442 Alternatively, we could try to excuse this piracy by noting that in
3443 any case, it does no harm to the industry. The Chinese who get access
3444 to American CDs at
50 cents a copy are not people who would have
3445 bought those American CDs at $
15 a copy. So no one really has any
3446 less money than they otherwise would have had.
<footnote><para>
3448 For an analysis of the economic impact of copying technology, see Stan
3449 Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002),
3450 144–90. "In some instances
… the impact of piracy on the
3451 copyright holder's ability to appropriate the value of the work will
3452 be negligible. One obvious instance is the case where the individual
3453 engaging in pirating would not have purchased an original even if
3454 pirating were not an option." Ibid.,
149.
3455 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3459 This is often true (though I have friends who have purchased many
3460 thousands of pirated DVDs who certainly have enough money to pay
3461 for the content they have taken), and it does mitigate to some degree
3462 the harm caused by such taking. Extremists in this debate love to say,
3463 "You wouldn't go into Barnes
& Noble and take a book off of the shelf
3464 without paying; why should it be any different with on-line music?"
3465 The difference is, of course, that when you take a book from Barnes
&
3466 Noble, it has one less book to sell. By contrast, when you take an MP3
3467 from a computer network, there is not one less CD that can be sold.
3468 The physics of piracy of the intangible are different from the physics of
3469 piracy of the tangible.
3472 This argument is still very weak. However, although copyright is a
3473 property right of a very special sort, it
<emphasis>is
</emphasis> a
3474 property right. Like all property rights, the copyright gives the
3475 owner the right to decide the terms under which content is shared. If
3476 the copyright owner doesn't want to sell, she doesn't have to. There
3477 are exceptions: important statutory licenses that apply to copyrighted
3478 content regardless of the wish of the copyright owner. Those licenses
3479 give people the right to "take" copyrighted content whether or not the
3480 copyright owner wants to sell. But
3482 <!-- PAGE BREAK 78 -->
3483 where the law does not give people the right to take content, it is
3484 wrong to take that content even if the wrong does no harm. If we have
3485 a property system, and that system is properly balanced to the
3486 technology of a time, then it is wrong to take property without the
3487 permission of a property owner. That is exactly what "property" means.
3490 Finally, we could try to excuse this piracy with the argument that the
3491 piracy actually helps the copyright owner. When the Chinese "steal"
3492 Windows, that makes the Chinese dependent on Microsoft. Microsoft
3493 loses the value of the software that was taken. But it gains users who
3494 are used to life in the Microsoft world. Over time, as the nation
3495 grows more wealthy, more and more people will buy software rather than
3496 steal it. And hence over time, because that buying will benefit
3497 Microsoft, Microsoft benefits from the piracy. If instead of pirating
3498 Microsoft Windows, the Chinese used the free GNU/Linux operating
3499 system, then these Chinese users would not eventually be buying
3500 Microsoft. Without piracy, then, Microsoft would lose.
3501 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3502 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3504 <primary>Microsoft
</primary>
3505 <secondary>Windows operating system of
</secondary>
3507 <indexterm><primary>Windows
</primary></indexterm>
3510 This argument, too, is somewhat true. The addiction strategy is a good
3511 one. Many businesses practice it. Some thrive because of it. Law
3512 students, for example, are given free access to the two largest legal
3513 databases. The companies marketing both hope the students will become
3514 so used to their service that they will want to use it and not the
3515 other when they become lawyers (and must pay high subscription fees).
3518 Still, the argument is not terribly persuasive. We don't give the
3519 alcoholic a defense when he steals his first beer, merely because that
3520 will make it more likely that he will buy the next three. Instead, we
3521 ordinarily allow businesses to decide for themselves when it is best
3522 to give their product away. If Microsoft fears the competition of
3523 GNU/Linux, then Microsoft can give its product away, as it did, for
3524 example, with Internet Explorer to fight Netscape. A property right
3525 means giving the property owner the right to say who gets access to
3526 what
—at least ordinarily. And if the law properly balances the
3527 rights of the copyright owner with the rights of access, then
3528 violating the law is still wrong.
3529 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3530 <indexterm><primary>Internet Explorer
</primary></indexterm>
3531 <indexterm><primary>Netscape
</primary></indexterm>
3532 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
3535 <!-- PAGE BREAK 79 -->
3536 Thus, while I understand the pull of these justifications for piracy,
3537 and I certainly see the motivation, in my view, in the end, these efforts
3538 at justifying commercial piracy simply don't cut it. This kind of piracy
3539 is rampant and just plain wrong. It doesn't transform the content it
3540 steals; it doesn't transform the market it competes in. It merely gives
3541 someone access to something that the law says he should not have.
3542 Nothing has changed to draw that law into doubt. This form of piracy
3546 But as the examples from the four chapters that introduced this part
3547 suggest, even if some piracy is plainly wrong, not all "piracy" is. Or
3548 at least, not all "piracy" is wrong if that term is understood in the
3549 way it is increasingly used today. Many kinds of "piracy" are useful
3550 and productive, to produce either new content or new ways of doing
3551 business. Neither our tradition nor any tradition has ever banned all
3552 "piracy" in that sense of the term.
3555 This doesn't mean that there are no questions raised by the latest
3556 piracy concern, peer-to-peer file sharing. But it does mean that we
3557 need to understand the harm in peer-to-peer sharing a bit more before
3558 we condemn it to the gallows with the charge of piracy.
3561 For (
1) like the original Hollywood, p2p sharing escapes an overly
3562 controlling industry; and (
2) like the original recording industry, it
3563 simply exploits a new way to distribute content; but (
3) unlike cable
3564 TV, no one is selling the content that is shared on p2p services.
3567 These differences distinguish p2p sharing from true piracy. They
3568 should push us to find a way to protect artists while enabling this
3572 <section id=
"piracy-ii">
3573 <title>Piracy II
</title>
3575 The key to the "piracy" that the law aims to quash is a use that "rob[s]
3576 the author of [his] profit."
<footnote><para>
3578 <citetitle>Bach
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Longman
</citetitle>,
98 Eng. Rep.
1274 (
1777).
3580 This means we must determine whether
3581 and how much p2p sharing harms before we know how strongly the
3582 <!-- PAGE BREAK 80 -->
3583 law should seek to either prevent it or find an alternative to assure the
3584 author of his profit.
3587 Peer-to-peer sharing was made famous by Napster. But the inventors of
3588 the Napster technology had not made any major technological
3589 innovations. Like every great advance in innovation on the Internet
3590 (and, arguably, off the Internet as well
<footnote><para>
3592 See Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary
3593 National Bestseller That Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle> (New York:
3594 HarperBusiness,
2000). Professor Christensen examines why companies
3595 that give rise to and dominate a product area are frequently unable to
3596 come up with the most creative, paradigm-shifting uses for their own
3597 products. This job usually falls to outside innovators, who
3598 reassemble existing technology in inventive ways. For a discussion of
3599 Christensen's ideas, see Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
89–92,
139.
3601 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
3602 </para></footnote>), Shawn Fanning and crew had simply
3603 put together components that had been developed independently.
3604 <indexterm><primary>Fanning, Shawn
</primary></indexterm>
3607 The result was spontaneous combustion. Launched in July
1999,
3608 Napster amassed over
10 million users within nine months. After
3609 eighteen months, there were close to
80 million registered users of the
3610 system.
<footnote><para>
3612 See Carolyn Lochhead, "Silicon Valley Dream, Hollywood Nightmare,"
<citetitle>San
3613 Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24 September
2002, A1; "Rock 'n' Roll Suicide,"
3614 <citetitle>New Scientist
</citetitle>,
6 July
2002,
42; Benny Evangelista, "Napster Names CEO,
3615 Secures New Financing,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
23 May
2003, C1;
3616 "Napster's Wake-Up Call,"
<citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
24 June
2000,
23; John Naughton,
3617 "Hollywood at War with the Internet" (London)
<citetitle>Times
</citetitle>,
26 July
2002,
18.
3619 Courts quickly shut Napster down, but other services emerged
3620 to take its place. (Kazaa is currently the most popular p2p service. It
3621 boasts over
100 million members.) These services' systems are different
3622 architecturally, though not very different in function: Each enables
3623 users to make content available to any number of other users. With a
3624 p2p system, you can share your favorite songs with your best friend
—
3625 or your
20,
000 best friends.
3628 According to a number of estimates, a huge proportion of Americans
3629 have tasted file-sharing technology. A study by Ipsos-Insight in
3630 September
2002 estimated that
60 million Americans had downloaded
3631 music
—28 percent of Americans older than
12.
<footnote><para>
3634 See Ipsos-Insight,
<citetitle>TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Online Music Distribution
</citetitle>
3635 (September
2002), reporting that
28 percent of Americans aged twelve
3636 and older have downloaded music off of the Internet and
30 percent have
3637 listened to digital music files stored on their computers.
3639 A survey by the NPD group quoted in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>
3640 estimated that
43 million citizens used file-sharing networks to
3641 exchange content in May
2003.
<footnote><para>
3643 Amy Harmon, "Industry Offers a Carrot in Online Music Fight,"
<citetitle>New
3644 York Times
</citetitle>,
6 June
2003, A1.
3646 The vast majority of these are not kids. Whatever the actual figure, a
3647 massive quantity of content is being "taken" on these networks. The
3648 ease and inexpensiveness of file-sharing networks have inspired
3649 millions to enjoy music in a way that they hadn't before.
3652 Some of this enjoying involves copyright infringement. Some of it does
3653 not. And even among the part that is technically copyright
3654 infringement, calculating the actual harm to copyright owners is more
3655 complicated than one might think. So consider
—a bit more
3656 carefully than the polarized voices around this debate usually
3657 do
—the kinds of sharing that file sharing enables, and the kinds
3661 <!-- PAGE BREAK 81 -->
3662 File sharers share different kinds of content. We can divide these
3663 different kinds into four types.
3665 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
3668 There are some who use sharing networks as substitutes for purchasing
3669 content. Thus, when a new Madonna CD is released, rather than buying
3670 the CD, these users simply take it. We might quibble about whether
3671 everyone who takes it would actually have bought it if sharing didn't
3672 make it available for free. Most probably wouldn't have, but clearly
3673 there are some who would. The latter are the target of category A:
3674 users who download instead of purchasing.
3675 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
3679 There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before
3680 purchasing it. Thus, a friend sends another friend an MP3 of an artist
3681 he's not heard of. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This
3682 is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the
3683 friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation,
3684 then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite
3685 good. The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of
3690 There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted
3691 content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased
3692 because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of
3693 sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were
3694 part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace
3695 magically appear again on the network. (One friend told me that when
3696 she discovered Napster, she spent a solid weekend "recalling" old
3697 songs. She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was
3698 available.) For content not sold, this is still technically a
3699 violation of copyright, though because the copyright owner is not
3700 selling the content anymore, the economic harm is zero
—the same
3701 harm that occurs when I sell my collection of
1960s
45-rpm records to
3705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 82 -->
3707 Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access
3708 to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner
3713 How do these different types of sharing balance out?
3716 Let's start with some simple but important points. From the
3717 perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the
3718 perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly
3719 harmful.
<footnote><para>
3721 See Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy
</citetitle>,
148–49.
3722 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
3724 Type B sharing is illegal but plainly beneficial. Type C sharing is
3725 illegal, yet good for society (since more exposure to music is good)
3726 and harmless to the artist (since the work is not otherwise
3727 available). So how sharing matters on balance is a hard question to
3728 answer
—and certainly much more difficult than the current
3729 rhetoric around the issue suggests.
3732 Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how
3733 harmful type A sharing is. Just as Edison complained about Hollywood,
3734 composers complained about piano rolls, recording artists complained
3735 about radio, and broadcasters complained about cable TV, the music
3736 industry complains that type A sharing is a kind of "theft" that is
3737 "devastating" the industry.
3740 While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how
3741 harmful is harder to reckon. It has long been the recording industry's
3742 practice to blame technology for any drop in sales. The history of
3743 cassette recording is a good example. As a study by Cap Gemini Ernst
3744 & Young put it, "Rather than exploiting this new, popular
3745 technology, the labels fought it."
<footnote><para>
3747 See Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young,
<citetitle>Technology Evolution and the
3748 Music Industry's Business Model Crisis
</citetitle> (
2003),
3. This report
3749 describes the music industry's effort to stigmatize the budding
3750 practice of cassette taping in the
1970s, including an advertising
3751 campaign featuring a cassette-shape skull and the caption "Home taping
3752 is killing music." At the time digital audio tape became a threat,
3753 the Office of Technical Assessment conducted a survey of consumer
3754 behavior. In
1988,
40 percent of consumers older than ten had taped
3755 music to a cassette format. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
3756 Assessment,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying: Technology Challenges the Law
</citetitle>,
3757 OTA-CIT-
422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
3758 October
1989),
145–56.
</para></footnote>
3759 The labels claimed that every album taped was an album unsold, and
3760 when record sales fell by
11.4 percent in
1981, the industry claimed
3761 that its point was proved. Technology was the problem, and banning or
3762 regulating technology was the answer.
3765 Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity
3766 to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record
3767 turnaround. "In the end," Cap Gemini concludes, "the `crisis'
… was
3768 not the fault of the tapers
—who did not [stop after MTV came into
3769 <!-- PAGE BREAK 83 -->
3770 being]
—but had to a large extent resulted from stagnation in musical
3771 innovation at the major labels."
<footnote><para>
3773 U.S. Congress,
<citetitle>Copyright and Home Copying
</citetitle>,
4.
3777 But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is
3778 wrong today. To evaluate the real threat that p2p sharing presents to
3779 the industry in particular, and society in general
—or at least
3780 the society that inherits the tradition that gave us the film
3781 industry, the record industry, the radio industry, cable TV, and the
3782 VCR
—the question is not simply whether type A sharing is
3783 harmful. The question is also
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> harmful type A
3784 sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are.
3787 We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the
3788 standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause.
3789 The "net harm" to the industry as a whole is the amount by which type
3790 A sharing exceeds type B. If the record companies sold more records
3791 through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing
3792 networks would actually benefit music companies on balance. They would
3793 therefore have little
<emphasis>static
</emphasis> reason to resist
3798 Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because
3799 of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales
3800 actually suggest it might be close.
3803 In
2002, the RIAA reported that CD sales had fallen by
8.9 percent,
3804 from
882 million to
803 million units; revenues fell
6.7
3805 percent.
<footnote><para>
3807 See Recording Industry Association of America,
<citetitle>2002 Yearend Statistics
</citetitle>,
3809 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
15</ulink>. A later
3810 report indicates even greater losses. See Recording Industry
3811 Association of America,
<citetitle>Some Facts About Music Piracy
</citetitle>,
25 June
2003,
3812 available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
3813 #
16</ulink>: "In the past four years, unit shipments of recorded music
3814 have fallen by
26 percent from
1.16 billion units in to
860 million
3815 units in
2002 in the United States (based on units shipped). In terms
3816 of sales, revenues are down
14 percent, from $
14.6 billion in to $
12.6
3817 billion last year (based on U.S. dollar value of shipments). The music
3818 industry worldwide has gone from a $
39 billion industry in
2000 down
3819 to a $
32 billion industry in
2002 (based on U.S. dollar value of
3822 This confirms a trend over the past few years. The RIAA blames
3823 Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that
3824 could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more
3825 than
20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since
1999. That no
3826 doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Rising prices could
3827 account for at least some of the loss. "From
1999 to
2001, the average
3828 price of a CD rose
7.2 percent, from $
13.04 to $
14.19."
<footnote>
3831 Jane Black, "Big Music's Broken Record," BusinessWeek online,
13
3832 February
2003, available at
3833 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
17</ulink>.
3834 <indexterm><primary>Black, Jane
</primary></indexterm>
3837 Competition from other forms of media could also account for some of
3838 the decline. As Jane Black of
<citetitle>BusinessWeek
</citetitle> notes, "The
3839 soundtrack to the film
<citetitle>High Fidelity
</citetitle> has a list price of
3840 $
18.98. You could get the whole movie [on DVD] for
3841 $
19.99."
<footnote><para>
3848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 84 -->
3849 But let's assume the RIAA is right, and all of the decline in CD sales
3850 is because of Internet sharing. Here's the rub: In the same period
3851 that the RIAA estimates that
803 million CDs were sold, the RIAA
3852 estimates that
2.1 billion CDs were downloaded for free. Thus,
3853 although
2.6 times the total number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3854 free, sales revenue fell by just
6.7 percent.
3857 There are too many different things happening at the same time to
3858 explain these numbers definitively, but one conclusion is unavoidable:
3859 The recording industry constantly asks, "What's the difference between
3860 downloading a song and stealing a CD?"
—but their own numbers
3861 reveal the difference. If I steal a CD, then there is one less CD to
3862 sell. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the
3863 RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of
3864 downloads. If every download were a lost sale
—if every use of
3865 Kazaa "rob[bed] the author of [his] profit"
—then the industry
3866 would have suffered a
100 percent drop in sales last year, not a
7
3867 percent drop. If
2.6 times the number of CDs sold were downloaded for
3868 free, and yet sales revenue dropped by just
6.7 percent, then there is
3869 a huge difference between "downloading a song and stealing a CD."
3872 These are the harms
—alleged and perhaps exaggerated but, let's
3873 assume, real. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on
3874 the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to
3878 One benefit is type C sharing
—making available content that
3879 is technically still under copyright but is no longer commercially
3880 available. This is not a small category of content. There are
3881 millions of tracks that are no longer commercially
3882 available.
<footnote><para>
3884 By one estimate,
75 percent of the music released by the major labels
3885 is no longer in print. See Online Entertainment and Copyright
3886 Law
—Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
3887 Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
107th Cong.,
1st sess. (
3 April
3888 2001) (prepared statement of the Future of Music Coalition), available
3889 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
18</ulink>.
3891 And while it's conceivable that some of this content is not available
3892 because the artist producing the content doesn't want it to be made
3893 available, the vast majority of it is unavailable solely because the
3894 publisher or the distributor has decided it no longer makes economic
3895 sense
<emphasis>to the company
</emphasis> to make it available.
3898 In real space
—long before the Internet
—the market had a simple
3899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 85 -->
3900 response to this problem: used book and record stores. There are
3901 thousands of used book and used record stores in America
3902 today.
<footnote><para>
3904 While there are not good estimates of the number of used record stores in
3905 existence, in
2002, there were
7,
198 used book dealers in the United States,
3906 an increase of
20 percent since
1993. See Book Hunter Press,
<citetitle>The Quiet
3907 Revolution: The Expansion of the Used Book Market
</citetitle> (
2002), available at
3908 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
19</ulink>. Used records accounted for $
260 million in sales in
2002. See
3910 Association of Recording Merchandisers, "
2002 Annual Survey
3913 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
20</ulink>.
3915 These stores buy content from owners, then sell the content they
3916 buy. And under American copyright law, when they buy and sell this
3917 content,
<emphasis>even if the content is still under
3918 copyright
</emphasis>, the copyright owner doesn't get a dime. Used
3919 book and record stores are commercial entities; their owners make
3920 money from the content they sell; but as with cable companies before
3921 statutory licensing, they don't have to pay the copyright owner for
3922 the content they sell.
3924 <indexterm><primary>Bernstein, Leonard
</primary></indexterm>
3926 Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used
3927 record stores. It is different, of course, because the person making
3928 the content available isn't making money from making the content
3929 available. It is also different, of course, because in real space,
3930 when I sell a record, I don't have it anymore, while in cyberspace,
3931 when someone shares my
1949 recording of Bernstein's "Two Love Songs,"
3932 I still have it. That difference would matter economically if the
3933 owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my
3934 sharing. But we're talking about the class of content that is not
3935 currently commercially available. The Internet is making it available,
3936 through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market.
3939 It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the
3940 copyright owner got something from this trade. But just because it may
3941 well be better, it doesn't follow that it would be good to ban used book
3942 stores. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be
3943 stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be
3947 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, file-sharing networks enable
3948 type D sharing to occur
—the sharing of content that copyright owners
3949 want to have shared or for which there is no continuing copyright. This
3950 sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author
3951 Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
3952 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, both free on-line and in bookstores on the same
3954 <!-- PAGE BREAK 86 -->
3955 day. His (and his publisher's) thinking was that the on-line distribution
3956 would be a great advertisement for the "real" book. People would read
3957 part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not. If
3958 they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. Doctorow's content is
3959 type D content. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then
3960 both he and society are better off. (Actually, much better off: It is a
3964 Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society
3965 with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem
3966 of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we
3967 lose something important in order to protect type A content.
3970 The point throughout is this: While the recording industry
3971 understandably says, "This is how much we've lost," we must also ask,
3972 "How much has society gained from p2p sharing? What are the
3973 efficiencies? What is the content that otherwise would be
3977 For unlike the piracy I described in the first section of this
3978 chapter, much of the "piracy" that file sharing enables is plainly
3979 legal and good. And like the piracy I described in chapter
3980 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"pirates"/>, much of
3981 this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by
3982 changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the
3983 tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and
3984 cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how
3985 best to preserve its benefits while minimizing (to the extent
3986 possible) the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of
3987 balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be
3988 found only with time.
3991 "But isn't the war just a war against illegal sharing? Isn't the target
3992 just what you call type A sharing?"
3995 You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The
3997 of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far
3998 beyond that one class of sharing. That much is obvious from the
4000 case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had
4002 a technology to block the transfer of
99.4 percent of identified
4003 <!-- PAGE BREAK 87 -->
4004 infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster
99.4
4005 percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the infringements
4006 "down to zero."
<footnote><para>
4008 See Transcript of Proceedings, In Re: Napster Copyright Litigation at
34-
4009 35 (N.D. Cal.,
11 July
2001), nos. MDL-
00-
1369 MHP, C
99-
5183
4012 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
21</ulink>. For an
4013 account of the litigation and its toll on Napster, see Joseph Menn,
4014 <citetitle>All the Rave: The Rise and Fall of Shawn Fanning's Napster
</citetitle> (New
4015 York: Crown Business,
2003),
269–82.
4019 If
99.4 percent is not good enough, then this is a war on file-sharing
4020 technologies, not a war on copyright infringement. There is no way to
4021 assure that a p2p system is used
100 percent of the time in compliance
4022 with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that
100 percent of
4023 VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or
100 percent of handguns
4024 are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p.
4025 The court's ruling means that we as a society must lose the benefits of
4026 p2p, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to
4027 assure that there are zero copyright infringements caused by p2p.
4030 Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the
4031 content industry that we know today. The history of American law has
4032 been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content
4033 was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new
4034 technology. In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the
4035 legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes
4036 this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less.
4039 So, as we've seen, when "mechanical reproduction" threatened the
4040 interests of composers, Congress balanced the rights of composers
4041 against the interests of the recording industry. It granted rights to
4042 composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be
4043 paid, but at a price set by Congress. But when radio started
4044 broadcasting the recordings made by these recording artists, and they
4045 complained to Congress that their "creative property" was not being
4046 respected (since the radio station did not have to pay them for the
4047 creativity it broadcast), Congress rejected their claim. An indirect
4051 Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts
4052 rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content
4053 they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to
4054 compensation, but at a level set by the law. It likewise gave cable
4055 companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory
4060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 88 -->
4061 This compromise, like the compromise affecting records and player
4062 pianos, served two important goals
—indeed, the two central goals
4063 of any copyright legislation. First, the law assured that new
4064 innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver
4065 content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid
4066 for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress
4067 simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they
4068 demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with
4069 broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology,
4070 cable. But if Congress had permitted cable to use broadcasters'
4071 content for free, then it would have unfairly subsidized cable. Thus
4072 Congress chose a path that would assure
4073 <emphasis>compensation
</emphasis> without giving the past
4074 (broadcasters) control over the future (cable).
4076 <indexterm><primary>Betamax
</primary></indexterm>
4078 In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major
4079 producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against
4080 another technology, the video tape recorder (VTR, or as we refer to
4081 them today, VCRs) that Sony had produced, the Betamax. Disney's and
4082 Universal's claim against Sony was relatively simple: Sony produced a
4083 device, Disney and Universal claimed, that enabled consumers to engage
4084 in copyright infringement. Because the device that Sony built had a
4085 "record" button, the device could be used to record copyrighted movies
4086 and shows. Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright
4087 infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and
4088 Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement.
4091 There was something to Disney's and Universal's claim. Sony did
4092 decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television
4093 shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct
4094 copying from a television broadcast. Or possibly, it could have built the
4095 machine to copy only if there were a special "copy me" signal on the
4096 line. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not
4097 grant anyone permission to copy. Indeed, if anyone had asked, no
4098 doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And
4099 <!-- PAGE BREAK 89 -->
4100 in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its
4101 system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did
4102 not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible
4103 for the architecture it chose.
4106 MPAA president Jack Valenti became the studios' most vocal
4107 champion. Valenti called VCRs "tapeworms." He warned, "When there are
4108 20,
30,
40 million of these VCRs in the land, we will be invaded by
4109 millions of `tapeworms,' eating away at the very heart and essence of
4110 the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his
4111 copyright."
<footnote><para>
4113 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearing on
4114 S.
1758 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
97th Cong.,
1st
4115 and
2nd sess.,
459 (
1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, president, Motion
4116 Picture Association of America, Inc.).
4118 "One does not have to be trained in sophisticated marketing and
4119 creative judgment," he told Congress, "to understand the devastation
4120 on the after-theater marketplace caused by the hundreds of millions of
4121 tapings that will adversely impact on the future of the creative
4122 community in this country. It is simply a question of basic economics
4123 and plain common sense."
<footnote><para>
4125 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
475.
4127 Indeed, as surveys would later show,
4128 percent of VCR owners had movie libraries of ten videos or more
<footnote><para>
4130 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
480 F. Supp.
429,
4133 — a use the Court would later hold was not "fair." By
4134 "allowing VCR owners to copy freely by the means of an exemption from
4135 copyright infringementwithout creating a mechanism to compensate
4136 copyrightowners," Valenti testified, Congress would "take from the
4137 owners the very essence of their property: the exclusive right to
4138 control who may use their work, that is, who may copy it and thereby
4139 profit from its reproduction."
<footnote><para>
4141 Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders),
485 (testimony
4146 It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme
4147 Court. In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
4148 includes Hollywood in its jurisdiction
—leading Judge Alex
4149 Kozinski, who sits on that court, refers to it as the "Hollywood
4150 Circuit"
—held that Sony would be liable for the copyright
4151 infringement made possible by its machines. Under the Ninth Circuit's
4152 rule, this totally familiar technology
—which Jack Valenti had
4153 called "the Boston Strangler of the American film industry" (worse
4154 yet, it was a
<emphasis>Japanese
</emphasis> Boston Strangler of the
4155 American film industry)
—was an illegal
4156 technology.
<footnote><para>
4158 <citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle>,
659 F.
2d
963 (
9th Cir.
4161 <indexterm><primary>Kozinski, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
4164 But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit.
4166 <!-- PAGE BREAK 90 -->
4167 And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of
4168 when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes. As the
4173 Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference
4174 to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
4176 for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional
4178 and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the
4179 varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
4181 by such new technology.
<footnote><para>
4183 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
431 (
1984).
4188 Congress was asked to respond to the Supreme Court's decision. But as
4189 with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress
4190 ignored the request. Congress was convinced that American film got
4191 enough, this "taking" notwithstanding. If we put these cases
4192 together, a pattern is clear:
4195 <informaltable id=
"t1">
4196 <tgroup cols=
"4" align=
"char">
4200 <entry>WHOSE VALUE WAS "PIRATED"
</entry>
4201 <entry>RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
</entry>
4202 <entry>RESPONSE OF CONGRESS
</entry>
4207 <entry>Recordings
</entry>
4208 <entry>Composers
</entry>
4209 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4210 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4213 <entry>Radio
</entry>
4214 <entry>Recording artists
</entry>
4216 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4219 <entry>Cable TV
</entry>
4220 <entry>Broadcasters
</entry>
4221 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4222 <entry>Statutory license
</entry>
4226 <entry>Film creators
</entry>
4227 <entry>No protection
</entry>
4228 <entry>Nothing
</entry>
4235 In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the
4236 way content was distributed.
<footnote><para>
4238 These are the most important instances in our history, but there are other
4239 cases as well. The technology of digital audio tape (DAT), for example,
4240 was regulated by Congress to minimize the risk of piracy. The remedy
4241 Congress imposed did burden DAT producers, by taxing tape sales and
4242 controlling the technology of DAT. See Audio Home Recording Act of
4243 1992 (Title
17 of the
<citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>), Pub. L. No.
102-
563,
106 Stat.
4244 4237, codified at
17 U.S.C. §
1001. Again, however, this regulation did not
4245 eliminate the opportunity for free riding in the sense I've described. See
4246 Lessig,
<citetitle>Future
</citetitle>,
71. See also Picker, "From Edison to the Broadcast Flag,"
4247 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
293–96.
4248 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
4250 In each case, throughout our history,
4251 that change meant that someone got a "free ride" on someone else's
4255 In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of these cases did either the courts or
4256 Congress eliminate all free riding. In
<emphasis>none
</emphasis> of
4257 these cases did the courts or Congress insist that the law should
4258 assure that the copyright holder get all the value that his copyright
4259 created. In every case, the copyright owners complained of "piracy."
4260 In every case, Congress acted to recognize some of the legitimacy in
4261 the behavior of the "pirates." In each case, Congress allowed some new
4262 technology to benefit from content made before. It balanced the
4264 <!-- PAGE BREAK 91 -->
4267 When you think across these examples, and the other examples that
4268 make up the first four chapters of this section, this balance makes
4269 sense. Was Walt Disney a pirate? Would doujinshi be better if creators
4270 had to ask permission? Should tools that enable others to capture and
4271 spread images as a way to cultivate or criticize our culture be better
4273 Is it really right that building a search engine should expose you
4274 to $
15 million in damages? Would it have been better if Edison had
4275 controlled film? Should every cover band have to hire a lawyer to get
4276 permission to record a song?
4279 We could answer yes to each of these questions, but our tradition
4280 has answered no. In our tradition, as the Supreme Court has stated,
4281 copyright "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control
4282 over all possible uses of his work."
<footnote><para>
4284 <citetitle>Sony Corp. of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
4287 Instead, the particular uses that the law regulates have been defined
4288 by balancing the good that comes from granting an exclusive right
4289 against the burdens such an exclusive right creates. And this
4290 balancing has historically been done
<emphasis>after
</emphasis> a
4291 technology has matured, or settled into the mix of technologies that
4292 facilitate the distribution of content.
4295 We should be doing the same thing today. The technology of the
4296 Internet is changing quickly. The way people connect to the Internet
4297 (wires vs. wireless) is changing very quickly. No doubt the network
4298 should not become a tool for "stealing" from artists. But neither
4299 should the law become a tool to entrench one particular way in which
4300 artists (or more accurately, distributors) get paid. As I describe in
4301 some detail in the last chapter of this book, we should be securing
4302 income to artists while we allow the market to secure the most
4303 efficient way to promote and distribute content. This will require
4304 changes in the law, at least in the interim. These changes should be
4305 designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong
4306 public interest that innovation continue.
4310 <!-- PAGE BREAK 92 -->
4311 This is especially true when a new technology enables a vastly
4312 superior mode of distribution. And this p2p has done. P2p technologies
4313 can be ideally efficient in moving content across a widely diverse
4314 network. Left to develop, they could make the network vastly more
4315 efficient. Yet these "potential public benefits," as John Schwartz
4316 writes in
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>, "could be delayed in the P2P
4317 fight."
<footnote><para>
4319 John Schwartz, "New Economy: The Attack on Peer-to-Peer Software
4320 Echoes Past Efforts,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
22 September
2003, C3.
4322 Yet when anyone begins to talk about "balance," the copyright warriors
4323 raise a different argument. "All this hand waving about balance and
4324 incentives," they say, "misses a fundamental point. Our content," the
4325 warriors insist, "is our
<emphasis>property
</emphasis>. Why should we
4326 wait for Congress to `rebalance' our property rights? Do you have to
4327 wait before calling the police when your car has been stolen? And why
4328 should Congress deliberate at all about the merits of this theft? Do
4329 we ask whether the car thief had a good use for the car before we
4333 "It is
<emphasis>our property
</emphasis>," the warriors insist. "And
4334 it should be protected just as any other property is protected."
4336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 93 -->
4340 <part id=
"c-property">
4341 <title>"PROPERTY"</title>
4345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 94 -->
4346 The copyright warriors are right: A copyright is a kind of
4347 property. It can be owned and sold, and the law protects against its
4348 theft. Ordinarily, the copyright owner gets to hold out for any price he
4349 wants. Markets reckon the supply and demand that partially determine
4350 the price she can get.
4353 But in ordinary language, to call a copyright a "property" right is a
4354 bit misleading, for the property of copyright is an odd kind of
4355 property. Indeed, the very idea of property in any idea or any
4356 expression is very odd. I understand what I am taking when I take the
4357 picnic table you put in your backyard. I am taking a thing, the picnic
4358 table, and after I take it, you don't have it. But what am I taking
4359 when I take the good
<emphasis>idea
</emphasis> you had to put a picnic
4360 table in the backyard
—by, for example, going to Sears, buying a
4361 table, and putting it in my backyard? What is the thing I am taking
4365 The point is not just about the thingness of picnic tables versus
4366 ideas, though that's an important difference. The point instead is that
4367 <!-- PAGE BREAK 95 -->
4368 in the ordinary case
—indeed, in practically every case except for a
4370 range of exceptions
—ideas released to the world are free. I don't
4371 take anything from you when I copy the way you dress
—though I
4372 might seem weird if I did it every day, and especially weird if you are a
4373 woman. Instead, as Thomas Jefferson said (and as is especially true
4374 when I copy the way someone else dresses), "He who receives an idea
4375 from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
4376 lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me."
<footnote><para>
4378 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (
13 August
1813) in
4379 <citetitle>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
</citetitle>, vol.
6 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
4380 Ellery Bergh, eds.,
1903),
330,
333–34.
4384 The exceptions to free use are ideas and expressions within the
4385 reach of the law of patent and copyright, and a few other domains that
4386 I won't discuss here. Here the law says you can't take my idea or
4388 without my permission: The law turns the intangible into
4392 But how, and to what extent, and in what form
—the details,
4393 in other words
—matter. To get a good sense of how this practice
4394 of turning the intangible into property emerged, we need to place this
4395 "property" in its proper context.
<footnote><para>
4397 As the legal realists taught American law, all property rights are
4398 intangible. A property right is simply a right that an individual has
4399 against the world to do or not do certain things that may or may not
4400 attach to a physical object. The right itself is intangible, even if
4401 the object to which it is (metaphorically) attached is tangible. See
4402 Adam Mossoff, "What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together,"
4403 <citetitle>Arizona Law Review
</citetitle> 45 (
2003):
373,
429 n.
241.
4407 My strategy in doing this will be the same as my strategy in the
4408 preceding part. I offer four stories to help put the idea of
4409 "copyright material is property" in context. Where did the idea come
4410 from? What are its limits? How does it function in practice? After
4411 these stories, the significance of this true
4412 statement
—"copyright material is property"
— will be a bit
4413 more clear, and its implications will be revealed as quite different
4414 from the implications that the copyright warriors would have us draw.
4418 <!-- PAGE BREAK 96 -->
4419 <chapter label=
"6" id=
"founders">
4420 <title>CHAPTER SIX: Founders
</title>
4421 <indexterm><primary>Henry V
</primary></indexterm>
4423 William Shakespeare wrote
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> in
1595. The play
4424 was first published in
1597. It was the eleventh major play that
4425 Shakespeare had written. He would continue to write plays through
4426 1613, and the plays that he wrote have continued to define
4427 Anglo-American culture ever since. So deeply have the works of a
4428 sixteenth-century writer seeped into our culture that we often don't
4429 even recognize their source. I once overheard someone commenting on
4430 Kenneth Branagh's adaptation of Henry V: "I liked it, but Shakespeare
4431 is so full of clichés."
4434 In
1774, almost
180 years after
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> was written, the
4435 "copy-right" for the work was still thought by many to be the exclusive
4436 right of a single London publisher, Jacob Tonson.
<footnote><para>
4438 Jacob Tonson is typically remembered for his associations with prominent
4439 eighteenth-century literary figures, especially John Dryden, and for his
4440 handsome "definitive editions" of classic works. In addition to
<citetitle>Romeo and
4441 Juliet
</citetitle>, he published an astonishing array of works that still remain at the
4442 heart of the English canon, including collected works of Shakespeare, Ben
4443 Jonson, John Milton, and John Dryden. See Keith Walker, "Jacob Tonson,
4444 Bookseller,"
<citetitle>American Scholar
</citetitle> 61:
3 (
1992):
424–31.
4446 Tonson was the most prominent of a small group of publishers called
4447 the Conger
<footnote><para>
4449 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle> (Nashville:
4450 Vanderbilt University Press,
1968),
151–52.
4452 who controlled bookselling in England during the eighteenth
4453 century. The Conger claimed a perpetual right to control the "copy" of
4454 books that they had acquired from authors. That perpetual right meant
4456 <!-- PAGE BREAK 97 -->
4457 one else could publish copies of a book to which they held the
4458 copyright. Prices of the classics were thus kept high; competition to
4459 produce better or cheaper editions was eliminated.
4462 Now, there's something puzzling about the year
1774 to anyone who
4463 knows a little about copyright law. The better-known year in the
4464 history of copyright is
1710, the year that the British Parliament
4465 adopted the first "copyright" act. Known as the Statute of Anne, the
4466 act stated that all published works would get a copyright term of
4467 fourteen years, renewable once if the author was alive, and that all
4468 works already published by
1710 would get a single term of twenty-one
4469 additional years.
<footnote><para>
4471 As Siva Vaidhyanathan nicely argues, it is erroneous to call this a
4472 "copyright law." See Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
40.
4473 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4474 </para></footnote> Under this law,
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> should have been
4475 free in
1731. So why was there any issue about it still being under
4476 Tonson's control in
1774?
4479 The reason is that the English hadn't yet agreed on what a "copyright"
4480 was
—indeed, no one had. At the time the English passed the
4481 Statute of Anne, there was no other legislation governing copyrights.
4482 The last law regulating publishers, the Licensing Act of
1662, had
4483 expired in
1695. That law gave publishers a monopoly over publishing,
4484 as a way to make it easier for the Crown to control what was
4485 published. But after it expired, there was no positive law that said
4486 that the publishers, or "Stationers," had an exclusive right to print
4488 <indexterm><primary>Licensing Act (
1662)
</primary></indexterm>
4491 There was no
<emphasis>positive
</emphasis> law, but that didn't mean
4492 that there was no law. The Anglo-American legal tradition looks to
4493 both the words of legislatures and the words of judges to know the
4494 rules that are to govern how people are to behave. We call the words
4495 from legislatures "positive law." We call the words from judges
4496 "common law." The common law sets the background against which
4497 legislatures legislate; the legislature, ordinarily, can trump that
4498 background only if it passes a law to displace it. And so the real
4499 question after the licensing statutes had expired was whether the
4500 common law protected a copyright, independent of any positive law.
4503 This question was important to the publishers, or "booksellers," as
4504 they were called, because there was growing competition from foreign
4505 publishers. The Scottish, in particular, were increasingly publishing
4506 and exporting books to England. That competition reduced the profits
4508 <!-- PAGE BREAK 98 -->
4509 of the Conger, which reacted by demanding that Parliament pass a law
4510 to again give them exclusive control over publishing. That demand
4512 resulted in the Statute of Anne.
4515 The Statute of Anne granted the author or "proprietor" of a book an
4516 exclusive right to print that book. In an important limitation,
4517 however, and to the horror of the booksellers, the law gave the
4518 bookseller that right for a limited term. At the end of that term, the
4519 copyright "expired," and the work would then be free and could be
4520 published by anyone. Or so the legislature is thought to have
4524 Now, the thing to puzzle about for a moment is this: Why would
4525 Parliament limit the exclusive right? Not why would they limit it to
4526 the particular limit they set, but why would they limit the right
4527 <emphasis>at all?
</emphasis>
4530 For the booksellers, and the authors whom they represented, had a very
4531 strong claim. Take
<citetitle>Romeo and Juliet
</citetitle> as an example: That play
4532 was written by Shakespeare. It was his genius that brought it into the
4533 world. He didn't take anybody's property when he created this play
4534 (that's a controversial claim, but never mind), and by his creating
4535 this play, he didn't make it any harder for others to craft a play. So
4536 why is it that the law would ever allow someone else to come along and
4537 take Shakespeare's play without his, or his estate's, permission? What
4538 reason is there to allow someone else to "steal" Shakespeare's work?
4541 The answer comes in two parts. We first need to see something special
4542 about the notion of "copyright" that existed at the time of the
4543 Statute of Anne. Second, we have to see something important about
4547 First, about copyright. In the last three hundred years, we have come
4548 to apply the concept of "copyright" ever more broadly. But in
1710, it
4549 wasn't so much a concept as it was a very particular right. The
4550 copyright was born as a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade
4551 others from reprinting a book. In
1710, the "copy-right" was a right
4552 to use a particular machine to replicate a particular work. It did not
4553 go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more
4555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 99 -->
4556 a work could be
<emphasis>used
</emphasis>. Today the right includes a
4557 large collection of restrictions on the freedom of others: It grants
4558 the author the exclusive right to copy, the exclusive right to
4559 distribute, the exclusive right to perform, and so on.
4562 So, for example, even if the copyright to Shakespeare's works were
4563 perpetual, all that would have meant under the original meaning of the
4564 term was that no one could reprint Shakespeare's work without the
4565 permission of the Shakespeare estate. It would not have controlled
4566 anything, for example, about how the work could be performed, whether
4567 the work could be translated, or whether Kenneth Branagh would be
4568 allowed to make his films. The "copy-right" was only an exclusive
4569 right to print
—no less, of course, but also no more.
4571 <indexterm><primary>Henry VIII, King of England
</primary></indexterm>
4573 Even that limited right was viewed with skepticism by the British.
4574 They had had a long and ugly experience with "exclusive rights,"
4575 especially "exclusive rights" granted by the Crown. The English had
4576 fought a civil war in part about the Crown's practice of handing out
4577 monopolies
—especially monopolies for works that already
4578 existed. King Henry VIII granted a patent to print the Bible and a
4579 monopoly to Darcy to print playing cards. The English Parliament began
4580 to fight back against this power of the Crown. In
1656, it passed the
4581 Statute of Monopolies, limiting monopolies to patents for new
4582 inventions. And by
1710, Parliament was eager to deal with the growing
4583 monopoly in publishing.
4586 Thus the "copy-right," when viewed as a monopoly right, was naturally
4587 viewed as a right that should be limited. (However convincing the
4588 claim that "it's my property, and I should have it forever," try
4589 sounding convincing when uttering, "It's my monopoly, and I should
4590 have it forever.") The state would protect the exclusive right, but
4591 only so long as it benefited society. The British saw the harms from
4592 specialinterest favors; they passed a law to stop them.
4595 Second, about booksellers. It wasn't just that the copyright was a
4596 monopoly. It was also that it was a monopoly held by the booksellers.
4597 Booksellers sound quaint and harmless to us. They were not viewed
4598 as harmless in seventeenth-century England. Members of the Conger
4599 <!-- PAGE BREAK 100 -->
4601 were increasingly seen as monopolists of the worst
4602 kind
—tools of the Crown's repression, selling the liberty of
4603 England to guarantee themselves a monopoly profit. The attacks against
4604 these monopolists were harsh: Milton described them as "old patentees
4605 and monopolizers in the trade of book-selling"; they were "men who do
4606 not therefore labour in an honest profession to which learning is
4607 indetted."
<footnote><para>
4610 Philip Wittenberg,
<citetitle>The Protection and Marketing of Literary
4611 Property
</citetitle> (New York: J. Messner, Inc.,
1937),
31.
4615 Many believed the power the booksellers exercised over the spread of
4616 knowledge was harming that spread, just at the time the Enlightenment
4617 was teaching the importance of education and knowledge spread
4618 generally. The idea that knowledge should be free was a hallmark of
4619 the time, and these powerful commercial interests were interfering
4623 To balance this power, Parliament decided to increase competition
4624 among booksellers, and the simplest way to do that was to spread the
4625 wealth of valuable books. Parliament therefore limited the term of
4626 copyrights, and thereby guaranteed that valuable books would become
4627 open to any publisher to publish after a limited time. Thus the setting
4628 of the term for existing works to just twenty-one years was a
4630 to fight the power of the booksellers. The limitation on terms was
4631 an indirect way to assure competition among publishers, and thus the
4632 construction and spread of culture.
4635 When
1731 (
1710 +
21) came along, however, the booksellers were
4636 getting anxious. They saw the consequences of more competition, and
4637 like every competitor, they didn't like them. At first booksellers simply
4638 ignored the Statute of Anne, continuing to insist on the perpetual right
4639 to control publication. But in
1735 and
1737, they tried to persuade
4640 Parliament to extend their terms. Twenty-one years was not enough,
4641 they said; they needed more time.
4644 Parliament rejected their requests. As one pamphleteer put it, in
4645 words that echo today,
4649 I see no Reason for granting a further Term now, which will not
4650 hold as well for granting it again and again, as often as the Old
4651 <!-- PAGE BREAK 101 -->
4652 ones Expire; so that should this Bill pass, it will in Effect be
4653 establishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the
4654 Eye of the Law; it will be a great Cramp to Trade, a Discouragement to
4655 Learning, no Benefit to the Authors, but a general Tax on the Publick;
4656 and all this only to increase the private Gain of the
4657 Booksellers.
<footnote><para>
4659 A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending
4660 in the House of Commons, for making more effectual an Act in the
4661 Eighth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entitled, An Act for the
4662 Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in
4663 the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
4664 mentioned (London,
1735), in Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et
4665 al.,
8,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618).
4670 Having failed in Parliament, the publishers turned to the courts in a
4671 series of cases. Their argument was simple and direct: The Statute of
4672 Anne gave authors certain protections through positive law, but those
4673 protections were not intended as replacements for the common law.
4674 Instead, they were intended simply to supplement the common law.
4675 Under common law, it was already wrong to take another person's
4676 creative "property" and use it without his permission. The Statute of
4677 Anne, the booksellers argued, didn't change that. Therefore, just
4678 because the protections of the Statute of Anne expired, that didn't
4679 mean the protections of the common law expired: Under the common law
4680 they had the right to ban the publication of a book, even if its
4681 Statute of Anne copyright had expired. This, they argued, was the only
4682 way to protect authors.
4685 This was a clever argument, and one that had the support of some of
4686 the leading jurists of the day. It also displayed extraordinary
4687 chutzpah. Until then, as law professor Raymond Patterson has put it,
4688 "The publishers
… had as much concern for authors as a cattle
4689 rancher has for cattle."
<footnote><para>
4691 Lyman Ray Patterson, "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,"
<citetitle>Vanderbilt
4692 Law Review
</citetitle> 40 (
1987):
28. For a wonderfully compelling account, see
4693 Vaidhyanathan,
37–48.
4694 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
4696 The bookseller didn't care squat for the rights of the author. His
4697 concern was the monopoly profit that the author's work gave.
4700 The booksellers' argument was not accepted without a fight.
4701 The hero of this fight was a Scottish bookseller named Alexander
4702 Donaldson.
<footnote><para>
4704 For a compelling account, see David Saunders,
<citetitle>Authorship and Copyright
</citetitle>
4705 (London: Routledge,
1992),
62–69.
4709 Donaldson was an outsider to the London Conger. He began his
4710 career in Edinburgh in
1750. The focus of his business was inexpensive
4711 reprints "of standard works whose copyright term had expired," at least
4712 under the Statute of Anne.
<footnote><para>
4714 Mark Rose,
<citetitle>Authors and Owners
</citetitle> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
4716 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
4718 Donaldson's publishing house prospered
4719 <!-- PAGE BREAK 102 -->
4720 and became "something of a center for literary Scotsmen." "[A]mong
4721 them," Professor Mark Rose writes, was "the young James Boswell
4722 who, together with his friend Andrew Erskine, published an anthology
4723 of contemporary Scottish poems with Donaldson."
<footnote><para>
4727 <indexterm><primary>Boswell, James
</primary></indexterm>
4728 <indexterm><primary>Erskine, Andrew
</primary></indexterm>
4731 When the London booksellers tried to shut down Donaldson's shop in
4732 Scotland, he responded by moving his shop to London, where he sold
4733 inexpensive editions "of the most popular English books, in defiance
4734 of the supposed common law right of Literary
4735 Property."
<footnote><para>
4737 Lyman Ray Patterson,
<citetitle>Copyright in Historical Perspective
</citetitle>,
167 (quoting
4740 His books undercut the Conger prices by
30 to
50 percent, and he
4741 rested his right to compete upon the ground that, under the Statute of
4742 Anne, the works he was selling had passed out of protection.
4745 The London booksellers quickly brought suit to block "piracy" like
4746 Donaldson's. A number of actions were successful against the "pirates,"
4747 the most important early victory being
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Taylor
</citetitle>.
4750 Millar was a bookseller who in
1729 had purchased the rights to James
4751 Thomson's poem "The Seasons." Millar complied with the requirements of
4752 the Statute of Anne, and therefore received the full protection of the
4753 statute. After the term of copyright ended, Robert Taylor began
4754 printing a competing volume. Millar sued, claiming a perpetual common
4755 law right, the Statute of Anne notwithstanding.
<footnote><para>
4757 Howard B. Abrams, "The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
4758 Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,"
<citetitle>Wayne Law Review
</citetitle> 29
4762 <indexterm id=
"idxmansfield2" class='startofrange'
>
4763 <primary>Mansfield, William Murray, Lord
</primary>
4766 Astonishingly to modern lawyers, one of the greatest judges in English
4767 history, Lord Mansfield, agreed with the booksellers. Whatever
4768 protection the Statute of Anne gave booksellers, it did not, he held,
4769 extinguish any common law right. The question was whether the common
4770 law would protect the author against subsequent "pirates."
4771 Mansfield's answer was yes: The common law would bar Taylor from
4772 reprinting Thomson's poem without Millar's permission. That common law
4773 rule thus effectively gave the booksellers a perpetual right to
4774 control the publication of any book assigned to them.
4777 Considered as a matter of abstract justice
—reasoning as if
4778 justice were just a matter of logical deduction from first
4779 principles
—Mansfield's conclusion might make some sense. But
4780 what it ignored was the larger issue that Parliament had struggled
4781 with in
1710: How best to limit
4782 <!-- PAGE BREAK 103 -->
4783 the monopoly power of publishers? Parliament's strategy was to offer a
4784 term for existing works that was long enough to buy peace in
1710, but
4785 short enough to assure that culture would pass into competition within
4786 a reasonable period of time. Within twenty-one years, Parliament
4787 believed, Britain would mature from the controlled culture that the
4788 Crown coveted to the free culture that we inherited.
4790 <indexterm startref=
"idxmansfield2" class='endofrange'
/>
4792 The fight to defend the limits of the Statute of Anne was not to end
4793 there, however, and it is here that Donaldson enters the mix.
4795 <indexterm><primary>Beckett, Thomas
</primary></indexterm>
4797 Millar died soon after his victory, so his case was not appealed. His
4798 estate sold Thomson's poems to a syndicate of printers that included
4799 Thomas Beckett.
<footnote><para>
4803 Donaldson then released an unauthorized edition
4804 of Thomson's works. Beckett, on the strength of the decision in
<citetitle>Millar
</citetitle>,
4805 got an injunction against Donaldson. Donaldson appealed the case to
4806 the House of Lords, which functioned much like our own Supreme
4807 Court. In February of
1774, that body had the chance to interpret the
4808 meaning of Parliament's limits from sixty years before.
4811 As few legal cases ever do,
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle> drew an
4812 enormous amount of attention throughout Britain. Donaldson's lawyers
4813 argued that whatever rights may have existed under the common law, the
4814 Statute of Anne terminated those rights. After passage of the Statute
4815 of Anne, the only legal protection for an exclusive right to control
4816 publication came from that statute. Thus, they argued, after the term
4817 specified in the Statute of Anne expired, works that had been
4818 protected by the statute were no longer protected.
4821 The House of Lords was an odd institution. Legal questions were
4822 presented to the House and voted upon first by the "law lords,"
4823 members of special legal distinction who functioned much like the
4824 Justices in our Supreme Court. Then, after the law lords voted, the
4825 House of Lords generally voted.
4828 The reports about the law lords' votes are mixed. On some counts,
4829 it looks as if perpetual copyright prevailed. But there is no ambiguity
4830 <!-- PAGE BREAK 104 -->
4831 about how the House of Lords voted as whole. By a two-to-one majority
4832 (
22 to
11) they voted to reject the idea of perpetual copyrights.
4833 Whatever one's understanding of the common law, now a copyright was
4834 fixed for a limited time, after which the work protected by copyright
4835 passed into the public domain.
4838 "The public domain." Before the case of
<citetitle>Donaldson
</citetitle>
4839 v.
<citetitle>Beckett
</citetitle>, there was no clear idea of a public domain in
4840 England. Before
1774, there was a strong argument that common law
4841 copyrights were perpetual. After
1774, the public domain was
4842 born. For the first time in Anglo-American history, the legal control
4843 over creative works expired, and the greatest works in English
4844 history
—including those of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, Johnson,
4845 and Bunyan
—were free of legal restraint.
4846 <indexterm><primary>Bacon, Francis
</primary></indexterm>
4847 <indexterm><primary>Bunyan, John
</primary></indexterm>
4848 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Samuel
</primary></indexterm>
4849 <indexterm><primary>Milton, John
</primary></indexterm>
4850 <indexterm><primary>Shakespeare, William
</primary></indexterm>
4853 It is hard for us to imagine, but this decision by the House of Lords
4854 fueled an extraordinarily popular and political reaction. In Scotland,
4855 where most of the "pirate publishers" did their work, people
4856 celebrated the decision in the streets. As the
<citetitle>Edinburgh Advertiser
</citetitle>
4857 reported, "No private cause has so much engrossed the attention of the
4858 public, and none has been tried before the House of Lords in the
4859 decision of which so many individuals were interested." "Great
4860 rejoicing in Edinburgh upon victory over literary property: bonfires
4861 and illuminations."
<footnote><para>
4867 In London, however, at least among publishers, the reaction was
4868 equally strong in the opposite direction. The
<citetitle>Morning Chronicle
</citetitle>
4873 By the above decision
… near
200,
000 pounds worth of what was
4874 honestly purchased at public sale, and which was yesterday thought
4875 property is now reduced to nothing. The Booksellers of London and
4876 Westminster, many of whom sold estates and houses to purchase
4877 Copy-right, are in a manner ruined, and those who after many years
4878 industry thought they had acquired a competency to provide for their
4879 families now find themselves without a shilling to devise to their
4880 successors.
<footnote><para>
4887 <!-- PAGE BREAK 105 -->
4888 "Ruined" is a bit of an exaggeration. But it is not an exaggeration to
4889 say that the change was profound. The decision of the House of Lords
4890 meant that the booksellers could no longer control how culture in
4891 England would grow and develop. Culture in England was thereafter
4892 <emphasis>free
</emphasis>. Not in the sense that copyrights would not
4893 be respected, for of course, for a limited time after a work was
4894 published, the bookseller had an exclusive right to control the
4895 publication of that book. And not in the sense that books could be
4896 stolen, for even after a copyright expired, you still had to buy the
4897 book from someone. But
<emphasis>free
</emphasis> in the sense that the
4898 culture and its growth would no longer be controlled by a small group
4899 of publishers. As every free market does, this free market of free
4900 culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose. English
4901 culture would develop as the many English readers chose to let it
4902 develop
— chose in the books they bought and wrote; chose in the
4903 memes they repeated and endorsed. Chose in a
<emphasis>competitive
4904 context
</emphasis>, not a context in which the choices about what
4905 culture is available to people and how they get access to it are made
4906 by the few despite the wishes of the many.
4909 At least, this was the rule in a world where the Parliament is
4910 antimonopoly, resistant to the protectionist pleas of publishers. In a
4911 world where the Parliament is more pliant, free culture would be less
4914 <!-- PAGE BREAK 106 -->
4916 <chapter label=
"7" id=
"recorders">
4917 <title>CHAPTER SEVEN: Recorders
</title>
4919 Jon Else is a filmmaker. He is best known for his documentaries and
4920 has been very successful in spreading his art. He is also a teacher, and
4921 as a teacher myself, I envy the loyalty and admiration that his students
4922 feel for him. (I met, by accident, two of his students at a dinner party.
4926 Else worked on a documentary that I was involved in. At a break,
4927 he told me a story about the freedom to create with film in America
4931 In
1990, Else was working on a documentary about Wagner's Ring
4932 Cycle. The focus was stagehands at the San Francisco Opera.
4933 Stagehands are a particularly funny and colorful element of an opera.
4934 During a show, they hang out below the stage in the grips' lounge and
4935 in the lighting loft. They make a perfect contrast to the art on the
4937 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
4940 During one of the performances, Else was shooting some stagehands
4941 playing checkers. In one corner of the room was a television set.
4942 Playing on the television set, while the stagehands played checkers
4943 and the opera company played Wagner, was
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. As Else judged
4944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 107 -->
4945 it, this touch of cartoon helped capture the flavor of what was special
4949 Years later, when he finally got funding to complete the film, Else
4950 attempted to clear the rights for those few seconds of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>.
4951 For of course, those few seconds are copyrighted; and of course, to use
4952 copyrighted material you need the permission of the copyright owner,
4953 unless "fair use" or some other privilege applies.
4956 Else called
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> creator Matt Groening's office to get permission.
4957 Groening approved the shot. The shot was a four-and-a-halfsecond image
4958 on a tiny television set in the corner of the room. How could it hurt?
4959 Groening was happy to have it in the film, but he told Else to contact
4960 Gracie Films, the company that produces the program.
4961 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4964 Gracie Films was okay with it, too, but they, like Groening, wanted
4965 to be careful. So they told Else to contact Fox, Gracie's parent company.
4966 Else called Fox and told them about the clip in the corner of the one
4967 room shot of the film. Matt Groening had already given permission,
4968 Else said. He was just confirming the permission with Fox.
4969 <indexterm><primary>Gracie Films
</primary></indexterm>
4972 Then, as Else told me, "two things happened. First we discovered
4973 … that Matt Groening doesn't own his own creation
—or at
4974 least that someone [at Fox] believes he doesn't own his own creation."
4975 And second, Fox "wanted ten thousand dollars as a licensing fee for us
4976 to use this four-point-five seconds of
… entirely unsolicited
4977 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> which was in the corner of the shot."
4980 Else was certain there was a mistake. He worked his way up to someone
4981 he thought was a vice president for licensing, Rebecca Herrera. He
4982 explained to her, "There must be some mistake here.
… We're
4983 asking for your educational rate on this." That was the educational
4984 rate, Herrera told Else. A day or so later, Else called again to
4985 confirm what he had been told.
4988 "I wanted to make sure I had my facts straight," he told me. "Yes, you
4989 have your facts straight," she said. It would cost $
10,
000 to use the
4990 clip of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> in the corner of a shot in a documentary film
4993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 108 -->
4994 Wagner's Ring Cycle. And then, astonishingly, Herrera told Else, "And
4995 if you quote me, I'll turn you over to our attorneys." As an assistant
4996 to Herrera told Else later on, "They don't give a shit. They just want
5000 Else didn't have the money to buy the right to replay what was playing
5001 on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera. To reproduce
5002 this reality was beyond the documentary filmmaker's budget. At the
5003 very last minute before the film was to be released, Else digitally
5004 replaced the shot with a clip from another film that he had worked on,
5005 <citetitle>The Day After Trinity
</citetitle>, from ten years before.
5006 <indexterm><primary>San Francisco Opera
</primary></indexterm>
5007 <indexterm><primary>Day After Trinity, The
</primary></indexterm>
5010 There's no doubt that someone, whether Matt Groening or Fox, owns the
5011 copyright to
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle>. That copyright is their property. To use
5012 that copyrighted material thus sometimes requires the permission of
5013 the copyright owner. If the use that Else wanted to make of the
5014 <citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> copyright were one of the uses restricted by the law, then he
5015 would need to get the permission of the copyright owner before he
5016 could use the work in that way. And in a free market, it is the owner
5017 of the copyright who gets to set the price for any use that the law
5018 says the owner gets to control.
5021 For example, "public performance" is a use of
<citetitle>The Simpsons
</citetitle> that the
5022 copyright owner gets to control. If you take a selection of favorite
5023 episodes, rent a movie theater, and charge for tickets to come see "My
5024 Favorite
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>," then you need to get permission from the copyright
5025 owner. And the copyright owner (rightly, in my view) can charge
5026 whatever she wants
—$
10 or $
1,
000,
000. That's her right, as set
5030 But when lawyers hear this story about Jon Else and Fox, their first
5031 thought is "fair use."
<footnote><para>
5033 For an excellent argument that such use is "fair use," but that
5034 lawyers don't permit recognition that it is "fair use," see Richard
5035 A. Posner with William F. Patry, "Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
5036 Wake of
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>" (draft on file with author), University of Chicago
5037 Law School, 5 August 2003.
5039 Else's use of just 4.5 seconds of an indirect shot of a <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle>
5040 episode is clearly a fair use of <citetitle>The Simpsons</citetitle>—and fair use does
5041 not require the permission of anyone.
5044 <!-- PAGE BREAK 109 -->
5045 So I asked Else why he didn't just rely upon "fair use.
" Here's his reply:
5049 The <citetitle>Simpsons</citetitle> fiasco was for me a great lesson in the gulf between what
5050 lawyers find irrelevant in some abstract sense, and what is crushingly
5051 relevant in practice to those of us actually trying to make and
5052 broadcast documentaries. I never had any doubt that it was "clearly
5053 fair use" in an absolute legal sense. But I couldn't rely on the
5054 concept in any concrete way. Here's why:
5056 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
5059 Before our films can be broadcast, the network requires that we buy
5060 Errors and Omissions insurance. The carriers require a detailed
5061 "visual cue sheet" listing the source and licensing status of each
5062 shot in the film. They take a dim view of "fair use," and a claim of
5063 "fair use" can grind the application process to a halt.
5067 I probably never should have asked Matt Groening in the first
5068 place. But I knew (at least from folklore) that Fox had a history of
5069 tracking down and stopping unlicensed
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle> usage, just as George
5070 Lucas had a very high profile litigating
<citetitle>Star Wars
</citetitle> usage. So I decided
5071 to play by the book, thinking that we would be granted free or cheap
5072 license to four seconds of
<citetitle>Simpsons
</citetitle>. As a documentary producer working
5073 to exhaustion on a shoestring, the last thing I wanted was to risk
5074 legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, and even to defend a
5076 <indexterm><primary>Lucas, George
</primary></indexterm>
5080 I did, in fact, speak with one of your colleagues at Stanford Law
5081 School
… who confirmed that it was fair use. He also confirmed
5082 that Fox would "depose and litigate you to within an inch of your
5083 life," regardless of the merits of my claim. He made clear that it
5084 would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the deeper
5085 pockets, me or them.
5086 <!-- PAGE BREAK 110 -->
5090 The question of fair use usually comes up at the end of the
5091 project, when we are up against a release deadline and out of
5097 In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory therefore
5098 supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture. But
5099 in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
5100 the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed,
5101 means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is
5102 slight. The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.
5105 This practice shows just how far the law has come from its
5106 eighteenth-century roots. The law was born as a shield to protect
5107 publishers' profits against the unfair competition of a pirate. It has
5108 matured into a sword that interferes with any use, transformative or
5111 <!-- PAGE BREAK 111 -->
5113 <chapter label=
"8" id=
"transformers">
5114 <title>CHAPTER EIGHT: Transformers
</title>
5115 <indexterm><primary>Allen, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
5116 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5118 In
1993, Alex Alben was a lawyer working at Starwave, Inc. Starwave
5119 was an innovative company founded by Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen to
5120 develop digital entertainment. Long before the Internet became
5121 popular, Starwave began investing in new technology for delivering
5122 entertainment in anticipation of the power of networks.
5124 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5126 Alben had a special interest in new technology. He was intrigued by
5127 the emerging market for CD-ROM technology
—not to distribute
5128 film, but to do things with film that otherwise would be very
5129 difficult. In
1993, he launched an initiative to develop a product to
5130 build retrospectives on the work of particular actors. The first actor
5131 chosen was Clint Eastwood. The idea was to showcase all of the work of
5132 Eastwood, with clips from his films and interviews with figures
5133 important to his career.
5135 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5137 At that time, Eastwood had made more than fifty films, as an actor and
5138 as a director. Alben began with a series of interviews with Eastwood,
5139 asking him about his career. Because Starwave produced those
5140 interviews, it was free to include them on the CD.
5143 <!-- PAGE BREAK 112 -->
5144 That alone would not have made a very interesting product, so
5145 Starwave wanted to add content from the movies in Eastwood's career:
5146 posters, scripts, and other material relating to the films Eastwood
5147 made. Most of his career was spent at Warner Brothers, and so it was
5148 relatively easy to get permission for that content.
5150 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5152 Then Alben and his team decided to include actual film clips. "Our
5153 goal was that we were going to have a clip from every one of
5154 Eastwood's films," Alben told me. It was here that the problem
5155 arose. "No one had ever really done this before," Alben explained. "No
5156 one had ever tried to do this in the context of an artistic look at an
5159 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5161 Alben brought the idea to Michael Slade, the CEO of Starwave.
5162 Slade asked, "Well, what will it take?"
5164 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5166 Alben replied, "Well, we're going to have to clear rights from
5167 everyone who appears in these films, and the music and everything
5168 else that we want to use in these film clips." Slade said, "Great! Go
5172 Technically, the rights that Alben had to clear were mainly those of
5173 publicity
—rights an artist has to control the commercial
5174 exploitation of his image. But these rights, too, burden "Rip, Mix,
5175 Burn" creativity, as this chapter evinces.
5177 <primary>artists
</primary>
5178 <secondary>publicity rights on images of
</secondary>
5183 The problem was that neither Alben nor Slade had any idea what
5184 clearing those rights would mean. Every actor in each of the films
5185 could have a claim to royalties for the reuse of that film. But CD-
5186 ROMs had not been specified in the contracts for the actors, so there
5187 was no clear way to know just what Starwave was to do.
5190 I asked Alben how he dealt with the problem. With an obvious
5191 pride in his resourcefulness that obscured the obvious bizarreness of his
5192 tale, Alben recounted just what they did:
5196 So we very mechanically went about looking up the film clips. We made
5197 some artistic decisions about what film clips to include
—of
5198 course we were going to use the "Make my day" clip from
<citetitle>Dirty
5199 Harry
</citetitle>. But you then need to get the guy on the ground who's wiggling
5200 under the gun and you need to get his permission. And then you have
5201 to decide what you are going to pay him.
5204 <!-- PAGE BREAK 113 -->
5205 We decided that it would be fair if we offered them the dayplayer rate
5206 for the right to reuse that performance. We're talking about a clip of
5207 less than a minute, but to reuse that performance in the CD-ROM the
5208 rate at the time was about $
600. So we had to identify the
5209 people
—some of them were hard to identify because in Eastwood
5210 movies you can't tell who's the guy crashing through the
5211 glass
—is it the actor or is it the stuntman? And then we just,
5212 we put together a team, my assistant and some others, and we just
5213 started calling people.
5216 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5218 Some actors were glad to help
—Donald Sutherland, for example,
5219 followed up himself to be sure that the rights had been cleared.
5220 Others were dumbfounded at their good fortune. Alben would ask,
5221 "Hey, can I pay you $
600 or maybe if you were in two films, you
5222 know, $
1,
200?" And they would say, "Are you for real? Hey, I'd love
5223 to get $
1,
200." And some of course were a bit difficult (estranged
5224 ex-wives, in particular). But eventually, Alben and his team had
5225 cleared the rights to this retrospective CD-ROM on Clint Eastwood's
5229 It was one
<emphasis>year
</emphasis> later
—"and even then we
5230 weren't sure whether we were totally in the clear."
5232 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5234 Alben is proud of his work. The project was the first of its kind and
5235 the only time he knew of that a team had undertaken such a massive
5236 project for the purpose of releasing a retrospective.
5240 Everyone thought it would be too hard. Everyone just threw up their
5241 hands and said, "Oh, my gosh, a film, it's so many copyrights, there's
5242 the music, there's the screenplay, there's the director, there's the
5243 actors." But we just broke it down. We just put it into its
5244 constituent parts and said, "Okay, there's this many actors, this many
5245 directors,
… this many musicians," and we just went at it very
5246 systematically and cleared the rights.
5251 <!-- PAGE BREAK 114 -->
5252 And no doubt, the product itself was exceptionally good. Eastwood
5253 loved it, and it sold very well.
5255 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5256 <indexterm><primary>Drucker, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
5258 But I pressed Alben about how weird it seems that it would have to
5259 take a year's work simply to clear rights. No doubt Alben had done
5260 this efficiently, but as Peter Drucker has famously quipped, "There is
5261 nothing so useless as doing efficiently that which should not be done
5262 at all."
<footnote><para>
5264 U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Acquisition Management,
<citetitle>Seven
5265 Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition
</citetitle>, available at
5266 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
22</ulink>.
5268 Did it make sense, I asked Alben, that this is the way a new work
5272 For, as he acknowledged, "very few
… have the time and resources,
5273 and the will to do this," and thus, very few such works would ever be
5274 made. Does it make sense, I asked him, from the standpoint of what
5275 anybody really thought they were ever giving rights for originally, that
5276 you would have to go clear rights for these kinds of clips?
5280 I don't think so. When an actor renders a performance in a movie,
5281 he or she gets paid very well.
… And then when
30 seconds of
5282 that performance is used in a new product that is a retrospective
5283 of somebody's career, I don't think that that person
… should be
5284 compensated for that.
5288 Or at least, is this
<emphasis>how
</emphasis> the artist should be
5289 compensated? Would it make sense, I asked, for there to be some kind
5290 of statutory license that someone could pay and be free to make
5291 derivative use of clips like this? Did it really make sense that a
5292 follow-on creator would have to track down every artist, actor,
5293 director, musician, and get explicit permission from each? Wouldn't a
5294 lot more be created if the legal part of the creative process could be
5295 made to be more clean?
5299 Absolutely. I think that if there were some fair-licensing
5300 mechanism
—where you weren't subject to hold-ups and you weren't
5301 subject to estranged former spouses
—you'd see a lot more of this
5302 work, because it wouldn't be so daunting to try to put together a
5303 <!-- PAGE BREAK 115 -->
5304 retrospective of someone's career and meaningfully illustrate it with
5305 lots of media from that person's career. You'd build in a cost as the
5306 producer of one of these things. You'd build in a cost of paying X
5307 dollars to the talent that performed. But it would be a known
5308 cost. That's the thing that trips everybody up and makes this kind of
5309 product hard to get off the ground. If you knew I have a hundred
5310 minutes of film in this product and it's going to cost me X, then you
5311 build your budget around it, and you can get investments and
5312 everything else that you need to produce it. But if you say, "Oh, I
5313 want a hundred minutes of something and I have no idea what it's going
5314 to cost me, and a certain number of people are going to hold me up for
5315 money," then it becomes difficult to put one of these things together.
5318 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
5320 Alben worked for a big company. His company was backed by some of the
5321 richest investors in the world. He therefore had authority and access
5322 that the average Web designer would not have. So if it took him a
5323 year, how long would it take someone else? And how much creativity is
5324 never made just because the costs of clearing the rights are so high?
5325 These costs are the burdens of a kind of regulation. Put on a
5326 Republican hat for a moment, and get angry for a bit. The government
5327 defines the scope of these rights, and the scope defined determines
5328 how much it's going to cost to negotiate them. (Remember the idea that
5329 land runs to the heavens, and imagine the pilot purchasing flythrough
5330 rights as he negotiates to fly from Los Angeles to San Francisco.)
5331 These rights might well have once made sense; but as circumstances
5332 change, they make no sense at all. Or at least, a well-trained,
5333 regulationminimizing Republican should look at the rights and ask,
5334 "Does this still make sense?"
5337 I've seen the flash of recognition when people get this point, but only
5338 a few times. The first was at a conference of federal judges in California.
5339 The judges were gathered to discuss the emerging topic of cyber-law. I
5340 was asked to be on the panel. Harvey Saferstein, a well-respected lawyer
5342 <!-- PAGE BREAK 116 -->
5343 from an L.A. firm, introduced the panel with a video that he and a
5344 friend, Robert Fairbank, had produced.
5347 The video was a brilliant collage of film from every period in the
5348 twentieth century, all framed around the idea of a
<citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode.
5349 The execution was perfect, down to the sixty-minute stopwatch. The
5350 judges loved every minute of it.
5352 <indexterm><primary>Nimmer, David
</primary></indexterm>
5354 When the lights came up, I looked over to my copanelist, David
5355 Nimmer, perhaps the leading copyright scholar and practitioner in the
5356 nation. He had an astonished look on his face, as he peered across the
5357 room of over
250 well-entertained judges. Taking an ominous tone, he
5358 began his talk with a question: "Do you know how many federal laws
5359 were just violated in this room?"
5361 <indexterm><primary>Boies, David
</primary></indexterm>
5363 For of course, the two brilliantly talented creators who made this
5364 film hadn't done what Alben did. They hadn't spent a year clearing the
5365 rights to these clips; technically, what they had done violated the
5366 law. Of course, it wasn't as if they or anyone were going to be
5367 prosecuted for this violation (the presence of
250 judges and a gaggle
5368 of federal marshals notwithstanding). But Nimmer was making an
5369 important point: A year before anyone would have heard of the word
5370 Napster, and two years before another member of our panel, David
5371 Boies, would defend Napster before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
5372 Nimmer was trying to get the judges to see that the law would not be
5373 friendly to the capacities that this technology would
5374 enable. Technology means you can now do amazing things easily; but you
5375 couldn't easily do them legally.
5378 We live in a "cut and paste" culture enabled by technology. Anyone
5379 building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that the cut
5380 and paste architecture of the Internet created
—in a second you can
5381 find just about any image you want; in another second, you can have it
5382 planted in your presentation.
5385 But presentations are just a tiny beginning. Using the Internet and
5386 <!-- PAGE BREAK 117 -->
5387 its archives, musicians are able to string together mixes of sound
5388 never before imagined; filmmakers are able to build movies out of
5389 clips on computers around the world. An extraordinary site in Sweden
5390 takes images of politicians and blends them with music to create
5391 biting political commentary. A site called Camp Chaos has produced
5392 some of the most biting criticism of the record industry that there is
5393 through the mixing of Flash! and music.
5394 <indexterm><primary>Camp Chaos
</primary></indexterm>
5397 All of these creations are technically illegal. Even if the creators
5398 wanted to be "legal," the cost of complying with the law is impossibly
5399 high. Therefore, for the law-abiding sorts, a wealth of creativity is
5400 never made. And for that part that is made, if it doesn't follow the
5401 clearance rules, it doesn't get released.
5404 To some, these stories suggest a solution: Let's alter the mix of
5405 rights so that people are free to build upon our culture. Free to add
5406 or mix as they see fit. We could even make this change without
5407 necessarily requiring that the "free" use be free as in "free beer."
5408 Instead, the system could simply make it easy for follow-on creators
5409 to compensate artists without requiring an army of lawyers to come
5410 along: a rule, for example, that says "the royalty owed the copyright
5411 owner of an unregistered work for the derivative reuse of his work
5412 will be a flat
1 percent of net revenues, to be held in escrow for the
5413 copyright owner." Under this rule, the copyright owner could benefit
5414 from some royalty, but he would not have the benefit of a full
5415 property right (meaning the right to name his own price) unless he
5419 Who could possibly object to this? And what reason would there be
5420 for objecting? We're talking about work that is not now being made;
5421 which if made, under this plan, would produce new income for artists.
5422 What reason would anyone have to oppose it?
5425 In February
2003, DreamWorks studios announced an agreement with Mike
5426 Myers, the comic genius of
<citetitle>Saturday Night Live
</citetitle> and
5427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 118 -->
5428 Austin Powers. According to the announcement, Myers and Dream-Works
5429 would work together to form a "unique filmmaking pact." Under the
5430 agreement, DreamWorks "will acquire the rights to existing motion
5431 picture hits and classics, write new storylines and
—with the use
5432 of stateof-the-art digital technology
—insert Myers and other
5433 actors into the film, thereby creating an entirely new piece of
5437 The announcement called this "film sampling." As Myers explained,
5438 "Film Sampling is an exciting way to put an original spin on existing
5439 films and allow audiences to see old movies in a new light. Rap
5440 artists have been doing this for years with music and now we are able
5441 to take that same concept and apply it to film." Steven Spielberg is
5442 quoted as saying, "If anyone can create a way to bring old films to
5443 new audiences, it is Mike."
5446 Spielberg is right. Film sampling by Myers will be brilliant. But if
5447 you don't think about it, you might miss the truly astonishing point
5448 about this announcement. As the vast majority of our film heritage
5449 remains under copyright, the real meaning of the DreamWorks
5450 announcement is just this: It is Mike Myers and only Mike Myers who is
5451 free to sample. Any general freedom to build upon the film archive of
5452 our culture, a freedom in other contexts presumed for us all, is now a
5453 privilege reserved for the funny and famous
—and presumably rich.
5456 This privilege becomes reserved for two sorts of reasons. The first
5457 continues the story of the last chapter: the vagueness of "fair use."
5458 Much of "sampling" should be considered "fair use." But few would
5459 rely upon so weak a doctrine to create. That leads to the second reason
5460 that the privilege is reserved for the few: The costs of negotiating the
5461 legal rights for the creative reuse of content are astronomically high.
5462 These costs mirror the costs with fair use: You either pay a lawyer to
5463 defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer to track down permissions
5464 so you don't have to rely upon fair use rights. Either way, the creative
5465 process is a process of paying lawyers
—again a privilege, or perhaps a
5466 curse, reserved for the few.
5468 <!-- PAGE BREAK 119 -->
5470 <chapter label=
"9" id=
"collectors">
5471 <title>CHAPTER NINE: Collectors
</title>
5473 In April
1996, millions of "bots"
—computer codes designed to
5474 "spider," or automatically search the Internet and copy content
—began
5475 running across the Net. Page by page, these bots copied Internet-based
5476 information onto a small set of computers located in a basement in San
5477 Francisco's Presidio. Once the bots finished the whole of the Internet,
5478 they started again. Over and over again, once every two months, these
5479 bits of code took copies of the Internet and stored them.
5482 By October
2001, the bots had collected more than five years of
5483 copies. And at a small announcement in Berkeley, California, the
5484 archive that these copies created, the Internet Archive, was opened to
5485 the world. Using a technology called "the Way Back Machine," you could
5486 enter a Web page, and see all of its copies going back to
1996, as
5487 well as when those pages changed.
5490 This is the thing about the Internet that Orwell would have
5491 appreciated. In the dystopia described in
<citetitle>1984</citetitle>, old newspapers were
5492 constantly updated to assure that the current view of the world,
5493 approved of by the government, was not contradicted by previous news
5497 <!-- PAGE BREAK 120 -->
5498 Thousands of workers constantly reedited the past, meaning there was
5499 no way ever to know whether the story you were reading today was the
5500 story that was printed on the date published on the paper.
5503 It's the same with the Internet. If you go to a Web page today,
5504 there's no way for you to know whether the content you are reading is
5505 the same as the content you read before. The page may seem the same,
5506 but the content could easily be different. The Internet is Orwell's
5507 library
—constantly updated, without any reliable memory.
5510 Until the Way Back Machine, at least. With the Way Back Machine, and
5511 the Internet Archive underlying it, you can see what the Internet
5512 was. You have the power to see what you remember. More importantly,
5513 perhaps, you also have the power to find what you don't remember and
5514 what others might prefer you forget.
<footnote><para>
5516 The temptations remain, however. Brewster Kahle reports that the White
5517 House changes its own press releases without notice. A May
13,
2003,
5518 press release stated, "Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." That was
5519 later changed, without notice, to "Major Combat Operations in Iraq
5520 Have Ended." E-mail from Brewster Kahle,
1 December
2003.
5524 We take it for granted that we can go back to see what we remember
5525 reading. Think about newspapers. If you wanted to study the reaction
5526 of your hometown newspaper to the race riots in Watts in
1965, or to
5527 Bull Connor's water cannon in
1963, you could go to your public
5528 library and look at the newspapers. Those papers probably exist on
5529 microfiche. If you're lucky, they exist in paper, too. Either way, you
5530 are free, using a library, to go back and remember
—not just what
5531 it is convenient to remember, but remember something close to the
5535 It is said that those who fail to remember history are doomed to
5536 repeat it. That's not quite correct. We
<emphasis>all
</emphasis>
5537 forget history. The key is whether we have a way to go back to
5538 rediscover what we forget. More directly, the key is whether an
5539 objective past can keep us honest. Libraries help do that, by
5540 collecting content and keeping it, for schoolchildren, for
5541 researchers, for grandma. A free society presumes this knowedge.
5544 The Internet was an exception to this presumption. Until the Internet
5545 Archive, there was no way to go back. The Internet was the
5546 quintessentially transitory medium. And yet, as it becomes more
5547 important in forming and reforming society, it becomes more and more
5548 <!-- PAGE BREAK 121 -->
5549 important to maintain in some historical form. It's just bizarre to
5550 think that we have scads of archives of newspapers from tiny towns
5551 around the world, yet there is but one copy of the Internet
—the
5552 one kept by the Internet Archive.
5555 Brewster Kahle is the founder of the Internet Archive. He was a very
5556 successful Internet entrepreneur after he was a successful computer
5557 researcher. In the
1990s, Kahle decided he had had enough business
5558 success. It was time to become a different kind of success. So he
5559 launched a series of projects designed to archive human knowledge. The
5560 Internet Archive was just the first of the projects of this Andrew
5561 Carnegie of the Internet. By December of
2002, the archive had over
10
5562 billion pages, and it was growing at about a billion pages a month.
5565 The Way Back Machine is the largest archive of human knowledge in
5566 human history. At the end of
2002, it held "two hundred and thirty
5567 terabytes of material"
—and was "ten times larger than the
5568 Library of Congress." And this was just the first of the archives that
5569 Kahle set out to build. In addition to the Internet Archive, Kahle has
5570 been constructing the Television Archive. Television, it turns out, is
5571 even more ephemeral than the Internet. While much of twentieth-century
5572 culture was constructed through television, only a tiny proportion of
5573 that culture is available for anyone to see today. Three hours of news
5574 are recorded each evening by Vanderbilt University
—thanks to a
5575 specific exemption in the copyright law. That content is indexed, and
5576 is available to scholars for a very low fee. "But other than that,
5577 [television] is almost unavailable," Kahle told me. "If you were
5578 Barbara Walters you could get access to [the archives], but if you are
5579 just a graduate student?" As Kahle put it,
5582 <indexterm><primary>Quayle, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
5584 Do you remember when Dan Quayle was interacting with Murphy Brown?
5585 Remember that back and forth surreal experience of a politician
5586 interacting with a fictional television character? If you were a
5587 graduate student wanting to study that, and you wanted to get those
5588 original back and forth exchanges between the two, the
5590 <!-- PAGE BREAK 122 -->
5591 <citetitle>60 Minutes
</citetitle> episode that came out after it
… it would be almost
5592 impossible.
… Those materials are almost unfindable.
…
5596 Why is that? Why is it that the part of our culture that is recorded
5597 in newspapers remains perpetually accessible, while the part that is
5598 recorded on videotape is not? How is it that we've created a world
5599 where researchers trying to understand the effect of media on
5600 nineteenthcentury America will have an easier time than researchers
5601 trying to understand the effect of media on twentieth-century America?
5604 In part, this is because of the law. Early in American copyright law,
5605 copyright owners were required to deposit copies of their work in
5606 libraries. These copies were intended both to facilitate the spread
5607 of knowledge and to assure that a copy of the work would be around
5608 once the copyright expired, so that others might access and copy the
5612 These rules applied to film as well. But in
1915, the Library
5613 of Congress made an exception for film. Film could be copyrighted so
5614 long as such deposits were made. But the filmmaker was then allowed to
5615 borrow back the deposits
—for an unlimited time at no cost. In
5616 1915 alone, there were more than
5,
475 films deposited and "borrowed
5617 back." Thus, when the copyrights to films expire, there is no copy
5618 held by any library. The copy exists
—if it exists at
5619 all
—in the library archive of the film company.
<footnote><para>
5621 Doug Herrick, "Toward a National Film Collection: Motion Pictures at
5622 the Library of Congress,"
<citetitle>Film Library Quarterly
</citetitle> 13 nos.
2–3
5623 (
1980):
5; Anthony Slide,
<citetitle>Nitrate Won't Wait: A History of Film
5624 Preservation in the United States
</citetitle> ( Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland
&
5629 The same is generally true about television. Television broadcasts
5630 were originally not copyrighted
—there was no way to capture the
5631 broadcasts, so there was no fear of "theft." But as technology enabled
5632 capturing, broadcasters relied increasingly upon the law. The law
5633 required they make a copy of each broadcast for the work to be
5634 "copyrighted." But those copies were simply kept by the
5635 broadcasters. No library had any right to them; the government didn't
5636 demand them. The content of this part of American culture is
5637 practically invisible to anyone who would look.
5640 Kahle was eager to correct this. Before September
11,
2001, he and
5641 <!-- PAGE BREAK 123 -->
5642 his allies had started capturing television. They selected twenty
5643 stations from around the world and hit the Record button. After
5644 September
11, Kahle, working with dozens of others, selected twenty
5645 stations from around the world and, beginning October
11,
2001, made
5646 their coverage during the week of September
11 available free on-line.
5647 Anyone could see how news reports from around the world covered the
5651 Kahle had the same idea with film. Working with Rick Prelinger, whose
5652 archive of film includes close to
45,
000 "ephemeral films" (meaning
5653 films other than Hollywood movies, films that were never copyrighted),
5654 Kahle established the Movie Archive. Prelinger let Kahle digitize
5655 1,
300 films in this archive and post those films on the Internet to be
5656 downloaded for free. Prelinger's is a for-profit company. It sells
5657 copies of these films as stock footage. What he has discovered is that
5658 after he made a significant chunk available for free, his stock
5659 footage sales went up dramatically. People could easily find the
5660 material they wanted to use. Some downloaded that material and made
5661 films on their own. Others purchased copies to enable other films to
5662 be made. Either way, the archive enabled access to this important
5663 part of our culture. Want to see a copy of the "Duck and Cover" film
5664 that instructed children how to save themselves in the middle of
5665 nuclear attack? Go to archive.org, and you can download the film in a
5666 few minutes
—for free.
5667 <indexterm><primary>Movie Archive
</primary></indexterm>
5670 Here again, Kahle is providing access to a part of our culture that we
5671 otherwise could not get easily, if at all. It is yet another part of
5672 what defines the twentieth century that we have lost to history. The
5673 law doesn't require these copies to be kept by anyone, or to be
5674 deposited in an archive by anyone. Therefore, there is no simple way
5678 The key here is access, not price. Kahle wants to enable free access
5679 to this content, but he also wants to enable others to sell access to
5680 it. His aim is to ensure competition in access to this important part
5681 of our culture. Not during the commercial life of a bit of creative
5682 property, but during a second life that all creative property
5683 has
—a noncommercial life.
5686 For here is an idea that we should more clearly recognize. Every bit
5687 of creative property goes through different "lives." In its first
5690 <!-- PAGE BREAK 124 -->
5691 creator is lucky, the content is sold. In such cases the commercial
5692 market is successful for the creator. The vast majority of creative
5693 property doesn't enjoy such success, but some clearly does. For that
5694 content, commercial life is extremely important. Without this
5695 commercial market, there would be, many argue, much less creativity.
5698 After the commercial life of creative property has ended, our
5699 tradition has always supported a second life as well. A newspaper
5700 delivers the news every day to the doorsteps of America. The very next
5701 day, it is used to wrap fish or to fill boxes with fragile gifts or to
5702 build an archive of knowledge about our history. In this second life,
5703 the content can continue to inform even if that information is no
5707 The same has always been true about books. A book goes out of print
5708 very quickly (the average today is after about a year
<footnote><para>
5710 Dave Barns, "Fledgling Career in Antique Books: Woodstock Landlord,
5711 Bar Owner Starts a New Chapter by Adopting Business,"
<citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
5712 5 September
1997, at Metro Lake
1L. Of books published between
1927
5713 and
1946, only
2.2 percent were in print in
2002. R. Anthony Reese,
5714 "The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks,"
<citetitle>Boston
5715 College Law Review
</citetitle> 44 (
2003):
593 n.
51.
5716 </para></footnote>). After
5717 it is out of print, it can be sold in used book stores without the
5718 copyright owner getting anything and stored in libraries, where many
5719 get to read the book, also for free. Used book stores and libraries
5720 are thus the second life of a book. That second life is extremely
5721 important to the spread and stability of culture.
5724 Yet increasingly, any assumption about a stable second life for
5725 creative property does not hold true with the most important
5726 components of popular culture in the twentieth and twenty-first
5727 centuries. For these
—television, movies, music, radio, the
5728 Internet
—there is no guarantee of a second life. For these sorts
5729 of culture, it is as if we've replaced libraries with Barnes
&
5730 Noble superstores. With this culture, what's accessible is nothing but
5731 what a certain limited market demands. Beyond that, culture
5735 For most of the twentieth century, it was economics that made this
5736 so. It would have been insanely expensive to collect and make
5737 accessible all television and film and music: The cost of analog
5738 copies is extraordinarily high. So even though the law in principle
5739 would have restricted the ability of a Brewster Kahle to copy culture
5741 <!-- PAGE BREAK 125 -->
5742 real restriction was economics. The market made it impossibly
5743 difficult to do anything about this ephemeral culture; the law had
5744 little practical effect.
5747 Perhaps the single most important feature of the digital revolution is
5748 that for the first time since the Library of Alexandria, it is
5749 feasible to imagine constructing archives that hold all culture
5750 produced or distributed publicly. Technology makes it possible to
5751 imagine an archive of all books published, and increasingly makes it
5752 possible to imagine an archive of all moving images and sound.
5755 The scale of this potential archive is something we've never imagined
5756 before. The Brewster Kahles of our history have dreamed about it; but
5757 we are for the first time at a point where that dream is possible. As
5762 It looks like there's about two to three million recordings of music.
5763 Ever. There are about a hundred thousand theatrical releases of
5764 movies,
… and about one to two million movies [distributed] during
5765 the twentieth century. There are about twenty-six million different
5766 titles of books. All of these would fit on computers that would fit in
5767 this room and be able to be afforded by a small company. So we're at
5768 a turning point in our history. Universal access is the goal. And the
5769 opportunity of leading a different life, based on this, is
5770 … thrilling. It could be one of the things humankind would be most
5771 proud of. Up there with the Library of Alexandria, putting a man on
5772 the moon, and the invention of the printing press.
5776 Kahle is not the only librarian. The Internet Archive is not the only
5777 archive. But Kahle and the Internet Archive suggest what the future of
5778 libraries or archives could be.
<emphasis>When
</emphasis> the
5779 commercial life of creative property ends, I don't know. But it
5780 does. And whenever it does, Kahle and his archive hint at a world
5781 where this knowledge, and culture, remains perpetually available. Some
5782 will draw upon it to understand it;
5783 <!-- PAGE BREAK 126 -->
5784 some to criticize it. Some will use it, as Walt Disney did, to
5785 re-create the past for the future. These technologies promise
5786 something that had become unimaginable for much of our past
—a
5787 future
<emphasis>for
</emphasis> our past. The technology of digital
5788 arts could make the dream of the Library of Alexandria real again.
5791 Technologists have thus removed the economic costs of building such an
5792 archive. But lawyers' costs remain. For as much as we might like to
5793 call these "archives," as warm as the idea of a "library" might seem,
5794 the "content" that is collected in these digital spaces is also
5795 someone's "property." And the law of property restricts the freedoms
5796 that Kahle and others would exercise.
5798 <!-- PAGE BREAK 127 -->
5800 <chapter label=
"10" id=
"property-i">
5801 <title>CHAPTER TEN: "Property"
</title>
5803 Jack Valenti has been the president of the Motion Picture Association
5804 of America since
1966. He first came to Washington, D.C., with Lyndon
5805 Johnson's administration
—literally. The famous picture of
5806 Johnson's swearing-in on Air Force One after the assassination of
5807 President Kennedy has Valenti in the background. In his almost forty
5808 years of running the MPAA, Valenti has established himself as perhaps
5809 the most prominent and effective lobbyist in Washington.
5810 <indexterm><primary>Johnson, Lyndon
</primary></indexterm>
5811 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
5814 The MPAA is the American branch of the international Motion Picture
5815 Association. It was formed in
1922 as a trade association whose goal
5816 was to defend American movies against increasing domestic criticism.
5817 The organization now represents not only filmmakers but producers and
5818 distributors of entertainment for television, video, and cable. Its
5819 board is made up of the chairmen and presidents of the seven major
5820 producers and distributors of motion picture and television programs
5821 in the United States: Walt Disney, Sony Pictures Entertainment, MGM,
5822 Paramount Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and
5824 <indexterm><primary>Disney, Inc.
</primary></indexterm>
5825 <indexterm><primary>Sony Pictures Entertainment
</primary></indexterm>
5826 <indexterm><primary>MGM
</primary></indexterm>
5827 <indexterm><primary>Paramount Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5828 <indexterm><primary>Twentieth Century Fox
</primary></indexterm>
5829 <indexterm><primary>Universal Pictures
</primary></indexterm>
5830 <indexterm><primary>Warner Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
5833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 128 -->
5834 Valenti is only the third president of the MPAA. No president before
5835 him has had as much influence over that organization, or over
5836 Washington. As a Texan, Valenti has mastered the single most important
5837 political skill of a Southerner
—the ability to appear simple and
5838 slow while hiding a lightning-fast intellect. To this day, Valenti
5839 plays the simple, humble man. But this Harvard MBA, and author of four
5840 books, who finished high school at the age of fifteen and flew more
5841 than fifty combat missions in World War II, is no Mr. Smith. When
5842 Valenti went to Washington, he mastered the city in a quintessentially
5846 In defending artistic liberty and the freedom of speech that our
5847 culture depends upon, the MPAA has done important good. In crafting
5848 the MPAA rating system, it has probably avoided a great deal of
5849 speech-regulating harm. But there is an aspect to the organization's
5850 mission that is both the most radical and the most important. This is
5851 the organization's effort, epitomized in Valenti's every act, to
5852 redefine the meaning of "creative property."
5855 In
1982, Valenti's testimony to Congress captured the strategy
5860 No matter the lengthy arguments made, no matter the charges and the
5861 counter-charges, no matter the tumult and the shouting, reasonable men
5862 and women will keep returning to the fundamental issue, the central
5863 theme which animates this entire debate:
<emphasis>Creative property
5864 owners must be accorded the same rights and protection resident in all
5865 other property owners in the nation
</emphasis>. That is the issue.
5866 That is the question. And that is the rostrum on which this entire
5867 hearing and the debates to follow must rest.
<footnote><para>
5869 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R.
4783, H.R.
5870 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R.
5250, H.R.
5488, and H.R.
5705 Before the
5871 Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
5872 Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
5873 Representatives,
97th Cong.,
2nd sess. (
1982):
65 (testimony of Jack
5879 The strategy of this rhetoric, like the strategy of most of Valenti's
5880 rhetoric, is brilliant and simple and brilliant because simple. The
5881 "central theme" to which "reasonable men and women" will return is
5883 <!-- PAGE BREAK 129 -->
5884 "Creative property owners must be accorded the same rights and
5885 protections resident in all other property owners in the nation."
5886 There are no second-class citizens, Valenti might have
5887 continued. There should be no second-class property owners.
5890 This claim has an obvious and powerful intuitive pull. It is stated
5891 with such clarity as to make the idea as obvious as the notion that we
5892 use elections to pick presidents. But in fact, there is no more
5893 extreme a claim made by
<emphasis>anyone
</emphasis> who is serious in
5894 this debate than this claim of Valenti's. Jack Valenti, however sweet
5895 and however brilliant, is perhaps the nation's foremost extremist when
5896 it comes to the nature and scope of "creative property." His views
5897 have
<emphasis>no
</emphasis> reasonable connection to our actual legal
5898 tradition, even if the subtle pull of his Texan charm has slowly
5899 redefined that tradition, at least in Washington.
5902 While "creative property" is certainly "property" in a nerdy and
5903 precise sense that lawyers are trained to understand,
<footnote><para>
5905 Lawyers speak of "property" not as an absolute thing, but as a bundle
5906 of rights that are sometimes associated with a particular
5907 object. Thus, my "property right" to my car gives me the right to
5908 exclusive use, but not the right to drive at
150 miles an hour. For
5909 the best effort to connect the ordinary meaning of "property" to
5910 "lawyer talk," see Bruce Ackerman,
<citetitle>Private Property and the
5911 Constitution
</citetitle> (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977),
26–27.
5912 </para></footnote> it has never been the case, nor should it be, that
5913 "creative property owners" have been "accorded the same rights and
5914 protection resident in all other property owners." Indeed, if creative
5915 property owners were given the same rights as all other property
5916 owners, that would effect a radical, and radically undesirable, change
5920 Valenti knows this. But he speaks for an industry that cares squat for
5921 our tradition and the values it represents. He speaks for an industry
5922 that is instead fighting to restore the tradition that the British
5923 overturned in
1710. In the world that Valenti's changes would create,
5924 a powerful few would exercise powerful control over how our creative
5925 culture would develop.
5928 I have two purposes in this chapter. The first is to convince you
5929 that, historically, Valenti's claim is absolutely wrong. The second is
5930 to convince you that it would be terribly wrong for us to reject our
5931 history. We have always treated rights in creative property
5932 differently from the rights resident in all other property
5933 owners. They have never been the same. And they should never be the
5934 same, because, however counterintuitive this may seem, to make them
5935 the same would be to
5937 <!-- PAGE BREAK 130 -->
5938 fundamentally weaken the opportunity for new creators to create.
5939 Creativity depends upon the owners of creativity having less than
5943 Organizations such as the MPAA, whose board includes the most powerful
5944 of the old guard, have little interest, their rhetoric
5945 notwithstanding, in assuring that the new can displace them. No
5946 organization does. No person does. (Ask me about tenure, for example.)
5947 But what's good for the MPAA is not necessarily good for America. A
5948 society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve
5949 precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old. To
5950 get just a hint that there is something fundamentally wrong in
5951 Valenti's argument, we need look no further than the United States
5952 Constitution itself.
5955 The framers of our Constitution loved "property." Indeed, so strongly
5956 did they love property that they built into the Constitution an
5957 important requirement. If the government takes your property
—if
5958 it condemns your house, or acquires a slice of land from your
5959 farm
—it is required, under the Fifth Amendment's "Takings
5960 Clause," to pay you "just compensation" for that taking. The
5961 Constitution thus guarantees that property is, in a certain sense,
5962 sacred. It cannot
<emphasis>ever
</emphasis> be taken from the property
5963 owner unless the government pays for the privilege.
5966 Yet the very same Constitution speaks very differently about what
5967 Valenti calls "creative property." In the clause granting Congress the
5968 power to create "creative property," the Constitution
5969 <emphasis>requires
</emphasis> that after a "limited time," Congress
5970 take back the rights that it has granted and set the "creative
5971 property" free to the public domain. Yet when Congress does this, when
5972 the expiration of a copyright term "takes" your copyright and turns it
5973 over to the public domain, Congress does not have any obligation to
5974 pay "just compensation" for this "taking." Instead, the same
5975 Constitution that requires compensation for your land
5976 <!-- PAGE BREAK 131 -->
5977 requires that you lose your "creative property" right without any
5978 compensation at all.
5981 The Constitution thus on its face states that these two forms of
5982 property are not to be accorded the same rights. They are plainly to
5983 be treated differently. Valenti is therefore not just asking for a
5984 change in our tradition when he argues that creative-property owners
5985 should be accorded the same rights as every other property-right
5986 owner. He is effectively arguing for a change in our Constitution
5990 Arguing for a change in our Constitution is not necessarily wrong.
5991 There was much in our original Constitution that was plainly wrong.
5992 The Constitution of
1789 entrenched slavery; it left senators to be
5993 appointed rather than elected; it made it possible for the electoral
5994 college to produce a tie between the president and his own vice
5995 president (as it did in
1800). The framers were no doubt
5996 extraordinary, but I would be the first to admit that they made big
5997 mistakes. We have since rejected some of those mistakes; no doubt
5998 there could be others that we should reject as well. So my argument is
5999 not simply that because Jefferson did it, we should, too.
6002 Instead, my argument is that because Jefferson did it, we should at
6003 least try to understand
<emphasis>why
</emphasis>. Why did the framers,
6004 fanatical property types that they were, reject the claim that
6005 creative property be given the same rights as all other property? Why
6006 did they require that for creative property there must be a public
6010 To answer this question, we need to get some perspective on the
6011 history of these "creative property" rights, and the control that they
6012 enabled. Once we see clearly how differently these rights have been
6013 defined, we will be in a better position to ask the question that
6014 should be at the core of this war: Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis>
6015 creative property should be protected, but how. Not
6016 <emphasis>whether
</emphasis> we will enforce the rights the law gives
6017 to creative-property owners, but what the particular mix of rights
6018 ought to be. Not
<emphasis>whether
</emphasis> artists should be paid,
6019 but whether institutions designed to assure that artists get paid need
6020 also control how culture develops.
6024 <!-- PAGE BREAK 132 -->
6025 To answer these questions, we need a more general way to talk about
6026 how property is protected. More precisely, we need a more general way
6027 than the narrow language of the law allows. In
<citetitle>Code and Other Laws of
6028 Cyberspace
</citetitle>, I used a simple model to capture this more general
6029 perspective. For any particular right or regulation, this model asks
6030 how four different modalities of regulation interact to support or
6031 weaken the right or regulation. I represented it with this diagram:
6033 <figure id=
"fig-1331">
6034 <title>How four different modalities of regulation interact to support or weaken the right or regulation.
</title>
6035 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6038 At the center of this picture is a regulated dot: the individual or
6039 group that is the target of regulation, or the holder of a right. (In
6040 each case throughout, we can describe this either as regulation or as
6041 a right. For simplicity's sake, I will speak only of regulations.)
6042 The ovals represent four ways in which the individual or group might
6043 be regulated
— either constrained or, alternatively, enabled. Law
6044 is the most obvious constraint (to lawyers, at least). It constrains
6045 by threatening punishments after the fact if the rules set in advance
6046 are violated. So if, for example, you willfully infringe Madonna's
6047 copyright by copying a song from her latest CD and posting it on the
6048 Web, you can be punished
6049 <!-- PAGE BREAK 133 -->
6050 with a $
150,
000 fine. The fine is an ex post punishment for violating
6051 an ex ante rule. It is imposed by the state.
6052 <indexterm><primary>Madonna
</primary></indexterm>
6055 Norms are a different kind of constraint. They, too, punish an
6056 individual for violating a rule. But the punishment of a norm is
6057 imposed by a community, not (or not only) by the state. There may be
6058 no law against spitting, but that doesn't mean you won't be punished
6059 if you spit on the ground while standing in line at a movie. The
6060 punishment might not be harsh, though depending upon the community, it
6061 could easily be more harsh than many of the punishments imposed by the
6062 state. The mark of the difference is not the severity of the rule, but
6063 the source of the enforcement.
6066 The market is a third type of constraint. Its constraint is effected
6067 through conditions: You can do X if you pay Y; you'll be paid M if you
6068 do N. These constraints are obviously not independent of law or
6069 norms
—it is property law that defines what must be bought if it
6070 is to be taken legally; it is norms that say what is appropriately
6071 sold. But given a set of norms, and a background of property and
6072 contract law, the market imposes a simultaneous constraint upon how an
6073 individual or group might behave.
6076 Finally, and for the moment, perhaps, most mysteriously,
6077 "architecture"
—the physical world as one finds it
—is a
6078 constraint on behavior. A fallen bridge might constrain your ability
6079 to get across a river. Railroad tracks might constrain the ability of
6080 a community to integrate its social life. As with the market,
6081 architecture does not effect its constraint through ex post
6082 punishments. Instead, also as with the market, architecture effects
6083 its constraint through simultaneous conditions. These conditions are
6084 imposed not by courts enforcing contracts, or by police punishing
6085 theft, but by nature, by "architecture." If a
500-pound boulder
6086 blocks your way, it is the law of gravity that enforces this
6087 constraint. If a $
500 airplane ticket stands between you and a flight
6088 to New York, it is the market that enforces this constraint.
6092 <!-- PAGE BREAK 134 -->
6093 So the first point about these four modalities of regulation is
6094 obvious: They interact. Restrictions imposed by one might be
6095 reinforced by another. Or restrictions imposed by one might be
6096 undermined by another.
6099 The second point follows directly: If we want to understand the
6100 effective freedom that anyone has at a given moment to do any
6101 particular thing, we have to consider how these four modalities
6102 interact. Whether or not there are other constraints (there may well
6103 be; my claim is not about comprehensiveness), these four are among the
6104 most significant, and any regulator (whether controlling or freeing)
6105 must consider how these four in particular interact.
6107 <indexterm id=
"idxdrivespeed" class='startofrange'
>
6108 <primary>driving speed, constraints on
</primary>
6111 So, for example, consider the "freedom" to drive a car at a high
6112 speed. That freedom is in part restricted by laws: speed limits that
6113 say how fast you can drive in particular places at particular
6114 times. It is in part restricted by architecture: speed bumps, for
6115 example, slow most rational drivers; governors in buses, as another
6116 example, set the maximum rate at which the driver can drive. The
6117 freedom is in part restricted by the market: Fuel efficiency drops as
6118 speed increases, thus the price of gasoline indirectly constrains
6119 speed. And finally, the norms of a community may or may not constrain
6120 the freedom to speed. Drive at
50 mph by a school in your own
6121 neighborhood and you're likely to be punished by the neighbors. The
6122 same norm wouldn't be as effective in a different town, or at night.
6125 The final point about this simple model should also be fairly clear:
6126 While these four modalities are analytically independent, law has a
6127 special role in affecting the three.
<footnote><para>
6129 By describing the way law affects the other three modalities, I don't
6130 mean to suggest that the other three don't affect law. Obviously, they
6131 do. Law's only distinction is that it alone speaks as if it has a
6132 right self-consciously to change the other three. The right of the
6133 other three is more timidly expressed. See Lawrence Lessig,
<citetitle>Code: And
6134 Other Laws of Cyberspace
</citetitle> (New York: Basic Books,
1999):
90–95;
6135 Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School,"
<citetitle>Journal of Legal Studies
</citetitle>,
6138 The law, in other words, sometimes operates to increase or decrease
6139 the constraint of a particular modality. Thus, the law might be used
6140 to increase taxes on gasoline, so as to increase the incentives to
6141 drive more slowly. The law might be used to mandate more speed bumps,
6142 so as to increase the difficulty of driving rapidly. The law might be
6143 used to fund ads that stigmatize reckless driving. Or the law might be
6144 used to require that other laws be more
6145 <!-- PAGE BREAK 135 -->
6146 strict
—a federal requirement that states decrease the speed
6147 limit, for example
—so as to decrease the attractiveness of fast
6150 <indexterm startref=
"idxdrivespeed" class='endofrange'
/>
6152 <figure id=
"fig-1361">
6153 <title>Law has a special role in affecting the three.
</title>
6154 <graphic fileref=
"images/1361.png"></graphic>
6157 These constraints can thus change, and they can be changed. To
6158 understand the effective protection of liberty or protection of
6159 property at any particular moment, we must track these changes over
6160 time. A restriction imposed by one modality might be erased by
6161 another. A freedom enabled by one modality might be displaced by
6165 Some people object to this way of talking about "liberty." They object
6166 because their focus when considering the constraints that exist at any
6167 particular moment are constraints imposed exclusively by the
6168 government. For instance, if a storm destroys a bridge, these people
6169 think it is meaningless to say that one's liberty has been
6170 restrained. A bridge has washed out, and it's harder to get from one
6171 place to another. To talk about this as a loss of freedom, they say,
6172 is to confuse the stuff of politics with the vagaries of ordinary
6173 life. I don't mean to deny the value in this narrower view, which
6174 depends upon the context of the inquiry. I do, however, mean to argue
6175 against any insistence that this narrower view is the only proper view
6176 of liberty. As I argued in
<citetitle>Code
</citetitle>, we come from a
6177 long tradition of political thought with a broader focus than the
6178 narrow question of what the government did when. John Stuart Mill
6179 defended freedom of speech, for example, from the tyranny of narrow
6180 minds, not from the fear of government prosecution; John Stuart Mill,
6181 <citetitle>On Liberty
</citetitle> (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co.,
6182 1978),
19. John R. Commons famously defended the economic freedom of
6183 labor from constraints imposed by the market; John R. Commons, "The
6184 Right to Work," in Malcom Rutherford and Warren J. Samuels, eds.,
6185 <citetitle>John R. Commons: Selected Essays
</citetitle> (London:
6186 Routledge:
1997),
62. The Americans with Disabilities Act increases
6187 the liberty of people with physical disabilities by changing the
6188 architecture of certain public places, thereby making access to those
6189 places easier;
42 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6190 12101 (
2000). Each of these interventions to change existing
6191 conditions changes the liberty of a particular group. The effect of
6192 those interventions should be accounted for in order to understand the
6193 effective liberty that each of these groups might face.
6194 <indexterm><primary>Americans with Disabilities Act (
1990)
</primary></indexterm>
6195 <indexterm><primary>Commons, John R.
</primary></indexterm>
6198 <section id=
"hollywood">
6199 <title>Why Hollywood Is Right
</title>
6201 The most obvious point that this model reveals is just why, or just
6202 how, Hollywood is right. The copyright warriors have rallied Congress
6203 and the courts to defend copyright. This model helps us see why that
6204 rallying makes sense.
6207 Let's say this is the picture of copyright's regulation before the
6210 <figure id=
"fig-1371">
6211 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6212 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6215 <!-- PAGE BREAK 136 -->
6216 There is balance between law, norms, market, and architecture. The law
6217 limits the ability to copy and share content, by imposing penalties on
6218 those who copy and share content. Those penalties are reinforced by
6219 technologies that make it hard to copy and share content
6220 (architecture) and expensive to copy and share content
6221 (market). Finally, those penalties are mitigated by norms we all
6222 recognize
—kids, for example, taping other kids' records. These
6223 uses of copyrighted material may well be infringement, but the norms
6224 of our society (before the Internet, at least) had no problem with
6225 this form of infringement.
6228 Enter the Internet, or, more precisely, technologies such as MP3s and
6229 p2p sharing. Now the constraint of architecture changes dramatically,
6230 as does the constraint of the market. And as both the market and
6231 architecture relax the regulation of copyright, norms pile on. The
6232 happy balance (for the warriors, at least) of life before the Internet
6233 becomes an effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
6236 Thus the sense of, and justification for, the warriors' response.
6237 Technology has changed, the warriors say, and the effect of this
6238 change, when ramified through the market and norms, is that a balance
6239 of protection for the copyright owners' rights has been lost. This is
6241 <!-- PAGE BREAK 137 -->
6242 after the fall of Saddam, but this time no government is justifying the
6243 looting that results.
6245 <figure id=
"fig-1381">
6246 <title>effective state of anarchy after the Internet.
</title>
6247 <graphic fileref=
"images/1381.png"></graphic>
6250 Neither this analysis nor the conclusions that follow are new to the
6251 warriors. Indeed, in a "White Paper" prepared by the Commerce
6252 Department (one heavily influenced by the copyright warriors) in
1995,
6253 this mix of regulatory modalities had already been identified and the
6254 strategy to respond already mapped. In response to the changes the
6255 Internet had effected, the White Paper argued (
1) Congress should
6256 strengthen intellectual property law, (
2) businesses should adopt
6257 innovative marketing techniques, (
3) technologists should push to
6258 develop code to protect copyrighted material, and (
4) educators should
6259 educate kids to better protect copyright.
6262 This mixed strategy is just what copyright needed
—if it was to
6263 preserve the particular balance that existed before the change induced
6264 by the Internet. And it's just what we should expect the content
6265 industry to push for. It is as American as apple pie to consider the
6266 happy life you have as an entitlement, and to look to the law to
6267 protect it if something comes along to change that happy
6268 life. Homeowners living in a
6270 <!-- PAGE BREAK 138 -->
6271 flood plain have no hesitation appealing to the government to rebuild
6272 (and rebuild again) when a flood (architecture) wipes away their
6273 property (law). Farmers have no hesitation appealing to the government
6274 to bail them out when a virus (architecture) devastates their
6275 crop. Unions have no hesitation appealing to the government to bail
6276 them out when imports (market) wipe out the U.S. steel industry.
6279 Thus, there's nothing wrong or surprising in the content industry's
6280 campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences of a
6281 technological innovation. And I would be the last person to argue that
6282 the changing technology of the Internet has not had a profound effect
6283 on the content industry's way of doing business, or as John Seely
6284 Brown describes it, its "architecture of revenue."
6286 <indexterm><primary>railroad industry
</primary></indexterm>
6288 But just because a particular interest asks for government support, it
6289 doesn't follow that support should be granted. And just because
6290 technology has weakened a particular way of doing business, it doesn't
6291 follow that the government should intervene to support that old way of
6292 doing business. Kodak, for example, has lost perhaps as much as
20
6293 percent of their traditional film market to the emerging technologies
6294 of digital cameras.
<footnote><para>
6296 See Geoffrey Smith, "Film vs. Digital: Can Kodak Build a Bridge?"
6297 BusinessWeek online,
2 August
1999, available at
6298 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
23</ulink>. For a more
6299 recent analysis of Kodak's place in the market, see Chana
6300 R. Schoenberger, "Can Kodak Make Up for Lost Moments?" Forbes.com,
6
6301 October
2003, available at
6302 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
24</ulink>.
6305 Does anyone believe the government should ban digital cameras just to
6306 support Kodak? Highways have weakened the freight business for
6307 railroads. Does anyone think we should ban trucks from roads
6308 <emphasis>for the purpose of
</emphasis> protecting the railroads?
6309 Closer to the subject of this book, remote channel changers have
6310 weakened the "stickiness" of television advertising (if a boring
6311 commercial comes on the TV, the remote makes it easy to surf ), and it
6312 may well be that this change has weakened the television advertising
6313 market. But does anyone believe we should regulate remotes to
6314 reinforce commercial television? (Maybe by limiting them to function
6315 only once a second, or to switch to only ten channels within an hour?)
6318 The obvious answer to these obviously rhetorical questions is no.
6319 In a free society, with a free market, supported by free enterprise and
6320 free trade, the government's role is not to support one way of doing
6321 <!-- PAGE BREAK 139 -->
6322 business against others. Its role is not to pick winners and protect
6323 them against loss. If the government did this generally, then we would
6324 never have any progress. As Microsoft chairman Bill Gates wrote in
6325 1991, in a memo criticizing software patents, "established companies
6326 have an interest in excluding future competitors."
<footnote><para>
6328 Fred Warshofsky,
<citetitle>The Patent Wars
</citetitle> (New York: Wiley,
1994),
170–71.
6331 startup, established companies also have the means. (Think RCA and
6332 FM radio.) A world in which competitors with new ideas must fight
6333 not only the market but also the government is a world in which
6334 competitors with new ideas will not succeed. It is a world of stasis and
6335 increasingly concentrated stagnation. It is the Soviet Union under
6337 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
6340 Thus, while it is understandable for industries threatened with new
6341 technologies that change the way they do business to look to the
6342 government for protection, it is the special duty of policy makers to
6343 guarantee that that protection not become a deterrent to progress. It
6344 is the duty of policy makers, in other words, to assure that the
6345 changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by
6346 changing technology, are changes that preserve the incentives and
6347 opportunities for innovation and change.
6350 In the context of laws regulating speech
—which include,
6351 obviously, copyright law
—that duty is even stronger. When the
6352 industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress to
6353 respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
6354 should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for
6355 the government to get into the business of regulating speech
6356 markets. The risks and dangers of that game are precisely why our
6357 framers created the First Amendment to our Constitution: "Congress
6358 shall make no law
… abridging the freedom of speech." So when
6359 Congress is being asked to pass laws that would "abridge" the freedom
6360 of speech, it should ask
— carefully
—whether such
6361 regulation is justified.
6364 My argument just now, however, has nothing to do with whether
6365 <!-- PAGE BREAK 140 -->
6366 the changes that are being pushed by the copyright warriors are
6367 "justified." My argument is about their effect. For before we get to
6368 the question of justification, a hard question that depends a great
6369 deal upon your values, we should first ask whether we understand the
6370 effect of the changes the content industry wants.
6373 Here's the metaphor that will capture the argument to follow.
6375 <indexterm id=
"idxddt" class='startofrange'
>
6376 <primary>DDT
</primary>
6379 In
1873, the chemical DDT was first synthesized. In
1948, Swiss
6380 chemist Paul Hermann Müller won the Nobel Prize for his work
6381 demonstrating the insecticidal properties of DDT. By the
1950s, the
6382 insecticide was widely used around the world to kill disease-carrying
6383 pests. It was also used to increase farm production.
6384 <indexterm><primary>Müller, Paul Hermann
</primary></indexterm>
6387 No one doubts that killing disease-carrying pests or increasing crop
6388 production is a good thing. No one doubts that the work of Müller was
6389 important and valuable and probably saved lives, possibly millions.
6391 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6393 But in
1962, Rachel Carson published
<citetitle>Silent Spring
</citetitle>, which argued that
6394 DDT, whatever its primary benefits, was also having unintended
6395 environmental consequences. Birds were losing the ability to
6396 reproduce. Whole chains of the ecology were being destroyed.
6397 <indexterm><primary>Carson, Rachel
</primary></indexterm>
6398 <indexterm><primary>Silent Sprint (Carson)
</primary></indexterm>
6401 No one set out to destroy the environment. Paul Müller certainly did
6402 not aim to harm any birds. But the effort to solve one set of problems
6403 produced another set which, in the view of some, was far worse than
6404 the problems that were originally attacked. Or more accurately, the
6405 problems DDT caused were worse than the problems it solved, at least
6406 when considering the other, more environmentally friendly ways to
6407 solve the problems that DDT was meant to solve.
6410 It is to this image precisely that Duke University law professor James
6411 Boyle appeals when he argues that we need an "environmentalism" for
6412 culture.
<footnote><para>
6414 See, for example, James Boyle, "A Politics of Intellectual Property:
6415 Environmentalism for the Net?"
<citetitle>Duke Law Journal
</citetitle> 47 (
1997):
87.
6417 His point, and the point I want to develop in the balance of this
6418 chapter, is not that the aims of copyright are flawed. Or that authors
6419 should not be paid for their work. Or that music should be given away
6420 "for free." The point is that some of the ways in which we might
6421 protect authors will have unintended consequences for the cultural
6422 environment, much like DDT had for the natural environment. And just
6423 <!-- PAGE BREAK 141 -->
6424 as criticism of DDT is not an endorsement of malaria or an attack on
6425 farmers, so, too, is criticism of one particular set of regulations
6426 protecting copyright not an endorsement of anarchy or an attack on
6427 authors. It is an environment of creativity that we seek, and we
6428 should be aware of our actions' effects on the environment.
6431 My argument, in the balance of this chapter, tries to map exactly
6432 this effect. No doubt the technology of the Internet has had a dramatic
6433 effect on the ability of copyright owners to protect their content. But
6434 there should also be little doubt that when you add together the
6435 changes in copyright law over time, plus the change in technology that
6436 the Internet is undergoing just now, the net effect of these changes will
6437 not be only that copyrighted work is effectively protected. Also, and
6438 generally missed, the net effect of this massive increase in protection
6439 will be devastating to the environment for creativity.
6442 In a line: To kill a gnat, we are spraying DDT with consequences
6443 for free culture that will be far more devastating than that this gnat will
6446 <indexterm startref=
"idxddt" class='endofrange'
/>
6448 <section id=
"beginnings">
6449 <title>Beginnings
</title>
6451 America copied English copyright law. Actually, we copied and improved
6452 English copyright law. Our Constitution makes the purpose of "creative
6453 property" rights clear; its express limitations reinforce the English
6454 aim to avoid overly powerful publishers.
6457 The power to establish "creative property" rights is granted to
6458 Congress in a way that, for our Constitution, at least, is very
6459 odd. Article I, section
8, clause
8 of our Constitution states that:
6462 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science and
6463 useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
6464 the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
6466 <!-- PAGE BREAK 142 -->
6467 We can call this the "Progress Clause," for notice what this clause
6468 does not say. It does not say Congress has the power to grant
6469 "creative property rights." It says that Congress has the power
6470 <emphasis>to promote progress
</emphasis>. The grant of power is its
6471 purpose, and its purpose is a public one, not the purpose of enriching
6472 publishers, nor even primarily the purpose of rewarding authors.
6475 The Progress Clause expressly limits the term of copyrights. As we saw
6476 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"founders"/>,
6477 the English limited the term of copyright so as to assure that a few
6478 would not exercise disproportionate control over culture by exercising
6479 disproportionate control over publishing. We can assume the framers
6480 followed the English for a similar purpose. Indeed, unlike the
6481 English, the framers reinforced that objective, by requiring that
6482 copyrights extend "to Authors" only.
6485 The design of the Progress Clause reflects something about the
6486 Constitution's design in general. To avoid a problem, the framers
6487 built structure. To prevent the concentrated power of publishers, they
6488 built a structure that kept copyrights away from publishers and kept
6489 them short. To prevent the concentrated power of a church, they banned
6490 the federal government from establishing a church. To prevent
6491 concentrating power in the federal government, they built structures
6492 to reinforce the power of the states
—including the Senate, whose
6493 members were at the time selected by the states, and an electoral
6494 college, also selected by the states, to select the president. In each
6495 case, a
<emphasis>structure
</emphasis> built checks and balances into
6496 the constitutional frame, structured to prevent otherwise inevitable
6497 concentrations of power.
6500 I doubt the framers would recognize the regulation we call "copyright"
6501 today. The scope of that regulation is far beyond anything they ever
6502 considered. To begin to understand what they did, we need to put our
6503 "copyright" in context: We need to see how it has changed in the
210
6504 years since they first struck its design.
6507 Some of these changes come from the law: some in light of changes
6508 in technology, and some in light of changes in technology given a
6509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 143 -->
6510 particular concentration of market power. In terms of our model, we
6513 <figure id=
"fig-1441">
6514 <title>Copyright's regulation before the Internet.
</title>
6515 <graphic fileref=
"images/1331.png"></graphic>
6520 <figure id=
"fig-1442">
6521 <title>"Copyright
" today.
</title>
6522 <graphic fileref=
"images/1442.png"></graphic>
6526 <!-- PAGE BREAK 144 -->
6529 <section id=
"lawduration">
6530 <title>Law: Duration
</title>
6532 When the first Congress enacted laws to protect creative property, it
6533 faced the same uncertainty about the status of creative property that
6534 the English had confronted in
1774. Many states had passed laws
6535 protecting creative property, and some believed that these laws simply
6536 supplemented common law rights that already protected creative
6537 authorship.
<footnote>
6540 William W. Crosskey,
<citetitle>Politics and the Constitution in the History of
6541 the United States
</citetitle> (London: Cambridge University Press,
1953), vol.
1,
6542 485–86: "extinguish[ing], by plain implication of `the supreme
6543 Law of the Land,'
<emphasis>the perpetual rights which authors had, or
6544 were supposed by some to have, under the Common Law
</emphasis>"
6546 <indexterm><primary>Crosskey, William W.</primary></indexterm>
6548 This meant that there was no guaranteed public domain in the United
6549 States in 1790. If copyrights were protected by the common law, then
6550 there was no simple way to know whether a work published in the United
6551 States was controlled or free. Just as in England, this lingering
6552 uncertainty would make it hard for publishers to rely upon a public
6553 domain to reprint and distribute works.
6556 That uncertainty ended after Congress passed legislation granting
6557 copyrights. Because federal law overrides any contrary state law,
6558 federal protections for copyrighted works displaced any state law
6559 protections. Just as in England the Statute of Anne eventually meant
6560 that the copyrights for all English works expired, a federal statute
6561 meant that any state copyrights expired as well.
6564 In 1790, Congress enacted the first copyright law. It created a
6565 federal copyright and secured that copyright for fourteen years. If
6566 the author was alive at the end of that fourteen years, then he could
6567 opt to renew the copyright for another fourteen years. If he did not
6568 renew the copyright, his work passed into the public domain.
6571 While there were many works created in the United States in the first
6572 ten years of the Republic, only 5 percent of the works were actually
6573 registered under the federal copyright regime. Of all the work created
6574 in the United States both before 1790 and from 1790 through 1800, 95
6575 percent immediately passed into the public domain; the balance would
6576 pass into the pubic domain within twenty-eight years at most, and more
6577 likely within fourteen years.<footnote><para>
6579 Although 13,000 titles were published in the United States from 1790
6580 to 1799, only 556 copyright registrations were filed; John Tebbel, <citetitle>A
6581 History of Book Publishing in the United States</citetitle>, vol. 1, <citetitle>The Creation
6582 of an Industry, 1630–1865</citetitle> (New York: Bowker, 1972), 141. Of the 21,000
6583 imprints recorded before 1790, only twelve were copyrighted under the
6584 1790 act; William J. Maher, <citetitle>Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension
6585 and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context</citetitle>, 7–10 (2002),
6586 available at <ulink url="http://free-culture.cc/notes/
">link
6587 #25</ulink>. Thus, the overwhelming majority of works fell
6588 immediately into the public domain. Even those works that were
6589 copyrighted fell into the public domain quickly, because the term of
6590 copyright was short. The initial term of copyright was fourteen years,
6591 with the option of renewal for an additional fourteen years. Copyright
6592 Act of May 31, 1790, §1, 1 stat. 124. </para></footnote>
6595 This system of renewal was a crucial part of the American system
6596 of copyright. It assured that the maximum terms of copyright would be
6597 <!-- PAGE BREAK 145 -->
6598 granted only for works where they were wanted. After the initial term
6599 of fourteen years, if it wasn't worth it to an author to renew his
6600 copyright, then it wasn't worth it to society to insist on the
6604 Fourteen years may not seem long to us, but for the vast majority of
6605 copyright owners at that time, it was long enough: Only a small
6606 minority of them renewed their copyright after fourteen years; the
6607 balance allowed their work to pass into the public
6608 domain.<footnote><para>
6610 Few copyright holders ever chose to renew their copyrights. For
6611 instance, of the 25,006 copyrights registered in 1883, only 894 were
6612 renewed in 1910. For a year-by-year analysis of copyright renewal
6613 rates, see Barbara A. Ringer, "Study No.
31: Renewal of Copyright,
"
6614 <citetitle>Studies on Copyright</citetitle>, vol. 1 (New York: Practicing Law Institute,
6615 1963), 618. For a more recent and comprehensive analysis, see William
6616 M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,"
6617 <citetitle>University of Chicago Law Review
</citetitle> 70 (
2003):
471,
498–501, and
6618 accompanying figures.
</para></footnote>
6621 Even today, this structure would make sense. Most creative work
6622 has an actual commercial life of just a couple of years. Most books fall
6623 out of print after one year.
<footnote><para>
6625 See Ringer, ch.
9, n.
2.
</para></footnote> When that happens, the
6626 used books are traded free of copyright regulation. Thus the books are
6627 no longer
<emphasis>effectively
</emphasis> controlled by
6628 copyright. The only practical commercial use of the books at that time
6629 is to sell the books as used books; that use
—because it does not
6630 involve publication
—is effectively free.
6633 In the first hundred years of the Republic, the term of copyright was
6634 changed once. In
1831, the term was increased from a maximum of
28
6635 years to a maximum of
42 by increasing the initial term of copyright
6636 from
14 years to
28 years. In the next fifty years of the Republic,
6637 the term increased once again. In
1909, Congress extended the renewal
6638 term of
14 years to
28 years, setting a maximum term of
56 years.
6641 Then, beginning in
1962, Congress started a practice that has defined
6642 copyright law since. Eleven times in the last forty years, Congress
6643 has extended the terms of existing copyrights; twice in those forty
6644 years, Congress extended the term of future copyrights. Initially, the
6645 extensions of existing copyrights were short, a mere one to two years.
6646 In
1976, Congress extended all existing copyrights by nineteen years.
6647 And in
1998, in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Congress
6648 extended the term of existing and future copyrights by twenty years.
6651 The effect of these extensions is simply to toll, or delay, the passing
6652 of works into the public domain. This latest extension means that the
6653 public domain will have been tolled for thirty-nine out of fifty-five
6654 years, or
70 percent of the time since
1962. Thus, in the twenty years
6656 <!-- PAGE BREAK 146 -->
6657 after the Sonny Bono Act, while one million patents will pass into the
6658 public domain, zero copyrights will pass into the public domain by virtue
6659 of the expiration of a copyright term.
6662 The effect of these extensions has been exacerbated by another,
6663 little-noticed change in the copyright law. Remember I said that the
6664 framers established a two-part copyright regime, requiring a copyright
6665 owner to renew his copyright after an initial term. The requirement of
6666 renewal meant that works that no longer needed copyright protection
6667 would pass more quickly into the public domain. The works remaining
6668 under protection would be those that had some continuing commercial
6672 The United States abandoned this sensible system in
1976. For
6673 all works created after
1978, there was only one copyright term
—the
6674 maximum term. For "natural" authors, that term was life plus fifty
6675 years. For corporations, the term was seventy-five years. Then, in
1992,
6676 Congress abandoned the renewal requirement for all works created
6677 before
1978. All works still under copyright would be accorded the
6678 maximum term then available. After the Sonny Bono Act, that term
6679 was ninety-five years.
6682 This change meant that American law no longer had an automatic way to
6683 assure that works that were no longer exploited passed into the public
6684 domain. And indeed, after these changes, it is unclear whether it is
6685 even possible to put works into the public domain. The public domain
6686 is orphaned by these changes in copyright law. Despite the requirement
6687 that terms be "limited," we have no evidence that anything will limit
6691 The effect of these changes on the average duration of copyright is
6692 dramatic. In
1973, more than
85 percent of copyright owners failed to
6693 renew their copyright. That meant that the average term of copyright
6694 in
1973 was just
32.2 years. Because of the elimination of the renewal
6695 requirement, the average term of copyright is now the maximum term.
6696 In thirty years, then, the average term has tripled, from
32.2 years to
95
6697 years.
<footnote><para>
6699 These statistics are understated. Between the years
1910 and
1962 (the
6700 first year the renewal term was extended), the average term was never
6701 more than thirty-two years, and averaged thirty years. See Landes and
6702 Posner, "Indefinitely Renewable Copyright," loc. cit.
6705 <!-- PAGE BREAK 147 -->
6707 <section id=
"lawscope">
6708 <title>Law: Scope
</title>
6710 The "scope" of a copyright is the range of rights granted by the law.
6711 The scope of American copyright has changed dramatically. Those
6712 changes are not necessarily bad. But we should understand the extent
6713 of the changes if we're to keep this debate in context.
6716 In
1790, that scope was very narrow. Copyright covered only "maps,
6717 charts, and books." That means it didn't cover, for example, music or
6718 architecture. More significantly, the right granted by a copyright gave
6719 the author the exclusive right to "publish" copyrighted works. That
6720 means someone else violated the copyright only if he republished the
6721 work without the copyright owner's permission. Finally, the right granted
6722 by a copyright was an exclusive right to that particular book. The right
6723 did not extend to what lawyers call "derivative works." It would not,
6724 therefore, interfere with the right of someone other than the author to
6725 translate a copyrighted book, or to adapt the story to a different form
6726 (such as a drama based on a published book).
6729 This, too, has changed dramatically. While the contours of copyright
6730 today are extremely hard to describe simply, in general terms, the
6731 right covers practically any creative work that is reduced to a
6732 tangible form. It covers music as well as architecture, drama as well
6733 as computer programs. It gives the copyright owner of that creative
6734 work not only the exclusive right to "publish" the work, but also the
6735 exclusive right of control over any "copies" of that work. And most
6736 significant for our purposes here, the right gives the copyright owner
6737 control over not only his or her particular work, but also any
6738 "derivative work" that might grow out of the original work. In this
6739 way, the right covers more creative work, protects the creative work
6740 more broadly, and protects works that are based in a significant way
6741 on the initial creative work.
6744 At the same time that the scope of copyright has expanded, procedural
6745 limitations on the right have been relaxed. I've already described the
6746 complete removal of the renewal requirement in
1992. In addition
6747 <!-- PAGE BREAK 148 -->
6748 to the renewal requirement, for most of the history of American
6749 copyright law, there was a requirement that a work be registered
6750 before it could receive the protection of a copyright. There was also
6751 a requirement that any copyrighted work be marked either with that
6752 famous
© or the word
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>. And for most
6753 of the history of American copyright law, there was a requirement that
6754 works be deposited with the government before a copyright could be
6758 The reason for the registration requirement was the sensible
6759 understanding that for most works, no copyright was required. Again,
6760 in the first ten years of the Republic,
95 percent of works eligible
6761 for copyright were never copyrighted. Thus, the rule reflected the
6762 norm: Most works apparently didn't need copyright, so registration
6763 narrowed the regulation of the law to the few that did. The same
6764 reasoning justified the requirement that a work be marked as
6765 copyrighted
—that way it was easy to know whether a copyright was
6766 being claimed. The requirement that works be deposited was to assure
6767 that after the copyright expired, there would be a copy of the work
6768 somewhere so that it could be copied by others without locating the
6772 All of these "formalities" were abolished in the American system when
6773 we decided to follow European copyright law. There is no requirement
6774 that you register a work to get a copyright; the copyright now is
6775 automatic; the copyright exists whether or not you mark your work with
6776 a
©; and the copyright exists whether or not you actually make a
6777 copy available for others to copy.
6780 Consider a practical example to understand the scope of these
6784 If, in
1790, you wrote a book and you were one of the
5 percent who
6785 actually copyrighted that book, then the copyright law protected you
6786 against another publisher's taking your book and republishing it
6787 without your permission. The aim of the act was to regulate publishers
6788 so as to prevent that kind of unfair competition. In
1790, there were
6789 174 publishers in the United States.
<footnote><para>
6791 See Thomas Bender and David Sampliner, "Poets, Pirates, and the
6792 Creation of American Literature,"
29 <citetitle>New York University Journal of
6793 International Law and Politics
</citetitle> 255 (
1997), and James Gilraeth, ed.,
6794 Federal Copyright Records,
1790–1800 (U.S. G.P.O.,
1987).
6797 The Copyright Act was thus a tiny
6798 regulation of a tiny proportion of a tiny part of the creative market in
6799 the United States
—publishers.
6802 <!-- PAGE BREAK 149 -->
6803 The act left other creators totally unregulated. If I copied your poem
6804 by hand, over and over again, as a way to learn it by heart, my act
6805 was totally unregulated by the
1790 act. If I took your novel and made
6806 a play based upon it, or if I translated it or abridged it, none of
6807 those activities were regulated by the original copyright act. These
6808 creative activities remained free, while the activities of publishers
6812 Today the story is very different: If you write a book, your book is
6813 automatically protected. Indeed, not just your book. Every e-mail,
6814 every note to your spouse, every doodle,
<emphasis>every
</emphasis>
6815 creative act that's reduced to a tangible form
—all of this is
6816 automatically copyrighted. There is no need to register or mark your
6817 work. The protection follows the creation, not the steps you take to
6821 That protection gives you the right (subject to a narrow range of
6822 fair use exceptions) to control how others copy the work, whether they
6823 copy it to republish it or to share an excerpt.
6826 That much is the obvious part. Any system of copyright would
6828 competing publishing. But there's a second part to the copyright of
6829 today that is not at all obvious. This is the protection of "derivative
6830 rights." If you write a book, no one can make a movie out of your
6831 book without permission. No one can translate it without permission.
6832 CliffsNotes can't make an abridgment unless permission is granted. All
6833 of these derivative uses of your original work are controlled by the
6834 copyright holder. The copyright, in other words, is now not just an
6836 right to your writings, but an exclusive right to your writings
6837 and a large proportion of the writings inspired by them.
6840 It is this derivative right that would seem most bizarre to our
6841 framers, though it has become second nature to us. Initially, this
6843 was created to deal with obvious evasions of a narrower
6845 If I write a book, can you change one word and then claim a
6846 copyright in a new and different book? Obviously that would make a
6847 joke of the copyright, so the law was properly expanded to include
6848 those slight modifications as well as the verbatim original work.
6851 <!-- PAGE BREAK 150 -->
6852 In preventing that joke, the law created an astonishing power
6853 within a free culture
—at least, it's astonishing when you
6854 understand that the law applies not just to the commercial publisher
6855 but to anyone with a computer. I understand the wrong in duplicating
6856 and selling someone else's work. But whatever
6857 <emphasis>that
</emphasis> wrong is, transforming someone else's work
6858 is a different wrong. Some view transformation as no wrong at
6859 all
—they believe that our law, as the framers penned it, should
6860 not protect derivative rights at all.
<footnote><para>
6862 Jonathan Zittrain, "The Copyright Cage,"
<citetitle>Legal
6863 Affairs
</citetitle>, July/August
2003, available at
6864 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
26</ulink>.
6865 <indexterm><primary>Zittrain, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
6867 Whether or not you go that far, it seems
6868 plain that whatever wrong is involved is fundamentally different from
6869 the wrong of direct piracy.
6872 Yet copyright law treats these two different wrongs in the same way. I
6873 can go to court and get an injunction against your pirating my book. I
6874 can go to court and get an injunction against your transformative use
6875 of my book.
<footnote><para>
6877 Professor Rubenfeld has presented a powerful constitutional argument
6878 about the difference that copyright law should draw (from the
6879 perspective of the First Amendment) between mere "copies" and
6880 derivative works. See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Freedom of Imagination:
6881 Copyright's Constitutionality,"
<citetitle>Yale Law
6882 Journal
</citetitle> 112 (
2002):
1–60 (see especially
6884 <indexterm><primary>Rubenfeld, Jeb
</primary></indexterm>
6886 These two different uses of my creative work are treated the same.
6889 This again may seem right to you. If I wrote a book, then why should
6890 you be able to write a movie that takes my story and makes money from
6891 it without paying me or crediting me? Or if Disney creates a creature
6892 called "Mickey Mouse," why should you be able to make Mickey Mouse
6893 toys and be the one to trade on the value that Disney originally
6897 These are good arguments, and, in general, my point is not that the
6898 derivative right is unjustified. My aim just now is much narrower:
6899 simply to make clear that this expansion is a significant change from
6900 the rights originally granted.
6903 <section id=
"lawreach">
6904 <title>Law and Architecture: Reach
</title>
6906 Whereas originally the law regulated only publishers, the change in
6907 copyright's scope means that the law today regulates publishers, users,
6908 and authors. It regulates them because all three are capable of making
6909 copies, and the core of the regulation of copyright law is copies.
<footnote><para>
6911 This is a simplification of the law, but not much of one. The law
6912 certainly regulates more than "copies"
—a public performance of a
6913 copyrighted song, for example, is regulated even though performance
6914 per se doesn't make a copy;
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6915 106(
4). And it certainly sometimes doesn't regulate a "copy";
17
6916 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
112(a). But the presumption under the
6917 existing law (which regulates "copies;"
17 <citetitle>United States Code
</citetitle>, section
6918 102) is that if there is a copy, there is a right.
6922 <!-- PAGE BREAK 151 -->
6923 "Copies." That certainly sounds like the obvious thing for
6924 <emphasis>copy
</emphasis>right law to regulate. But as with Jack
6925 Valenti's argument at the start of this chapter, that "creative
6926 property" deserves the "same rights" as all other property, it is the
6927 <emphasis>obvious
</emphasis> that we need to be most careful
6928 about. For while it may be obvious that in the world before the
6929 Internet, copies were the obvious trigger for copyright law, upon
6930 reflection, it should be obvious that in the world with the Internet,
6931 copies should
<emphasis>not
</emphasis> be the trigger for copyright
6932 law. More precisely, they should not
<emphasis>always
</emphasis> be
6933 the trigger for copyright law.
6936 This is perhaps the central claim of this book, so let me take this
6937 very slowly so that the point is not easily missed. My claim is that the
6938 Internet should at least force us to rethink the conditions under which
6939 the law of copyright automatically applies,
<footnote><para>
6941 Thus, my argument is not that in each place that copyright law
6942 extends, we should repeal it. It is instead that we should have a good
6943 argument for its extending where it does, and should not determine its
6944 reach on the basis of arbitrary and automatic changes caused by
6947 because it is clear that the
6948 current reach of copyright was never contemplated, much less chosen,
6949 by the legislators who enacted copyright law.
6952 We can see this point abstractly by beginning with this largely
6955 <figure id=
"fig-1521">
6956 <title>All potential uses of a book.
</title>
6957 <graphic fileref=
"images/1521.png"></graphic>
6960 <!-- PAGE BREAK 152 -->
6961 Think about a book in real space, and imagine this circle to represent
6962 all its potential
<emphasis>uses
</emphasis>. Most of these uses are
6963 unregulated by copyright law, because the uses don't create a copy. If
6964 you read a book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If you
6965 give someone the book, that act is not regulated by copyright law. If
6966 you resell a book, that act is not regulated (copyright law expressly
6967 states that after the first sale of a book, the copyright owner can
6968 impose no further conditions on the disposition of the book). If you
6969 sleep on the book or use it to hold up a lamp or let your puppy chew
6970 it up, those acts are not regulated by copyright law, because those
6971 acts do not make a copy.
6973 <figure id=
"fig-1531">
6974 <title>Examples of unregulated uses of a book.
</title>
6975 <graphic fileref=
"images/1531.png"></graphic>
6978 Obviously, however, some uses of a copyrighted book are regulated
6979 by copyright law. Republishing the book, for example, makes a copy. It
6980 is therefore regulated by copyright law. Indeed, this particular use stands
6981 at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work. It is the
6982 paradigmatic use properly regulated by copyright regulation (see first
6983 diagram on next page).
6986 Finally, there is a tiny sliver of otherwise regulated copying uses
6987 that remain unregulated because the law considers these "fair uses."
6989 <!-- PAGE BREAK 153 -->
6990 <figure id=
"fig-1541">
6991 <title>Republishing stands at the core of this circle of possible uses of a copyrighted work.
</title>
6992 <graphic fileref=
"images/1541.png"></graphic>
6995 These are uses that themselves involve copying, but which the law
6996 treats as unregulated because public policy demands that they remain
6997 unregulated. You are free to quote from this book, even in a review
6998 that is quite negative, without my permission, even though that
6999 quoting makes a copy. That copy would ordinarily give the copyright
7000 owner the exclusive right to say whether the copy is allowed or not,
7001 but the law denies the owner any exclusive right over such "fair uses"
7002 for public policy (and possibly First Amendment) reasons.
7004 <figure id=
"fig-1542">
7005 <title>Unregulated copying considered
"fair uses.
"</title>
7006 <graphic fileref=
"images/1542.png"></graphic>
7009 <figure id=
"fig-1551">
7010 <title>Uses that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively regulated.
</title>
7011 <graphic fileref=
"images/1551.png"></graphic>
7014 <!-- PAGE BREAK 154 -->
7015 In real space, then, the possible uses of a book are divided into three
7016 sorts: (
1) unregulated uses, (
2) regulated uses, and (
3) regulated uses that
7017 are nonetheless deemed "fair" regardless of the copyright owner's views.
7020 Enter the Internet
—a distributed, digital network where every use
7021 of a copyrighted work produces a copy.
<footnote><para>
7023 I don't mean "nature" in the sense that it couldn't be different, but
7024 rather that its present instantiation entails a copy. Optical networks
7025 need not make copies of content they transmit, and a digital network
7026 could be designed to delete anything it copies so that the same number
7029 And because of this single, arbitrary feature of the design of a
7030 digital network, the scope of category
1 changes dramatically. Uses
7031 that before were presumptively unregulated are now presumptively
7032 regulated. No longer is there a set of presumptively unregulated uses
7033 that define a freedom associated with a copyrighted work. Instead,
7034 each use is now subject to the copyright, because each use also makes
7035 a copy
—category
1 gets sucked into category
2. And those who
7036 would defend the unregulated uses of copyrighted work must look
7037 exclusively to category
3, fair uses, to bear the burden of this
7041 So let's be very specific to make this general point clear. Before the
7042 Internet, if you purchased a book and read it ten times, there would
7043 be no plausible
<emphasis>copyright
</emphasis>-related argument that
7044 the copyright owner could make to control that use of her
7045 book. Copyright law would have nothing to say about whether you read
7046 the book once, ten times, or every
7047 <!-- PAGE BREAK 155 -->
7048 night before you went to bed. None of those instances of
7049 use
—reading
— could be regulated by copyright law because
7050 none of those uses produced a copy.
7053 But the same book as an e-book is effectively governed by a different
7054 set of rules. Now if the copyright owner says you may read the book
7055 only once or only once a month, then
<emphasis>copyright
7056 law
</emphasis> would aid the copyright owner in exercising this degree
7057 of control, because of the accidental feature of copyright law that
7058 triggers its application upon there being a copy. Now if you read the
7059 book ten times and the license says you may read it only five times,
7060 then whenever you read the book (or any portion of it) beyond the
7061 fifth time, you are making a copy of the book contrary to the
7062 copyright owner's wish.
7065 There are some people who think this makes perfect sense. My aim
7066 just now is not to argue about whether it makes sense or not. My aim
7067 is only to make clear the change. Once you see this point, a few other
7068 points also become clear:
7071 First, making category
1 disappear is not anything any policy maker
7072 ever intended. Congress did not think through the collapse of the
7073 presumptively unregulated uses of copyrighted works. There is no
7074 evidence at all that policy makers had this idea in mind when they
7075 allowed our policy here to shift. Unregulated uses were an important
7076 part of free culture before the Internet.
7079 Second, this shift is especially troubling in the context of
7080 transformative uses of creative content. Again, we can all understand
7081 the wrong in commercial piracy. But the law now purports to regulate
7082 <emphasis>any
</emphasis> transformation you make of creative work
7083 using a machine. "Copy and paste" and "cut and paste" become
7084 crimes. Tinkering with a story and releasing it to others exposes the
7085 tinkerer to at least a requirement of justification. However
7086 troubling the expansion with respect to copying a particular work, it
7087 is extraordinarily troubling with respect to transformative uses of
7091 Third, this shift from category
1 to category
2 puts an extraordinary
7093 <!-- PAGE BREAK 156 -->
7094 burden on category
3 ("fair use") that fair use never before had to
7095 bear. If a copyright owner now tried to control how many times I
7096 could read a book on-line, the natural response would be to argue that
7097 this is a violation of my fair use rights. But there has never been
7098 any litigation about whether I have a fair use right to read, because
7099 before the Internet, reading did not trigger the application of
7100 copyright law and hence the need for a fair use defense. The right to
7101 read was effectively protected before because reading was not
7105 This point about fair use is totally ignored, even by advocates for
7106 free culture. We have been cornered into arguing that our rights
7107 depend upon fair use
—never even addressing the earlier question
7108 about the expansion in effective regulation. A thin protection
7109 grounded in fair use makes sense when the vast majority of uses are
7110 <emphasis>unregulated
</emphasis>. But when everything becomes
7111 presumptively regulated, then the protections of fair use are not
7115 The case of Video Pipeline is a good example. Video Pipeline was
7116 in the business of making "trailer" advertisements for movies available
7117 to video stores. The video stores displayed the trailers as a way to sell
7118 videos. Video Pipeline got the trailers from the film distributors, put
7119 the trailers on tape, and sold the tapes to the retail stores.
7122 The company did this for about fifteen years. Then, in
1997, it began
7123 to think about the Internet as another way to distribute these
7124 previews. The idea was to expand their "selling by sampling"
7125 technique by giving on-line stores the same ability to enable
7126 "browsing." Just as in a bookstore you can read a few pages of a book
7127 before you buy the book, so, too, you would be able to sample a bit
7128 from the movie on-line before you bought it.
7131 In
1998, Video Pipeline informed Disney and other film distributors
7132 that it intended to distribute the trailers through the Internet
7133 (rather than sending the tapes) to distributors of their videos. Two
7134 years later, Disney told Video Pipeline to stop. The owner of Video
7135 <!-- PAGE BREAK 157 -->
7136 Pipeline asked Disney to talk about the matter
—he had built a
7137 business on distributing this content as a way to help sell Disney
7138 films; he had customers who depended upon his delivering this
7139 content. Disney would agree to talk only if Video Pipeline stopped the
7140 distribution immediately. Video Pipeline thought it was within their
7141 "fair use" rights to distribute the clips as they had. So they filed a
7142 lawsuit to ask the court to declare that these rights were in fact
7146 Disney countersued
—for $
100 million in damages. Those damages
7147 were predicated upon a claim that Video Pipeline had "willfully
7148 infringed" on Disney's copyright. When a court makes a finding of
7149 willful infringement, it can award damages not on the basis of the
7150 actual harm to the copyright owner, but on the basis of an amount set
7151 in the statute. Because Video Pipeline had distributed seven hundred
7152 clips of Disney movies to enable video stores to sell copies of those
7153 movies, Disney was now suing Video Pipeline for $
100 million.
7156 Disney has the right to control its property, of course. But the video
7157 stores that were selling Disney's films also had some sort of right to be
7158 able to sell the films that they had bought from Disney. Disney's claim
7159 in court was that the stores were allowed to sell the films and they were
7160 permitted to list the titles of the films they were selling, but they were
7161 not allowed to show clips of the films as a way of selling them without
7162 Disney's permission.
7165 Now, you might think this is a close case, and I think the courts
7166 would consider it a close case. My point here is to map the change
7167 that gives Disney this power. Before the Internet, Disney couldn't
7168 really control how people got access to their content. Once a video
7169 was in the marketplace, the "first-sale doctrine" would free the
7170 seller to use the video as he wished, including showing portions of it
7171 in order to engender sales of the entire movie video. But with the
7172 Internet, it becomes possible for Disney to centralize control over
7173 access to this content. Because each use of the Internet produces a
7174 copy, use on the Internet becomes subject to the copyright owner's
7175 control. The technology expands the scope of effective control,
7176 because the technology builds a copy into every transaction.
7179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 158 -->
7180 No doubt, a potential is not yet an abuse, and so the potential for
7181 control is not yet the abuse of control. Barnes
& Noble has the
7182 right to say you can't touch a book in their store; property law gives
7183 them that right. But the market effectively protects against that
7184 abuse. If Barnes
& Noble banned browsing, then consumers would
7185 choose other bookstores. Competition protects against the
7186 extremes. And it may well be (my argument so far does not even
7187 question this) that competition would prevent any similar danger when
7188 it comes to copyright. Sure, publishers exercising the rights that
7189 authors have assigned to them might try to regulate how many times you
7190 read a book, or try to stop you from sharing the book with anyone. But
7191 in a competitive market such as the book market, the dangers of this
7192 happening are quite slight.
7195 Again, my aim so far is simply to map the changes that this changed
7196 architecture enables. Enabling technology to enforce the control of
7197 copyright means that the control of copyright is no longer defined by
7198 balanced policy. The control of copyright is simply what private
7199 owners choose. In some contexts, at least, that fact is harmless. But
7200 in some contexts it is a recipe for disaster.
7203 <section id=
"lawforce">
7204 <title>Architecture and Law: Force
</title>
7206 The disappearance of unregulated uses would be change enough, but a
7207 second important change brought about by the Internet magnifies its
7208 significance. This second change does not affect the reach of copyright
7209 regulation; it affects how such regulation is enforced.
7212 In the world before digital technology, it was generally the law that
7213 controlled whether and how someone was regulated by copyright law.
7214 The law, meaning a court, meaning a judge: In the end, it was a human,
7215 trained in the tradition of the law and cognizant of the balances that
7216 tradition embraced, who said whether and how the law would restrict
7219 <indexterm><primary>Casablanca
</primary></indexterm>
7220 <indexterm id=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7221 <primary>Marx Brothers
</primary>
7223 <indexterm id=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='startofrange'
>
7224 <primary>Warner Brothers
</primary>
7227 There's a famous story about a battle between the Marx Brothers
7228 and Warner Brothers. The Marxes intended to make a parody of
7229 <!-- PAGE BREAK 159 -->
7230 <citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>. Warner Brothers objected. They
7231 wrote a nasty letter to the Marxes, warning them that there would be
7232 serious legal consequences if they went forward with their
7233 plan.
<footnote><para>
7235 See David Lange, "Recognizing the Public Domain,"
<citetitle>Law and
7236 Contemporary Problems
</citetitle> 44 (
1981):
172–73.
7240 This led the Marx Brothers to respond in kind. They warned
7241 Warner Brothers that the Marx Brothers "were brothers long before
7242 you were."
<footnote><para>
7244 Ibid. See also Vaidhyanathan,
<citetitle>Copyrights and
7245 Copywrongs
</citetitle>,
1–3.
7246 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
7248 The Marx Brothers therefore owned the word
7249 <citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>, and if Warner Brothers insisted on
7250 trying to control
<citetitle>Casablanca
</citetitle>, then the Marx
7251 Brothers would insist on control over
<citetitle>brothers
</citetitle>.
7254 An absurd and hollow threat, of course, because Warner Brothers,
7255 like the Marx Brothers, knew that no court would ever enforce such a
7256 silly claim. This extremism was irrelevant to the real freedoms anyone
7257 (including Warner Brothers) enjoyed.
7260 On the Internet, however, there is no check on silly rules, because on
7261 the Internet, increasingly, rules are enforced not by a human but by a
7262 machine: Increasingly, the rules of copyright law, as interpreted by
7263 the copyright owner, get built into the technology that delivers
7264 copyrighted content. It is code, rather than law, that rules. And the
7265 problem with code regulations is that, unlike law, code has no
7266 shame. Code would not get the humor of the Marx Brothers. The
7267 consequence of that is not at all funny.
7269 <indexterm startref=
"idxwarnerbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7270 <indexterm startref=
"idxmarxbrothers" class='endofrange'
/>
7272 <indexterm id=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='startofrange'
>
7273 <primary>Adobe eBook Reader
</primary>
7276 Consider the life of my Adobe eBook Reader.
7279 An e-book is a book delivered in electronic form. An Adobe eBook is
7280 not a book that Adobe has published; Adobe simply produces the
7281 software that publishers use to deliver e-books. It provides the
7282 technology, and the publisher delivers the content by using the
7286 On the next page is a picture of an old version of my Adobe eBook
7290 As you can see, I have a small collection of e-books within this
7291 e-book library. Some of these books reproduce content that is in the
7292 public domain:
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, for example, is in
7293 the public domain. Some of them reproduce content that is not in the
7294 public domain: My own book
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>
7295 is not yet within the public domain. Consider
7296 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> first. If you click on my e-book
7298 <!-- PAGE BREAK 160 -->
7299 <citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>, you'll see a fancy cover, and then
7300 a button at the bottom called Permissions.
7302 <figure id=
"fig-1611">
7303 <title>Picture of an old version of Adobe eBook Reader
</title>
7304 <graphic fileref=
"images/1611.png"></graphic>
7307 If you click on the Permissions button, you'll see a list of the
7308 permissions that the publisher purports to grant with this book.
7310 <figure id=
"fig-1612">
7311 <title>List of the permissions that the publisher purports to grant.
</title>
7312 <graphic fileref=
"images/1612.png"></graphic>
7315 <!-- PAGE BREAK 161 -->
7316 According to my eBook Reader, I have the permission to copy to the
7317 clipboard of the computer ten text selections every ten days. (So far,
7318 I've copied no text to the clipboard.) I also have the permission to
7319 print ten pages from the book every ten days. Lastly, I have the
7320 permission to use the Read Aloud button to hear
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle>
7321 read aloud through the computer.
7324 Here's the e-book for another work in the public domain (including the
7325 translation): Aristotle's
<citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>.
7326 <indexterm><primary>Aristotle
</primary></indexterm>
7327 <indexterm><primary><citetitle>Politics
</citetitle>, (Aristotle)
</primary></indexterm>
7329 <figure id=
"fig-1621">
7330 <title>E-book of Aristotle;s
"Politics
"</title>
7331 <graphic fileref=
"images/1621.png"></graphic>
7334 According to its permissions, no printing or copying is permitted
7335 at all. But fortunately, you can use the Read Aloud button to hear
7338 <figure id=
"fig-1622">
7339 <title>List of the permissions for Aristotle;s
"Politics
".
</title>
7340 <graphic fileref=
"images/1622.png"></graphic>
7343 Finally (and most embarrassingly), here are the permissions for the
7344 original e-book version of my last book,
<citetitle>The Future of
7347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 162 -->
7348 <figure id=
"fig-1631">
7349 <title>List of the permissions for
"The Future of Ideas
".
</title>
7350 <graphic fileref=
"images/1631.png"></graphic>
7353 No copying, no printing, and don't you dare try to listen to this book!
7356 Now, the Adobe eBook Reader calls these controls
7357 "permissions"
— as if the publisher has the power to control how
7358 you use these works. For works under copyright, the copyright owner
7359 certainly does have the power
—up to the limits of the copyright
7360 law. But for work not under copyright, there is no such copyright
7361 power.
<footnote><para>
7363 In principle, a contract might impose a requirement on me. I might,
7364 for example, buy a book from you that includes a contract that says I
7365 will read it only three times, or that I promise to read it three
7366 times. But that obligation (and the limits for creating that
7367 obligation) would come from the contract, not from copyright law, and
7368 the obligations of contract would not necessarily pass to anyone who
7369 subsequently acquired the book.
7371 When my e-book of
<citetitle>Middlemarch
</citetitle> says I have the
7372 permission to copy only ten text selections into the memory every ten
7373 days, what that really means is that the eBook Reader has enabled the
7374 publisher to control how I use the book on my computer, far beyond the
7375 control that the law would enable.
7378 The control comes instead from the code
—from the technology
7379 within which the e-book "lives." Though the e-book says that these are
7380 permissions, they are not the sort of "permissions" that most of us
7381 deal with. When a teenager gets "permission" to stay out till
7382 midnight, she knows (unless she's Cinderella) that she can stay out
7383 till
2 A.M., but will suffer a punishment if she's caught. But when
7384 the Adobe eBook Reader says I have the permission to make ten copies
7385 of the text into the computer's memory, that means that after I've
7386 made ten copies, the computer will not make any more. The same with
7387 the printing restrictions: After ten pages, the eBook Reader will not
7388 print any more pages. It's the same with the silly restriction that
7389 says that you can't use the Read Aloud button to read my book
7390 aloud
—it's not that the company will sue you if you do; instead,
7391 if you push the Read Aloud button with my book, the machine simply
7395 <!-- PAGE BREAK 163 -->
7396 These are
<emphasis>controls
</emphasis>, not permissions. Imagine a
7397 world where the Marx Brothers sold word processing software that, when
7398 you tried to type "Warner Brothers," erased "Brothers" from the
7400 <indexterm><primary>Marx Brothers
</primary></indexterm>
7403 This is the future of copyright law: not so much copyright
7404 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> as copyright
<emphasis>code
</emphasis>. The
7405 controls over access to content will not be controls that are ratified
7406 by courts; the controls over access to content will be controls that
7407 are coded by programmers. And whereas the controls that are built into
7408 the law are always to be checked by a judge, the controls that are
7409 built into the technology have no similar built-in check.
7412 How significant is this? Isn't it always possible to get around the
7413 controls built into the technology? Software used to be sold with
7414 technologies that limited the ability of users to copy the software,
7415 but those were trivial protections to defeat. Why won't it be trivial
7416 to defeat these protections as well?
7419 We've only scratched the surface of this story. Return to the Adobe
7423 Early in the life of the Adobe eBook Reader, Adobe suffered a public
7424 relations nightmare. Among the books that you could download for free
7425 on the Adobe site was a copy of
<citetitle>Alice's Adventures in
7426 Wonderland
</citetitle>. This wonderful book is in the public
7427 domain. Yet when you clicked on Permissions for that book, you got the
7429 <indexterm><primary>Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (Carroll)
</primary></indexterm>
7431 <figure id=
"fig-1641">
7432 <title>List of the permissions for
"Alice's Adventures in
7433 Wonderland
".
</title>
7434 <graphic fileref=
"images/1641.png"></graphic>
7436 <beginpage pagenum=
"164"/>
7438 Here was a public domain children's book that you were not allowed to
7439 copy, not allowed to lend, not allowed to give, and, as the
7440 "permissions" indicated, not allowed to "read aloud"!
7443 The public relations nightmare attached to that final permission.
7444 For the text did not say that you were not permitted to use the Read
7445 Aloud button; it said you did not have the permission to read the book
7446 aloud. That led some people to think that Adobe was restricting the
7447 right of parents, for example, to read the book to their children, which
7448 seemed, to say the least, absurd.
7451 Adobe responded quickly that it was absurd to think that it was trying
7452 to restrict the right to read a book aloud. Obviously it was only
7453 restricting the ability to use the Read Aloud button to have the book
7454 read aloud. But the question Adobe never did answer is this: Would
7455 Adobe thus agree that a consumer was free to use software to hack
7456 around the restrictions built into the eBook Reader? If some company
7457 (call it Elcomsoft) developed a program to disable the technological
7458 protection built into an Adobe eBook so that a blind person, say,
7459 could use a computer to read the book aloud, would Adobe agree that
7460 such a use of an eBook Reader was fair? Adobe didn't answer because
7461 the answer, however absurd it might seem, is no.
7464 The point is not to blame Adobe. Indeed, Adobe is among the most
7465 innovative companies developing strategies to balance open access to
7466 content with incentives for companies to innovate. But Adobe's
7467 technology enables control, and Adobe has an incentive to defend this
7468 control. That incentive is understandable, yet what it creates is
7471 <indexterm startref=
"idxadobeebookreader" class='endofrange'
/>
7473 To see the point in a particularly absurd context, consider a favorite
7474 story of mine that makes the same point.
7476 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7477 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7479 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog1" class='startofrange'
>
7480 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7482 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='startofrange'
>
7483 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7484 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7487 Consider the robotic dog made by Sony named "Aibo." The Aibo
7488 learns tricks, cuddles, and follows you around. It eats only electricity
7489 and that doesn't leave that much of a mess (at least in your house).
7492 The Aibo is expensive and popular. Fans from around the world
7493 have set up clubs to trade stories. One fan in particular set up a Web
7494 site to enable information about the Aibo dog to be shared. This fan set
7495 <beginpage pagenum=
"165"/>
7496 up aibopet.com (and aibohack.com, but that resolves to the same site),
7497 and on that site he provided information about how to teach an Aibo
7498 to do tricks in addition to the ones Sony had taught it.
7501 "Teach" here has a special meaning. Aibos are just cute computers.
7502 You teach a computer how to do something by programming it
7503 differently. So to say that aibopet.com was giving information about
7504 how to teach the dog to do new tricks is just to say that aibopet.com
7505 was giving information to users of the Aibo pet about how to hack
7506 their computer "dog" to make it do new tricks (thus, aibohack.com).
7509 If you're not a programmer or don't know many programmers, the word
7510 <citetitle>hack
</citetitle> has a particularly unfriendly
7511 connotation. Nonprogrammers hack bushes or weeds. Nonprogrammers in
7512 horror movies do even worse. But to programmers, or coders, as I call
7513 them,
<citetitle>hack
</citetitle> is a much more positive
7514 term.
<citetitle>Hack
</citetitle> just means code that enables the
7515 program to do something it wasn't originally intended or enabled to
7516 do. If you buy a new printer for an old computer, you might find the
7517 old computer doesn't run, or "drive," the printer. If you discovered
7518 that, you'd later be happy to discover a hack on the Net by someone
7519 who has written a driver to enable the computer to drive the printer
7523 Some hacks are easy. Some are unbelievably hard. Hackers as a
7524 community like to challenge themselves and others with increasingly
7525 difficult tasks. There's a certain respect that goes with the talent to hack
7526 well. There's a well-deserved respect that goes with the talent to hack
7530 The Aibo fan was displaying a bit of both when he hacked the program
7531 and offered to the world a bit of code that would enable the Aibo to
7532 dance jazz. The dog wasn't programmed to dance jazz. It was a clever
7533 bit of tinkering that turned the dog into a more talented creature
7534 than Sony had built.
7536 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7537 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog1" class='endofrange'
/>
7538 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo1" class='endofrange'
/>
7540 I've told this story in many contexts, both inside and outside the
7541 United States. Once I was asked by a puzzled member of the audience,
7542 is it permissible for a dog to dance jazz in the United States? We
7543 forget that stories about the backcountry still flow across much of
7546 <!-- PAGE BREAK 166 -->
7547 world. So let's just be clear before we continue: It's not a crime
7548 anywhere (anymore) to dance jazz. Nor is it a crime to teach your dog
7549 to dance jazz. Nor should it be a crime (though we don't have a lot to
7550 go on here) to teach your robot dog to dance jazz. Dancing jazz is a
7551 completely legal activity. One imagines that the owner of aibopet.com
7552 thought,
<emphasis>What possible problem could there be with teaching
7553 a robot dog to dance?
</emphasis>
7556 Let's put the dog to sleep for a minute, and turn to a pony show
—
7557 not literally a pony show, but rather a paper that a Princeton academic
7558 named Ed Felten prepared for a conference. This Princeton academic
7559 is well known and respected. He was hired by the government in the
7560 Microsoft case to test Microsoft's claims about what could and could
7561 not be done with its own code. In that trial, he demonstrated both his
7562 brilliance and his coolness. Under heavy badgering by Microsoft
7563 lawyers, Ed Felten stood his ground. He was not about to be bullied
7564 into being silent about something he knew very well.
7567 But Felten's bravery was really tested in April
2001.
<footnote><para>
7569 See Pamela Samuelson, "Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to Science,"
7570 <citetitle>Science
</citetitle> 293 (
2001):
2028; Brendan I. Koerner,
"Play Dead: Sony Muzzles
7571 the Techies Who Teach a Robot Dog New Tricks," <citetitle>American Prospect
</citetitle>,
7572 January
2002; "Court Dismisses Computer Scientists' Challenge to
7573 DMCA,"
<citetitle>Intellectual Property Litigation Reporter
</citetitle>,
11 December
2001; Bill
7574 Holland, "Copyright Act Raising Free-Speech Concerns,"
<citetitle>Billboard
</citetitle>,
7575 May
2001; Janelle Brown, "Is the RIAA Running Scared?" Salon.com,
7576 April
2001; Electronic Frontier Foundation, "Frequently Asked
7577 Questions about
<citetitle>Felten and USENIX
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> Legal Case," available at
7578 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
27</ulink>.
7579 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
7581 He and a group of colleagues were working on a paper to be submitted
7582 at conference. The paper was intended to describe the weakness in an
7583 encryption system being developed by the Secure Digital Music
7584 Initiative as a technique to control the distribution of music.
7587 The SDMI coalition had as its goal a technology to enable content
7588 owners to exercise much better control over their content than the
7589 Internet, as it originally stood, granted them. Using encryption, SDMI
7590 hoped to develop a standard that would allow the content owner to say
7591 "this music cannot be copied," and have a computer respect that
7592 command. The technology was to be part of a "trusted system" of
7593 control that would get content owners to trust the system of the
7597 When SDMI thought it was close to a standard, it set up a competition.
7598 In exchange for providing contestants with the code to an
7599 SDMI-encrypted bit of content, contestants were to try to crack it
7600 and, if they did, report the problems to the consortium.
7603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 167 -->
7604 Felten and his team figured out the encryption system quickly. He and
7605 the team saw the weakness of this system as a type: Many encryption
7606 systems would suffer the same weakness, and Felten and his team
7607 thought it worthwhile to point this out to those who study encryption.
7610 Let's review just what Felten was doing. Again, this is the United
7611 States. We have a principle of free speech. We have this principle not
7612 just because it is the law, but also because it is a really great
7613 idea. A strongly protected tradition of free speech is likely to
7614 encourage a wide range of criticism. That criticism is likely, in
7615 turn, to improve the systems or people or ideas criticized.
7618 What Felten and his colleagues were doing was publishing a paper
7619 describing the weakness in a technology. They were not spreading free
7620 music, or building and deploying this technology. The paper was an
7621 academic essay, unintelligible to most people. But it clearly showed the
7622 weakness in the SDMI system, and why SDMI would not, as presently
7623 constituted, succeed.
7625 <indexterm id=
"idxaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7626 <primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary>
7628 <indexterm id=
"idxroboticdog2" class='startofrange'
>
7629 <primary>robotic dog
</primary>
7631 <indexterm id=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='startofrange'
>
7632 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7633 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7636 What links these two, aibopet.com and Felten, is the letters they
7637 then received. Aibopet.com received a letter from Sony about the
7638 aibopet.com hack. Though a jazz-dancing dog is perfectly legal, Sony
7643 Your site contains information providing the means to circumvent
7644 AIBO-ware's copy protection protocol constituting a violation of the
7645 anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
7648 <indexterm startref=
"idxsonyaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7649 <indexterm startref=
"idxroboticdog2" class='endofrange'
/>
7650 <indexterm startref=
"idxaibo2" class='endofrange'
/>
7652 And though an academic paper describing the weakness in a system
7653 of encryption should also be perfectly legal, Felten received a letter
7654 from an RIAA lawyer that read:
7658 Any disclosure of information gained from participating in the
7659 <!-- PAGE BREAK 168 -->
7660 Public Challenge would be outside the scope of activities permitted by
7661 the Agreement and could subject you and your research team to actions
7662 under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
7666 In both cases, this weirdly Orwellian law was invoked to control the
7667 spread of information. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act made
7668 spreading such information an offense.
7671 The DMCA was enacted as a response to copyright owners' first fear
7672 about cyberspace. The fear was that copyright control was effectively
7673 dead; the response was to find technologies that might compensate.
7674 These new technologies would be copyright protection
7675 technologies
— technologies to control the replication and
7676 distribution of copyrighted material. They were designed as
7677 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> to modify the original
7678 <emphasis>code
</emphasis> of the Internet, to reestablish some
7679 protection for copyright owners.
7682 The DMCA was a bit of law intended to back up the protection of this
7683 code designed to protect copyrighted material. It was, we could say,
7684 <emphasis>legal code
</emphasis> intended to buttress
7685 <emphasis>software code
</emphasis> which itself was intended to
7686 support the
<emphasis>legal code of copyright
</emphasis>.
7689 But the DMCA was not designed merely to protect copyrighted works to
7690 the extent copyright law protected them. Its protection, that is, did
7691 not end at the line that copyright law drew. The DMCA regulated
7692 devices that were designed to circumvent copyright protection
7693 measures. It was designed to ban those devices, whether or not the use
7694 of the copyrighted material made possible by that circumvention would
7695 have been a copyright violation.
7697 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7698 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7700 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7701 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7704 Aibopet.com and Felten make the point. The Aibo hack circumvented a
7705 copyright protection system for the purpose of enabling the dog to
7706 dance jazz. That enablement no doubt involved the use of copyrighted
7707 material. But as aibopet.com's site was noncommercial, and the use did
7708 not enable subsequent copyright infringements, there's no doubt that
7709 aibopet.com's hack was fair use of Sony's copyrighted material. Yet
7710 fair use is not a defense to the DMCA. The question is not whether the
7711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 169 -->
7712 use of the copyrighted material was a copyright violation. The question
7713 is whether a copyright protection system was circumvented.
7716 The threat against Felten was more attenuated, but it followed the
7717 same line of reasoning. By publishing a paper describing how a
7718 copyright protection system could be circumvented, the RIAA lawyer
7719 suggested, Felten himself was distributing a circumvention technology.
7720 Thus, even though he was not himself infringing anyone's copyright,
7721 his academic paper was enabling others to infringe others' copyright.
7723 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7725 The bizarreness of these arguments is captured in a cartoon drawn in
7726 1981 by Paul Conrad. At that time, a court in California had held that
7727 the VCR could be banned because it was a copyright-infringing
7728 technology: It enabled consumers to copy films without the permission
7729 of the copyright owner. No doubt there were uses of the technology
7730 that were legal: Fred Rogers, aka "
<citetitle>Mr. Rogers
</citetitle>,"
7731 for example, had testified in that case that he wanted people to feel
7732 free to tape Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood.
7733 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7737 Some public stations, as well as commercial stations, program the
7738 "Neighborhood" at hours when some children cannot use it. I think that
7739 it's a real service to families to be able to record such programs and
7740 show them at appropriate times. I have always felt that with the
7741 advent of all of this new technology that allows people to tape the
7742 "Neighborhood" off-the-air, and I'm speaking for the "Neighborhood"
7743 because that's what I produce, that they then become much more active
7744 in the programming of their family's television life. Very frankly, I
7745 am opposed to people being programmed by others. My whole approach in
7746 broadcasting has always been "You are an important person just the way
7747 you are. You can make healthy decisions." Maybe I'm going on too long,
7748 but I just feel that anything that allows a person to be more active
7749 in the control of his or her life, in a healthy way, is
7750 important.
<footnote><para>
7752 <citetitle>Sony Corporation of America
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Universal City Studios, Inc
</citetitle>.,
464 U.S.
417,
7753 455 fn.
27 (
1984). Rogers never changed his view about the VCR. See
7754 James Lardner,
<citetitle>Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the Onslaught of
7755 the VCR
</citetitle> (New York: W. W. Norton,
1987),
270–71.
7756 <indexterm><primary>Rogers, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
7761 <!-- PAGE BREAK 170 -->
7762 Even though there were uses that were legal, because there were
7763 some uses that were illegal, the court held the companies producing
7764 the VCR responsible.
7767 This led Conrad to draw the cartoon below, which we can adopt to
7769 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7772 No argument I have can top this picture, but let me try to get close.
7775 The anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA target copyright
7776 circumvention technologies. Circumvention technologies can be used for
7777 different ends. They can be used, for example, to enable massive
7778 pirating of copyrighted material
—a bad end. Or they can be used
7779 to enable the use of particular copyrighted materials in ways that
7780 would be considered fair use
—a good end.
7783 A handgun can be used to shoot a police officer or a child. Most
7784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 171 -->
7785 would agree such a use is bad. Or a handgun can be used for target
7786 practice or to protect against an intruder. At least some would say that
7787 such a use would be good. It, too, is a technology that has both good
7790 <figure id=
"fig-1711">
7791 <title>VCR/handgun cartoon.
</title>
7792 <graphic fileref=
"images/1711.png"></graphic>
7795 The obvious point of Conrad's cartoon is the weirdness of a world
7796 where guns are legal, despite the harm they can do, while VCRs (and
7797 circumvention technologies) are illegal. Flash:
<emphasis>No one ever
7798 died from copyright circumvention
</emphasis>. Yet the law bans circumvention
7799 technologies absolutely, despite the potential that they might do some
7800 good, but permits guns, despite the obvious and tragic harm they do.
7801 <indexterm><primary>Conrad, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
7803 <indexterm><primary>Aibo robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7804 <indexterm><primary>robotic dog
</primary></indexterm>
7806 <primary>Sony
</primary>
7807 <secondary>Aibo robotic dog produced by
</secondary>
7810 The Aibo and RIAA examples demonstrate how copyright owners are
7811 changing the balance that copyright law grants. Using code, copyright
7812 owners restrict fair use; using the DMCA, they punish those who would
7813 attempt to evade the restrictions on fair use that they impose through
7814 code. Technology becomes a means by which fair use can be erased; the
7815 law of the DMCA backs up that erasing.
7818 This is how
<emphasis>code
</emphasis> becomes
7819 <emphasis>law
</emphasis>. The controls built into the technology of
7820 copy and access protection become rules the violation of which is also
7821 a violation of the law. In this way, the code extends the
7822 law
—increasing its regulation, even if the subject it regulates
7823 (activities that would otherwise plainly constitute fair use) is
7824 beyond the reach of the law. Code becomes law; code extends the law;
7825 code thus extends the control that copyright owners effect
—at
7826 least for those copyright holders with the lawyers who can write the
7827 nasty letters that Felten and aibopet.com received.
7830 There is one final aspect of the interaction between architecture and
7831 law that contributes to the force of copyright's regulation. This is
7832 the ease with which infringements of the law can be detected. For
7833 contrary to the rhetoric common at the birth of cyberspace that on the
7834 Internet, no one knows you're a dog, increasingly, given changing
7835 technologies deployed on the Internet, it is easy to find the dog who
7836 committed a legal wrong. The technologies of the Internet are open to
7837 snoops as well as sharers, and the snoops are increasingly good at
7838 tracking down the identity of those who violate the rules.
7842 <!-- PAGE BREAK 172 -->
7843 For example, imagine you were part of a
<citetitle>Star Trek
</citetitle> fan club. You
7844 gathered every month to share trivia, and maybe to enact a kind of fan
7845 fiction about the show. One person would play Spock, another, Captain
7846 Kirk. The characters would begin with a plot from a real story, then
7847 simply continue it.
<footnote><para>
7849 For an early and prescient analysis, see Rebecca Tushnet, "Legal Fictions,
7850 Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,"
<citetitle>Loyola of Los Angeles
7851 Entertainment Law Journal
</citetitle> 17 (
1997):
651.
7855 Before the Internet, this was, in effect, a totally unregulated
7856 activity. No matter what happened inside your club room, you would
7857 never be interfered with by the copyright police. You were free in
7858 that space to do as you wished with this part of our culture. You were
7859 allowed to build on it as you wished without fear of legal control.
7862 But if you moved your club onto the Internet, and made it generally
7863 available for others to join, the story would be very different. Bots
7864 scouring the Net for trademark and copyright infringement would
7865 quickly find your site. Your posting of fan fiction, depending upon
7866 the ownership of the series that you're depicting, could well inspire
7867 a lawyer's threat. And ignoring the lawyer's threat would be extremely
7868 costly indeed. The law of copyright is extremely efficient. The
7869 penalties are severe, and the process is quick.
7872 This change in the effective force of the law is caused by a change
7873 in the ease with which the law can be enforced. That change too shifts
7874 the law's balance radically. It is as if your car transmitted the speed at
7875 which you traveled at every moment that you drove; that would be just
7876 one step before the state started issuing tickets based upon the data you
7877 transmitted. That is, in effect, what is happening here.
7880 <section id=
"marketconcentration">
7881 <title>Market: Concentration
</title>
7883 So copyright's duration has increased dramatically
—tripled in
7884 the past thirty years. And copyright's scope has increased as
7885 well
—from regulating only publishers to now regulating just
7886 about everyone. And copyright's reach has changed, as every action
7887 becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as technologists
7889 <!-- PAGE BREAK 173 -->
7890 to control the use of content, and as copyright is increasingly
7891 enforced through technology, copyright's force changes, too. Misuse is
7892 easier to find and easier to control. This regulation of the creative
7893 process, which began as a tiny regulation governing a tiny part of the
7894 market for creative work, has become the single most important
7895 regulator of creativity there is. It is a massive expansion in the
7896 scope of the government's control over innovation and creativity; it
7897 would be totally unrecognizable to those who gave birth to copyright's
7901 Still, in my view, all of these changes would not matter much if it
7902 weren't for one more change that we must also consider. This is a
7903 change that is in some sense the most familiar, though its significance
7904 and scope are not well understood. It is the one that creates precisely the
7905 reason to be concerned about all the other changes I have described.
7908 This is the change in the concentration and integration of the media.
7909 In the past twenty years, the nature of media ownership has undergone
7910 a radical alteration, caused by changes in legal rules governing the
7911 media. Before this change happened, the different forms of media were
7912 owned by separate media companies. Now, the media is increasingly
7913 owned by only a few companies. Indeed, after the changes that the FCC
7914 announced in June
2003, most expect that within a few years, we will
7915 live in a world where just three companies control more than percent
7919 These changes are of two sorts: the scope of concentration, and its
7923 Changes in scope are the easier ones to describe. As Senator John
7924 McCain summarized the data produced in the FCC's review of media
7925 ownership, "five companies control
85 percent of our media sources."
<footnote><para>
7927 FCC Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Science and
7928 Transportation Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
22 May
2003)
7929 (statement of Senator John McCain).
</para></footnote>
7930 The five recording labels of Universal Music Group, BMG, Sony Music
7931 Entertainment, Warner Music Group, and EMI control
84.8 percent of the
7932 U.S. music market.
<footnote><para>
7934 Lynette Holloway, "Despite a Marketing Blitz, CD Sales Continue to
7935 Slide,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
23 December
2002.
7937 The "five largest cable companies pipe
7938 programming to
74 percent of the cable subscribers nationwide."
<footnote><para>
7940 Molly Ivins, "Media Consolidation Must Be Stopped,"
<citetitle>Charleston Gazette
</citetitle>,
7943 <indexterm><primary>BMG
</primary></indexterm>
7944 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
7945 <indexterm><primary>McCain, John
</primary></indexterm>
7946 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
7947 <indexterm><primary>Warner Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
7950 The story with radio is even more dramatic. Before deregulation,
7951 the nation's largest radio broadcasting conglomerate owned fewer than
7952 <!-- PAGE BREAK 174 -->
7953 seventy-five stations. Today
<emphasis>one
</emphasis> company owns
7954 more than
1,
200 stations. During that period of consolidation, the
7955 total number of radio owners dropped by
34 percent. Today, in most
7956 markets, the two largest broadcasters control
74 percent of that
7957 market's revenues. Overall, just four companies control
90 percent of
7958 the nation's radio advertising revenues.
7961 Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated as well. Today,
7962 there are six hundred fewer daily newspapers in the United States than
7963 there were eighty years ago, and ten companies control half of the
7964 nation's circulation. There are twenty major newspaper publishers in
7965 the United States. The top ten film studios receive
99 percent of all
7966 film revenue. The ten largest cable companies account for
85 percent
7967 of all cable revenue. This is a market far from the free press the
7968 framers sought to protect. Indeed, it is a market that is quite well
7969 protected
— by the market.
7972 Concentration in size alone is one thing. The more invidious
7973 change is in the nature of that concentration. As author James Fallows
7974 put it in a recent article about Rupert Murdoch,
7975 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7979 Murdoch's companies now constitute a production system
7980 unmatched in its integration. They supply content
—Fox movies
7981 … Fox TV shows
… Fox-controlled sports broadcasts, plus
7982 newspapers and books. They sell the content to the public and to
7983 advertisers
—in newspapers, on the broadcast network, on the
7984 cable channels. And they operate the physical distribution system
7985 through which the content reaches the customers. Murdoch's satellite
7986 systems now distribute News Corp. content in Europe and Asia; if
7987 Murdoch becomes DirecTV's largest single owner, that system will serve
7988 the same function in the United States.
<footnote><para>
7990 James Fallows, "The Age of Murdoch,"
<citetitle>Atlantic Monthly
</citetitle> (September
7992 <indexterm><primary>Fallows, James
</primary></indexterm>
7997 The pattern with Murdoch is the pattern of modern media. Not
7998 just large companies owning many radio stations, but a few companies
7999 owning as many outlets of media as possible. A picture describes this
8000 pattern better than a thousand words could do:
8002 <figure id=
"fig-1761">
8003 <title>Pattern of modern media ownership.
</title>
8004 <graphic fileref=
"images/1761.png"></graphic>
8007 <!-- PAGE BREAK 175 -->
8008 Does this concentration matter? Will it affect what is made, or
8009 what is distributed? Or is it merely a more efficient way to produce and
8013 My view was that concentration wouldn't matter. I thought it was
8014 nothing more than a more efficient financial structure. But now, after
8015 reading and listening to a barrage of creators try to convince me to the
8016 contrary, I am beginning to change my mind.
8019 Here's a representative story that begins to suggest how this
8020 integration may matter.
8022 <indexterm><primary>Lear, Norman
</primary></indexterm>
8023 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8024 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8026 In
1969, Norman Lear created a pilot for
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle>. He took
8027 the pilot to ABC. The network didn't like it. It was too edgy, they told
8028 Lear. Make it again. Lear made a second pilot, more edgy than the
8029 first. ABC was exasperated. You're missing the point, they told Lear.
8030 We wanted less edgy, not more.
8033 Rather than comply, Lear simply took the show elsewhere. CBS
8034 was happy to have the series; ABC could not stop Lear from walking.
8035 The copyrights that Lear held assured an independence from network
8036 control.
<footnote><para>
8038 Leonard Hill, "The Axis of Access," remarks before Weidenbaum Center
8039 Forum, "Entertainment Economics: The Movie Industry," St. Louis,
8040 Missouri,
3 April
2003 (transcript of prepared remarks available at
8041 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
28</ulink>;
8042 for the Lear story, not included in the prepared remarks, see
8043 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
29</ulink>).
8048 <!-- PAGE BREAK 176 -->
8049 The network did not control those copyrights because the law forbade
8050 the networks from controlling the content they syndicated. The law
8051 required a separation between the networks and the content producers;
8052 that separation would guarantee Lear freedom. And as late as
1992,
8053 because of these rules, the vast majority of prime time
8054 television
—75 percent of it
—was "independent" of the
8058 In
1994, the FCC abandoned the rules that required this independence.
8059 After that change, the networks quickly changed the balance. In
1985,
8060 there were twenty-five independent television production studios; in
8061 2002, only five independent television studios remained. "In
1992,
8062 only
15 percent of new series were produced for a network by a company
8063 it controlled. Last year, the percentage of shows produced by
8064 controlled companies more than quintupled to
77 percent." "In
1992,
16
8065 new series were produced independently of conglomerate control, last
8066 year there was one."
<footnote><para>
8068 NewsCorp./DirecTV Merger and Media Consolidation: Hearings on Media
8069 Ownership Before the Senate Commerce Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st
8070 sess. (
2003) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman on behalf of Consumers Union
8071 and the Consumer Federation of America), available at
8072 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
30</ulink>. Kimmelman
8073 quotes Victoria Riskin, president of Writers Guild of America, West,
8074 in her Remarks at FCC En Banc Hearing, Richmond, Virginia,
27 February
8077 In
2002,
75 percent of prime time television was owned by the networks
8078 that ran it. "In the ten-year period between
1992 and
2002, the number
8079 of prime time television hours per week produced by network studios
8080 increased over
200%, whereas the number of prime time television hours
8081 per week produced by independent studios decreased
8082 63%."
<footnote><para>
8087 <indexterm><primary>All in the Family
</primary></indexterm>
8089 Today, another Norman Lear with another
<citetitle>All in the Family
</citetitle> would
8090 find that he had the choice either to make the show less edgy or to be
8091 fired: The content of any show developed for a network is increasingly
8092 owned by the network.
8095 While the number of channels has increased dramatically, the ownership
8096 of those channels has narrowed to an ever smaller and smaller few. As
8097 Barry Diller said to Bill Moyers,
8098 <indexterm><primary>Diller, Barry
</primary></indexterm>
8099 <indexterm><primary>Moyers, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
8103 Well, if you have companies that produce, that finance, that air on
8104 their channel and then distribute worldwide everything that goes
8105 through their controlled distribution system, then what you get is
8106 fewer and fewer actual voices participating in the process. [We
8107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 177 -->
8108 u]sed to have dozens and dozens of thriving independent production
8109 companies producing television programs. Now you have less than a
8110 handful.
<footnote><para>
8112 "Barry Diller Takes on Media Deregulation,"
<citetitle>Now with Bill Moyers
</citetitle>, Bill
8113 Moyers,
25 April
2003, edited transcript available at
8114 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
31</ulink>.
8119 This narrowing has an effect on what is produced. The product of such
8120 large and concentrated networks is increasingly homogenous.
8121 Increasingly safe. Increasingly sterile. The product of news shows
8122 from networks like this is increasingly tailored to the message the
8123 network wants to convey. This is not the communist party, though from
8124 the inside, it must feel a bit like the communist party. No one can
8125 question without risk of consequence
—not necessarily banishment
8126 to Siberia, but punishment nonetheless. Independent, critical,
8127 different views are quashed. This is not the environment for a
8130 <indexterm><primary>Clark, Kim B.
</primary></indexterm>
8132 Economics itself offers a parallel that explains why this integration
8133 affects creativity. Clay Christensen has written about the "Innovator's
8134 Dilemma": the fact that large traditional firms find it rational to ignore
8135 new, breakthrough technologies that compete with their core business.
8136 The same analysis could help explain why large, traditional media
8137 companies would find it rational to ignore new cultural trends.
<footnote><para>
8139 Clayton M. Christensen,
<citetitle>The Innovator's Dilemma: The
8140 Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way We Do Business
</citetitle>
8141 (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press,
1997). Christensen
8142 acknowledges that the idea was first suggested by Dean Kim Clark. See
8143 Kim B. Clark, "The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and Market
8144 Concepts in Technological Evolution,"
<citetitle>Research Policy
</citetitle> 14 (
1985):
8145 235–51. For a more recent study, see Richard Foster and Sarah
8146 Kaplan,
<citetitle>Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last
8147 Underperform the Market
—and How to Successfully Transform Them
</citetitle>
8148 (New York: Currency/Doubleday,
2001).
</para></footnote>
8150 Lumbering giants not only don't, but should not, sprint. Yet if the
8151 field is only open to the giants, there will be far too little
8153 <indexterm><primary>Christensen, Clayton M.
</primary></indexterm>
8156 I don't think we know enough about the economics of the media
8157 market to say with certainty what concentration and integration will
8158 do. The efficiencies are important, and the effect on culture is hard to
8162 But there is a quintessentially obvious example that does strongly
8163 suggest the concern.
8166 In addition to the copyright wars, we're in the middle of the drug
8167 wars. Government policy is strongly directed against the drug cartels;
8168 criminal and civil courts are filled with the consequences of this battle.
8171 Let me hereby disqualify myself from any possible appointment to
8172 any position in government by saying I believe this war is a profound
8173 mistake. I am not pro drugs. Indeed, I come from a family once
8175 <!-- PAGE BREAK 178 -->
8176 wrecked by drugs
—though the drugs that wrecked my family were
8177 all quite legal. I believe this war is a profound mistake because the
8178 collateral damage from it is so great as to make waging the war
8179 insane. When you add together the burdens on the criminal justice
8180 system, the desperation of generations of kids whose only real
8181 economic opportunities are as drug warriors, the queering of
8182 constitutional protections because of the constant surveillance this
8183 war requires, and, most profoundly, the total destruction of the legal
8184 systems of many South American nations because of the power of the
8185 local drug cartels, I find it impossible to believe that the marginal
8186 benefit in reduced drug consumption by Americans could possibly
8187 outweigh these costs.
8190 You may not be convinced. That's fine. We live in a democracy, and it
8191 is through votes that we are to choose policy. But to do that, we
8192 depend fundamentally upon the press to help inform Americans about
8196 Beginning in
1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy launched
8197 a media campaign as part of the "war on drugs." The campaign produced
8198 scores of short film clips about issues related to illegal drugs. In
8199 one series (the Nick and Norm series) two men are in a bar, discussing
8200 the idea of legalizing drugs as a way to avoid some of the collateral
8201 damage from the war. One advances an argument in favor of drug
8202 legalization. The other responds in a powerful and effective way
8203 against the argument of the first. In the end, the first guy changes
8204 his mind (hey, it's television). The plug at the end is a damning
8205 attack on the pro-legalization campaign.
8208 Fair enough. It's a good ad. Not terribly misleading. It delivers its
8209 message well. It's a fair and reasonable message.
8212 But let's say you think it is a wrong message, and you'd like to run a
8213 countercommercial. Say you want to run a series of ads that try to
8214 demonstrate the extraordinary collateral harm that comes from the drug
8218 Well, obviously, these ads cost lots of money. Assume you raise the
8219 <!-- PAGE BREAK 179 -->
8220 money. Assume a group of concerned citizens donates all the money in
8221 the world to help you get your message out. Can you be sure your
8222 message will be heard then?
8225 No. You cannot. Television stations have a general policy of avoiding
8226 "controversial" ads. Ads sponsored by the government are deemed
8227 uncontroversial; ads disagreeing with the government are
8228 controversial. This selectivity might be thought inconsistent with
8229 the First Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held that stations have
8230 the right to choose what they run. Thus, the major channels of
8231 commercial media will refuse one side of a crucial debate the
8232 opportunity to present its case. And the courts will defend the
8233 rights of the stations to be this biased.
<footnote><para>
8235 The Marijuana Policy Project, in February
2003, sought to place ads
8236 that directly responded to the Nick and Norm series on stations within
8237 the Washington, D.C., area. Comcast rejected the ads as "against
8238 [their] policy." The local NBC affiliate, WRC, rejected the ads
8239 without reviewing them. The local ABC affiliate, WJOA, originally
8240 agreed to run the ads and accepted payment to do so, but later decided
8241 not to run the ads and returned the collected fees. Interview with
8242 Neal Levine,
15 October
2003. These restrictions are, of course, not
8243 limited to drug policy. See, for example, Nat Ives, "On the Issue of
8244 an Iraq War, Advocacy Ads Meet with Rejection from TV Networks,"
<citetitle>New
8245 York Times
</citetitle>,
13 March
2003, C4. Outside of election-related air time
8246 there is very little that the FCC or the courts are willing to do to
8247 even the playing field. For a general overview, see Rhonda Brown, "Ad
8248 Hoc Access: The Regulation of Editorial Advertising on Television and
8249 Radio,"
<citetitle>Yale Law and Policy Review
</citetitle> 6 (
1988):
449–79, and for a
8250 more recent summary of the stance of the FCC and the courts, see
8251 <citetitle>Radio-Television News Directors Association
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>FCC
</citetitle>,
184 F.
3d
872
8252 (D.C. Cir.
1999). Municipal authorities exercise the same authority as
8253 the networks. In a recent example from San Francisco, the San
8254 Francisco transit authority rejected an ad that criticized its Muni
8255 diesel buses. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, "Antidiesel Group Fuming
8256 After Muni Rejects Ad," SFGate.com,
16 June
2003, available at
8257 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
32</ulink>. The ground
8258 was that the criticism was "too controversial."
8259 <indexterm><primary>ABC
</primary></indexterm>
8260 <indexterm><primary>Comcast
</primary></indexterm>
8261 <indexterm><primary>Marijuana Policy Project
</primary></indexterm>
8262 <indexterm><primary>NBC
</primary></indexterm>
8263 <indexterm><primary>WJOA
</primary></indexterm>
8264 <indexterm><primary>WRC
</primary></indexterm>
8268 I'd be happy to defend the networks' rights, as well
—if we lived
8269 in a media market that was truly diverse. But concentration in the
8270 media throws that condition into doubt. If a handful of companies
8271 control access to the media, and that handful of companies gets to
8272 decide which political positions it will allow to be promoted on its
8273 channels, then in an obvious and important way, concentration
8274 matters. You might like the positions the handful of companies
8275 selects. But you should not like a world in which a mere few get to
8276 decide which issues the rest of us get to know about.
8279 <section id=
"together">
8280 <title>Together
</title>
8282 There is something innocent and obvious about the claim of the
8283 copyright warriors that the government should "protect my property."
8284 In the abstract, it is obviously true and, ordinarily, totally
8285 harmless. No sane sort who is not an anarchist could disagree.
8288 But when we see how dramatically this "property" has changed
—
8289 when we recognize how it might now interact with both technology and
8290 markets to mean that the effective constraint on the liberty to
8291 cultivate our culture is dramatically different
—the claim begins
8294 <!-- PAGE BREAK 180 -->
8295 less innocent and obvious. Given (
1) the power of technology to
8296 supplement the law's control, and (
2) the power of concentrated
8297 markets to weaken the opportunity for dissent, if strictly enforcing
8298 the massively expanded "property" rights granted by copyright
8299 fundamentally changes the freedom within this culture to cultivate and
8300 build upon our past, then we have to ask whether this property should
8304 Not starkly. Or absolutely. My point is not that we should abolish
8305 copyright or go back to the eighteenth century. That would be a total
8306 mistake, disastrous for the most important creative enterprises within
8310 But there is a space between zero and one, Internet culture
8311 notwithstanding. And these massive shifts in the effective power of
8312 copyright regulation, tied to increased concentration of the content
8313 industry and resting in the hands of technology that will increasingly
8314 enable control over the use of culture, should drive us to consider
8315 whether another adjustment is called for. Not an adjustment that
8316 increases copyright's power. Not an adjustment that increases its
8317 term. Rather, an adjustment to restore the balance that has
8318 traditionally defined copyright's regulation
—a weakening of that
8319 regulation, to strengthen creativity.
8322 Copyright law has not been a rock of Gibraltar. It's not a set of
8323 constant commitments that, for some mysterious reason, teenagers and
8324 geeks now flout. Instead, copyright power has grown dramatically in a
8325 short period of time, as the technologies of distribution and creation
8326 have changed and as lobbyists have pushed for more control by
8327 copyright holders. Changes in the past in response to changes in
8328 technology suggest that we may well need similar changes in the
8329 future. And these changes have to be
<emphasis>reductions
</emphasis>
8330 in the scope of copyright, in response to the extraordinary increase
8331 in control that technology and the market enable.
8334 For the single point that is lost in this war on pirates is a point that
8335 we see only after surveying the range of these changes. When you add
8336 <!-- PAGE BREAK 181 -->
8337 together the effect of changing law, concentrated markets, and
8338 changing technology, together they produce an astonishing conclusion:
8339 <emphasis>Never in our history have fewer had a legal right to control
8340 more of the development of our culture than now
</emphasis>.
8343 Not when copyrights were perpetual, for when copyrights were
8344 perpetual, they affected only that precise creative work. Not when
8345 only publishers had the tools to publish, for the market then was much
8346 more diverse. Not when there were only three television networks, for
8347 even then, newspapers, film studios, radio stations, and publishers
8348 were independent of the networks.
<emphasis>Never
</emphasis> has
8349 copyright protected such a wide range of rights, against as broad a
8350 range of actors, for a term that was remotely as long. This form of
8351 regulation
—a tiny regulation of a tiny part of the creative
8352 energy of a nation at the founding
—is now a massive regulation
8353 of the overall creative process. Law plus technology plus the market
8354 now interact to turn this historically benign regulation into the most
8355 significant regulation of culture that our free society has
8356 known.
<footnote><para>
8358 Siva Vaidhyanathan captures a similar point in his "four surrenders" of
8359 copyright law in the digital age. See Vaidhyanathan,
159–60.
8360 <indexterm><primary>Vaidhyanathan, Siva
</primary></indexterm>
8364 This has been a long chapter. Its point can now be briefly stated.
8367 At the start of this book, I distinguished between commercial and
8368 noncommercial culture. In the course of this chapter, I have
8369 distinguished between copying a work and transforming it. We can now
8370 combine these two distinctions and draw a clear map of the changes
8371 that copyright law has undergone. In
1790, the law looked like this:
8374 <informaltable id=
"t2">
8375 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8379 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8380 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8385 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8386 <entry>©</entry>
8390 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8399 The act of publishing a map, chart, and book was regulated by
8400 copyright law. Nothing else was. Transformations were free. And as
8401 copyright attached only with registration, and only those who intended
8403 <!-- PAGE BREAK 182 -->
8404 to benefit commercially would register, copying through publishing of
8405 noncommercial work was also free.
8408 By the end of the nineteenth century, the law had changed to this:
8411 <informaltable id=
"t3">
8412 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8416 <entry>PUBLISH
</entry>
8417 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8422 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8423 <entry>©</entry>
8424 <entry>©</entry>
8427 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8436 Derivative works were now regulated by copyright law
—if
8437 published, which again, given the economics of publishing at the time,
8438 means if offered commercially. But noncommercial publishing and
8439 transformation were still essentially free.
8442 In
1909 the law changed to regulate copies, not publishing, and after
8443 this change, the scope of the law was tied to technology. As the
8444 technology of copying became more prevalent, the reach of the law
8445 expanded. Thus by
1975, as photocopying machines became more common,
8446 we could say the law began to look like this:
8449 <informaltable id=
"t4">
8450 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8455 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8460 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8461 <entry>©</entry>
8462 <entry>©</entry>
8465 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8466 <entry>©/Free
</entry>
8474 The law was interpreted to reach noncommercial copying through, say,
8475 copy machines, but still much of copying outside of the commercial
8476 market remained free. But the consequence of the emergence of digital
8477 technologies, especially in the context of a digital network, means
8478 that the law now looks like this:
8481 <informaltable id=
"t5">
8482 <tgroup cols=
"3" align=
"char">
8487 <entry>TRANSFORM
</entry>
8492 <entry>Commercial
</entry>
8493 <entry>©</entry>
8494 <entry>©</entry>
8497 <entry>Noncommercial
</entry>
8498 <entry>©</entry>
8499 <entry>©</entry>
8506 Every realm is governed by copyright law, whereas before most
8507 creativity was not. The law now regulates the full range of
8509 <!-- PAGE BREAK 183 -->
8510 commercial or not, transformative or not
—with the same rules
8511 designed to regulate commercial publishers.
8514 Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation
8515 that does no good. So the question that we should be asking just now
8516 is whether extending the regulations of copyright law into each of
8517 these domains actually does any good.
8520 I have no doubt that it does good in regulating commercial copying.
8521 But I also have no doubt that it does more harm than good when
8522 regulating (as it regulates just now) noncommercial copying and,
8523 especially, noncommercial transformation. And increasingly, for the
8524 reasons sketched especially in chapters
8525 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/> and
8526 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"transformers"/>, one
8527 might well wonder whether it does more harm than good for commercial
8528 transformation. More commercial transformative work would be created
8529 if derivative rights were more sharply restricted.
8532 The issue is therefore not simply whether copyright is property. Of
8533 course copyright is a kind of "property," and of course, as with any
8534 property, the state ought to protect it. But first impressions
8535 notwithstanding, historically, this property right (as with all
8536 property rights
<footnote><para>
8538 It was the single most important contribution of the legal realist
8539 movement to demonstrate that all property rights are always crafted to
8540 balance public and private interests. See Thomas C. Grey, "The
8541 Disintegration of Property," in
<citetitle>Nomos XXII: Property
</citetitle>, J. Roland
8542 Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. (New York: New York University
8544 <indexterm><primary>legal realist movement
</primary></indexterm>
8546 has been crafted to balance the important need to give authors and
8547 artists incentives with the equally important need to assure access to
8548 creative work. This balance has always been struck in light of new
8549 technologies. And for almost half of our tradition, the "copyright"
8550 did not control
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis> the freedom of others to
8551 build upon or transform a creative work. American culture was born
8552 free, and for almost
180 years our country consistently protected a
8553 vibrant and rich free culture.
8556 We achieved that free culture because our law respected important
8557 limits on the scope of the interests protected by "property." The very
8558 birth of "copyright" as a statutory right recognized those limits, by
8559 granting copyright owners protection for a limited time only (the
8560 story of chapter
6). The tradition of "fair use" is animated by a
8561 similar concern that is increasingly under strain as the costs of
8562 exercising any fair use right become unavoidably high (the story of
8564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 184 -->
8565 statutory rights where markets might stifle innovation is another
8566 familiar limit on the property right that copyright is (chapter
8567 8). And granting archives and libraries a broad freedom to collect,
8568 claims of property notwithstanding, is a crucial part of guaranteeing
8569 the soul of a culture (chapter
9). Free cultures, like free markets,
8570 are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a
8571 free culture is very different from the extremist vision that
8572 dominates the debate today.
8575 Free culture is increasingly the casualty in this war on piracy. In
8576 response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the
8577 technologies of the Internet present to twentieth-century business
8578 models for producing and distributing culture, the law and technology
8579 are being transformed in a way that will undermine our tradition of
8580 free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
8581 balanced right that it was, or was intended to be. The property right
8582 that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme. The
8583 opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a world in
8584 which creation requires permission and creativity must check with a
8587 <!-- PAGE BREAK 185 -->
8591 <part id=
"c-puzzles">
8592 <title>PUZZLES
</title>
8594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 186 -->
8595 <chapter label=
"11" id=
"chimera">
8596 <title>CHAPTER ELEVEN: Chimera
</title>
8597 <indexterm id=
"idxchimera" class='startofrange'
>
8598 <primary>chimeras
</primary>
8600 <indexterm id=
"idxwells" class='startofrange'
>
8601 <primary>Wells, H. G.
</primary>
8603 <indexterm id=
"idxtcotb" class='startofrange'
>
8604 <primary>"Country of the Blind, The
" (Wells)
</primary>
8608 In a well-known short story by H. G. Wells, a mountain climber
8609 named Nunez trips (literally, down an ice slope) into an unknown and
8610 isolated valley in the Peruvian Andes.
<footnote><para>
8612 H. G. Wells, "The Country of the Blind" (
1904,
1911). See H. G. Wells,
8613 <citetitle>The Country of the Blind and Other Stories
</citetitle>, Michael Sherborne, ed. (New
8614 York: Oxford University Press,
1996).
8616 The valley is extraordinarily beautiful, with "sweet water, pasture,
8617 an even climate, slopes of rich brown soil with tangles of a shrub
8618 that bore an excellent fruit." But the villagers are all blind. Nunez
8619 takes this as an opportunity. "In the Country of the Blind," he tells
8620 himself, "the One-Eyed Man is King." So he resolves to live with the
8621 villagers to explore life as a king.
8624 Things don't go quite as he planned. He tries to explain the idea of
8625 sight to the villagers. They don't understand. He tells them they are
8626 "blind." They don't have the word
<citetitle>blind
</citetitle>. They think he's just thick.
8627 Indeed, as they increasingly notice the things he can't do (hear the
8628 sound of grass being stepped on, for example), they increasingly try
8629 to control him. He, in turn, becomes increasingly frustrated. "`You
8630 don't understand,' he cried, in a voice that was meant to be great and
8631 resolute, and which broke. `You are blind and I can see. Leave me
8635 <!-- PAGE BREAK 187 -->
8636 The villagers don't leave him alone. Nor do they see (so to speak) the
8637 virtue of his special power. Not even the ultimate target of his
8638 affection, a young woman who to him seems "the most beautiful thing in
8639 the whole of creation," understands the beauty of sight. Nunez's
8640 description of what he sees "seemed to her the most poetical of
8641 fancies, and she listened to his description of the stars and the
8642 mountains and her own sweet white-lit beauty as though it was a guilty
8643 indulgence." "She did not believe," Wells tells us, and "she could
8644 only half understand, but she was mysteriously delighted."
8647 When Nunez announces his desire to marry his "mysteriously delighted"
8648 love, the father and the village object. "You see, my dear," her
8649 father instructs, "he's an idiot. He has delusions. He can't do
8650 anything right." They take Nunez to the village doctor.
8653 After a careful examination, the doctor gives his opinion. "His brain
8654 is affected," he reports.
8657 "What affects it?" the father asks. "Those queer things that are
8658 called the eyes
… are diseased
… in such a way as to affect
8662 The doctor continues: "I think I may say with reasonable certainty
8663 that in order to cure him completely, all that we need to do is a
8664 simple and easy surgical operation
—namely, to remove these
8665 irritant bodies [the eyes]."
8668 "Thank Heaven for science!" says the father to the doctor. They inform
8669 Nunez of this condition necessary for him to be allowed his bride.
8670 (You'll have to read the original to learn what happens in the end. I
8671 believe in free culture, but never in giving away the end of a story.)
8672 It sometimes happens that the eggs of twins fuse in the mother's
8673 womb. That fusion produces a "chimera." A chimera is a single creature
8674 with two sets of DNA. The DNA in the blood, for example, might be
8675 different from the DNA of the skin. This possibility is an underused
8677 <!-- PAGE BREAK 188 -->
8678 plot for murder mysteries. "But the DNA shows with
100 percent
8679 certainty that she was not the person whose blood was at the
8682 <indexterm startref=
"idxtcotb" class='endofrange'
/>
8683 <indexterm startref=
"idxwells" class=
"endofrange"/>
8685 Before I had read about chimeras, I would have said they were
8686 impossible. A single person can't have two sets of DNA. The very idea
8687 of DNA is that it is the code of an individual. Yet in fact, not only
8688 can two individuals have the same set of DNA (identical twins), but
8689 one person can have two different sets of DNA (a chimera). Our
8690 understanding of a "person" should reflect this reality.
8693 The more I work to understand the current struggle over copyright and
8694 culture, which I've sometimes called unfairly, and sometimes not
8695 unfairly enough, "the copyright wars," the more I think we're dealing
8696 with a chimera. For example, in the battle over the question "What is
8697 p2p file sharing?" both sides have it right, and both sides have it
8698 wrong. One side says, "File sharing is just like two kids taping each
8699 others' records
—the sort of thing we've been doing for the last
8700 thirty years without any question at all." That's true, at least in
8701 part. When I tell my best friend to try out a new CD that I've bought,
8702 but rather than just send the CD, I point him to my p2p server, that
8703 is, in all relevant respects, just like what every executive in every
8704 recording company no doubt did as a kid: sharing music.
8707 But the description is also false in part. For when my p2p server is
8708 on a p2p network through which anyone can get access to my music, then
8709 sure, my friends can get access, but it stretches the meaning of
8710 "friends" beyond recognition to say "my ten thousand best friends" can
8711 get access. Whether or not sharing my music with my best friend is
8712 what "we have always been allowed to do," we have not always been
8713 allowed to share music with "our ten thousand best friends."
8716 Likewise, when the other side says, "File sharing is just like walking
8717 into a Tower Records and taking a CD off the shelf and walking out
8718 with it," that's true, at least in part. If, after Lyle Lovett
8719 (finally) releases a new album, rather than buying it, I go to Kazaa
8720 and find a free copy to take, that is very much like stealing a copy
8722 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
8726 <!-- PAGE BREAK 189 -->
8727 But it is not quite stealing from Tower. After all, when I take a CD
8728 from Tower Records, Tower has one less CD to sell. And when I take a
8729 CD from Tower Records, I get a bit of plastic and a cover, and
8730 something to show on my shelves. (And, while we're at it, we could
8731 also note that when I take a CD from Tower Records, the maximum fine
8732 that might be imposed on me, under California law, at least, is
8733 $
1,
000. According to the RIAA, by contrast, if I download a ten-song
8734 CD, I'm liable for $
1,
500,
000 in damages.)
8737 The point is not that it is as neither side describes. The point is
8738 that it is both
—both as the RIAA describes it and as Kazaa
8739 describes it. It is a chimera. And rather than simply denying what the
8740 other side asserts, we need to begin to think about how we should
8741 respond to this chimera. What rules should govern it?
8744 We could respond by simply pretending that it is not a chimera. We
8745 could, with the RIAA, decide that every act of file sharing should be
8746 a felony. We could prosecute families for millions of dollars in
8747 damages just because file sharing occurred on a family computer. And
8748 we can get universities to monitor all computer traffic to make sure
8749 that no computer is used to commit this crime. These responses might
8750 be extreme, but each of them has either been proposed or actually
8751 implemented.
<footnote><para>
8753 For an excellent summary, see the report prepared by GartnerG2 and the
8754 Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School,
8755 "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
8757 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
8758 #
33</ulink>. Reps. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.) and Howard L. Berman
8759 (D-Calif.) have introduced a bill that would treat unauthorized
8760 on-line copying as a felony offense with punishments ranging as high
8761 as five years imprisonment; see Jon Healey, "House Bill Aims to Up
8762 Stakes on Piracy,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
17 July
2003, available at
8763 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
34</ulink>. Civil
8764 penalties are currently set at $
150,
000 per copied song. For a recent
8765 (and unsuccessful) legal challenge to the RIAA's demand that an ISP
8766 reveal the identity of a user accused of sharing more than
600 songs
8767 through a family computer, see
<citetitle>RIAA
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Verizon Internet Services (In
8768 re. Verizon Internet Services)
</citetitle>,
240 F. Supp.
2d
24
8769 (D.D.C.
2003). Such a user could face liability ranging as high as $
90
8770 million. Such astronomical figures furnish the RIAA with a powerful
8771 arsenal in its prosecution of file sharers. Settlements ranging from
8772 $
12,
000 to $
17,
500 for four students accused of heavy file sharing on
8773 university networks must have seemed a mere pittance next to the $
98
8774 billion the RIAA could seek should the matter proceed to court. See
8775 Elizabeth Young, "Downloading Could Lead to Fines," redandblack.com,
8776 August
2003, available at
8777 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
35</ulink>. For an
8778 example of the RIAA's targeting of student file sharing, and of the
8779 subpoenas issued to universities to reveal student file-sharer
8780 identities, see James Collins, "RIAA Steps Up Bid to Force BC, MIT to
8781 Name Students,"
<citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
8 August
2003, D3, available at
8782 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
36</ulink>.
8783 <indexterm><primary>Conyers, John, Jr.
</primary></indexterm>
8784 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
8788 <indexterm startref=
"idxchimera" class='endofrange'
/>
8790 Alternatively, we could respond to file sharing the way many kids act
8791 as though we've responded. We could totally legalize it. Let there be
8792 no copyright liability, either civil or criminal, for making
8793 copyrighted content available on the Net. Make file sharing like
8794 gossip: regulated, if at all, by social norms but not by law.
8797 Either response is possible. I think either would be a mistake.
8798 Rather than embrace one of these two extremes, we should embrace
8799 something that recognizes the truth in both. And while I end this book
8800 with a sketch of a system that does just that, my aim in the next
8801 chapter is to show just how awful it would be for us to adopt the
8802 zero-tolerance extreme. I believe
<emphasis>either
</emphasis> extreme
8803 would be worse than a reasonable alternative. But I believe the
8804 zero-tolerance solution would be the worse of the two extremes.
8808 <!-- PAGE BREAK 190 -->
8809 Yet zero tolerance is increasingly our government's policy. In the
8810 middle of the chaos that the Internet has created, an extraordinary
8811 land grab is occurring. The law and technology are being shifted to
8812 give content holders a kind of control over our culture that they have
8813 never had before. And in this extremism, many an opportunity for new
8814 innovation and new creativity will be lost.
8817 I'm not talking about the opportunities for kids to "steal" music. My
8818 focus instead is the commercial and cultural innovation that this war
8819 will also kill. We have never seen the power to innovate spread so
8820 broadly among our citizens, and we have just begun to see the
8821 innovation that this power will unleash. Yet the Internet has already
8822 seen the passing of one cycle of innovation around technologies to
8823 distribute content. The law is responsible for this passing. As the
8824 vice president for global public policy at one of these new
8825 innovators, eMusic.com, put it when criticizing the DMCA's added
8826 protection for copyrighted material,
8830 eMusic opposes music piracy. We are a distributor of copyrighted
8831 material, and we want to protect those rights.
8834 But building a technology fortress that locks in the clout of the
8835 major labels is by no means the only way to protect copyright
8836 interests, nor is it necessarily the best. It is simply too early to
8837 answer that question. Market forces operating naturally may very well
8838 produce a totally different industry model.
8841 This is a critical point. The choices that industry sectors make
8842 with respect to these systems will in many ways directly shape the
8843 market for digital media and the manner in which digital media
8844 are distributed. This in turn will directly influence the options
8845 that are available to consumers, both in terms of the ease with
8846 which they will be able to access digital media and the equipment
8847 that they will require to do so. Poor choices made this early in the
8848 game will retard the growth of this market, hurting everyone's
8849 interests.
<footnote><para>
8851 WIPO and the DMCA One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital
8852 Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the
8853 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
8854 House Committee on Commerce,
106th Cong.
29 (
1999) (statement of Peter
8855 Harter, vice president, Global Public Policy and Standards,
8856 EMusic.com), available in LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
8857 Congressional Testimony File.
</para></footnote>
8860 <!-- PAGE BREAK 191 -->
8862 In April
2001, eMusic.com was purchased by Vivendi Universal,
8863 one of "the major labels." Its position on these matters has now
8865 <indexterm><primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary></indexterm>
8868 Reversing our tradition of tolerance now will not merely quash
8869 piracy. It will sacrifice values that are important to this culture,
8870 and will kill opportunities that could be extraordinarily valuable.
8873 <!-- PAGE BREAK 192 -->
8875 <chapter label=
"12" id=
"harms">
8876 <title>CHAPTER TWELVE: Harms
</title>
8878 To fight "piracy," to protect "property," the content industry has
8879 launched a war. Lobbying and lots of campaign contributions have now
8880 brought the government into this war. As with any war, this one will
8881 have both direct and collateral damage. As with any war of
8882 prohibition, these damages will be suffered most by our own people.
8885 My aim so far has been to describe the consequences of this war, in
8886 particular, the consequences for "free culture." But my aim now is to
8887 extend this description of consequences into an argument. Is this war
8891 In my view, it is not. There is no good reason why this time, for the
8892 first time, the law should defend the old against the new, just when the
8893 power of the property called "intellectual property" is at its greatest in
8896 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
8897 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
8899 Yet "common sense" does not see it this way. Common sense is still on
8900 the side of the Causbys and the content industry. The extreme claims
8901 of control in the name of property still resonate; the uncritical
8902 rejection of "piracy" still has play.
8905 <!-- PAGE BREAK 193 -->
8906 There will be many consequences of continuing this war. I want to
8907 describe just three. All three might be said to be unintended. I am quite
8908 confident the third is unintended. I'm less sure about the first two. The
8909 first two protect modern RCAs, but there is no Howard Armstrong in
8910 the wings to fight today's monopolists of culture.
8912 <section id=
"constrain">
8913 <title>Constraining Creators
</title>
8915 In the next ten years we will see an explosion of digital
8916 technologies. These technologies will enable almost anyone to capture
8917 and share content. Capturing and sharing content, of course, is what
8918 humans have done since the dawn of man. It is how we learn and
8919 communicate. But capturing and sharing through digital technology is
8920 different. The fidelity and power are different. You could send an
8921 e-mail telling someone about a joke you saw on Comedy Central, or you
8922 could send the clip. You could write an essay about the
8923 inconsistencies in the arguments of the politician you most love to
8924 hate, or you could make a short film that puts statement against
8925 statement. You could write a poem to express your love, or you could
8926 weave together a string
—a mash-up
— of songs from your
8927 favorite artists in a collage and make it available on the Net.
8930 This digital "capturing and sharing" is in part an extension of the
8931 capturing and sharing that has always been integral to our culture,
8932 and in part it is something new. It is continuous with the Kodak, but
8933 it explodes the boundaries of Kodak-like technologies. The technology
8934 of digital "capturing and sharing" promises a world of extraordinarily
8935 diverse creativity that can be easily and broadly shared. And as that
8936 creativity is applied to democracy, it will enable a broad range of
8937 citizens to use technology to express and criticize and contribute to
8938 the culture all around.
8941 Technology has thus given us an opportunity to do something with
8942 culture that has only ever been possible for individuals in small groups,
8944 <!-- PAGE BREAK 194 -->
8946 isolated from others. Think about an old man telling a story to a
8947 collection of neighbors in a small town. Now imagine that same
8948 storytelling extended across the globe.
8951 Yet all this is possible only if the activity is presumptively legal. In
8952 the current regime of legal regulation, it is not. Forget file sharing for
8953 a moment. Think about your favorite amazing sites on the Net. Web
8954 sites that offer plot summaries from forgotten television shows; sites
8955 that catalog cartoons from the
1960s; sites that mix images and sound
8956 to criticize politicians or businesses; sites that gather newspaper articles
8957 on remote topics of science or culture. There is a vast amount of creative
8958 work spread across the Internet. But as the law is currently crafted, this
8959 work is presumptively illegal.
8962 That presumption will increasingly chill creativity, as the
8963 examples of extreme penalties for vague infringements continue to
8964 proliferate. It is impossible to get a clear sense of what's allowed
8965 and what's not, and at the same time, the penalties for crossing the
8966 line are astonishingly harsh. The four students who were threatened
8967 by the RIAA ( Jesse Jordan of chapter
3 was just one) were threatened
8968 with a $
98 billion lawsuit for building search engines that permitted
8969 songs to be copied. Yet World-Com
—which defrauded investors of
8970 $
11 billion, resulting in a loss to investors in market capitalization
8971 of over $
200 billion
—received a fine of a mere $
750
8972 million.
<footnote><para>
8974 See Lynne W. Jeter,
<citetitle>Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom
</citetitle>
8975 (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley
& Sons,
2003),
176,
204; for details of
8976 the settlement, see MCI press release, "MCI Wins U.S. District Court
8977 Approval for SEC Settlement" (
7 July
2003), available at
8978 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
37</ulink>.
8979 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
8981 And under legislation being pushed in Congress right now, a doctor who
8982 negligently removes the wrong leg in an operation would be liable for
8983 no more than $
250,
000 in damages for pain and
8984 suffering.
<footnote>
8986 <!-- f2. --> The bill, modeled after California's tort reform model, was passed in the
8987 House of Representatives but defeated in a Senate vote in July
2003. For
8988 an overview, see Tanya Albert, "Measure Stalls in Senate: `We'll Be Back,'
8989 Say Tort Reformers," amednews.com,
28 July
2003, available at
8990 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
38</ulink>,
8991 and "Senate Turns Back Malpractice Caps," CBSNews.com,
9 July
2003,
8993 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
39</ulink>. President Bush has continued to urge tort reform in
8995 <indexterm><primary>Bush, George W.
</primary></indexterm>
8997 Can common sense recognize the absurdity in a world where
8998 the maximum fine for downloading two songs off the Internet is more
8999 than the fine for a doctor's negligently butchering a patient?
9000 <indexterm><primary>Worldcom
</primary></indexterm>
9003 The consequence of this legal uncertainty, tied to these extremely
9004 high penalties, is that an extraordinary amount of creativity will
9005 either never be exercised, or never be exercised in the open. We drive
9006 this creative process underground by branding the modern-day Walt
9007 Disneys "pirates." We make it impossible for businesses to rely upon a
9008 public domain, because the boundaries of the public domain are
9011 <!-- PAGE BREAK 195 -->
9012 be unclear. It never pays to do anything except pay for the right
9013 to create, and hence only those who can pay are allowed to create. As
9014 was the case in the Soviet Union, though for very different reasons,
9015 we will begin to see a world of underground art
—not because the
9016 message is necessarily political, or because the subject is
9017 controversial, but because the very act of creating the art is legally
9018 fraught. Already, exhibits of "illegal art" tour the United
9019 States.
<footnote><para>
9022 See Danit Lidor, "Artists Just Wanna Be Free,"
<citetitle>Wired
</citetitle>,
7 July
9024 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
40</ulink>. For an overview of the exhibition, see
9025 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
41</ulink>.
9027 In what does their "illegality" consist?
9028 In the act of mixing the culture around us with an expression that is
9029 critical or reflective.
9032 Part of the reason for this fear of illegality has to do with the
9033 changing law. I described that change in detail in chapter
9034 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. But an
9035 even bigger part has to do with the increasing ease with which
9036 infractions can be tracked. As users of file-sharing systems
9037 discovered in
2002, it is a trivial matter for copyright owners to get
9038 courts to order Internet service providers to reveal who has what
9039 content. It is as if your cassette tape player transmitted a list of
9040 the songs that you played in the privacy of your own home that anyone
9041 could tune into for whatever reason they chose.
9044 Never in our history has a painter had to worry about whether
9045 his painting infringed on someone else's work; but the modern-day
9046 painter, using the tools of Photoshop, sharing content on the Web,
9047 must worry all the time. Images are all around, but the only safe images
9048 to use in the act of creation are those purchased from Corbis or another
9049 image farm. And in purchasing, censoring happens. There is a free
9050 market in pencils; we needn't worry about its effect on creativity. But
9051 there is a highly regulated, monopolized market in cultural icons; the
9052 right to cultivate and transform them is not similarly free.
9055 Lawyers rarely see this because lawyers are rarely empirical. As I
9056 described in chapter
9057 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"recorders"/>, in
9058 response to the story about documentary filmmaker Jon Else, I have
9059 been lectured again and again by lawyers who insist Else's use was
9060 fair use, and hence I am wrong to say that the law regulates such a
9065 <!-- PAGE BREAK 196 -->
9066 But fair use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to
9067 defend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
9068 for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad
—in
9069 practically every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it
9070 delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection
9071 to the justice underlying the claim. The legal system may be tolerable
9072 for the very rich. For everyone else, it is an embarrassment to a
9073 tradition that prides itself on the rule of law.
9076 Judges and lawyers can tell themselves that fair use provides adequate
9077 "breathing room" between regulation by the law and the access the law
9078 should allow. But it is a measure of how out of touch our legal system
9079 has become that anyone actually believes this. The rules that
9080 publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors
9081 impose upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon
9082 journalists
— these are the real laws governing creativity. And
9083 these rules have little relationship to the "law" with which judges
9087 For in a world that threatens $
150,
000 for a single willful
9088 infringement of a copyright, and which demands tens of thousands of
9089 dollars to even defend against a copyright infringement claim, and
9090 which would never return to the wrongfully accused defendant anything
9091 of the costs she suffered to defend her right to speak
—in that
9092 world, the astonishingly broad regulations that pass under the name
9093 "copyright" silence speech and creativity. And in that world, it takes
9094 a studied blindness for people to continue to believe they live in a
9095 culture that is free.
9098 As Jed Horovitz, the businessman behind Video Pipeline, said to me,
9102 We're losing [creative] opportunities right and left. Creative people
9103 are being forced not to express themselves. Thoughts are not being
9104 expressed. And while a lot of stuff may [still] be created, it still
9105 won't get distributed. Even if the stuff gets made
… you're not
9106 going to get it distributed in the mainstream media unless
9107 <!-- PAGE BREAK 197 -->
9108 you've got a little note from a lawyer saying, "This has been
9109 cleared." You're not even going to get it on PBS without that kind of
9110 permission. That's the point at which they control it.
9114 <section id=
"innovators">
9115 <title>Constraining Innovators
</title>
9117 The story of the last section was a crunchy-lefty
9118 story
—creativity quashed, artists who can't speak, yada yada
9119 yada. Maybe that doesn't get you going. Maybe you think there's enough
9120 weird art out there, and enough expression that is critical of what
9121 seems to be just about everything. And if you think that, you might
9122 think there's little in this story to worry you.
9125 But there's an aspect of this story that is not lefty in any sense.
9126 Indeed, it is an aspect that could be written by the most extreme
9127 promarket ideologue. And if you're one of these sorts (and a special
9128 one at that,
188 pages into a book like this), then you can see this
9129 other aspect by substituting "free market" every place I've spoken of
9130 "free culture." The point is the same, even if the interests
9131 affecting culture are more fundamental.
9134 The charge I've been making about the regulation of culture is the
9135 same charge free marketers make about regulating markets. Everyone, of
9136 course, concedes that some regulation of markets is necessary
—at
9137 a minimum, we need rules of property and contract, and courts to
9138 enforce both. Likewise, in this culture debate, everyone concedes that
9139 at least some framework of copyright is also required. But both
9140 perspectives vehemently insist that just because some regulation is
9141 good, it doesn't follow that more regulation is better. And both
9142 perspectives are constantly attuned to the ways in which regulation
9143 simply enables the powerful industries of today to protect themselves
9144 against the competitors of tomorrow.
9146 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9148 This is the single most dramatic effect of the shift in regulatory
9149 <!-- PAGE BREAK 198 -->
9150 strategy that I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select:
9151 labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>. The consequence of this massive
9152 threat of liability tied to the murky boundaries of copyright law is
9153 that innovators who want to innovate in this space can safely innovate
9154 only if they have the sign-off from last generation's dominant
9155 industries. That lesson has been taught through a series of cases
9156 that were designed and executed to teach venture capitalists a
9157 lesson. That lesson
—what former Napster CEO Hank Barry calls a
9158 "nuclear pall" that has fallen over the Valley
—has been learned.
9161 Consider one example to make the point, a story whose beginning
9162 I told in
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle> and which has progressed in a way that
9163 even I (pessimist extraordinaire) would never have predicted.
9165 <indexterm><primary>Roberts, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
9167 In
1997, Michael Roberts launched a company called MP3.com. MP3.com
9168 was keen to remake the music business. Their goal was not just to
9169 facilitate new ways to get access to content. Their goal was also to
9170 facilitate new ways to create content. Unlike the major labels,
9171 MP3.com offered creators a venue to distribute their creativity,
9172 without demanding an exclusive engagement from the creators.
9175 To make this system work, however, MP3.com needed a reliable way to
9176 recommend music to its users. The idea behind this alternative was to
9177 leverage the revealed preferences of music listeners to recommend new
9178 artists. If you like Lyle Lovett, you're likely to enjoy Bonnie
9180 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
9183 This idea required a simple way to gather data about user preferences.
9184 MP3.com came up with an extraordinarily clever way to gather this
9185 preference data. In January
2000, the company launched a service
9186 called my.mp3.com. Using software provided by MP3.com, a user would
9187 sign into an account and then insert into her computer a CD. The
9188 software would identify the CD, and then give the user access to that
9189 content. So, for example, if you inserted a CD by Jill Sobule, then
9190 wherever you were
—at work or at home
—you could get access
9191 to that music once you signed into your account. The system was
9192 therefore a kind of music-lockbox.
9195 No doubt some could use this system to illegally copy content. But
9196 that opportunity existed with or without MP3.com. The aim of the
9198 <!-- PAGE BREAK 199 -->
9199 my.mp3.com service was to give users access to their own content, and
9200 as a by-product, by seeing the content they already owned, to discover
9201 the kind of content the users liked.
9204 To make this system function, however, MP3.com needed to copy
50,
000
9205 CDs to a server. (In principle, it could have been the user who
9206 uploaded the music, but that would have taken a great deal of time,
9207 and would have produced a product of questionable quality.) It
9208 therefore purchased
50,
000 CDs from a store, and started the process
9209 of making copies of those CDs. Again, it would not serve the content
9210 from those copies to anyone except those who authenticated that they
9211 had a copy of the CD they wanted to access. So while this was
50,
000
9212 copies, it was
50,
000 copies directed at giving customers something
9213 they had already bought.
9215 <indexterm id=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='startofrange'
>
9216 <primary>Vivendi Universal
</primary>
9219 Nine days after MP3.com launched its service, the five major labels,
9220 headed by the RIAA, brought a lawsuit against MP3.com. MP3.com settled
9221 with four of the five. Nine months later, a federal judge found
9222 MP3.com to have been guilty of willful infringement with respect to
9223 the fifth. Applying the law as it is, the judge imposed a fine against
9224 MP3.com of $
118 million. MP3.com then settled with the remaining
9225 plaintiff, Vivendi Universal, paying over $
54 million. Vivendi
9226 purchased MP3.com just about a year later.
9229 That part of the story I have told before. Now consider its conclusion.
9232 After Vivendi purchased MP3.com, Vivendi turned around and filed a
9233 malpractice lawsuit against the lawyers who had advised it that they
9234 had a good faith claim that the service they wanted to offer would be
9235 considered legal under copyright law. This lawsuit alleged that it
9236 should have been obvious that the courts would find this behavior
9237 illegal; therefore, this lawsuit sought to punish any lawyer who had
9238 dared to suggest that the law was less restrictive than the labels
9242 The clear purpose of this lawsuit (which was settled for an
9243 unspecified amount shortly after the story was no longer covered in
9244 the press) was to send an unequivocal message to lawyers advising
9246 <!-- PAGE BREAK 200 -->
9247 space: It is not just your clients who might suffer if the content
9248 industry directs its guns against them. It is also you. So those of
9249 you who believe the law should be less restrictive should realize that
9250 such a view of the law will cost you and your firm dearly.
9252 <indexterm startref=
"idxvivendiuniversal" class='endofrange'
/>
9253 <indexterm><primary>Hummer, John
</primary></indexterm>
9254 <indexterm><primary>Barry, Hank
</primary></indexterm>
9255 <indexterm><primary>Hummer Winblad
</primary></indexterm>
9257 This strategy is not just limited to the lawyers. In April
2003,
9258 Universal and EMI brought a lawsuit against Hummer Winblad, the
9259 venture capital firm (VC) that had funded Napster at a certain stage of
9260 its development, its cofounder ( John Hummer), and general partner
9261 (Hank Barry).
<footnote><para>
9263 See Joseph Menn, "Universal, EMI Sue Napster Investor,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles
9264 Times
</citetitle>,
23 April
2003. For a parallel argument about the effects on
9265 innovation in the distribution of music, see Janelle Brown, "The Music
9266 Revolution Will Not Be Digitized," Salon.com,
1 June
2001, available
9267 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
42</ulink>.
9268 See also Jon Healey, "Online Music Services Besieged,"
<citetitle>Los Angeles
9269 Times
</citetitle>,
28 May
2001.
9271 The claim here, as well, was that the VC should have recognized the
9272 right of the content industry to control how the industry should
9273 develop. They should be held personally liable for funding a company
9274 whose business turned out to be beyond the law. Here again, the aim of
9275 the lawsuit is transparent: Any VC now recognizes that if you fund a
9276 company whose business is not approved of by the dinosaurs, you are at
9277 risk not just in the marketplace, but in the courtroom as well. Your
9278 investment buys you not only a company, it also buys you a lawsuit.
9279 So extreme has the environment become that even car manufacturers are
9280 afraid of technologies that touch content. In an article in
9281 <citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>, Rafe Needleman describes a
9282 discussion with BMW:
9283 <indexterm><primary>EMI
</primary></indexterm>
9284 <indexterm><primary>Universal Music Group
</primary></indexterm>
9287 <indexterm><primary>BMW
</primary></indexterm>
9289 I asked why, with all the storage capacity and computer power in
9290 the car, there was no way to play MP3 files. I was told that BMW
9291 engineers in Germany had rigged a new vehicle to play MP3s via
9292 the car's built-in sound system, but that the company's marketing
9293 and legal departments weren't comfortable with pushing this
9294 forward for release stateside. Even today, no new cars are sold in the
9295 United States with bona fide MP3 players.
… <footnote>
9298 Rafe Needleman, "Driving in Cars with MP3s,"
<citetitle>Business
2.0</citetitle>,
16 June
9300 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
43</ulink>. I am grateful
9301 to Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli for this example.
9302 <indexterm><primary>Needleman, Rafe
</primary></indexterm>
9307 This is the world of the mafia
—filled with "your money or your
9308 life" offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats
9309 that the law empowers copyright holders to exercise. It is a system
9310 that will obviously and necessarily stifle new innovation. It is hard
9311 enough to start a company. It is impossibly hard if that company is
9312 constantly threatened by litigation.
9316 <!-- PAGE BREAK 201 -->
9317 The point is not that businesses should have a right to start illegal
9318 enterprises. The point is the definition of "illegal." The law is a
9319 mess of uncertainty. We have no good way to know how it should apply
9320 to new technologies. Yet by reversing our tradition of judicial
9321 deference, and by embracing the astonishingly high penalties that
9322 copyright law imposes, that uncertainty now yields a reality which is
9323 far more conservative than is right. If the law imposed the death
9324 penalty for parking tickets, we'd not only have fewer parking tickets,
9325 we'd also have much less driving. The same principle applies to
9326 innovation. If innovation is constantly checked by this uncertain and
9327 unlimited liability, we will have much less vibrant innovation and
9328 much less creativity.
9331 The point is directly parallel to the crunchy-lefty point about fair
9332 use. Whatever the "real" law is, realism about the effect of law in
9333 both contexts is the same. This wildly punitive system of regulation
9334 will systematically stifle creativity and innovation. It will protect
9335 some industries and some creators, but it will harm industry and
9336 creativity generally. Free market and free culture depend upon vibrant
9337 competition. Yet the effect of the law today is to stifle just this
9338 kind of competition. The effect is to produce an overregulated
9339 culture, just as the effect of too much control in the market is to
9340 produce an overregulatedregulated market.
9343 The building of a permission culture, rather than a free culture, is
9344 the first important way in which the changes I have described will
9345 burden innovation. A permission culture means a lawyer's
9346 culture
—a culture in which the ability to create requires a call
9347 to your lawyer. Again, I am not antilawyer, at least when they're kept
9348 in their proper place. I am certainly not antilaw. But our profession
9349 has lost the sense of its limits. And leaders in our profession have
9350 lost an appreciation of the high costs that our profession imposes
9351 upon others. The inefficiency of the law is an embarrassment to our
9352 tradition. And while I believe our profession should therefore do
9353 everything it can to make the law more efficient, it should at least
9354 do everything it can to limit the reach of the
9355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 202 -->
9356 law where the law is not doing any good. The transaction costs buried
9357 within a permission culture are enough to bury a wide range of
9358 creativity. Someone needs to do a lot of justifying to justify that
9359 result. The uncertainty of the law is one burden on innovation. There
9360 is a second burden that operates more directly. This is the effort by
9361 many in the content industry to use the law to directly regulate the
9362 technology of the Internet so that it better protects their content.
9365 The motivation for this response is obvious. The Internet enables the
9366 efficient spread of content. That efficiency is a feature of the
9367 Internet's design. But from the perspective of the content industry,
9368 this feature is a "bug." The efficient spread of content means that
9369 content distributors have a harder time controlling the distribution
9370 of content. One obvious response to this efficiency is thus to make
9371 the Internet less efficient. If the Internet enables "piracy," then,
9372 this response says, we should break the kneecaps of the Internet.
9375 The examples of this form of legislation are many. At the urging of
9376 the content industry, some in Congress have threatened legislation that
9377 would require computers to determine whether the content they access
9378 is protected or not, and to disable the spread of protected content.
<footnote><para>
9379 <!-- f6. --> "Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster World," GartnerG2 and
9380 the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School
9381 (
2003),
33–35, available at
9382 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9384 Congress has already launched proceedings to explore a mandatory
9385 "broadcast flag" that would be required on any device capable of
9386 transmitting digital video (i.e., a computer), and that would disable
9387 the copying of any content that is marked with a broadcast flag. Other
9388 members of Congress have proposed immunizing content providers from
9389 liability for technology they might deploy that would hunt down
9390 copyright violators and disable their machines.
<footnote><para>
9392 GartnerG2,
26–27.
9396 In one sense, these solutions seem sensible. If the problem is the
9397 code, why not regulate the code to remove the problem. But any
9398 regulation of technical infrastructure will always be tuned to the
9399 particular technology of the day. It will impose significant burdens
9401 <!-- PAGE BREAK 203 -->
9402 the technology, but will likely be eclipsed by advances around exactly
9406 In March
2002, a broad coalition of technology companies, led by
9407 Intel, tried to get Congress to see the harm that such legislation
9408 would impose.
<footnote><para>
9410 See David McGuire, "Tech Execs Square Off Over Piracy," Newsbytes,
9411 February
2002 (Entertainment).
9413 Their argument was obviously not that copyright should not be
9414 protected. Instead, they argued, any protection should not do more
9416 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
9419 There is one more obvious way in which this war has harmed
9420 innovation
—again, a story that will be quite familiar to the
9424 Copyright may be property, but like all property, it is also a form
9425 of regulation. It is a regulation that benefits some and harms others.
9426 When done right, it benefits creators and harms leeches. When done
9427 wrong, it is regulation the powerful use to defeat competitors.
9430 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9431 linkend=
"property-i"/>, despite this feature of copyright as
9432 regulation, and subject to important qualifications outlined by
9433 Jessica Litman in her book
<citetitle>Digital
9434 Copyright
</citetitle>,
<footnote><para>
9436 Jessica Litman,
<citetitle>Digital Copyright
</citetitle> (Amherst,
9437 N.Y.: Prometheus Books,
2001).
9438 <indexterm><primary>Litman, Jessica
</primary></indexterm>
9440 overall this history of copyright is not bad. As chapter
10 details,
9441 when new technologies have come along, Congress has struck a balance
9442 to assure that the new is protected from the old. Compulsory, or
9443 statutory, licenses have been one part of that strategy. Free use (as
9444 in the case of the VCR) has been another.
9447 But that pattern of deference to new technologies has now changed
9448 with the rise of the Internet. Rather than striking a balance between
9449 the claims of a new technology and the legitimate rights of content
9450 creators, both the courts and Congress have imposed legal restrictions
9451 that will have the effect of smothering the new to benefit the old.
9454 The response by the courts has been fairly universal.
<footnote><para>
9456 The only circuit court exception is found in
<citetitle>Recording Industry
9457 Association of America (RIAA)
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Diamond Multimedia Systems
</citetitle>,
180 F.
3d
9458 1072 (
9th Cir.
1999). There the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit
9459 reasoned that makers of a portable MP3 player were not liable for
9460 contributory copyright infringement for a device that is unable to
9461 record or redistribute music (a device whose only copying function is
9462 to render portable a music file already stored on a user's hard
9463 drive). At the district court level, the only exception is found in
9464 <citetitle>Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc
</citetitle>. v.
<citetitle>Grokster, Ltd
</citetitle>.,
259 F. Supp.
2d
9465 1029 (C.D. Cal.,
2003), where the court found the link between the
9466 distributor and any given user's conduct too attenuated to make the
9467 distributor liable for contributory or vicarious infringement
9470 It has been mirrored in the responses threatened and actually
9471 implemented by Congress. I won't catalog all of those responses
9472 here.
<footnote><para>
9474 For example, in July
2002, Representative Howard Berman introduced the
9475 Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R.
5211), which would immunize
9476 copyright holders from liability for damage done to computers when the
9477 copyright holders use technology to stop copyright infringement. In
9478 August
2002, Representative Billy Tauzin introduced a bill to mandate
9479 that technologies capable of rebroadcasting digital copies of films
9480 broadcast on TV (i.e., computers) respect a "broadcast flag" that
9481 would disable copying of that content. And in March of the same year,
9482 Senator Fritz Hollings introduced the Consumer Broadband and Digital
9483 Television Promotion Act, which mandated copyright protection
9484 technology in all digital media devices. See GartnerG2, "Copyright and
9485 Digital Media in a Post-Napster World,"
27 June
2003,
33–34,
9487 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
44</ulink>.
9488 <indexterm><primary>Berman, Howard L.
</primary></indexterm>
9489 <indexterm><primary>Hollings, Fritz
</primary></indexterm>
9491 But there is one example that captures the flavor of them all. This is
9492 the story of the demise of Internet radio.
9496 <!-- PAGE BREAK 204 -->
9497 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
9498 linkend=
"pirates"/>, when a radio station plays a song, the recording
9499 artist doesn't get paid for that "radio performance" unless he or she
9500 is also the composer. So, for example if Marilyn Monroe had recorded a
9501 version of "Happy Birthday"
—to memorialize her famous
9502 performance before President Kennedy at Madison Square Garden
—
9503 then whenever that recording was played on the radio, the current
9504 copyright owners of "Happy Birthday" would get some money, whereas
9505 Marilyn Monroe would not.
9506 <indexterm><primary>Kennedy, John F.
</primary></indexterm>
9509 The reasoning behind this balance struck by Congress makes some
9510 sense. The justification was that radio was a kind of advertising. The
9511 recording artist thus benefited because by playing her music, the
9512 radio station was making it more likely that her records would be
9513 purchased. Thus, the recording artist got something, even if only
9514 indirectly. Probably this reasoning had less to do with the result
9515 than with the power of radio stations: Their lobbyists were quite good
9516 at stopping any efforts to get Congress to require compensation to the
9520 Enter Internet radio. Like regular radio, Internet radio is a
9521 technology to stream content from a broadcaster to a listener. The
9522 broadcast travels across the Internet, not across the ether of radio
9523 spectrum. Thus, I can "tune in" to an Internet radio station in
9524 Berlin while sitting in San Francisco, even though there's no way for
9525 me to tune in to a regular radio station much beyond the San Francisco
9529 This feature of the architecture of Internet radio means that there
9530 are potentially an unlimited number of radio stations that a user
9531 could tune in to using her computer, whereas under the existing
9532 architecture for broadcast radio, there is an obvious limit to the
9533 number of broadcasters and clear broadcast frequencies. Internet radio
9534 could therefore be more competitive than regular radio; it could
9535 provide a wider range of selections. And because the potential
9536 audience for Internet radio is the whole world, niche stations could
9537 easily develop and market their content to a relatively large number
9538 of users worldwide. According to some estimates, more than eighty
9539 million users worldwide have tuned in to this new form of radio.
9543 <!-- PAGE BREAK 205 -->
9544 Internet radio is thus to radio what FM was to AM. It is an
9545 improvement potentially vastly more significant than the FM
9546 improvement over AM, since not only is the technology better, so, too,
9547 is the competition. Indeed, there is a direct parallel between the
9548 fight to establish FM radio and the fight to protect Internet
9549 radio. As one author describes Howard Armstrong's struggle to enable
9554 An almost unlimited number of FM stations was possible in the
9555 shortwaves, thus ending the unnatural restrictions imposed on radio in
9556 the crowded longwaves. If FM were freely developed, the number of
9557 stations would be limited only by economics and competition rather
9558 than by technical restrictions.
… Armstrong likened the situation
9559 that had grown up in radio to that following the invention of the
9560 printing press, when governments and ruling interests attempted to
9561 control this new instrument of mass communications by imposing
9562 restrictive licenses on it. This tyranny was broken only when it
9563 became possible for men freely to acquire printing presses and freely
9564 to run them. FM in this sense was as great an invention as the
9565 printing presses, for it gave radio the opportunity to strike off its
9566 shackles.
<footnote><para>
9573 This potential for FM radio was never realized
—not
9574 because Armstrong was wrong about the technology, but because he
9575 underestimated the power of "vested interests, habits, customs and
9576 legislation"
<footnote><para>
9580 to retard the growth of this competing technology.
9583 Now the very same claim could be made about Internet radio. For
9584 again, there is no technical limitation that could restrict the number of
9585 Internet radio stations. The only restrictions on Internet radio are
9586 those imposed by the law. Copyright law is one such law. So the first
9587 question we should ask is, what copyright rules would govern Internet
9591 But here the power of the lobbyists is reversed. Internet radio is a
9592 new industry. The recording artists, on the other hand, have a very
9594 <!-- PAGE BREAK 206 -->
9595 powerful lobby, the RIAA. Thus when Congress considered the phenomenon
9596 of Internet radio in
1995, the lobbyists had primed Congress to adopt
9597 a different rule for Internet radio than the rule that applies to
9598 terrestrial radio. While terrestrial radio does not have to pay our
9599 hypothetical Marilyn Monroe when it plays her hypothetical recording
9600 of "Happy Birthday" on the air,
<emphasis>Internet radio
9601 does
</emphasis>. Not only is the law not neutral toward Internet
9602 radio
—the law actually burdens Internet radio more than it
9603 burdens terrestrial radio.
9606 This financial burden is not slight. As Harvard law professor
9607 William Fisher estimates, if an Internet radio station distributed adfree
9608 popular music to (on average) ten thousand listeners, twenty-four
9609 hours a day, the total artist fees that radio station would owe would be
9610 over $
1 million a year.
<footnote>
9613 This example was derived from fees set by the original Copyright
9614 Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) proceedings, and is drawn from an
9615 example offered by Professor William Fisher. Conference Proceedings,
9616 iLaw (Stanford),
3 July
2003, on file with author. Professors Fisher
9617 and Zittrain submitted testimony in the CARP proceeding that was
9618 ultimately rejected. See Jonathan Zittrain, Digital Performance Right
9619 in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No.
2000-
9, CARP
9620 DTRA
1 and
2, available at
9621 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
45</ulink>.
9622 For an excellent analysis making a similar point, see Randal
9623 C. Picker, "Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital
9624 Distribution,"
<citetitle>Antitrust Bulletin
</citetitle> (Summer/Fall
2002):
461: "This was
9625 not confusion, these are just old-fashioned entry barriers. Analog
9626 radio stations are protected from digital entrants, reducing entry in
9627 radio and diversity. Yes, this is done in the name of getting
9628 royalties to copyright holders, but, absent the play of powerful
9629 interests, that could have been done in a media-neutral way."
9630 <indexterm><primary>CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel)
</primary></indexterm>
9631 <indexterm><primary>Picker, Randal C.
</primary></indexterm>
9633 A regular radio station broadcasting the same content would pay no
9637 The burden is not financial only. Under the original rules that were
9638 proposed, an Internet radio station (but not a terrestrial radio
9639 station) would have to collect the following data from
<emphasis>every
9640 listening transaction
</emphasis>:
9642 <!-- PAGE BREAK 207 -->
9643 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
9645 name of the service;
9648 channel of the program (AM/FM stations use station ID);
9651 type of program (archived/looped/live);
9654 date of transmission;
9657 time of transmission;
9660 time zone of origination of transmission;
9663 numeric designation of the place of the sound recording within the program;
9666 duration of transmission (to nearest second);
9669 sound recording title;
9672 ISRC code of the recording;
9675 release year of the album per copyright notice and in the case of compilation albums, the release year of the album and copy- right date of the track;
9678 featured recording artist;
9687 UPC code of the retail album;
9693 copyright owner information;
9696 musical genre of the channel or program (station format);
9699 name of the service or entity;
9705 date and time that the user logged in (in the user's time zone);
9708 date and time that the user logged out (in the user's time zone);
9711 time zone where the signal was received (user);
9714 unique user identifier;
9717 the country in which the user received the transmissions.
9722 The Librarian of Congress eventually suspended these reporting
9723 requirements, pending further study. And he also changed the original
9724 rates set by the arbitration panel charged with setting rates. But the
9725 basic difference between Internet radio and terrestrial radio remains:
9726 Internet radio has to pay a
<emphasis>type of copyright fee
</emphasis>
9727 that terrestrial radio does not.
9730 Why? What justifies this difference? Was there any study of the
9731 economic consequences from Internet radio that would justify these
9732 differences? Was the motive to protect artists against piracy?
9734 <indexterm><primary>Alben, Alex
</primary></indexterm>
9735 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
9737 In a rare bit of candor, one RIAA expert admitted what seemed obvious
9738 to everyone at the time. As Alex Alben, vice president for Public
9739 Policy at Real Networks, told me,
9743 The RIAA, which was representing the record labels, presented
9744 some testimony about what they thought a willing buyer would
9745 pay to a willing seller, and it was much higher. It was ten times
9746 higher than what radio stations pay to perform the same songs for
9747 the same period of time. And so the attorneys representing the
9748 webcasters asked the RIAA,
… "How do you come up with a
9750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 208 -->
9751 rate that's so much higher? Why is it worth more than radio? Because
9752 here we have hundreds of thousands of webcasters who want to pay, and
9753 that should establish the market rate, and if you set the rate so
9754 high, you're going to drive the small webcasters out of
9758 And the RIAA experts said, "Well, we don't really model this as an
9759 industry with thousands of webcasters,
<emphasis>we think it should be
9760 an industry with, you know, five or seven big players who can pay a
9761 high rate and it's a stable, predictable market
</emphasis>." (Emphasis
9766 Translation: The aim is to use the law to eliminate competition, so
9767 that this platform of potentially immense competition, which would
9768 cause the diversity and range of content available to explode, would not
9769 cause pain to the dinosaurs of old. There is no one, on either the right
9770 or the left, who should endorse this use of the law. And yet there is
9771 practically no one, on either the right or the left, who is doing anything
9772 effective to prevent it.
9775 <section id=
"corruptingcitizens">
9776 <title>Corrupting Citizens
</title>
9778 Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives
9780 a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity
9781 for a democratic creativity that digital technology enables.
9784 In addition to these important harms, there is one more that was
9785 important to our forebears, but seems forgotten today. Overregulation
9786 corrupts citizens and weakens the rule of law.
9789 The war that is being waged today is a war of prohibition. As with
9790 every war of prohibition, it is targeted against the behavior of a very
9791 large number of citizens. According to
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>,
43 million
9792 Americans downloaded music in May
2002.
<footnote><para>
9793 <!-- f15. --> Mike Graziano and Lee Rainie, "The Music Downloading Deluge," Pew
9794 Internet and American Life Project (
24 April
2001), available at
9795 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
46</ulink>.
9796 The Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that
37 million
9797 Americans had downloaded music files from the Internet by early
2001.
9799 According to the RIAA,
9800 the behavior of those
43 million Americans is a felony. We thus have a
9801 set of rules that transform
20 percent of America into criminals. As the
9803 <!-- PAGE BREAK 209 -->
9804 RIAA launches lawsuits against not only the Napsters and Kazaas of
9805 the world, but against students building search engines, and
9807 against ordinary users downloading content, the technologies for
9808 sharing will advance to further protect and hide illegal use. It is an arms
9809 race or a civil war, with the extremes of one side inviting a more
9811 response by the other.
9814 The content industry's tactics exploit the failings of the American
9815 legal system. When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it
9816 knew that in Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant. The
9817 threat of having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
9818 ($
15,
000,
000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
9819 paying all the money in the world in damages ($
250,
000 in legal fees)
9820 led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
9821 ($
12,
000) to make the suit go away. The same strategy animates the
9822 RIAA's suits against individual users. In September
2003, the RIAA
9823 sued
261 individuals
—including a twelve-year-old girl living in public
9824 housing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
9825 was.
<footnote><para>
9827 Alex Pham, "The Labels Strike Back: N.Y. Girl Settles RIAA Case,"
<citetitle>Los
9828 Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, Business.
9830 As these scapegoats discovered, it will always cost more to defend
9831 against these suits than it would cost to simply settle. (The twelve
9832 year old, for example, like Jesse Jordan, paid her life savings of $
2,
000
9833 to settle the case.) Our law is an awful system for defending rights. It
9834 is an embarrassment to our tradition. And the consequence of our law
9835 as it is, is that those with the power can use the law to quash any rights
9839 Wars of prohibition are nothing new in America. This one is just
9840 something more extreme than anything we've seen before. We
9841 experimented with alcohol prohibition, at a time when the per capita
9842 consumption of alcohol was
1.5 gallons per capita per year. The war
9843 against drinking initially reduced that consumption to just
30 percent
9844 of its preprohibition levels, but by the end of prohibition,
9845 consumption was up to
70 percent of the preprohibition
9846 level. Americans were drinking just about as much, but now, a vast
9847 number were criminals.
<footnote><para>
9849 Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, "Alcohol Consumption During
9850 Prohibition,"
<citetitle>American Economic Review
</citetitle> 81, no.
2 (
1991):
242.
9853 <!-- PAGE BREAK 210 -->
9854 launched a war on drugs aimed at reducing the consumption of regulated
9855 narcotics that
7 percent (or
16 million) Americans now use.
<footnote><para>
9857 National Drug Control Policy: Hearing Before the House Government
9858 Reform Committee,
108th Cong.,
1st sess. (
5 March
2003) (statement of
9859 John P. Walters, director of National Drug Control Policy).
9861 That is a drop from the high (so to speak) in
1979 of
14 percent of
9862 the population. We regulate automobiles to the point where the vast
9863 majority of Americans violate the law every day. We run such a complex
9864 tax system that a majority of cash businesses regularly
9865 cheat.
<footnote><para>
9867 See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, "Tax
9868 Compliance,"
<citetitle>Journal of Economic Literature
</citetitle> 36 (
1998):
818 (survey of
9869 compliance literature).
9871 We pride ourselves on our "free society," but an endless array of
9872 ordinary behavior is regulated within our society. And as a result, a
9873 huge proportion of Americans regularly violate at least some law.
9874 <indexterm><primary>alcohol prohibition
</primary></indexterm>
9877 This state of affairs is not without consequence. It is a particularly
9878 salient issue for teachers like me, whose job it is to teach law
9879 students about the importance of "ethics." As my colleague Charlie
9880 Nesson told a class at Stanford, each year law schools admit thousands
9881 of students who have illegally downloaded music, illegally consumed
9882 alcohol and sometimes drugs, illegally worked without paying taxes,
9883 illegally driven cars. These are kids for whom behaving illegally is
9884 increasingly the norm. And then we, as law professors, are supposed to
9885 teach them how to behave ethically
—how to say no to bribes, or
9886 keep client funds separate, or honor a demand to disclose a document
9887 that will mean that your case is over. Generations of
9888 Americans
—more significantly in some parts of America than in
9889 others, but still, everywhere in America today
—can't live their
9890 lives both normally and legally, since "normally" entails a certain
9891 degree of illegality.
9892 <indexterm><primary>law schools
</primary></indexterm>
9895 The response to this general illegality is either to enforce the law
9896 more severely or to change the law. We, as a society, have to learn
9897 how to make that choice more rationally. Whether a law makes sense
9898 depends, in part, at least, upon whether the costs of the law, both
9899 intended and collateral, outweigh the benefits. If the costs, intended
9900 and collateral, do outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be
9901 changed. Alternatively, if the costs of the existing system are much
9902 greater than the costs of an alternative, then we have a good reason
9903 to consider the alternative.
9907 <!-- PAGE BREAK 211 -->
9908 My point is not the idiotic one: Just because people violate a law, we
9909 should therefore repeal it. Obviously, we could reduce murder statistics
9910 dramatically by legalizing murder on Wednesdays and Fridays. But
9911 that wouldn't make any sense, since murder is wrong every day of the
9912 week. A society is right to ban murder always and everywhere.
9915 My point is instead one that democracies understood for generations,
9916 but that we recently have learned to forget. The rule of law depends
9917 upon people obeying the law. The more often, and more repeatedly, we
9918 as citizens experience violating the law, the less we respect the
9919 law. Obviously, in most cases, the important issue is the law, not
9920 respect for the law. I don't care whether the rapist respects the law
9921 or not; I want to catch and incarcerate the rapist. But I do care
9922 whether my students respect the law. And I do care if the rules of law
9923 sow increasing disrespect because of the extreme of regulation they
9924 impose. Twenty million Americans have come of age since the Internet
9925 introduced this different idea of "sharing." We need to be able to
9926 call these twenty million Americans "citizens," not "felons."
9929 When at least forty-three million citizens download content from the
9930 Internet, and when they use tools to combine that content in ways
9931 unauthorized by copyright holders, the first question we should be
9932 asking is not how best to involve the FBI. The first question should
9933 be whether this particular prohibition is really necessary in order to
9934 achieve the proper ends that copyright law serves. Is there another
9935 way to assure that artists get paid without transforming forty-three
9936 million Americans into felons? Does it make sense if there are other
9937 ways to assure that artists get paid without transforming America into
9941 This abstract point can be made more clear with a particular example.
9944 We all own CDs. Many of us still own phonograph records. These pieces
9945 of plastic encode music that in a certain sense we have bought. The
9946 law protects our right to buy and sell that plastic: It is not a
9947 copyright infringement for me to sell all my classical records at a
9950 <!-- PAGE BREAK 212 -->
9951 record store and buy jazz records to replace them. That "use" of the
9955 But as the MP3 craze has demonstrated, there is another use of
9956 phonograph records that is effectively free. Because these recordings
9957 were made without copy-protection technologies, I am "free" to copy,
9958 or "rip," music from my records onto a computer hard disk. Indeed,
9959 Apple Corporation went so far as to suggest that "freedom" was a
9960 right: In a series of commercials, Apple endorsed the "Rip, Mix, Burn"
9961 capacities of digital technologies.
9963 <indexterm><primary>Adromeda
</primary></indexterm>
9965 This "use" of my records is certainly valuable. I have begun a large
9966 process at home of ripping all of my and my wife's CDs, and storing
9967 them in one archive. Then, using Apple's iTunes, or a wonderful
9968 program called Andromeda, we can build different play lists of our
9969 music: Bach, Baroque, Love Songs, Love Songs of Significant
9970 Others
—the potential is endless. And by reducing the costs of
9971 mixing play lists, these technologies help build a creativity with
9972 play lists that is itself independently valuable. Compilations of
9973 songs are creative and meaningful in their own right.
9976 This use is enabled by unprotected media
—either CDs or records.
9977 But unprotected media also enable file sharing. File sharing threatens
9978 (or so the content industry believes) the ability of creators to earn
9979 a fair return from their creativity. And thus, many are beginning to
9980 experiment with technologies to eliminate unprotected media. These
9981 technologies, for example, would enable CDs that could not be
9982 ripped. Or they might enable spy programs to identify ripped content
9983 on people's machines.
9986 If these technologies took off, then the building of large archives of
9987 your own music would become quite difficult. You might hang in hacker
9988 circles, and get technology to disable the technologies that protect
9989 the content. Trading in those technologies is illegal, but maybe that
9990 doesn't bother you much. In any case, for the vast majority of people,
9991 these protection technologies would effectively destroy the archiving
9993 <!-- PAGE BREAK 213 -->
9994 use of CDs. The technology, in other words, would force us all back to
9995 the world where we either listened to music by manipulating pieces of
9996 plastic or were part of a massively complex "digital rights
10000 If the only way to assure that artists get paid were the elimination
10001 of the ability to freely move content, then these technologies to
10002 interfere with the freedom to move content would be justifiable. But
10003 what if there were another way to assure that artists are paid,
10004 without locking down any content? What if, in other words, a different
10005 system could assure compensation to artists while also preserving the
10006 freedom to move content easily?
10009 My point just now is not to prove that there is such a system. I offer
10010 a version of such a system in the last chapter of this book. For now,
10011 the only point is the relatively uncontroversial one: If a different
10012 system achieved the same legitimate objectives that the existing
10013 copyright system achieved, but left consumers and creators much more
10014 free, then we'd have a very good reason to pursue this
10015 alternative
—namely, freedom. The choice, in other words, would
10016 not be between property and piracy; the choice would be between
10017 different property systems and the freedoms each allowed.
10020 I believe there is a way to assure that artists are paid without
10021 turning forty-three million Americans into felons. But the salient
10022 feature of this alternative is that it would lead to a very different
10023 market for producing and distributing creativity. The dominant few,
10024 who today control the vast majority of the distribution of content in
10025 the world, would no longer exercise this extreme of control. Rather,
10026 they would go the way of the horse-drawn buggy.
10029 Except that this generation's buggy manufacturers have already saddled
10030 Congress, and are riding the law to protect themselves against this
10031 new form of competition. For them the choice is between fortythree
10032 million Americans as criminals and their own survival.
10035 It is understandable why they choose as they do. It is not
10036 understandable why we as a democracy continue to choose as we do. Jack
10038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 214 -->
10040 Valenti is charming; but not so charming as to justify giving up a
10041 tradition as deep and important as our tradition of free culture.
10042 There's one more aspect to this corruption that is particularly
10043 important to civil liberties, and follows directly from any war of
10044 prohibition. As Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Fred von
10045 Lohmann describes, this is the "collateral damage" that "arises
10046 whenever you turn a very large percentage of the population into
10047 criminals." This is the collateral damage to civil liberties
10049 <indexterm><primary>Electronic Frontier Foundation
</primary></indexterm>
10052 "If you can treat someone as a putative lawbreaker," von Lohmann
10054 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10058 then all of a sudden a lot of basic civil liberty protections
10059 evaporate to one degree or another.
… If you're a copyright
10060 infringer, how can you hope to have any privacy rights? If you're a
10061 copyright infringer, how can you hope to be secure against seizures of
10062 your computer? How can you hope to continue to receive Internet
10063 access?
… Our sensibilities change as soon as we think, "Oh, well,
10064 but that person's a criminal, a lawbreaker." Well, what this campaign
10065 against file sharing has done is turn a remarkable percentage of the
10066 American Internet-using population into "lawbreakers."
10070 And the consequence of this transformation of the American public
10071 into criminals is that it becomes trivial, as a matter of due process, to
10072 effectively erase much of the privacy most would presume.
10075 Users of the Internet began to see this generally in
2003 as the RIAA
10076 launched its campaign to force Internet service providers to turn over
10077 the names of customers who the RIAA believed were violating copyright
10078 law. Verizon fought that demand and lost. With a simple request to a
10079 judge, and without any notice to the customer at all, the identity of
10080 an Internet user is revealed.
10083 <!-- PAGE BREAK 215 -->
10084 The RIAA then expanded this campaign, by announcing a general strategy
10085 to sue individual users of the Internet who are alleged to have
10086 downloaded copyrighted music from file-sharing systems. But as we've
10087 seen, the potential damages from these suits are astronomical: If a
10088 family's computer is used to download a single CD's worth of music,
10089 the family could be liable for $
2 million in damages. That didn't stop
10090 the RIAA from suing a number of these families, just as they had sued
10091 Jesse Jordan.
<footnote><para>
10093 See Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single
10094 Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants,"
10095 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Chris Cobbs, "Worried Parents
10096 Pull Plug on File `Stealing'; With the Music Industry Cracking Down on
10097 File Swapping, Parents are Yanking Software from Home PCs to Avoid
10098 Being Sued,"
<citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
30 August
2003, C1; Jefferson
10099 Graham, "Recording Industry Sues Parents,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
15 September
10100 2003,
4D; John Schwartz, "She Says She's No Music Pirate. No Snoop
10101 Fan, Either,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
25 September
2003, C1; Margo Varadi, "Is
10102 Brianna a Criminal?"
<citetitle>Toronto Star
</citetitle>,
18 September
2003, P7.
10107 Even this understates the espionage that is being waged by the
10108 RIAA. A report from CNN late last summer described a strategy the
10109 RIAA had adopted to track Napster users.
<footnote><para>
10111 See "Revealed: How RIAA Tracks Downloaders: Music Industry Discloses
10112 Some Methods Used," CNN.com, available at
10113 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
47</ulink>.
10115 Using a sophisticated hashing algorithm, the RIAA took what is in
10116 effect a fingerprint of every song in the Napster catalog. Any copy of
10117 one of those MP3s will have the same "fingerprint."
10120 So imagine the following not-implausible scenario: Imagine a
10121 friend gives a CD to your daughter
—a collection of songs just
10122 like the cassettes you used to make as a kid. You don't know, and
10123 neither does your daughter, where these songs came from. But she
10124 copies these songs onto her computer. She then takes her computer to
10125 college and connects it to a college network, and if the college
10126 network is "cooperating" with the RIAA's espionage, and she hasn't
10127 properly protected her content from the network (do you know how to do
10128 that yourself ?), then the RIAA will be able to identify your daughter
10129 as a "criminal." And under the rules that universities are beginning
10130 to deploy,
<footnote><para>
10132 See Jeff Adler, "Cambridge: On Campus, Pirates Are Not Penitent,"
10133 <citetitle>Boston Globe
</citetitle>,
18 May
2003, City Weekly,
1; Frank Ahrens, "Four
10134 Students Sued over Music Sites; Industry Group Targets File Sharing at
10135 Colleges,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
4 April
2003, E1; Elizabeth Armstrong,
10136 "Students `Rip, Mix, Burn' at Their Own Risk,"
<citetitle>Christian Science
10137 Monitor
</citetitle>,
2 September
2003,
20; Robert Becker and Angela Rozas, "Music
10138 Pirate Hunt Turns to Loyola; Two Students Names Are Handed Over;
10139 Lawsuit Possible,"
<citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
16 July
2003,
1C; Beth Cox, "RIAA
10140 Trains Antipiracy Guns on Universities,"
<citetitle>Internet News
</citetitle>,
30 January
10141 2003, available at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link
10142 #
48</ulink>; Benny Evangelista, "Download Warning
101: Freshman
10143 Orientation This Fall to Include Record Industry Warnings Against File
10144 Sharing,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
11 August
2003, E11; "Raid, Letters
10145 Are Weapons at Universities,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
26 September
2000,
3D.
10147 your daughter can lose the right to use the university's computer
10148 network. She can, in some cases, be expelled.
10151 Now, of course, she'll have the right to defend herself. You can hire
10152 a lawyer for her (at $
300 per hour, if you're lucky), and she can
10153 plead that she didn't know anything about the source of the songs or
10154 that they came from Napster. And it may well be that the university
10155 believes her. But the university might not believe her. It might treat
10156 this "contraband" as presumptive of guilt. And as any number of
10159 <!-- PAGE BREAK 216 -->
10160 have already learned, our presumptions about innocence disappear in
10161 the middle of wars of prohibition. This war is no different.
10163 <indexterm><primary>von Lohmann, Fred
</primary></indexterm>
10167 So when we're talking about numbers like forty to sixty million
10168 Americans that are essentially copyright infringers, you create a
10169 situation where the civil liberties of those people are very much in
10170 peril in a general matter. [I don't] think [there is any] analog where
10171 you could randomly choose any person off the street and be confident
10172 that they were committing an unlawful act that could put them on the
10173 hook for potential felony liability or hundreds of millions of dollars
10174 of civil liability. Certainly we all speed, but speeding isn't the
10175 kind of an act for which we routinely forfeit civil liberties. Some
10176 people use drugs, and I think that's the closest analog, [but] many
10177 have noted that the war against drugs has eroded all of our civil
10178 liberties because it's treated so many Americans as criminals. Well, I
10179 think it's fair to say that file sharing is an order of magnitude
10180 larger number of Americans than drug use.
… If forty to sixty
10181 million Americans have become lawbreakers, then we're really on a
10182 slippery slope to lose a lot of civil liberties for all forty to sixty
10187 When forty to sixty million Americans are considered "criminals" under
10188 the law, and when the law could achieve the same objective
—
10189 securing rights to authors
—without these millions being
10190 considered "criminals," who is the villain? Americans or the law?
10191 Which is American, a constant war on our own people or a concerted
10192 effort through our democracy to change our law?
10195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 217 -->
10199 <part id=
"c-balances">
10200 <title>BALANCES
</title>
10203 <!-- PAGE BREAK 218 -->
10205 So here's the picture: You're standing at the side of the road. Your
10206 car is on fire. You are angry and upset because in part you helped start
10207 the fire. Now you don't know how to put it out. Next to you is a bucket,
10208 filled with gasoline. Obviously, gasoline won't put the fire out.
10211 As you ponder the mess, someone else comes along. In a panic, she
10212 grabs the bucket. Before you have a chance to tell her to
10213 stop
—or before she understands just why she should
10214 stop
—the bucket is in the air. The gasoline is about to hit the
10215 blazing car. And the fire that gasoline will ignite is about to ignite
10219 A war about copyright rages all around
—and we're all focusing on
10220 the wrong thing. No doubt, current technologies threaten existing
10221 businesses. No doubt they may threaten artists. But technologies
10222 change. The industry and technologists have plenty of ways to use
10223 technology to protect themselves against the current threats of the
10224 Internet. This is a fire that if let alone would burn itself out.
10227 <!-- PAGE BREAK 219 -->
10228 Yet policy makers are not willing to leave this fire to itself. Primed
10229 with plenty of lobbyists' money, they are keen to intervene to
10230 eliminate the problem they perceive. But the problem they perceive is
10231 not the real threat this culture faces. For while we watch this small
10232 fire in the corner, there is a massive change in the way culture is
10233 made that is happening all around.
10236 Somehow we have to find a way to turn attention to this more important
10237 and fundamental issue. Somehow we have to find a way to avoid pouring
10238 gasoline onto this fire.
10241 We have not found that way yet. Instead, we seem trapped in a simpler,
10242 binary view. However much many people push to frame this debate more
10243 broadly, it is the simple, binary view that remains. We rubberneck to
10244 look at the fire when we should be keeping our eyes on the road.
10247 This challenge has been my life these last few years. It has also been
10248 my failure. In the two chapters that follow, I describe one small
10249 brace of efforts, so far failed, to find a way to refocus this
10250 debate. We must understand these failures if we're to understand what
10251 success will require.
10255 <!-- PAGE BREAK 220 -->
10256 <chapter label=
"13" id=
"eldred">
10257 <title>CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Eldred
</title>
10258 <indexterm id=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='startofrange'
>
10259 <primary>Hawthorne, Nathaniel
</primary>
10262 In
1995, a father was frustrated that his daughters didn't seem to
10263 like Hawthorne. No doubt there was more than one such father, but at
10264 least one did something about it. Eric Eldred, a retired computer
10265 programmer living in New Hampshire, decided to put Hawthorne on the
10266 Web. An electronic version, Eldred thought, with links to pictures and
10267 explanatory text, would make this nineteenth-century author's work
10271 It didn't work
—at least for his daughters. They didn't find
10272 Hawthorne any more interesting than before. But Eldred's experiment
10273 gave birth to a hobby, and his hobby begat a cause: Eldred would build
10274 a library of public domain works by scanning these works and making
10275 them available for free.
10278 Eldred's library was not simply a copy of certain public domain
10279 works, though even a copy would have been of great value to people
10280 across the world who can't get access to printed versions of these
10281 works. Instead, Eldred was producing derivative works from these
10282 public domain works. Just as Disney turned Grimm into stories more
10283 <!-- PAGE BREAK 221 -->
10284 accessible to the twentieth century, Eldred transformed Hawthorne, and
10285 many others, into a form more accessible
—technically
10286 accessible
—today.
10289 Eldred's freedom to do this with Hawthorne's work grew from the same
10290 source as Disney's. Hawthorne's
<citetitle>Scarlet Letter
</citetitle> had passed into the
10291 public domain in
1907. It was free for anyone to take without the
10292 permission of the Hawthorne estate or anyone else. Some, such as Dover
10293 Press and Penguin Classics, take works from the public domain and
10294 produce printed editions, which they sell in bookstores across the
10295 country. Others, such as Disney, take these stories and turn them into
10296 animated cartoons, sometimes successfully (
<citetitle>Cinderella
</citetitle>), sometimes not
10297 (
<citetitle>The Hunchback of Notre Dame
</citetitle>,
<citetitle>Treasure Planet
</citetitle>). These are all
10298 commercial publications of public domain works.
10300 <indexterm startref=
"idxhawthornenathaniel" class='endofrange'
/>
10302 The Internet created the possibility of noncommercial publications of
10303 public domain works. Eldred's is just one example. There are literally
10304 thousands of others. Hundreds of thousands from across the world have
10305 discovered this platform of expression and now use it to share works
10306 that are, by law, free for the taking. This has produced what we might
10307 call the "noncommercial publishing industry," which before the
10308 Internet was limited to people with large egos or with political or
10309 social causes. But with the Internet, it includes a wide range of
10310 individuals and groups dedicated to spreading culture
10311 generally.
<footnote><para>
10313 There's a parallel here with pornography that is a bit hard to
10314 describe, but it's a strong one. One phenomenon that the Internet
10315 created was a world of noncommercial pornographers
—people who
10316 were distributing porn but were not making money directly or
10317 indirectly from that distribution. Such a class didn't exist before
10318 the Internet came into being because the costs of distributing porn
10319 were so high. Yet this new class of distributors got special attention
10320 in the Supreme Court, when the Court struck down the Communications
10321 Decency Act of
1996. It was partly because of the burden on
10322 noncommercial speakers that the statute was found to exceed Congress's
10323 power. The same point could have been made about noncommercial
10324 publishers after the advent of the Internet. The Eric Eldreds of the
10325 world before the Internet were extremely few. Yet one would think it
10326 at least as important to protect the Eldreds of the world as to
10327 protect noncommercial pornographers.
</para></footnote>
10330 As I said, Eldred lives in New Hampshire. In
1998, Robert Frost's
10331 collection of poems
<citetitle>New Hampshire
</citetitle> was slated to
10332 pass into the public domain. Eldred wanted to post that collection in
10333 his free public library. But Congress got in the way. As I described
10334 in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
10335 linkend=
"property-i"/>, in
1998, for the eleventh time in forty years,
10336 Congress extended the terms of existing copyrights
—this time by
10337 twenty years. Eldred would not be free to add any works more recent
10338 than
1923 to his collection until
2019. Indeed, no copyrighted work
10339 would pass into the public domain until that year (and not even then,
10340 if Congress extends the term again). By contrast, in the same period,
10341 more than
1 million patents will pass into the public domain.
10345 <!-- PAGE BREAK 222 -->
10346 This was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
10347 (CTEA), enacted in memory of the congressman and former musician
10348 Sonny Bono, who, his widow, Mary Bono, says, believed that
10349 "copyrights should be forever."
<footnote><para>
10351 The full text is: "Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright
10352 protection to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change
10353 would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to
10354 strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
10355 you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for a term to last
10356 forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next
10357 Congress,"
144 Cong. Rec. H9946,
9951-
2 (October
7,
1998).
10362 Eldred decided to fight this law. He first resolved to fight it through
10363 civil disobedience. In a series of interviews, Eldred announced that he
10364 would publish as planned, CTEA notwithstanding. But because of a
10365 second law passed in
1998, the NET (No Electronic Theft) Act, his act
10366 of publishing would make Eldred a felon
—whether or not anyone
10367 complained. This was a dangerous strategy for a disabled programmer
10371 It was here that I became involved in Eldred's battle. I was a
10373 scholar whose first passion was constitutional
10375 And though constitutional law courses never focus upon the
10376 Progress Clause of the Constitution, it had always struck me as
10378 different. As you know, the Constitution says,
10382 Congress has the power to promote the Progress of Science
…
10383 by securing for limited Times to Authors
… exclusive Right to
10384 their
… Writings.
…
10388 As I've described, this clause is unique within the power-granting
10389 clause of Article I, section
8 of our Constitution. Every other clause
10390 granting power to Congress simply says Congress has the power to do
10391 something
—for example, to regulate "commerce among the several
10392 states" or "declare War." But here, the "something" is something quite
10393 specific
—to "promote
… Progress"
—through means that
10394 are also specific
— by "securing" "exclusive Rights" (i.e.,
10395 copyrights) "for limited Times."
10398 In the past forty years, Congress has gotten into the practice of
10399 extending existing terms of copyright protection. What puzzled me
10400 about this was, if Congress has the power to extend existing terms,
10401 then the Constitution's requirement that terms be "limited" will have
10402 <!-- PAGE BREAK 223 -->
10403 no practical effect. If every time a copyright is about to expire,
10404 Congress has the power to extend its term, then Congress can achieve
10405 what the Constitution plainly forbids
—perpetual terms "on the
10406 installment plan," as Professor Peter Jaszi so nicely put it.
10407 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
10410 As an academic, my first response was to hit the books. I remember
10411 sitting late at the office, scouring on-line databases for any serious
10412 consideration of the question. No one had ever challenged Congress's
10413 practice of extending existing terms. That failure may in part be why
10414 Congress seemed so untroubled in its habit. That, and the fact that
10415 the practice had become so lucrative for Congress. Congress knows that
10416 copyright owners will be willing to pay a great deal of money to see
10417 their copyright terms extended. And so Congress is quite happy to keep
10418 this gravy train going.
10421 For this is the core of the corruption in our present system of
10422 government. "Corruption" not in the sense that representatives are
10423 bribed. Rather, "corruption" in the sense that the system induces the
10424 beneficiaries of Congress's acts to raise and give money to Congress
10425 to induce it to act. There's only so much time; there's only so much
10426 Congress can do. Why not limit its actions to those things it must
10427 do
—and those things that pay? Extending copyright terms pays.
10430 If that's not obvious to you, consider the following: Say you're one
10431 of the very few lucky copyright owners whose copyright continues to
10432 make money one hundred years after it was created. The Estate of
10433 Robert Frost is a good example. Frost died in
1963. His poetry
10434 continues to be extraordinarily valuable. Thus the Robert Frost estate
10435 benefits greatly from any extension of copyright, since no publisher
10436 would pay the estate any money if the poems Frost wrote could be
10437 published by anyone for free.
10440 So imagine the Robert Frost estate is earning $
100,
000 a year from
10441 three of Frost's poems. And imagine the copyright for those poems
10442 is about to expire. You sit on the board of the Robert Frost estate.
10443 Your financial adviser comes to your board meeting with a very grim
10447 "Next year," the adviser announces, "our copyrights in works A, B,
10449 <!-- PAGE BREAK 224 -->
10450 and C will expire. That means that after next year, we will no longer be
10451 receiving the annual royalty check of $
100,
000 from the publishers of
10455 "There's a proposal in Congress, however," she continues, "that
10456 could change this. A few congressmen are floating a bill to extend the
10457 terms of copyright by twenty years. That bill would be extraordinarily
10458 valuable to us. So we should hope this bill passes."
10461 "Hope?" a fellow board member says. "Can't we be doing something
10465 "Well, obviously, yes," the adviser responds. "We could contribute
10466 to the campaigns of a number of representatives to try to assure that
10467 they support the bill."
10470 You hate politics. You hate contributing to campaigns. So you want
10471 to know whether this disgusting practice is worth it. "How much
10472 would we get if this extension were passed?" you ask the adviser. "How
10476 "Well," the adviser says, "if you're confident that you will continue
10477 to get at least $
100,
000 a year from these copyrights, and you use the
10478 `discount rate' that we use to evaluate estate investments (
6 percent),
10479 then this law would be worth $
1,
146,
000 to the estate."
10482 You're a bit shocked by the number, but you quickly come to the
10483 correct conclusion:
10486 "So you're saying it would be worth it for us to pay more than
10487 $
1,
000,
000 in campaign contributions if we were confident those
10489 would assure that the bill was passed?"
10492 "Absolutely," the adviser responds. "It is worth it to you to
10494 up to the `present value' of the income you expect from these
10495 copyrights. Which for us means over $
1,
000,
000."
10498 You quickly get the point
—you as the member of the board and, I
10499 trust, you the reader. Each time copyrights are about to expire, every
10500 beneficiary in the position of the Robert Frost estate faces the same
10501 choice: If they can contribute to get a law passed to extend copyrights,
10502 <!-- PAGE BREAK 225 -->
10503 they will benefit greatly from that extension. And so each time
10505 are about to expire, there is a massive amount of lobbying to get
10506 the copyright term extended.
10509 Thus a congressional perpetual motion machine: So long as legislation
10510 can be bought (albeit indirectly), there will be all the incentive in
10511 the world to buy further extensions of copyright.
10514 In the lobbying that led to the passage of the Sonny Bono
10516 Term Extension Act, this "theory" about incentives was proved
10517 real. Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
10518 received the maximum contribution from Disney's political action
10519 committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors received
10520 contributions.
<footnote><para>
10521 <!-- f3. --> Associated Press, "Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey
10522 Mouse Effort; Congress OKs Bill Granting Creators
20 More Years,"
10523 <citetitle>Chicago Tribune
</citetitle>,
17 October
1998,
22.
10525 The RIAA and the MPAA are estimated to have spent over
10526 $
1.5 million lobbying in the
1998 election cycle. They paid out more
10527 than $
200,
000 in campaign contributions.
<footnote><para>
10528 <!-- f4. --> See Nick Brown, "Fair Use No More?: Copyright in the Information
10530 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
49</ulink>.
10532 Disney is estimated to have
10533 contributed more than $
800,
000 to reelection campaigns in the
10534 cycle.
<footnote><para>
10536 Alan K. Ota, "Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,"
10537 <citetitle>Congressional Quarterly This Week
</citetitle>,
8 August
1990, available at
10538 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
50</ulink>.
10543 Constitutional law is not oblivious to the obvious. Or at least,
10544 it need not be. So when I was considering Eldred's complaint, this
10546 about the never-ending incentives to increase the copyright term
10547 was central to my thinking. In my view, a pragmatic court committed
10548 to interpreting and applying the Constitution of our framers would see
10549 that if Congress has the power to extend existing terms, then there
10550 would be no effective constitutional requirement that terms be
10552 If they could extend it once, they would extend it again and again
10556 It was also my judgment that
<emphasis>this
</emphasis> Supreme Court
10557 would not allow Congress to extend existing terms. As anyone close to
10558 the Supreme Court's work knows, this Court has increasingly restricted
10559 the power of Congress when it has viewed Congress's actions as
10560 exceeding the power granted to it by the Constitution. Among
10561 constitutional scholars, the most famous example of this trend was the
10564 <!-- PAGE BREAK 226 -->
10565 decision in
1995 to strike down a law that banned the possession of
10569 Since
1937, the Supreme Court had interpreted Congress's granted
10570 powers very broadly; so, while the Constitution grants Congress the
10571 power to regulate only "commerce among the several states" (aka
10573 commerce"), the Supreme Court had interpreted that power to
10574 include the power to regulate any activity that merely affected
10579 As the economy grew, this standard increasingly meant that there was
10580 no limit to Congress's power to regulate, since just about every
10581 activity, when considered on a national scale, affects interstate
10582 commerce. A Constitution designed to limit Congress's power was
10583 instead interpreted to impose no limit.
10585 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
10587 The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's command, changed
10588 that in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The government had
10589 argued that possessing guns near schools affected interstate
10590 commerce. Guns near schools increase crime, crime lowers property
10591 values, and so on. In the oral argument, the Chief Justice asked the
10592 government whether there was any activity that would not affect
10593 interstate commerce under the reasoning the government advanced. The
10594 government said there was not; if Congress says an activity affects
10595 interstate commerce, then that activity affects interstate
10596 commerce. The Supreme Court, the government said, was not in the
10597 position to second-guess Congress.
10600 "We pause to consider the implications of the government's arguments,"
10601 the Chief Justice wrote.
<footnote><para>
10602 <!-- f6. --> <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>,
514 U.S.
549,
564 (
1995).
10604 If anything Congress says is interstate commerce must therefore be
10605 considered interstate commerce, then there would be no limit to
10606 Congress's power. The decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> was reaffirmed five years
10607 later in
<citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>.
<footnote><para>
10609 <citetitle>United States
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Morrison
</citetitle>,
529 U.S.
598 (
2000).
10613 If a principle were at work here, then it should apply to the Progress
10614 Clause as much as the Commerce Clause.
<footnote><para>
10616 If it is a principle about enumerated powers, then the principle
10617 carries from one enumerated power to another. The animating point in
10618 the context of the Commerce Clause was that the interpretation offered
10619 by the government would allow the government unending power to
10620 regulate commerce
—the limitation to interstate commerce
10621 notwithstanding. The same point is true in the context of the
10622 Copyright Clause. Here, too, the government's interpretation would
10623 allow the government unending power to regulate copyrights
—the
10624 limitation to "limited times" notwithstanding.
10626 And if it is applied to the Progress Clause, the principle should
10627 yield the conclusion that Congress
10628 <!-- PAGE BREAK 227 -->
10629 can't extend an existing term. If Congress could extend an existing
10630 term, then there would be no "stopping point" to Congress's power over
10631 terms, though the Constitution expressly states that there is such a
10632 limit. Thus, the same principle applied to the power to grant
10633 copyrights should entail that Congress is not allowed to extend the
10634 term of existing copyrights.
10637 <emphasis>If
</emphasis>, that is, the principle announced in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
10638 stood for a principle. Many believed the decision in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> stood for
10639 politics
—a conservative Supreme Court, which believed in states'
10640 rights, using its power over Congress to advance its own personal
10641 political preferences. But I rejected that view of the Supreme Court's
10642 decision. Indeed, shortly after the decision, I wrote an article
10643 demonstrating the "fidelity" in such an interpretation of the
10644 Constitution. The idea that the Supreme Court decides cases based upon
10645 its politics struck me as extraordinarily boring. I was not going to
10646 devote my life to teaching constitutional law if these nine Justices
10647 were going to be petty politicians.
10650 Now let's pause for a moment to make sure we understand what the
10651 argument in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was not about. By insisting on the
10652 Constitution's limits to copyright, obviously Eldred was not endorsing
10653 piracy. Indeed, in an obvious sense, he was fighting a kind of
10654 piracy
—piracy of the public domain. When Robert Frost wrote his
10655 work and when Walt Disney created Mickey Mouse, the maximum copyright
10656 term was just fifty-six years. Because of interim changes, Frost and
10657 Disney had already enjoyed a seventy-five-year monopoly for their
10658 work. They had gotten the benefit of the bargain that the Constitution
10659 envisions: In exchange for a monopoly protected for fifty-six years,
10660 they created new work. But now these entities were using their
10661 power
—expressed through the power of lobbyists' money
—to
10662 get another twenty-year dollop of monopoly. That twenty-year dollop
10663 would be taken from the public domain. Eric Eldred was fighting a
10664 piracy that affects us all.
10667 Some people view the public domain with contempt. In their brief
10669 <!-- PAGE BREAK 228 -->
10670 before the Supreme Court, the Nashville Songwriters Association
10671 wrote that the public domain is nothing more than "legal piracy."
<footnote><para>
10673 Brief of the Nashville Songwriters Association,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10674 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618), n
.10, available
10675 at
<ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
51</ulink>.
10677 But it is not piracy when the law allows it; and in our constitutional
10678 system, our law requires it. Some may not like the Constitution's
10679 requirements, but that doesn't make the Constitution a pirate's
10681 <indexterm><primary>Nashville Songwriters Association
</primary></indexterm>
10684 As we've seen, our constitutional system requires limits on
10686 as a way to assure that copyright holders do not too heavily
10688 the development and distribution of our culture. Yet, as Eric
10689 Eldred discovered, we have set up a system that assures that copyright
10690 terms will be repeatedly extended, and extended, and extended. We
10691 have created the perfect storm for the public domain. Copyrights have
10692 not expired, and will not expire, so long as Congress is free to be
10693 bought to extend them again.
10696 It is valuable copyrights that are responsible for terms being
10698 Mickey Mouse and "Rhapsody in Blue." These works are too
10699 valuable for copyright owners to ignore. But the real harm to our
10701 from copyright extensions is not that Mickey Mouse remains
10703 Forget Mickey Mouse. Forget Robert Frost. Forget all the works
10704 from the
1920s and
1930s that have continuing commercial value. The
10705 real harm of term extension comes not from these famous works. The
10706 real harm is to the works that are not famous, not commercially
10708 and no longer available as a result.
10711 If you look at the work created in the first twenty years (
1923 to
10712 1942) affected by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
10713 2 percent of that work has any continuing commercial value. It was the
10714 copyright holders for that
2 percent who pushed the CTEA through.
10715 But the law and its effect were not limited to that
2 percent. The law
10716 extended the terms of copyright generally.
<footnote><para>
10717 <!-- f10. --> The figure of
2 percent is an extrapolation from the study by the
10719 Research Service, in light of the estimated renewal ranges. See Brief
10720 of Petitioners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
7, available at
10721 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
52</ulink>.
10726 Think practically about the consequence of this
10727 extension
—practically,
10728 as a businessperson, and not as a lawyer eager for more legal
10730 <!-- PAGE BREAK 229 -->
10731 work. In
1930,
10,
047 books were published. In
2000,
174 of those
10732 books were still in print. Let's say you were Brewster Kahle, and you
10733 wanted to make available to the world in your iArchive project the
10735 9,
873. What would you have to do?
10738 Well, first, you'd have to determine which of the
9,
873 books were
10739 still under copyright. That requires going to a library (these data are
10740 not on-line) and paging through tomes of books, cross-checking the
10741 titles and authors of the
9,
873 books with the copyright registration
10742 and renewal records for works published in
1930. That will produce a
10743 list of books still under copyright.
10746 Then for the books still under copyright, you would need to locate
10747 the current copyright owners. How would you do that?
10750 Most people think that there must be a list of these copyright
10752 somewhere. Practical people think this way. How could there be
10753 thousands and thousands of government monopolies without there
10754 being at least a list?
10757 But there is no list. There may be a name from
1930, and then in
10758 1959, of the person who registered the copyright. But just think
10760 about how impossibly difficult it would be to track down
10762 of such records
—especially since the person who registered is
10763 not necessarily the current owner. And we're just talking about
1930!
10766 "But there isn't a list of who owns property generally," the
10767 apologists for the system respond. "Why should there be a list of
10771 Well, actually, if you think about it, there
<emphasis>are
</emphasis>
10772 plenty of lists of who owns what property. Think about deeds on
10773 houses, or titles to cars. And where there isn't a list, the code of
10774 real space is pretty good at suggesting who the owner of a bit of
10775 property is. (A swing set in your backyard is probably yours.) So
10776 formally or informally, we have a pretty good way to know who owns
10777 what tangible property.
10780 So: You walk down a street and see a house. You can know who
10781 owns the house by looking it up in the courthouse registry. If you see
10782 a car, there is ordinarily a license plate that will link the owner to the
10784 <!-- PAGE BREAK 230 -->
10785 car. If you see a bunch of children's toys sitting on the front lawn of a
10786 house, it's fairly easy to determine who owns the toys. And if you
10788 to see a baseball lying in a gutter on the side of the road, look
10789 around for a second for some kids playing ball. If you don't see any
10790 kids, then okay: Here's a bit of property whose owner we can't easily
10791 determine. It is the exception that proves the rule: that we ordinarily
10792 know quite well who owns what property.
10795 Compare this story to intangible property. You go into a library.
10796 The library owns the books. But who owns the copyrights? As I've
10798 described, there's no list of copyright owners. There are authors'
10799 names, of course, but their copyrights could have been assigned, or
10800 passed down in an estate like Grandma's old jewelry. To know who
10801 owns what, you would have to hire a private detective. The bottom
10802 line: The owner cannot easily be located. And in a regime like ours, in
10803 which it is a felony to use such property without the property owner's
10804 permission, the property isn't going to be used.
10807 The consequence with respect to old books is that they won't be
10808 digitized, and hence will simply rot away on shelves. But the
10810 for other creative works is much more dire.
10812 <indexterm><primary>Agee, Michael
</primary></indexterm>
10813 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
10814 <indexterm><primary>Laurel and Hardy Films
</primary></indexterm>
10816 Consider the story of Michael Agee, chairman of Hal Roach Studios,
10817 which owns the copyrights for the Laurel and Hardy films. Agee is a
10818 direct beneficiary of the Bono Act. The Laurel and Hardy films were
10819 made between
1921 and
1951. Only one of these films,
<citetitle>The Lucky Dog
</citetitle>, is
10820 currently out of copyright. But for the CTEA, films made after
1923
10821 would have begun entering the public domain. Because Agee controls the
10822 exclusive rights for these popular films, he makes a great deal of
10823 money. According to one estimate, "Roach has sold about
60,
000
10824 videocassettes and
50,
000 DVDs of the duo's silent
10825 films."
<footnote><para>
10827 See David G. Savage, "High Court Scene of Showdown on Copyright Law,"
10828 <citetitle>Los Angeles Times
</citetitle>,
6 October
2002; David Streitfeld, "Classic Movies,
10829 Songs, Books at Stake; Supreme Court Hears Arguments Today on Striking
10830 Down Copyright Extension,"
<citetitle>Orlando Sentinel Tribune
</citetitle>,
9 October
2002.
10833 <indexterm><primary>Lucky Dog, The
</primary></indexterm>
10836 Yet Agee opposed the CTEA. His reasons demonstrate a rare virtue in
10837 this culture: selflessness. He argued in a brief before the Supreme
10838 Court that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act will, if left
10839 standing, destroy a whole generation of American film.
10842 His argument is straightforward. A tiny fraction of this work has
10844 <!-- PAGE BREAK 231 -->
10845 any continuing commercial value. The rest
—to the extent it
10846 survives at all
—sits in vaults gathering dust. It may be that
10847 some of this work not now commercially valuable will be deemed to be
10848 valuable by the owners of the vaults. For this to occur, however, the
10849 commercial benefit from the work must exceed the costs of making the
10850 work available for distribution.
10853 We can't know the benefits, but we do know a lot about the costs.
10854 For most of the history of film, the costs of restoring film were very
10855 high; digital technology has lowered these costs substantially. While
10856 it cost more than $
10,
000 to restore a ninety-minute black-and-white
10857 film in
1993, it can now cost as little as $
100 to digitize one hour of
10858 mm film.
<footnote><para>
10860 Brief of Hal Roach Studios and Michael Agee as Amicus Curiae
10861 Supporting the Petitoners,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
10862 U.S.
186 (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
12. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
10863 filed on behalf of Petitioners by the Internet Archive,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle>
10864 v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, available at
10865 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
53</ulink>.
10870 Restoration technology is not the only cost, nor the most
10872 Lawyers, too, are a cost, and increasingly, a very important one. In
10873 addition to preserving the film, a distributor needs to secure the rights.
10874 And to secure the rights for a film that is under copyright, you need to
10875 locate the copyright owner.
10878 Or more accurately,
<emphasis>owners
</emphasis>. As we've seen, there
10879 isn't only a single copyright associated with a film; there are
10880 many. There isn't a single person whom you can contact about those
10881 copyrights; there are as many as can hold the rights, which turns out
10882 to be an extremely large number. Thus the costs of clearing the rights
10883 to these films is exceptionally high.
10886 "But can't you just restore the film, distribute it, and then pay the
10887 copyright owner when she shows up?" Sure, if you want to commit a
10888 felony. And even if you're not worried about committing a felony, when
10889 she does show up, she'll have the right to sue you for all the profits you
10890 have made. So, if you're successful, you can be fairly confident you'll be
10891 getting a call from someone's lawyer. And if you're not successful, you
10892 won't make enough to cover the costs of your own lawyer. Either way,
10893 you have to talk to a lawyer. And as is too often the case, saying you have
10894 to talk to a lawyer is the same as saying you won't make any money.
10897 For some films, the benefit of releasing the film may well exceed
10899 <!-- PAGE BREAK 232 -->
10900 these costs. But for the vast majority of them, there is no way the
10902 would outweigh the legal costs. Thus, for the vast majority of old
10903 films, Agee argued, the film will not be restored and distributed until
10904 the copyright expires.
10907 But by the time the copyright for these films expires, the film will
10908 have expired. These films were produced on nitrate-based stock, and
10909 nitrate stock dissolves over time. They will be gone, and the metal
10911 in which they are now stored will be filled with nothing more
10915 Of all the creative work produced by humans anywhere, a tiny
10916 fraction has continuing commercial value. For that tiny fraction, the
10917 copyright is a crucially important legal device. For that tiny fraction,
10918 the copyright creates incentives to produce and distribute the
10920 work. For that tiny fraction, the copyright acts as an "engine of
10924 But even for that tiny fraction, the actual time during which the
10925 creative work has a commercial life is extremely short. As I've
10927 most books go out of print within one year. The same is true of
10928 music and film. Commercial culture is sharklike. It must keep moving.
10929 And when a creative work falls out of favor with the commercial
10931 the commercial life ends.
10934 Yet that doesn't mean the life of the creative work ends. We don't
10935 keep libraries of books in order to compete with Barnes
& Noble, and
10936 we don't have archives of films because we expect people to choose
10938 spending Friday night watching new movies and spending
10940 night watching a
1930 news documentary. The noncommercial life
10941 of culture is important and valuable
—for entertainment but also, and
10942 more importantly, for knowledge. To understand who we are, and
10943 where we came from, and how we have made the mistakes that we
10944 have, we need to have access to this history.
10947 Copyrights in this context do not drive an engine of free expression.
10949 <!-- PAGE BREAK 233 -->
10950 In this context, there is no need for an exclusive right. Copyrights in
10951 this context do no good.
10954 Yet, for most of our history, they also did little harm. For most of
10955 our history, when a work ended its commercial life, there was no
10956 <emphasis>copyright-related use
</emphasis> that would be inhibited by
10957 an exclusive right. When a book went out of print, you could not buy
10958 it from a publisher. But you could still buy it from a used book
10959 store, and when a used book store sells it, in America, at least,
10960 there is no need to pay the copyright owner anything. Thus, the
10961 ordinary use of a book after its commercial life ended was a use that
10962 was independent of copyright law.
10965 The same was effectively true of film. Because the costs of restoring
10966 a film
—the real economic costs, not the lawyer costs
—were
10967 so high, it was never at all feasible to preserve or restore
10968 film. Like the remains of a great dinner, when it's over, it's
10969 over. Once a film passed out of its commercial life, it may have been
10970 archived for a bit, but that was the end of its life so long as the
10971 market didn't have more to offer.
10974 In other words, though copyright has been relatively short for most
10975 of our history, long copyrights wouldn't have mattered for the works
10976 that lost their commercial value. Long copyrights for these works
10977 would not have interfered with anything.
10980 But this situation has now changed.
10983 One crucially important consequence of the emergence of digital
10984 technologies is to enable the archive that Brewster Kahle dreams of.
10985 Digital technologies now make it possible to preserve and give access
10986 to all sorts of knowledge. Once a book goes out of print, we can now
10987 imagine digitizing it and making it available to everyone,
10988 forever. Once a film goes out of distribution, we could digitize it
10989 and make it available to everyone, forever. Digital technologies give
10990 new life to copyrighted material after it passes out of its commercial
10991 life. It is now possible to preserve and assure universal access to
10992 this knowledge and culture, whereas before it was not.
10995 <!-- PAGE BREAK 234 -->
10996 And now copyright law does get in the way. Every step of producing
10997 this digital archive of our culture infringes on the exclusive right
10998 of copyright. To digitize a book is to copy it. To do that requires
10999 permission of the copyright owner. The same with music, film, or any
11000 other aspect of our culture protected by copyright. The effort to make
11001 these things available to history, or to researchers, or to those who
11002 just want to explore, is now inhibited by a set of rules that were
11003 written for a radically different context.
11006 Here is the core of the harm that comes from extending terms: Now that
11007 technology enables us to rebuild the library of Alexandria, the law
11008 gets in the way. And it doesn't get in the way for any useful
11009 <emphasis>copyright
</emphasis> purpose, for the purpose of copyright
11010 is to enable the commercial market that spreads culture. No, we are
11011 talking about culture after it has lived its commercial life. In this
11012 context, copyright is serving no purpose
<emphasis>at all
</emphasis>
11013 related to the spread of knowledge. In this context, copyright is not
11014 an engine of free expression. Copyright is a brake.
11017 You may well ask, "But if digital technologies lower the costs for
11018 Brewster Kahle, then they will lower the costs for Random House, too.
11019 So won't Random House do as well as Brewster Kahle in spreading
11023 Maybe. Someday. But there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
11024 publishers would be as complete as libraries. If Barnes
& Noble
11025 offered to lend books from its stores for a low price, would that
11026 eliminate the need for libraries? Only if you think that the only role
11027 of a library is to serve what "the market" would demand. But if you
11028 think the role of a library is bigger than this
—if you think its
11029 role is to archive culture, whether there's a demand for any
11030 particular bit of that culture or not
—then we can't count on the
11031 commercial market to do our library work for us.
11034 I would be the first to agree that it should do as much as it can: We
11035 should rely upon the market as much as possible to spread and enable
11036 culture. My message is absolutely not antimarket. But where we see the
11037 market is not doing the job, then we should allow nonmarket forces the
11039 <!-- PAGE BREAK 235 -->
11040 freedom to fill the gaps. As one researcher calculated for American
11041 culture,
94 percent of the films, books, and music produced between
11042 and
1946 is not commercially available. However much you love the
11043 commercial market, if access is a value, then
6 percent is a failure
11044 to provide that value.
<footnote><para>
11046 Jason Schultz, "The Myth of the
1976 Copyright `Chaos' Theory,"
20
11047 December
2002, available at
11048 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
54</ulink>.
11053 In January
1999, we filed a lawsuit on Eric Eldred's behalf in federal
11054 district court in Washington, D.C., asking the court to declare the
11055 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act unconstitutional. The two
11056 central claims that we made were (
1) that extending existing terms
11057 violated the Constitution's "limited Times" requirement, and (
2) that
11058 extending terms by another twenty years violated the First Amendment.
11061 The district court dismissed our claims without even hearing an
11062 argument. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also
11063 dismissed our claims, though after hearing an extensive argument. But
11064 that decision at least had a dissent, by one of the most conservative
11065 judges on that court. That dissent gave our claims life.
11068 Judge David Sentelle said the CTEA violated the requirement that
11069 copyrights be for "limited Times" only. His argument was as elegant as
11070 it was simple: If Congress can extend existing terms, then there is no
11071 "stopping point" to Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. The
11072 power to extend existing terms means Congress is not required to grant
11073 terms that are "limited." Thus, Judge Sentelle argued, the court had
11074 to interpret the term "limited Times" to give it meaning. And the best
11075 interpretation, Judge Sentelle argued, would be to deny Congress the
11076 power to extend existing terms.
11079 We asked the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as a whole to
11080 hear the case. Cases are ordinarily heard in panels of three, except for
11081 important cases or cases that raise issues specific to the circuit as a
11082 whole, where the court will sit "en banc" to hear the case.
11085 The Court of Appeals rejected our request to hear the case en banc.
11086 This time, Judge Sentelle was joined by the most liberal member of the
11088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 236 -->
11089 D.C. Circuit, Judge David Tatel. Both the most conservative and the
11090 most liberal judges in the D.C. Circuit believed Congress had
11091 overstepped its bounds.
11094 It was here that most expected Eldred v. Ashcroft would die, for the
11095 Supreme Court rarely reviews any decision by a court of appeals. (It
11096 hears about one hundred cases a year, out of more than five thousand
11097 appeals.) And it practically never reviews a decision that upholds a
11098 statute when no other court has yet reviewed the statute.
11101 But in February
2002, the Supreme Court surprised the world by
11102 granting our petition to review the D.C. Circuit opinion. Argument
11103 was set for October of
2002. The summer would be spent writing
11104 briefs and preparing for argument.
11107 It is over a year later as I write these words. It is still
11108 astonishingly hard. If you know anything at all about this story, you
11109 know that we lost the appeal. And if you know something more than just
11110 the minimum, you probably think there was no way this case could have
11111 been won. After our defeat, I received literally thousands of missives
11112 by well-wishers and supporters, thanking me for my work on behalf of
11113 this noble but doomed cause. And none from this pile was more
11114 significant to me than the e-mail from my client, Eric Eldred.
11117 But my client and these friends were wrong. This case could have
11118 been won. It should have been won. And no matter how hard I try to
11119 retell this story to myself, I can never escape believing that my own
11122 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11124 The mistake was made early, though it became obvious only at the very
11125 end. Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an
11126 extraordinary lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had
11127 moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue. Jones Day took a great deal of
11129 <!-- PAGE BREAK 237 -->
11130 from its copyright-protectionist clients for supporting us. They
11131 ignored this pressure (something that few law firms today would ever
11132 do), and throughout the case, they gave it everything they could.
11134 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11135 <indexterm><primary>Bromberg, Dan
</primary></indexterm>
11136 <indexterm><primary>Steward, Geoffrey
</primary></indexterm>
11138 There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day. Geoff
11139 Stewart was the first, but then Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became
11140 quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer in particular had a common view
11141 about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly
11142 told me, if we could make the issue seem "important" to the Supreme
11143 Court. It had to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free
11144 speech and free culture; otherwise, they would never vote against "the
11145 most powerful media companies in the world."
11148 I hate this view of the law. Of course I thought the Sonny Bono Act
11149 was a dramatic harm to free speech and free culture. Of course I still
11150 think it is. But the idea that the Supreme Court decides the law based
11151 on how important they believe the issues are is just wrong. It might be
11152 "right" as in "true," I thought, but it is "wrong" as in "it just shouldn't be
11153 that way." As I believed that any faithful interpretation of what the
11154 framers of our Constitution did would yield the conclusion that the
11155 CTEA was unconstitutional, and as I believed that any faithful
11157 of what the First Amendment means would yield the
11158 conclusion that the power to extend existing copyright terms is
11160 I was not persuaded that we had to sell our case like soap.
11161 Just as a law that bans the swastika is unconstitutional not because the
11162 Court likes Nazis but because such a law would violate the
11164 so too, in my view, would the Court decide whether Congress's
11165 law was constitutional based on the Constitution, not based on whether
11166 they liked the values that the framers put in the Constitution.
11169 In any case, I thought, the Court must already see the danger and
11170 the harm caused by this sort of law. Why else would they grant review?
11171 There was no reason to hear the case in the Supreme Court if they
11172 weren't convinced that this regulation was harmful. So in my view, we
11173 didn't need to persuade them that this law was bad, we needed to show
11174 why it was unconstitutional.
11177 There was one way, however, in which I felt politics would matter
11179 <!-- PAGE BREAK 238 -->
11180 and in which I thought a response was appropriate. I was convinced
11181 that the Court would not hear our arguments if it thought these were
11182 just the arguments of a group of lefty loons. This Supreme Court was
11183 not about to launch into a new field of judicial review if it seemed
11184 that this field of review was simply the preference of a small
11185 political minority. Although my focus in the case was not to
11186 demonstrate how bad the Sonny Bono Act was but to demonstrate that it
11187 was unconstitutional, my hope was to make this argument against a
11188 background of briefs that covered the full range of political
11189 views. To show that this claim against the CTEA was grounded in
11190 <emphasis>law
</emphasis> and not politics, then, we tried to gather
11191 the widest range of credible critics
—credible not because they
11192 were rich and famous, but because they, in the aggregate, demonstrated
11193 that this law was unconstitutional regardless of one's politics.
11196 The first step happened all by itself. Phyllis Schlafly's
11197 organization, Eagle Forum, had been an opponent of the CTEA from the
11198 very beginning. Mrs. Schlafly viewed the CTEA as a sellout by
11199 Congress. In November
1998, she wrote a stinging editorial attacking
11200 the Republican Congress for allowing the law to pass. As she wrote,
11201 "Do you sometimes wonder why bills that create a financial windfall to
11202 narrow special interests slide easily through the intricate
11203 legislative process, while bills that benefit the general public seem
11204 to get bogged down?" The answer, as the editorial documented, was the
11205 power of money. Schlafly enumerated Disney's contributions to the key
11206 players on the committees. It was money, not justice, that gave Mickey
11207 Mouse twenty more years in Disney's control, Schlafly argued.
11208 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11209 <indexterm><primary>Schlafly, Phyllis
</primary></indexterm>
11212 In the Court of Appeals, Eagle Forum was eager to file a brief
11213 supporting our position. Their brief made the argument that became the
11214 core claim in the Supreme Court: If Congress can extend the term of
11215 existing copyrights, there is no limit to Congress's power to set
11216 terms. That strong conservative argument persuaded a strong
11217 conservative judge, Judge Sentelle.
11220 In the Supreme Court, the briefs on our side were about as diverse as
11221 it gets. They included an extraordinary historical brief by the Free
11223 <!-- PAGE BREAK 239 -->
11224 Software Foundation (home of the GNU project that made GNU/ Linux
11225 possible). They included a powerful brief about the costs of
11226 uncertainty by Intel. There were two law professors' briefs, one by
11227 copyright scholars and one by First Amendment scholars. There was an
11228 exhaustive and uncontroverted brief by the world's experts in the
11229 history of the Progress Clause. And of course, there was a new brief
11230 by Eagle Forum, repeating and strengthening its arguments.
11231 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11232 <indexterm><primary>Intel
</primary></indexterm>
11233 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
11234 <indexterm><primary>Eagle Forum
</primary></indexterm>
11237 Those briefs framed a legal argument. Then to support the legal
11238 argument, there were a number of powerful briefs by libraries and
11239 archives, including the Internet Archive, the American Association of
11240 Law Libraries, and the National Writers Union.
11241 <indexterm><primary>American Association of Law Libraries
</primary></indexterm>
11242 <indexterm><primary>National Writers Union
</primary></indexterm>
11244 <indexterm><primary>Hal Roach Studios
</primary></indexterm>
11246 But two briefs captured the policy argument best. One made the
11247 argument I've already described: A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued
11248 that unless the law was struck, a whole generation of American film
11249 would disappear. The other made the economic argument absolutely
11252 <indexterm><primary>Akerlof, George
</primary></indexterm>
11253 <indexterm><primary>Arrow, Kenneth
</primary></indexterm>
11254 <indexterm><primary>Buchanan, James
</primary></indexterm>
11255 <indexterm><primary>Coase, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11256 <indexterm><primary>Friedman, Milton
</primary></indexterm>
11258 This economists' brief was signed by seventeen economists, including
11259 five Nobel Prize winners, including Ronald Coase, James Buchanan,
11260 Milton Friedman, Kenneth Arrow, and George Akerlof. The economists, as
11261 the list of Nobel winners demonstrates, spanned the political
11262 spectrum. Their conclusions were powerful: There was no plausible
11263 claim that extending the terms of existing copyrights would do
11264 anything to increase incentives to create. Such extensions were
11265 nothing more than "rent-seeking"
—the fancy term economists use
11266 to describe special-interest legislation gone wild.
11269 The same effort at balance was reflected in the legal team we gathered
11270 to write our briefs in the case. The Jones Day lawyers had been with
11271 us from the start. But when the case got to the Supreme Court, we
11272 added three lawyers to help us frame this argument to this Court: Alan
11273 Morrison, a lawyer from Public Citizen, a Washington group that had
11274 made constitutional history with a series of seminal victories in the
11275 Supreme Court defending individual rights; my colleague and dean,
11276 Kathleen Sullivan, who had argued many cases in the Court, and
11278 <!-- PAGE BREAK 240 -->
11279 who had advised us early on about a First Amendment strategy; and
11280 finally, former solicitor general Charles Fried.
11281 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11282 <indexterm><primary>Morrison, Alan
</primary></indexterm>
11283 <indexterm><primary>Public Citizen
</primary></indexterm>
11284 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11287 Fried was a special victory for our side. Every other former solicitor
11288 general was hired by the other side to defend Congress's power to give
11289 media companies the special favor of extended copyright terms. Fried
11290 was the only one who turned down that lucrative assignment to stand up
11291 for something he believed in. He had been Ronald Reagan's chief lawyer
11292 in the Supreme Court. He had helped craft the line of cases that
11293 limited Congress's power in the context of the Commerce Clause. And
11294 while he had argued many positions in the Supreme Court that I
11295 personally disagreed with, his joining the cause was a vote of
11296 confidence in our argument.
11297 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11300 The government, in defending the statute, had its collection of
11301 friends, as well. Significantly, however, none of these "friends" included
11302 historians or economists. The briefs on the other side of the case were
11303 written exclusively by major media companies, congressmen, and
11307 The media companies were not surprising. They had the most to gain
11308 from the law. The congressmen were not surprising either
—they
11309 were defending their power and, indirectly, the gravy train of
11310 contributions such power induced. And of course it was not surprising
11311 that the copyright holders would defend the idea that they should
11312 continue to have the right to control who did what with content they
11316 Dr. Seuss's representatives, for example, argued that it was
11317 better for the Dr. Seuss estate to control what happened to
11318 Dr. Seuss's work
— better than allowing it to fall into the
11319 public domain
—because if this creativity were in the public
11320 domain, then people could use it to "glorify drugs or to create
11321 pornography."
<footnote><para>
11323 Brief of Amici Dr. Seuss Enterprise et al.,
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>,
537
11324 U.S. (
2003) (No.
01-
618),
19.
11326 That was also the motive of the Gershwin estate, which defended its
11327 "protection" of the work of George Gershwin. They refuse, for example,
11328 to license
<citetitle>Porgy and Bess
</citetitle> to anyone who refuses to use African
11329 Americans in the cast.
<footnote><para>
11331 Dinitia Smith, "Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey
11332 Mouse Joins the Fray,"
<citetitle>New York Times
</citetitle>,
28 March
1998, B7.
11335 <!-- PAGE BREAK 241 -->
11336 their view of how this part of American culture should be controlled,
11337 and they wanted this law to help them effect that control.
11338 <indexterm><primary>Gershwin, George
</primary></indexterm>
11341 This argument made clear a theme that is rarely noticed in this
11342 debate. When Congress decides to extend the term of existing
11343 copyrights, Congress is making a choice about which speakers it will
11344 favor. Famous and beloved copyright owners, such as the Gershwin
11345 estate and Dr. Seuss, come to Congress and say, "Give us twenty years
11346 to control the speech about these icons of American culture. We'll do
11347 better with them than anyone else." Congress of course likes to reward
11348 the popular and famous by giving them what they want. But when
11349 Congress gives people an exclusive right to speak in a certain way,
11350 that's just what the First Amendment is traditionally meant to block.
11353 We argued as much in a final brief. Not only would upholding the CTEA
11354 mean that there was no limit to the power of Congress to extend
11355 copyrights
—extensions that would further concentrate the market;
11356 it would also mean that there was no limit to Congress's power to play
11357 favorites, through copyright, with who has the right to speak.
11358 Between February and October, there was little I did beyond preparing
11359 for this case. Early on, as I said, I set the strategy.
11361 <indexterm><primary>Rehnquist, William H.
</primary></indexterm>
11363 The Supreme Court was divided into two important camps. One camp we
11364 called "the Conservatives." The other we called "the Rest." The
11365 Conservatives included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor,
11366 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. These five had
11367 been the most consistent in limiting Congress's power. They were the
11368 five who had supported the
<citetitle>Lopez/Morrison
</citetitle> line
11369 of cases that said that an enumerated power had to be interpreted to
11370 assure that Congress's powers had limits.
11372 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11374 The Rest were the four Justices who had strongly opposed limits on
11375 Congress's power. These four
—Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
11376 Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
—had repeatedly argued that
11378 <!-- PAGE BREAK 242 -->
11379 gives Congress broad discretion to decide how best to implement its
11380 powers. In case after case, these justices had argued that the Court's
11381 role should be one of deference. Though the votes of these four
11382 justices were the votes that I personally had most consistently agreed
11383 with, they were also the votes that we were least likely to get.
11386 In particular, the least likely was Justice Ginsburg's. In addition to
11387 her general view about deference to Congress (except where issues of
11388 gender are involved), she had been particularly deferential in the
11389 context of intellectual property protections. She and her daughter (an
11390 excellent and well-known intellectual property scholar) were cut from
11391 the same intellectual property cloth. We expected she would agree with
11392 the writings of her daughter: that Congress had the power in this
11393 context to do as it wished, even if what Congress wished made little
11396 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11398 Close behind Justice Ginsburg were two justices whom we also viewed as
11399 unlikely allies, though possible surprises. Justice Souter strongly
11400 favored deference to Congress, as did Justice Breyer. But both were
11401 also very sensitive to free speech concerns. And as we strongly
11402 believed, there was a very important free speech argument against
11403 these retrospective extensions.
11406 The only vote we could be confident about was that of Justice
11407 Stevens. History will record Justice Stevens as one of the greatest
11408 judges on this Court. His votes are consistently eclectic, which just
11409 means that no simple ideology explains where he will stand. But he
11410 had consistently argued for limits in the context of intellectual property
11411 generally. We were fairly confident he would recognize limits here.
11414 This analysis of "the Rest" showed most clearly where our focus had to
11415 be: on the Conservatives. To win this case, we had to crack open these
11416 five and get at least a majority to go our way. Thus, the single
11417 overriding argument that animated our claim rested on the
11418 Conservatives' most important jurisprudential innovation
—the
11419 argument that Judge Sentelle had relied upon in the Court of Appeals,
11420 that Congress's power must be interpreted so that its enumerated
11421 powers have limits.
11424 This then was the core of our strategy
—a strategy for which I am
11425 responsible. We would get the Court to see that just as with the
11426 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>
11427 <!-- PAGE BREAK 243 -->
11428 case, under the government's argument here, Congress would always have
11429 unlimited power to extend existing terms. If anything was plain about
11430 Congress's power under the Progress Clause, it was that this power was
11431 supposed to be "limited." Our aim would be to get the Court to
11432 reconcile
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> with
11433 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>: If Congress's power to regulate commerce
11434 was limited, then so, too, must Congress's power to regulate copyright
11438 The argument on the government's side came down to this: Congress has
11439 done it before. It should be allowed to do it again. The government
11440 claimed that from the very beginning, Congress has been extending the
11441 term of existing copyrights. So, the government argued, the Court
11442 should not now say that practice is unconstitutional.
11445 There was some truth to the government's claim, but not much. We
11446 certainly agreed that Congress had extended existing terms in
1831
11447 and in
1909. And of course, in
1962, Congress began extending
11449 terms regularly
—eleven times in forty years.
11452 But this "consistency" should be kept in perspective. Congress
11454 existing terms once in the first hundred years of the Republic.
11455 It then extended existing terms once again in the next fifty. Those rare
11456 extensions are in contrast to the now regular practice of extending
11458 terms. Whatever restraint Congress had had in the past, that
11460 was now gone. Congress was now in a cycle of extensions; there
11461 was no reason to expect that cycle would end. This Court had not
11463 to intervene where Congress was in a similar cycle of extension.
11464 There was no reason it couldn't intervene here.
11465 Oral argument was scheduled for the first week in October. I
11467 in D.C. two weeks before the argument. During those two
11468 weeks, I was repeatedly "mooted" by lawyers who had volunteered to
11470 <!-- PAGE BREAK 244 -->
11471 help in the case. Such "moots" are basically practice rounds, where
11472 wannabe justices fire questions at wannabe winners.
11475 I was convinced that to win, I had to keep the Court focused on a
11476 single point: that if this extension is permitted, then there is no limit to
11477 the power to set terms. Going with the government would mean that
11478 terms would be effectively unlimited; going with us would give
11480 a clear line to follow: Don't extend existing terms. The moots
11481 were an effective practice; I found ways to take every question back to
11484 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11485 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
11487 One moot was before the lawyers at Jones Day. Don Ayer was the
11488 skeptic. He had served in the Reagan Justice Department with Solicitor
11489 General Charles Fried. He had argued many cases before the Supreme
11490 Court. And in his review of the moot, he let his concern speak:
11491 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11494 "I'm just afraid that unless they really see the harm, they won't be
11495 willing to upset this practice that the government says has been a
11496 consistent practice for two hundred years. You have to make them see
11497 the harm
—passionately get them to see the harm. For if they
11498 don't see that, then we haven't any chance of winning."
11500 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11502 He may have argued many cases before this Court, I thought, but
11503 he didn't understand its soul. As a clerk, I had seen the Justices do the
11504 right thing
—not because of politics but because it was right. As a law
11505 professor, I had spent my life teaching my students that this Court
11506 does the right thing
—not because of politics but because it is right. As
11507 I listened to Ayer's plea for passion in pressing politics, I understood
11508 his point, and I rejected it. Our argument was right. That was enough.
11509 Let the politicians learn to see that it was also good.
11510 The night before the argument, a line of people began to form
11511 in front of the Supreme Court. The case had become a focus of the
11512 press and of the movement to free culture. Hundreds stood in line
11514 <!-- PAGE BREAK 245 -->
11515 for the chance to see the proceedings. Scores spent the night on the
11516 Supreme Court steps so that they would be assured a seat.
11519 Not everyone has to wait in line. People who know the Justices can
11520 ask for seats they control. (I asked Justice Scalia's chambers for seats for
11521 my parents, for example.) Members of the Supreme Court bar can get
11522 a seat in a special section reserved for them. And senators and
11524 have a special place where they get to sit, too. And finally, of
11525 course, the press has a gallery, as do clerks working for the Justices on
11526 the Court. As we entered that morning, there was no place that was
11527 not taken. This was an argument about intellectual property law, yet
11528 the halls were filled. As I walked in to take my seat at the front of the
11529 Court, I saw my parents sitting on the left. As I sat down at the table,
11530 I saw Jack Valenti sitting in the special section ordinarily reserved for
11531 family of the Justices.
11534 When the Chief Justice called me to begin my argument, I began
11535 where I intended to stay: on the question of the limits on Congress's
11536 power. This was a case about enumerated powers, I said, and whether
11537 those enumerated powers had any limit.
11540 Justice O'Connor stopped me within one minute of my opening.
11541 The history was bothering her.
11545 justice o'connor: Congress has extended the term so often
11546 through the years, and if you are right, don't we run the risk of
11547 upsetting previous extensions of time? I mean, this seems to be a
11548 practice that began with the very first act.
11552 She was quite willing to concede "that this flies directly in the face
11553 of what the framers had in mind." But my response again and again
11554 was to emphasize limits on Congress's power.
11558 mr. lessig: Well, if it flies in the face of what the framers had in
11559 mind, then the question is, is there a way of interpreting their
11560 <!-- PAGE BREAK 246 -->
11561 words that gives effect to what they had in mind, and the answer
11566 There were two points in this argument when I should have seen
11567 where the Court was going. The first was a question by Justice
11568 Kennedy, who observed,
11572 justice kennedy: Well, I suppose implicit in the argument that
11573 the '
76 act, too, should have been declared void, and that we
11574 might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all these
11575 years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts.
11576 I just don't see any empirical evidence for that.
11580 Here follows my clear mistake. Like a professor correcting a
11586 mr. lessig: Justice, we are not making an empirical claim at all.
11587 Nothing in our Copyright Clause claim hangs upon the empirical
11588 assertion about impeding progress. Our only argument is this is a
11589 structural limit necessary to assure that what would be an effectively
11590 perpetual term not be permitted under the copyright laws.
11593 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11595 That was a correct answer, but it wasn't the right answer. The right
11596 answer was instead that there was an obvious and profound harm. Any
11597 number of briefs had been written about it. He wanted to hear it. And
11598 here was the place Don Ayer's advice should have mattered. This was a
11599 softball; my answer was a swing and a miss.
11602 The second came from the Chief, for whom the whole case had been
11603 crafted. For the Chief Justice had crafted the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> ruling,
11604 and we hoped that he would see this case as its second cousin.
11607 It was clear a second into his question that he wasn't at all
11608 sympathetic. To him, we were a bunch of anarchists. As he asked:
11610 <!-- PAGE BREAK 247 -->
11614 chief justice: Well, but you want more than that. You want the
11615 right to copy verbatim other people's books, don't you?
11618 mr. lessig: We want the right to copy verbatim works that
11619 should be in the public domain and would be in the public
11621 but for a statute that cannot be justified under ordinary First
11622 Amendment analysis or under a proper reading of the limits built
11623 into the Copyright Clause.
11627 Things went better for us when the government gave its argument;
11628 for now the Court picked up on the core of our claim. As Justice Scalia
11629 asked Solicitor General Olson,
11633 justice scalia: You say that the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11634 time would be a violation [of the Constitution], but that's precisely
11635 the argument that's being made by petitioners here, that a limited
11636 time which is extendable is the functional equivalent of an unlimited
11641 When Olson was finished, it was my turn to give a closing rebuttal.
11642 Olson's flailing had revived my anger. But my anger still was directed
11643 to the academic, not the practical. The government was arguing as if
11644 this were the first case ever to consider limits on Congress's
11645 Copyright and Patent Clause power. Ever the professor and not the
11646 advocate, I closed by pointing out the long history of the Court
11647 imposing limits on Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and
11648 Patent Clause
— indeed, the very first case striking a law of
11649 Congress as exceeding a specific enumerated power was based upon the
11650 Copyright and Patent Clause. All true. But it wasn't going to move the
11654 As I left the court that day, I knew there were a hundred points I
11655 wished I could remake. There were a hundred questions I wished I had
11657 <!-- PAGE BREAK 248 -->
11658 answered differently. But one way of thinking about this case left me
11662 The government had been asked over and over again, what is the limit?
11663 Over and over again, it had answered there is no limit. This was
11664 precisely the answer I wanted the Court to hear. For I could not
11665 imagine how the Court could understand that the government believed
11666 Congress's power was unlimited under the terms of the Copyright
11667 Clause, and sustain the government's argument. The solicitor general
11668 had made my argument for me. No matter how often I tried, I could not
11669 understand how the Court could find that Congress's power under the
11670 Commerce Clause was limited, but under the Copyright Clause,
11671 unlimited. In those rare moments when I let myself believe that we may
11672 have prevailed, it was because I felt this Court
—in particular,
11673 the Conservatives
—would feel itself constrained by the rule of
11674 law that it had established elsewhere.
11677 The morning of January
15,
2003, I was five minutes late to the office
11678 and missed the
7:
00 A.M. call from the Supreme Court clerk. Listening to
11679 the message, I could tell in an instant that she had bad news to report.The
11680 Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Seven
11681 justices had voted in the majority. There were two dissents.
11684 A few seconds later, the opinions arrived by e-mail. I took the
11685 phone off the hook, posted an announcement to our blog, and sat
11686 down to see where I had been wrong in my reasoning.
11689 My
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. Here was a case that pitted all the
11690 money in the world against
<emphasis>reasoning
</emphasis>. And here
11691 was the last naïve law professor, scouring the pages, looking for
11695 I first scoured the opinion, looking for how the Court would
11696 distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in
11697 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. The argument was nowhere to be found. The case was not even
11698 cited. The argument that was the core argument of our case did not
11699 even appear in the Court's opinion.
11703 <!-- PAGE BREAK 249 -->
11704 Justice Ginsburg simply ignored the enumerated powers argument.
11705 Consistent with her view that Congress's power was not limited
11706 generally, she had found Congress's power not limited here.
11709 Her opinion was perfectly reasonable
—for her, and for Justice
11710 Souter. Neither believes in
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle>. It would be too much to expect them
11711 to write an opinion that recognized, much less explained, the doctrine
11712 they had worked so hard to defeat.
11715 But as I realized what had happened, I couldn't quite believe what I
11716 was reading. I had said there was no way this Court could reconcile
11717 limited powers with the Commerce Clause and unlimited powers with the
11718 Progress Clause. It had never even occurred to me that they could
11719 reconcile the two simply
<emphasis>by not addressing the
11720 argument
</emphasis>. There was no inconsistency because they would not
11721 talk about the two together. There was therefore no principle that
11722 followed from the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case: In that context, Congress's power would
11723 be limited, but in this context it would not.
11726 Yet by what right did they get to choose which of the framers' values
11727 they would respect? By what right did they
—the silent
11728 five
—get to select the part of the Constitution they would
11729 enforce based on the values they thought important? We were right back
11730 to the argument that I said I hated at the start: I had failed to
11731 convince them that the issue here was important, and I had failed to
11732 recognize that however much I might hate a system in which the Court
11733 gets to pick the constitutional values that it will respect, that is
11734 the system we have.
11736 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11738 Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote very strong dissents. Stevens's
11739 opinion was crafted internal to the law: He argued that the tradition
11740 of intellectual property law should not support this unjustified
11741 extension of terms. He based his argument on a parallel analysis that
11742 had governed in the context of patents (so had we). But the rest of
11743 the Court discounted the parallel
—without explaining how the
11744 very same words in the Progress Clause could come to mean totally
11745 different things depending upon whether the words were about patents
11746 or copyrights. The Court let Justice Stevens's charge go unanswered.
11748 <indexterm><primary>Breyer, Stephen
</primary></indexterm>
11750 <!-- PAGE BREAK 250 -->
11751 Justice Breyer's opinion, perhaps the best opinion he has ever
11752 written, was external to the Constitution. He argued that the term of
11753 copyrights has become so long as to be effectively unlimited. We had
11754 said that under the current term, a copyright gave an author
99.8
11755 percent of the value of a perpetual term. Breyer said we were wrong,
11756 that the actual number was
99.9997 percent of a perpetual term. Either
11757 way, the point was clear: If the Constitution said a term had to be
11758 "limited," and the existing term was so long as to be effectively
11759 unlimited, then it was unconstitutional.
11762 These two justices understood all the arguments we had made. But
11763 because neither believed in the
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> case, neither was willing to push
11764 it as a reason to reject this extension. The case was decided without
11765 anyone having addressed the argument that we had carried from Judge
11766 Sentelle. It was
<citetitle>Hamlet
</citetitle> without the Prince.
11769 Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when
11770 depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure
11771 the depression. This anger was of two sorts.
11774 It was first anger with the five "Conservatives." It would have been
11775 one thing for them to have explained why the principle of
<citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> didn't
11776 apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
11777 argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
11778 tried to make it myself. But it at least would have been an act of
11779 integrity. These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the
11780 proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is "originalism"
—to
11781 first understand the framers' text, interpreted in their context, in
11782 light of the structure of the Constitution. That method had produced
11783 <citetitle>Lopez
</citetitle> and many other "originalist" rulings. Where was their
11787 Here, they had joined an opinion that never once tried to explain
11788 what the framers had meant by crafting the Progress Clause as they
11789 did; they joined an opinion that never once tried to explain how the
11790 structure of that clause would affect the interpretation of Congress's
11792 <!-- PAGE BREAK 251 -->
11793 power. And they joined an opinion that didn't even try to explain why
11794 this grant of power could be unlimited, whereas the Commerce Clause
11795 would be limited. In short, they had joined an opinion that did not
11796 apply to, and was inconsistent with, their own method for interpreting
11797 the Constitution. This opinion may well have yielded a result that
11798 they liked. It did not produce a reason that was consistent with their
11802 My anger with the Conservatives quickly yielded to anger with
11804 For I had let a view of the law that I liked interfere with a view of
11807 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11809 Most lawyers, and most law professors, have little patience for
11810 idealism about courts in general and this Supreme Court in particular.
11811 Most have a much more pragmatic view. When Don Ayer said that this
11812 case would be won based on whether I could convince the Justices that
11813 the framers' values were important, I fought the idea, because I
11814 didn't want to believe that that is how this Court decides. I insisted
11815 on arguing this case as if it were a simple application of a set of
11816 principles. I had an argument that followed in logic. I didn't need
11817 to waste my time showing it should also follow in popularity.
11820 As I read back over the transcript from that argument in October, I
11821 can see a hundred places where the answers could have taken the
11822 conversation in different directions, where the truth about the harm
11823 that this unchecked power will cause could have been made clear to
11824 this Court. Justice Kennedy in good faith wanted to be shown. I,
11825 idiotically, corrected his question. Justice Souter in good faith
11826 wanted to be shown the First Amendment harms. I, like a math teacher,
11827 reframed the question to make the logical point. I had shown them how
11828 they could strike this law of Congress if they wanted to. There were a
11829 hundred places where I could have helped them want to, yet my
11830 stubbornness, my refusal to give in, stopped me. I have stood before
11831 hundreds of audiences trying to persuade; I have used passion in that
11832 effort to persuade; but I
11833 <!-- PAGE BREAK 252 -->
11834 refused to stand before this audience and try to persuade with the
11835 passion I had used elsewhere. It was not the basis on which a court
11836 should decide the issue.
11838 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11840 Would it have been different if I had argued it differently? Would it
11841 have been different if Don Ayer had argued it? Or Charles Fried? Or
11843 <indexterm><primary>Fried, Charles
</primary></indexterm>
11846 My friends huddled around me to insist it would not. The Court
11847 was not ready, my friends insisted. This was a loss that was destined. It
11848 would take a great deal more to show our society why our framers were
11849 right. And when we do that, we will be able to show that Court.
11852 Maybe, but I doubt it. These Justices have no financial interest in
11853 doing anything except the right thing. They are not lobbied. They have
11854 little reason to resist doing right. I can't help but think that if I had
11855 stepped down from this pretty picture of dispassionate justice, I could
11859 And even if I couldn't, then that doesn't excuse what happened in
11860 January. For at the start of this case, one of America's leading
11861 intellectual property professors stated publicly that my bringing this
11862 case was a mistake. "The Court is not ready," Peter Jaszi said; this
11863 issue should not be raised until it is.
11864 <indexterm><primary>Jaszi, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
11867 After the argument and after the decision, Peter said to me, and
11868 publicly, that he was wrong. But if indeed that Court could not have
11869 been persuaded, then that is all the evidence that's needed to know that
11870 here again Peter was right. Either I was not ready to argue this case in
11871 a way that would do some good or they were not ready to hear this case
11872 in a way that would do some good. Either way, the decision to bring
11873 this case
—a decision I had made four years before
—was wrong.
11874 While the reaction to the Sonny Bono Act itself was almost
11875 unanimously negative, the reaction to the Court's decision was mixed.
11876 No one, at least in the press, tried to say that extending the term of
11877 copyright was a good idea. We had won that battle over ideas. Where
11879 <!-- PAGE BREAK 253 -->
11880 the decision was praised, it was praised by papers that had been
11881 skeptical of the Court's activism in other cases. Deference was a good
11882 thing, even if it left standing a silly law. But where the decision
11883 was attacked, it was attacked because it left standing a silly and
11884 harmful law.
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> wrote in its editorial,
11888 In effect, the Supreme Court's decision makes it likely that we are
11889 seeing the beginning of the end of public domain and the birth of
11890 copyright perpetuity. The public domain has been a grand experiment,
11891 one that should not be allowed to die. The ability to draw freely on
11892 the entire creative output of humanity is one of the reasons we live
11893 in a time of such fruitful creative ferment.
11897 The best responses were in the cartoons. There was a gaggle of
11898 hilarious images
—of Mickey in jail and the like. The best, from
11899 my view of the case, was Ruben Bolling's, reproduced on the next page
11900 (
<xref linkend=
"fig-18"/>). The "powerful and wealthy" line is a bit
11901 unfair. But the punch in the face felt exactly like that.
11902 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11904 <figure id=
"fig-18">
11905 <title>Tom the Dancing Bug cartoon
</title>
11906 <graphic fileref=
"images/18.png"></graphic>
11907 <indexterm><primary>Bolling, Ruben
</primary></indexterm>
11910 The image that will always stick in my head is that evoked by the
11911 quote from
<citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle>. That "grand experiment" we call the
11912 "public domain" is over? When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey,
11913 I shrunk the Constitution." But I can rarely make light of it. We had
11914 in our Constitution a commitment to free culture. In the case that I
11915 fathered, the Supreme Court effectively renounced that commitment. A
11916 better lawyer would have made them see differently.
11918 <!-- PAGE BREAK 254 -->
11920 <chapter label=
"14" id=
"eldred-ii">
11921 <title>CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Eldred II
</title>
11923 The day
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was decided, fate would have it that I was to travel to
11924 Washington, D.C. (The day the rehearing petition in
<citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> was
11925 denied
—meaning the case was really finally over
—fate would
11926 have it that I was giving a speech to technologists at Disney World.)
11927 This was a particularly long flight to my least favorite city. The
11928 drive into the city from Dulles was delayed because of traffic, so I
11929 opened up my computer and wrote an op-ed piece.
11931 <indexterm><primary>Ayer, Don
</primary></indexterm>
11933 It was an act of contrition. During the whole of the flight from San
11934 Francisco to Washington, I had heard over and over again in my head
11935 the same advice from Don Ayer: You need to make them see why it is
11936 important. And alternating with that command was the question of
11937 Justice Kennedy: "For all these years the act has impeded progress in
11938 science and the useful arts. I just don't see any empirical evidence for
11939 that." And so, having failed in the argument of constitutional principle,
11940 finally, I turned to an argument of politics.
11943 <citetitle>The New York Times
</citetitle> published the piece. In it, I proposed a simple
11944 fix: Fifty years after a work has been published, the copyright owner
11945 <!-- PAGE BREAK 256 -->
11946 would be required to register the work and pay a small fee. If he paid
11947 the fee, he got the benefit of the full term of copyright. If he did not,
11948 the work passed into the public domain.
11951 We called this the Eldred Act, but that was just to give it a name.
11952 Eric Eldred was kind enough to let his name be used once again, but as
11953 he said early on, it won't get passed unless it has another name.
11956 Or another two names. For depending upon your perspective, this
11957 is either the "Public Domain Enhancement Act" or the "Copyright
11958 Term Deregulation Act." Either way, the essence of the idea is clear
11959 and obvious: Remove copyright where it is doing nothing except
11960 blocking access and the spread of knowledge. Leave it for as long as
11961 Congress allows for those works where its worth is at least $
1. But for
11962 everything else, let the content go.
11964 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
11966 The reaction to this idea was amazingly strong. Steve Forbes endorsed
11967 it in an editorial. I received an avalanche of e-mail and letters
11968 expressing support. When you focus the issue on lost creativity,
11969 people can see the copyright system makes no sense. As a good
11970 Republican might say, here government regulation is simply getting in
11971 the way of innovation and creativity. And as a good Democrat might
11972 say, here the government is blocking access and the spread of
11973 knowledge for no good reason. Indeed, there is no real difference
11974 between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. Anyone can recognize
11975 the stupid harm of the present system.
11978 Indeed, many recognized the obvious benefit of the registration
11979 requirement. For one of the hardest things about the current system
11980 for people who want to license content is that there is no obvious
11981 place to look for the current copyright owners. Since registration is
11982 not required, since marking content is not required, since no
11983 formality at all is required, it is often impossibly hard to locate
11984 copyright owners to ask permission to use or license their work. This
11985 system would lower these costs, by establishing at least one registry
11986 where copyright owners could be identified.
11988 <indexterm><primary>Berlin Act (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11989 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
11991 <!-- PAGE BREAK 257 -->
11992 As I described in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
11993 linkend=
"property-i"/>, formalities in copyright law were
11994 removed in
1976, when Congress followed the Europeans by abandoning
11995 any formal requirement before a copyright is granted.
<footnote><para>
11997 Until the
1908 Berlin Act of the Berne Convention, national copyright
11998 legislation sometimes made protection depend upon compliance with
11999 formalities such as registration, deposit, and affixation of notice of
12000 the author's claim of copyright. However, starting with the
1908 act,
12001 every text of the Convention has provided that "the enjoyment and the
12002 exercise" of rights guaranteed by the Convention "shall not be subject
12003 to any formality." The prohibition against formalities is presently
12004 embodied in Article
5(
2) of the Paris Text of the Berne
12005 Convention. Many countries continue to impose some form of deposit or
12006 registration requirement, albeit not as a condition of
12007 copyright. French law, for example, requires the deposit of copies of
12008 works in national repositories, principally the National Museum.
12009 Copies of books published in the United Kingdom must be deposited in
12010 the British Library. The German Copyright Act provides for a Registrar
12011 of Authors where the author's true name can be filed in the case of
12012 anonymous or pseudonymous works. Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>International
12013 Intellectual Property Law, Cases and Materials
</citetitle> (New York: Foundation
12014 Press,
2001),
153–54.
</para></footnote>
12015 The Europeans are said to view copyright as a "natural right." Natural
12016 rights don't need forms to exist. Traditions, like the Anglo-American
12017 tradition that required copyright owners to follow form if their
12018 rights were to be protected, did not, the Europeans thought, properly
12019 respect the dignity of the author. My right as a creator turns on my
12020 creativity, not upon the special favor of the government.
12023 That's great rhetoric. It sounds wonderfully romantic. But it is
12024 absurd copyright policy. It is absurd especially for authors, because
12025 a world without formalities harms the creator. The ability to spread
12026 "Walt Disney creativity" is destroyed when there is no simple way to
12027 know what's protected and what's not.
12029 <indexterm><primary>Berne Convention (
1908)
</primary></indexterm>
12031 The fight against formalities achieved its first real victory in
12032 Berlin in
1908. International copyright lawyers amended the Berne
12033 Convention in
1908, to require copyright terms of life plus fifty
12034 years, as well as the abolition of copyright formalities. The
12035 formalities were hated because the stories of inadvertent loss were
12036 increasingly common. It was as if a Charles Dickens character ran all
12037 copyright offices, and the failure to dot an
<citetitle>i
</citetitle> or cross a
12038 <citetitle>t
</citetitle> resulted in the loss of widows' only income.
12041 These complaints were real and sensible. And the strictness of the
12042 formalities, especially in the United States, was absurd. The law
12043 should always have ways of forgiving innocent mistakes. There is no
12044 reason copyright law couldn't, as well. Rather than abandoning
12045 formalities totally, the response in Berlin should have been to
12046 embrace a more equitable system of registration.
12049 Even that would have been resisted, however, because registration
12050 in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was still expensive. It was
12051 also a hassle. The abolishment of formalities promised not only to save
12052 the starving widows, but also to lighten an unnecessary regulatory
12054 imposed upon creators.
12057 In addition to the practical complaint of authors in
1908, there was
12058 a moral claim as well. There was no reason that creative property
12060 <!-- PAGE BREAK 258 -->
12061 should be a second-class form of property. If a carpenter builds a
12062 table, his rights over the table don't depend upon filing a form with
12063 the government. He has a property right over the table "naturally,"
12064 and he can assert that right against anyone who would steal the table,
12065 whether or not he has informed the government of his ownership of the
12069 This argument is correct, but its implications are misleading. For the
12070 argument in favor of formalities does not depend upon creative
12071 property being second-class property. The argument in favor of
12072 formalities turns upon the special problems that creative property
12073 presents. The law of formalities responds to the special physics of
12074 creative property, to assure that it can be efficiently and fairly
12078 No one thinks, for example, that land is second-class property just
12079 because you have to register a deed with a court if your sale of land
12080 is to be effective. And few would think a car is second-class property
12081 just because you must register the car with the state and tag it with
12082 a license. In both of those cases, everyone sees that there is an
12083 important reason to secure registration
—both because it makes
12084 the markets more efficient and because it better secures the rights of
12085 the owner. Without a registration system for land, landowners would
12086 perpetually have to guard their property. With registration, they can
12087 simply point the police to a deed. Without a registration system for
12088 cars, auto theft would be much easier. With a registration system, the
12089 thief has a high burden to sell a stolen car. A slight burden is
12090 placed on the property owner, but those burdens produce a much better
12091 system of protection for property generally.
12094 It is similarly special physics that makes formalities important in
12095 copyright law. Unlike a carpenter's table, there's nothing in nature that
12096 makes it relatively obvious who might own a particular bit of creative
12097 property. A recording of Lyle Lovett's latest album can exist in a billion
12098 places without anything necessarily linking it back to a particular
12099 owner. And like a car, there's no way to buy and sell creative property
12100 with confidence unless there is some simple way to authenticate who is
12101 the author and what rights he has. Simple transactions are destroyed in
12103 <!-- PAGE BREAK 259 -->
12104 a world without formalities. Complex, expensive,
12105 <emphasis>lawyer
</emphasis> transactions take their place.
12106 <indexterm><primary>Lovett, Lyle
</primary></indexterm>
12109 This was the understanding of the problem with the Sonny Bono
12110 Act that we tried to demonstrate to the Court. This was the part it
12111 didn't "get." Because we live in a system without formalities, there is no
12112 way easily to build upon or use culture from our past. If copyright
12113 terms were, as Justice Story said they would be, "short," then this
12114 wouldn't matter much. For fourteen years, under the framers' system, a
12115 work would be presumptively controlled. After fourteen years, it would
12116 be presumptively uncontrolled.
12119 But now that copyrights can be just about a century long, the
12120 inability to know what is protected and what is not protected becomes
12121 a huge and obvious burden on the creative process. If the only way a
12122 library can offer an Internet exhibit about the New Deal is to hire a
12123 lawyer to clear the rights to every image and sound, then the
12124 copyright system is burdening creativity in a way that has never been
12125 seen before
<emphasis>because there are no formalities
</emphasis>.
12128 The Eldred Act was designed to respond to exactly this problem. If
12129 it is worth $
1 to you, then register your work and you can get the
12130 longer term. Others will know how to contact you and, therefore, how
12131 to get your permission if they want to use your work. And you will get
12132 the benefit of an extended copyright term.
12135 If it isn't worth it to you to register to get the benefit of an extended
12136 term, then it shouldn't be worth it for the government to defend your
12137 monopoly over that work either. The work should pass into the public
12138 domain where anyone can copy it, or build archives with it, or create a
12139 movie based on it. It should become free if it is not worth $
1 to you.
12142 Some worry about the burden on authors. Won't the burden of
12143 registering the work mean that the $
1 is really misleading? Isn't the
12144 hassle worth more than $
1? Isn't that the real problem with
12148 It is. The hassle is terrible. The system that exists now is awful. I
12149 completely agree that the Copyright Office has done a terrible job (no
12150 doubt because they are terribly funded) in enabling simple and cheap
12152 <!-- PAGE BREAK 260 -->
12153 registrations. Any real solution to the problem of formalities must
12154 address the real problem of
<emphasis>governments
</emphasis> standing
12155 at the core of any system of formalities. In this book, I offer such a
12156 solution. That solution essentially remakes the Copyright Office. For
12157 now, assume it was Amazon that ran the registration system. Assume it
12158 was one-click registration. The Eldred Act would propose a simple,
12159 one-click registration fifty years after a work was published. Based
12160 upon historical data, that system would move up to
98 percent of
12161 commercial work, commercial work that no longer had a commercial life,
12162 into the public domain within fifty years. What do you think?
12164 <indexterm><primary>Forbes, Steve
</primary></indexterm>
12166 When Steve Forbes endorsed the idea, some in Washington began to pay
12167 attention. Many people contacted me pointing to representatives who
12168 might be willing to introduce the Eldred Act. And I had a few who
12169 directly suggested that they might be willing to take the first step.
12172 One representative, Zoe Lofgren of California, went so far as to get
12173 the bill drafted. The draft solved any problem with international
12174 law. It imposed the simplest requirement upon copyright owners
12175 possible. In May
2003, it looked as if the bill would be
12176 introduced. On May
16, I posted on the Eldred Act blog, "we are
12177 close." There was a general reaction in the blog community that
12178 something good might happen here.
12179 <indexterm><primary>Lofgren, Zoe
</primary></indexterm>
12182 But at this stage, the lobbyists began to intervene. Jack Valenti and
12183 the MPAA general counsel came to the congresswoman's office to give
12184 the view of the MPAA. Aided by his lawyer, as Valenti told me, Valenti
12185 informed the congresswoman that the MPAA would oppose the Eldred
12186 Act. The reasons are embarrassingly thin. More importantly, their
12187 thinness shows something clear about what this debate is really about.
12190 The MPAA argued first that Congress had "firmly rejected the central
12191 concept in the proposed bill"
—that copyrights be renewed. That
12192 was true, but irrelevant, as Congress's "firm rejection" had occurred
12193 <!-- PAGE BREAK 261 -->
12194 long before the Internet made subsequent uses much more likely.
12195 Second, they argued that the proposal would harm poor copyright
12196 owners
—apparently those who could not afford the $
1 fee. Third,
12197 they argued that Congress had determined that extending a copyright
12198 term would encourage restoration work. Maybe in the case of the small
12199 percentage of work covered by copyright law that is still commercially
12200 valuable, but again this was irrelevant, as the proposal would not cut
12201 off the extended term unless the $
1 fee was not paid. Fourth, the MPAA
12202 argued that the bill would impose "enormous" costs, since a
12203 registration system is not free. True enough, but those costs are
12204 certainly less than the costs of clearing the rights for a copyright
12205 whose owner is not known. Fifth, they worried about the risks if the
12206 copyright to a story underlying a film were to pass into the public
12207 domain. But what risk is that? If it is in the public domain, then the
12208 film is a valid derivative use.
12211 Finally, the MPAA argued that existing law enabled copyright owners to
12212 do this if they wanted. But the whole point is that there are
12213 thousands of copyright owners who don't even know they have a
12214 copyright to give. Whether they are free to give away their copyright
12215 or not
—a controversial claim in any case
—unless they know
12216 about a copyright, they're not likely to.
12219 At the beginning of this book, I told two stories about the law
12220 reacting to changes in technology. In the one, common sense prevailed.
12221 In the other, common sense was delayed. The difference between the two
12222 stories was the power of the opposition
—the power of the side
12223 that fought to defend the status quo. In both cases, a new technology
12224 threatened old interests. But in only one case did those interest's
12225 have the power to protect themselves against this new competitive
12229 I used these two cases as a way to frame the war that this book has
12230 been about. For here, too, a new technology is forcing the law to react.
12231 And here, too, we should ask, is the law following or resisting common
12232 sense? If common sense supports the law, what explains this common
12237 <!-- PAGE BREAK 262 -->
12238 When the issue is piracy, it is right for the law to back the
12239 copyright owners. The commercial piracy that I described is wrong and
12240 harmful, and the law should work to eliminate it. When the issue is
12241 p2p sharing, it is easy to understand why the law backs the owners
12242 still: Much of this sharing is wrong, even if much is harmless. When
12243 the issue is copyright terms for the Mickey Mouses of the world, it is
12244 possible still to understand why the law favors Hollywood: Most people
12245 don't recognize the reasons for limiting copyright terms; it is thus
12246 still possible to see good faith within the resistance.
12249 But when the copyright owners oppose a proposal such as the Eldred
12250 Act, then, finally, there is an example that lays bare the naked
12251 selfinterest driving this war. This act would free an extraordinary
12252 range of content that is otherwise unused. It wouldn't interfere with
12253 any copyright owner's desire to exercise continued control over his
12254 content. It would simply liberate what Kevin Kelly calls the "Dark
12255 Content" that fills archives around the world. So when the warriors
12256 oppose a change like this, we should ask one simple question:
12257 <indexterm><primary>Kelly, Kevin
</primary></indexterm>
12260 What does this industry really want?
12263 With very little effort, the warriors could protect their content. So
12264 the effort to block something like the Eldred Act is not really about
12265 protecting
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> content. The effort to block the
12266 Eldred Act is an effort to assure that nothing more passes into the
12267 public domain. It is another step to assure that the public domain
12268 will never compete, that there will be no use of content that is not
12269 commercially controlled, and that there will be no commercial use of
12270 content that doesn't require
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> permission
12274 The opposition to the Eldred Act reveals how extreme the other side
12275 is. The most powerful and sexy and well loved of lobbies really has as
12276 its aim not the protection of "property" but the rejection of a
12277 tradition. Their aim is not simply to protect what is
12278 theirs.
<emphasis>Their aim is to assure that all there is is what is
12282 It is not hard to understand why the warriors take this view. It is not
12283 hard to see why it would benefit them if the competition of the public
12285 <!-- PAGE BREAK 263 -->
12286 domain tied to the Internet could somehow be quashed. Just as RCA
12287 feared the competition of FM, they fear the competition of a public
12288 domain connected to a public that now has the means to create with it
12289 and to share its own creation.
12291 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
12292 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
12294 What is hard to understand is why the public takes this view. It is
12295 as if the law made airplanes trespassers. The MPAA stands with the
12296 Causbys and demands that their remote and useless property rights be
12297 respected, so that these remote and forgotten copyright holders might
12298 block the progress of others.
12301 All this seems to follow easily from this untroubled acceptance of the
12302 "property" in intellectual property. Common sense supports it, and so
12303 long as it does, the assaults will rain down upon the technologies of
12304 the Internet. The consequence will be an increasing "permission
12305 society." The past can be cultivated only if you can identify the
12306 owner and gain permission to build upon his work. The future will be
12307 controlled by this dead (and often unfindable) hand of the past.
12309 <!-- PAGE BREAK 264 -->
12312 <chapter label=
"15" id=
"c-conclusion">
12313 <title>CONCLUSION
</title>
12315 There are more than
35 million people with the AIDS virus
12316 worldwide. Twenty-five million of them live in sub-Saharan Africa.
12317 Seventeen million have already died. Seventeen million Africans
12318 is proportional percentage-wise to seven million Americans. More
12319 importantly, it is seventeen million Africans.
12322 There is no cure for AIDS, but there are drugs to slow its
12323 progression. These antiretroviral therapies are still experimental,
12324 but they have already had a dramatic effect. In the United States,
12325 AIDS patients who regularly take a cocktail of these drugs increase
12326 their life expectancy by ten to twenty years. For some, the drugs make
12327 the disease almost invisible.
12330 These drugs are expensive. When they were first introduced in the
12331 United States, they cost between $
10,
000 and $
15,
000 per person per
12332 year. Today, some cost $
25,
000 per year. At these prices, of course, no
12333 African nation can afford the drugs for the vast majority of its
12335 $
15,
000 is thirty times the per capita gross national product of
12336 Zimbabwe. At these prices, the drugs are totally unavailable.
<footnote><para>
12337 <!-- f1. --> Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, "Final Report: Integrating
12338 Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy" (London,
2002),
12340 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
55</ulink>. According to a World Health Organization press
12342 issued
9 July
2002, only
230,
000 of the
6 million who need drugs in
12343 the developing world receive them
—and half of them are in Brazil.
12347 <!-- PAGE BREAK 265 -->
12348 These prices are not high because the ingredients of the drugs are
12349 expensive. These prices are high because the drugs are protected by
12350 patents. The drug companies that produced these life-saving mixes
12351 enjoy at least a twenty-year monopoly for their inventions. They use
12352 that monopoly power to extract the most they can from the market. That
12353 power is in turn used to keep the prices high.
12356 There are many who are skeptical of patents, especially drug
12357 patents. I am not. Indeed, of all the areas of research that might be
12358 supported by patents, drug research is, in my view, the clearest case
12359 where patents are needed. The patent gives the drug company some
12360 assurance that if it is successful in inventing a new drug to treat a
12361 disease, it will be able to earn back its investment and more. This is
12362 socially an extremely valuable incentive. I am the last person who
12363 would argue that the law should abolish it, at least without other
12367 But it is one thing to support patents, even drug patents. It is
12368 another thing to determine how best to deal with a crisis. And as
12369 African leaders began to recognize the devastation that AIDS was
12370 bringing, they started looking for ways to import HIV treatments at
12371 costs significantly below the market price.
12374 In
1997, South Africa tried one tack. It passed a law to allow the
12375 importation of patented medicines that had been produced or sold in
12376 another nation's market with the consent of the patent owner. For
12377 example, if the drug was sold in India, it could be imported into
12378 Africa from India. This is called "parallel importation," and it is
12379 generally permitted under international trade law and is specifically
12380 permitted within the European Union.
<footnote>
12383 See Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism: Who
12384 Owns the Knowledge Economy?
</citetitle> (New York: The New Press,
2003),
37.
12385 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12386 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12390 However, the United States government opposed the bill. Indeed, more
12391 than opposed. As the International Intellectual Property Association
12392 characterized it, "The U.S. government pressured South Africa
…
12393 not to permit compulsory licensing or parallel
12394 imports."
<footnote><para>
12396 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12397 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12398 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12399 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
14, available at
12400 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
56</ulink>. For a
12401 firsthand account of the struggle over South Africa, see Hearing
12402 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
12403 Resources, House Committee on Government Reform, H. Rep.,
1st sess.,
12404 Ser. No.
106-
126 (
22 July
1999),
150–57 (statement of James
12407 Through the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the
12408 government asked South Africa to change the law
—and to add
12409 pressure to that request, in
1998, the USTR listed South Africa for
12410 possible trade sanctions.
12411 <!-- PAGE BREAK 266 -->
12412 That same year, more than forty pharmaceutical companies began
12413 proceedings in the South African courts to challenge the government's
12414 actions. The United States was then joined by other governments from
12415 the EU. Their claim, and the claim of the pharmaceutical companies,
12416 was that South Africa was violating its obligations under
12417 international law by discriminating against a particular kind of
12418 patent
— pharmaceutical patents. The demand of these governments,
12419 with the United States in the lead, was that South Africa respect
12420 these patents as it respects any other patent, regardless of any
12421 effect on the treatment of AIDS within South Africa.
<footnote><para>
12423 International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI),
<citetitle>Patent
12424 Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan
12425 Africa, a Report Prepared for the World Intellectual Property
12426 Organization
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.,
2000),
15.
</para></footnote>
12429 We should place the intervention by the United States in context. No
12430 doubt patents are not the most important reason that Africans don't
12431 have access to drugs. Poverty and the total absence of an effective
12432 health care infrastructure matter more. But whether patents are the
12433 most important reason or not, the price of drugs has an effect on
12434 their demand, and patents affect price. And so, whether massive or
12435 marginal, there was an effect from our government's intervention to
12436 stop the flow of medications into Africa.
12439 By stopping the flow of HIV treatment into Africa, the United
12440 States government was not saving drugs for United States citizens.
12441 This is not like wheat (if they eat it, we can't); instead, the flow that the
12442 United States intervened to stop was, in effect, a flow of knowledge:
12443 information about how to take chemicals that exist within Africa, and
12444 turn those chemicals into drugs that would save
15 to
30 million lives.
12447 Nor was the intervention by the United States going to protect the
12448 profits of United States drug companies
—at least, not substantially. It
12449 was not as if these countries were in the position to buy the drugs for
12450 the prices the drug companies were charging. Again, the Africans are
12451 wildly too poor to afford these drugs at the offered prices. Stopping the
12452 parallel import of these drugs would not substantially increase the sales
12456 Instead, the argument in favor of restricting this flow of
12457 information, which was needed to save the lives of millions, was an
12459 <!-- PAGE BREAK 267 -->
12460 about the sanctity of property.
<footnote><para>
12462 See Sabin Russell, "New Crusade to Lower AIDS Drug Costs: Africa's
12463 Needs at Odds with Firms' Profit Motive,"
<citetitle>San Francisco Chronicle
</citetitle>,
24
12464 May
1999, A1, available at
12465 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
57</ulink>
12466 ("compulsory licenses and gray markets pose a threat to the entire
12467 system of intellectual property protection"); Robert Weissman, "AIDS
12468 and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to Essential
12469 Medicines,"
<citetitle>Foreign Policy in Focus
</citetitle> 4:
23 (August
1999), available at
12470 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
58</ulink>
12471 (describing U.S. policy); John A. Harrelson, "TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
12472 Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between
12473 Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, a Synopsis,"
<citetitle>Widener Law
12474 Symposium Journal
</citetitle> (Spring
2001):
175.
12475 <!-- PAGE BREAK 333 -->
12477 It was because "intellectual property" would be violated that these
12478 drugs should not flow into Africa. It was a principle about the
12479 importance of "intellectual property" that led these government actors
12480 to intervene against the South African response to AIDS.
12483 Now just step back for a moment. There will be a time thirty years
12484 from now when our children look back at us and ask, how could we have
12485 let this happen? How could we allow a policy to be pursued whose
12486 direct cost would be to speed the death of
15 to
30 million Africans,
12487 and whose only real benefit would be to uphold the "sanctity" of an
12488 idea? What possible justification could there ever be for a policy
12489 that results in so many deaths? What exactly is the insanity that
12490 would allow so many to die for such an abstraction?
12493 Some blame the drug companies. I don't. They are corporations.
12494 Their managers are ordered by law to make money for the corporation.
12495 They push a certain patent policy not because of ideals, but because it is
12496 the policy that makes them the most money. And it only makes them the
12497 most money because of a certain corruption within our political system
—
12498 a corruption the drug companies are certainly not responsible for.
12501 The corruption is our own politicians' failure of integrity. For the
12502 drug companies would love
—they say, and I believe them
—to
12503 sell their drugs as cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and
12504 elsewhere. There are issues they'd have to resolve to make sure the
12505 drugs didn't get back into the United States, but those are mere
12506 problems of technology. They could be overcome.
12509 A different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the
12510 fear of the grandstanding politician who would call the presidents of
12511 the drug companies before a Senate or House hearing, and ask, "How
12512 is it you can sell this HIV drug in Africa for only $
1 a pill, but the same
12513 drug would cost an American $
1,
500?" Because there is no "sound
12514 bite" answer to that question, its effect would be to induce regulation
12515 of prices in America. The drug companies thus avoid this spiral by
12516 avoiding the first step. They reinforce the idea that property should be
12517 <!-- PAGE BREAK 268 -->
12518 sacred. They adopt a rational strategy in an irrational context, with the
12519 unintended consequence that perhaps millions die. And that rational
12520 strategy thus becomes framed in terms of this ideal
—the sanctity of an
12521 idea called "intellectual property."
12524 So when the common sense of your child confronts you, what will
12525 you say? When the common sense of a generation finally revolts
12526 against what we have done, how will we justify what we have done?
12527 What is the argument?
12530 A sensible patent policy could endorse and strongly support the patent
12531 system without having to reach everyone everywhere in exactly the same
12532 way. Just as a sensible copyright policy could endorse and strongly
12533 support a copyright system without having to regulate the spread of
12534 culture perfectly and forever, a sensible patent policy could endorse
12535 and strongly support a patent system without having to block the
12536 spread of drugs to a country not rich enough to afford market prices
12537 in any case. A sensible policy, in other words, could be a balanced
12538 policy. For most of our history, both copyright and patent policies
12539 were balanced in just this sense.
12542 But we as a culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the
12543 critical eye that helps us see the difference between truth and
12544 extremism. A certain property fundamentalism, having no connection to
12545 our tradition, now reigns in this culture
—bizarrely, and with
12546 consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost
12547 any other single policy decision that we as a democracy will make. A
12548 simple idea blinds us, and under the cover of darkness, much happens
12549 that most of us would reject if any of us looked. So uncritically do
12550 we accept the idea of property in ideas that we don't even notice how
12551 monstrous it is to deny ideas to a people who are dying without
12552 them. So uncritically do we accept the idea of property in culture
12553 that we don't even question when the control of that property removes
12555 <!-- PAGE BREAK 269 -->
12556 ability, as a people, to develop our culture democratically. Blindness
12557 becomes our common sense. And the challenge for anyone who would
12558 reclaim the right to cultivate our culture is to find a way to make
12559 this common sense open its eyes.
12562 So far, common sense sleeps. There is no revolt. Common sense
12563 does not yet see what there could be to revolt about. The extremism
12564 that now dominates this debate fits with ideas that seem natural, and
12565 that fit is reinforced by the RCAs of our day. They wage a frantic war
12566 to fight "piracy," and devastate a culture for creativity. They defend
12567 the idea of "creative property," while transforming real creators into
12568 modern-day sharecroppers. They are insulted by the idea that rights
12569 should be balanced, even though each of the major players in this
12570 content war was itself a beneficiary of a more balanced ideal. The
12571 hypocrisy reeks. Yet in a city like Washington, hypocrisy is not even
12572 noticed. Powerful lobbies, complex issues, and MTV attention spans
12573 produce the "perfect storm" for free culture.
12575 <indexterm><primary>Reagan, Ronald
</primary></indexterm>
12577 In August
2003, a fight broke out in the United States about a
12578 decision by the World Intellectual Property Organization to cancel a
12579 meeting.
<footnote><para>
12580 <!-- f6. --> Jonathan Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
12581 August
2003, E1, available at
12582 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
59</ulink>; William New, "Global Group's
12583 Shift on `Open Source' Meeting Spurs Stir,"
<citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12584 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12585 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
60</ulink>; William New, "U.S. Official
12586 Opposes `Open Source' Talks at WIPO,"
<citetitle>National Journal's Technology
12587 Daily
</citetitle>,
19 August
2003, available at
12588 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
61</ulink>.
12590 At the request of a wide range of interests, WIPO had decided to hold
12591 a meeting to discuss "open and collaborative projects to create public
12592 goods." These are projects that have been successful in producing
12593 public goods without relying exclusively upon a proprietary use of
12594 intellectual property. Examples include the Internet and the World
12595 Wide Web, both of which were developed on the basis of protocols in
12596 the public domain. It included an emerging trend to support open
12597 academic journals, including the Public Library of Science project
12598 that I describe in the Afterword. It included a project to develop
12599 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), which are thought to have
12600 great significance in biomedical research. (That nonprofit project
12601 comprised a consortium of the Wellcome Trust and pharmaceutical and
12602 technological companies, including Amersham Biosciences, AstraZeneca,
12603 <!-- PAGE BREAK 270 -->
12604 Aventis, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Hoffmann-La Roche,
12605 Glaxo-SmithKline, IBM, Motorola, Novartis, Pfizer, and Searle.) It
12606 included the Global Positioning System, which Ronald Reagan set free
12607 in the early
1980s. And it included "open source and free software."
12608 <indexterm><primary>academic journals
</primary></indexterm>
12609 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12610 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
12613 The aim of the meeting was to consider this wide range of projects
12614 from one common perspective: that none of these projects relied upon
12615 intellectual property extremism. Instead, in all of them, intellectual
12616 property was balanced by agreements to keep access open or to impose
12617 limitations on the way in which proprietary claims might be used.
12620 From the perspective of this book, then, the conference was ideal.
<footnote><para>
12621 <!-- f7. --> I should disclose that I was one of the people who asked WIPO for the
12624 The projects within its scope included both commercial and
12625 noncommercial work. They primarily involved science, but from many
12626 perspectives. And WIPO was an ideal venue for this discussion, since
12627 WIPO is the preeminent international body dealing with intellectual
12631 Indeed, I was once publicly scolded for not recognizing this fact
12632 about WIPO. In February
2003, I delivered a keynote address to a
12633 preparatory conference for the World Summit on the Information Society
12634 (WSIS). At a press conference before the address, I was asked what I
12635 would say. I responded that I would be talking a little about the
12636 importance of balance in intellectual property for the development of
12637 an information society. The moderator for the event then promptly
12638 interrupted to inform me and the assembled reporters that no question
12639 about intellectual property would be discussed by WSIS, since those
12640 questions were the exclusive domain of WIPO. In the talk that I had
12641 prepared, I had actually made the issue of intellectual property
12642 relatively minor. But after this astonishing statement, I made
12643 intellectual property the sole focus of my talk. There was no way to
12644 talk about an "Information Society" unless one also talked about the
12645 range of information and culture that would be free. My talk did not
12646 make my immoderate moderator very happy. And she was no doubt correct
12647 that the scope of intellectual property protections was ordinarily the
12649 <!-- PAGE BREAK 271 -->
12650 WIPO. But in my view, there couldn't be too much of a conversation
12651 about how much intellectual property is needed, since in my view, the
12652 very idea of balance in intellectual property had been lost.
12655 So whether or not WSIS can discuss balance in intellectual property, I
12656 had thought it was taken for granted that WIPO could and should. And
12657 thus the meeting about "open and collaborative projects to create
12658 public goods" seemed perfectly appropriate within the WIPO agenda.
12661 But there is one project within that list that is highly
12662 controversial, at least among lobbyists. That project is "open source
12663 and free software." Microsoft in particular is wary of discussion of
12664 the subject. From its perspective, a conference to discuss open source
12665 and free software would be like a conference to discuss Apple's
12666 operating system. Both open source and free software compete with
12667 Microsoft's software. And internationally, many governments have begun
12668 to explore requirements that they use open source or free software,
12669 rather than "proprietary software," for their own internal uses.
12672 I don't mean to enter that debate here. It is important only to
12673 make clear that the distinction is not between commercial and
12674 noncommercial software. There are many important companies that depend
12675 fundamentally upon open source and free software, IBM being the most
12676 prominent. IBM is increasingly shifting its focus to the GNU/Linux
12677 operating system, the most famous bit of "free software"
—and IBM
12678 is emphatically a commercial entity. Thus, to support "open source and
12679 free software" is not to oppose commercial entities. It is, instead,
12680 to support a mode of software development that is different from
12681 Microsoft's.
<footnote><para>
12683 Microsoft's position about free and open source software is more
12684 sophisticated. As it has repeatedly asserted, it has no problem with
12685 "open source" software or software in the public domain. Microsoft's
12686 principal opposition is to "free software" licensed under a "copyleft"
12687 license, meaning a license that requires the licensee to adopt the
12688 same terms on any derivative work. See Bradford L. Smith, "The Future
12689 of Software: Enabling the Marketplace to Decide,"
<citetitle>Government Policy
12690 Toward Open Source Software
</citetitle> (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Brookings Joint
12691 Center for Regulatory Studies, American Enterprise Institute for
12692 Public Policy Research,
2002),
69, available at
12693 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
62</ulink>. See also
12694 Craig Mundie, Microsoft senior vice president,
<citetitle>The Commercial Software
12695 Model
</citetitle>, discussion at New York University Stern School of Business (
3
12696 May
2001), available at
12697 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
63</ulink>.
12699 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
12700 <indexterm><primary>"copyleft" licenses
</primary></indexterm>
12701 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12702 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
12705 More important for our purposes, to support "open source and free
12706 software" is not to oppose copyright. "Open source and free software"
12707 is not software in the public domain. Instead, like Microsoft's
12708 software, the copyright owners of free and open source software insist
12709 quite strongly that the terms of their software license be respected
12711 <!-- PAGE BREAK 272 -->
12712 adopters of free and open source software. The terms of that license
12713 are no doubt different from the terms of a proprietary software
12714 license. Free software licensed under the General Public License
12715 (GPL), for example, requires that the source code for the software be
12716 made available by anyone who modifies and redistributes the
12717 software. But that requirement is effective only if copyright governs
12718 software. If copyright did not govern software, then free software
12719 could not impose the same kind of requirements on its adopters. It
12720 thus depends upon copyright law just as Microsoft does.
12723 It is therefore understandable that as a proprietary software
12724 developer, Microsoft would oppose this WIPO meeting, and
12725 understandable that it would use its lobbyists to get the United
12726 States government to oppose it, as well. And indeed, that is just what
12727 was reported to have happened. According to Jonathan Krim of the
12728 <citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>, Microsoft's lobbyists succeeded in getting the United
12729 States government to veto the meeting.
<footnote><para>
12731 Krim, "The Quiet War over Open-Source," available at
<ulink
12732 url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
64</ulink>.
12734 And without U.S. backing, the meeting was canceled.
12735 <indexterm><primary>Krim, Jonathan
</primary></indexterm>
12738 I don't blame Microsoft for doing what it can to advance its own
12739 interests, consistent with the law. And lobbying governments is
12740 plainly consistent with the law. There was nothing surprising about
12741 its lobbying here, and nothing terribly surprising about the most
12742 powerful software producer in the United States having succeeded in
12743 its lobbying efforts.
12746 What was surprising was the United States government's reason for
12747 opposing the meeting. Again, as reported by Krim, Lois Boland, acting
12748 director of international relations for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
12749 Office, explained that "open-source software runs counter to the
12750 mission of WIPO, which is to promote intellectual-property rights."
12751 She is quoted as saying, "To hold a meeting which has as its purpose
12752 to disclaim or waive such rights seems to us to be contrary to the
12756 These statements are astonishing on a number of levels.
12758 <!-- PAGE BREAK 273 -->
12760 First, they are just flat wrong. As I described, most open source and
12761 free software relies fundamentally upon the intellectual property
12762 right called "copyright". Without it, restrictions imposed by those
12763 licenses wouldn't work. Thus, to say it "runs counter" to the mission
12764 of promoting intellectual property rights reveals an extraordinary gap
12765 in understanding
—the sort of mistake that is excusable in a
12766 first-year law student, but an embarrassment from a high government
12767 official dealing with intellectual property issues.
12770 Second, who ever said that WIPO's exclusive aim was to "promote"
12771 intellectual property maximally? As I had been scolded at the
12772 preparatory conference of WSIS, WIPO is to consider not only how best
12773 to protect intellectual property, but also what the best balance of
12774 intellectual property is. As every economist and lawyer knows, the
12775 hard question in intellectual property law is to find that
12776 balance. But that there should be limits is, I had thought,
12777 uncontested. One wants to ask Ms. Boland, are generic drugs (drugs
12778 based on drugs whose patent has expired) contrary to the WIPO mission?
12779 Does the public domain weaken intellectual property? Would it have
12780 been better if the protocols of the Internet had been patented?
12783 Third, even if one believed that the purpose of WIPO was to maximize
12784 intellectual property rights, in our tradition, intellectual property
12785 rights are held by individuals and corporations. They get to decide
12786 what to do with those rights because, again, they are
12787 <emphasis>their
</emphasis> rights. If they want to "waive" or
12788 "disclaim" their rights, that is, within our tradition, totally
12789 appropriate. When Bill Gates gives away more than $
20 billion to do
12790 good in the world, that is not inconsistent with the objectives of the
12791 property system. That is, on the contrary, just what a property system
12792 is supposed to be about: giving individuals the right to decide what
12793 to do with
<emphasis>their
</emphasis> property.
12794 <indexterm><primary>Gates, Bill
</primary></indexterm>
12797 When Ms. Boland says that there is something wrong with a meeting
12798 "which has as its purpose to disclaim or waive such rights," she's
12799 saying that WIPO has an interest in interfering with the choices of
12800 <!-- PAGE BREAK 274 -->
12801 the individuals who own intellectual property rights. That somehow,
12802 WIPO's objective should be to stop an individual from "waiving" or
12803 "disclaiming" an intellectual property right. That the interest of
12804 WIPO is not just that intellectual property rights be maximized, but
12805 that they also should be exercised in the most extreme and restrictive
12809 There is a history of just such a property system that is well known
12810 in the Anglo-American tradition. It is called "feudalism." Under
12811 feudalism, not only was property held by a relatively small number of
12812 individuals and entities. And not only were the rights that ran with
12813 that property powerful and extensive. But the feudal system had a
12814 strong interest in assuring that property holders within that system
12815 not weaken feudalism by liberating people or property within their
12816 control to the free market. Feudalism depended upon maximum control
12817 and concentration. It fought any freedom that might interfere with
12820 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12821 <indexterm><primary>Braithwaite, John
</primary></indexterm>
12823 As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite relate, this is precisely the
12824 choice we are now making about intellectual property.
<footnote><para>
12826 See Drahos with Braithwaite,
<citetitle>Information Feudalism
</citetitle>,
210–20.
12827 <indexterm><primary>Drahos, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
12829 We will have an information society. That much is certain. Our only
12830 choice now is whether that information society will be
12831 <emphasis>free
</emphasis> or
<emphasis>feudal
</emphasis>. The trend is
12835 When this battle broke, I blogged it. A spirited debate within the
12836 comment section ensued. Ms. Boland had a number of supporters who
12837 tried to show why her comments made sense. But there was one comment
12838 that was particularly depressing for me. An anonymous poster wrote,
12842 George, you misunderstand Lessig: He's only talking about the world as
12843 it should be ("the goal of WIPO, and the goal of any government,
12844 should be to promote the right balance of intellectual property rights,
12845 not simply to promote intellectual property rights"), not as it is. If
12846 we were talking about the world as it is, then of course Boland didn't
12847 say anything wrong. But in the world
12848 <!-- PAGE BREAK 275 -->
12849 as Lessig would have it, then of course she did. Always pay attention
12850 to the distinction between Lessig's world and ours.
12854 I missed the irony the first time I read it. I read it quickly and
12855 thought the poster was supporting the idea that seeking balance was
12856 what our government should be doing. (Of course, my criticism of Ms.
12857 Boland was not about whether she was seeking balance or not; my
12858 criticism was that her comments betrayed a first-year law student's
12859 mistake. I have no illusion about the extremism of our government,
12860 whether Republican or Democrat. My only illusion apparently is about
12861 whether our government should speak the truth or not.)
12864 Obviously, however, the poster was not supporting that idea. Instead,
12865 the poster was ridiculing the very idea that in the real world, the
12866 "goal" of a government should be "to promote the right balance" of
12867 intellectual property. That was obviously silly to him. And it
12868 obviously betrayed, he believed, my own silly utopianism. "Typical for
12869 an academic," the poster might well have continued.
12872 I understand criticism of academic utopianism. I think utopianism is
12873 silly, too, and I'd be the first to poke fun at the absurdly
12874 unrealistic ideals of academics throughout history (and not just in
12875 our own country's history).
12878 But when it has become silly to suppose that the role of our
12879 government should be to "seek balance," then count me with the silly,
12880 for that means that this has become quite serious indeed. If it should
12881 be obvious to everyone that the government does not seek balance, that
12882 the government is simply the tool of the most powerful lobbyists, that
12883 the idea of holding the government to a different standard is absurd,
12884 that the idea of demanding of the government that it speak truth and
12885 not lies is just na
ïve, then who have we, the most powerful
12886 democracy in the world, become?
12889 It might be crazy to expect a high government official to speak
12890 the truth. It might be crazy to believe that government policy will be
12891 something more than the handmaiden of the most powerful interests.
12892 <!-- PAGE BREAK 276 -->
12893 It might be crazy to argue that we should preserve a tradition that has
12894 been part of our tradition for most of our history
—free culture.
12896 <indexterm><primary>CodePink Women in Peace
</primary></indexterm>
12898 If this is crazy, then let there be more crazies. Soon. There are
12899 moments of hope in this struggle. And moments that surprise. When the
12900 FCC was considering relaxing ownership rules, which would thereby
12901 further increase the concentration in media ownership, an
12902 extraordinary bipartisan coalition formed to fight this change. For
12903 perhaps the first time in history, interests as diverse as the NRA,
12904 the ACLU, Moveon.org, William Safire, Ted Turner, and CodePink Women
12905 for Peace organized to oppose this change in FCC policy. An
12906 astonishing
700,
000 letters were sent to the FCC, demanding more
12907 hearings and a different result.
12908 <indexterm><primary>Turner, Ted
</primary></indexterm>
12909 <indexterm><primary>Safire, William
</primary></indexterm>
12912 This activism did not stop the FCC, but soon after, a broad coalition
12913 in the Senate voted to reverse the FCC decision. The hostile hearings
12914 leading up to that vote revealed just how powerful this movement had
12915 become. There was no substantial support for the FCC's decision, and
12916 there was broad and sustained support for fighting further
12917 concentration in the media.
12920 But even this movement misses an important piece of the puzzle.
12921 Largeness as such is not bad. Freedom is not threatened just because
12922 some become very rich, or because there are only a handful of big
12923 players. The poor quality of Big Macs or Quarter Pounders does not
12924 mean that you can't get a good hamburger from somewhere else.
12927 The danger in media concentration comes not from the concentration,
12928 but instead from the feudalism that this concentration, tied to the
12929 change in copyright, produces. It is not just that there are a few
12930 powerful companies that control an ever expanding slice of the
12931 media. It is that this concentration can call upon an equally bloated
12932 range of rights
—property rights of a historically extreme
12933 form
—that makes their bigness bad.
12935 <!-- PAGE BREAK 277 -->
12937 It is therefore significant that so many would rally to demand
12938 competition and increased diversity. Still, if the rally is understood
12939 as being about bigness alone, it is not terribly surprising. We
12940 Americans have a long history of fighting "big," wisely or not. That
12941 we could be motivated to fight "big" again is not something new.
12944 It would be something new, and something very important, if an equal
12945 number could be rallied to fight the increasing extremism built within
12946 the idea of "intellectual property." Not because balance is alien to
12947 our tradition; indeed, as I've argued, balance is our tradition. But
12948 because the muscle to think critically about the scope of anything
12949 called "property" is not well exercised within this tradition anymore.
12952 If we were Achilles, this would be our heel. This would be the place
12955 <indexterm><primary>Dylan, Bob
</primary></indexterm>
12957 As I write these final words, the news is filled with stories about
12958 the RIAA lawsuits against almost three hundred individuals.
<footnote><para>
12960 John Borland, "RIAA Sues
261 File Swappers," CNET News.com, September
12962 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
65</ulink>; Paul
12963 R. La Monica, "Music Industry Sues Swappers," CNN/Money,
8 September
12965 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
66</ulink>; Soni
12966 Sangha and Phyllis Furman with Robert Gearty, "Sued for a Song,
12967 N.Y.C.
12-Yr-Old Among
261 Cited as Sharers,"
<citetitle>New York Daily News
</citetitle>,
9
12968 September
2003,
3; Frank Ahrens, "RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised
12969 Targets; Single Mother in Calif.,
12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among
12970 Defendants,"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003, E1; Katie Dean,
12971 "Schoolgirl Settles with RIAA,"
<citetitle>Wired News
</citetitle>,
10 September
2003,
12973 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
67</ulink>.
12975 Eminem has just been sued for "sampling" someone else's
12976 music.
<footnote><para>
12978 Jon Wiederhorn, "Eminem Gets Sued
… by a Little Old Lady,"
12979 mtv.com,
17 September
2003, available at
12980 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
68</ulink>.
12982 The story about Bob Dylan "stealing" from a Japanese author has just
12983 finished making the rounds.
<footnote><para>
12985 Kenji Hall, Associated Press, "Japanese Book May Be Inspiration for
12986 Dylan Songs," Kansascity.com,
9 July
2003, available at
12987 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
69</ulink>.
12988 <!-- PAGE BREAK 334 -->
12990 An insider from Hollywood
—who insists he must remain
12991 anonymous
—reports "an amazing conversation with these studio
12992 guys. They've got extraordinary [old] content that they'd love to use
12993 but can't because they can't begin to clear the rights. They've got
12994 scores of kids who could do amazing things with the content, but it
12995 would take scores of lawyers to clean it first." Congressmen are
12996 talking about deputizing computer viruses to bring down computers
12997 thought to violate the law. Universities are threatening expulsion for
12998 kids who use a computer to share content.
13000 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Thomas Lee
</primary></indexterm>
13001 <indexterm><primary>Causby, Tinie
</primary></indexterm>
13002 <indexterm><primary>Creative Commons
</primary></indexterm>
13003 <indexterm><primary>Gil, Gilberto
</primary></indexterm>
13005 Yet on the other side of the Atlantic, the BBC has just announced
13006 that it will build a "Creative Archive," from which British citizens can
13007 download BBC content, and rip, mix, and burn it.
<footnote><para>
13008 <!-- f14. --> "BBC Plans to Open Up Its Archive to the Public," BBC press release,
13009 24 August
2003, available at
13010 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
70</ulink>.
13012 And in Brazil, the culture minister, Gilberto Gil, himself a folk hero
13013 of Brazilian music, has joined with Creative Commons to release
13014 content and free licenses in that Latin American
13015 country.
<footnote><para>
13017 "Creative Commons and Brazil," Creative Commons Weblog,
6 August
2003,
13019 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
71</ulink>.
13021 <!-- PAGE BREAK 278 -->
13022 I've told a dark story. The truth is more mixed. A technology has
13023 given us a new freedom. Slowly, some begin to understand that this
13024 freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the
13025 twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of
13026 digital technology being destroyed. It will take some thought, and
13027 more importantly, it will take some will to transform the RCAs of our
13028 day into the Causbys.
13031 Common sense must revolt. It must act to free culture. Soon, if this
13032 potential is ever to be realized.
13034 <!-- PAGE BREAK 279 -->
13038 <chapter label=
"16" id=
"c-afterword">
13039 <title>AFTERWORD
</title>
13042 <!-- PAGE BREAK 280 -->
13043 At least some who have read this far will agree with me that something
13044 must be done to change where we are heading. The balance of this book
13045 maps what might be done.
13048 I divide this map into two parts: that which anyone can do now,
13049 and that which requires the help of lawmakers. If there is one lesson
13050 that we can draw from the history of remaking common sense, it is that
13051 it requires remaking how many people think about the very same issue.
13054 That means this movement must begin in the streets. It must recruit a
13055 significant number of parents, teachers, librarians, creators,
13056 authors, musicians, filmmakers, scientists
—all to tell this
13057 story in their own words, and to tell their neighbors why this battle
13061 Once this movement has its effect in the streets, it has some hope of
13062 having an effect in Washington. We are still a democracy. What people
13063 think matters. Not as much as it should, at least when an RCA stands
13064 opposed, but still, it matters. And thus, in the second part below, I
13065 sketch changes that Congress could make to better secure a free culture.
13067 <!-- PAGE BREAK 281 -->
13069 <section id=
"usnow">
13070 <title>US, NOW
</title>
13072 Common sense is with the copyright warriors because the debate so far
13073 has been framed at the extremes
—as a grand either/or: either
13074 property or anarchy, either total control or artists won't be paid. If
13075 that really is the choice, then the warriors should win.
13078 The mistake here is the error of the excluded middle. There are
13079 extremes in this debate, but the extremes are not all that there
13080 is. There are those who believe in maximal copyright
—"All Rights
13081 Reserved"
— and those who reject copyright
—"No Rights
13082 Reserved." The "All Rights Reserved" sorts believe that you should ask
13083 permission before you "use" a copyrighted work in any way. The "No
13084 Rights Reserved" sorts believe you should be able to do with content
13085 as you wish, regardless of whether you have permission or not.
13088 When the Internet was first born, its initial architecture effectively
13089 tilted in the "no rights reserved" direction. Content could be copied
13090 perfectly and cheaply; rights could not easily be controlled. Thus,
13091 regardless of anyone's desire, the effective regime of copyright under
13094 <!-- PAGE BREAK 282 -->
13095 original design of the Internet was "no rights reserved." Content was
13096 "taken" regardless of the rights. Any rights were effectively
13100 This initial character produced a reaction (opposite, but not quite
13101 equal) by copyright owners. That reaction has been the topic of this
13102 book. Through legislation, litigation, and changes to the network's
13103 design, copyright holders have been able to change the essential
13104 character of the environment of the original Internet. If the original
13105 architecture made the effective default "no rights reserved," the
13106 future architecture will make the effective default "all rights
13107 reserved." The architecture and law that surround the Internet's
13108 design will increasingly produce an environment where all use of
13109 content requires permission. The "cut and paste" world that defines
13110 the Internet today will become a "get permission to cut and paste"
13111 world that is a creator's nightmare.
13114 What's needed is a way to say something in the middle
—neither
13115 "all rights reserved" nor "no rights reserved" but "some rights
13116 reserved"
— and thus a way to respect copyrights but enable
13117 creators to free content as they see fit. In other words, we need a
13118 way to restore a set of freedoms that we could just take for granted
13122 <section id=
"examples">
13123 <title>Rebuilding Freedoms Previously Presumed: Examples
</title>
13125 If you step back from the battle I've been describing here, you will
13126 recognize this problem from other contexts. Think about
13127 privacy. Before the Internet, most of us didn't have to worry much
13128 about data about our lives that we broadcast to the world. If you
13129 walked into a bookstore and browsed through some of the works of Karl
13130 Marx, you didn't need to worry about explaining your browsing habits
13131 to your neighbors or boss. The "privacy" of your browsing habits was
13135 What made it assured?
13137 <!-- PAGE BREAK 283 -->
13139 Well, if we think in terms of the modalities I described in chapter
13140 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"property-i"/>, your
13141 privacy was assured because of an inefficient architecture for
13142 gathering data and hence a market constraint (cost) on anyone who
13143 wanted to gather that data. If you were a suspected spy for North
13144 Korea, working for the CIA, no doubt your privacy would not be
13145 assured. But that's because the CIA would (we hope) find it valuable
13146 enough to spend the thousands required to track you. But for most of
13147 us (again, we can hope), spying doesn't pay. The highly inefficient
13148 architecture of real space means we all enjoy a fairly robust amount
13149 of privacy. That privacy is guaranteed to us by friction. Not by law
13150 (there is no law protecting "privacy" in public places), and in many
13151 places, not by norms (snooping and gossip are just fun), but instead,
13152 by the costs that friction imposes on anyone who would want to spy.
13154 <indexterm><primary>Amazon
</primary></indexterm>
13156 Enter the Internet, where the cost of tracking browsing in particular
13157 has become quite tiny. If you're a customer at Amazon, then as you
13158 browse the pages, Amazon collects the data about what you've looked
13159 at. You know this because at the side of the page, there's a list of
13160 "recently viewed" pages. Now, because of the architecture of the Net
13161 and the function of cookies on the Net, it is easier to collect the
13162 data than not. The friction has disappeared, and hence any "privacy"
13163 protected by the friction disappears, too.
13164 <indexterm><primary>cookies, Internet
</primary></indexterm>
13167 Amazon, of course, is not the problem. But we might begin to worry
13168 about libraries. If you're one of those crazy lefties who thinks that
13169 people should have the "right" to browse in a library without the
13170 government knowing which books you look at (I'm one of those lefties,
13171 too), then this change in the technology of monitoring might concern
13172 you. If it becomes simple to gather and sort who does what in
13173 electronic spaces, then the friction-induced privacy of yesterday
13177 It is this reality that explains the push of many to define "privacy"
13178 on the Internet. It is the recognition that technology can remove what
13179 friction before gave us that leads many to push for laws to do what
13180 friction did.
<footnote><para>
13183 See, for example, Marc Rotenberg, "Fair Information Practices and the
13184 Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),"
<citetitle>Stanford Technology
13185 Law Review
</citetitle> 1 (
2001): par.
6–18, available at
13187 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>
13188 (describing examples in which technology defines privacy policy). See
13189 also Jeffrey Rosen,
<citetitle>The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom
13190 in an Anxious Age
</citetitle> (New York: Random House,
2004) (mapping tradeoffs
13191 between technology and privacy).
</para></footnote>
13192 And whether you're in favor of those laws or not, it is the pattern
13193 that is important here. We must take affirmative steps to secure a
13195 <!-- PAGE BREAK 284 -->
13196 kind of freedom that was passively provided before. A change in
13197 technology now forces those who believe in privacy to affirmatively
13198 act where, before, privacy was given by default.
13201 A similar story could be told about the birth of the free software
13202 movement. When computers with software were first made available
13203 commercially, the software
—both the source code and the
13204 binaries
— was free. You couldn't run a program written for a
13205 Data General machine on an IBM machine, so Data General and IBM didn't
13206 care much about controlling their software.
13207 <indexterm><primary>IBM
</primary></indexterm>
13209 <indexterm><primary>Stallman, Richard
</primary></indexterm>
13211 That was the world Richard Stallman was born into, and while he was a
13212 researcher at MIT, he grew to love the community that developed when
13213 one was free to explore and tinker with the software that ran on
13214 machines. Being a smart sort himself, and a talented programmer,
13215 Stallman grew to depend upon the freedom to add to or modify other
13219 In an academic setting, at least, that's not a terribly radical
13220 idea. In a math department, anyone would be free to tinker with a
13221 proof that someone offered. If you thought you had a better way to
13222 prove a theorem, you could take what someone else did and change
13223 it. In a classics department, if you believed a colleague's
13224 translation of a recently discovered text was flawed, you were free to
13225 improve it. Thus, to Stallman, it seemed obvious that you should be
13226 free to tinker with and improve the code that ran a machine. This,
13227 too, was knowledge. Why shouldn't it be open for criticism like
13231 No one answered that question. Instead, the architecture of revenue
13232 for computing changed. As it became possible to import programs from
13233 one system to another, it became economically attractive (at least in
13234 the view of some) to hide the code of your program. So, too, as
13235 companies started selling peripherals for mainframe systems. If I
13236 could just take your printer driver and copy it, then that would make
13237 it easier for me to sell a printer to the market than it was for you.
13240 Thus, the practice of proprietary code began to spread, and by the
13241 early
1980s, Stallman found himself surrounded by proprietary code.
13242 <!-- PAGE BREAK 285 -->
13243 The world of free software had been erased by a change in the
13244 economics of computing. And as he believed, if he did nothing about
13245 it, then the freedom to change and share software would be
13246 fundamentally weakened.
13249 Therefore, in
1984, Stallman began a project to build a free operating
13250 system, so that at least a strain of free software would survive. That
13251 was the birth of the GNU project, into which Linus Torvalds's "Linux"
13252 kernel was added to produce the GNU/Linux operating system.
13253 <indexterm><primary>GNU/Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13254 <indexterm><primary>Linux operating system
</primary></indexterm>
13257 Stallman's technique was to use copyright law to build a world of
13258 software that must be kept free. Software licensed under the Free
13259 Software Foundation's GPL cannot be modified and distributed unless
13260 the source code for that software is made available as well. Thus,
13261 anyone building upon GPL'd software would have to make their buildings
13262 free as well. This would assure, Stallman believed, that an ecology of
13263 code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His
13264 fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a
13268 Stallman was thus doing for software what privacy advocates now
13269 do for privacy. He was seeking a way to rebuild a kind of freedom that
13270 was taken for granted before. Through the affirmative use of licenses
13271 that bind copyrighted code, Stallman was affirmatively reclaiming a
13272 space where free software would survive. He was actively protecting
13273 what before had been passively guaranteed.
13276 Finally, consider a very recent example that more directly resonates
13277 with the story of this book. This is the shift in the way academic and
13278 scientific journals are produced.
13280 <indexterm id=
"idxacademocjournals" class='startofrange'
>
13281 <primary>academic journals
</primary>
13284 As digital technologies develop, it is becoming obvious to many that
13285 printing thousands of copies of journals every month and sending them
13286 to libraries is perhaps not the most efficient way to distribute
13287 knowledge. Instead, journals are increasingly becoming electronic, and
13288 libraries and their users are given access to these electronic
13289 journals through password-protected sites. Something similar to this
13290 has been happening in law for almost thirty years: Lexis and Westlaw
13291 have had electronic versions of case reports available to subscribers
13292 to their service. Although a Supreme Court opinion is not
13293 copyrighted, and anyone is free to go to a library and read it, Lexis
13294 and Westlaw are also free
13295 <!-- PAGE BREAK 286 -->
13296 to charge users for the privilege of gaining access to that Supreme
13297 Court opinion through their respective services.
13300 There's nothing wrong in general with this, and indeed, the ability to
13301 charge for access to even public domain materials is a good incentive
13302 for people to develop new and innovative ways to spread knowledge.
13303 The law has agreed, which is why Lexis and Westlaw have been allowed
13304 to flourish. And if there's nothing wrong with selling the public
13305 domain, then there could be nothing wrong, in principle, with selling
13306 access to material that is not in the public domain.
13309 But what if the only way to get access to social and scientific data
13310 was through proprietary services? What if no one had the ability to
13311 browse this data except by paying for a subscription?
13314 As many are beginning to notice, this is increasingly the reality with
13315 scientific journals. When these journals were distributed in paper
13316 form, libraries could make the journals available to anyone who had
13317 access to the library. Thus, patients with cancer could become cancer
13318 experts because the library gave them access. Or patients trying to
13319 understand the risks of a certain treatment could research those risks
13320 by reading all available articles about that treatment. This freedom
13321 was therefore a function of the institution of libraries (norms) and
13322 the technology of paper journals (architecture)
—namely, that it
13323 was very hard to control access to a paper journal.
13326 As journals become electronic, however, the publishers are demanding
13327 that libraries not give the general public access to the
13328 journals. This means that the freedoms provided by print journals in
13329 public libraries begin to disappear. Thus, as with privacy and with
13330 software, a changing technology and market shrink a freedom taken for
13334 This shrinking freedom has led many to take affirmative steps to
13335 restore the freedom that has been lost. The Public Library of Science
13336 (PLoS), for example, is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to making
13337 scientific research available to anyone with a Web connection. Authors
13338 <!-- PAGE BREAK 287 -->
13339 of scientific work submit that work to the Public Library of Science.
13340 That work is then subject to peer review. If accepted, the work is
13341 then deposited in a public, electronic archive and made permanently
13342 available for free. PLoS also sells a print version of its work, but
13343 the copyright for the print journal does not inhibit the right of
13344 anyone to redistribute the work for free.
13345 <indexterm><primary>PLoS (Public Library of Science)
</primary></indexterm>
13348 This is one of many such efforts to restore a freedom taken for
13349 granted before, but now threatened by changing technology and markets.
13350 There's no doubt that this alternative competes with the traditional
13351 publishers and their efforts to make money from the exclusive
13352 distribution of content. But competition in our tradition is
13353 presumptively a good
—especially when it helps spread knowledge
13356 <indexterm startref=
"idxacademocjournals" class='endofrange'
/>
13359 <section id=
"oneidea">
13360 <title>Rebuilding Free Culture: One Idea
</title>
13361 <indexterm id=
"idxcc" class='startofrange'
>
13362 <primary>Creative Commons
</primary>
13365 The same strategy could be applied to culture, as a response to the
13366 increasing control effected through law and technology.
13369 Enter the Creative Commons. The Creative Commons is a nonprofit
13370 corporation established in Massachusetts, but with its home at
13371 Stanford University. Its aim is to build a layer of
13372 <emphasis>reasonable
</emphasis> copyright on top of the extremes that
13373 now reign. It does this by making it easy for people to build upon
13374 other people's work, by making it simple for creators to express the
13375 freedom for others to take and build upon their work. Simple tags,
13376 tied to human-readable descriptions, tied to bulletproof licenses,
13377 make this possible.
13380 <emphasis>Simple
</emphasis>—which means without a middleman, or
13381 without a lawyer. By developing a free set of licenses that people
13382 can attach to their content, Creative Commons aims to mark a range of
13383 content that can easily, and reliably, be built upon. These tags are
13384 then linked to machine-readable versions of the license that enable
13385 computers automatically to identify content that can easily be
13386 shared. These three expressions together
—a legal license, a
13387 human-readable description, and
13388 <!-- PAGE BREAK 288 -->
13389 machine-readable tags
—constitute a Creative Commons license. A
13390 Creative Commons license constitutes a grant of freedom to anyone who
13391 accesses the license, and more importantly, an expression of the ideal
13392 that the person associated with the license believes in something
13393 different than the "All" or "No" extremes. Content is marked with the
13394 CC mark, which does not mean that copyright is waived, but that
13395 certain freedoms are given.
13398 These freedoms are beyond the freedoms promised by fair use. Their
13399 precise contours depend upon the choices the creator makes. The
13400 creator can choose a license that permits any use, so long as
13401 attribution is given. She can choose a license that permits only
13402 noncommercial use. She can choose a license that permits any use so
13403 long as the same freedoms are given to other uses ("share and share
13404 alike"). Or any use so long as no derivative use is made. Or any use
13405 at all within developing nations. Or any sampling use, so long as full
13406 copies are not made. Or lastly, any educational use.
13409 These choices thus establish a range of freedoms beyond the default of
13410 copyright law. They also enable freedoms that go beyond traditional
13411 fair use. And most importantly, they express these freedoms in a way
13412 that subsequent users can use and rely upon without the need to hire a
13413 lawyer. Creative Commons thus aims to build a layer of content,
13414 governed by a layer of reasonable copyright law, that others can build
13415 upon. Voluntary choice of individuals and creators will make this
13416 content available. And that content will in turn enable us to rebuild
13420 This is just one project among many within the Creative Commons. And
13421 of course, Creative Commons is not the only organization pursuing such
13422 freedoms. But the point that distinguishes the Creative Commons from
13423 many is that we are not interested only in talking about a public
13424 domain or in getting legislators to help build a public domain. Our
13425 aim is to build a movement of consumers and producers
13426 <!-- PAGE BREAK 289 -->
13427 of content ("content conducers," as attorney Mia Garlick calls them)
13428 who help build the public domain and, by their work, demonstrate the
13429 importance of the public domain to other creativity.
13430 <indexterm><primary>Garlick, Mia
</primary></indexterm>
13433 The aim is not to fight the "All Rights Reserved" sorts. The aim is to
13434 complement them. The problems that the law creates for us as a culture
13435 are produced by insane and unintended consequences of laws written
13436 centuries ago, applied to a technology that only Jefferson could have
13437 imagined. The rules may well have made sense against a background of
13438 technologies from centuries ago, but they do not make sense against
13439 the background of digital technologies. New rules
—with different
13440 freedoms, expressed in ways so that humans without lawyers can use
13441 them
—are needed. Creative Commons gives people a way effectively
13442 to begin to build those rules.
13445 Why would creators participate in giving up total control? Some
13446 participate to better spread their content. Cory Doctorow, for
13447 example, is a science fiction author. His first novel,
<citetitle>Down and Out in
13448 the Magic Kingdom
</citetitle>, was released on-line and for free, under a Creative
13449 Commons license, on the same day that it went on sale in bookstores.
13452 Why would a publisher ever agree to this? I suspect his publisher
13453 reasoned like this: There are two groups of people out there: (
1)
13454 those who will buy Cory's book whether or not it's on the Internet,
13455 and (
2) those who may never hear of Cory's book, if it isn't made
13456 available for free on the Internet. Some part of (
1) will download
13457 Cory's book instead of buying it. Call them bad-(
1)s. Some part of (
2)
13458 will download Cory's book, like it, and then decide to buy it. Call
13459 them (
2)-goods. If there are more (
2)-goods than bad-(
1)s, the
13460 strategy of releasing Cory's book free on-line will probably
13461 <emphasis>increase
</emphasis> sales of Cory's book.
13464 Indeed, the experience of his publisher clearly supports that
13465 conclusion. The book's first printing was exhausted months before the
13466 publisher had expected. This first novel of a science fiction author
13467 was a total success.
13470 The idea that free content might increase the value of nonfree content
13471 was confirmed by the experience of another author. Peter Wayner,
13472 <!-- PAGE BREAK 290 -->
13473 who wrote a book about the free software movement titled
<citetitle>Free for All
</citetitle>,
13474 made an electronic version of his book free on-line under a Creative
13475 Commons license after the book went out of print. He then monitored
13476 used book store prices for the book. As predicted, as the number of
13477 downloads increased, the used book price for his book increased, as
13479 <indexterm><primary>Free for All (Wayner)
</primary></indexterm>
13480 <indexterm><primary>Wayner, Peter
</primary></indexterm>
13482 <indexterm><primary>Public Enemy
</primary></indexterm>
13483 <indexterm><primary>rap music
</primary></indexterm>
13485 These are examples of using the Commons to better spread proprietary
13486 content. I believe that is a wonderful and common use of the
13487 Commons. There are others who use Creative Commons licenses for other
13488 reasons. Many who use the "sampling license" do so because anything
13489 else would be hypocritical. The sampling license says that others are
13490 free, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, to sample content from
13491 the licensed work; they are just not free to make full copies of the
13492 licensed work available to others. This is consistent with their own
13493 art
—they, too, sample from others. Because the
13494 <emphasis>legal
</emphasis> costs of sampling are so high (Walter
13495 Leaphart, manager of the rap group Public Enemy, which was born
13496 sampling the music of others, has stated that he does not "allow"
13497 Public Enemy to sample anymore, because the legal costs are so
13498 high
<footnote><para>
13500 <citetitle>Willful Infringement: A Report from the Front Lines of the Real
13501 Culture Wars
</citetitle> (
2003), produced by Jed Horovitz, directed by Greg
13502 Hittelman, a Fiat Lucre production, available at
13503 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
72</ulink>.
13504 </para></footnote>),
13505 these artists release into the creative environment content
13506 that others can build upon, so that their form of creativity might grow.
13507 <indexterm><primary>Leaphart, Walter
</primary></indexterm>
13510 Finally, there are many who mark their content with a Creative Commons
13511 license just because they want to express to others the importance of
13512 balance in this debate. If you just go along with the system as it is,
13513 you are effectively saying you believe in the "All Rights Reserved"
13514 model. Good for you, but many do not. Many believe that however
13515 appropriate that rule is for Hollywood and freaks, it is not an
13516 appropriate description of how most creators view the rights
13517 associated with their content. The Creative Commons license expresses
13518 this notion of "Some Rights Reserved," and gives many the chance to
13522 In the first six months of the Creative Commons experiment, over
13523 1 million objects were licensed with these free-culture licenses. The next
13524 step is partnerships with middleware content providers to help them
13525 build into their technologies simple ways for users to mark their content
13527 <!-- PAGE BREAK 291 -->
13528 with Creative Commons freedoms. Then the next step is to watch and
13529 celebrate creators who build content based upon content set free.
13532 These are first steps to rebuilding a public domain. They are not
13533 mere arguments; they are action. Building a public domain is the first
13534 step to showing people how important that domain is to creativity and
13535 innovation. Creative Commons relies upon voluntary steps to achieve
13536 this rebuilding. They will lead to a world in which more than voluntary
13537 steps are possible.
13540 Creative Commons is just one example of voluntary efforts by
13541 individuals and creators to change the mix of rights that now govern
13542 the creative field. The project does not compete with copyright; it
13543 complements it. Its aim is not to defeat the rights of authors, but to
13544 make it easier for authors and creators to exercise their rights more
13545 flexibly and cheaply. That difference, we believe, will enable
13546 creativity to spread more easily.
13548 <indexterm startref=
"idxcc" class='endofrange'
/>
13550 <!-- PAGE BREAK 292 -->
13553 <section id=
"themsoon">
13554 <title>THEM, SOON
</title>
13556 We will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will
13557 also take important reforms of laws. We have a long way to go before
13558 the politicians will listen to these ideas and implement these reforms.
13559 But that also means that we have time to build awareness around the
13560 changes that we need.
13563 In this chapter, I outline five kinds of changes: four that are general,
13564 and one that's specific to the most heated battle of the day, music. Each
13565 is a step, not an end. But any of these steps would carry us a long way
13569 <section id=
"formalities">
13570 <title>1. More Formalities
</title>
13572 If you buy a house, you have to record the sale in a deed. If you buy land
13573 upon which to build a house, you have to record the purchase in a deed.
13574 If you buy a car, you get a bill of sale and register the car. If you buy an
13575 airplane ticket, it has your name on it.
13578 <!-- PAGE BREAK 293 -->
13579 These are all formalities associated with property. They are
13580 requirements that we all must bear if we want our property to be
13584 In contrast, under current copyright law, you automatically get a
13585 copyright, regardless of whether you comply with any formality. You
13586 don't have to register. You don't even have to mark your content. The
13587 default is control, and "formalities" are banished.
13593 As I suggested in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
13594 linkend=
"property-i"/>, the motivation to abolish formalities was a
13595 good one. In the world before digital technologies, formalities
13596 imposed a burden on copyright holders without much benefit. Thus, it
13597 was progress when the law relaxed the formal requirements that a
13598 copyright owner must bear to protect and secure his work. Those
13599 formalities were getting in the way.
13602 But the Internet changes all this. Formalities today need not be a
13603 burden. Rather, the world without formalities is the world that
13604 burdens creativity. Today, there is no simple way to know who owns
13605 what, or with whom one must deal in order to use or build upon the
13606 creative work of others. There are no records, there is no system to
13607 trace
— there is no simple way to know how to get permission. Yet
13608 given the massive increase in the scope of copyright's rule, getting
13609 permission is a necessary step for any work that builds upon our
13610 past. And thus, the
<emphasis>lack
</emphasis> of formalities forces
13611 many into silence where they otherwise could speak.
13614 The law should therefore change this requirement
<footnote><para>
13616 The proposal I am advancing here would apply to American works only.
13617 Obviously, I believe it would be beneficial for the same idea to be
13618 adopted by other countries as well.
</para></footnote>—but it
13619 should not change it by going back to the old, broken system. We
13620 should require formalities, but we should establish a system that will
13621 create the incentives to minimize the burden of these formalities.
13624 The important formalities are three: marking copyrighted work,
13625 registering copyrights, and renewing the claim to
13626 copyright. Traditionally, the first of these three was something the
13627 copyright owner did; the second two were something the government
13628 did. But a revised system of formalities would banish the government
13629 from the process, except for the sole purpose of approving standards
13630 developed by others.
13633 <!-- PAGE BREAK 294 -->
13635 <section id=
"registration">
13636 <title>REGISTRATION AND RENEWAL
</title>
13638 Under the old system, a copyright owner had to file a registration
13639 with the Copyright Office to register or renew a copyright. When
13640 filing that registration, the copyright owner paid a fee. As with most
13641 government agencies, the Copyright Office had little incentive to
13642 minimize the burden of registration; it also had little incentive to
13643 minimize the fee. And as the Copyright Office is not a main target of
13644 government policymaking, the office has historically been terribly
13645 underfunded. Thus, when people who know something about the process
13646 hear this idea about formalities, their first reaction is
13647 panic
—nothing could be worse than forcing people to deal with
13648 the mess that is the Copyright Office.
13651 Yet it is always astonishing to me that we, who come from a tradition
13652 of extraordinary innovation in governmental design, can no longer
13653 think innovatively about how governmental functions can be designed.
13654 Just because there is a public purpose to a government role, it
13655 doesn't follow that the government must actually administer the
13656 role. Instead, we should be creating incentives for private parties to
13657 serve the public, subject to standards that the government sets.
13660 In the context of registration, one obvious model is the Internet.
13661 There are at least
32 million Web sites registered around the world.
13662 Domain name owners for these Web sites have to pay a fee to keep their
13663 registration alive. In the main top-level domains (.com, .org, .net),
13664 there is a central registry. The actual registrations are, however,
13665 performed by many competing registrars. That competition drives the
13666 cost of registering down, and more importantly, it drives the ease
13667 with which registration occurs up.
13670 We should adopt a similar model for the registration and renewal of
13671 copyrights. The Copyright Office may well serve as the central
13672 registry, but it should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it
13673 should establish a database, and a set of standards for registrars. It
13674 should approve registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars
13675 would then compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and
13676 simplest systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That
13677 competition would substantially lower the burden of this
13678 formality
—while producing a database
13679 <!-- PAGE BREAK 295 -->
13680 of registrations that would facilitate the licensing of content.
13684 <section id=
"marking">
13685 <title>MARKING
</title>
13687 It used to be that the failure to include a copyright notice on a
13688 creative work meant that the copyright was forfeited. That was a harsh
13689 punishment for failing to comply with a regulatory rule
—akin to
13690 imposing the death penalty for a parking ticket in the world of
13691 creative rights. Here again, there is no reason that a marking
13692 requirement needs to be enforced in this way. And more importantly,
13693 there is no reason a marking requirement needs to be enforced
13694 uniformly across all media.
13697 The aim of marking is to signal to the public that this work is
13698 copyrighted and that the author wants to enforce his rights. The mark
13699 also makes it easy to locate a copyright owner to secure permission to
13703 One of the problems the copyright system confronted early on was
13704 that different copyrighted works had to be differently marked. It wasn't
13705 clear how or where a statue was to be marked, or a record, or a film. A
13706 new marking requirement could solve these problems by recognizing
13707 the differences in media, and by allowing the system of marking to
13708 evolve as technologies enable it to. The system could enable a special
13709 signal from the failure to mark
—not the loss of the copyright, but the
13710 loss of the right to punish someone for failing to get permission first.
13713 Let's start with the last point. If a copyright owner allows his work
13714 to be published without a copyright notice, the consequence of that
13715 failure need not be that the copyright is lost. The consequence could
13716 instead be that anyone has the right to use this work, until the
13717 copyright owner complains and demonstrates that it is his work and he
13718 doesn't give permission.
<footnote><para>
13720 There would be a complication with derivative works that I have not
13721 solved here. In my view, the law of derivatives creates a more complicated
13722 system than is justified by the marginal incentive it creates.
13724 The meaning of an unmarked work would therefore be "use unless someone
13725 complains." If someone does complain, then the obligation would be to
13726 stop using the work in any new
13727 <!-- PAGE BREAK 296 -->
13728 work from then on though no penalty would attach for existing uses.
13729 This would create a strong incentive for copyright owners to mark
13733 That in turn raises the question about how work should best be
13734 marked. Here again, the system needs to adjust as the technologies
13735 evolve. The best way to ensure that the system evolves is to limit the
13736 Copyright Office's role to that of approving standards for marking
13737 content that have been crafted elsewhere.
13740 For example, if a recording industry association devises a method for
13741 marking CDs, it would propose that to the Copyright Office. The
13742 Copyright Office would hold a hearing, at which other proposals could
13743 be made. The Copyright Office would then select the proposal that it
13744 judged preferable, and it would base that choice
13745 <emphasis>solely
</emphasis> upon the consideration of which method
13746 could best be integrated into the registration and renewal system. We
13747 would not count on the government to innovate; but we would count on
13748 the government to keep the product of innovation in line with its
13749 other important functions.
13752 Finally, marking content clearly would simplify registration
13753 requirements. If photographs were marked by author and year, there
13754 would be little reason not to allow a photographer to reregister, for
13755 example, all photographs taken in a particular year in one quick
13756 step. The aim of the formality is not to burden the creator; the
13757 system itself should be kept as simple as possible.
13760 The objective of formalities is to make things clear. The existing
13761 system does nothing to make things clear. Indeed, it seems designed to
13762 make things unclear.
13765 If formalities such as registration were reinstated, one of the most
13766 difficult aspects of relying upon the public domain would be removed.
13767 It would be simple to identify what content is presumptively free; it
13768 would be simple to identify who controls the rights for a particular
13769 kind of content; it would be simple to assert those rights, and to renew
13770 that assertion at the appropriate time.
13773 <!-- PAGE BREAK 297 -->
13776 <section id=
"shortterms">
13777 <title>2. Shorter Terms
</title>
13779 The term of copyright has gone from fourteen years to ninety-five
13780 years for corporate authors, and life of the author plus seventy years for
13784 In
<citetitle>The Future of Ideas
</citetitle>, I proposed a seventy-five-year term,
13785 granted in five-year increments with a requirement of renewal every
13786 five years. That seemed radical enough at the time. But after we lost
13787 <citetitle>Eldred
</citetitle> v.
<citetitle>Ashcroft
</citetitle>, the proposals became even more
13788 radical.
<citetitle>The Economist
</citetitle> endorsed a proposal for a fourteen-year
13789 copyright term.
<footnote><para>
13792 "A Radical Rethink,"
<citetitle>Economist
</citetitle>,
366:
8308 (
25 January
2003):
15,
13794 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
74</ulink>.
13796 Others have proposed tying the term to the term for patents.
13799 I agree with those who believe that we need a radical change in
13800 copyright's term. But whether fourteen years or seventy-five, there
13801 are four principles that are important to keep in mind about copyright
13804 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
13807 <emphasis>Keep it short:
</emphasis> The term should be as long as
13808 necessary to give incentives to create, but no longer. If it were tied
13809 to very strong protections for authors (so authors were able to
13810 reclaim rights from publishers), rights to the same work (not
13811 derivative works) might be extended further. The key is not to tie the
13812 work up with legal regulations when it no longer benefits an author.
13816 <emphasis>Keep it simple:
</emphasis> The line between the public
13817 domain and protected content must be kept clear. Lawyers like the
13818 fuzziness of "fair use," and the distinction between "ideas" and
13819 "expression." That kind of law gives them lots of work. But our
13820 framers had a simpler idea in mind: protected versus unprotected. The
13821 value of short terms is that there is little need to build exceptions
13822 into copyright when the term itself is kept short. A clear and active
13823 "lawyer-free zone" makes the complexities of "fair use" and
13824 "idea/expression" less necessary to navigate.
13825 <!-- PAGE BREAK 298 -->
13829 <emphasis>Keep it alive:
</emphasis> Copyright should have to be
13830 renewed. Especially if the maximum term is long, the copyright owner
13831 should be required to signal periodically that he wants the protection
13832 continued. This need not be an onerous burden, but there is no reason
13833 this monopoly protection has to be granted for free. On average, it
13834 takes ninety minutes for a veteran to apply for a
13835 pension.
<footnote><para>
13837 Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Application for Compensation
13838 and/or Pension, VA Form
21-
526 (OMB Approved No.
2900-
0001),
13840 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
75</ulink>.
13842 If we make veterans suffer that burden, I don't see why we couldn't
13843 require authors to spend ten minutes every fifty years to file a
13845 <indexterm><primary>veterans' pensions
</primary></indexterm>
13849 <emphasis>Keep it prospective:
</emphasis> Whatever the term of
13850 copyright should be, the clearest lesson that economists teach is that
13851 a term once given should not be extended. It might have been a mistake
13852 in
1923 for the law to offer authors only a fifty-six-year term. I
13853 don't think so, but it's possible. If it was a mistake, then the
13854 consequence was that we got fewer authors to create in
1923 than we
13855 otherwise would have. But we can't correct that mistake today by
13856 increasing the term. No matter what we do today, we will not increase
13857 the number of authors who wrote in
1923. Of course, we can increase
13858 the reward that those who write now get (or alternatively, increase
13859 the copyright burden that smothers many works that are today
13860 invisible). But increasing their reward will not increase their
13861 creativity in
1923. What's not done is not done, and there's nothing
13862 we can do about that now.
</para></listitem>
13865 These changes together should produce an
<emphasis>average
</emphasis>
13866 copyright term that is much shorter than the current term. Until
1976,
13867 the average term was just
32.2 years. We should be aiming for the
13871 No doubt the extremists will call these ideas "radical." (After all, I
13872 call them "extremists.") But again, the term I recommended was longer
13873 than the term under Richard Nixon. How "radical" can it be to ask for
13874 a more generous copyright law than Richard Nixon presided over?
13877 <!-- PAGE BREAK 299 -->
13880 <section id=
"freefairuse">
13881 <title>3. Free Use Vs. Fair Use
</title>
13883 As I observed at the beginning of this book, property law originally
13884 granted property owners the right to control their property from the
13885 ground to the heavens. The airplane came along. The scope of property
13886 rights quickly changed. There was no fuss, no constitutional
13887 challenge. It made no sense anymore to grant that much control, given
13888 the emergence of that new technology.
13891 Our Constitution gives Congress the power to give authors "exclusive
13892 right" to "their writings." Congress has given authors an exclusive
13893 right to "their writings" plus any derivative writings (made by
13894 others) that are sufficiently close to the author's original
13895 work. Thus, if I write a book, and you base a movie on that book, I
13896 have the power to deny you the right to release that movie, even
13897 though that movie is not "my writing."
13900 Congress granted the beginnings of this right in
1870, when it
13901 expanded the exclusive right of copyright to include a right to
13902 control translations and dramatizations of a work.
<footnote><para>
13904 Benjamin Kaplan,
<citetitle>An Unhurried View of Copyright
</citetitle> (New York: Columbia
13905 University Press,
1967),
32.
13907 The courts have expanded it slowly through judicial interpretation
13908 ever since. This expansion has been commented upon by one of the law's
13909 greatest judges, Judge Benjamin Kaplan.
13910 <indexterm><primary>Kaplan, Benjamin
</primary></indexterm>
13914 So inured have we become to the extension of the monopoly to a
13915 large range of so-called derivative works, that we no longer sense
13916 the oddity of accepting such an enlargement of copyright while
13917 yet intoning the abracadabra of idea and expression.
<footnote><para>
13918 <!-- f6. --> Ibid.,
56.
13923 I think it's time to recognize that there are airplanes in this field and
13924 the expansiveness of these rights of derivative use no longer make
13925 sense. More precisely, they don't make sense for the period of time that
13926 a copyright runs. And they don't make sense as an amorphous grant.
13927 Consider each limitation in turn.
13930 <emphasis>Term:
</emphasis> If Congress wants to grant a derivative
13931 right, then that right should be for a much shorter term. It makes
13932 sense to protect John
13934 <!-- PAGE BREAK 300 -->
13935 Grisham's right to sell the movie rights to his latest novel (or at least
13936 I'm willing to assume it does); but it does not make sense for that right
13937 to run for the same term as the underlying copyright. The derivative
13938 right could be important in inducing creativity; it is not important long
13939 after the creative work is done.
13940 <indexterm><primary>Grisham, John
</primary></indexterm>
13943 <emphasis>Scope:
</emphasis> Likewise should the scope of derivative
13944 rights be narrowed. Again, there are some cases in which derivative
13945 rights are important. Those should be specified. But the law should
13946 draw clear lines around regulated and unregulated uses of copyrighted
13947 material. When all "reuse" of creative material was within the control
13948 of businesses, perhaps it made sense to require lawyers to negotiate
13949 the lines. It no longer makes sense for lawyers to negotiate the
13950 lines. Think about all the creative possibilities that digital
13951 technologies enable; now imagine pouring molasses into the
13952 machines. That's what this general requirement of permission does to
13953 the creative process. Smothers it.
13956 This was the point that Alben made when describing the making of the
13957 Clint Eastwood CD. While it makes sense to require negotiation for
13958 foreseeable derivative rights
—turning a book into a movie, or a
13959 poem into a musical score
—it doesn't make sense to require
13960 negotiation for the unforeseeable. Here, a statutory right would make
13964 In each of these cases, the law should mark the uses that are
13965 protected, and the presumption should be that other uses are not
13966 protected. This is the reverse of the recommendation of my colleague
13967 Paul Goldstein.
<footnote>
13970 Paul Goldstein,
<citetitle>Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial
13971 Jukebox
</citetitle> (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003),
187–216.
13972 <indexterm><primary>Goldstein, Paul
</primary></indexterm>
13974 His view is that the law should be written so that
13975 expanded protections follow expanded uses.
13978 Goldstein's analysis would make perfect sense if the cost of the legal
13979 system were small. But as we are currently seeing in the context of
13980 the Internet, the uncertainty about the scope of protection, and the
13981 incentives to protect existing architectures of revenue, combined with
13982 a strong copyright, weaken the process of innovation.
13985 The law could remedy this problem either by removing protection
13986 <!-- PAGE BREAK 301 -->
13987 beyond the part explicitly drawn or by granting reuse rights upon
13988 certain statutory conditions. Either way, the effect would be to free
13989 a great deal of culture to others to cultivate. And under a statutory
13990 rights regime, that reuse would earn artists more income.
13994 <section id=
"liberatemusic">
13995 <title>4. Liberate the Music
—Again
</title>
13997 The battle that got this whole war going was about music, so it
13998 wouldn't be fair to end this book without addressing the issue that
13999 is, to most people, most pressing
—music. There is no other
14000 policy issue that better teaches the lessons of this book than the
14001 battles around the sharing of music.
14004 The appeal of file-sharing music was the crack cocaine of the
14005 Internet's growth. It drove demand for access to the Internet more
14006 powerfully than any other single application. It was the Internet's
14007 killer app
—possibly in two senses of that word. It no doubt was
14008 the application that drove demand for bandwidth. It may well be the
14009 application that drives demand for regulations that in the end kill
14010 innovation on the network.
14013 The aim of copyright, with respect to content in general and music in
14014 particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed,
14015 performed, and, most importantly, spread. The law does this by giving
14016 an exclusive right to a composer to control public performances of his
14017 work, and to a performing artist to control copies of her performance.
14020 File-sharing networks complicate this model by enabling the spread of
14021 content for which the performer has not been paid. But of course,
14022 that's not all the file-sharing networks do. As I described in chapter
14023 <xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber" linkend=
"piracy"/>, they enable
14024 four different kinds of sharing:
14026 <orderedlist numeration=
"upperalpha">
14029 There are some who are using sharing networks as substitutes
14030 for purchasing CDs.
14034 There are also some who are using sharing networks to sample,
14035 on the way to purchasing CDs.
14038 <!-- PAGE BREAK 302 -->
14040 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14041 content that is no longer sold but is still under copyright or that
14042 would have been too cumbersome to buy off the Net.
14046 There are many who are using file-sharing networks to get access to
14047 content that is not copyrighted or to get access that the copyright
14048 owner plainly endorses.
14052 Any reform of the law needs to keep these different uses in focus. It
14053 must avoid burdening type D even if it aims to eliminate type A. The
14054 eagerness with which the law aims to eliminate type A, moreover,
14055 should depend upon the magnitude of type B. As with VCRs, if the net
14056 effect of sharing is actually not very harmful, the need for regulation is
14057 significantly weakened.
14060 As I said in chapter
<xref xrefstyle=
"select: labelnumber"
14061 linkend=
"piracy"/>, the actual harm caused by sharing is
14062 controversial. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I assume
14063 the harm is real. I assume, in other words, that type A sharing is
14064 significantly greater than type B, and is the dominant use of sharing
14068 Nonetheless, there is a crucial fact about the current technological
14069 context that we must keep in mind if we are to understand how the law
14073 Today, file sharing is addictive. In ten years, it won't be. It is
14074 addictive today because it is the easiest way to gain access to a
14075 broad range of content. It won't be the easiest way to get access to
14076 a broad range of content in ten years. Today, access to the Internet
14077 is cumbersome and slow
—we in the United States are lucky to have
14078 broadband service at
1.5 MBs, and very rarely do we get service at
14079 that speed both up and down. Although wireless access is growing, most
14080 of us still get access across wires. Most only gain access through a
14081 machine with a keyboard. The idea of the always on, always connected
14082 Internet is mainly just an idea.
14085 But it will become a reality, and that means the way we get access to
14086 the Internet today is a technology in transition. Policy makers should
14087 not make policy on the basis of technology in transition. They should
14088 <!-- PAGE BREAK 303 -->
14089 make policy on the basis of where the technology is going. The
14090 question should not be, how should the law regulate sharing in this
14091 world? The question should be, what law will we require when the
14092 network becomes the network it is clearly becoming? That network is
14093 one in which every machine with electricity is essentially on the Net;
14094 where everywhere you are
—except maybe the desert or the
14095 Rockies
—you can instantaneously be connected to the
14096 Internet. Imagine the Internet as ubiquitous as the best cell-phone
14097 service, where with the flip of a device, you are connected.
14100 In that world, it will be extremely easy to connect to services that
14101 give you access to content on the fly
—such as Internet radio,
14102 content that is streamed to the user when the user demands. Here,
14103 then, is the critical point: When it is
<emphasis>extremely
</emphasis>
14104 easy to connect to services that give access to content, it will be
14105 <emphasis>easier
</emphasis> to connect to services that give you
14106 access to content than it will be to download and store content
14107 <emphasis>on the many devices you will have for playing
14108 content
</emphasis>. It will be easier, in other words, to subscribe
14109 than it will be to be a database manager, as everyone in the
14110 download-sharing world of Napster-like technologies essentially
14111 is. Content services will compete with content sharing, even if the
14112 services charge money for the content they give access to. Already
14113 cell-phone services in Japan offer music (for a fee) streamed over
14114 cell phones (enhanced with plugs for headphones). The Japanese are
14115 paying for this content even though "free" content is available in the
14116 form of MP3s across the Web.
<footnote><para>
14118 See, for example, "Music Media Watch," The J@pan Inc. Newsletter,
3
14119 April
2002, available at
14120 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
76</ulink>.
14125 This point about the future is meant to suggest a perspective on the
14126 present: It is emphatically temporary. The "problem" with file
14127 sharing
—to the extent there is a real problem
—is a problem
14128 that will increasingly disappear as it becomes easier to connect to
14129 the Internet. And thus it is an extraordinary mistake for policy
14130 makers today to be "solving" this problem in light of a technology
14131 that will be gone tomorrow. The question should not be how to
14132 regulate the Internet to eliminate file sharing (the Net will evolve
14133 that problem away). The question instead should be how to assure that
14134 artists get paid, during
14136 <!-- PAGE BREAK 304 -->
14137 this transition between twentieth-century models for doing business
14138 and twenty-first-century technologies.
14141 The answer begins with recognizing that there are different "problems"
14142 here to solve. Let's start with type D content
—uncopyrighted
14143 content or copyrighted content that the artist wants shared. The
14144 "problem" with this content is to make sure that the technology that
14145 would enable this kind of sharing is not rendered illegal. You can
14146 think of it this way: Pay phones are used to deliver ransom demands,
14147 no doubt. But there are many who need to use pay phones who have
14148 nothing to do with ransoms. It would be wrong to ban pay phones in
14149 order to eliminate kidnapping.
14152 Type C content raises a different "problem." This is content that was,
14153 at one time, published and is no longer available. It may be
14154 unavailable because the artist is no longer valuable enough for the
14155 record label he signed with to carry his work. Or it may be
14156 unavailable because the work is forgotten. Either way, the aim of the
14157 law should be to facilitate the access to this content, ideally in a
14158 way that returns something to the artist.
14161 Again, the model here is the used book store. Once a book goes out of
14162 print, it may still be available in libraries and used book
14163 stores. But libraries and used book stores don't pay the copyright
14164 owner when someone reads or buys an out-of-print book. That makes
14165 total sense, of course, since any other system would be so burdensome
14166 as to eliminate the possibility of used book stores' existing. But
14167 from the author's perspective, this "sharing" of his content without
14168 his being compensated is less than ideal.
14171 The model of used book stores suggests that the law could simply deem
14172 out-of-print music fair game. If the publisher does not make copies of
14173 the music available for sale, then commercial and noncommercial
14174 providers would be free, under this rule, to "share" that content,
14175 even though the sharing involved making a copy. The copy here would be
14176 incidental to the trade; in a context where commercial publishing has
14177 ended, trading music should be as free as trading books.
14181 <!-- PAGE BREAK 305 -->
14182 Alternatively, the law could create a statutory license that would
14183 ensure that artists get something from the trade of their work. For
14184 example, if the law set a low statutory rate for the commercial
14185 sharing of content that was not offered for sale by a commercial
14186 publisher, and if that rate were automatically transferred to a trust
14187 for the benefit of the artist, then businesses could develop around
14188 the idea of trading this content, and artists would benefit from this
14192 This system would also create an incentive for publishers to keep
14193 works available commercially. Works that are available commercially
14194 would not be subject to this license. Thus, publishers could protect
14195 the right to charge whatever they want for content if they kept the
14196 work commercially available. But if they don't keep it available, and
14197 instead, the computer hard disks of fans around the world keep it
14198 alive, then any royalty owed for such copying should be much less than
14199 the amount owed a commercial publisher.
14202 The hard case is content of types A and B, and again, this case is
14203 hard only because the extent of the problem will change over time, as
14204 the technologies for gaining access to content change. The law's
14205 solution should be as flexible as the problem is, understanding that
14206 we are in the middle of a radical transformation in the technology for
14207 delivering and accessing content.
14210 So here's a solution that will at first seem very strange to both sides
14211 in this war, but which upon reflection, I suggest, should make some sense.
14214 Stripped of the rhetoric about the sanctity of property, the basic
14215 claim of the content industry is this: A new technology (the Internet)
14216 has harmed a set of rights that secure copyright. If those rights are to
14217 be protected, then the content industry should be compensated for that
14218 harm. Just as the technology of tobacco harmed the health of millions
14219 of Americans, or the technology of asbestos caused grave illness to
14220 thousands of miners, so, too, has the technology of digital networks
14221 harmed the interests of the content industry.
14224 <!-- PAGE BREAK 306 -->
14225 I love the Internet, and so I don't like likening it to tobacco or
14226 asbestos. But the analogy is a fair one from the perspective of the
14227 law. And it suggests a fair response: Rather than seeking to destroy
14228 the Internet, or the p2p technologies that are currently harming
14229 content providers on the Internet, we should find a relatively simple
14230 way to compensate those who are harmed.
14233 The idea would be a modification of a proposal that has been
14234 floated by Harvard law professor William Fisher.
<footnote>
14237 William Fisher,
<citetitle>Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities
</citetitle> (last
14238 revised:
10 October
2000), available at
14239 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
77</ulink>; William
14240 Fisher,
<citetitle>Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of
14241 Entertainment
</citetitle> (forthcoming) (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
14242 2004), ch.
6, available at
14243 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
78</ulink>. Professor
14244 Netanel has proposed a related idea that would exempt noncommercial
14245 sharing from the reach of copyright and would establish compensation
14246 to artists to balance any loss. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, "Impose a
14247 Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P File Sharing," available at
14248 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
79</ulink>. For other proposals, see Lawrence Lessig, "Who's Holding Back
14249 Broadband?"
<citetitle>Washington Post
</citetitle>,
8 January
2002, A17; Philip S. Corwin on
14250 behalf of Sharman Networks, A Letter to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
14251 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
26 February
2002,
14253 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
80</ulink>; Serguei Osokine,
<citetitle>A Quick Case for Intellectual Property
14254 Use Fee (IPUF)
</citetitle>,
3 March
2002, available at
14255 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
81</ulink>; Jefferson Graham,
14256 "Kazaa, Verizon Propose to Pay Artists Directly,"
<citetitle>USA Today
</citetitle>,
13 May
14258 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
82</ulink>; Steven M. Cherry, "Getting Copyright Right,"
14259 IEEE Spectrum Online,
1 July
2002, available at
14260 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
83</ulink>; Declan
14261 McCullagh, "Verizon's Copyright Campaign," CNET News.com,
27 August
14263 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
84</ulink>.
14264 Fisher's proposal is very similar to Richard Stallman's proposal for
14265 DAT. Unlike Fisher's, Stallman's proposal would not pay artists directly
14266 proportionally, though more popular artists would get more than the less
14267 popular. As is typical with Stallman, his proposal predates the current
14268 debate by about a decade. See
14269 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
85</ulink>.
14270 <indexterm><primary>Fisher, William
</primary></indexterm>
14271 <indexterm><primary>Netanel, Neil Weinstock
</primary></indexterm>
14272 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14274 Fisher suggests a very clever way around the current impasse of the
14275 Internet. Under his plan, all content capable of digital transmission
14276 would (
1) be marked with a digital watermark (don't worry about how
14277 easy it is to evade these marks; as you'll see, there's no incentive
14278 to evade them). Once the content is marked, then entrepreneurs would
14279 develop (
2) systems to monitor how many items of each content were
14280 distributed. On the basis of those numbers, then (
3) artists would be
14281 compensated. The compensation would be paid for by (
4) an appropriate
14285 Fisher's proposal is careful and comprehensive. It raises a million
14286 questions, most of which he answers well in his upcoming book,
14287 <citetitle>Promises to Keep
</citetitle>. The modification that I would make is relatively
14288 simple: Fisher imagines his proposal replacing the existing copyright
14289 system. I imagine it complementing the existing system. The aim of
14290 the proposal would be to facilitate compensation to the extent that
14291 harm could be shown. This compensation would be temporary, aimed at
14292 facilitating a transition between regimes. And it would require
14293 renewal after a period of years. If it continues to make sense to
14294 facilitate free exchange of content, supported through a taxation
14295 system, then it can be continued. If this form of protection is no
14296 longer necessary, then the system could lapse into the old system of
14297 controlling access.
14298 <indexterm><primary>Promises to Keep (Fisher)
</primary></indexterm>
14301 Fisher would balk at the idea of allowing the system to lapse. His aim
14302 is not just to ensure that artists are paid, but also to ensure that
14303 the system supports the widest range of "semiotic democracy"
14304 possible. But the aims of semiotic democracy would be satisfied if the
14305 other changes I described were accomplished
—in particular, the
14306 limits on derivative
14308 <!-- PAGE BREAK 307 -->
14309 uses. A system that simply charges for access would not greatly burden
14310 semiotic democracy if there were few limitations on what one was
14311 allowed to do with the content itself.
14313 <indexterm><primary>Real Networks
</primary></indexterm>
14315 No doubt it would be difficult to calculate the proper measure of
14316 "harm" to an industry. But the difficulty of making that calculation
14317 would be outweighed by the benefit of facilitating innovation. This
14318 background system to compensate would also not need to interfere with
14319 innovative proposals such as Apple's MusicStore. As experts predicted
14320 when Apple launched the MusicStore, it could beat "free" by being
14321 easier than free is. This has proven correct: Apple has sold millions
14322 of songs at even the very high price of
99 cents a song. (At
99 cents,
14323 the cost is the equivalent of a per-song CD price, though the labels
14324 have none of the costs of a CD to pay.) Apple's move was countered by
14325 Real Networks, offering music at just
79 cents a song. And no doubt
14326 there will be a great deal of competition to offer and sell music
14330 This competition has already occurred against the background of "free"
14331 music from p2p systems. As the sellers of cable television have known
14332 for thirty years, and the sellers of bottled water for much more than
14333 that, there is nothing impossible at all about "competing with free."
14334 Indeed, if anything, the competition spurs the competitors to offer
14335 new and better products. This is precisely what the competitive market
14336 was to be about. Thus in Singapore, though piracy is rampant, movie
14337 theaters are often luxurious
—with "first class" seats, and meals
14338 served while you watch a movie
—as they struggle and succeed in
14339 finding ways to compete with "free."
14342 This regime of competition, with a backstop to assure that artists
14343 don't lose, would facilitate a great deal of innovation in the
14344 delivery of content. That competition would continue to shrink type A
14345 sharing. It would inspire an extraordinary range of new
14346 innovators
—ones who would have a right to the content, and would
14347 no longer fear the uncertain and barbarically severe punishments of
14351 In summary, then, my proposal is this:
14355 <!-- PAGE BREAK 308 -->
14356 The Internet is in transition. We should not be regulating a
14357 technology in transition. We should instead be regulating to minimize
14358 the harm to interests affected by this technological change, while
14359 enabling, and encouraging, the most efficient technology we can
14363 We can minimize that harm while maximizing the benefit to innovation
14366 <orderedlist numeration=
"arabic">
14369 guaranteeing the right to engage in type D sharing;
14373 permitting noncommercial type C sharing without liability,
14374 and commercial type C sharing at a low and fixed rate set by
14379 while in this transition, taxing and compensating for type A
14380 sharing, to the extent actual harm is demonstrated.
14384 But what if "piracy" doesn't disappear? What if there is a competitive
14385 market providing content at a low cost, but a significant number of
14386 consumers continue to "take" content for nothing? Should the law do
14390 Yes, it should. But, again, what it should do depends upon how the
14391 facts develop. These changes may not eliminate type A sharing. But the
14392 real issue is not whether it eliminates sharing in the abstract. The
14393 real issue is its effect on the market. Is it better (a) to have a
14394 technology that is
95 percent secure and produces a market of size
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>,
14395 or (b) to have a technology that is
50 percent secure but produces a
14396 market of five times
<citetitle>x
</citetitle>? Less secure might produce more unauthorized
14397 sharing, but it is likely to also produce a much bigger market in
14398 authorized sharing. The most important thing is to assure artists'
14399 compensation without breaking the Internet. Once that's assured, then
14400 it may well be appropriate to find ways to track down the petty
14404 But we're a long way away from whittling the problem down to this
14405 subset of type A sharers. And our focus until we're there should not
14406 be on finding ways to break the Internet. Our focus until we're there
14408 <!-- PAGE BREAK 309 -->
14409 should be on how to make sure the artists are paid, while protecting
14410 the space for innovation and creativity that the Internet is.
14414 <section id=
"firelawyers">
14415 <title>5. Fire Lots of Lawyers
</title>
14417 I'm a lawyer. I make lawyers for a living. I believe in the law. I believe
14418 in the law of copyright. Indeed, I have devoted my life to working in
14419 law, not because there are big bucks at the end but because there are
14420 ideals at the end that I would love to live.
14423 Yet much of this book has been a criticism of lawyers, or the role
14424 lawyers have played in this debate. The law speaks to ideals, but it
14425 is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the
14426 client. And in a world where the rich clients have one strong view,
14427 the unwillingness of the profession to question or counter that one
14428 strong view queers the law.
14431 The evidence of this bending is compelling. I'm attacked as a
14432 "radical" by many within the profession, yet the positions that I am
14433 advocating are precisely the positions of some of the most moderate
14434 and significant figures in the history of this branch of the
14435 law. Many, for example, thought crazy the challenge that we brought to
14436 the Copyright Term Extension Act. Yet just thirty years ago, the
14437 dominant scholar and practitioner in the field of copyright, Melville
14438 Nimmer, thought it obvious.
<footnote><para>
14440 Lawrence Lessig, "Copyright's First Amendment" (Melville B. Nimmer
14441 Memorial Lecture),
<citetitle>UCLA Law Review
</citetitle> 48 (
2001):
1057,
1069–70.
14446 However, my criticism of the role that lawyers have played in this
14447 debate is not just about a professional bias. It is more importantly
14448 about our failure to actually reckon the costs of the law.
14451 Economists are supposed to be good at reckoning costs and benefits.
14452 But more often than not, economists, with no clue about how the legal
14453 system actually functions, simply assume that the transaction costs of
14454 the legal system are slight.
<footnote><para>
14456 A good example is the work of Professor Stan Liebowitz. Liebowitz is
14457 to be commended for his careful review of data about infringement,
14458 leading him to question his own publicly stated
14459 position
—twice. He initially predicted that downloading would
14460 substantially harm the industry. He then revised his view in light of
14461 the data, and he has since revised his view again. Compare Stan
14462 J. Liebowitz,
<citetitle>Rethinking the Network Economy: The True Forces That
14463 Drive the Digital Marketplace
</citetitle> (New York: Amacom,
2002), (reviewing his
14464 original view but expressing skepticism) with Stan J. Liebowitz,
14465 "Will MP3s Annihilate the Record Industry?" working paper, June
2003,
14467 <ulink url=
"http://free-culture.cc/notes/">link #
86</ulink>.
14468 Liebowitz's careful analysis is extremely valuable in estimating the
14469 effect of file-sharing technology. In my view, however, he
14470 underestimates the costs of the legal system. See, for example,
14471 <citetitle>Rethinking
</citetitle>,
174–76.
14472 <indexterm><primary>Liebowitz, Stan
</primary></indexterm>
14474 They see a system that has been around for hundreds of years, and they
14475 assume it works the way their elementary school civics class taught
14479 <!-- PAGE BREAK 310 -->
14480 But the legal system doesn't work. Or more accurately, it doesn't work
14481 for anyone except those with the most resources. Not because the
14482 system is corrupt. I don't think our legal system (at the federal
14483 level, at least) is at all corrupt. I mean simply because the costs of
14484 our legal system are so astonishingly high that justice can
14485 practically never be done.
14488 These costs distort free culture in many ways. A lawyer's time is
14489 billed at the largest firms at more than $
400 per hour. How much time
14490 should such a lawyer spend reading cases carefully, or researching
14491 obscure strands of authority? The answer is the increasing reality:
14492 very little. The law depended upon the careful articulation and
14493 development of doctrine, but the careful articulation and development
14494 of legal doctrine depends upon careful work. Yet that careful work
14495 costs too much, except in the most high-profile and costly cases.
14498 The costliness and clumsiness and randomness of this system mock
14499 our tradition. And lawyers, as well as academics, should consider it
14500 their duty to change the way the law works
—or better, to change the
14501 law so that it works. It is wrong that the system works well only for the
14502 top
1 percent of the clients. It could be made radically more efficient,
14503 and inexpensive, and hence radically more just.
14506 But until that reform is complete, we as a society should keep the law
14507 away from areas that we know it will only harm. And that is precisely
14508 what the law will too often do if too much of our culture is left to
14512 Think about the amazing things your kid could do or make with digital
14513 technology
—the film, the music, the Web page, the blog. Or think
14514 about the amazing things your community could facilitate with digital
14515 technology
—a wiki, a barn raising, activism to change something.
14516 Think about all those creative things, and then imagine cold molasses
14517 poured onto the machines. This is what any regime that requires
14518 permission produces. Again, this is the reality of Brezhnev's Russia.
14521 The law should regulate in certain areas of culture
—but it should
14522 regulate culture only where that regulation does good. Yet lawyers
14524 <!-- PAGE BREAK 311 -->
14525 rarely test their power, or the power they promote, against this
14526 simple pragmatic question: "Will it do good?" When challenged about
14527 the expanding reach of the law, the lawyer answers, "Why not?"
14530 We should ask, "Why?" Show me why your regulation of culture is
14531 needed. Show me how it does good. And until you can show me both,
14532 keep your lawyers away.
14534 <!-- PAGE BREAK 312 -->
14538 <chapter label=
"17" id=
"c-notes">
14539 <title>NOTES
</title>
14541 Throughout this text, there are references to links on the World Wide
14542 Web. As anyone who has tried to use the Web knows, these links can be
14543 highly unstable. I have tried to remedy the instability by redirecting
14544 readers to the original source through the Web site associated with
14545 this book. For each link below, you can go to
14546 http://free-culture.cc/notes and locate the original source by
14547 clicking on the number after the # sign. If the original link remains
14548 alive, you will be redirected to that link. If the original link has
14549 disappeared, you will be redirected to an appropriate reference for
14552 <!--PAGE BREAK 336-->
14555 <chapter label=
"18" id=
"c-acknowledgments">
14556 <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
</title>
14558 This book is the product of a long and as yet unsuccessful struggle that
14559 began when I read of Eric Eldred's war to keep books free. Eldred's
14560 work helped launch a movement, the free culture movement, and it is
14561 to him that this book is dedicated.
14563 <indexterm><primary>Rose, Mark
</primary></indexterm>
14565 I received guidance in various places from friends and academics,
14566 including Glenn Brown, Peter DiCola, Jennifer Mnookin, Richard Posner,
14567 Mark Rose, and Kathleen Sullivan. And I received correction and
14568 guidance from many amazing students at Stanford Law School and
14569 Stanford University. They included Andrew B. Coan, John Eden, James
14570 P. Fellers, Christopher Guzelian, Erica Goldberg, Robert Hallman,
14571 Andrew Harris, Matthew Kahn, Brian Link, Ohad Mayblum, Alina Ng, and
14572 Erica Platt. I am particularly grateful to Catherine Crump and Harry
14573 Surden, who helped direct their research, and to Laura Lynch, who
14574 brilliantly managed the army that they assembled, and provided her own
14575 critical eye on much of this.
14578 Yuko Noguchi helped me to understand the laws of Japan as well as
14579 its culture. I am thankful to her, and to the many in Japan who helped
14580 me prepare this book: Joi Ito, Takayuki Matsutani, Naoto Misaki,
14581 Michihiro Sasaki, Hiromichi Tanaka, Hiroo Yamagata, and Yoshihiro
14582 <!--PAGE BREAK 337-->
14583 Yonezawa. I am thankful as well as to Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama,
14584 and the Tokyo University Business Law Center, for giving me the
14585 chance to spend time in Japan, and to Tadashi Shiraishi and Kiyokazu
14586 Yamagami for their generous help while I was there.
14589 These are the traditional sorts of help that academics regularly draw
14590 upon. But in addition to them, the Internet has made it possible to
14591 receive advice and correction from many whom I have never even
14592 met. Among those who have responded with extremely helpful advice to
14593 requests on my blog about the book are Dr. Mohammad Al-Ubaydli, David
14594 Gerstein, and Peter DiMauro, as well as a long list of those who had
14595 specific ideas about ways to develop my argument. They included
14596 Richard Bondi, Steven Cherry, David Coe, Nik Cubrilovic, Bob Devine,
14597 Charles Eicher, Thomas Guida, Elihu M. Gerson, Jeremy Hunsinger,
14598 Vaughn Iverson, John Karabaic, Jeff Keltner, James Lindenschmidt,
14599 K. L. Mann, Mark Manning, Nora McCauley, Jeffrey McHugh, Evan
14600 McMullen, Fred Norton, John Pormann, Pedro A. D. Rezende, Shabbir
14601 Safdar, Saul Schleimer, Clay Shirky, Adam Shostack, Kragen Sitaker,
14602 Chris Smith, Bruce Steinberg, Andrzej Jan Taramina, Sean Walsh, Matt
14603 Wasserman, Miljenko Williams, "Wink," Roger Wood, "Ximmbo da Jazz,"
14604 and Richard Yanco. (I apologize if I have missed anyone; with
14605 computers come glitches, and a crash of my e-mail system meant I lost
14606 a bunch of great replies.)
14609 Richard Stallman and Michael Carroll each read the whole book in
14610 draft, and each provided extremely helpful correction and advice.
14611 Michael helped me to see more clearly the significance of the
14612 regulation of derivitive works. And Richard corrected an
14613 embarrassingly large number of errors. While my work is in part
14614 inspired by Stallman's, he does not agree with me in important places
14615 throughout this book.
14618 Finally, and forever, I am thankful to Bettina, who has always
14619 insisted that there would be unending happiness away from these
14620 battles, and who has always been right. This slow learner is, as ever,
14621 grateful for her perpetual patience and love.
14623 <!--PAGE BREAK 338-->